Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge in Gersonides*

DETERMINISM, CONTINGENCY, FREE CHOICE, AND FOREKNOWLEDGE IN GERSONIDES*

One of the most important features of Gersonides’ thought is his close attention to method. Rather than pontiﬁcating, Gersonides grounds his opinions on investigative methods (of which the most important is the dialectic method) and retraces with his readers the stages of his inquiry. He applies these methods in order to arrive at the “truth” with regard to philosophical and philosophical-theological issues about which past thinkers had not achieved a consensus. In his writings it is almost impossible to distinguish the “path to truth” from “the truth” discovered at the end of the path. In fact, it is the “path to truth” that largely determines the nature and formulation of the solution he reaches. Here we will look at Gersonides’ treatment of the complex of problems posed by determinism, contingency, free choice, and foreknowledge in two of his works: the supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia, completed in 1324, and books II and III of his theological and philosophical magnum opus, the Wars of the Lord, which were written in 1324–1325.1 The emphasis will be on the methods of inquiry he employs and the stepwise logical structure of the discussion. Our scrutiny of his methods of inquiry and the stages of the discussion will achieve three ends: (1) It will illuminate the structural principles of the Wars of the Lord, which in books I–IV corresponds (as I will demonstrate) to the logical progression of his treatment of the set of problems we are addressing here. (2) It will help us understand and evaluate Gersonides’ stand on the issues of determinism, free choice, and foreknowledge. In particular it will cast light on his discussion of the problem of God’s knowledge, locate it in his thought, and evaluate his solution to it. (3) It will uncover the new departure represented

* This chapter is a revised version of an article published in Daat 22 (1986). Some of the changes derive from Prof. Seymour Feldman’s observations on the Hebrew article, which he conveyed to me in 1994. I would like thank him for those comments. 1 For the dating of Gersonides’ works see Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide ( Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1973), pp. 49–75. 222 determinism, contingency, free choice by Gersonides’ treatment of these problems and his contribution to medieval Jewish philosophy. Medieval Jewish philosophers before Gersonides addressed several of the issues addressed here—notably the problem of free choice. They advanced three key arguments in support of the view that free choice exists:

1. An argument based on personal experience: Our own experience provides evidence that we have a faculty of discretion and that this discretion is the cause of our action. From this it follows that human beings have free choice. This argument is advanced by Saadia (Book of Beliefs and Opinions IV.4), Judah Halevi (Kuzari V.20) and Maimonides (Eight Chapters 8). 2. A theological argument: If everything is necessary, there is no place for commandments or for reward and punishment. Inasmuch as human beings were given commandments and were promised reward and punishment we must assume that free choice exists. Another variety of the theological argument relies on the postulate that God is a just God. Only if there is free choice can we say that God who requites human beings according to their deeds is indeed just. This argument is advanced by Saadia (Beliefs and Opinions IV.4), Baya Ibn Paquda (Duties of the Heart III.8), Abraham Ibn Daud (Book of the Exalted Faith),2 and Maimonides (Eight Chapters 8). 3. A philosophical argument: Aristotle had refuted the doctrine of determinism. Before Gersonides, this argument is found only in Maimo- nides, who evidently draws on the Nicomachean Ethics or on another Aristotelian source: “You, however, should know that our Law and Greek philosophy agree that all of man’s actions are in his power, as has been veriﬁed by true proofs” (ibid.).3

2 Abraham Ibn Daud, Sefer ha-Emunah ha-ramah [cited below as Exalted Faith, ﬁrst from the Hebrew edition by S. Weil ( Frankfurt a.M., 1852) and then from the English translation: Abraham Ibn Daud, The Exalted Faith, trans. Norbert M. Samuelson, ed. Gershom Weiss ( Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986)], p. 96 / p. 248. I have silently modiﬁed Samuelson’s English on occasion. 3 Raymond L. Weiss, Maimonides’ Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 84. See A. Altmann, “The Religion of the Thinkers: Free Will and Predesti- nation in Saadia, Bahya, and Maimonides,” Religion in a Religious Age, ed. S. D. Goitein (Cambridge, MA: Association for Jewish Studies, 1974), p. 37.