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A PEC L AR s c s s s . _ U I intere t atta he to Ha dai Cresca He s wam again st the current of the philo sophical expos ition

his was O s s of day . He bold enough to ppo e the peculative

s s e rea oning of Ari totl , the man who held nearly all the

s s his so c s philo opher in grip during many enturie ; and ,

s above all , he dared to criticize the introduction ofAri totelian

e s s s vi w into the religiou philo ophy of his own people , even though these views were dre ssed in Jewi sh garb by the ma ster hand of Maimonide s . The current passed him by ; it could not overwhelm him .

In the following page s D r. Meyer Waxman has given ’ us a detailed and a very interesting exposition of Cre sca s s philosophic system and he has added to thi s a comparison ’ sc s s s t t d t of Cre a view , no only with hose of Maimoni es , bu

s s S us al o with tho e of pinoza . We have thus lined up for the three greatest mind s that speculative Jewi sh theology pro duced during the Middle Ages ; and the means are afforded us to estimate the value of their dip into the

Unknown .

RICHARD GOTTH EIL .

M c 2 1 1 ar /z . 4, 9 9

TO MY W IFE

R SA AH V . WAXMAN PRE F ATORY NOTE

T H E s o bulk of thi study f rming the body of the book ,

' s c s in eze' zs/z chapter i to vii in lu ive , appeared originally the y

fle rl Re vie w S s III . s y , New eries , Volume V , Nos 3 , 4 ,

X 1 Nos . 1 . I . 2 2 , Nos , , X , , , 3 To the editor and publishers of the Quarterly my thanks are due for their kindness in granting me the permission

s to reprint the article in book form . The introductory

s - chapter , dealing with the view held by the pre Maimonidean

o s s sc ss I was phil opher on the problems di u ed in Part , added for the purpo se of s upplying the reader with the necessary

s s was hi torical background . For the ame reason it deemed advi sable to include in the i ntroductory chapter a short ’ s s s s account of Ari totle theology , ina much as it form the centre around which Jewish philosophic theology revolves .

EW K N YOR ,

[ Ware/z 2 1 1 20 . , 9 B I O G RA PH I CAL N OTE

Chasdai s Hasdai (or ) Crescas, the ubject of this study ,

S the I 0 . H is was born in Barcelona , pain , in year 34 family was one of the noblest and wealthiest among the Catalonian

s s u c s Jew , and pplied many a leader in ommunal affair as

as s s S . s well in cholar hip to panish Jewry Hasdai , de pite his c great Talmudic scholarship , never occupied any offi ial

Rabbinical position ; his wealth made him completely independent . Yet the fact that he was a layman did not

s H is a s dimini h his pre stige . f me pread far and wide

a his was throughout the diaspor , and word law to many

Jewish communities . Even the gentile world thought

h s s hig ly of him , for he tood in ome degree of relationship

a I s to the court of J mes of Aragon , and was often con ulted

s s a on matter of t te . ’ sc s s was n o t its Cre a life , however , all bright , but had

s a s s s . c dark hadow well As the result of a con pira y,

Cre s cas was accused before the court and was thrown into

s w pri on , together ith some of the notables of Catalonian

O f his s Jewry , among whom were some friends and al o his teacher . After a long term of imprisonment he was

s . s 1 1 w eventually relea ed on bail The per ecution of 3 9 , hich

S a n s swept through p i like a tornado , leaving behind de ola

s O f s s tion and ruin in mo t the Jewi h communitie , failed not

s s its s In s to include Cre ca among victim . the mas acre of

Barcelona his only so n was killed . Thereupon he removed

S ss his to arag o a , where the rest of life was spent in philo

s 1 1 0 . sophic tudy . He died in 4

1 X ’ Or Adouaz Besides his work , treati se against Christianity in which the fundamental

s doctrines of the church are analy ed . The latter

S n written in panish and later translated i to Hebrew . The

’ was w 07 Adozzaz originally written in Hebre . TAB L E O F CO NTE NTS

P REFATORY NOTE B I OGRAPHIC AL NOT E

INTR R ODU C TO RY CH APTE .

I a a ce s cs w s h s . . Gener l Ch ra t ri ti of Je i h P ilo ophy II A a c os . r bi Phil ophy

H s o ca S v am e of the b m s III . i t ri l ur ey of the Tre t nt Pro le re lative to the Existe nce of GodandH is Attributes in Pre - M aim on idian J e wish Philosophy

IV The A s e . Theology of ri totl

R I G D PA T . O

’ NOTE ON C RESCAS S PHILOSO PHICAL POSIT IO N

C H APTER I ’ C RESCAS S EXPOSITI ON O F TH E M AIM ON ID IAN TH EORI ES AN D T H EI R C RITI C I S M m The M aim on idian Ari stotelian Proposition

o a c s s s t Log ic l Con sequen e of the Propo ition a h h / T e Proofs of t e Propositio ns C ’ as s R f 1 i n A m A Cre sc e futatio n o the A stotelia rg u ents .

M The Re futation of the Proofs o f M aimonid e s .

C H APTER II ’ CRESCAS S TREAT M ENT O F T H E P ROBLE M S RELATI NG TO TH E EXI ST EN C E O F GOD AN D H IS ATTRI BU TES ’ R a 1 scas s fs the Ex s ce . . Cre Proo of i ten of God el tion to Sp inoza

2 Ess ce Ex s ce . . en and i ten ’ A e s an dU S as V w S c 3 . ttribut nity pinoz ie on the ubje t com pare dwith that of Cre scas

x i xii

R II G D AN TH PA T . O D E WO RLD C H APTER III PAGE RO B E S o r O N SC ENC E RO EN C E AND P L M M I I , P VID , F REEDO M O F T H E WILL IN PRE- M AIM ON ID IAN J EWI SH PHILOSO PH Y

C H APTER IV ’ ’ M AI M ON IDES VI EW AN D C RESC AS S CO M M ENTS ON IT ’ 1 M am o e s e am e o f e m . i nid Tr t nt the Probl s of Pre

sc c o ce an d m ien e , Pr viden , Freedo ’ s as o n sc ce — S o as c m 2 . Cre c Pre ien pin z View o pared

C H APTER V

RO ENC E OT ENC E AN D R EE W P VID , P , F ILL

o e c . Pr vid n e Pote nce — Sp in oz ao n Potence W l n W s a n e Il S oz a o e i . e c s o e . 3 . Cr Fr pin Fre ll Views compare d

C H APTER VI

’ C RESC As s T ELEOLO G Y AN D ET H I CS Spinoz ao n Te leol og y

C H APTER VII

D IVI N E WILL AN D C REAT I ON ’ ’ s s o ce o — z a5 R mak Cre sca C n pti n Spino e r s .

B I BLI OG RAP H Y

IN DE X TH E PH I LOSO PH Y O F D O N H ASDAI CRESCAS

INTRO D UCTO RY CHAPTER

I ENERAL ARACTER STICS OF EW S . G CH I J I H

PHI LOSOPHY .

J EWI SH philosophy owe s its birth to two great factors that stimulated thought and intellectual pursuits in the early mediaeval world in general , but more particularly c in the Arabic world of whi h the Jews formed a part . These two factors were (I ) the nece ssity arising among 1 theologians to defend their doctrines of faith from heresies

s which had their origin in the writing of the ancients , portion s of which were newly brought to ligh t and widely circulated during that period : (2) the ri se of learning at

s h as the dawn of the Middle Age , whic came a reaction against the ignorance that reigned in the preceding period known as the D ark Ages .

c o s t he Of these two fa t r , latter preceded in point of

was far the It is time , but the former by more important .

f h s s a rather di ficult task , owever , to draw hard and fa t line a and fix the priority of one f ctor over another , for they c very often overlapped . The sear h for weapons of defence

1 ' ' f k dr P / C . Stoc l e r Geschzchte e hi 050 51 1 1 ? des M zttcl alters 8 , 1 , p . .

W . B 2 T H E PHI LOSO PHY O F D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

ne w s gave impetus to the study of ancient writing . This ,

in turn, brought to light a multitude of new problems ,

which again opened up new fields for speculation . The

s apologetic tendency, however (though it never di appeared f s s rom mediaeval peculation), changed its form omewhat and expressed itself in a desire to rationalize religion— to f s ound the principles of belief on a peculative basis . The

ut int e l li am is famous maxim of Anselm , Credo g the formal 2 s s . s was as s expres ion of that triving The purpo e not , ome

s think , to determine the nature of reason , and thu limit the

s t c se t field of philo ophy , but , on he ontrary , to before 3 S s s is the theologian a peculative end . Thi de ire manifest

s c throughout mediaeval philo ophi speculation , wherever it m E s ade its appearance , whether in the a t or the West ,

s so in s s and e pecially Jewish philo ophy , where it as umed

n e the leading motive , the apologetic te d ncy being relegated t o the background .

The character of Jewi sh philosophy is thus already determined by the conditions of its birth as well as by the

s I general trend of thought characteri tic of that era . t

s retains conspicuou sly all the peculiaritie of the age . It is

o receptive in content as well as in form . Auth rity pre dominates ; personality and individual opinion fall to the

s background before a general ab tract tone . The barmo n istic or synthetic tendency to reconcile the conflicting

s O pinions of variou s authoritie holds a prominent place .

is . Above all , it theological and metaphysical

s i s s As a re ult of t character, the problem with which

Jewi sh philosophy concerns itself are limited . God occupies the central place around which the di scussion turn s . His

' ' 2 2 B ae umke r in A Ilg eme zn e Geschzchte der p . 97. 3 Ibzd . I NTROD UCTO RY C HAPTER 3

e xistence , the proofs of His essence , unity, and attributes are extensively discussed and commented upon . Next in

r importance to God is man , but this wo thy object of

n r thought is o ly viewed elatively, in the light of his relation S to the upreme Being . This situation gives rise to a discuss ion of human actions and involves the question of free will and determinism , Providence , and the problem

n of immortality . The latter includes the definitio of the

s nature and e sence of the soul , and presupposes a study of psychology in so far as it affects the nature and the

s position of the soul in the hierarchy of piritual beings , and its participation in the activity of the intelligibles .

A deeper insight into consciousness was unknown in that age . Logic occupied a worthy place as an instrumental means by which proofs were established and theories c tested . The theory of knowledge was of little onsequence in those days everything was revelation . Man was created

for the purpose of knowing . On the other hand , certain m e ta h sico- s p y phy ical problems , such as time and space attracted great attention . Thei r importance lay in the fact that they were involved in the discu ssion of the proofs o f the existence of God as well as in the question , all

’ ' '

creatzo ex m kzl o. important for theological purposes, of

Inas much as in the treatment of these problem s Jewish thinkers were greatly influenced by Arabic philosophy, and borrowed most of their material from it (in fact,

Jewish philosophy can be said to be a child of the latter), a short survey of Arabic philosophy will help to make

s clear the degree of relation hip between them and , at t he same time , bring out the exact character of Jewish p hilosophy . 4 TH E P HI LOSOP HY O F D ON HASDAI C RESCAS

II . R C LOSOP A ABI PHI HY .

Arabic philosophy owes its birth to a combination of circum stances which made possible the continuation of

Greek speculation in a modified form in the East after 4 its e As exil from the West . Greek was hardly intelligible

E s at this period in that part of the a t , translations into a S . yriac , the vernacular , became necessity When the

s Arab later conquered the country , learning received a

s s s s fresh impetus . New erie of tran lation were undertaken

S c as as from yria into Arabic , well from Greek into 5 s Arabic . The works translated were of a curiou blend ’ and included portions of Plato s D ialogues (especially

6 ’ s s s Timaeus), many of Ari totle genuine work and many

s - s s A hro P eudo Ari totelian , Commentarie of Alexander of p ’ disias The mistius s Is c , of , Porphyry agoge , a few ex erpts

- s s from the pre Platonic philo ophers , mo tly of a pseudo

s S C . haracter, and , finally , ome of the toic works The

C haracter of the work s tran slated became an importa nt

c s T factor in the development of Arabi philo ophy . he wh o le field of thi s philosophy was permeated with the ’ - s s s s spirit of Neo Platoni m , and even Ari totle work were

c s f s e s s . s viewed thro ugh the am glas e Be au e of thi actor, the strain of Neo - Platonis m was never removed from

c s s Arabi philo ophy , and that , too , in its most Ari totelian

A s s s period . a re ult of thi , the centre of gravity in philo sophic di scussion shifted from purely Ari stotelian problem s to tho se which occupy an important place in the Neo

as S - s &c Platonic school such the NOU , the world oul ,

4 m f us tin ian 2 A . D . In the ti e o J , 5 9 5 — lam 1 1 . H hilo h in Is . D e B o e r is tory of P s op y , pp 5 7 , 6 2 an dn ote 1 . te in C G P/z . . S . . p 3 3 , , 3

6 TH E P HI LOSO PHY O F D ON HASDAI CRESCAS

S r its exponents in the ociety of the Brothe s , who flourished in the Tenth Century and left behind a cyclopedia in

s t d d . t t which heir i eas are preserve Thi line of hough , as

n s s s its origi te tifie , is my tical in character . The theo ry

of emanation , the development of the soul through lower

urifica forms into the human , its return to its source after p

tion by means of the knowledge of truth , are some of its 9 teachings .

e o The third t ndency in Arabic philosophy , the Arist

I c - . ts Al telian , is the most important hief exponents , Kindi

Al - Ib n S Ib n Roshd Farabi , ina and

- m have attained renown . However, even here , Neo Platonis

is not bani shed ; Al - Farabi still teaches it ; the NOUS

— - — - wornrm é g another name for the world soul is all im

portant . Another doctrine of great value was the Averroistic

‘ unitas inte ll e ctus which taught that there is no individual c intellect but rather a universal one , the a tive reason , and

it is individual only in so far as any one personal mind

participates in the general . The question of the eternity of the world was another difli cult and keenly perplexing

problem which Averroes was finally compelled to admit 1 0 s s . and as a re ult , to limit creation to the form

Al l s of these movement , currents , and undercurrents thought agitating the Arabicworld have their counterpart

s w s in Jewish philo ophy, hich may al o be divided into three

Similar periods in which the above- mentioned tendencies a al i Viz . M utak l im n prevailed , ( ) the , of which many Karaite writers and principally the Rabbinist Saadia (940)are the

b - s Ib n Gab irol exponents ( )the Neo Platonic , repre ented by

and c partly by Bahya ; and ( ) the Aristotelian , whose

9 ’ l dz ihe r in l hil o G o A l e eine G z h e der P os h es . g m esch c t p i , p . 53 ‘0 i - Goldz he r 8 . , 5 64 INTROD UCTO RY C HAPTER 7

r Ib n D spokesmen are Ab aham aud , Maimonides , and

r r Ge rso nide s . Crescas stands apa t f om all these and r r r Al - esembles mo e closely the Arabic philosophe Gazali ,

’ ' his D estructzo P izzl oso fzorum who, in book p , likewise attacked the philosophic doctrines of his age and attempted to show

are b e their fallibility . These divisions , however, to regarded as rough landmarks rathe r than as fixed boun

rie da s . Jewish philosophy is not entirely a shadow of

It can Arabic philosophy . lay claim to individuality and I initiative . ts exponents never followed blindly any one

r s Arabic school , but ather cho e various theories from each

s r . school , e pecially those that stood a igid test of criticism

STORICAL S R E F TH E REAT M ENT O F TH E III. HI U V Y O T P ROBLEM S RELAT IV E To T H E EXISTENC E O F GOD AND H IS ATTRIBU TES B Y TH E CH IEF J EWISH

PHI LO SO PH ERS.

S 8 R aadia ( 92 the first abbinic philosopher, followed the indirect method of the M utakallimin in his philosophic

s . proofs of the exi tence of God To them , the question of

' ' ' creatzo ex m lzzl o an - was all important one , and to it they devoted all their energies . The exi stence of God was

s d a necessary corollary to this que tion for, grante that the c s . world is created , the existen e of a creator must be po ited

M utakallimi n Saadia , however , followed the more in method

his than in content . Of eight proofs only a few agree with those of the M utakallimin as quoted by Maimonides . The proofs for the existence of God are arranged by Saadia in the following order

- a I. fi nite s The world is fact , demon trated according to the knowledge of his times . This is also one of the 8 T H E P HILO SOP HY O F D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

e . fundam ntal principles of Aristotle Again, a finite body must neces sarily possess a finite moving power (this is ’ likewise one of Aristotle s propositions and was used repeatedly in his proofs of the existence of God). Like

s every finite thing , the world , therefore, mu t have a beginning , a f and hence w s created . The corollary O the exi stence

is t s . of a creator more implied han expres ed The proof,

is s c n however , not ab olutely o vincing for , one may argue ,

has granted that the world a beginning, it still may not have a creator . It may have arisen by Chance . Saadia

C himself argues later against the theory of hance .

I - s I . The world matter is compo ite and , as every

is s s composed thing , it po sible of exi tence ; for the elements p er se have no natural tendency to stay apart or to be

u . If s s s nited uch a tendency exi ted , either the element would stay apart for ever or would never decompose . The

is so It case , however , not . follows , therefore , that there must be some external source affecting their composition ;

as s s c s is ss e and cau e follow au e , there of nece ity som final creator . Thi s la s t agrees with the third proof u sed by the M utakal limi n as qu o ted by Maimonides (Guide of tire ’ P e r lex ed I It is s s s p , , al o imilar to the co mological

b y s ff proof formulated Leibnitz , although omewhat di erently expressed .

III s c . We ob erve in the world of things that a cidents c are continually generated and de stroyed . But ac idents

e s s a are inseparably inher nt in ub t nce ; it, therefore , follows that if accident s have a beginning matte r mu st have as

s a . s s well , and hence mu t have a cre tor Thi proof agree entirely with the fourth of the M utakil limi n cited by

s is c Cal amitic Maimonide , and directly conne ted with the theory of matter which assumes 1 1 that the atom becomes

s s is matter only through its accident . But thi untenable according to the Aristotelian notion of primal matter , which is said to be a substance devoid of accidents and is known as ether .

IV . s . Time mu t be finite For, assuming that time is

as infinite and , is usual , is conveniently divided into past ,

u no w present, and fut re , the present which has no magni tude may , for the sake of argument , be taken as a starting point . If we then try in our imagination to reach upward

i s from that po nt , the human reason is unable to gra p the

s fact that time is infinite . This being the ca e , how could

us s ? existence ever reach , since an infinity never end We ,

is . It o t t however, do exist f llows , herefore, tha time

finite ; and accordingly the world which is in time had

is lam it a beginning and a creator . Thi s proof Ca ic in form , especially the emphasis laid upon unthinkability of

— s the infinite with a View to its unreality . Ari totle produces — a similar argument as regards the infi n ite The dictum that whatever is unthinkable is al so non - exi stent was a fundamental principle with this school . The proof itself,

s hiIO SO hic is however , urvived long in p p literature , and

s repeated by Kant in his thesis of the fir t antinomy , where almost the exact argument is reproduced with the omission of the part played by unthinkability . Saadia brings forth three more proofs of a direct

: 1 s It character ( ) Things could not create them elves . is evident that the state of being is more perfect than that

se e of becoming . But we that if in the state of being a thing happens to be imperfect it can not become more

1 1 Se e ab o e se ction 2 v , . I O TH E PHILO SO PHY O F D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

s an perfect by its own mean , but needs the help of external 1 2 agent ; how then could it become at all by itself ? A

2 similar argument is quoted by Albertus Magnus . ( ) It is impossible for things to create them selves on accoun t of

is the peculiar nature of time . Time only conventionally divided into three pa rts ; while in reality there are only

s two for, the present has no duration . The que tion there upon ari ses when could things create themselves ? In the time previous to their origin they were not in existence ; then how could a non - existing thing create itself ? And to say that they created themselves after their coming into c exi stence is highly absurd . To speak of their reating themselves at the particular moment of coming into e x is

is ss tence meaningle , for that moment of time cannot be ‘ ’ i s olated since it is a now and therefore has no duration . (3 ) If we endow things with the ability to create them s s c elves , we must al o oncede them the power of not entering

s fo r s s . into exi tence , otherwise things would alway exi t

s s We po it then two contrarie at one and the same time .

In s s order to fortify him elf again t every form of attack ,

Saadia reprod uce s the famous Aristotelian proposition which demonstrates the impossibility of an infinite cau sal 1 3 s . s eries He employs it , however , to di prove the eternity of matter and not to prove that there is a final moving

as s s . t t cause , the philosopher do By his he wi hes o imply

that material causes could not go on infinitely but must

have had a b e ginning .

After the proofs for the existence of God had been

‘2 ’ F rs r i i e e us d It i ru hat u t s in te p re tat o n of th s pass ag has b e n e . s t e t

t he assa e e n d i s in r tatio ut fo r hi oso hica p g l s t e lf to amore strict te p re n , b p l p l

ce rn e o f thou ht m adisab e l a ss g afull in te rp re tatio n se e s mo re v l . 1 3 M eta h szcs a2 p y , . there is only one God . He brings forward the following argument s : (1 ) Since it was proved that God is the cause of all being , it follows that he is incorporeal ; for every

s s form of being is compo ite , and a compo ite thing cannot

s be an ultimate cause , ince it needs some other external cause to effect its composition . Were there more gods than one , the conception of God would fall under the

is category of number , and whatever in the category of

It is number is corporeal . evident, therefore, that God 1 4 . 2 n is one ( ) There can ot be two gods ; for , if there were

s r two , we mu t assume that in the act of c eation they

In cannot act independently but need mutual help . such case they are determined and one is the cause of the other— an assumption directly in contradiction to the con ce tion p of God as the sole ultimate cause . On the other hand , should we assume their absolute independence , the act of creation is hardly conceivable ; for a conflict would ” s s of neces ity ensue . The trength of this proof is best comprehended on comparing it with the fifth proof of the 1 6 M utakal limin as quoted by Maimonides , where the reason ing is improved in logical strength by the s upply of a link in

‘ c viz If ss the hain of argument , . , on a uming that the two

ds s s go are independent , we mu t al o assume that each one is potent enough to create the world , then the other is entirely ’ is . is superfluous (3) The third proof very logical , and the strongest . How shall we conceive these two gods ?

Are they exactly alike in sub stance without the least

? If . difference so , they are one and not two Wherefore ,

1 ‘ u m A i t Cf Maimo n ide s Guide Pro ositio n 1 6 ote d ro r sto e . . , . p q f l

“5 f n h e n d h ti ca suh ro ra C a t r a t e ob e c on f C re to c o . C . i o s s f , p I , j p f 1 ° ' P h D K b n le r aum n n A ttn ute b e. G. . . C f a C . . , 75 . f , T H E PHILO SO PHY O F D O N HASDAI C R ESCAS

s e we must a sume that they are diff rent , but not entirely different ; they mu st be similar at leas t in as far as both are E a gods . ach one of them will ccordingly have points of

e c s O f as s diff ren e and point similarity , and will , a re ult , — c s a c t o be ompo ite fact ontrary the conception of God .

The fact that to Saadia the creation o f the world is an

- all important principle affe cted his theory of attributes .

s He derive them solely from t he concept creator. They

“

s . are very few in number, living , potent , and wi e Willing is fo r is s e left out , it not trictly inher nt in the concept cre ator . It implies the notion o f striving t o an end and so 1 7 c ss s s ne e arily involves a limitation . Be ide , potent really

1 8 includes willing . These attributes do not imply any change in his e ssence they denote really one thing. The , attributes are n o t separated from his b e ing but exist

his In s through being . God , exi tence and essence are

is s . one . God beyond any categorie , even that of quality

s sc s The emotional qualitie often a ribed to Him , uch as

o are t o s l ving or hating , be under tood in a rather figurative

s s way . God commanded certain precept and tho e who

s t o o n follow them are aid be loved , the contrary those 1 9 who di sobey them are des cribed as being hated . When

s e s e s p aking of God a being an ag nt , we mu t conceive it in

f r a dif e rent sens e than the agency of man , for cont ary to ?l o m an He is not moved while acting and is always active

The m any adjectives of God which are often mentioned in

e w o the Bibl , hether em tional or active , are all relative ,

describing H is relation in reference to H is creatures .

1 7 n o z A e n dix to 1 Ethics . C f. Spi a. pp v . , ‘3 tr buten l el z re 2 N . . Kaufman n A t i p . 7 54 , , , 1 9 al /1 e d K ito we r us o 1 88 . o a. Em zm oflz ve D e . p s , , J eff, 5, 2° ‘ b d 1 a. I r p . 5

I 4 TH E PHILO SO PHY O F D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

are original . He adduces seven proofs of which the third ,

s c fourth , and seventh agree with the e ond , third , and fourth

: of Saadia . The others are stated in the following manner

I In s n ( ) observing the world of thing , we notice an ascendi g scale of causes . Their number is always less than that 23 s s in of the thing cau ed , and the higher we ascend the

s It scale of being , the fewer the cau es become. follows ,

s then , that on reaching the top of the ladder, there mu t be only one cau se . (2) D e sign testifies not only to a creator

s is so s but al o to one , for the world beautifully harmoniou that we must involuntarily conclude that it is the plan O f

e s o ne creator . (3) One is the fundam ntal basi of number i and measure . Before there s plurality there must be

s a s It unity, for plural mean only so m ny time one . is evident , therefore , that there must be only one ultimate

a is cause , for if we gree that there more than one creator ,

c ss there must by ne e ity be one preceding , and then he is

s ac is b . su the God (4) Plurality mu t have cidents , for it s c e s is umed under the at gory of quantity , and thi contrary to the conception of God . This last proof is analogous to ’ adi s s o s a Sa a . fir t pr of, but expre sed in different form

In e s a the theory of attribut , B hya diverges greatly from

Saadia in naming such attribut e s as are entirely omitted f by the former . The dif erence ari se s through the variance

s a of the method of derivation . Bahya divide the ttributes

s e s ss a a s s s e c . S into two cla , ential and a tive a di also u e the

a s s s same n mes indirectly for variou clas es of attribute , but the name e ssential has a different meaning with Saadia .

’ S s ub s ecie e reatiom s s aadia viewed the attributes p , ince they

o c . are all derived from the noti n reator Bahya , on the

e the e n ra ar e s than the s e cie s the cate ori e s e ss than the . g . g e e l s p , g l

e n e r g a. I NTRO D UCTO RY C HAPTER 1 5

w e s ecie s eculationis other hand , views them p p , and they are , therefore, according to him , existent , one , and eternal , such as have bee n proven to belong to God by philosophical demonstration . That these attributes are sublime, pure ,

s and ab tract in character , and approach the highest philo

SO hiC - m p conception of God , is self evident . The ter essen

b which s s tial , y Bahya de cribes the foregoing attribute , ‘

. signifies that thes e attributes are to be predicated of God independently of the fact that he is creator of the ‘ the world . These attributes , though in relation to God are

s as is named e sential , yet , as far the human mind con cerned , express only a negative meaning . The second

s t O clas , the active , describe the relations of God the world and men through actions . They are of course figurative in

24 s s . sense , and re orted to only by force of neces ity Je hudaHalevi (1 1 40) is more of an ethical philosopher a s . H is a ri is s than a metaphy ical one book , the , o religiously inspired that it can hardly be expected of its author to endeavour to prove the existence of God , when

s - such a thing is elf evident . The fact that all humanity

s s is f s believe in the exi tence of God s u ficient for him . Thi kind of proof is indire ctly inferred from the whole tenor of

his the book, and especially from the fact that in arguments about the truth of the Jewi sh tradition he lays great 25 emphasi s upon the consensus omn im n He makes also occasional and indirect m e ntion of the argument from

26 design .

H is r theory of att ibutes, however, is quite interesting

24 ’ Passag e s use di n e x positio n o f B ahyas doctrin e are foun din H obot ha-Lebbabol e dW Il n aTractat I 6 6 - 2 , . , , pp . 9 . 95 f a x n i e The same p roo w s e te s ve ly us damon g the Christian Philosophe rs . 9“ K az ari e d saacM e tz II . 2 , . I , , p 7. 1 6 TH E P HILO SO PHY O F D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

for its method of divi sion . Halevi divides the attributes

s : into three kind active , relative, and negative . The active ’ r s s c are de ived through the de cription of God a tions , and include the emotional . The relative are such that m e n

s w as s & C . be to upon Him , prai ed , holy , sublime , They

s are , therefore , entirely ubjective , and are related to the

s . human tate of mind The most important attributes ,

s the e sential as Bahya would call them , are the negative .

s They are living, one , and fir t and last . These connote

s In nothing el e but the denial of the opposite . reality , we

hardly conceive the kind of life we attribute to God , and

sure l ab so l ute l m c it is y different fro our onception of life , y. but we expre ss it in the positive form in ord e r to ward o ff

a a is the popul r conception th t he who not alive is dead . i ’ The same is to be said about the rest . It s to be noticed that although Bahya mentions that his essential attributes

a e s a have negativ meaning , he doe not n me them negative ;

ra his s a and , on the cont ry , naming show th t they really

was s s have positive contents . Halevi the fir t philo opher

a R s who introduced the term neg tive (in abbinic), and u ed

s it in accordan ce with its l o gical meaning . He al o names

e his s s will an attribut , a thing which predeces or avoided

s s his andwhich philosophy always shrank from . He use a defe nce the argument from de sign which shows that not

27 only is there a cre ator but al s o a wilful one .

Abraham Ib n D aud (died the la st of the Jewish

- im o ni ian s s s philosophers of the Pre M a d period , how him elf

s his s a follower of Ari totle , and accordingly argument and proofs are more philosophic in content s as we l l as i n form .

s s s Of the proof for the exi tence of God , he adduce two ,

which are really one under two form s . The first is the

27 ' K uaarz e d saacM e tz . 2 . , . I , II , p 7 I NTRO DUCTO RY C HAPTER 1 7

famous A ristotelian used over and ove r, and even mentioned

S a but r r by a dia and Bahya , neve as yet p oduced in its It w pure p hiIOSOp hic fo rm till Ib n D aud . runs as follo s

e r There is no infinite body , ther is also no infinite powe in

r r a finite body, but the first sphere moves ete nally ; the e

r r . r must , therefo e , be a p ime mover This p ime mover is

fo r s not incorporeal , since it doe not move itself it is in

as time . (The premisses , as well the conclusions , of this

. If is proof will be discussed in full later ) it not in time ,

s is it is infinite ; again , ince it is infinite it not body , for 28 body is finite The second proof is analogous to one

i S s ment oned by aadia , but it is expre sed in better logical

s form , and therefore more convincing . The world of thing presents to us continual possibility . There must be one thing necessary of existence , for the possible of existence

u ' fi requires a ca se , and so we would have an in nite causal

re re ssus . g , but that is impossible Out of the fundamental

Ib n D conception of God being necessary of existence , aud deduces the unity of God . The fact that God is necessary

st t t s t of exi ence implies ha H e is ab olu ely simple, for every

s is s . s s sim compo ite thing pos ible Thi , however , prove icit l . the p y As for numerical unity , he adduces the famous

Saadianic- Bahyan arguments of the impossibility of the

s e exi t nce of two Gods . Unity , according to him , belongs

s . to the es ence of God , and has therefore a negative ring His theory of attributes shows rather a concession to

s popular demand than to philosophy . He enumerate the largest number of attributes ever stated by a Jewish

r s philosophe . There are eight attribute according to him

they are , one , existent , true , eternal , living , knowing, willing, and potent . He could not help but realize that

23 f ith i A C w th s on usi n hat of ri in t h i b k K . x . . c cl o t stotl e M e ap ys cs , oo C

W . C 1 8 TH E PHI LOSO PHY o r D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

r su e rfluitie in there are seve al p s his list . Let us take the i attribute , living ; since we cont nue counting knowing , willing , it is already evident that God is living . But , says

Ib n D his f we aud in de ence , when speaking of attributes , s r hould not leave too much to logical easoning, but rather

is . I n be popular . Truthful an interesting attribute b D aud

s It him is the only one that employ it . is according to c onnected with existent . What do we mean by truth and "9 e Ib n D . rror, except the real and the unreal , says aud

s . God is alway real , therefore he is the source of truth

Yet in spite of the fact that Ib n D aud is not very accurate

his as s in enumeration of the attributes , he is zealou in his interpretation of them as any other philosopher to remove even a probable shad ow of corporeality from God . He ,

s er se therefore , in ists that whatever the attributes express p , 3 0 us to they have only a negative meaning .

F R STOT LE . IV . T H E TH EO LOGY O A I

In order to elucidate the philosophical ground of the

s - theology of the Jewish philosopher , the Pre Maimonidean , as as s s - well Maimonide , and the Po t Maimonidean , includ ’ s w ing Cresca , a brief outline of Aristotle s theological Vie

s s s is necessary . Ari totle prove the exi tence of a first cau se in s everal ways ; though they may be ultimately

M e ta /z sics to f . In reduced one , yet di fer in form the p y ,

Aristotle proves the existence of God in the following

manner : There mu st exist an eternal immovable s ubstance .

It s s s mu t be eternal , for since ubstance is the fir t of existing

s s thing , it mu t be indestructible , in order that things should

s is not all be de tructible . Again , movement eternal , for

29 ‘ a hi e sa Truth an dErro r Ne w Realism . f . W M n i C . P t e n s s . o gu y 3 ° — Eim un aRom alz Ex at e d aith e d Wi na . 1 6 . , l F , . l , p 5 I NTRO DUCTO RY C HAPTER 1 9

time is , and movement is connected with it . That which is causm g movement must be something necessary ofexistence ,

c s for it is constantly active , and if the cause were not ne e sary of existence , movement would not be eternal . The first heaven is eternally moved , but everything which is moved a . n . must have a mover There is, therefore, eternal mover

s Thi mover is unmoved , for a thing that moves and is

is s s s moved only a econdary , never a fir t cause ; and ince there must be a first cau se for there is no infinite causal

3 1 3 2 re re ssus is . In P k s ics g , the first mover immovable the y , the same proof from motion is produced but more emphasis

- im ossi is laid on the non existence of an infinite , and the p b ilit re re ssus y of an infinite causal g . The metaphysical argument that there must be one necessary cau se in this

s world , for all pos ible is only potential , but not constantly

— active , its ground is really the supposition that there c n — annot be any i finite causal series , was very often used by early scholastic philosophers as well as by Pre Maimonidean Jewish philosophers in various modified

s s was form , though the basal propo ition frequently omitted . 3 3 Fra men ts s s Again , in the g , Aristotle prove the exi tence of God by the arrangement of the series of beings in the

world order . We note that there is a variety of beings,

vari is s and that this ety arranged in an a cending scale, there must be then one being who is the highest in that

c s f s as ending series , or , to expre s it dif erently , the la t link in that chain . This proof was also utilized by various Christian 3 4 hiIOSO h r and Jewish p p e s .

s s As regard the attribute of that first cause , or God ,

3 1 M e ta h sics XII C 6 — p y , , . 7.

3 2 - 3 3 Ph sics C . 8 1 0 . F ra m en ts 1 y , VIII , g , 5. 3 ‘ ’ C f. ab o e se ctio n in the e x osition of B ah as ie w s v , III , p y v . C 2 TH E PHILO SO PHY O F D O N HASDAI C RESCAS

s they follow mo tly from the nature of the proofs . God

s is as n s exist , and his existence necessary , has bee hown ,

and not only necessary but eternal . All this follows

directly from the conception of a first mover . Further ,

3 5 is c s is since God ne es ary , He also excellent or good ; for

ss s s the nece ary , without which thing cannot be, is al o good

3 6 i s de fi nition . by t own Life is also an attribute of God , for according to the Ari stotelian conception the highest

is a is activity thought , and the actu lity of thought life, and s ss s s a s ince God posse e the highe t ctivity , it follow that He

ss ss s is b e atific . po e e life . Moreover, that life a one This

c e s s follow s from the same onc ption , ince the best enjoyment that we humans have in life are th o se of mental activities ;

s eo 2250 is s s God , who e activity 7 thought , mu t neces arily be

is s c happy . God al o without any magnitude , for He annot

s s be a finite magnitude , ince He produce motion in infinite 3 7 e s s . time , and no finit body can pos e s an infinite power

a s c Again , He c nnot be of infinite magnitude , in e there are w s e s . s e no uch magnitud He mu t , therefor , be ithout any

s s . is s part and indivi ible There only one first cau e , for

i e s n . there only one h ave Would there be many , there

s a s c would be ever l mover who would be one in prin iple ,

s s s and se veral in number . Thi uppo ition would imply the

o s materiality of the G d , for that which imparts individuality to a member of a speci e s is the matter since the form is one ; but we proved that the first cau se is incorporeal and 3 8 therefore one .

' The foregoing pro ved the exi stence of a God and

a s c H is ende voured to describe , though ab tra tly , nature and

. s s s essence The que tion till remain , and a very important

3 “ M e ta h s i cs XII p y , , 7. 3 7 Ib d XII P h 3 8 Ibi XII C 8 i . ics VIII d. . . , , 7 ; ys , . , ,

TH E P HI LO SO P HY O F DO N HASDAI CRESC AS

liae val s theologians assumed the ame View , among 43 1 1 Thomas Aquinas . They tried to overcome the

culty by positing that the thoughts of God include

findof ideal principles or intelligibles which are realized ‘ s s he world . Thoma Aquinas say , Since God is the se f c s of things the ef e t are contained in Him , and thus it 44 s s >ws that God in knowing Him elf know the world . 44 t thi s Jules Simon rightly objects that S . Thomas

s found s the conception of a cau e with a logical priority ,

as s God , under tood by Aristotle , is only the latter and

c s s a preceding ause . A imilar conclu ion to that of

l his >mas is reached a so by Caird in quoted work . w ever , the whole conception of the realization of ideal

Icip le s is entirely extraneou s to the Aristotelian p hil oso

and it is rather Platonic .

I is s c t evident that u h a theology, no matter how nt ific it might have been , could hardly be accepted by

1 was to whom religion not a mere matter of speculation ,

was of tradition and dogma , to whom God not only I >g ical principle but an active force in li fe . t had to be

ifi e and It d dby them opposed in part . elucidated the

why most of the Pre - Maimonidean Jewish philosophers s so s ted strenuou ly on the creation of the world , and they endeavoured to prove it before the existence of

I ss is . They felt that unle God proved to be an active l tIVC H is is s force , existence valueless for religiou pur

es . It is s s only in Maimonide , who followed Ari totle

i s I ely , that creation loses t force . t also illustrates to rrtain o s degree the opp sition of Cre cas to Maimonides .

l . c 1 p . 00 . ‘ Pate t u ’ o dD e us cog nos ce ndo se ipsum omnia co n oscit ope ra q g ,

WITII Hasdai Crescas , the list of Jewish mediaeval

C s n thinkers , worthy of the name , lo es ; but his importa ce lies rathe r in his own originality than in his chronological

is fe w s position . He among the Jewi h philosophers who a exhibited originality of thought , critical cumen , and logical

s . It sequence , combined with a profound religiou feeling is

s s s ss rather the irony of fate that thi philo opher , who urpa es

s s in depth and power of analysi even Maimonide , should have received rather s light attention at the hand s of the

s s and historians of Jewi h thought . The book articles

dealing with Cresca s are fe w in number . The book by

. Chasdai Crescas is s s M Joel , , , perhap the larg e t and best

its s a s of them ; but , with all merit , it f ils to pre ent a com ’ s It prehen ive view of Crescas s thought . is therefore the hope of the present writer that the attempt in the following

pages to present a systematic treatment of the philos ophical conceptions of Crescas will be welcomed by students of the

s s c hi tory of Jewi h thought in parti ular, and of philosophy in general .

The method adopted in treating the s ubject is the problematic one ; chiefly becau se it is the most elucidating In dealing with a subject of a p hil o sop hico -theological

as s s character such our , and also becau e the work of ’ ‘ ’ Or Adonai s Crescas, , The Light of God , lends it elf to

such treatment , since it is primarily a book on dogmatics ’ 2 6 C RESCAS S PHILO SO P HI C AL PO SITI O N

s s s s and follow the u ual divi ion into dogma . As the main interest of thi s s tudy lies in the philosophic a spect of ’ sc s s Cre a s thinking , only uch problems have been included as o have a philosophic bearing , while all purely the logical

s s . que tion have been excluded For this reason , all detailed

s s c e creatio ex n ihil o r di cus ion onc rning , wherein C escas

s s Ge rson ide s . oppo e with great critical ability , are omitted

Broadly speaking , the study is divided into two parts corre sp onding to the two central ideas around which the problem s a 6 s v iz . group them elves , ( ) God , ( ) God and the world the problems themselves being treated in the various chapters and subdivi sions .

The theses laid d o wn in thi s study are the following

1 s s § . Cre ca hold s a prominent place as a critical examiner of some of the important Ari stotelian conceptions

as s H is is such pace , time , and the infinite . criticism

S s s decidedly modern in pirit , and ome of his anticipation and theories were later fully corroborated by the founders

s s . s s of modern philo ophy and co mology The e anticipation , together with his revolt against Ari stotelianism in an age

- when it was all dominating , prove the high character of his

. his s work Moreover , thought on this subject were not

s s s entirely re tricted to a mall circle of reader of Hebrew ,

s . It but al o found their way to the external world follows ,

s s therefore , that the eeds sown by Cre cas are not only

s s valuable in them elve , but have borne fruit , though how

was s It this accompli hed is not known . is extremely difficult to trace the path over which thought travels .

2 s . The tudy intends to point out the mental proximity between Cre sca s and tha t great Jewish thinker Spinoza . ’ An attempt has be en made to draw a sketch of Crescas s positive philosophy , which has been compared at each step ’ C RESCAS S P HILOSO PHI CAL POSI TI ON 2 7

’ r r o b se w e d with that of Spinoza s system . G eat ca e was in avoiding final decisions in rega rd to the influence of the

r . e r forme upon the latter Unfortunately, the t m influence is often misunderstood to mean either a direct borrowing If or at least a kind of imitation . influence is to be

s interpreted in a broad sense, and is to imply the exi tence

of a number of points of contact, and the supply of a certain motive power or impulse in a definite direction by one

r s system upon anothe , such an influence of Cre cas upon

robabl Spinoza probably exists . The word p y is used

s advi edly , for the evidence at hand only justifies us in

using the term influence with this qualification .

r c A Crescas, howeve , is only an indire t critic of ristotle ’ through his attack on Maimonides proof of the existence

of God and theory of attributes which embody the

Aristotelian principles . Hence it is that in order to ’ elucidate Crescas s contribution to Jewish and general

philosophy we have to turn to Maimonides first .

e s - s Maimonid collected twenty six propo itions , which are

P h sics M e ta h sics found scattered through the y , p y , and

D e Gaela s s s his , and on the e as a ba i he reared philo

s s s s ophical theology . Crescas reproduce the e propo itions

r s r in full , and even quotes at length their p oof which we e

his omitted by Maimonides , and then launches criticism

s not only against Maimonides but against Ari totle himself. It was rather a bold attempt for those times (end of the

rt t d t t st t t fou eenth century) o are o cri icize Ari o le , bu he

s . It n pur ued it with unflinching persistency is ecessary , ’ in order to have a full comprehension of D o n Hasdai s

w s philosophy, to follo him in all the intricate maze of

Aristotelian physics . We will , therefore , quote the pro

positions verbatim .

3 0 CRESC ASS EXPO SIT I O N O F TH E

s s 6 is of four kind , e sential , accidental , forced , and partial . Essential movement means the movement of a body

its ss according to nature and e ence . Accid e ntal pertains to the movement of an accident , such as the movement

c ss of bla kne in a body from one place to another, blacknes s being only an accident . By the partial is meant the move

t n d t ment of a par of a body whe the whole is move , bu c l with referen e to that part, such as the movement of a nai

s is s in a hip , which moved by the movement of the hip as

as . a a whole Partial movement , different from ccidental ,

s s s s s refer to uch thing as are bodies for them elve , but are attached by artificial means to another body . Forced movement includes all kinds of movement which are c unnatural . According to Aristotle , ea h of the elements

s has a natural place whither it tend . A movement in that direction is natural ; thus the natural movement of fire is upwards and of earth downward s ; but a movement in the oppo site direction is unnatural . The movement

s s of a tone upward is contrary to nature , and can be accompli shed only by the force exerted by the thrower .

V II s is s W is . Whatever change divi ible , and hatever not 7 divi s ible does not move and is no body . Aristotle proves thi s by explaining that every C hange is an intermediary 8 s o s te rminus a uo tate between two ppo ites , or between a q

e min us ad ue e n and a t r q ; therefore , a body in the state

c ss s s c of hange must nece arily be divi ible , and in e movement

is is a kind of change , it follows that whatever moved is

s s s . III . divi ible , and al o the conver e V Whatever moves

” 6 a n 1 p hnn mm man: mm m m: me Dev: 3 mvun . 1 n

M ore/z Ph sics . p 5n, , y , VIII , 4

) ’ 7 ' ! m 04 1 6 1 61 1 sl vat Ph sics VI . T1 62 p eraBt ov (Sin ai cwdy ) 61 7 , y , , 4 8 M eta h 1 6 p . 0 9 b . MAIM O NIDIAN TH EO RI ES AND T H EI R C R I T I C I SM 3 1

9 a s ccidentally will ultimately rest of necessity . This is ba ed ’ on Aristotle s conception of the accide ntal which identifie s

s s it with the pos ible . Whatever is possible must of nece sity

E has become actual in infinite time . very possible two

s phases , e . g . possible of existence , it is pos ible for it to

s b s s exi t , and possi le not to exist . Both of the e two pos i b il itie s must be realized in an infinite time , for if not , the thing is either necessarily existing or necessarily non

ss existing. Likewise , the po ible of movement when it does

s s s move will ultimately re t , for the oppo ite must neces arily

IX s be realized . . A body moving another body is it elf 1 0 s moved at the same time . This , however , doe not include such things as move others by being an end to which things

I w s s a s strive . t a on account of thi fact th t Ari totle made

s the unmoved mover the end of exi tence , for otherwise

s s he could not be a fir t cause . The mediaeval philosopher ,

f s . however, had some di ficulty with thi proposition The magnet attracting iron and moving it toward s itself seemed to form an exception to the rule laid down in the proposi 1 1 s s tion . Variou an wers were given but are too absurd to reproduce . X . Whatever pertains to body , either the body

i s . i s s . s s the tay of it , e g accident , or it the tay of the body , ” XI. S as form . ome things that have their stay in the

as c s body are divided when the body is divided , ac ident

S . . s are . ome things that are the stay of the body, e g oul ,

1 3 XII is . E are not divided . very force pertaining to body

9 1 0 Ph s ics V Ibid I y , , 3 . . , VI I , 5 5m m ouumn inane: 1am: ne w mm m 51 : ne w want

" 1 Or Adonai e d a 1 3 k mar/13 . ie n n . b . 1 mm R51 5 m , , V , p 9 1 2 mm 1 : 01 2 m m i ni: ammo i s D up e : mm In' l’DV ni nnwDR ‘ fl l b fl r /i P h s ics I O M o e . y , , II , 5 y , VIII , 1 3 Ibid . ’ 3 2 C RESCAS S EXPOSIT I ON O F TH E

1 4 is fin ite III. s C b . finite , since ody X All kind of hanges

e s are not continuous , xcept patial motion , and of it only the

1 5 i s XI . s circular . V Spatial motion the fir t of movements

1 6 both in nature and in time . XV. Time is an accident of

s motion , and both are so related that they exi t simultane o usl is y. There no movement but in time , and whatever ha e 1 7 s XV I. no mov ment is not in time . Whatever is not

8 s 1 a body doe not fall under the category of number .

II. e is has XV What ver moved a mover, either as an external force o r as an internal tendency which is the cause

1 9 . I is of the movement XV II. Whatever being realized

ass s in p ing from the potential to the actual , the cau e of i a 20 t the realization s extern l by necessity . I could not be

s s inherent in the thing it elf, for in that ca e the thing would

s a I s s s . X X. never be po ible , but lway exi ting Whatever

s fo r it s s is s s has a cau e exi tence pos ible of exi tence .

c s is c ss s c has XX . The onver e , what ne e ary of exi ten e no

a e is s o s is XXI . s . cau e Wh t ver compo ite , the c mpo ition

s ca s c an d ss as it use of exi ten e , therefore po ible , evidenced

I s s a e I . i fro m abov . XX Body compo ed of m tter and form

e c ss and is c s by n e ity , the bearer of some a cident by

III is ss ss . . nece ity XX Whatever po ible , even if the

ss is s po ibility internal , and the thing doe not need any

e c fo r a is s ext rnal for e realiz tion , yet it pos ible that it

21 s I a is a. s hould not exi t . XX V . Whatever is potenti l materi l

‘4 ‘5 Ibid Ph s ics I 8. . y , VII , 1 6 ‘7 Ibid Ibid 1 2 . . , VIII , 7. . , IV ,

1 7 8 i ” F 1 i ‘ N ite ra in whate e r is n o t P30 n 53 1 1 N5 1 1 l xw D 53 , l lly, v

i n ca n o t b e c n c i M e t X I b o d e n um e rat o n o e e d a h I 8 . a y v , p , , - 1 9 n 1 M ore/z m m 1 1 1 51 1 mum: 51 mm 5s nan in NW o 5: 3 , ,

Ph sics I . II , 9 ; y , VII ,

2° h XII 2 eta . . M p , ’ 21 In the t rans lati on o f this p ro positio n I have followe dHasdai C rescas s T H E LO GI CAL CO NSEQU ENCES O F TH E PRO PO SI TIONS.

In basing his proofs of the existence of God and thi

s s theory of attributes , Maimonide does not tart from the firs

s - fi fth propo ition , but on the contrary from the twenty

s is - se co nc This propo ition , which in turn based on the twenty

s s 0 1 which state that a body is compo ite by necessity , and the fifth which defines the nature of motion as the p ro ce s:

s : E c tc of realization , say very omposite body in order become needs a mover . Since all bodies in the p e rce p tib k

s is c ss t o s : world are compo ite , it ne e ary look for their cau e

s s s c o n or movers . Thi series of cau e annot go to infinity

s a has been demonstrated in the third proposition . Again

s IV that in regard to movements , we found in propo ition

s there are four kind , and of these locomotion is the earliest as s s XIV C m om hown in propo ition , and the ircular the

s perfect . The movement of the fi r t s phere is then the

s e cau e of all movement in this world . However , by the sam force of reasoning we are comp e lled to search for the m ove I

i of thi s sphere . We have seen in propo sition XV II tha a body may be moved either by an external cau se or ar

’ ‘ ‘ ‘ int e r re tatio n in 1 2 b whe re he sa s : I ’ ' p n IIN, , y Il NI IN DJ 1 35 I ll:

' ‘ ' “ ‘ ‘ ‘ ' ” NIH NIH?! Ilfi Ws l l W3 ! nan NIHW I m 53 T WIN? mo 53 I IDWPnI 1 5mm nn was ntv nun was 11 3 : am nmwae nw rm 1 m m

' - - h i flwh N n rimm » n wn m M b flwm H wn m sm sw an a h en s » m -mm un u ’ 4 C RESCAS S EXPOSITI O N O F T H E

Ite rnal one . The cause of movement of the first sphe re

s s c s I annot be inherent in it elf, in e by propo ition XXV we

is is now that movement eternal , and thus it infinite ; he moving force of the first Sphere then would have to be

fi te s is ss It as S I I n i . w s , but thi impo ible hown in propo ition hat no infinite b o dy exist s the first Sphere then is a finite

i . as s c ody But uch it cannot have any infinite for e, for was proved in propo sition XII that no finite body can

I s ave an infinite force inherent in it . t follow that the

23 s s s is au e of movement of the fir t phere an external one .

Ve e s a s s have , then , t bli hed the proof of the exi tence of

. It s e s prime mover mu t be the prime , for oth rwi e we h an sa s s all have infinite cau l erie .

The nature and character of the mover can al s o be

s a educed from the ame proposition s . The extern l prime i fo r over cannot be corporeal , then , according to the ninth

»ro osition w n e ce s p , it ould be moved while moving , and aril o as its s y it would require another b dy mover , and thu d III . i n n itum h s is s . fi , but t i impos ible (prop ) Again ,

is o e a is s o e o s ince it incorp r l it al o unm v d , for m vement

ss o c a an d re either e ential to b dies or ac ident l , the prime

Tover not being a body does not move eith e r essentially

c in . s is is s r a cidentally Further , ince it unmoved it al o

Iivisib l e a c ro osition VII and unch ngeable , for, ac ording to p p , w is s b e n is hatever not divi i l does o t move and not a body , c he converse of it being equally true . From the for e of he same conclu s ions follow s al so the unity of the prime

23 51 5m np unh nnwm n anon mnnw 1 1 mm 1 1 1 1 55 man: man» u ” p i5nn imm ne to: 51 51 7 I 573 1 5 The w ord he re m e ans

o n B f r the sa e o f ce arn e ss o f thou ht ot ly e x te rn al b ut in corpo re al . ut o k l g

a h M arch II i the n e x t ara r . we pre fe r to t re at o f the inco rp o re ality n p g p , ,

u 1 b G i e . 6 3 ; d, p . M AIM O NIDIAN T H EORI ES AND T H EI R C RITI C I SM 3 5

i h ro si . o ne w t o mover There is only , for in accordance p p

' XVI a f r tion , whatever is neither body nor a o ce inherent in a body does not fall under the category of number . .We have then established the existence of God , His incor 24 ore alit . p y, indivisibility, immutability , and unity

Maimonides quotes also several other proofs borrowed

’ ' M e ta h s ics It from Aristotle s works , one from the p y . is the one mentioned above . There mu st be an unmoved

fi nd mover, for since we find a moved mover, and we also

s a thing moved and not moving, it follow that there must be an unmoved mover ; as it is proved that when we find

c s on a thing omposed of two element , and then we find e

s element alone , it follow that the other element must also

c s is be found alone . The nature of the first au e deduced

is from the fact that it unmoved , in the same way as 25 In s s above . his third proof, Maimonide follow closely the

s fl a h i e XII c . t h s ics . Ari totelian found in p y , book , vi There

s c c s s must be one ubstan e ne e sary of existence , otherwi e

26 the world of things would be destructible . The third

s is propo ition again utilized , for there cannot be an infinite re r ssus g e of possibles . Since it is necessary of e xi stence

is t through itself it incorporeal , for according to proposi ion

XXI c f is its O a . , the omposition body the cause of existence

s s The re t of the qualities follow nece sarily . Maimonides

s s c quote al o a fourth proof whi h adds nothing new , but repeats the same argument in a different form . Maimonides

24 M oreh I 1 b i 1 1 I . Gude 1 . 6 , , p 3 ; , , p . 25 M arch II 1 a Guide II 1 s , p . ; , pp . . , 4 , 7 q 2° 1 13 : 1 1 1 1 053 nun mam : W‘t’) ‘ll' l N mmm: man: man» aN N5 IJ’NL’) s mart mi fi DDJ R51 mm N5 ans Rm : mmw name mwsnn annn NI?! 53 1 1 55: 1 3 wean nfi WDN re 713 5: N51 min

n M oreh 1 1 1 a mwm w as N5, , , 5 . D 2 ’ 3 6 C RESCAS S EXPOSIT IO N O F T H E

r s p oduces two more proof for the oneness of God . Of

S . these two , one is mentioned by aadia and Bahia Suppose t here were two Gods , there would have to be at least one point of difference betwee n them and some points of s s s imilarity in a far as both are God . This would involve

c in s the existen e of two elements the nature of the God ,

s is and thus they would be composite . The econd proof from the harmony and uniformity of the s um total of existence . This bears evidence to the oneness of God .

If n there were two Gods , there ought to be eithera divisio

s s of labour or collaboration , for the interdependence te tifie

is to one plan . But the first impossible , for then God

- s would not be all potent , and , con equently , there would be a cau se restraining the D ivine power ; but thi s is contrary

s a to the concept of God . Thi rgument is also brought

S b ut s s s n by aadia , Maimonide give it a more Ari totelia SW fo rm . ’ ' In comparing Maimonides proofs with the proofs of

who se e those went before him , we that , while he did not c contribute mu h originality to the problem , he at the same time sys tematized and arranged the proofs in complete

c . logical order , which made them onvincing Most of the antecedent philo sophers either omitted some links in the

s s logical Chain , uch as the impossibility of an infinite cau al re re ssus g , or hinted at it without making their thoughts

s as . clear . Maimonide , a careful builder , included everything

In s s regard to Ari totle , he exhibit himself a faithful

follower, without accepting the conclusion at which he arrives .

“7 — u 2 de . M oreh II 1 6 a b G i . , , ; , p 3

’ 3 8 C RESCAS S EXPOSITI O N O F TH E

fi n i e e tud. already implies Ther are , however, more con c rete arguments . An infinite body could be neither Si mple nor composite , for if the elements are finite , one at least

s mu t be infinite , and then the others will be destroyed since the infinite element mu st s urely have most potency .

If s all the element were infinite , the infinite body would c fi i in n tie s s . S be omposed of many , which is ab urd imple

is s it cannot be , for it not of the fou r element , since they

s s are all finite and there are no other element be ide them . c Again , how could anything be reated , for becoming

s a implie change from one contr ry to another, and infinite

It i s . s has no contrarie evident , therefore , that there cannot be a simple infinite body .

e Further, if there is an infinit body, it must have weight ,

s t t s is , t whe her ligh or heavy, but thi impo sible for the ligh

s s moves upward and the heavy downward , but the infinite ’ ‘ has neither an up nor a down Again , since every body

is s in place , infinite body mu t have infinite place , but there

is a s six s a not any infinite pl ce , ince there are kind of pl ce ,

81 C . c the up and the down , Finally , sin e body must be in

sur place , and the latter by definition is the limit of the

3 1 s fi n it e . rounding body , body mu t be

It is al so impossible that there should exist a moving

I c s c c r. nfinite , whether moving in re tilinear fa hion or ir ula

E has r very body a definite place , and the place of the pa t a is s . and the whole the me Consequently, an infinite body

c as s cannot move re tilinearly, it is compo ed either of like

, s If s parts or unlike part . of like part , no part can move, for the place of the part is the place of the whole and it is

If s s s infinite . of unlike part , the part mu t be either finite

n s In or Infinite ; if fi ite , then at lea t one is infinite magnitude ,

3 1 h bookK ch x . M eta . P sics . hy , III , 5 p , , MAIM O NID IAN TH EO RI ES AND T H EI R C RITI C I SM 3 9

' 3 2 his If andt . is imp ossible they are infinite in number,

r then the e are an infinite number of places , but this is

3 3 n e impossible . Again , an infinite body must have infi it

is The weight , and because of it its moving unthinkable . I heavier a body is the less the time in which it moves . t follows that an infinite body mu s t either move in no time

‘ ’ is s or the now , which the ame , or that if we p osit for it some time we will find a finite body moving in the same

r . time . The relation of time and weight is a reve se one

s s Now if we po it ome time for the infinite , it is possible to find a finite body of whatever weight moving in the same time . We have then a finite and infinite body moving in the same ratio of time : this is contrary to the principles S of motion . till more , if we multiply the body of finite m weight , it will ove in less time than the body of infinite

s . weight , but uch a supposition is absurd

is im Likewise , the circular movement of an infinite body

the C possible , for if ircle is infinite , the radii are also infinite and the distance infinite ; the circle then would never be completed and the distance never measured through .

is Again , the time of the revolution of a circle finite , but the distance in thi s case is infinite ; how then can infinite 3 4 t ? is dis ance be traversed in finite time Finally , it impos sible for the infinite to be either an active agent

s or a patient . The relation between two bodie , one

f f is w : af ecting and the other af ected , the follo ing Two bodies equally large will both be affected in an equal time ;

is s s . n if one maller , it is affected in les time The relatio

s also varie according to the power of the agent , and the

3 2 ab o e this se ctio n . C p . v , 33 D e Cacl o e d Pran tl ch Ph sics III M e a h b oo K h x . t c , . , I , 7 y , , 5 ; p , k , . .

D e Coel o 1 ch . . , , 5 ’ 4 0 C RESCAS S EXPOSIT I O N O F TH E

f ac af ection must be complished in a certain limited time .

It s the follow , therefore , that infinite can neither affect nor

s ce s s c , be affected , for in we mu t po it for it a ertain time

f can s as it cannot be affected nor af ect in no time , we alway find a certain finite body that is either affected or affects a o n . in a similar m u t of time Moreover , if the finite body is s s f c increa ed in ize , it will be a fected or affe t in a longer

s e s a or a ho rter tim re pectively th n the infinite body . But thi s is contrary to the principle of action and passion .

s in s u s ns The e , hort , are the arg ments of Ari totle agai t a c c the infinite , which are very c urately reprodu ed by

Crescas . He show s an exten sive acquaintance with ’ Aristotle s works hardly di splayed before by any Jewi sh

w c hi cs philosopher . He n o laun hes s criti i m again st each

s . of the argument , examining it in detail

’ C RESCAS S RE FU TAT I O NS O F A RI STOTEL I AN

M ENT A RG U S. ’ s s a c s o s s Cre ca , in tta king Ari t tle , follow the latter

a e . s s s arguments in logic l ord r Fir t , Ari totle argue that

is s fi as a se there no eparate in nite thing in it lf, for if it

is s its s does exist and divi ible , part would have to be

n e c s C . . s s s s e infinite ( p above) Thi , replie Cresca , doe not

aril S s is s y follow . ince the infinite we are peaking of

s c s s a eparable , not a orporeal one , why hould it be divi ible

s or its parts infinite ? Is the mathematical line divi ible ,

and are its parts points ? Why can there not be an

3 6 indivisible in fin ite ? But the main force of the Aris

3 5 Ib 2 id . . , p . 73 - 3 6 m e me mi tot m 5p Tum 1 1 mm mm mm nsmnw worm fl aw 1 1 1 1 1 11 I N5 m5i aura mwsm nos i n5zi 51 1 : MAIM ONIDIAN TH EO RI ES AND TH EI R CR IT I C I SM tote lian argument against the existence of a separate

as s s s s im infinite, Cre ca rightly ob erve , consists in the possibility o f the exi stence of a separate magnitude not

1 c . A connected with a body (Cp above). magnitude annot

s s v exi t eparately , for then space would ha e to exist

n s separately of the body , but accordi g to the Ari totelian c onception of space it is impo ssible . Out side of the world n othing exists ; there is no vacuum stretching beyond its

s is is boundaries , and , ince whatever in the world body,

s t d c c st it follow tha if we o on eive any magnitude , we mu conceive it in bodily form ; hen ce there is no separate m e c . agnitud , and , onsequently no separate infinite ,

s s s s as is e ti tio But , ay Cre cas , thi line of re oning a p

ri ncz u as t c s is st t s s ; p p , he onclu ion ill o be e tabli hed for should we prove the exis tence of a vacuum there is a

ss e as po ibility for an infinit to exi st . Cresc then proceeds ’ to refute Ari sto tle s contention of the non - exi stence of the

a is c c s . infinite , att king the ba ic principle There no va uum ,

A s argues ri totle , for if there were , movement in it would

c is s be impossible . Movement in spa e cau ed by the differen ce in the natural inclination of things to s trive

a s c s s s s tow rd ertain point ome tending upward , ome down wards ; the Vacuum has no such place s . A body in it

s would either never move , for why hould it move in one

e s dir ction rather than in the other, or never top , since

~ ~ : dnai 1 a I O r A o . . m5n i p a m T rim N5w ID: 5p my n , p 4

S in o z a in his E is tolaX1 ] in discus s in the in nite roduce s the same p , p , g fi , p ‘ arg um e n t : Quare om n is illa farrag o arg ume n to rum quib us sub stan tiam e x t ruit Om n ia te nsam fi n itam s e hil os o hi u o m huntur suas o n e . e s , p p v lg o p illasub stan tiacorp ore am e x partib us con flatam sup p o n un t ade un de m e tiam modum alii ui ost uam sibi e rs uase run t l in e am un ctis compo n i multa q p q p , p in ve n ire p otue run t arg ume n ta quibus o ste n de run t lin e am n o n e sse i n ’ in fi n itam di i ib l m I 5 v s i e . O era I p , , p . 4 . ’ 42 C RESCAS S EXPOSITI O N O F TH E

’ 3 7 ' c c n . n not C nl there is no tenden y to a ertai place Agai , y c ould there not be natural motion , but not even violent

e s t motion . Proj ctiles thrown by a per on or ins rument continue their motion after the motor ceased to have

s contact with them , because the particle of the air are moved , and they impart the motion continually to the c proje tile . But in a vacuum the motion cannot be con v e ye d the projectile mu st therefore stop of necess ity

s c Further , the rate of motion varie ac ording to the power of the motor and according to the media and their

power of resi stance . The thinner the medium , the more

If c s s accelerated is the motion . a va uum exi t , motion

a . s in it would h ve to take place in no time Two bodie , A B D I C . f and , move in different media , and the motors

a o fA B are equal , the r te of time and motion and will vary

c D if D is is C . a cording to and But a vacuum , there no

a c s ratio , for wh t ompari on could there be between the

o ]? c s m tion of whi h is not offered any re istance whatever, and that of A which has to overcome it in a degree ?

O f B The movement , therefore , will be in no time . But

s s movement mu t be in time ; a vacuum , therefore , doe not

s a s s exi t . Fin lly , if a vacuum exist , it is pos ible for two

s c is bodie to o cupy one place . When anything thrown

an into water, amount of water equal to the body is dis

s ss s . placed , and a imilar proce take place in air What then

will happen to a body in a vacuum ? If the vacuum m e rely

recedes then it is nothing ; it is ju st this that we endeavoured

s to prove . But if the vacuum is omething , it must per

3 8 meate the body ; why then should not any body permeate

3 7 Ph c si s . y , IV, 7 3 3 ’ Ph s ics I 8 e as im i ius s com m e n tar to that cha te r y , V . Se l o S pl c y p , ,

Ph ics of Aristo t e t ranslate dby Tho mas Tayl o r in his tran s latio n o f the ys l . 8 8 Lo n do n 1 0 6 2 2 . , , p . MAIM O NIDIAN T H EO RI ES AND T H EI R C RIT I CI SM 43 another body ? The reason that body does not permeate

' b ody is not because of its substance or colour but because

w r of its distance or interval s . No if the inte vals of the vacuum may permeate a body , why not any other intervals ?

These arguments Cres cas attempts to disprove in the It following manner . does not follow , says he , that the e I xistence of a vacuum should prevent motion . t is true that a vacuum does not po ssess any differences of a s patial

s s as nature uch as upward and downwards , but still , long as the points of natural tendency exi st and the element s

s s w p os e s that tendency , they ill go on moving though the medium of movement is a vacuum . As for Violent motion ,

is it seems that the moment a body set in motion , it acquires by virtue of its elements and their tendency toward s their natural place a propensity to move without an y assistance on the part of the medium . Further , argues

s s Cre ca , granted that rectilinear motion cannot be in a

is vacuum , still what there to prevent the existence of an

— can extra mundane vacuum , wherein a body move in

s ss a circular fashion , a movement which doe not nece itate

3 9 the possession of the termin i a one and adque ni . In

s s regard to the econd argument of Aristotle , Cre cas con tend s that it is based on a false premise . The argument assumes that the ratio of the motion of one body to

is as the motion of the other medium to medium , when

3 9 tamp on 1 1 1 mm nn5 mm: (11 1 1 1 01 1 W 1 53 ) 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 um 31 mm: 1 mm 1 1 : 1 1 1 1 1) 1 1 5W mm 1 1 13 13 12 nuvan 1 1 1 511 1 1 1 1 3 a 1 1 1 1 03 13 : nv mnm 1 1 1 m 1 1 1 1 : a mwm nr51 m nnuIN m 1 . - - 051 1 5 m ni in 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 1 1 13 11 1 1 51 a ms 3 1 1 1 1 1 N52) 126 1 m a , 1 r p 1 w 3 1 11 11 1 R5 1 1 5W am ne w man 1 5 1t 1 1 1 mm m use nu5

1 1 O r Adon ai 1 b 1 1 1 : arr/1 5 1 1 1 1 3 0 nvun 1 1 1 mm , p . 4 . , ’ 44 C RESCAS S EXPOSI T I O N O F TH E

f media are di ferent in density , but this is untrue . We ,

ss s sc s a ert Cre as , mu t grant to every moving body an ori gi nal motion which was imparted to it by the motor

a c s varying c ording to the trength of the motor . The

e o s its s e m dium nly retard the motion by resi tanc , but it c cannot a celerate it . The formula , therefore, ought to be the ratio of retardation of one body to the retardation of

a e s as . In nother body vari the media a vacuum , therefore ,

s s is e e re i tance r duc d to zero , but the original motion is

s e is s . pre rved , and the body till moved in a certain time

e the Finally , the argum nt of impenetrability of matter ’ C is s c . a sc s s ( p bove) objected to by Cre a . Ari totle di tum that body cannot p e netrate body on account of its distances

s s c e fo r a is e and dimen ion annot be tru , body impen trable no t 01 1 a o its ss ss distance s b ut s cc unt of po e ing mere , becau e

s s c I s s of the matter filling tho e di tan es . mmaterial di tance , s c as w c is m a u h the interval hi h called a vacuum , y permeate

. It is e s a body evid nt , therefore , that a vacuum may exi t .

Further evid e nce of it s exi stence is the fact that it is

e as s quantitatively conceiv d , , for in tance , if the air in a

sse is a o ut we sa a is ve l p rtly pumped , y th t the vacuum

e s c larg or mall ac o rding to the amount of air pumped out .

It is ss then nece arily a magnitude , and though granting

a is an s c th t there not infinite body , the exi ten e of a s e a is s c s parable infinite m gnitude till more ne es itated .

e is n o B yond the world there body, the vacuum cannot

b e s c limited by body , but it urely annot be limited by

40 c s in fi nite a va uum ; it mu t be .

Whil e these objection s hardly have any value in the

s e e of light of modern ci nc , yet according to the spirit

a s l the times they are v lid , and greatly te tify to the critica

4° r Adon ai ibid 1 a O , . , 5 .

’ 46 C RESCAS S Ex p osITIO N O F T H E ,

s s c infinite , say Ari totle , annot be a composite , for if it is , h t e s s s . element would have to be infinite , and thi is impos ible

s s s e Cre ca rejoins , The impo sibility of the existence of infinit

s is s ~ element not e tablished ; the reason, according to

s - s c Ari totle , for the non exi tence is that the infinite annot

c s s s be onceived ; but , a ks Cresca , mu t they be conceived

43 in order to exist ? The elements qua element s may have

c s c s exi sten e though not exactly known . Thi obje tion mark a departure from the dominant Aristotelian system which ascribed exi stence only to s uch things that were supported S by the evidence of the senses and l o gi cal reaso ning . uch a conception could hardly be grasped by an Aristotelian .

s t o use That a thing in it elf, the Kantian terminology , may exi st without being either perceived o r logically analysed 44 o r sc was ss . de ribed , an impo ibility to them

s s scas Further , ay Cre , the objection that if the infinite

s s s is compo ite , one element at lea t mu t be infinite and then

w s s a s s it ould de troy the re t , can be n wered in thi way , that the infinite may b e devoid of qualities ju st as the

s s are s s s heavenly phere . However , here Cre cas eem not

M e ta h i . c s s . s e s s to under tand Ari totle Ari totl , in p y , book K ,

c e s s ch . s s s x , tate di tin tly that one el ment mu t not fall hort

c a is o c s s s in poten y , and wh tever in p ten y mu t ometime be

4 5 a so a s t re lized , that fin lly it will de roy the other element .

Cre scas probably thought that it meant the infinite e lement ’ o a s a s s s w uld h ve tronger ctual qualitie . Again , Ari totle argument for the impo ssibility of the exi stence O f an

43 m1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ns n5 1 1 1 511 1 1 1 1 no: 1 1 1 5I1 nnr1 mam: 1 1 1 : mm

‘ O r Adon ai 1 lNIDD , , p . 5 .

‘4 O r A do n ai a , p . 1 5 .

‘5 ' ran di i n d e hi -Rb m c en C . B s in h s H a buch de r Geschichte der Gri c sch rs h p ,

lul so hie P o . 2 Ph sics p , II , p 7 7 ; y , IV, 5. MAIM ONIDIAN TH EO RI ES AND TH EI R C RITI CI SM infinite body on iaccount of its weight and its tending to

s C . . its natural place ( p above) is not unimpeachable Why ,

s s ? Is ask Crescas , mu t it have weight it not because all sensible bodies in the sublunar sphere have it ? But suppose the is infinite is different , not the matter of the heavenly

40 S s s o ? phere , according to Ari t tle , devoid of weight This is another indictment against the following of the chain

s c s of evidence of the sense and logi al rea oning .

e s his s Finally , Crescas dir ct main attack again t the

s arguments from the nature of space . Ari totle defines 47 as t t c us space the limi of the con aining body , and o e quently by its very definition an dnature it must be finite

is and inherently C onnected with body . Where there no

is s as body there no pace , and , therefore , the world a whole

its s . s s is not in space though part are Thi theory , say

s s Cre cas , is untenable . The whole conceptual tructure of

c w s Aristotle of natural pla es , of up ard and downwards ,

s s is and the tendency of variou element thereto , built on

s s s . s s ss has fal e premi e How , a k he , can we a ert that air ‘ ’ s ? a natural place , the up , near the fiery phere What happen s then to the middle layers of air ? Are they in their natural place ? but it was assert e d that their natural place is If e the up they are not in th ir natural place , we have ac then a phenomenon of variance of pl es , the place of the ac “8 t . par differing from the pl e of the whole Again ,

" 46 1 13 3 N51 1 3 1 : 1 5 may 1 nN1 n :1 1 from 1 n1 Nn B51 N1

1 1 » don ai 1 a 1 nunN 1 1 1 1 5 am n ion 13 13 1 1 3 e w O r A . . 1 n , , p s 47 Ph i I s cs V . y , , 3 ” 48 mnn rp n We n nuwn N1 n 1 55 n 1 v 1 1 1 Nn mp uun1 1 1 1 1 m 1 13 1 1 1 m m n5nn 1:1 1 p m 41 1 13 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 or) 1 5 are nu5 wNn :1 1 n1 1 1 un 1 13 513 3 J' N'o 1 m 1 1 nN . waun mm: N1 nw EN 13 513 : N5

3 3 NW 3 ‘ 7 1 1 " 1 ”5 71 5 5 W K vnun 131 1 13 5 1 511 1 1 n5u5 Ir/N mun 1 1:1 1 PM )

O Adon ai 1 un r . m , , p 5 f ’ 48 C RESCAS S EXPO SIT I O N O F TH E

‘ ’ o f is the place the element of earth the down . But 49 is the absolute down only a point , and a point is not in 50 c s s place . Cres a , therefore , propose a different definition

It is as s sa of place . , we hould y, a receptacle of things ,

a ss o s It is qu lityle , imm vable , and inde cribable . infinite , 51 for by its very nature it cannot be fi nite . In the world

O f s is O c s s s thing it c upied , but beyond the world it exi t a

s s empty pace . The fact that place is immovable an wers ’ s s s as Ari totle argument against defining place an interval .

S s s uch a definition , say Ari totle , would compel us to admit

s c c s the exi ten e of a pla e to place , for if we move a ves el

ss is s full of water, the interval of the ve el tran ferred into

a s o . s s s another interv l , and on But if we a sume with Cre ca

a is m difli cult s that pl ce i movable , the y di appears , for the ve ssel simply pa sses from one part of the universal vacuum

A a ss is . s to another for the w ter in the ve el , it moved accidentally by the m o vement of the vessel . Aristotle

52 explain s the m o vement of the water in the same way . ’ The re futation o f Ari stotle s ass ertion of the im p ossi b ility for an infinite body to mov e either in a rectilinear ’ or circular fashion runs in the following manner : Aristotle s

s a e fir t rgum nt that the infinite cannot move rectilinearly , ’ ‘ for thi s movement r e quires an up and a down and is

e e o th refore a limit d movement , can be bviated by replying that though ki nd s o f place s may be conceptually limited

s are so S ce s . In s in genu , yet they not in pe i other word ,

49 5° e l o Or Ado n ai . 1 b D e Co . , p 5 . - 5 1 o n 1 1 1 1 1 13 1 1 WN neu5 man man N1 n tar/1 5 1 nuNn m nn w p w,

1 1 O r Adon ai . 1 b a ain 3 1 1 1 : 1 n 1 3 1 m , p 4 ; g , 1 2 mm N 5 m mp nnw ’ ‘ ‘ ibid a s a ar ume n ts ab n Jn . . 1 b . C . b o e C re c s s out the q p p m S , , p 5 p v g u m vac u . 52 SIm l icius adl ocum uote db Thomas Ta o r The Phi l oso h p , q y yl , p y of

r l A istot e. MAIM O NIDIAN T HEO RI ES AND T H EI R C R IT I C I SM 49 there is no absolute point where we may say that thi s is the up but there may be a s eries of ups adinfi n itum ; ’ the term up being only our s ubjective designation . His

s an second argument (cp . above) that if there exi ts infinite body it would have infinite weight , and then would move ‘ ’ is v s . S in the now irrele ant , say Crescas ince movement

s s of a body mu t be in time , we hall have to posit a certain It minimum for an infinite body . is true that a finite body w may be found that will move in the s ame time . But hat

t of it ? The law of rela ions of movement to movement ,

s according to the weight , extend only down to a certain

53 s s o s point . Of course , Cre ca sh w here a poor conception c of law , but a more accurate conception ould hardly be

his expected in time . Crescas al so attempts to di sprove the Aristotelian argument s against the possibility of an infinite body moving

can in a circular fa shion . Aristotle says that there be no circular movement , because the distance between two radii would be infinite , and it is impossible to traverse an infinite

s c . e s s di tan e To this Crescas r join that , though the line

s may be infinite , yet the di tance between them may be

s s finite . The argument , however, are too ob cure and

s e as c s abstru e to reproduce her , and they affe t the ubject

s very little we may omit them . He seem to imply that there is a possibility of an infinite body moving in an

so incomplete circle , that parts of it may move a finite B u distance . t how he could at all conceive of the move

f se e ment of an infinite body is di ficult to , for granted that

is s there an infinite pace , the infinite body occupies it all

i s by virtue of t own definition . And what meaning has

s s movement , unles we a sume the modern conception of

53 ai 1 Or don . 6 a A , p . E ’ 50 C RESCAS S EXPO SIT I ON O F TH E

s . a growing infinite , but thi is hardly what Crescas means

c s s However , Cres a wrote many things for the ake of

s s s s argument , imply to how that what Ari totle aid can be

s as s refuted , ju t Aristotle him self multiplied unnece sary

s s arguments . What is important for us is the e tabli hment

the S ss of theory of infinite pace , and the po ibility of an 54 in fi nitude s s s as r s of magnitude . Thi lead , C esca well saw , to the possibility of the exi s tence of other worlds besides

s a c s . thi one , onjecture which was later well establi hed ’ Especially important is his remark again s t Ari stotle s

s s s argument , that if there were many world the element

S ? would move from one to the other . Why hould they as s sc s Is s k Cre a . it not po ssible that the element we

s o know exi t only in this w rld , and the other worlds have different elements and different tendencies ? We notice

s here the beginning of the fall of the Aristotelian co mology ,

s s s was ba ed on the evidence of sen e only , an event which delayed for some time but accompli shed in full by s uch

s s as c s . ma ter Coperni u , Giordano Bruno , and Galileo

s s is o ss an The econd propo ition , that it imp ible for

s s infinite number of finite magnitudes to exi t , tands and

s s . fall with the fir t The critici sm of the third proposition ,

s o fan s re re ssus is . the impos ibility infinite cau al g , interesting

s s n c ss Cre ca does not refute it e tirely , it being ne e ary for

s as s . his proof of the exi tence of God , will be hown He

s e . s s s s doe give it a different int rpretation Why , a k Cre ca , can there not be an infinite number of effects which are at the same time causes to each o ther ? It is true that we

s s s mu t posit one prior cau e , but that hould not prevent

‘ “ 5 1 1 1 53 1 1 51 1 3 1 1 1 53 51 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 3 1 m m p w no: 1 N3 nn one m1 i1 1 rz1 a 1 N1 an N1 n 1351 1 1 5 rm n~ 5z1 n 51 1 : 1 1 1 53 1 1 51 1 1 1 : 1 1 3 1 1 3 1 m - 1 1 u i 1 r Ado a a. W EN 13 3 1 13 13 51 1 1 O p . 7 , , MAIM O NID IAN T H EO RI ES AND T H EI R CR ITI C I SM 5 1

’ r the posterior causes f om being infinite . Aristotle s argument that every intermediate term must be preceded 55 fi rst by a , would be well applicable if the causal series

s were a timely one, namely , that each event in the serie

s must precede the other in time . But the relation of cau e

is s and effect really one of logical priority . Ari totle himself

is r argues for the eternity of the world , and the efore forced to admit that the firs t cause is only prior in a logical sense

s s is s . and not in time , as the fir t phere al o eternal Why can we not say that out of the firs t cau se there emanated

f e s s an infinite number of ef ects which xi t simultaneou ly , instead of one effect as Ari stotle wants us to believe ?

ff s is And since an infinite number of e ect possible , what prevents us from ass uming that the effects are al so cau ses to one another , since causal priority does not posit temporal

56 ’ ? s s s precedence Of cour e , in spite of Crescas critici m ,

s s s s the neces ity of a fir t cause , fir t in nece sity , is well

s is e tablished but the form changed , and has an important c bearing upon the whole con eption of infinity . The manner in which Crescas utilized this proposition for the proof of

s so ff the exi tence of God , very di erent from the customary

57 was S . peripatetic way , commended by pinoza Aristotle

s his s was not entirely ignorant of the weakne s of a sertion , a h X c M e t sics II h. v i and in p y , book , , he mentions a similar

s interpretation to that of Cre cas , but in his main discussions

a h c his s s in M e t p ysi s language how the contrary . The eighth pro position stating that whatever moves

s accidentally will eventually rest of nece sity , which forms

55 M eta h sics I ao r II. p y , ” ” 56 m p N5 1 1 nu5 n5v WIN 5: n :1 :1 n n1 51 5vn a: m m mm - 1 nN n‘1 1 p n 51 1 ummm n1 1 a1 1 3 1 5 01 3 1 1 1 : a N5N 51 13 3 01 14) nm

1 1 1 b . n1 N snn 1 waN 1353 12 . p . 7 57 X O era 1 1 E istola II . p , V, p ’ 2 C RESCAS S E PO S T O N O F TH E 5 , X I I

’ o f is : a link in the proof the existence of God , severely

. Is scrutinized by Crescas it not possible , asks he , that accident s exi st as long as the substance itself ; now if the .

s s ? D o sub tance is eternally moved , why not the accident

s s not the lower phere move eternally , because of the

ss s e ential movement of the first phere, though their own movement is accidental ? The crucial point of the

is s Aristotelian argument , that ince a mover while moving

is s another body moved it elf, a power in a body while

s is s c it move the body al o moved a cidentally , and con

a s ss s s s sequently it will h ve to re t of nece ity . Cre ca say ,

It w ss as does not follo nece arily , for as long the body can

s be moved eternally , why hould the movement of the force ever have to stop s ince it is connected with the essential movement of the body ? 58

H is critici sm of the tenth proposition is interesting

s It though of little importance for the ubject . relates to

s the famou Aristotelian theory that form is the stay of body .

s Ib n Ro shdwho s Cresca , after quoting , a serts that body by evidence of sen se is really one but logic forces us to admit

s s its s can compo ition becau e of corruptibility , a ks , Why

as s we not conceive matter having a certain form by it elf,

s s s In the corporeality , for in tance , con i ting a kind of general

c c S ? quality s u h as oc upying pace Of course , when we contemplate a particular piece of matte r we find it to have

s a particular form , but thi is only the individual form , and

is s while essential yet not the tay of the body, for the material form is always in existence and is really the bearer

59 s is of the individual form . Thi remark , though short ,

s rt very suggestive . It remind us of the Ca esian principle that all matter is extension .

53 59 d. 1 8 b i 1 8 a Ibi . Adona . Or , ,

’ 54 C RESCAS S EXPOSIT I ON O F TH E

s n is Finally , the Ari totelian conceptio of time attacked .

s s s (Thi form propo ition XV . ) Time , says the Stagyrite, is an accident of motion , and cannot be conceived without

s s s s 1 it . Thi tatement comprise four premis es . . Time is an accident joined to movement ; 2 . either is not found

is without the other ; 3 . and not conceived without the

is other ; 4 . and , finally , whatever has no movement not

s s a in time . But , rejoins Cre ca , is not time measure of rest as well ? D o we not measure the state of rest of a

is s ? body in time , whether it long or hort The first two

s a s . s premis e then f ll The third , however , may be ju tified

s if we define re st a the privation of motion . The conception c of time is joined to motion and not onceived without it,

s though not alway found together with motion . Crescas ,

s s is therefore , propo e a new definition of time . Time the

c o f a s con ept continuity of a cert in tate of a body, whether I it is movement or res t . t is true that time is an

s accident , but an accident relating to the oul and 6 1 s c c not to anything else . Thi on eption of time is

s quite a modern one , and remind one of the Kantian

concept .

T H E ROO S O F A M ON D ES RE TED P F M I I FU .

After attacking the individual links which make up

M aim o n idian s c s the proof of the existen e of God , Cresca

proceed s to demonstrate the results o f the refutations

bearing on the proofs . The first proof of Maimonides

s s rs s (cp . above)make e sential use of the fi t prop o ition in

61 IN mp a' mn " IWW NIDW ”NW” {DD ”DJ?!

” ' a D Or Adon ai 1 . DID], DW IJW HIJDD , , 9 MAIM ONID IAN T H EO RI ES AND T H EI R C RITI C I SM 55

connexion with the twelfth , for if there exists an infinite

- body it has infinite force, and so it can be self moved , and

s II there is no need of a first mover . Again , propo itions

III n and are necessary, for if there is an i finite causal

re re ssus is s . In l g there no first cau e the same way , severa more propositions are needed . Since these propositions

s III were refuted by Crescas (though propo ition , which is

s really the ba ic one , was not refuted , but given an

f s entirely dif erent interpretation), it follow that the proof

as I e fute d. s s a whole is But , add Cresca , even granting

s r s s s the truth of all the e p opo ition , yet Maimonide has

s s not established his case . The twelfth propo ition tating

s that a finite body mu t have a finite force , which is a cardinal point in the proof, does not establish the imposs ibility of a force in a finite body moving in an infinite time where there is no resi stance ; though we may

s c is e c . grant that the trength of the for e finit ( p above).

This O bjection alone is s ufficient to overthro w the whole s tructure of the proof. There is no necessity for a first

s can its unmoved mover, for the phere be moved by own force infinitely .

s s Again , Maimonides has not e tabli hed the unity of

s s God . He proves it by the ixteenth propo ition , which asserts that whatever is neither a body nor a force in a body

c s cannot be con eived under number unle s it is a cause , and since there can be o nly one cause of that character

s s o f s s . to thi world , the onene s thi cause follow But , says

f n Crescas , this argument would be su ficie t if we assume that there is only one world . But s ince it was demonstrated

c s is b ( p . above)that the exi tence of several worlds possi le ,

s s s s c it is al o pos ible that there hould be everal Gods , ea h one being a different cau se of a different world in a different ’ 56 C R ESCAS S EX PO SI T I O N O F TH E

e as s s r lation , and uch the Gods may be counted . Thu ,

6 2 is o the numerical unity n t proved . ’ The second proof of Maimonide s is based o n Ari stotle s

s s a sertion that if we find a thing compo ed of two elements ,

o n e e and then elem nt alone , it follows that the other

o element mu st al so exist by itself (cp . ab ve for the con

l i n cus o . s is c s s s s ) The conclu ion atta ked by Cre ca , who ay that logically it follows only that the separate exis tence of the other element is possible but not that it is absolutely ,

s sa s his an s nece ry . He support contention by illu tration hi drawn from physiology as it was understood in s time .

We know that all living beings are al so vegetative as far as

c . o growth is con erned We find , th ugh , vegetation without

we s a life , but never find living being not h ving the vegeta

It is a s s t he tive quality . ( b urd , of cour e , from modern

O f is s . point view , that vegetation a living organi m ) We se e is a s ssa , therefore , that it not b olutely nece ry for the

s c s t o s s e two element that ompo e a thing exi t parately , especially if o ne m ay act as a perfecting agent . The force i “3 of the M am on idian argument is then broken .

a n o f s s The third rgume t Maimonide , ba ed on the

ass s s e ertion that all being cannot be peri hable , ince tim

is a s s cas and movement are eternal , n wered by Cre in the

following manner : The imperi shability of all being does

not follow from the eternity of time and movement , for

s t c if we upposed hat they would all perish at on e , the argument would be valid ; but why can there not be a

s s s s ? continual erie of peri hable being , one following another 64 ss s s . The premi , therefore , has not been e tabli hed He

a c s s a s adv n e al o another argument gain t the proof, but it

6 2 r A don i 2 0 Thi sub e ct i b e discusse da ain in this cha e r O a a. s j w ll g pt ,

an din cha te r p II . “3 “4 d Ib d 2 0 b Ibi . i . , . M AIM O NID IAN TH EO RIES ' AND T H EI R C R I T I C I SM 57

In really has little force . general , his refutation of the third proof is more for the sake of argumentation and logical

s casuistry than for the sake of seriou s discussion . Cresca

as l s c s himself, wil be evidenced in the e ond chapter , prove the existence of God through a similar chain of argu l ff . mentation , though with a di erent interpretation Final y , the las t arguments of Maimonides are assailed . The

s argument centre about unity . Crescas has already shown that Maimonides did not s ucceed in proving the oneness

s c s . a s s of the fir t au e He now el borate the ubject , and

s s s analy e the other arguments of Maimonides . The e argument s have often been quoted in Jewi sh as well as in I s s s o s C . chola tic philo ophy, and run as foll w ( p ntroduction)

The exi stence of two Gods is imposs ible for several rea s ons

I . If c there were two , there would be a differen e between

as as s t them well a imilari y ; they would , therefore , be

c s . 2 ompo ite . The harmony of the world and the inter dependence o f beings testify to the exi stence of one God .

If s c a 3 . there were two Gods , we hould have to con lude th t either one God created a part of the world and the other

n and another , or that one worked for a certai time the

o r c - O o . other for another period , that they perated All

s s It a is the e result are absurd . would follow th t God

c s is c s a ompo ite , in time and possible , which onsequence

c . I o as as are untenable ( p ntroducti n , well above in the

M aim nidi n exposition of the o a theory for elucidation).

s s s c s ss But , rejoin Cre ca , the con lu ion , namely , the onene

s s s of God , is not warranted . Fir t , the God mu t not be

f e b e composite , for the dif erence b tween them need not

65 s S c s material ; it may be only a cau al one e ond , ince

’ ’ 65 n1 1 N 1 n1 1 n 1 N3 nn N5 nan n1 1 nnN mm p nn mate : an e m ’ 1 O Ado nnN5 n N un: n r n ai . 2 0 b . 5p n 1 a5 n , p ’ 58 C RESCAS S EXPOSI T I O N O F TH E M AIM O NID IAN THEORI ES

s we may posit several worlds , we may al o posit several 66 his s o ne . s God , each having world This answer also

the other arguments for besides that the interdependence

s s s of thi world of thing doe not prove anything , as there

- s may be a pre establi hed harmony of plan between the Gods ,

it vanishes entirely with the assumption of the existence

s a s as is . of ever l world , it evident There are also other arguments quoted by Saadia and Bahia that are not affected

ss s by this a umption , but these arguments will be di cussed in the second chapter together with the Spinozistic View

s on the ubject . ’ s s We have reached a boundary line in Cre cas philosophy,

his o namely, the end of critical expositi n of the proofs of the exi stence of God . The point of View of Cres cas

It s has been mentioned before . will uffice to remark in passing that his endeavour is to show the invalidity of

o s s s many phil ophic argument concerning theological dogma , so that necessarily we have to rely upon tradition . How

a has s ever , wh t happened to many other has happened

has c to him , that while their aim not been rea hed , the very negative side is valuable . He displayed in his critici s ms

s s s a keen en e of philo ophic acumen and originality , and

e were this book more widely known , its influenc on general H i th o ught would undoubtedly be greater . s anticipation s

s of modern conception have already been noticed . Yet

h s his s Cres cas a value , not only in negative critici ms but

s It also in his positive conception . will be evident in the

s s ss . future chapter . We thu pa on to the second chapter

66 2 1 a p . . C HAPT ER II

’ C RESCAS S TREATM ENT OF TH E PRO BLEM S RELATING To

T E E EN E F AN D TES H XI ST C O GOD H IS A TTRIBU .

T H E exi stence of God is proved by Cresca s in a ve ry

s : simple manner . The proof run in the following way

f s Whether there is a finite or an infinite number of ef ect ,

s s s as or whether an infinite erie of cau es is given , but long as s s s the erie is infinite and all thing are caused , we do not find in nature a thing that is ab solutely necessary of

s is s existence . But to conclude thu impos ible , for if all beings are possible there must be some power that call s

t a . I forth existence , so as to overb lance privation follows 67 e a s c In s that th re is being neces sary of exi ten e . thi proof t as S s is he force of the argument , pinoza well remark , not in the impossibility of an infinite act or an infinite cau sal re re ssus s r s is s g , but the t e s laid on the absurdity of po iting

6 8 ss b a world of po i les .

1 ” 1 n5p n1 ~nn 13 5m 1 1 1 : I1 :1 :1 1 N 01 51 51 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 n1 uON ni n1 nrnn: I1 1 N1 snn WODN 1 1 n 11 1 51 51 1 05: m DNW nu5 13 553 5 nnN n5p n1 n1 1 yn 51 1 nn1 N1 m 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 13 5 11 1 3 1 1 3 am ne w ‘ “ 1 a r A on i Tr I se ct ch. 2 . 2 2 . n 5Nn N1 n1 nn1 N 1 n np nnnn, O d a, . , 3 , , p

63 ’ It will b e b e st to quote Spin oz as o w n w ords o n the s ubj e ct Ve rum hicob ite r adhuc n o ari im uo d e ri t i r c n ti re s ut uide m ut t ve l q p pae t ci e e o q p o, mal e i n te ll e x e rin t de mo n s tration e m ve te rum qua oste n de re n ite b antur de i e x i te n iam Nam ut i sam a I dae u ue n am R b Ghas dai vocatim s t . p pud u m q d a re e rio sic s o nat s i dan tur rO re ssus causarum in in fi nitum crun t omn ia p , , p g ,

ua s un t e tiam cauata A u n u i u u tum m e tit vi suae e s . t e odca sa e st co q , q ll q p , ’ 6 0 CRESCAS S TR EAT M ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S RELAT I NG

Here may be considered the proper place to say a few

s t he s word about relation of Cre cas to Spinoza . That the

w s o s latter kne writing of the f rmer and tudied them , we

w ass S kno from the p age quoted , where pinoza mentions ’ scas an d a c a e s s Cre by name , very c ur t ly explain the latter proof o f the exi stence of God . The question is whether

Crescas really e xe rt e d any marked influence upon the ’ a o o f s s l form ti n Spinoza s ystem . Joel endeavoured in evera o f his writings t o establi sh that Spinoza was under the

e s c s an d c influenc of Cre a , attempted to tra e the influence ’ s e O f S o s s I ne ce s in om pin za important theorie . t will be s ary fo r us to di scu ss these point s of similarity as they come along . Kuno Fi sch e r (in his Ge schichte de r n euere n

P hiloso hie II S o e s p , V , , pin za)att mpt to refute all arguments

ut o a o f ce an d s p f rth in f vour influen , conclude that there

6 9 is in c nothing ommon between them . ’ sc s a e s c c n ot s s . Fi her rgum nt , however , do eem on lu ive ’ I wi sh t o call attention t o the first point in Spin o za s s s a e s s s , ce ce G . y tem n m ly , the exi ten of ub tan or od The wa S n o his E thics e s s y pi za , in , conc ive the exi tence of

s c s is s sc I a fir t au e trikingly similar to that of Cre a s . t is

e a Tractatus B re t/is his s c tru th t in the , fir t philosophi al

ssa S s s s e y , pinoza prove that God mu t exi t , in the famous

s a o e O f the Carte i n way thr ugh the conc ption idea of God .

But in the E thics the bas ic conception of the whole system is

a o e s s th t , in lo king upon natur , we mu t come to the conclu ion

naturae n e ce ss arie e x is te re e r o n Ihil e st In n atura ad cuius e ss e n tiam , g

u r e rtm e t n e ce ssario e x is te re Se dhoce s t ab s urdum e r o e t il lud. a e p . g Q

V Is ar um e n ti n o n in e as itae st quo dim po ss ib il e Si t dari actui n fi n itum aut g , p ro g re s s us causarum in In fi m tum ; s e d tan tum i n e a quo ds up p o n atur re s quae s ua n atura n o n n e ce ssario e x istun t n o n de te rmin ari ade x iste n dum ’ X Van Vl ote n . E i la II e d. a re ua n atur n e ario e x i te n t . s to s a e c s s s p , , II , 45 ° 9 — il s h 2 6 . Ges chi chte der n eueren Ph o o ie . p , II , pp 5 73

’ 6 2 C RESCAS S TREATM ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S RELATI NG and might as well be taken by Spinoza as the basis of his ’ s s as S y tem . Fischer , if feeling that in quoting pinoza s ’ letter where Crescas s proof is cited in such a way as to ’ s S s s s re emble pinoza own , he weakens his ca e , attempt to strengthen his argument s by alluding to the manner in

s ue ndam which Spinoza speaks of Cre cas . He names him q ’ a ha ai sc f s s f R b G sd . Fi her in er that thi proves su ficiently

S s his s that pinoza hardly knew Cre cas and teaching , and ‘ ” s D s s was ue ndam winds up by aying , e carte not a q to

’71 s Spinoza . Such an argument is hardly conclu ive .

S s s pinoza wrote to Lewi Meyer, who urely hardly knew ’ c s o w s s e a . of Cr s a , and to wh m he a certain But if Fi cher ’ were acquainted with the difli cul ty of Crescas s style and its a e S c remark ble br vity , he would know that pinoza ould hardly give such a lucid and penetrating summary of ’ Cresca s s pro o f by mere hearsay without having studied his

s a hi E X1 ] . s a work carefully Ag in , addition l remark (in p . ,

‘ i n e a s e st s s it quoted above), non ita quod impo sibile dari ’ actu in fi n it um sh o w s that he read Crescas s whole refuta

o s e c c ti n of the Ari tot lian do trine . The fa t that Spinoza c a sc s alls him a perip tetic , while Cre a combated the

s a c n s is s u ce e c Ari toteli n do tri e , not ffi i nt evid n e of his ’ e scas s was s s ignoranc of Cre work . There till left in Cre cas e nough o f the philo sophy of his tim e to entitle him to that name .

ESSENC E AND EX STENCE I .

It was an O lddebatable que stion with the mediaeval

s s s c is c ss philo opher , whether exi ten e identi al with the e ence o f a thing or is s omething separate . Ib n Sina taught that

7‘ P l s hie I 2 eschichte er n euere n hi o o I . . G d p , , p 73 TO TH E EXI STENCE O F GO D AND H IS ATTRIBUTES 63

72 Ib n Ro shd existence is an accident of essence . , on the

other hand , claimed that existence can be nothing else

s A Ib n Roshd but identical with es ence . ccording to and

s s H is s is his follower then , in regard to God , ince e sence

ff s s absolutely di erent from the es ence of the rest of being ,

s s f it follow that His existence will al o be dif erent in kind , and in positing existence to both God and other beings

so s we do in an ab olutely homonymous way , not denoting 73 any common relation but the name . But also the followers

Ib n s fo r c of Sina agree to thi conception , they oncede

s t e c nece sarily that with God exis enc is not an a cident ,

s but identical with essence . And ince with other beings c c it is only ac idental , it follows that the name existen e in applying it to God and to man is employed in an ab solute homonymous way . I c Crescas does not agree with either view . n criti izing ’ Ib n Roshds c f view , he points out the logi al di ficulty

If is involved in its assumption . existence identical with

as ? In s essence , what then does it add a predicate tating

s that God exist , the predicate does not add anything ;

s Godis s it amount to saying , God the ame is true of any

a as I n S s n . b other proposition of the ame ki d Ag in , if, ina

s s is s s say , exi tence only an accident , it need then a ubject

s c s c but the ubje t must also exist , hence another ubje t must

s c precede it, and so on to infinity . Again , in e existence is ' s th e s e the real form and tay of ubj ct , for without it it

- c a ? s would be not being , how ould we c ll it accident Thi

the V iew mu st necessarily be abandoned . But other view

I s is s . t untenable al o mu t , therefore , be concluded that

” ’ 72 ' ‘ ‘ ‘ n I M oreh s e e aso C re scas s WPWIP U I I D ru p fi b J ID , , LVII ( l

Co m m n ta e r Guide . 2 0 . y) , p 4 73 r A nai 2 1 b O do p . . , ’ 6 4 C RESCAS S TREATM ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S R ELATI NG

s i st , t s s t exi ence while not iden ical with es ence , e sential o 74 In s s can a . being thi way , exi tence be predicated of

s as everything , of the e sence well as of accidents , though

ff . c there will be a di erence of degree The general onception ,

s s . however , mu t be under tood in a negative way The thing we predi cate existence of is to be understood not non :

s . s e s exi ting As a result , when we p ak of the exi tence of

c s God , and the existen e of other beings , it mu t not be a s bsolutely homonymou , but there may be a certain relation ,

a — s s namely , th t the negation for exi ting equal not non

— - e xi sting has a difference of degree . The not non existence

is s s O f God due to him elf, while of the other being to their

75 s a s s e his cau e . Wh t Cresca want to prov by naming

existence e sse ntial is that it is one of the expr e ssion s of

e . essenc , i mplying that there are more

Spinoza s eem s to believe that exi stence and essence

s o s s are different in the ca e of ther beings , for e sence depend a on natur l law , but existence on the order of the causal

In s c s s series . God , however , exi ten e is not di tingui hed

ss s c s from e ence , for by definition , exi ten e belong to his

76 nature .

T R TES AN D A T IBU U N I TY .

’ s s is c Maimonide theory of Attribute , which criti ized by

s e s its Crescas , re embl in entirety the other theories of the

s s s s r s s preceding Jewi h philo opher , with a t ong empha i on

c . the negativity of their con eption A thing can be described ,

s e its says he , in four way ; ither according to definition or

‘ 1 “ 7 D1 1 p n p nonn nNannw In: mnnn mm 1 JJ1 Nw 3 11 1 1 1 Ir/N3 1

” ‘ 1 1 1 n Or Adon ai 2 2 a n1 np 5 mmn n w 3 N nNe [w rm , p . . TO TH E EXI STENCE O F GO D AND H IS ATT RIBUTES 65

apart thereof, or by one of its essential qualities , or by

relation to some other things , either to time , place , or another 77 . In of body regard to God , attributes describing in any

- the above mentioned ways are inapplicable , for since we

s posit Him imple , and one , and above all categories , it is evident that He cannot be defined , nor can we speak of

s a part of Him nor of any e sential quality in Him . As for a rel tion , there is no relation between Him and place or time ,

s s or any other being, for they are all pos ible of exi tence

r and He is necessary . There emains , therefore , a fifth way

. S of describing , namely, according to the actions uch kind

s t o of attribute it is not impossible app ly to God , for they

t . do no imply any plurality, change , or division This form

is . of attributes paronymic , after the actions we perceive

ss is There are , however , e ential attributes , that , such as appertain to the essence without having any bearing on S the actions . uch by the consensus of religious leaders

s and philosophers are exi tent , living , knowing , wise , potent , It u and willing . is to be noticed that Maimonides incl des will as an attribute just as his peripatetic predecesso r

Ib n D S aud has done , while aadia and Bahia do not count it (cp . Introduction). How then shall we understand these

ss s ? is e ential attribute Of course , it evident that in applying them to both God and man we employ them in an absolute

c r homonymi manne , for there is no possible relation between

God andother beings . These attributes have to be con

ce ive d s purely negatively, and yet, says Maimonide , they

s convey to us some po itive notion . He proceeds to explain

s his a sertion . The statement that God is existent implies

- only that He is not non existing , or the denial of privation ;

77 ” ’ 3 M oreh I 2 Guide 1 8 a: 1 1 51 N p 5n fi n , , , 5 (p . , p . 7 . F ’ 6 6 CRESCAS S TREATM ENT O F TH E PRO BLEMS RELAT I NG

is and when we say that God living , we only assert that

is His existence not like the existence of dead matter .

In f s a similar way , the more di ficult attribute are explained ;

s ss potent mean the denial of weakne ; wise , the privation

s s of fooli hness ; willing , the ab ence of disorder . Thi s , in

78 M aim on idian s . short , is the theory of attribute

Ge rson ide s ss sc , the immediate predece or of Cre as , had c already obje ted to such a theory . He argued against the assumption of absolute homonymity in applying the att ri

I s . t s butes to both God and man is impos ible , he ays , to assume that there is only a likeness of name in the two

O f is o s applications the attribute , if it c n trued to have a negative meaning . Take , for example , the negative concept

O f s sa - s exi ting , can we y that the denial of non exi tence whi ch the concept implies has two absolutely different

s ? are t t meaning We forced , then , to admit ha the difference

is only in degree ; why then can we not hold the same

s s conception in regard to po itive attribute , namely , that they are applied to God and to man in di fferent degrees ’ of perfection ? 9 We have noticed a s imilar argument

o c s advanced by Crescas in regard t existen e . We hall ’ ’ s a now pass on to Crescas s critici m of M imonides theory .

s s s s as s Maimonide is loath , ay Cre c , to a cribe to God any attributes that will bring Him in relation with something

H is el se for fear that it may imply a privation in nature , ,

- 71 1 5N: n1 1 3 n1 nY1 1 1 03 m N1 nw nuuvn 1 5N 1 1 513 1 : 1 31 13 N1 , nN1 5 N5 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 N 5n3 1 N51 53 1: N51 nN1 5 1 J1 Nw D1 1 Nnn

- ’ ~ 51 1 1 1 13 N 1 1 1 1 1 m51 i 1: 1 1 nN nNsnn5 1 1 n: W 1 n1 N xnw N 1 1 , 1 : any N51 N5 IJ' IDN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 13 1 5: W e Ni ne;

M ore/i 3 - 86 19 Gwda P L m m 1 1 1: 51 1 n1 n51 n n1 NYmn n5N 53 , , 1 ; , ,

2 1 p . 0 .

79 d Le i z i The B attles o he L ord . 1 Mil am ot e . f t , II , p 3 4 ( h , p g , T O TH E EXI STENCE O F GOD AND H IS ATTRIBUTES 6 7 and yet he allows himself to describe Him with active

s attributes . But , asks Crescas , does the application of uch ’ attributes not imply any defect in God s perfection ? When

we say, God created or made , does it not mean that before the act His power was potential and only later became ’ active ? Such an implicatio n suggests change in God s 80 ’ s nature Again, Maimonide assertion that there is absolutely no relation between God and created beings or

s time is false . Is not God the cause of all exi ting being ?

is n s But if He , there is already a relatio establi hed , or if

is we assume that time eternal , there is a relation of likeness

s s s between God and time . But Cresca ee as well as

Maimonides the danger involved in ascribing to God posi tive attributes and at the same time asserting that He is

is simple and one . Yet , he says , there really no contra diction . The fact that we humans may conceive plurality

through attributes does not mean real plurality . His

s infinite goodne s which is His essence unites them . Good

s nes here should be understood to mean perfection , or in — S c other words , God is infinitely perfect what pinoza alls 81 his s s c in writing the ab olute perfect , not perfe t after its

is s d . , d kin Again since God indivi ible and simple , an

s s perfection is es ential , then why cannot exi tence or any

s c of the other attribute , as poten e or wisdom , be posited as a positive attribute in just the same relation as light

8° EN 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 N3 w mp EE 51 1 1 1 1 1 12 1 n51 r> 1 5 1 r)EN 1 N m i 1 n N1 n1 1 1 o 1 3 N1 n1 E1 Nnnr) N n 1 a mm 1 v 5 w n51 1 5. n 1 e) 1 1 n 5nn ” 1 mm to 1 1 m "IN nan 5s aw)1 E nN1 1 5 5a 1 3 1 mm N5w1 m 5N N1 3 1 1 3 : mo N1 3 1 ne vi 51 )E 1 ENI1 1 5N: 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 1 : 1 n1 n 1 N\1 n1 w ” aw E nN1 n1 n 1 3 : nN1 1 3 n 1 N nwyn 1 N n51 rEn E1 1 1 2) 1 1 xin

7 5 53 O r Adon ai . 2 a. 1 , p 3 ,

81 is tolaXXX] O e ra 1 1 Ep , p , V , ’ iCAS S T REATM ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S RELATI NG

? of a luminous body Let us , following up the suppose that the fi rst cause is a luminous body u l rse e nt . Is q y necessary of existence its light ,

Io t c the identi al with the essence of body , less

1 s of existence , or can the body not be de cribed

~ ‘ he is s light is not a separate thing, but an e sential b In rough which the body may be described . a r u O f a ner , we can call the attributes God positive ,

c as s I su h eternity , exi tence , and unity , and yet

82 Iot It imply plurality . is true that so far as our m is concerned we cannot give th e m a positive

s for that would determine God , and we mu t use

- . s & . . a s c tive , e g existent , not non exi tent , , but in

h s o God himself t ey are surely po itive , and He 83 l e s ri e c b dby them . ’ ciall s s s y precariou is Maimonide position , say when we con sider the other attributes such as

s s and potence . What doe he mean by aying that

s s s mean ab ence of weaknes , or knowing , privation ance ? He does not remove the p os itive content e is tertium uid e attribute . There no q b tween

- it and not knowing , if not not knowing ; hence ily follows that God is knowing . But if the attri

has v w is knowing a positi e content, hat then that

It s c is not identical with e sence , for the essen e s inconceivable in its totality and surely it cannot mun 1 13 1 1 1 1 5 mNumn nnnnnn 1 ~ NE 5cm 1 1 1 51 ) mm 1 5 mm 1 : N5 1 5 1 wN n1 N1 YEn nun 131 1 3 1 1 13 : amnion 1 1 m , 1 1 11 1 ) N1 n 53 N rnp m 3 1 3 1 13 5 1 1 1 1 1 a 1 1 1 1 13 s

”’ " O r Adonai 2 b . J Jv N1 1 ! 73 1 3 , p . 4

, 70 C RESCAS S TREATM ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S RELATI NG

86 s s unicum As expres e the latter by for the first , it was

s s is , t d well e tabli hed for God necessary of exis ence , an

ss st t everything nece ary of exi ence canno be composite , 87 as has been discussed . The question remains in regard

s Is ? to the econd . there only one God We have shown above that Cre scas always considered the arguments sub stantiatin ss as ffi g the onene insu cient . The interdependence of the world and the harmony of action are counterbalanced by his s upposition of the possible exi st e nce of two world s i c . . s c ( p above) There , however , one more argument , whi h

s s s e say that ince we po it the infinit potence of God , the

e ce is ss exist n of another God impo ible , for they would

s c . s s s s s con train ea h other Yet , ay Cre ca , the e arguments

o is s ss a are not c nvincing , for it till po ible th t the other one c is e . not activ He , therefore , con ludes that the numerical

88 is a s o f unity of God only ubject revelation .

It mu st be admitted that Crescas in thi s point is not

a e only we k , but prejudic d . His polemical nature over

s c s m mastered the philo ophi al . What doe he ean by a passive God ? D o e s it n o t contradict his own conception ‘ ? If ss sse s c of God God po e infinite poten e , what then

? It is is that other being neither active nor potential .

It is evident that thi s abs urd argument was only advanced

as s s s just a hot at the philosopher , though it fell hort of

s s . the mark , and Cre ca well conceived it ’ It is s s nece sary , in conclu ion of this part of Crescas s

sa s his c theory , to y a few word concerning influen e on

S fe O . pinoza , regarding which there is some dif rence of pinion 89 his Z ur Ge nesis de r L ehr S inoz as D r. Joel , in book e p ,

86 aM eta h 1 1 2 at . Co it . g p , ,

37 h sam e roo has b e e n u t db S inoz a T e p f q o e y p . 83 89 — r dn ai . 2 6 P 1 2 . O A o p a. . 4 , p 9 ‘ TO TH E EXI STENCE O F GOD AND H IS ATTRIBUTES 7I asserts that Spinoza was greatly influenced by Crescas in the formation of his theory of attributes . He says that

Crescas makes a distinction between attributes of an essential nature and such as are rational modes of con ce ti n o . p Again , that this is the same distinction that "O S ro ria pinoza makes between attributes and p p , namely , ’ s c s c s u h qualitie whi h are a part of God own essence , f though they do not af ect His simplicity or immutability .

It f c s s is di fi ult to agree with Joel , both that uch a di tinction ’ s is made by Cresca and that it is identical with Spinoza s .

s s s Cre cas call both kinds of attribute , such as eternity,

s c s exi ten e , and unity (rather implicity), those that Joel would

s include in the econd class , and knowledge or potency ,

s C which are, according to Joel , in the fir t lass , by one name , ” 13 1 1 13 2 ) 01 1 mm s s s namely, 1 , which mean es ential attribute .

It is true that Crescas says that the fi rst - named attributes

c o f n are less apt to affect the simpli ity God , for their conte t is s only a rational mode with a negative form , as exi tence , 92 - 81 C . is not non being , But no real distinction found . He

s s c It is say di tin tly , clear from the foregoing that exi stent

s and unity ( implicity), which are predicated of Him , His

ss s s D r name be praised , are e ential attribute or a . Joel

‘ ’

ss s s . would expre him elf, we enhafter Art Where then

s his s ? S s doe Joel get di tinction Again , pinoza ba es his t distinction on the definition that the a tributes , according

are ss to him , identical with the e ence of God which is

9 ° n ai . 2 a O r Ado , p 5 .

91 o te Verhan delin O e ra 2 K r g , p , p . 74. ” 92 1 1 1 N1 1 1 13 n1 mm 1 1 1 53 NW ) 1 1 1 53 1 ) n1 1 n3 N5N 1 1 1 1 1 1 2) 1 1 1 13 1 p n r) 3 1 1 1 51 1 3 1 n1 1 n 51 1 mm N1 nw n1 1 nNn1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 53 1 mm nN1 1 n N1 ne)

‘ ’ ' 1 1 3 1 3 s IH l: ”1 07 Admi t” IT l lm it) 1 m N W! ”Sti l 3 3 , ; p 93 a I id. . 2 b , p 5 . ’ 72 C RESCAS S TREATM ENT O F TH E PROBLEM S RELAT I NG

conceived through them ; of such we know only two ,

thought and extension . The Propria are such as belong 94 ss s to God , but do not expre His essence . Of uch a ds i s scas . r i tinction there no mention in Cre On the contra y ,

s s ss s s c Cre ca a ert that the e sen e of God is inconceivable .

Thi s is really a fundamental difference betwee n Crescas

S . o se and pinoza Again , we find many of th Propria of

S e ss as s c pinoza among the ential attributes , , for in tan e,

95 . sa s a knowledge How , then , can we y that it is the me di stinction ? We can neverthele ss admit that the idea found

s s s s in Cre ca that there are ome attribute which , though

c t t s ss ss predi a ed of God , do no by all mean expre His e ence ,

s c s f i al so found in Spinoza . But to on ider it as aso urce O

influence is exaggerating .

I want t o direct atte ntion to another point of contact

sc s and S s between Cre a pinoza , which bring the possible

It is influence into a more favourable light . the relation

u s s s s of the attrib te to the e sence of God . Cre ca teaches

e a s the infinite p rfection of God , and the b olute unity of

H is ss e s a c ss e enc , in pite of the fact th t we predi ate e ential

a s H is sse ttribute of Him , for in infinite e nce they are all

It is he s o ne . true that doe not make clear in what way

these essential attributes are to be understood they do not

s H is e ss H is s c a b e c expres ence , for e sen e c nnot onceived

s s and sse . It by us , but neverthele s are po itive e ntial may be that in his insi s ting that the essence of God is not con

ce ive d us s s s by , he mean to say that , while the e attribute

s e s as are es ential , yet th y are not to be under tood final ;

is . s but our conception of them incomplete For in tance ,

we predicate knowledge as an attribute , but we do not know

what kind or what degree of knowledge He posses ses .

9“ 95 r V dl in 2 - 2 Ibid 2 K o t erhan . . . 2 e e g , pp 74 9 , p . 9 . TO TH E EXI STENCE O F GO D AND H IS ATTRIBUT ES 73

S 96 imilarly, Spinoza teaches the infinite perfection of God , 97 s and that He po sesses infinite attributes , all of which

s con stitute one being . What Spinoza means by attribute was a matter of great controversy, but the interpretation

93 s . of Fi cher is the correct one According to it, the infinite attributes are infinite forces O f God and not different w . S s substances ince the attribute are infinite , it follo s that the human mind will never know all of them , and so the essence of God is not conceived fully . The attributes

We se e known by us are thought and extension . , therefore , that in spite of the widely separating gulf between the t wo

s is s s system , there till a marked imilarity in the basic

O f s c conception the attribute . Both tea h infinite perfection , infinite unity in spite of the positive content of the att ri

n s . butes , and the i complete knowledge of the e sence Of

I the f s s . cour e , am not blind to dif erence of their teachings

Spinoza emphasizes that the attribute s of exten sio n and

ss s as c thought expre the es ence of God for es, and as such

c d b . as are fully onceive y man Cresc , on the other hand ,

in would shrink horror from s uch a conception . But s uch ’ differences are due t o the diffe rent nature of Spinoza s s s e s y tem , which is wholly div rgent from that of Cre cas , as 1“ far as the God of a religiou s man is from the God of a

s . s s c philo opher Yet they afford points of imilarity , e pe ially at the base of their system s where the variance is at its ’ minimum . It can almo st b e said that Spinoza s system ’ is Only a re s ult of carrying out Cres ca s s principles to their

o I extreme l gical conclusion . t will be best illustrated in t t t G d t he chap ers on the rela ion of od and the worl , for i is there that the real divergence is evident .

97 D t e f. 6 E hics ; , I . 9 3 z 8 — 2 K i che r S in o a 0 . . F s , p , pp . 3 9 ’ 74 CRESCAS S TREATM ENT O F TH E PRO BLEMS RELAT I NG

’ n s s s We see , the , that in pite of Fi cher contention against any possible influence of Crescas on Spinoza there

s s are to be found trace of marked likenes between them .

We must not forget that when we say influence we do not

mean that the latter actually followed the former, or anything to that e ffect ; what it signifies is a thought impulse and a pointing in a certain direction . That

S s t pinoza read Cresca carefully , and no , as Fischer

s was maintain , only imperfectly acquainted with him , we I have shown above . wi sh to remark that Fi scher is nOt

s sc s s D entirely ju t to Cre a by aying of him , enn selbst die

E n s E s i heit Gotte ist bei ihm kein Object der rkenntni , ’ f s as sondern der Of enbarung , and using thi fact an

s argument to di prove the influence of Cresca s on Spinoza . ‘ I pres ume that Fi s cher means by the words die Einheit

s c a Gotte the numeri al unity of God , for the essenti l unity

s a was demon tr ted by Crescas as clearly as by Spinoza .

the was But even in regard to former , it already mentioned ’ a s s s a a (Cp . above) th t Cre ca rem rk in th t regard should be

e s e and s . taken with r erv , that it is only a polemic expres ion

In c o f is s s c reality , numeri al unity God e tabli hed ac ording

s s s c s s the . to Cre ca , in e he po it infinite potence of God

c S c s Of ourse , pinoza dedu e unity with great accuracy from the mere definition of God ; but the difference of deduction in the two systems in regard to a certain point does not prove that it is impos sible for one system to have influenced

i s f the other . It s only religious u ficiency that prevented

Cre scas from following up his own definition and reaching

s the ame conclusion .

In concluding his theory of attributes C rescas discusses a few emoti o nal qualities which are to be attributed to God .

s is s The discu sion intere ting , both by the novelty of the TO TH E EXI STENCE O F GOD AND H IS ATTRIBUTES 75

n a conce tio s . p , well as by the interpretations o f the emotions

s Aristotle teache the happiness of God , and deduces it in the following manner . We must attribute to God the highest activity which is no higher thing than contemplation ,

s and since we humans feel plea ure and happiness in thought ,

is it follows that God who eternally active , namely con t e m lative p , and the quality of His contemplation being of

s s s s s the highe t and pure t kind , mu t neces arily be alway

99 S c s s s is happy . u h a conception , ay Cre cas , untenable ,

s s t t . s w and is ba ed on a false heory of emo ion Joy and orro , s s s a or plea ure and pain , are contrarie , and con equently f ll under the category of action . They really do not depen d

w s on kno ledge, but on will . Plea ure is only the gratification

c . we derive from the arrying out of our will Pain , on the is other hand , the feeling we experience when our will is

1 00 O If bstructed . we do experience joy in our knowing ,

is c is w it be ause there a will to kno , and by attaining knowledge we overcome the obstacle to our will . It will

as c c be evident , therefore , that as far God is on erned we H i cannot attribut e any happiness to Him . s knowledge has s s H is no limitation , and there are no obstruction to

c e a will . When we humans experien e any pleasur t con ce iv in is s c g a certain thing , it becau e that con eption was

us and not known to , in overcoming the obstacle we experience a sens e of pleasure . But in regard to God

c : ss su h a mode is inapplicable whence, then , His happine

s t ? s s t , t a knowing Cresca a er s , therefore hat if we do

99 M a h XII Ethics X et . . p , , 7 ; , 1 00 ;1 Y1 3 n1 1 1 1 1 1 nn N1 n 3 1 1 m 11 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 nn 1 N nnuwn 1 3

’I r Adna 2 a ust to kn o w how m ode rn thi s D WDI 13 n1 , O o i , p . 7 . J

f e mo tio n s is w e ha e b u t o co m are the ie ws o n e asure an d the ory o , v t p v pl

i En ish s cho o ist E G Stout in his Man ual o P s chol o pan o f the g l p y l g , . . , f y g y , c a r n Pain an dP e as ure h pte o l . ’ 76 CRESCAS S T REAT M ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S REI

attribute happiness to God it is because of His love

is c s c wr voluntarily the au e of all being, and sin e

s is s s so that exi tence goodne s , it follow that in far

s v olun taril i is voluntarily the cau e of being , He is

The co ntinuation of the exi stence of beings is tl

is r continual emanation of His go odne ss . It e vide

that in so far as God continually e manates H is g 1

e e m and perf ction voluntarily , in so far He loves the

e ss c ss is s c of goodn ne e arily , and it thi a tion of em

p e rm e ated with love that is described as joy or happ

s ss o r is sse as v Thi happine joy e ntial to God , for ,

e is e t c c th s en , it inher n ly onne ted with His being

O f things an d the co ntinual e manati o n of H is g .

e c c ss u and p rfe tion . We annot help but expre o r ' tion fo r such a high e t hical conception of th e ha

s c s a of God , in comp ari on with whi h the Ari toteli n as the Spinozi stic (as will be shown) pale s as rega

glow o f ethical warmth .

In re gard to the relati o n s of Cre sca s and Spi i

s Am or D e i o s ss thi point of , J el lay great stre

influence ex e rted by the fo rm e r on the l atter . Th

D e i in tel lectual is has t wo meanings : the love

o a s s I t w rd God , and that of God toward man ; but

t o e to sc ss the def r the former a later di u ion , where

o f s ss c O God and man will be di cu ed , and oc upy

e c s at pr sent with the latter. Joel ontend that

l o ve of God is not far fro m the teaching of Spin!

God love s Him se lf with an infinite inte llectual

” 1 01 N1 n 3 N nan mm 1 1 1 1 : n1 r3 5e n1 3 1 r3 nr3 2 3 1 91 11)

;1 s1 n 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 n51 1 n3 nNn mm mm: .1 3 1 13 n a wm m e

r a I 2 a- b Adon i . O , , 7 1 02 Ethics V XX Pro o sition . , , X V, p

’ 78 C RESCAs s TREAT M ENT O F TH E PRO BLEM S RELATI NG

’ s s formal ide it approaches Aristotle view , which also makes

ss the happine of God consist in thinking, and Himself the

H is . s ff r subject of thoughts But there is es ential di e ence , i this is the idea of cau se . It s not the act of thought that

s i i make up the rejo c ng , but the being a cause and ground

is of all being . Thi s the fundamental difference that widely

s c . separate the two con eptions On the other hand , it is

thi s same idea of cau se that form s a point O f contact with ’ sc s a so as Cre a s View . The latter states th t in far God is a c s s n s au e of exi te ce He love the good , for existence is a e a c o a continu l m nation of good and perfe ti n . But ,

is n a f s s s again , there a fu d mental di ference ; Cre ca exclude l al . o knowledge from that love On the other hand , acc rding ’ c s s is to Cres a theory of emotions , which by the way a very

s is e true one , plea ure not connect d with knowledge , but ’ s in s ss with will . And al o regard to God love or happine

s s s w . S is he in i t on ill With pinoza , however , will entirely omitted ; the mechanical or necessary conception takes the ascendancy ; knowledge and r e ality are the principal ingredients in the teaching of Spinoza .

ma o a C re scasian We y, theref re , conclude th t while the and Spinozi stic views on the l o ve o f God have a basic point of contact , yet they are totally different in their

s is - s i content ; the fir t an emotional voluntari t c , the other

s is s a a trongly intellectual . There a po sibility th t the term

o c s is love of God , if not directly borr wed from Cres a , at

his use as least influenced by of it , the term love does not precisely describe the idea which Spinoza wishes to convey

s by it . There are some critic s who score Spinoza everely fo r his introducing the conception O f Amor D 5 2, and point to the difficulty involved in Speaking of God as

- e as s . s lf loving , if He were compo ed of subject and object To TH E EXISTENC E O F GO D AND H IS ATTRIBUTES 79

They assert that the conception is contradictory to the 1 09 s fundamental Spinozistic doctrines . But this discus ion

s n is beyond our point of intere t . The real poi t of gravity

' s Amor D ez of that que tion is the of man , but this is

In I s reserved for the next chapters . general , wi h to say that I do not intend to minimize the influence of Crescas

S . I upon pinoza On the contrary, believe that both systems

f s af ord many point of contact , and , furthermore , that their

is s . source really one , except that they run in divergent line It is possible to find a goodly number of likenesses , but

s they are never commensurable . To thi point more space will be devoted in the coming chapters .

1 09 Se e K i che r in his z a . F s S ino 73 p , p 5

E IN D R I. R CHAPT R II T O UCTO Y .

O PI NIONS H ELD B Y T H E PRE- M AIM ON ID IAN J EWI SH PHI LO SOPH ERS CO NC ERN I NG T H E P RO BLEM S OF

M N SC ENCE RO D ENC E AND REED O M O I I , P VI , F

F H E LL O T WI .

TH E problem of the freedom of the will presents one of the most interesting a spects in the hi story of human

Its . It thought . roots lie far back in antiquity arose out of the peculiar position that man hold s in the domain of

- s s nature , and at the moment that self con ciou ness appeared in man and enabled him to refl ect upon the s urrounding

s as world , and his own per onality related to it . Man l represents a puzzling riddle unto himse f. On the one

s s hand , he feel himself to be the master of thing , the lord

of being ; on the other , contemplation teaches him that he is only a part of that great mysterious environment

. s h called nature Furthermore , thi nature is not a hap azard

s and conglomeration of thing events , but there is a kind

s s of succes ion and equence , law and order, and to which

e 71 01 5723 vol e m s s . ven he , , mu t submit him elf The develop

s e ment of religion imply changed the aspect of the probl m .

It s s placed man in conflict with the will of the god , in tead

c . W of with the blind natural for e ith polytheism , however , the gods were not strong enough to replace entirely the G 2 8 O M N SC ENC E PRO ENC E AND REEDO M O F W L 4 I I , VID , F IL

O ld s something that rules over the de tiny of man , now

w s kno n by the name of fate , and were even them elves ‘ s . s s suppo ed to be dominated by it Homer ay , When

s the hour of fate comes for man , even a god is helple s , no

tt c t s s ma er how mu h he loves him Herodo u goe farther ,

1 1 1 and a sserts that a God is not able to avoid it Thu s the problem becomes a much di scussed subject in ancient thought ; and it can really be said that out of this dual ’ character o f a man s positi o n there developed Greek ethics

its s s with pecial emphasi upon contemplation and thought .

s s s With the ri e of monothei m , po iting a being all

- s - powerful , all wi e , and all knowing , the problem became

s c c . s more a ute How in the face of u h a being , in compari on

e s insi n ificance s with which man dwindl into g . can man ave

his pers onal freed o m ? It ought by the nature of the

e c conception of God to be given up . Yet p uliarly enough ,

the first monothei sti c religion not only did not reject the

1 1 2 as a freedom of the will , but incorporated it dogma .

The story of the receiving of the ten commandm e nts as 1 1 3 sc as t he s de ribed in the Bible , as well term covenant u ed

innumerable times to designate the process of receiving

the Law implie s plainly that man is free and that the ,

Is s c raelite were entirely at liberty to reje t the Law of God . “ 4 O f is s The idea freedom repeated many time in the Bible .

One may argue that the monothei stic conception was

e s probably loos with the Hebrew in the early times , yet

can c s s s none a cu e the Hebrew prophet , e pecially the later

O s s s ne , of a lack of pure monothei m , and in pite of it the freedom of the will is asserted by them with the same

n o m d us I Ili d xvn 6 e ro o t . a . H 7 , , 44 , 9

1 2 - 1 8 1 - 6 uma . . D r. D . Ne r P k , haw: awl ym mwSm, I , p p 1 1 3 " 4 u 0 1 . Ex o d. 1 I D e t. . 9 . o . 3 9

86 O M N SC ENC E P RO D ENC E AND REE O M O F W I I , VI , F D ILL

c s s s the se t and variou doctrine , attempting the solution 1 1 9 of the problem in one way or another.

The first who dealt with the problem in Jewish philo

as x s was S . S sophy , might be e pected , aadia aadia ays ,

s an d is Man is free in his action , there no intervention

s c on the part of God . Thi fa t is proved by the evidence

Of s s s t . e en e , of rea on , and of radition We see in daily lif

is s s s is s that man ma ter of him elf ; he peaks or ilent at will,

s s doe a number of other thing or refrains from doing them ,

and never conceives that anybody can restrain him in acting

W s n m a according to his i h . This evide ce , though it y seem

us c c s uperficial to , carried a certain amount of onvi tion

S a Who the M utaz ilite s to aadi , , following , attached great

can c importance to conception , for whatever be con eived d c c c is real , an the ontrary , whatever is not on eived does 1 20 c not po sse ss any reality . Hen e the empha s is laid by Saadia on the fact that man conceives and that accordingly

R s . s is he is free . ea on testifies to freedom Fir t , it proved

that it is impo ssible for one act to be pro duced by two

If s w s . age nt God interfered in human action , it ould be

s . S o G the effect of two agent , God and man ec ndly , if od

s an act W a s force m to do a certain , h t rea on would there be for his punishment or reward ? The believer and 1 21 the athei st would be on an equal footing . As for the

~ ’ ' 1 1 9 rare : mnm our) 1 5 re m un 3 nfis n D fi nm " ms m um

- ' " m i mB N51 am s DW D D nrm am an mm m m m 59 s c . p

" ) Em un ot/z Wedeot/z e d m . n5np 3 w1 amaz e mam 53 m mm um , ,

w 1 8 6 b os e o 8 . . J f , 5 p 4 , 1 2° du i n s e ct. . C . n tro ct o p I , 3 ”1 ' . 6 Aristot e o fle rs im i ar ar um n t l W e l h a. e Em un ol z edo , p 5 l s l g s to p ro v e ‘ i as e rti n hat m n is the o ri i nato r o f thin s H e a s : Te stimo h s s o t a g g . s y ny

e e m to b e b o rn e b oth b ri ate In di iduas an db aw i e rs to o in th s s y p v v l y l g v , , at t he chas tI e and un is h t ho se that do wro n whi e the ho nour those y s p g , l y who IN PRE-MAIM O NID IAN J EWI SH PHILO SO PHY 8 7

r o f objection on traditional g ounds , he quotes a number verses to that effect .

s The problem ari es then , How is it possible to conceive freedom of human action and at the same time prescience of God ? If God knows beforehand that man Will rebel

H is 3 0 s against will , does it not follow {p ro that man mu t ’ s act in thi fashion , for otherwise God s knowledge is not t ? S d t t perfec aa ia replies that , in reali y , he supposed ’ conclusion does not follow . God s knowledge is not the

. c h cause of human actions Were it the ause , we s ould ’ ’ have to grant that man s actions are predestined , for God s knowledge is eternal and necessarily the effect s would be

so . It determined , but the case is not is true that He

s know beforehand the events that are going to happen ,

s In c but He know them their true light . God knows whi h

s H is s ever way man is going to elect , yet knowledge doe not have any causal relation to the things which are going

h I is c . to appen . t pure knowledge without any active for e The fact that the things happen in the future and He knows

H is them beforehand does not bear on the subject , for

is knowledge is above temporal accidents . There only one time exi sting in regard to God , and that is the present .

If ask H O W s u one will , is it po sible that , if God kno s

s a man is going to speak , yet he could have cho en to be

? s s t Silent to thi the reply is made , that had he kept ilen ’ c c God s knowledge would have taken ognizance of the fa t , 1 22 for God knows the way man Will choose after deliberation .

f s sc By way O illu tration , we may compare the pre ience

’ O f co urse he re the re e re nce is n ot to the o o ica authorit act rig ht ly . , f l g l y,

h rc f um n i the sam e Nze Ethzc e r t e o e o the ar e t s . . s but po l itical ho w ve f , ; , g

III , V . 1 22 / — /z e tl z 6 a b . Em zm ot IVedo p . 5 , 88 O M N SC ENC E PR O ENC E AND REE O M F W I I , VID , F D O ILL

as S a o s of God , aadi c nceived it , to a man tanding on avery

s an high mountain , and from this exalted position he View

exceptionally long row of men passing by ; some have

s s 3 s s s pa sed , ome are pa ing , and ome will pas . He sees

hi s is . s e his s them all for po ition very elevat d , but eeing

1 23 s ss . is not the cau e of their pa ing However, we cannot ’ help admitting that a shrinkage in God s pres ci e nce has A S . s a s been assumed by aadia result , objection to his

1 24 a s s theory h ve been rai ed by later religiou philoso phers . But Saadia was very zealous to save human freedom and , 1 25 some sacrifice had to be made The problem of the compatibility of the providence o f G o dwith the fre edom

o f is S It e s the will not treated by aadia definitely . s em ,

e v ss his n erthele , from the whole tenor of book , that he

s x s s c c believe in the e i tence of u h a providen e , for how

e It co uld he not believ it ? is found in the Bible . There

s a c o e s sa s the e . III are , h wev r , ome pa ge be ring on subj t

one of them it is s tat e d that the events that happen t o man

o D s s are thr ugh ivine cau ality , but at the ame time they

a s man se s c re partly cau ed by him lf, namely , that ome ome

1 26 his c e as a puni shment for previou s choi e . The qu stion

s s to still remains open . Are the event prede tined happen ’ s s s s e o r is a imultaneou ly with God pre cienc of them , it th t

God cau ses them to happen afte r the human acti o n s have

n o s s s taken place ? But uch di cu sion is found .

as s Bahia , an ethical philo opher , and a man imbued

1 23 r o Em un t/z We eoth adl ocum C o m me n ta y t o d , .

' 1 24 Al b o s ays that Saadi as vie w is al mo st tan tam oun t to the opin io n that i de n ie s Go dany kn o wl e dg e of po ss b l e s .

”5 n un t re im i ar diffi cut an d The e arly C hrIs tian fathe rs e co e d a s l l y, ’ o ow dthe s ame ath So didO ri e n a ow a in dof n arrowi n o f G ods f ll e p . g ll k g

re scie n ce F Ise he r H is tor o Chris l ian D o m a 1 06 . p . , y f g , 1 2“ un o kWedeot/z 66 b E m t , .

0 O M N SC ENC E PRO ENC E AND REE O M O F W 9 I I , VID , F D ILL

" human and D ivine knowledge d o es not carry with it the

c a s cs s spe ulative ch racteri ti which attend that of Maimonide ,

e c in ra . I s who O ffer d a similar suggestion ( p . f ) t is imply

s a blind re ignation of a believer to the dogma s of belief. Halevi treats the problem of freedom in an accurate

s ss s and philo ophical manner . He a erts that human action

s ss s are pos ible and not nece ary , and prove it from the flm general beli e f of m an Hal e vi al ways laid great emphasis

o f c u on the generality an idea and the on se ns s om nizzm .

' As fo r c c s the onfli t of freedom with God providence ,

Halevi e vade s it by a sserting that there are two kind s of D ca s . As a s O f ivine u ality , direct and indirect ex mple the

s s s c s as s fir t kind may erve u h thing the order of the univer e , c the way and manner of the omposition of all living being,

e a s c the genera of the v get ble kingdom , and all u h pheno

m e na that 6 0 ip so testify to the plan of a wise maker .

A S s a o f s m a an in t nce the econd kind , we y quote the

s burning of a log of wood by fire . The immediate cau e

of thi s phenomenon is easily explained ; but thi s cause has

c s so o n s another au e , and until we finally reach the fir t

a se s c . c u , till the onnexion is not a direct one We have

a o s s then fourf ld divi ion of event . divine , natural , chance 1 3 0 - s and e c s . D wi e , el ctive or hoice wi e The ivine are those

s D that mu t be re ferred immediately to ivine attention ,

s s uch as hav e been mentioned . The natural ari e through

s s m mp s man in . mediate cau e ( u ), but with an end View

- s s s The chance wise ari e also through mediate cau e , but

s s with no particular order or de ign . The elective are tho e

1 29 ur 1 8 8 1 1 . K az an e d saacM e tz amb . . H g , 3 , p 9 , I ,

1 3 ° r b f i o w its ch i n hi s e dition . 1 2 0 i . m h (C o r e cte d y Z I r n , p , asp n DN ) p ’ ni mp b IN m ime It: DN nSN rm D' WLDH z ns m np fi nz m mum:

‘ ‘ — C fo r aSim i ar di is io n the Ph s ics o f Aris to t e II 6 . D fi l DD i x . p . l v y l , , 5 IN PRE-M AIM O NIDIAN J EW I SH P HILOSO PHY 9 1

of which the human will is the cause . Freedom is one of

s the mediate causes . We have then a twofold sy tem

D . of ivine causality, the immediate and the mediate The

s mediate through the cau al nexus returns to God , but the connexion is a loose one , no force is exerted and man

1 is 3 1 D c is s s . free to choo e ivine providen e thus aved , for c all events revert to Him indire tly . Halevi goes on

s s . polemizing again t tho e that deny the possible He argues ,

If is c man has no choice in acting , but for ed to perform

act s the by the sequence of event , why then do men display greater anger at the one who injures them willingly than at the one who does so unwillingly ? Are n o t all human

1 3 2 action s involuntary ? In regard to the problem of the compatibility of the

e s pr science of God with freedom , Halevi doe not add

1 3 8 S M utaz ilite s anything original , but follows aadia and the , in asserting that the knowledge of an event beforehand is e not the cause of the realization of that event . Hal vi l s s s s s . ay a great deal of tre s on the middle cau e (cp . above)

H is c s ethi s thu receives a contemplative aspect . The middle

s is w cau es are powerful influences , and it necessary to kno

1 3 4 which to choose and which to obviate . The natural

s is cau es are necessary, but yet there a possibility by a knowledge of facts to obstruct their results and avoid

. s s them Halevi admit a pecial kind of Providence , for in his divi sion of events there is one class O f D ivine action ; and there is nothing preventing God from interfering at

1 31 K az an 1 2 0 i m e ia c u . The de a o f he d t a se s a n o i . t e w s w n n , p k an i uit b the Sto ics C i i n i W ll e z I t . L Ste n h s i n reili e t I O n o te 1 q y y p . . sf , p . , 75 . 2 1 3 K az an 1 2 0 p . . ,

1 3 3 ' ae i a ude s dire ct t o the Mutaz il iah in th t H l v ll ly a. “34 K az a 2 2 n 1 . , p . 2 O M N SC ENC E P RO ENC E AND R EE OM O F W 9 I I , VID , F D ILL

cc s o s an d f s certain o a i n , e fecting omething immediately

n a t s s . eve in world of media e cau e He evades , however ,

e o f s . It ss s a the probl m inju tice is po ible , he ays , th t if we were able t o penetrate and follow up the long series of

s s we s cau e , might di cover the reasons why the righteous

s is suffer and the wicked prosper , but thi really beyond

u . s h man intelligence We mu t , therefore , rely on the

o f an d H is s c a knowledge God ju ti e , and dmit our own 1 3 5 shortcomings .

Ib n D s s Abraham aud , the fir t Ari totelian in Jewish

s is s s philo ophy , a trong upporter of the freedom of the

I is is c a . n a h c hum n will f ct , it prin ipal ethi al foundation .

s M an ss ss s s He ays , po e e the po sibility to do evil , and the s is the tronger the inclination in a certain man , harder

s the truggle to overcome that inclination , the higher the

1 3 6 value which is attached to the virtuou s act . He utilize s

c D s the do trine of the twofold ivine cau ality , but it is hardly

ss as po ible that he borrowed it from Halevi , he evidently

“ 7 s e did not know him . Mo t lik ly both derived it from

1 3 8 s aco m m o n source . In regard to the problem of pre cience

Ib n D a s s and freedom , ud solve it in a very imple manner . ’ He concede s that God s foreknowledge is undecided in

s regard to the exact way man will act . He know before

a a s h nd that cert in actions will be pre ented to human choice ,

1 3 ’ ‘ ”‘ ’ ‘ n ~ (e rino witsch PWYD) l BD mnon 3 1 8 3 n p n: n5nw WWDNI o xn mm5x mm 1 : h DD‘ 71 l l‘JJ‘Nw nm 1 5mm W “ ; 1 5mi

7 1 2 “7e p . 5 .

° 1 3 W i ran urt a M Em unakRam a/z d e . . e . . , l , F kf , p 9 7 1 3 7 i i th Em unakRam ah 2 Ib n Daudm e n tio n s In h n tro dut n t o e . t e c o , p , ’ that he re adSaadias b oo as w e as Ib n Gab irol b ut m a e s n o m e ntio n k ll , k

of th K az ar hi e s o ro e that he was unac uain te dw ith it for e i . T s g o t p v q , h i di o the rw ise he ce rtain ly w o uld ave m e nt on e t.

1 38 K auman n I ce i ni t n D . O n this s ubj e ct the re s adiffe re n o f o p o n b e w e e . f

’ W ll s re zt 2 0 n o te A ttn but nl ehre 2 an dSte in in his i en ihe . . e p . f , p , 43 , 79 ,

CHAPT ER IV

’ ’ A M O N D E E M I I S VI W AND C RESCAS S COM M ENTS.

A M ON D ES M I I , the chief conciliator between theology

s and philosophy in Jewi h thought , devotes much space to the elucidation of the problem di scu ssed in the previou s

as its s . chapter, well as to its solution in all aspect

s as his ss s s s Maimonide , predece ors , di tingui he between the firs t cau se of events and the proximate ones . The

s s s o proximate one he divide , as tho e before him , int natural , 1 41 - - c is c s s . hance wi e , and choice wi e Choi e , however , the exclu s ive g ift of man who is endowed with a Special faculty .

s c s c Maimonide introdu e a distin tion , already made by

1 42 s o e s c c is Ari t tle , b tween in tin tive willing whi h only

1 43 s s c c . a re ult of de ire , and human hoi e He , however , does not connect choice with reason as much as Aristotle

e as o s a . o s does Maim nid a theol gian , attribute it to direct ,

s a w S act of the will o f Go d. Ju t s God illed that fire hould

s a s tend upward and e rth downwards , so did He in titute

an s s s that m hould be ma ter of himself, and his action 1 44 Ib n D his s . should be in own hand He , like aud ,

1 “ ui d 2 2 2 / h 8 G e . M ore 1 c . 4 ; , p . , II ,

“ 2 ice is ain o untar b ut the tw o are no t co e x te nsi e M o ral cho pl ly v l y, v ,

in the m o re co m re he nsi e te rm for rst chi dre n an dal l vo lun tary b e g p v ; fi , l h s i m h in u tar acti o n b ut n o t in m o ra cho ice . Et ic o the r an al s s are v ol n y , l ,

III 2 1 1 b , . 3 . ’ 1 43 1 5~ 5Nw np m s nni nn mnn wannb n nan ni nw nr nnn SHI

‘ ’ “ ~ M ore/1 ch . 8 . Notice the INtj D mt: fi JDfl nn n , , II , 4

' ’ i an d ‘ ” dis t i n ctio n b e tw e e n OWN m n: D Vl 51 m jl hfi .

“ 4 ' Guide III 8 . ub ah Pe n ite n ce ch . C o de D iv . 1 Te s h , , ( , 5 , 4 ; , , ’ ’ M AIM O NID Es VI EW AND C RESCAS S C O M M ENTS 95

s cv rl o recognize the inclination in man to do , and theref re assumes freedom as a standard of actions ; the more the

f . S struggle , the higher the worth O the ethical action ince

was free will instituted in man by the will of God , it may

as on special occasion be taken away from man , such we 1 45 s find in the case of Pharaoh . This ca e is well known to

1 46 s s all theological philosopher , Chri tian as well as Jewish .

c s s Of our e , uch a possible limitation will not be pleasing

O f to the upholder absolute free will .

In D regard to the ivine knowledge , Maimonides , after polemizing against s ome of the philosophers who wanted

s is c to limit it , assert that God omnis ient and nothing is 1 47 n hidden from Him . I this connexion , Maimonides remarks that great philo sophers of the pre - Ari stotelian period accepted the doctrine O f omni science . He refers

’ D e R e im zne s to the book g , by Alexander of Aphrodisia , where their O pinions are quoted . The only one to whose I opinion we find a distinct reference is Socrates . n ’ Xenophon s M e morabil ia he is quoted as preaching that

s a t d s , , d he go know all thing what is s id what is done , an 1 48 what is meditated in silence Maimonides furthe r asserts

s is n that thi knowledge eternal . The problem the appears in full vigour, How are we to reconcile the freedom of man With this prescience ? The an swer to this problem

1 40 s s i . Maimonide find in his Theory OfAttr b ut e s (Cp above). Maimonides conceives the D ivine attributes in a negative

s h s way, and ays that w en applying the ame attributes to

s God and man , we use them in an ab olute homonymous

“ 5 h e r Mai m o n i h 8 re f t Ex o . C a t s of de s c . o d . p , . , 7. 3 “ 6 ' ri n D e P rm iis I I 1 r ith thi rob e m . O e a , I appl e s w s p l g , p , , g 1 47 1 48 ’ G ide III 1 6 fil em orabiha I . 1 . u , , , , I , 9 1 9 4 h t 2 C ap e r . ’ ’ 96 M AI M O NID ES V i Ew AND C R ESCAS S C O M M ENTS

s s way . Thi theory contends that it is ab olutely imp o ssible for the human mi n d to grasp the meaning of the attributes

to S applied God . ince the attribute of prescience forms

c f s no ex eption , the di ficulty is olved . The problem arises

o in s only when we c nceive knowledge the human ense .

man e is With , knowl dge correlative with fact . Applying

e ce the sam con ption by analogy to that of God , it follows ’ s e s s that God pr cience ought to agree with the fact , otherwi e it contradicts itself. B ut s ince we do away with that

ss H is o analogy and a ert that kn wledge is different in kind ,

s . s s the difficulty disappear God know thing beforehand ,

1 50 yet the possible still remains . Thi s teaching is not

c ss o c as o merely a once ion of ign ran e , but , menti ned , ’ e o f s s ground d in the theory attribute . God knowl e dge is not a s eparate thing from His essence but connected

and s as s s s c i w . In t with it , ju t the e en e , it unkno n the ac ” of human k nowl e dge we di stinguish the t his I n? the

knower , the known , and the knowledge itself, but with God

”1 He is all three in one .

As fo r s c a s the que tion of Providen e , M imonide treats

H e O s it in detail . quotes four different pinion , and then

s his is E e add . The first the picur an , denying Providence

c s . s i s a entirely The e ond the Ari toteli n , in the garb of 1 52 O hrodisias D c Alexander p , namely , that ivine providen e

he s c s s at t . ea e ublunar world But as Providence, even

in t o s s s s s regard the phere , con i t mainly in their preserva

1 50 ui de III ch 2 0 G . . , , 1 5 1 ha te rs 1 - 8 A Si m i ar us e of the ho m o n m ous the o r is made b C p . l y y y

i i ataM l z It i in e re s in to co m are with the ast S n oz a Co t el a . . s t t p , g p , VI , 9 g p l ’ i r n 2 i A i n z a F sche s o te 4 n his n hang to Sp o . 1 52 As fo r Aris to tl e him se lf it is doub tful W he the r he e ve r e x p re s s e dany , ’ ’ o i n io n o n he sub c Se e ue s Le Sim on i n his Etude de la The odicee de p t j e t . J l

Platon et A rzs tote 1 0 0 , p f.

’ ’ 98 MAI M ONI DES VI EW AND CRESCAS S CO M M ENTS

s . The chief critic , however , is Cre cas himself This question

s I will be discus ed in detail . have also omitted fo r the

M aim o n idian present the theory of origin of evil , as well as some philosophic arguments for the denial of pres cience and Providence quoted by Maimonides . These are dis c at s s ussed length by Cresca , and hould be taken in connexion with his own solutions as they form a part of his theory.

C RESCAS ON P RESCI EN C E.

as s s Crescas , a foundation to his di course on the ubject ,

s c a posit three principles , which , ac ording to him , gree with and c ss a s a are ne e it ted by tradition . The e are ( ) the infinite s 5 s c H is w cience of God , ( ) His pre cience , ( ) that forekno

f s ledge O the pos ible event does not change the nature of it .

He proceed s then to analyse the philosophical doubts that

s s as arise in connexion with uch conception , and , usual ,

s . reproduces them fir t First , if God knows the events

s happening in thi world , it follows that God is being

s has s perfected by thi knowledge , for it been e tablished that knowledge is a kind of perfection ; but such conclusion

is s s ab urd , for how can the ab olute Perfect be perfected

s ? S s through the knowledge of inferior thing econd , ince

it is known that the mind in conceiving things becomes

identified with the conc e pts an d assimilates them to its

s s s e sence , it follow that there will re ult a multiplicity in ’ s s c s God es en e , for the thing are many . The third and ’ fourth arguments attack God s a ssumed knowledge of

s particulars . There were two curre nt philosophical opinion

in regard to the Ari stotelian conception of the matter . ’ The first denied entirely God s knowledge of anything

e x s ternal to Himself. (Thi seems to be the right one , ’ ’ MAI MO NI DES VI EW AND CRESCAS S C OM M ENTS 99

. I r IV . cf above , nt oduction , ) The other , following Alexander , 1 56 admitted the knowledge of universals . Particular things can be conceived only th rough their matter and passive intellect, but God has no matter ; it follows that He cannot

1 57 conceive the particular things . Again , particulars are

s temporal , and whatever relate to time is an accident of

is motion but God above motion and time , He therefore

s . s does not know of the particular Finally , the po iting ’ o f D O f f ivine science the world s af airs is untenable , as the di sorder in the natural sphere and the existence of evil f 1 58 in human af airs testify . These are the objections to the general principle of ’ ’ positing God s knowledge of the world s affairs . There are several O bjections especially to several of the specific

s c principle , namely , the infinite s ience of God and His pre ’ sc . s ience How, asks the opponent , can God knowledge be infinite ? Is not knowledge a comprehensive and determining ? thing How , then , can the infinite be comprehended or

? . determined There is then a contradiction in terms Again ,

sc pre ience seems to be impossible . Real knowledge ofa thing

c s s implies that the obje t known exi ts, for in what consist

55 1 ide G e rson s l am ot III 1 1 2 0 . , h , , , p . 1 57 Al l the s e obj e ctio ns are al so foun d arran g e din a similar orde r in

G e rson ide s l am ot 2 ti i n C re scas am o re o ica . o we e r w e n o ce , h , III , H v , l g l

rran e m e n t I is n d th m dire ct a g . t not e ce ssary that he b orrowe e ly from

G e rson ide s thou h the co n te n ts an rm are Simi ar The s e Ob e ction , g dfo l . j s w e re curre n t in the thou ht o h a m f he m are aso m e n ti n g f t e g e . So e o t l o e d b Maim n ide In the third ob e tion the re is a di re ssio n b C re sc y o s . j c g y as w hich de s e r e s som e n otice I is th r i h G e rso n ide s H e sa s th t e st w t . v . fi y at the particular is con ce iv e dthroug h the hyl e an p o w e r such as se n se an d i ma inatio n C r ca ub stitu a i a f n s That u . e s s s wo da g te s m tte r n ste do s e e . l g re e with the Aris to te ian co n ce tion o f in di iduait which co n sists in m at r l p v l y te , fo r it is this that i e s the un i ue n e ss sin ce orm is e n e ra to e nu g v q f g l g s. XII 8 , . 1 53 O r Adon ai 2 a , p . 9 . ’ ’ I O O M AI M O NID ES Vi Ew AND C RESCAS S COM M ENTS

the truthfulness of a conception O f things if not in the fact that the mental conception of a thing agrees with the O bject

I 59 s s P r t exi ting out ide of the mind Fu thermore , if we gran

s s that God doe know thing before their occurrence . a change

H is is in knowledge necessitated . Before they occur He

as s knows them future happenings , after that as pa t . And

s e ss inc the mind e ence changes with the concepts , there

ss will then be a change in His e ence , but this is impossible . The ass umption that the exi stence of possible future events

is c c s s ompatible with the pres ience of God is al o a sailed .

If we po sit that God knows before the realization of one

s s c of the two pos ible a pe ts of a future event , and at the

same time we a ssert that the opposite aspect is possible

of occurren ce ; then while in H is pre science the opposite

c ss is still onceived as po ible , after the action occurs the

possibility is removed and a change in the D ivine kno wl e dge

s c . ss nece sarily effe ted Moreover, the a umption that God knows whichever a spect is going to occur proves to be

s as is untenable , for with a pos ible event , in far as it

ss s S po ible , either ide may be assumed . uppose , then , that we a ssume the opposite s ide of that of which God is

s e s a , s d , prescient exi ting , if so ab urditi woul result ( )a change

H is 6 as . If in knowledge , ( ) a f l ity in it that cannot be the ’ s s is s ca e , the pos ible done away with and God prescience 1 60 s involves the necessity of human action .

e h Aft r reproducing at length all the objections , w ich ,

Ge rsonide s as remarked , are identical with those quoted by

his M il/zamot s in book (The Battle of the Lord), Crescas

s e rson idian quotes al o the G solution , though not mentioning

59 ’ 1 ocke de fi n ition o f no w e de in Essa on H um an Understan din Cp . L s k l g y g ,

B k ch 1 . 4 , . . 5 1 ° 2 a O r Adonai Tr. . . , II , p 9

, ’ 1 02 MAI M ONIDES VI EW AND C RESCAS S CO M M ENTS

is In general order preconceived by God finite . the same

O s way the two bjections raised again t prescience (cp . above)

s are righted . Since God know things through their general

s order which emanates directly from Him , the thing are

s s is already exi ting , and urely there no change in the

s If s knowledge it elf. God knew the particular in as far as

a s is they are p rticular , that from the point c f their differ e ntiation , that change would be implied , but He knows

s is them from their general order , and thi not changed .

s difli cul t s is s is Finally , the mo t que tion olved ; this the

question of the exi s tence of the possible in spite of

s e . s s s pre ci nce Pos ible event have two aspect , and may

ss . be preordained in one way , and po ible in the other

From the a spect of general order of events they are

o s c determined , but fr m the a pect of human hoice they

are indeterm inate . God know s the se things only so far

ss s as they are po ible , but He doe not know which side

ss . It is of the po ibility will be realized evident , therefore ,

that when G e rso n ide s speaks O f po ssible things as being

s determined by the general order , he mean that only their 1 63 po ssibility is determined but not their realization .

sc s in s s Cre a , re uming the foregoing discu sion , points — out that the reasoning of those philosophers s till not

mentioning any name — compel us to posit two principles (1 ) God knows the particulars only throug h\the ir general

2 s s s b order ( ) God know only that certain thing are pos i le , ’ ’ MAI MO NI DES VI EW AND CRESCAS S CO M M ENTS 1 03

1 64 a os te rior/ £ sides , even p Were He to know of the fact, a change in H is knowledge would be implied . Before the occurrence of the event He knew of it only as a possible ,

s and after it as actual . Crescas see in such an assumption ’ s s a shrinkage of God science , a dangerou doctrine , and sets

s s out in his acute manner to refute it . The e philo ophers ,

s s . In he ays , have not solved the doubt at all spite of their in sisting on unity by po siting that God knows things

s through the unified aspect , namely , the general order , the e

s s s philo opher , according to Cre cas , have not succeeded in

s removing multiplicity. True knowledge consist in knowing things through all their causes , mediate or immediate . Knowledge of compo sed things then would be perfect only when the elements of which they are composed would be

r s s conceived by the knowe , for the elements are cau e

s of thing , but the elements are many, there follows then

n that the knower must conceive the manifold . Again , eve if we grant that existing things form a kind O f unified order

c s w of perfe tion , thi ill be true only of the broadest genera ,

s s such as the divi ion of the kingdom , e . g . the vegetative ,

&c s animal , . , but con idering the narrower genera or the c spe ies , we find that one does not perfect the other, e . g .

has the horse no relation of perfection to the donkey .

If s we po it , then , of God a knowledge of genera , He cannot

s escape conceiving multiplicity . Thirdly , even if we a sume ’ that God s knowledge is limited to the spheres and in te lli ib l e s f s g , the di ficulty is not olved , for though they present a certain unity they also exhibit differentiation ; the knowledge of the differentiating aspect would then

’ “ 1 “ w e an ~ p 5nn nnxn p 5nn 1 7t nns w nu my on) mmm

‘ t ’ Adon ai 0 a O r . . 1 3 ny l 1 5 PR , , p 3 ’ ’ I o 4 MAI M O NID ES V i Ew AND C RESCAS S C O M M ENTS

1 65 l imply multiplicity . Lastly , there is an astrologica

c s G e rsonide s att ri argument dire ted chiefly again t , who

e s butes great influence to the spher s and constellation .

c s s s The knowledge of parti ular by God ari e , according to

s s him , out of the order of the heavenly phere , which order is due to the various combination s of the constellation s .

But the combination s may be infinite ; for the great circle

s is is s . in the phere a quantity , and it infinitely divi ible

It s can follows , then , that the arrangement be infinite , and ’ so God s science does not e s cape multiplicity .

It is e the n evid nt , then , that principal object in removi g the manifo ld from D ivine knowledge has not been obtained .

But there is still a greater error . The followers of the

the o r in d s t d foregoing y , their en eavour to put forth an exal e

o f G ct s conception od , have attributed to Him imperfe ion ,

If s ss . sa namely, finitene , as they y, God doe not know

c s as c ws s e the parti ular parti ulars, it follo , inc the number

s is ss ss s of particular thing infinite , that He po e e ignorance ’ a and a e a in reg rd to the infinite, th t the r l tion of God s

H is a is as knowledge to ignor nce the finite to the infinite ,

s is for the number of things that He doe know finite .

e s Again , if God do not know beforehand which of the two

s s e s s possible ide of an event will be r alized , it appear , ince

the possible events are incomparably greater than the

c s is s ne es ary ones , that God ignorant of mo t of the hap

e in s s s s s n . L t d p g of the world a ly , tho e philo opher , in or er

to avoid the a ssumption of the po ssibility of a change in ’ s God s knowledge , a serted that God does not know of the

' 1 65 Di i ni nwn omni s 55m an on 7m np wn nnnnnn Jm nit: ni n rm ni sfii nnb nm was: “ 11 83 DH’W‘NW nn nmn chate au ’ uni on: annn 5 s: ni nr n nn nunn on e no: Di sbnno on fi rm

' ' ’ O r Adonai o b D vi i nan mm 73 : m3 , , p . s .

’ ’ 1 06 M AI M O NID ES Vi Ew AND C RESCAS S CO M M ENTS

assumes that all attributes and knowledge included are s aid to differ in their application to God and man only

. M aim o n idian in degree , but not in kind The solution

of the problem of prescience and the possible falls then ,

1 67 the foundation being undermined .

a s assa Ge rson ide s s Ag in t the ilment of , Cresca steps

as a e forth defend r of Maimonides . Knowledge attributed

man s s to God and mu t be in an ab olute homonymous way .

It sa s cannot be id that it differ only in degree , for the content

c s of any attribute predi ated of thing and differing in degree , is s s the ame , no matter how widely the degree it may

a o s c ff as s connote in v ri u appli ations may di er, , for in tance ,

x s is s s the content of e i tence , which predicated of ub tance

1 68 as as s s well of other thing . The content in both predi c s are sa s ation the me , namely being , but the degree are

s s s s s s variou ; ub tance exi t through it elf, while the other

s s things e xi st thro ugh the ubstance . But in peaking of

s c H is is the knowledge of God , in e knowledge a kind of

s ss c is es ential thing , and His e en e different from ours in

s sa s H is . kind , it follow that the me will be aid of knowledge

I i e c t s true that n gatively , when onceiving the attributes

s no t under a negative a pect , namely knowledge , denoting

x s e - e s , t , ignorant e i t nt , not non xisten the content are one when e mployed of God and man . But when applying

s s s these attribute in a po itive way , we mu t admit that the I application is homonymou s . t is evident from the ex

so a s position , and more on re ding the original , that Cresca f find s himself in his defe nce in a rather di ficult position .

1 57 M il am ot . h , III , 3

1 68 n i r ate o rie s The w o rdi n the t e x t is manna which me a s l te all C g , , y b ut to o n e w ho is n ot acquain te dw ith the Aristote lian co n ce ptio n of

b e co n usin C ate g o rie s the wo rdhe re w ould f g . ’ ’ M AI MONI DES VI EW AND C RESCAS S CO M M ENTS 1 0 7

s He apparently contradicts him elf in defending Maimonides , and in assuming the homonymy theory he changes his own

1 60 s s s c attitude which he expre sed in his fir t e tion , where he

s distinctly state that existence , when applied to God and

s man , is not used absolutely homonymou ly , but in a kind 1 70 — ss s s of non e ential likeness , and he peak definitely of

is f . a dif erence in degree However , the contradiction removed by his insi sting on the di stinction between a

s a negative proposition and a po itive , and claiming th t

s s while the negative content may have a likene s , the po itive

s s S which we are going to as ume may differ ab olutely . till ,

s is s Crescas admit that it only defensive , but he him elf probably hold s a different View . Toward s the end of the ‘ s : argument he remark Be it whichever way , whether following the master (Maimonides) that knowledge is applied homonymous ly or that there is only a difference

s of degree as we say , and denotes an es ential attribute

s the s as we howed in third ection of the first tractate ,

’”1 it remains for us to solve the q uestion in a different way .

c s his re al Cres a then proceeds to state own View . The and special distinction between the knowledge of God an d

s is H is d c our that knowle ge is a tive and causal , and O urs derivative . Through His knowledge and true plan of His w s s ill , the known exi ting thing have acquired their

is existence . Our knowledge derived from the existing

9 1 6 i e t ii i 2 2 an u r Adon I s c . a ds a Se e O r a . ch II 2 , , p , , . . , p , 1 7° The e b re w w ordis which is to b e tran s ate b h h H DIED , l d y t e w ole

hrase c Maim on ide s n 3 . p ; p . , nun 1 1 1 5 , p 43 1 71 or: nan "m: nip : nine : nww DR nm i n own n~n~ w 71 m m 5 uni s manure in: ininsv ni nn 51 : m m nini m nD‘7P3 ame n ’ ’ - Nn nosnnn i n 553 3 mp e in: mmsvSni nn run zi ne in: in mauve no 7m»: 7m: mp son nnn: arrow 1 31 51 : 7w

' ' O r Adonai . 2 b . l l lvw, , p 3 ’ ’ 1 0 8 MAI M O NID ES Vi Ew AND C RESCAS S C O M M ENTS“

”2 s e s s thing by m ans of the en es and imagination . This f fundamental dif erence will remove all objections . First , in regard to God it cannot be said that knowledge of

e fo r is ext rnal things adds perfection , it this knowledge that

aus s s e c o s It is c e the exi t n e of ther thing . evident , there

o s s f re , that the thing themselve cannot add anything to their

s s c are cau e in e they dependent upon it . The difference

' between Crescas s point of view and that of Ge rso nide s

s b e ce s as the s mu t made l ar at the out et , olution of the

first objection by G e rson ide s s eem s to be s imilar in

1 73 u G e r o ni e s a s s o f the a lang age . s d l s o peak f ct that the e xi stence of other things is d e pendent upon the existence ’ o s c o o e s is of God , and that G d oncepti n of th r thing derived

c ce o o f H is e f c s s through the on pti n s lf. The di ference on i ts

s G e rson ide s e e in thi , that l ft out the voluntary lement ; the

G o d G e rso n ide s as as s of , well of ome others of the Peri

ate tic e s was a rf p follow r , to certain degree an impe ect

e so . sa is s s p r nality God , they y, the cau e of exi tence , but

o a a o not directly , nly through kind of eman ti n by means of ce rtain e manative beings which fo rm a channel of

H e o ws w s a s . s c u ality kn the being by kno ing Him elf, but

H e kno ws th e m o nly by m e ans o f the general order ;

s I the detail wer e left to the o th e r emanated beings . t is

thi s loophole that enabled Crescas to overthrow the whole

G e rso n idian s u e and s w its ca s tr ctur , ho logi l un oundness

s e e his a ( argument above). The great f ilure of the Peri

p at e tic philo sophical th e o logian s was that they stopped

midway between an absolute personality of God and an

” “ - " 2 urn wi n mi n now ii nv' 1 ’5 mm ; i”: mum W W W ’ - U mn nurse s : D nuni: nni i aN nn n n mwsnn ai m i n u u p p . p

1 do ai m m Or A n . 2 b 1 . 3 , , p 3 1 ' s ' M zl am ot 2 an de x os itio n ab o e . h , III , , p v

, ’ I I O MAI M ONI DES VI EW AND C RESCAS S COM M ENTS

Crescas then proceeds to discuss the objections which

s . he term partial The question , How can knowledge com prehend an infinite number of things ? is answered by maintaining that the objection would be valid if the know

o f as is ledge were a finite kind such the human , but since

s s is ffi it i it elf infinite there no di culty . The contention ’ that God s knowledge may be infinite is strictly connected with the possibility of the exi stence of an infinite numbe r

s s c . of effects , and this is maintained by Cre ca ( p above , chapter I of thi s work). The Second argument insisting that foreknowledge of a thing implies already the existence

is s s t of the thing known , for it thi that con titu es true knowledge , is met by Crescas in the following manner.

s s s is The a ertion , he say , true of human knowledge which ’ is derivative , but not of God s ; His prescience of a thing

s is is c that it will exi t real and true , for it that whi h assures the thing its exi stence . The other difficulty connected

s with the que tion of prescience , the one of change , namely , that there is a change in the status of the thing from being

n s a future happeni g to a pa t occurrence , and therefore also

s f a change in the knowledge of it , doe not af ect the know

O f s o ledge God , for He know bef rehand that at a certain time t he event will happen . He finally arrives at the most f di ficult part of the problem , the compatibility of the ’ s exi stence of the possible with God prescience . How can we call a thing possible when God knows beforehand whichever way it is going to happen ? Here Cresca s gives us a glimp se of his theory of an apparent or nominal

s s e s po sible . His consi tency in r fu ing to admit any ’ shri n kage in God s prescience forces him to abandon

fre e do m o f a great part of the I the will . A thing, he says , , ’ MAI MO NI DES VI EW AND C RESCAS S C O M M ENTS I I I

1 75 may be necessary in one way and possible in another. As an example he cites the knowledge which a man has

n s s of certai things that are pos ible of exi tence , as most

ne ce ssi things are . The knowledge that we have of them

is tates their existing, for knowledge an agreement of the

s mental idea with the things exi sting . Yet this knowledge

s doe not change their nature of being po ssible of existence .

In mi a si lar way , the knowledge of God knowing the way which man will elect does not Change the nature of the

It s possibility . mu t be admitted that the example is not

s s is a os teriori happily cho en , for human knowledge ofthing p ,

s is s the pos ibility of the existence already a pa t thing, w s a riori hile the knowledge of God which we peak of is p ,

In s s s . and the po sibility is till exi ting addition , human

is is knowledge not causal , while that of God , and His

s f prescience mu t af ect the future occurrence , unless we ’ ass ume with Saadia that God s knowledge is not the cause

s of thing ; but Crescas really argued the contrary . How

is in ever, the question taken up again connexion with

s s freedom of the will , and he solve it quite dexterou ly . ’ It is a mooted que stion whether Spinoza s reputed impersonality of God is so complete as many of his inter 1 76 re te p rs want to attribute to him . There are others who assert that in Spite O f some passages which lend themselves

S is no t to such an interpretation , the God of pinoza entirely 1 77 s ss s S robbed of con ciou sne . The que tion what pinoza ’ meant by God s knowledge or intellect is dependent on

s the previous conception . The language is confu ing , and

”5 no as: T im: n an nii nw p an p am i s ty no: nSnsnni ni ni

’ ' ; O r A n az a. 1 11 1 73 an in nrn T n R5 do p . 3 v , , 3 7 1 6 K i h r in C . . sc e S oz a 6 6 p F , p , p . 3 . 1 77 Z ur der L re n oz s o e Gen eszs eh S i a 1 6 . J l , p , p . ’ ’ 1 1 2 M AI M O N I DES Vi Ew AND C RESCAS S CO M M ENTS

. It the passages often ambiguous seems , however, that a certain discrepancy exists between his earlier remarks on the subject o f D ivine knowledge in the Cog itata M e ta

h sica E thics . In p y and that of the the former , his language is c hiIO SO hie o - more in ac ord with the p p theological terms .

s s s s He attribute omni cience to God , and of ingular more

s In s than of universal . his polemic against those that want ’ c s a s s s to ex lude ingul r from God s cience , he remind us of 1 78 s Maimonide in denying any e xi stence to universal s . He

S a s further pe k of God being the O bject of H is own thoughts .

In E thics s the , on the other hand , in the famous cholium

s II s E thics S to propo ition XV in the fir t book of , pinoza ‘ ’ e s r mark , that neither intellect nor will appertain to God s ’ e t s s s nature , y again , in the ame cholium he de cribes the way he attributes intellect and will to God in quite

M aim o n idian s s s s fa hion , in i ting on ab olute homonymy in

s s c appl ying the e attribute to God . Again , in a orollary

s II s S s s : to propo ition XXX , in the fir t book , pinoza ay

Will and intellect s tand in the same relation to the nature

of God as do motion and rest and absolutely all natural ’ ’ n s phe omena . This las t passag e Shows Spinoza View of

God to be impersonal ; yet he goes on to say in the s s V II II cholium to propo ition , book , that whatsoever can be perceive d by the infinite intellect as constituting the ’ ss s s a s e ence of ub tance belongs ltogether to one sub tance . ‘ ’ ffi What the word perceived mean s here is di cult to tell .

Joel conclude s that all that Spinoza means to say in the scholium is that there is no relation between the human

" 8 ' ai i M eta h t ch. ud n d o itata . C M m on ide s G e 1 8 a C . p . , , III , , g p , p II , 7

i n t un ive rsalium aute m de de re s re alite r e x is te n te s De um ig n orare statuun ,

uae n i e ntiam co nition e m q o n s unt n e cnl lam hab e n t p rae te r sing ular um e ss , g D e o afii ng unt

’ ’ 1 1 4 M AI M O NID ES Vi Ew AND C RESCAS S CO M M ENTS

s a ground of causal nece sity, but still the kinship of the

s . It , teaching cannot be denied is not definitely known whom Spinoza had in mind when he makes the statement in connexion with the intellect of God in the foregoing ‘ s s s passage , Thi eem to have been recognized by those who ’ ’ ’ ss r s s s have a e ted that God intellect , God will , and God ’ power are one and the same ; but that in Crescas this idea

is s . expre sed clearly is evident However, we shall return

s s to thi s subject later in the di cus ion on will an dcreation .

I s sa s c wi h nevertheless, to y a few word oncerning a . s s s s . S K Fi cher t nd on the ubject pinoza , in scholium

V II II E thics s s to proposition , book of his , in di cu sing

e s s c s ' the unity of thinking and xtended ub tan e , remark

‘ This truth seems to have been dimly reco gnized by those ’ s m e c Jew who aintained that God , God s intell t , and the ’ s a s s c . thing under tood by God are identi l Fi cher, in

1 83 s s s c quoting thi pas age , doe not atta h much importance

ss to any influence which it may po ibly indicate , but in note 34 in his Anhang he says : D erartige Vorahnungen einer Ide ntitat s p hil osop hie fi nde n s ich nicht wie man

s Ib n Es so gemeint hat bei Maimonides , ondern bei ra , in

' ‘ i i m E m n' 1 1 3 Ni?! " dessen b e r hm te Satz ( xod . m p 5 3

is (He alone knower , knowledge , and Why

Fi scher should se e in thi s dictum the foreshadowing of the

s s s e s is ffi c se e Spinozi tic identity of ub tanc di ult to , as well

Ib n E s as his di scovery of it in zra alone . Thi identical dictum is quoted al so by Maimonides in the eighth chapter ’ his s E s of treati e known as The ight Chapter , where he s s : It ss H is ay has been explained that He , ble ed be name , is H is s attribute , and His attributes are He , so that it is said of Him that He is the knowledge , the knower , and the

1 33 S in oz a 2 p , p . 73 . ’ ’ MAI MONI DES Vi Ew AND C RESCAS S COM M ENTS 1 1 5

f known ; He is life , living, and the cause of His own li e

r It was also quoted quite often by the Arabic philosophe s . This dictum does not contain any other idea than the Aristotelian conception that God is the object of His own thought , and it is quoted by Maimonides in this sense to ’ Show the difference between God s knowledge and that

s of man , which is something eparate from the subject ,

s the knower . The later commentator of Aristotle inter p re te dAristotle to mean that God in thinking of His own subject conceives ideas which are realized in the world as general principles , and so He knows . the universals .

It is Ib n E in this sense that it was used by zra , following the Arabic philosophers who maintained that God ’s science is only limited to general order , but no foreshadowing of S If pinoza can be seen in that dictum . any claim to

s fore hadowing is admitted on that basis alone , Maimonides surely cannot be excluded from being a forerunner of

S . pinoza , as has been shown That the origin of the dictum ’ is to be found in the Aristotelia n conception of God s

M e ta h sics XII has thinking quoted in p y , , 7 and 9, been 1 84 . S s pointed out by L . Stein Vestiges of a pinozi tic identity conception can be found only in Crescas , but of that later .

1 3 ‘ ’ IVille r hezt 0 1 1 6 . ny ei , pp . 7 , CHAPTER V

RO D ENC E OTENC E AN D REE LL P VI , P , F WI .

C RESCAS posits that the providence of God extend s

s . I also to particular , yet it is not entirely uniform t presents rather a kind of graded scale . It is in s ome

s s s a pect generic and univer al , and in some way individual . The general is again s ubdivided into a more general order where the system is natural law without any particular attention to the perfe ction of the species or individual

c a s c in luded , and into pe ial kind where the perfection of the unit is in some way taken into consideration .

the Again , the individual providence , though not in form

s s . of natural law and a kind of special , yet admit of divi ion

There is some kind in which the perfection of the provided

s is s individual completely taken into view , and ome kind in which the relation of Providence to the provided is not so ab solute in regard to their perfe ction . Crescas goes

s s is on to exemplify hi divi ion . The general Providence

its c s seen in every existing being , in ompo ition , natural

c s c s n . tenden ie , organi function , me tal powers , and so forth Although these forces vary according to the genus and the

1 1 8 PRO D ENC E POTENC E AND REE W VI , , F I LL

by Cre scas . The fact is that we observe at times that

s evil befall a man when he acts righteously, and again when

s the same man turns to the wrong path he ucceeds . This

fo r turn of events gives the case a problematic status ,

s whatever the man really is , not apparently , the re ults ought at lea st to follow in opposite directions . On the

r other hand , the denial of the predicate is cont avened by fact , for we find many evils that befall the righteous with

r . no pu pose for the good , and the opposite

s - s s Again , the olution of the quasi Ari totelian , which is - rather Neo Platonic , that evil has its origin in matter

has is s o and little to do with God , not sati fact ry , for that ’ simply leads to admit a shrinkage of God s power . G e rso nide s tried to solve thi s question in a peculiar

1 89 s . manner . Providence follows the intellectual cale Man through his reason and potential unity with the active

s s rea on tands in a certain relation to God . The more man

s his develop mental powers the nearer he comes to God ,

s i s s and o s aid to be under pecial Providence . On the

other hand , the one that neglects the cultivation of

the intellect is forsaken . The purpose of the special

Providence is to provide the d e serving with adequate

O . causes to btain the good However, exceptions to the

c s rule oc ur very often , and the cau e of these exceptions

is the influence of the spheres . The wicked sometimes

s S . pro per because of a certain idereal arrangement Again , the suffering of the righteou s may be explained through

s . As other causes al o for the influence of the spheres ,

though in particular cases it may be unjust , yet taken as

s a whole it tend for the good , preservation of the existence ,

” ' ‘ 1 3 C re scas re fe rs to Ge rso n ide s by the te rm IJ DJH 1 1 p some o f our

’

Adonai b . a e s O r . s g , , p 3 5 P RO D ENC E P OTENC E AND REE W 1 1 VI , , F ILL 9

In and general good . this way they tried to solve the problem of injustice as well as the question of evil , how th they can be related to God . The evil is severed from e It direct connexion with God . befalls man when forsaken

r s to the natural o der, caused by idereal or spherical 1 90 flue n in ce .

s Thi confused theory is justly rejected , for according

is u to it the main emphasis laid pon contemplation , and

ss a man can be as wicked as po ible , yet by virtue of his

t o S philosophical attainments be entitled pecial Providence ,

is which contrary to every religious principle . Again , the undue influence of the spheres cau ses shrinkage in D ivine providence . Crescas , therefore , propounds his own solution .

It s s is actuated by a deep religiou motive , but at the ame time by an exalted feeling which may compare in depth t o

c is the Kantian theory of ethi al autonomy . The real good

the the not material good , nor is the real bad material evil ,

s It a but the piritual . has been evidenced by experience th t practice of virtue brings about the acquisition by the soul

c s of a tenden y and inclination to virtue , and surely thi tendency is strengthened if it was there before . The more a man practi se s virtue under adverse circumstances the greater his perfection . It follows then that when the

s f r is s righteous uf e it really for their own good , for by thi

s c their perfection increa es , and their in lination is deepened , 1 9 1 which is the real good . Crescas does not exclude other

1 90 6 O r Adon ai 6 a hIzl a o . . h m t , , p 3 , IV ; 1 91 nm n uni nifiivanw nnomn nm p nn nnnxni w "VIN more nu norm; nth nan: nni p rai n on nmx i p inno Wm wan ni nnp mm 53: non mowni p an: nan urb an 71 6 1 :i niwn nonono R51 7 ni n mm mm Tm wh o ran run n~ n~ w T' Ni inmSw “ m un 51 mi n nunui nns nus: are run nan new: 3 1 0 1 n‘53 n ni n

“ Adn ai b . O r o . WDJH Rm, , p 3 7 1 2 0 P RO ENC E PO TENC E AND REE W VID , , F ILL poss ibilities s uch as have been put forth by previous

s as c e s an thinker , evil o curring to the right ou through ”2 ce stral s s . r s wrong or other cau es He ,howeve , doe not

ce wh suc ed with the other part of the problem , y the wicked

s e prosper . He resorts to the usual method mployed by

his c ss s . s ss is prede e or He remark , neverthele , that it possible that the good of the wicked is for the purpose

s a ss o s as of piritu l badne , but it d e not work out so well in the first ca se .

The question o f the exi stence of evil in thi s world is

s is s c an wered by him , that there not u h a thing in the

s O s world . We mu t b erve here that all these philosophers have never reflected upon the natural evil which abound s

SO much in the external world ; they co ncentrate their

s ss s s di cu ions upon human event , and though the e may

s o a s s ari e thr ugh n tural agencie , yet the que tion of the wherefore o f such agencies of dest ruction has never been

a se w r ce t ken up , otherwi they ould form a bette con ption o s f natural law . Maimonides makes s ome remark on the s e c a ubj t ttributing evil to the imperfection of matter , but

s does not treat the problem s u ffi ciently . The bad thing that befall the righteou s have been shown to be for the

s as s purpo e of the good , and for the ufferings of the wicked s uch a phenomenon from the point of justice cannot be

s s a s . called but good . Cre cas here take up third que tion ’ It s can sa s has been a ked , How we y that God providence extend s to man ? Is it not a belittling of God to speak O f

as ? In s Him being interested in man an wer to this ,

1 9 2 Such a s oluti o n of the que stion was n o t un k no w n to the an cie n t

T h e i f O i x an An ti o n e b So hoce s is G re e k s . he w ol tr l og y o e dpus Re d g y p l

r i O i n h hi re n suffe r throu h no in t e wo ve n w ith that de a. e dpus a d is c ld g

u o i w ro n o f the ir o wn b ut b e caus e o f the an cie n t curs e o n the ho se f aus . g , L

1 2 2 PRO ENC E POT ENC E AND REE W VID , , F ILL

‘ ’ . i s s of God When say ng infinite in all re pects , Cre cas explains that he mean s by it the inclusion of seve ral ki nds

’95 infi n ite . of There may be , he says , an infinite in time

in s s s and an infinite trength , and he empha ize that God is s said to be infinite in both ways . He , however, expres es him self against a blind and extreme conception of omni potence . As it was mentioned , this infinity of potence is

s o d . t d b unde by rea on We cannot , therefore , attribute o Go

c s s s the ac ompli hment of a logical impo sibility , uch as the existence of two contraries in one thing at the same time . Such a limitation is really no contradiction to the concept

s n of omnipotent , for the ability to bring about the exi te ce

of a thing which cannot be conceived by reason is not

included at all by the word potence , and therefore the lack

is s afli rm of such potence not a defect . Likewi e , we can

c n1 53 wmn that God annot contradict the first axioms ,

mJIWN' h‘I , for their annulment would imply a concentration

t t . , of he con raries and such things He is , however not

bounded by experience ; we cannot a ssert that God cannot

do s uch things as are impossible according to our ex

e rie nce can p , for as long as reason possibly conceive it , 1 96 is it within His sphere of potency .

In ss connexion with his discu ion on potence , Crescas ’ makes a few remarks on Ari stotle s proof of the exi stence

of God and the conception of it . Aristotle , he says ,

has only proved through the eternity of movements the

existence of an infinite sepa rate force in time but not in

In s strength . other word , the God of Aristotle is not

I is S perfect . t true that the force moving the phere is

’ ” m ' 1 1 13 1: mm : :i 1 5 nn5 rn sn n 3 :i m ore 0mm ” " O r Adon ai b n 3 :i . 0 . p i : n :1 3 1 mm m1 : n , , p 4 1 96 I d bi . PRO DENC E POTENCE AND REE W 1 2 VI , , F ILL 3

’ t fi t t t d s t t t t e ernal or in ni e , bu i oe no follow ha i can move

s - s the daily phere in less than twenty four hour , and it may be limited by impotency . But the right conception is ,

s s he ay , that there is no relation between God and the things acted upon , for all determination arises from a c ertain relation , but when doing away with that relation

is s s s He neces arily omnipotent . Cresca goe on to say that the infinite potence in time and strength is not only

is potential but actual . The attribute of potence inde t e rm ine d fo r f is is , the oundation only will , and it this that is meant by infinite , namely, the impossibility of being 1 97 determined .

In comparing the Spinozistic theory of potence with

s that of Cre cas , we notice a striking resemblance not only S in conception but also in language . pinoza , as well as

s s Cre ca , conceives God to be omnipotent , and understands

s in s as s by it , at lea t formal language , the ame thing Cre cas , that ‘He decreed things through and purely from the liberty of His will It remind s us directly of the closing s n s ente ces of the preceding paragraph , where Cre cas emphasizes the relation O f potence to will and defines ’ s s God infinity to consi t in the lack of determination , which i ”9 s exactly what Spinoza means by the liberty of H is will .

Spinoza al so quote s in several places the fact that true

’ 200 things cannot become fal se by God s potence . It is true that the contents of the later (especially in the E thics)

97 1 r Ado ai O n 0 b 1 a. , pp . 4 , 4 1 98 Nos v e ro qui iam oste n dimus o mn iaade cre to D e i ab solute de pe nde re , die i mus de um e s se o m n ipote n te m ; at p o stquam in te l l e x imus cum quae dam ’ d re vi x me ra ib rtate s u vol n is e in de cum e sse immutab i l e m e c t e l e e u tat , ac d ,

Co i tataM e ta h Part II g p , , 9 . 1 99 Ethics Pro o sitio n X I , p VI . 20° E ’ l XL Cog izataM etap h ibid p . 493 ; p zsto a H I 1 1 2 PRO ENC E POT ENC E AND REE W 4 VID , , F ILL

Spinozistic conception of omnipotence is considerably different from that of Crescas . The impersonality of it

o and the mechanical interpretation are too patent to ign re , ’ s is s s while Cresca s View urely a per onal one . Crescas has not discu ssed the question whether God could create a nother world or a better one than the present , a question which is di scussed by Spinoza at great length in scholia to

s s II II his s E thics propo ition XV and XXX in fir t book of , and to which he give s a negative answer ; but from the ’ trend o f Cresca s s thought it canbe inferred that he wo uld

his s be forced , following the logic of rea oning , to assume

s If a s is . s s s e a imilar View , he in i t , God indet rminate and c a infinitely perfe t , wh t then prevented Him from creating that other world unless we Should attribute to Him

s imperfection . But Cre cas really never followed the logical

c s s s O ff con lu ion to the extreme , but alway turned at an angle (as has been remarked above in Chapter II concerning

s e s the unity of God). The ame occurr d here ; he use his definition of infinite potence rather to prove the possibility

c s creatio ex n ihil o c of mira le and , whi h really do not follow

s s s . logically . We hall return to thi ubject once again

FREE WI LL AND D ETERM IN I SM .

s s s o f Cre ca , in di cussing the very important question

s his free will and determini m , follows usual method in

s analysing all the points p ro and con tra. The pos ible

exists , for we observe that things have a number

s s s of cause , and ome of them are cognizable , other are

d is ss s s and wanting , an it po ible that all the cau es exi t

‘ s s c s s possible that ome do not exi t , and since the au e are only

possible then the things themselves are al so only possible .

1 2 6 PRO D ENC E POTENCE AND REE W VI , , F ILL

c potential to the actual . The ause of this change must

s as r be external , uch the agreement between the desi e

c is I and the imagination whi h the cause of the will . t is

n evident . therefore , that when the particular agreeme t

s is ss exi t s the will nece itated , and if we go on searching

s s s we hall di cover cause for the arrangement , and so

s further . On the other hand , we cannot as ume that the

s mover of the will is the will itself ; fir t , that would con t radict the principle that a thing being realized from the potential to the actual needs an external cause ; secondly,

as its s the will would require a preceding will cau e , and

s s so on to Finally , the pos ible doe not exist ’ s o was c a s on religiou gr und , for it a cepted th t God s cience extend s to particulars ; and if events are possible it

a s c can would contr dict the concept of pre cien e , for we hardly call it knowledge when the c o ntrary to it may

It s t s a ss c . oc ur follow , hen , that there exi ts kind of nece ity

s m s in the ord e r o f the world . The e are the argu ent

203 p ro and con tra.

c s a s s s Cres a , fter reviewing the e argument , come to the conclu sion that the possible exi sts in some a spect s and in

is s n o t s . some it doe exi t He , however, more inclined to

s s s ss s the d e termini tic ide . He assert that the po ible exi ts

In S s only in re gard to itself. pinozi tic language it mean s that when attended to i tself as an i solated phenomenon

ss it it is a po ible event , but that when attended to s

202 “pan mm “1 3 5 1 1 san s 1 n s 1 nn 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 13 12) m: ans aom ” 1 13 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 313 aaan n1 n1 'o Ds 01 51 133 3 o ans nm :i~ nn1 nan n1 1 nn - 1 n1 i 1 31 0 1 1 1) mia 1 1 sa5 n~n~ w os 1 n1 51 1 Damon nnap nn aan s 1 n1 nuwan1 nn1 1 na1 p ans j1 sana1 nn z1 ra51 51 mi n 5s nan 1 ns 1 1 n~1 ” r A o n ai 6 a h 3 3 O d p 4 . , ,

”3 a- b Ibid . . . , p 4 7 PRO DENC E PO TENC E AND REE W 1 2 VI , , F ILL 7

’ causes and viewed in the long chain of causality the eve nt

s is neces ary . He proceeds then to refute the arguments

s produced on behalf of the po sible , even in regard to its causes . The first argument saying that with some things it

s is possible that all their cause are found , and possible that

is s etitio rinci ii . It some do not exist , imply a p p p is just the possibility of their causes that we seek to establish . The second one that appeals to common s ens e and for which

is the fact adduced that man wills one thing or another , partakes of the same defect , for the theory of necessity

s s asserts that the will must have a cau e , and it is one cau e that makes him choose one way, and another cause that

e t makes him choose another way , and y will remains will

s e r so without trict mechanism , for the will p would probably

s s choose either of the possibilities , but the cau e pu hes it in one direction ; still the will it self does not feel any

ss nece ity . The other argument , appealing to everyday

s facts of endeavour and expenditure of energy , which te tify

s s c to the exi tence of the possible , proves only the exi ten e

ss er se s . of the po ible p , but not in respect to the cau es

Nay , even these very endeavours and exertions of energy are causes in the long chain of events that bring about the state of prosperity of the man who displays them ; for the causes are not determined or fixed , but can be

204 increased or diminished .

S u ss imilarly, the theory of ca sal nece ity does not find

O c s any bje tion from the religiou point of View. The question of the s up e rfluity of precepts and commandments

c s is s i n if the events are ne es itated , an wered a manner

9“ a C r s a Adon ai b 8 . e c s um u hi Or . s s s the r in th , pp 47 , 4 p o y e fo ll owin g

1 1 ‘ ’ w o rds : ms un 3 1 m ; ;1 1 1 n arrow h up on i NL) as un s 1 n n1 51 man rui ns: s 51 O sman ni anan n1 13 s1 1 nrnaz s 5s awnsn 1 2 8 P RO ENC E P OTENC E AND R EE W VID , , F ILL

s resembling the refutation of the last peculative argument . The precepts and commandments are causes in the long 205 R chain of events that lead up to a certain action . eward

' s an and puni hment , however , seem to form quite ob stacl e

r s to the theo y, for is it reasonable to peak of being punished or rewarded when there is a kind of necessity pervading human action ? Crescas nevertheless is not

s s s di mayed , and advances a peculiar hypothesi (we hall

find its counterpart in Spinoza): If we look upon reward and puni shment as the effects of O b se rving the precepts

~ s s is s as and their transgre sion there no injustice, ju t there is no injustice in the fact that a man is scorched on

n c s touching fire , eve when that touching is a compli hed

In S is without any wilful inclination . hort , there a strict cau se and effect necessity which brings about that punish ment should follow from one or reward from the other with the same force as any natural phenomenon follows from

206 its cau se . The View of Cresca s on the question of determinism and free will is already apparent though presented in an

um s ss er se . s indirect way To up , event are po ible p but

s s s necessary through their cau e , and the one doe not conflict with the other . The potentiality of the primal

c s s s matter , ac ording to the Ari totelian conception , erve

20“ 1 1 n1 s 5 nn~ n1 3 0 mm : no anm mar/51 s ni anan 13 s 53 s n1 1 1 1 1 1z1 n1 :i o 1 1 n1 1 : n1 1 mie n n1 53 n5 53 s n5ozi5 n1 an1 sn1 numn

‘ u 1 Ibzd n1 :1 0n ni aam 01m m n awas an arts 0 ana5, . 51 13 1 1 1 1 1 n ns w nunwp ro non nann 1 1 s n: 1 1 1 m m: ni ns i

00 3 1 073 7! mnnn (p e rhap s mama) n1 a:1 1 1 n1 n1 1 a1 3 1 1 n13 nwnnn 1 1 1 mm 5s nuap n 51 1 1 1 1 1 1 s w 1 13 : 51 1 1 ow n on: ans 1 s 5 nan mnon 1 1a

1 sa h 5irz 1 n3 a nn~ n os 1 at/1 1:1 ws n an dfurthe r i n the pag e , 1 p fi

1 Or Adon at nz on 113 3 3 1 mm arena: 1 a3 1 1 n13 W13 1 ni p nw1 wua s 51 , , 8 a p . 4 .

1 0 P RO DENC E POTENCE AND REE W 3 VI , , F I LL knowledge of the future is like His knowledge of things existing which does not impart an essential necessity to them , for there is still some room for the poss ible in so far as endeavours and attempts are factors in the decision .

ut s f f r B that doe not a fect the knowledge of God , o in whichever way the event may result He would have known

209 s it beforehand . We have een above that this same ’ remark of God s science being above time was as well

s as the last as ertions already advanced by Saadia . The originality in Crescas consists in his conception of the nature of events , and in admitting only a partial kind of freedom , an anticipation which was followed by great

s philo ophers . ’ Spinoza s View on the question of determinis m resembles

s its s that of Cre cas in a good many ways , especially in fir t stage , for in his View there is to be noticed a kind of gradation which is apparent when we compare his earli e r

itaa M e ta h sica his E th s Co t ics . writing , the , g p y , with

s s s Spinoza , more than Cre ca , mu t , by the virtue of his

s s s causalistic c whole ystem , viewing thing in a trictly hain ,

s e t his be a determini t , y in early work he attempts a reconciliation between necessity and liberty which looks

In o tata M e a C re scasian . C i t almost , even in language g 21 0 ‘ h s ca s : If p y i he ays we attend to our nature , we are free in our action s and deliberate about many things for the

s s s . ole reason becau e we wi h to On the other hand , if we attend to the D ivine nature we perceive clearly and

209 ai 8 b O r Adon . , p 4 . ‘ “ 0 I adn ostram n aturam atte ndamus o itata M eta h Pars ch . Si C g p , , 3 ,

s mut s i te r i um n os in n o stris actionibus e ss e l ib e ro , e t de l i de l b e rare p rop dsol [ quo dvo lumus s i e tiam adde i n aturam atte n damus ut m odo oste n dimus Clare , e t distin cte e rci imus o mn iaab i s o e nde re n ihil ue e xis te re n isi uod p p , p p , q q ’ ab x t ae te rn o aD e o de cre tum e st ut e is ta. PRO DENCE POTENCE AND REE W . 1 1 VI , , F ILL 3

distinctly that everything depends upon Him , and nothing exists except that which was eternally decreed by God

s that it should exist He expre ses, however, his ignorance

’ to conceive how both necessity and liberty are compatible, and s imply says that there are many things that escape human comprehension . Again , in the same work in the

S s second part , pinoza as erts once more the liberty of man , in spite of his taking cognizance of the causal force which f 21 1 impels the mind to a firm or negate . He does not explain

s how the thing is accompli hed , but in a previous section

21 2 S . pinoza again declares his ignorance We see , there

S s fore , that pinoza grapple with the problem in the same

ss manner as Crescas does , and like him a umes that actions

ss er se c ss c . are po ible p , and ne e ary through the ausal chain

But we mu st admit that Spinoza does not carry that

s principle out with the same con istency as Crescas , and later abandons human freedom entirely , and then again speaks in its name trying to save it at least in a shadowy form .

Fi scher insists that even in Cog itataM e tap hys icaSpinoza

s is already an avowed and thorough determini t , and con st rue s his confession of ignorance in respect to the way human liberty exists in spite of necessity to mean that

21 3 we conceive that human liberty does not exist . He

ss s s s his quotes a number of pa age to ub tantiate view, but in reality these passages do not add more to what is said

s e his s in the pas age quoted wher Spinozamakes confe sion . All that they Show is that Spinoza recognizes the chain

s of neces ity , and that man is a part of nature , but this

al so s is contained in the pas age quoted above . On the

21 1 o ataM e a h Par II ch 1 2 C it t . s 0 g p , , . , p . 5 3 . 21 2 21 3 ch. 1 1 , 00 , S in oz a 08 , p 5 p , p . 3 . 1 2 P RO DENC E POTENC E AND REE W L 3 VI , , F I L

fi s s fact s which other ha d , Fi cher fail to explain a decidedly ’ Shows that there are two stages in Spinoza s conception ’ fr ui e e ddm . s s B r an of Thi is the famou example of d s ass .

In his earlier work (Cog itataM e tap hysica) Spinoza asserts that were a man placed in s uch an equilibrium of forces

e s to . di of hunger , he would not be con idered a man but 21 4 s . the most tupid donkey On the other hand , in the

E thics s is S a s , the ame example quoted , and pinoz remark I am quite ready to admit that a man placed in the equi

s o f If I librium de cribed would die hunger and thirst . am asked whether such a one should not rather be con sidered an ’21 5 ass I s I S than a man , an wer that do not know . pinoza agrees with Cresca s in the theological question of punish

. s s s ment The wicked , he ay , are puni hed by a decree

ask s s of God , and if you why they hould be puni hed

S c ince they are a ting from their own nature , we may reply ,

21 6 Why should poi sonou s s nakes be exterminated ? In his

21 7 s is letter to Oldenburg , a more triking example given ‘ s s He who goe mad from the bite of a dog is excu able , ’ is s s is s yet he rightly uffocated . Thi exactly the ame as the saying by Crescas that whoever touches fire must be burned .

In E thics S s s s . the , pinoza become an ab olute determini t

2“ ‘ Co ztataM e ta h Pars ch 1 1 uo daute m an imatan te m o te n tiam g p II , . Q p hab e at quamv is a n ul lis re b us e x te rn is de te rmin e tur co mmodiss ime e x p l icari o te st e x e m in ae B uridian i Si e n im homin e m oco asinae o n amus p pl o as . l p in tai ae uilib rio itum h m o o r r itan e s e d ro tur issimo l q pos , o n n p o e cog t p p ’ asi no cri t hab e n dus s i ame e t site e re at , f p 21 5 E tl n ium to ro os itio n XL X cs s cho . , l p p I 21 6 o i tataM e a Par ch 8 At re s o d e tiam x de cre t di in o C t h s . n e o e o g p , II , p v e sse ut p uniatur e t Si tan tum illi quos n o n n isi e x l ib e rtate fi n g imus p e ccare e sse n t un ie n i x m in re con antur e x di cur hom n e s se rp e n te s v e n on osos e te r a , p , ’ n atura n im r e p o p riatan tum pe ccan t n e cal iudp oss unt . 2" E zs l XL] p . .

1 PRO D ENC E POTENCE AND REE W L 3 4 VI , , F IL

- ' ” is conce ive dto have force for continuing in existence? 2 It is clear from the foregoing that man does possess a kind of determination and is not merely mechanically acted

- upon . The idea of self preservation carries in itself already the conception of a struggle, there is something external which tends to destroy the individual or to pe rvert it

from developing according to its own laws ; it is against thi s external force that the power of self- p reservation

battles . This is well recognized by Spinoza when he says : ‘ c s s is The for e whereby a man persi t in existing limited ,

and is infinitely s urpassed by the power of external ’223 ‘ ’ cau s es . The term infinitely may probably refer to

s s physical exi tence , but not to exi tence according to its

s s h w own law , for otherwi e it is impossible to conceive o

man can ever become free even in the Spinozistic fashion .

his Hence follows the bondage of man , which means sub

je ction to emotions and passions the cau ses of which are

s his . external , and do not follow from the law of nature

Where then is the way to freedom ? This consists

simply in po siting against a lower emotion which intends

22“ s s to en lave the activitie of man another one , for an emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another 225 It one contrary thereto and with more power . is here

s as s that knowledge come in a potent factor , for by mean

of it man can discern what is useful to him , and so perceive

226 his o wn . s s being A cending in the cale of knowledge,

we find that the highest point is to know God , which in

s other word means to know true nature and its unfoldings , ’ I man s own powers included . t follows then that when

man reaches that state or is on the path to it that he is

222 223 2“ d IV d I Ibi . . Ethics 2 6 de m on . Ibi . II . , IV, , , , , 5

225 ”5 bid 2 I id 5 I . 0. b , , , PRO DEN E OTENCE AND REE W LL 1 VI C , P , F I 3 5

r said to be free, for viewing things unde the species of 227 r s eason , he must nece sarily follow the laws of his own nature and avoid things which tend to sway him from that S or subject him to bondage . pinoza goes on to show in detail the way man frees himself ; and his ethical con

e i n c p t o is evolved through that notion of freedom . But w that does not concern us here . What we wish to Sho is the generation of that freedom , and what it is . To sum ’ ’ S s is -willist s up , pinoza freedom not a free freedom , but a reasonable intrinsic necessity , subject to immutable laws , as against a slavish irrational necessity subject to external

s s s causes the re ult of which tend toward de truction . This human freedom correspond s exactly to that D ivine freedom

S his of which pinoza speaks in first book , where the main element consi sts in the absence of external forces coercing it . What interests us mainly in the theory is the re cog ni tion of the struggle , and the consideration of the human power as a factor in bringing about the result , the same steps which were taken by Crescas to liberate man and restore to him a part of his lost freedom .

s S As regard the question of evil , pinoza gives on that point a clear and more comprehensive explanation than

H is s that of Crescas . View is analogou to that of the

Peripatetics who saw in evil a kind of imperfection which cannot be attributed to God but to matter . Spinoza denies

228 s entirely the po itive existence of evil and error, for in so

s is far as any act of evil expre ses reality it not evil , the badness of it comes only in comparison with another act 229 is of more perfection , and so the whole conception of it

23 0 only human .

223 227 h s 6 E i t XXIII dVl t Et ic , s . e o e n , IV , 7 p , . . ” 23 ° 9 XIX o itataM eta h I ch E ist . C I . 8 P . g P . , 1 . 1 PRO ENCE POTENC E AND REE W 3 6 VID , , F ILL

’

s . To return to Cresca , he feels that the question of conciliating D ivine ju stice with that of necessity ought

‘ s s d a to be di cu se more thoroughly . He ende voured to establish the difference between nece ssity without man

s s being con ciou of it , and that where the subject is con

I s ss s . t scious seem , neverthele , that ince reward and punishment are evolved from good and bad acts as effects

s is s s s from cause , there really no rea on for thi di tinction , for the cau se is a cause ju st the same whether accompanied

s s by con ciousne s or not . But then the whole foundation

D is of punishment , whether ivine or human , undermined , 23 1 for both assume this distinction as their basi s . Another diffi culty is raised by the qu e stion of dogma s . Religion

s its s c require adherent to believe in ertain dogmas , but what connexion has will with dogma ? Crescas produces

' three arguments against the possibility that will may be

- ss f. s is a nece ary element in belie Fir t , if will pre requisite

b ss ss to elief, then belief does not po e that kind of truth

i sse s s wh ch it claims to po s , for the nature of will carrie

s e s the pos ible with it , eith r man will to believe or not , and he may al so will contrarily in succession ; where then is ? S t a the truth econdly , belief implies tha a cert in thing

s s as so exi t outside of the mind well as in the mind , and if

can s what dependence it have on the will , e pecially if a certain kind of dogma is necessitated by proofs ? It is

ss impo ible not to believe it . What foundations have , then ,

23 2 the punitive measures attached to dogmas P

In s s s s an wer to these que tions , Cre cas reiterate his ’ doctrine that God s precepts act as cau ses in determining

D . human actions . ivine righteousness aim s at the good

23 1 ”2 Or Adonai b [ bid p . 49 . ,

C HAPTER VI

ELEOLOG AND ET CS T Y HI .

TH ERE are four possible ends which may be the goal

a t t t - t t t of human life , ( ) ei her he prac ical ethical , ha is , he

O f b perfection morals, ( ) or contemplation , or happiness ,

c d S . e which may be ( ) material , or ( ) piritual The obj ct

fo r is , then , to determine which of these is the final end ,

s while all may be mediate end , there must be a final one

is which the highest of all . Crescas proceeds then to eliminate some . Material happiness cannot be thought of as a final end in view of the fact that we posited as

s a possible end also piritual happiness . A final end must eo i so s p be the highe t ; but material happiness , no matter how great, is only temporal , while spiritual , meaning the

s . It s happine s of the soul , may be eternal follow that

for the balance is on the side of s oul happiness . As the

perfection of morals, though it is undoubtedly a great end ,

s it cannot be viewed as a final end . It i the means to purify the soul and overcome the passions that prevent

I s the s oul from reaching the desired perfection . t also help to bring out the latent qualities and develop the powers

s s . It of the soul , and as uch it is a sub idiary one is rather

an s S curious to hear such opinion from Cre cas , who howed

himself several times endowed with a true ethical spirit , I 3 9 1 40 TELEO LO GY AND ET HI CS

s s s and giving an autonomou ba i to good deeds , to speak of morality as preparatory to development of contemplative

23 5 power , the very idea which he immediately combats .

It may be explained that even Crescas had t o pay his toll to the spirit of the age .

Cre sca s devote s some attention to the di scu ssion of the c a perfection of thought and ontemplation as final end .

S s s Ge rson ide s s ome (mo t likely he refer to ), he say , have I d e ve lop e d such a theory . t is kno wn that the mind

s s s s become a similated with the conception it perceive .

n o s s I other w rds , the ub tance of the mind increases by

s a means of the conception , and so we have fin lly an acquired mind (n3p 3n53 w) which is to a c e rtain degree

f e a as s di ferent from the pot nti l mind , or , Ari totle called it ,

23 6 S s the passive mind . ince thi acquired mind is different

so as the s is from the potential in far la t only potence ,

G e rso nide s as well as Crescas in expo sition calls that

hiiul ian {5M m . It , after analogy of } , atter, potential is

S has c eternal in pite of being generated , for it no ause

S s of de struction ince it doe not contain anything material .

Eternal happiness will therefore consist in contemplation 23 7 is s as . and re on , for it thi only that gives immortality

c e The higher the onception , the greater the d gree of

23 5 na1 s 1 co m 71 3 1 : n ow not: mm on: 1 1 s n1 aon n1 o5wo51 s 1 one; msi m os i p n n1 1 s no o1 s o1 no nwap nm nns 5n moo aon1 n1 5: airs mm 1 1 3 3 5 (Pe rhap s nno5 n1 3 n1 n1 3 ap o) n1 3 1 ap n n1 no

O r Adon ai 2 a- b n: n1 53 w1 on nysn, , p . 5 . ‘ ’ 23 5 f an ac uire d n o us was are ad tau ht b A e x an r T his ide a o q l y g y l de ,

hi o he rs o r e di t e m diae a o s b row . Se Z r e fro m w ho m the e v l p l p e ll e r, G e k

zam ot b Ge rso n ide s se c 1 chs 1 2 Phi lo o h 2 al so l t. . . s p . 6 l y , , p y, 9 ; , 23 7 1 1 1 11 1 1 2 a1 i1 nnp i n n1 53 w1 on ni ni on nn5snn n1 nn oi5

1 - 1 1 oumon 1 1 1 aws : n51 a1 an1 nn5snn man o n ouimo

" dn ai 2 h - O r A o . b aso l am ot h [313 mp , p 5 ; l se ct. 1 c s . 7 1 . p , , , 4

1 42 TELEO LO GY AND ETHICS

is t out of which it generated ; it follows, then , tha it is

o ut generated of nothing , which is contradictory to all principles . Again , there is a contradiction in terms in the dictum that reason acquires its essence th rough the con ce p tions . Which reason is meant here ? Shall we say

hiiul ian ? its s is the But es ence not acquired , it is given ; and the essence acquired through conceptions is something

f It s c di ferent . mu t then be the a quired reason ; but it is impossible to speak of it as reason since it does not exist

23 9 It is as yet . evident from the foregoing that the in te ll e ctualistic theory is untenable . It remain s for us to

find a te rtium quid which Shall serve as the final end leading to spiritual happiness and eternity . This Crescas 240 I finds in the love of God . t is not an intellectual concept ff by all means , and widely di erent from the Peripatetic

as as S s notion well the pinozi tic , though the intellect may

It s be a u seful ingredient in it . is best under tood and

s conceived after the consideration of three propo itions .

First that the human soul which is the form of the body is a spiritual being and potential in regard to conception .

s c s The e ond , that the perfect being love the good and

s as perfection , and that de ire for it well as its intensity is proportional to the degree of perfection the said being

ss s s . s s po e se Third , that love and inten ity of de ire for a thing are not related to the intellectual vigour employed 241 in conceiving that thing . The establi shment of these

s s three propo itions is very interesting , for the fir t proposi

” 2 1 1 1 woo osvno 5: 1en1e n1 1 nwn 1 : 1 1 95 1 an1 o nin aosonwono1

1 n n 1 1 1 nn 1 3 n 1 n1 n 5am n 1 n a: osp n w5m m) oh . 51 53 1m 1 3 n 1 1 1 s osvno s 1 no 1 Jaos n1 n ni p i n 53 m 5s 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 os 1 1 1 51 1 nno no

1 ‘ r donai a 1 1 r 1 i o z O A . . n oap sso 1 n no : as: 1 Iw1 o w a , , p 53 24° 2“ Ibi d b Ibid. a. ., p . 53 . , 54 TELEO LOGY AND ETHICS 1 43

m the tion contains in a short for psychology of Crescas , while the other two relate to the foundation of his ethical h t eory . The soul is the form of the body , for we see that on its departure the body becomes corrupted just as do

i t s things without form . Again , it is sp iritual , for posse ses

o n s p wers which are not depe dent on the sen es , such as I t e d . t t t imagina ion , m mory , an reason is po en ial of con ce tion s p or reasoning, for it is evident that it is the ubject

s of the rea oning power , since that one is related to the

s body by mean s of the oul . Crescas then endeavours to prove his statement that the soul is the subject of the

as potentiality . But it is objected that since the soul is f a orm it cannot be a subject , for forms are not subjects

s s s for other forms , we mu t therefore uppose that thi is 242 done through the medium of the body . This theory

s its is primarily Ari totelean in main concepts , except that f it di fers in the concept of immortality . The second proposition treati n g of perfection and the love

: is of good is evidenced from the following God , who the c source and fountain of all perfe tion , loves the good , for this can be seen through his causing general exi s tence of beings and the continual creation— here we see already the origin ‘ ’ e is c of the dictum , r ality good , whi h will play an im portant part later— and si nce the causality is all through

is ss is His will , it nece itated that the love of the good an I s H is . t s es ential conception of perfection follow , then , that the higher the perfection the stronger the love and

s the inten ity of the desire to do good , for God possesses the highest perfection and at the same time the strongest “ 3 will to do good as evidenced from creation . The third

242 It is all Aristote an l e . ’ 243 m m mp 7: 1 am ownw m » mnw m5 3: nm mn : n ma 1 44 TELEO LO GY AND ET HIC S

" ' i is inde e nd ~ one, asserting that ntensity of desire p ent of

s ‘ ‘ rea oning, is proved by definition of the terms . Will is a relation between the appetitive and the imaginative

s n power , and according to the degree of relatio will be

s s R s the inten ity of the de ire . ea on , on the other hand ,

s d t , t w d epend on concep s and principles bo h of ;, hich resi e

facult and ff in the reasoning y, , that faculty is di erent from

s the imaginative and appetitive . It i evident that intensity of desire is independent of reason . After establi shing these

' s s s his the o r of im three proposition , Cresca formulate y

and s as mortality purpo e , which follow a result of the

se s S c has s r premi . in e it been proved in the fir t p oposition

s is that the oul a spiritual being , it may be immortal

its after departure from the body , for it has no factors of

s s corruption . The econd proposition showed u that the love of the good is proportional to the degree of the per fe ctio n of the soul , the converse follows that the higher

It is the good loved , the higher the perfection . evident ,

is therefore , that the love of God , who infinitely good , is s s s neces ary for the perfection of the oul . A for the independence of thi s love of contemplation and intellectual 244 s s s exerci e , it was establi hed by the third propo ition .

I is ss the c t seen , then , that the e ential thing for perfe tion

s is of the oul something indep endent of contemplation ,

' and that is the love of God . Since we have seen that . ’ s ab o ut man his there is nothing la ting except soul , and man an» : imp air am am: inm5w5h am mm 13 5: ne inp - "m me nrm am e nm 553 : mwm n nxm n: 1 ' ai net m 5

1 nm$w$ m a mm mm m m: man: rm mwan u : p n y m m 5: n,

O r Adon az b , p . 54 . “4 “ own run nSa n 1 1 51 : n: mmp m nnnunwfin m anna) ~a51 anasamm nSnwnn nSuar r mm m m

1 46 TELEO LO GY AND ‘ ETHI CS is really one in genu s in regard to man and the

246 universe .

" o But in order to c nceive this purpose clearly , a little more di scus sion as regards the beco ming of the world is necessary . It is accepted that the universe in its manifold ne ss presents a certain unity and an interdependence o f its

s f parts . Thi unity would lead us to accept the unity o

o is s s s l . It purp se , but here a problem pre ent it e f to us

s s s c known that from the simple ari e the simple , and in e

G o d is a s s s c the b olute imple t being , when e then the multitude of comp o sit e beings ? The various an swers

s propo ed to that problem are in s ufficient . The theory

a s s s of eman tion . which ee in exi stence a gradual descend

sc s is a e ing ale from pure pirituality to materiality , in dequat , c for the probl e m is still there . When e the matter ? Another

sa c s c s explanation , ying that the au ed beings by being au ed ,

is ss s c s that , by being po ible of exi tence , acquire ompo ite

s s s ne s , and the lower the being in the cale of emanation

c s fo r s is s the greater the ompositenes , the cau e of it al o

ss s is is s po ible , ince it the third or fourth emanation , al o

s it weak . A thing may be compo ite in regard to s exist

c e s . s ff en e , but simple in r gard to e sence Cre cas o ers , c . It is ss therefore , his solution true that if the pro e of causation were a mechanical one there would be no place

for composition , but the fact is that it is a voluntary one .

It is is c s s and the will of God that the au e of all being ,

s it is through it that they arise . But here the que tion

s can w ? arise , How a simple being have more than one ill

o se e for in the p siting of the manifold , we shall have to

' “ “ 6 mu: n~ 53 nn am am mwm nw no: “ manna; np ? ~3 1 mm

- “ nmm sn wh imiv mm: mm nan Jinn nmp n nfi inn

’ " ' “ Or Adonat b nim N1 n no: me; n unn mm , p . 59 . , TELEO LOGY“ AND ETHI CS 1 47

a manifold expression of the will . To this Crescas replies l that the unity of the will consists in goodness . The wil 2” to do good and distributing it is the predominant feature (the real question of will as creative cause will be discussed

VII is . later in chapter , it only brought in here casually) It is already manifest that the purpose in the universe I . t is one is creative , not as an end to be realized , but as

s . a cau e The conception of it , according to Crescas , is best put in syllogi stic form . The will of God is the will

s a E s . to do good . xi tence or re lity is goodne s Hence the

s s its exi ting univer e carries own purpose within it . In comparing the Spinozi stic conception of the love

of z fo r s of God ( ) with that of Cre cas , we cannot help

c s noti ing the triking similarity in form , yet there is a vast

as s is ss difference to content . There much discu ion on

s S the ubject , by those who assert that pinoza in this important teaching of his was greatly influenced by

s s s Maimonides and Crescas , his predece sor , and tho e who

f s . t t deny such in luence Of the firs , the mos vigorou is ’ as s S Joel , who ventured to go as far to as ert that pinoza s ‘ ’ is expression , The intellectual love of God , borrowed ‘ ’ ’ s s s from two ources, the love from Cre ca , and intellectual 248 s as from Maimonide . That Joel went too far in his s his c s s s is ertion , and that onclu ion are unju tifiable, evident a s s . e from a trict compari on Howev r, thorough investi g atio n of the theory and that of Maimonides would be

beyond the limits of our work ; we shall , therefore , limit ourselves to Crescas .

2“ mm “me am w an wm é mm n~~n~ 5mm mm ne w nu — : numwm 5: nmSi— nnnnn mmmm nn nx m um run 7: a:

‘ " r du a m o A o m . 60 a. mum Bun hm Sa , , p 2“ ' ’ ' ' ' o e n oz as Theolo zsclz-P ol ztzscl zer Tractat orw ort X J l , s g , V , . L z 1 48 TELEO LOGY AND ETHICS

The conception of the love of God in Sp Inoz a fo rm

his s s an integral part of y tem , as any of his fundament :

‘ It is ideas . strictly connected with his co nce p tion r

as as his s f e freedom , well with p ychology . The re do r 249 S as is s n of pinoza , seen , freedom from emotion , and doi such things as foll o w from the very essence of man ar

s - s s tend to elf pre ervation . Thi freedom can be o b taine by inculcating in the mind a kind of controlling idea

as power . But in proportion a mental image is re fe rre

s so l ' to more object , it is more frequent or more often V Vl

250 c s . It s ti and o cupie the mind more follow , then , that

o f c s s 1 idea God , whi h really mean the comprehen ion

e c o f the h c ma the xa t order universe , and through w i h

251 s s s c is s idf conceive him elf clearly and di tin tly , uch an

”2 c e c tl whi h may control the mind , and th refore o cupy

a s ' Chief pl ce in it . Thi endeavour to reach the heigh

2 e s is fo r is of und r tanding termed love , love by definition pleasure accompanied with the idea of an external caus

In s c we s l e asui thi onception of God have plea ure, for p is defined as atransition fro m l esser to greater p e rfe ctior and in conc e iving the ideaof God we are acquiring g re atr

e c o is . VI perf ti n , that , more of reality and truth Again ,

s It is as conceive the cau ality in its fulle st aspect . l o t l highest virtue of the mind for virtue in the Spinozist

254 ! conceptio n is power o r man S e ssence . This love ari s 2 only through the third kind of knowledge , or intuition ,

ss ss ab solul namely , the po e ion of an adequate idea of the

ss ce c is c e en of God whi h eternal , for God is eternal , hen

249 250 a e r Ethics ro ositio n XI. C ab o e ch t . p . v , p VI , V , p p 251 252 i i Ibzd ro ositio n XVI. ro os t o n XV . . p p p p , 253 254 i f . 2 D f m Eth s de . e n i tio n o E o tion s 6 . c 4, p fi , , II , III , VIII , “55 k 2 ium i n XLI oo . Scho t ro osit o . l o p p , B II , p 3

1 50 TELEO LOGY AND ETHICS

i s ethical yearning , the econd by a kind of thought

s ab orption .

Looking upon those two kinds of the love of God from an ethical point of view , namely, valuing them as ethical factors in human life, the preference ought to be given

H is to that of Crescas . love of God is a glowing emotional

It is s force . a strong de ire to do good for the sake of

s is S God , for thi the way to perfection , while that of pinoza ,

s s is though erene and sublime , yet breathe cold there the

ss fate of nece ity hanging over it , and while it may endow c a man with a brave stoi ism and a kind of asceticism , yet

can s s - sacrifice it hardly arouse emotion of altrui m and self ,

is s c for it more of a negative than po itive chara ter .

That there is no purpose in nature fo llows from the

s s a ub whole y tem of Spinoz . He who sees everything s s ecie n ecessital is s c p and eternal law , mu t perfor e be a

s S stringent antagoni t of teleology . pinoza accordingly expresses him self in his scholium to the First Book of

E f/zics d e ploringly o f th os e who po sit final causes in the

s S world , or that God work for a certain end . uch a con ce t io n c is p , ac ording to him , a lowering of the notion of

s s a s e God , and he ay th t it aro e mer ly through human

is imagination . He , therefore , at the first glance , wholly

a sc s s contr dictory to Cre as , for the latter speak of a purpo e

as has on the part of God in creating the world , yet , been

s o f is already pointed out , the purpo e Crescas merely an

t is s . e hical one , and not an end but a cau e of beginning

As such all Spinozistic argument s against teleology fall

s s short of it . Cre cas , trengthened by the theory of purpose,

s c make his ethi al view , the will to do good , a cosmic prin ‘ ’ ci l e . s s p The purpose of Cre ca , if examined thoroughly ,

s s S s amounts almo t to the neces ity of pinoza, but thi will be brought out in the next chapter . T ELEO Locv AND ETHI CS 1 5 1

CHAPTER ‘ V II

D I N E IL AND REAT N VI W L C I O .

RESCAS s C , in ba ing his theory of creation , begins with a long pol e mical essay again st those who maintain the

as as s eternity of the world , well again t Maimonides and

G e rson ide s s s , examining the phy ical argument of the former , and proving the insufficiency of the defen ce of creation by

ss the latter . We thought it nece ary to omit all these

s as s s argument , mo t of them are based on a fal e and

s l antique view of nature . We hall imit ourselves to ’ s s s s s s Cre ca own view , and elect tho e point which have philos ophical value .

In his s as s introducing view , Cre c produce a general argument against those who po sited the co - eternity of

e — cs — e as as matt r the Peripateti Gentil well Jewish ,

If s G e rso nide s s . a repre enting the latter , he says , we have

e is e as is prov d , God to be conc ived the only being who

c ss s s ne e ary of exi tence , it follow that all other beings ,

s a s whether piritual or m terial , are po sible of existence and r e lated t o God as a fact to cau se in s ome way . We cannot s as co - s as - peak , therefore , of matter exi ting , but sub existing .

It is s brought about by God , and it doe not matter whether

s s that bringing about is by neces ity or free will . Cre cas here makes a peculiar use of the term creation . He does not endeavour to prove the novelty as ag ainst the eternity

M aim o nidian s creatzo ex i i/t i of the world in the sen e , but i l e

‘ was to him means that everything caused by God , and 1 52 TELEO LOGY AND ETHI CS

260 s outside Him nothing exi ts . There is , however, a great

' difi e re nce s whether we a sume the world eternal or novel ,

t s c s s t d for in he fir t a e we as ume the po ence of Go infinite , ’

. is in the other finite Moreover, since God s potence also e s s ternal , it follow that exi tence is produced by God always 261 s and neces arily .

s c s - o However , exi tence may be au ed by God in a two f ld

ff s way , either through emanation , where the e ect flow from

s wa . s s the cau e in a natural y, or through will Cre ca assumes that although the exi stence of the universe may c be ne essary , yet it is not through emanation but through

. S s will ince we conceive God as a thinking being, it follow that together with the bri nging about of exi sting thing there ought to be a conceptio n or presentatio n of that

s s s s exi tence . Again , a thinking principle will what it de ire ,

c ce c as . we therefore on ive reation through will Moreover , the theory of emanation will always have to grapple with

he the problem of the manifold and t one . Since we have

s s is s x s e tabli hed that God the ole principle of e i tence , the question of the exi stence of the composite is a menacing

s a e s one . We mu t therefore h v recour e to the theory of

E s as s the will . xi tence a whole is good , and from this ide

s s i It as far a it i good it s s imple . is true that viewing

is ss it from a different angle it manifold , but the goodne andperfection of existence consi st in the manifold being

o ne . It is is evident , therefore , that since reality good and

so as is s s e one , God in far He good mu t nece sarily cr ate ,

262 s hence the necessity of exi tence through will .

26° rm s 5w1 wi p m “ms mnmw mare m w» name: mum San

' Or A don at 6 a map use : mm 1 5, , p . 9 . 261 Ibid .

262 ‘ " “ i Furthe r lNlJD ne w Hm DIWD WIN DID NIHWTIDJ mun n m

1 54 T ELEO LO GY AND ET HI CS

s s : is s turn around and ays After all , the real truth a it is n ha ded over in tradition , that the world was created at ’ c . s s o at t a ertain time He he itate , h wever , accep ing it

its s ac aue a s sa is ss at urf e v l , and ttempt to y that it po ible that ther e are series of worlds continually being created

s and a ss and de troyed , th t the novelty expre ed in tradition

s se o . a refer only to the pre nt w rld At any r te , he does not c s . s s con ider it a dogma of faith Cre a here , like all such

c s s s s h s theologi al thinker . pay the price of topping hort of i

? 64 own logical conclu s ions by being inconsi stent ’ In comparing Spin o za s view o f creation with that of

s s we s e e as s a s ss s e Cre ca , , u u l , point of likene and di agr e

a c r ment . Spinoz d e fines reati o n as an o pe ation in which

a s s f there are no other c u e but the e ficient one , or that created thing s are s uch to whose exi stence nothing is

265 s o se S o a s s pre upp d but God . What pin z intend by thi d e finition is to e x clude not o nly a material cau se but al s o

? 66 as s f s the s a final , he him el explain in ame chapter

It is exactly in the same spirit that Crescas conceives ’ c s c c e a o as has e s . e s s e r ti n , be n hown Cr a whole tra tat ,

‘ ’ a o ce t he o f though n med C n rning Novelty the World ,

s o was ex n i/ziZo trie only to pr ve that the world created ,

as has s s s and , been hown , in the en e that nothing

a is c - exi sts outs ide Go d and th t matter not o exi sting .

Spinoza says that he omitted the word s ex i i i/t il e because thos e who use it con stru e it as if the n ihil is a s ubject out

26 7 of which things were creat e d In the same strain writes

204 Ibid.

“ 2 C re atione m e ss e o p e rati o n e m in quan ullaccausae p rae te r e fii cie n te m co n curran t Siv e re s cre ata e s t illa quae ade x is te n dum n ihil prae te r D e um , ’ rae su o nit die i mus I i tur Co itataM eta /z . Pars II X. p p p , g g p , , 26“ [ bid . p . 495 “ 7 ’ ‘ b d uin i i 7 6 n ihi n o n ut n e ation e m o m ne s re alitate s I z . . ll l g , p 494 Q con side rave run t s e dah uidre al e e ss e fi nx e runt aut imag in al e fue run t , q TELEOLO GY AND ET HI C S 1 55

’ ex m lzil o ii i/i i! Crescas , that his does not mean that is a t subject , but simply that there was no other outside subjec co - s existing with God . The fact that Crescas ees an end in ’ w S s the creation of the world , hile pinoza definition aims to

s exclude it , does not destroy the imilarity, for the end that S pinoza combats is an external one , but that of Crescas

s has ff is in the es ence of God , as been shown , and di ers but ’ s ss cc little from Spinoza nece ity a ording to his nature .

S s s c s pinoza , like Cre ca , comes to the onclu ion that the basi s fo r an eternal world is the conception of the infinite

? 68 S his s s n o t potence of God pinoza , in fir t attempt , was so eager to establi sh the eternity of the w o rld as much as

c s e w is the continuity of reation , for inc the ill of God

69 is a? s is eternal , creation etern l The ame thought found

s s as was s e . s is in Cre ca , hown abov Again , a imilarity also found in the conception of the will and intelligence

c I has of God as a reative power . t been already remarked 270 s s s s e t above that uch a imilarity exi t , y to reiterate in

S as as s s s passing , pinoza well Cresca ee in creation a kind

In t o s i II of rea sonable act . his s cholium propo it on XXX

E thics S s s in the First Book of , pinoza definitely ay that

e s s s s s an dso s God n ces arily under tand what He wi he , thing ’ s could not be different from what they are , for then God understanding ought to be different .

c s As for the divergen e , very little ought to be said , for ’ ae S s e n they r patent . pinoza term of creation conveys an It t ire ly different meaning from that of Crescas . is only a

s s convenient word , but in reality it carrie with it a neces ity , s c ss as c s e uch a ne e ity Cres as ought to scape , namely , an

2“ ‘ Nos il lam duratio n e m n o n e x s ola co n te mp latio ne cre atarum re rum ’ s e de x con te m latio n e in fi nitae De i t n tia dcre a dum in te ll e e p p o e e a n g re . ”9 27° C hap te r IV. s . no room in it for voluntary action in the usual sense It is . jus t thi s element that Cre s ca s introduces by his voluntary

s is s s creation . It true that Cre ca proves the necessity of c is ss reation by asserting that God e entially good , and that he doe s not conceive of the will o f God in the way that we speak ’ o f a s is s of that m n , but there the per onal element attached

c o t o S s s e . it , from whi h pin za trie to e cap The fact is that the o f s c o s immutability thing , whi h f rm a very important ’ S s s s is c c part in pinoza y tem , for it intimately onne ted with his prin cipl e that things fl o w fro m God in the same way as the e quality of the three angle s of the triangle to

a s was ss s s two right ngle , wholly mi ed by Cre ca . He , like

S o s s o f co o an pin za , peak ntinual creati n but with entirely

a s use o f t o different meaning , for he m ke it prove the c possibility of miracles . Up to a ertain point these two u a s b t . thinker go together , later they p rt company

It is difficult t o de scri b e d e finitely the extent of influence

m a e a e s c an earlier thinker y xert upon latter , pe ially when

l s no t s the atter doe name the fir t , but comparing the ideas ‘ ’ ss Ce imm M e ta /z siaz c a D e C re at io ne expre ed in g p y , h pter X , ,

s sc s s and tho e of Cre a , we find them decidedly imilar , and it is a p o ssibility that the latter took his cue from the form e r .

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a H as dai o s itio n o f in e w ish Ex iste nce o f God C re sc s , , J , p hi oso h ro e db Saadia 8 s p l p y , 7 p v y , q i oso h 2 b a a 1 s b n e w i s h h h . oo s o J p l p y, 5 y B y , 3 q k ’ hi ca as e ct o f C re s cas s b ae i 1 s philo so p l p y H l v 5 . , q thi n i n 2 b Ib n Daud 1 k g , 4 y , 7 i n o f Aris to t e ar um e n ts b Aristo t e 1 8 1 re utat o y l , f l , g , 9 M a ai n s t i n n ite 0 s . b aim o n ide s 2 s . g fi , 4 q y , 9 q ’ i n f Maim o n ide s roo s b C re scas re futat o o p f y , 59 s o f e x is te n ce o f G o d 54 q . by Sp in o z a 60 , , o w n p ro o f o f the e x is te n ce o f re latio n o f e x is te n ce o f Go d to e ss e n ce 6 G o d s . , 59 , 3 q i w n e sse n ce an d e x iste n ce E i in the w o r d ro b e m o f e d v e o , v l l , p l , so lv b Ib n Daud 6 3 sq . y , 9 3 i t s an dun i t 6 6 b y Mai m o n ide s 1 1 o n attr b ue y , 7, 9 , 7 n e mo ti o n a att ri b ut e s b C re scas 1 2 0 o l , 75 y , ’ f C re s cas t o S in o z as b S in o z a 1 re lat i o n o p y p , 3 5 ro o o f the e x i ste n ce o f Go d p f , F 6 0 s q . in i tude o f t i m e s ee Ti me F , n de x i te n e , o f v ie w o n e ss e ce an s c , o f o rce i n ab o d 2 f y , 3 6 4 o f s ace see S ace u p , p f ie w o f att ri b te s 1 s . o v , 7 q ishe r K un o ie w o n re atio n b e F , V l o f o e o f G o d 6 s Vi e w l v , 7 q tw e e n C re scas an d S in oz a p , s ie n ce 8 s . o n pre c , 9 q ’ 6 0 s q 74 ag ain st Mai m o n i de s V ie w o n ’ i n te rp re tat i o n o f Spino z as m e an p re s cie n ce 1 0 0 , in o f attribute s g , 73 ro i de n ce 1 1 6 on p v , orm re atio n to matte r F l , 3 3 , o n o te n ce 1 2 1 1 2 2 s . p , , q sta o f b o d acco rdi n o Aris tot e y y g t l , n e do m 1 2 o fre , 7 3 1 ' C re s cas s ie o f 2 D V w , 5 ran z Pico taian hi oso he r F , I l p l p , 45 e fe n ce o f re l i i o n caus e o f rise o f D g , re e m f h w i ro b e m of F do o t e ll p l , , e w i sh hi o so h 2 J p l p y , u u 8 disc ss e di n an tiq ity 4 sq . , D e mo cratus t he o r o f at o m s ado t e d , y p b Saadi a 86 y , i n Arab i c hi o s o h p l p y , 5 b ah a 8 B y , 9 ah a y D e s i n ar ume n t ro m . i n g , g f B y , a i s b e 0 . y H l v , 9 q 1 3 u 2 b Ab raham l b n Da d s . y , 9 q i n ae i 1 H l v , 5 b Mai mo n ide s s . y , 94 q D i o ue s o f P ato tran s ati o n o f al g l , l , 4 b C re scas 1 2 s . y , 7 q t h s he re s 2 1 D i v i n e l o v e m o vin e p , - , g in 1 1 s 1 s . 1 b S oz a . y p , 3 q , 3 3 q , 3 5 t w me an in s o f 6 o g , 7 an G fo r m , 77 ’ e rs o n ide s cri ti cis m o f Mai m o n ide s E G , f att rib ute s 6 0 the o ry o , Eman ati o n the o r o f 6 , y , an run o Gio rd o B , 45 ee Attrib ute s Emo ti o n al attri bute s s . o 2 , ace o f i n e w ish hi os h G odpl , J p l p y, ,

Em un ah Ramal i b o o o f 1 8 no te . , k , , u e f b e in 1 1 ca s o g , e n e re atio n to e x is te n ce 6 Es s c l , 3 i Ar stot e 2 1 , re latio n to t he w orldn i l , ’ Ib n Ros l i ds i e w o f 6 V , 3 as a e n t 1 2 ’ g , l b n Si n as ie w o f 6 V , 3 H is e x is te n ce an de ss e n ce 1 2 ’ , i e s cas s i e w o n 6 C V , 4 e s e cuati o n co ntinuation o f Gre k p l , , i n o z ao n 6 Sp , 4 e Ea t i n th s , 4 u 6 s 1 an dattrib te s . , 5 q , 7 s t rans atio n o f G re e k b o o k . l , 4 E rn i t o f the w o r d adm itte db te y l , y H A rro e s 6 ve , i tau ht b Ari sto t e 1 Hal e vi see J udah Hal e v g y l , 5 , n tia to G od 6 Ex ist e n ce o f G od ro o o f o ccu ie s H a in e ss div 1 n e e ss e l , 7 , p f , p p p , , e ro do tus 8 i m po rtan t place i n J e w ish phil o H , 4 o n ate 8 So h H om e r f , 4 p y , 3 ,

1 62 IND Ex

’ P e asure an d ain C r s ca s de fi n i S in o z a aruh l p , e s p , B c tio n o f r o of e x iste n ce of Go d 60 , 75 p o f , u de n e db S in o z a in f e n ce of C re scas on 6 1 s . fi y p , 77 l , q Po r h r co rre s nde nce i e wis M e e r p y 4 po w th , y , L y Po s i b e the e x i e f 2 6 2 s st n o 1 0 s . l , , ce , q , 1 2 n e n e i 5 o ss e ce an d x ste nce , 64 Pote n ce an att rib ute o f d a ia the o r o f att rib ute s 1 , Go , Sa d y , 7 , 73 o n 1 2 in fl ue n ce d C re s cas 1 , by , 7 , 73 Ib n Daudo n ie o n o e o f od , 1 7 v w l v G , 77 ’ Maim o n ide s o n 6 Q o n G o ds o m n is ci e n ce 1 1 2 1 1 , , , 4 C re scas o n 1 2 1 —2 s o n o te nce 1 2 , q . p , 3 S in o z ao n 1 2 o n re e dom 1 0 s 1 s p , 3 f , 3 q . , 3 3 q . ci e n ce divm o n e f 1 1 1 Pre s e and r d o o God 8 s . e e o m . , f , l v 4 , 49 q 77 , , Saadiao n 8 o n di v m e W i an dcre atio n 1 , 7 ll , 55 ah i ao n 8 Sub stan ce ne ce ssar for e x i ste n ce B , 9 , y , ae i o n 1 i e o f Ari to t e 1 8— 1 H l v , 9 v w s l 9 , l b n Daudo n 2 s o f Maim nide s , 9 q . o , 3 5 Mai m o n i de s o n 6 , 9 T ca n C re s s o 8 s . 1 1 2 , 9 q , 0 7, 9 G e rso n i de s o n 1 0 1 Te e o o dis cussion o f b C re scas , l l g , , y , y Pro i de n ce r b e o m of ace i 1 s . v , p l , pl n 3 9 q e w i sh hi h f J p l os o p , Tho u ht acti it o G o d 2 1 y 3 g , v y , Saadi ao n 88 att rib ute o f , , 73 ahi ao n 8 i fi ni u f c i n B , T m e . t de o a co rd to 9 , g ae i n H l v o , 0 9 1 Saadi a 9 , , 9 M ai m o n ide s o n di is i o n o f I O , 9 7 v , C re scas o n 1 1 0 ah ao n 1 , B y , 3 Ps ams ro b e m of in ustice re e rre d an dm o ti o n 2 l , p l , j f , 3 to in 8 e t rn i t f , 5 e y o , 3 3 ’ Ps cho o ace in e w ish hi o C re scas s de n i t i o n o f 2 y l g y, pl J p l fi , 54 so h Truth adi i n e attri b ute 1 8 p y, , 3 v , o f C re 2 scas , 1 4 U

n it o f Go d tau ht b Saadia 1 1 R U y , g y , b ah a 1 y B y , 4 Re ward an d pun ishm e nt i o bl e m , p b Ib n Daud 1 y , 7 o f i n C re scas 1 6 1 , , 3 , 3 7 b Aristo t e 2 0 y l , Re s i s tance de te rm i n i n facto r i n , g i n ide s 6 b y M amo , 3 5, 3 m o t i o n 8 ’ , 4 , 53 imo nide s ie b criti cis m o f Ma v w , y C r scas 6 e , 5 , 57 do ub e me an i n o f 0 S l g , 7

Saadi a b e n o se h e i sh hi o s J p , J w p l V so he r p , 7 acuum n ot e x is tin accordin to V , g , g ro o s fo r t he e x is te nce o f God p f , 1 s Aris to tl e , 4 q .

8 s . q x te n o f tau ht b C re scas e i s ce , g y , o n un i t o f God 1 1 y , 43 SQ o n attri b ute s 1 2 , W o n re e do m 86 f , o n re s i c di i attribute 1 8 p ce n e 8 W ill v ne , , 7 , ’ ’ S ace m o e me n t i n A i S in o z as ie w o n 1 1 2 1 1 p , v , r s totl e s Vie w p V , , 4 o f 1 s de n itio n of b C re scas 1 , 4 q . fi , y , 47 in n ite wi andcre atio n 1 2 fi , 45 ll , 5 de n itio n o f b Ari s S in o z aon 1 , to tl e p , 55 fi y , 47 ’ C re scas s de n i i \Vis d0m adi ine attribute 68 t on 8 , v , fi , 4 S in oz a aruch co mm nd re p , B , e s C s ’ X cas s ro o o f e x i n f p f ste ce o G o d, X n ho n bo ok o f 59 e o p , , 95 C O L U M B I A U N I V E R SI T Y P R E SS

C ol um b iaU n i v e rsi ty in the C i ty o f N e w Y o rk

The ss was c a e 8 1 8 m o Pre in orpor ted J un , 93 , to pro te the pub l icatio n the s s It is a co r of re ult of orig in al res e arch . private

o ratio n a c o o m ve s b the o p , rel ted dire tly t C lu bia Uni r ity y pr vi s i o n s that its Tru stee s shall be o ffi ce rs o f the U n ivers ity an dthat the Pres id e nt of Columbia Univers ity s hall b e Pr e s id e nt o f the

e s s Pr .

The p ublicati o n s o f the C o lum biaU n iv e rs ity Pre s s i n clude wo rks o n B io a h H s o Econo m cs Educa o n h l o so h Lin us cs an d g r p y, i t ry, i , ti , P i p y, g i ti , L e aue an dthe fo o n se s it r t r , ll wi g ri e A dam s L e cture s C arp e n ti e r Le cture s Jul ius B e e r L e cture s H e wi t t Le ctur e s B lum e n thal L e ctur e s Je s up Le ctur e s C o lum bi aUn i v e r s ity C o n tri butio n s t o A n th r o p ol o g y C o l um bia Un iv e r s i ty B i o l o g i cal S e ri e s C o l um biaU n i v e rsity S tudi e s i n C an ce r an dAl l ie dSubje ct s C o lum b i aUn i v e r s ity S tudi e s i n Cl as s i cal Phil o l o g y C o l um biaU n i v e r s i t y Studi e s in C o m p arat i v e L i te ratur e C o lum biaU n i v e rs i ty S tudie s i n E n g l i s h C ol um bi aU n iv e rs i ty Ge o l o g ical S e ri e s Co l um b i a U n i v e rs i t y Ge rm an i cS tudi e s C o l um b iaU n iv e rs ity In do -I ran ian S e ri e s C ol um biaU n i v e rs i t y C o n t ributio n s t o O ri e n tal H i s to ry an dPh i l o l o g y C o l um biaU n i v e rs ity O ri e n tal Studi e s 0 C ol um biaU n iv e r s i ty S tudi e s i n Rom an ce Phil o l o g y an dLi te ratur e R e co rds o f Ci v il i z ati o n : S o urce s an dStudi e s

Catal og ues will be sen tf ree on ap p l i cation

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V l IX Th E v ui o n o f M o d n H e w Li e a u 1 - 1 1 2 B o . . e o e e e 8 0 . l t r br t r t r , 5 9 y 8 B R A O N W P . A A S LO O ALD STEIN h D vo co h 1 2 . H . . + M M , , l t , p p Vii 7

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