The Military situation in the Baltic States1 By Mr. Edgars Andersons

n literature, the Baltic States are usu- Lithuania and Latvia. The forests in the the Baltic Sea gives access to the Atlantic ally called “small” although their total Baltic States, especially in Latvia, can be Ocean, one should pay attention to the area is not that unimportant at all. It is regarded as one of their great natural riches. fact that it belongs to the so-called bor- roughly as large as two thirds of North- Moreover, the Baltic States are not as poor der seas, which creates certain military ern Germany or the UK, it comprises in mineral resources as commonly assumed. difficulties. The Baltic States are also a about half of Japan or California and it An important factor in the Baltic States natural focal point for international traf- is about one and a half times larger than was the development of industry based on fic routes in the air, on railroads and the area of the BeNeLux states (Belgium, local materials, but that later turned into a roads. The land’s surface is mostly very the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Re- specialization in electrical engineering, pre- suitable for the building of transport garding transport and commerce, the cision instruments, chemistry and similar infrastrucure.2 Baltic States are perfectly situated between branches. This industry, especially in Latvia, However, the military situation of the Eastern and Western Europe. They are could more easily compete with the great Baltic States must be regarded as highly agriculturally self-sufficient. Shale in Es- powers on the world market. The long coast dangerous. They are in the northern sec- tonia and waterpower in Lithuania and of the Baltic Sea with its great ports, espe- tion of a long and narrow line of smaller especially Latvia create optimal conditions cially Riga, Ventspils (Windau), Liepâja states that are an obstacle for access from for power generation and the industrial (Liebau), Tallinn (Reval) and Klaipeda Russian territory to the Atlantic Ocean, development of these states. After World (Memel), is of considerable economic the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. War II, oil fields even were found in importance for the Baltic States. Although One should always be aware of the fact

113 that the Russian empire, known today as the Middle Ages, it has been a serious threat whereas Latvia’s situation in this respect the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the independence of the Baltic States was threatened. In recent years, as much (USSR), makes up one sixth of the earth’s in modern times. But centuries-old expe- as 25% of Latvia’s population has been total surface area. The situation of the rience has taught the Germans that the non-Latvian.6 Baltic States was aggravated by the fact Baltic “horn” – situated far in the North- Another negative factor was the centu- that access to the Baltic Sea was easiest pre- east and under German rule – has always ries-old alienation between the Baltic peo- cisely in their territory. This fact poses a been extremely difficult to defend and, ple and lack of a sense of community. serious threat to the independence of the thus, constantly endangered in military Even while the Baltic States were independ- Baltic peoples as long as the Russian em- terms.4 Therefore, the opinion has devel- ent, little was done to remedy this situa- pire exists and the non-Russian peoples that oped that support for the bastion of the tion. Only when the threatening clouds are under Russian influence (about one half independent Baltic States and an encour- of World War II started gathering did, of the general population) do not gain sov- agement of the right of self-determination the Baltic peoples realize that they shared ereignty. To the rear of the Baltic people – of the Baltic people against the presump- a common destiny. But then it was too in the West – is the open sea. The tions and the pressure of the non-Baltic late to combine their powers on a large Scandinavian peoples on the other side, people (especially those of the Russians), scale.7 remembering their sad experiences in the would be the best solution for the Ger- In international literature one can find past, have always tried to stay away from man interests.5 Unfortunately, this under- the view that the independence of the the problems of the European continent standing came to late. Baltic States was just a short incident in and especially of the Baltics and to remain An extremely unfavourable factor is world history and that the Baltic people in relative isolation on the Scandinavian the small Baltic population. Only six mil- did not play a part in political, economic Peninsula. However, the Baltic and Finno- lion people live in the area, among them and military terms in the past. This opin- Ugrian people have been able to stay on an unusually high number of descendants ion is completely wrong. In the course of the coasts of the Baltic Sea for more than of late immigrants such as Russians, Poles, history, the fact went unnoticed that the 4.000 years although they have lost wide Germans, Jews, White Russians, Swedish Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have been areas in Northern and Central Russia.3 and others. Estonia and Lithuania (except able to stay in their present areas of settle- The German Empire bordered the Bal- for the areas of Petseri, Vilnius, and ment for 4,000 to 5,000 years, that about tic States in the Southwest. Just like in Klaipeda) were nationally quite uniform, 2,000 B.C. the Baltic peoples inhabited

114 an area that extended from the Urals to trol several times until it stretched from mistake cost the Poles, as well as the un- the Oder and from Estonia to Central the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, becom- fortunate peoples who were linked to Poland and that from the birth of Christ ing the largest state in medieval Europe.12 them, dearly. up to the sixth century the Baltic tribes, The combined powers of the Poles and Although the German conquerors had reached a cultural peak that was quite the Lithuanians stopped the advance of saved the Latvians and Estonians from remarkable compared to their neigh- the Tartars and the Mongols towards Eu- becoming assimilated by the masses of the bours.8 For several centuries, the Latvian rope, saved several Russian areas from Slavs, connected them with Western cul- and Estonian tribes not only resisted the the Mongolian yoke, slowed down the ture and did not try to Germanise them, simultaneous pressure of the Scandinavian Germans’ drive towards the East by beat- they committed a crucial mistake in ex- and Slavic tribes, but also started coun- ing the German Order in 1410, and ab- ploiting these peoples in the interest of terattacks into the areas of the Swedes, sorbed the Ottomans’ advance towards German squires and merchants ever more Danes and Slavs.9 The Baltic peoples the Holy Roman Empire.13 Unfortu- mercilessly. A deep rift opened up between showed unusual persistence and bravery nately, the Lithuanians lost their politi- the German immigrants and the native and were militarily successful against en- cal and even cultural independence to a peoples, a rift that weakened the bastion emies that often were technically better considerable extent during the union of Livonia and was hard to overcome. equipped during the crusades. The Esto- with Poland, although kings from the Although Latvian and Estonian units nians’ fight for freedom against the Lithuanian Jagellons-Dynasty governed fought bravely under their own com- Swedes, Danes and Germans lasted from both states for several centuries.14 The manders, together with German troops of 1191 to 122710 and the resistance of Latvia Poles on their part made a historic mis- the Livonian League against the Russian against the combined German powers take when they tried to subjugate not intruders in several battles, the Livonian lasted considerably longer – from 1186 to only the people of the states they had League fell apart. The conflict between the 1290. The Order of the Brothers of the conquered – White Russians, Ukrainians leading groups was to blame for this. In Sword was destroyed and the Livonian and Latvians – but also the Lithuanians, the following centuries the leading Ger- Order was severely beaten.11 who were their allies and much larger in man social classes mainly tried to defend The Lithuanians not only managed to number. The Poles were not interested their own interests and privileges and failed hold their ground against intruders, but in a confederation in which these peo- to unite the native peoples against the su- also enlarged the area under their con- ples would have had equal rights.15 This premacy of foreign states.16

115 Although the local landowners sub- sian control, soldiers of these peoples were the Latvians and Estonians, in 1905, when jected the majority of Latvians, Estoni- in Russia’s army and fleet, where they held these countries were more or less under ans, and Lithuanians to serfdom, these positions at the end of the 19th and the control by their own people.29 Lithua- peoples did not lose their national and beginning of the 20th century.23 During nian and, in smaller numbers, also Latvian military spirit even under the most se- Napoleon’s invasion and during the emigrants also took part in the American vere conditions. The great Estonian re- Crimean War, there were purely Latvian Civil War. The first victim of this war volt of 1343 against Danish and German navy and army units in the fight against was the Latvian Martiò¿ Buciò¿.30 Dur- supremacy, which liberated the whole of the invaders.24 When the Lithuanians came ing the Spanish-American War, Lithuanian Northern Estonia for a short period, under Russian control, the opposite hap- emigrants even sent their own military proved this.17 In 1372, the Lithuanians pened. Lithuanian units volunteered for units.31 All the above shows that the pe- conquered the Kremlin in Moscow.18 the fight against the Russians in 1812.25 riod of oppression that lasted for centu- During the Livonian War Latvian and In the part of Lithuania that had fallen to ries could not suppress the national con- Estonian peasant armies operated.19 Units Prussia, the Prussian army had two Lithua- sciousness and the instinct for truth, jus- of Latvian soldiers were among the troops nian cavalry regiments for many years.26 tice and solidarity among the Baltic peo- of Sweden and the Dukedom of Courland. The times of the Russian administra- ple. Latvians and Estonians not only had Latvian soldiers fought not only in their tion were nevertheless the hardest trial for training opportunities in the Russian native country, but also in Poland, Aus- the Baltic peoples. Several revolts, under- army and fleet, but were also able to gain tria, and the Netherlands and some sol- taken by Estonians, Latvians and Lithua- experience in the highest commanding diers and seamen even showed up in the nians against the local authorities of the positions. The Catholic Lithuanians were colonies of the Dukedom of Courland, Russian, German-Baltic and Polish land- not accepted as officers into the Russian in Africa and America.20 In 1560, the Es- owners and against the Russian adminis- armed forces.32 Instead the political lead- tonians even liberated a part of their tration, clearly show this. These uprisings ers of Lithuania had – due to the long country again for a short period of reached their peak in the great Polish- period of proud independence – the clear- time.21 During the Great Nordic War, Lithuanian revolutions of 1830-1831 and est and the farthest-reaching political goal: twelve Latvian infantry battalions and ar- 1863-186527 , the Estonian Mahtras War the restoration of Lithuania’s independ- tillery units fought on the Swedish side.22 of 185828 , and the bloody revolution of ence. The part of the Lithuanian popula- When Latvia and Estonia fell under Rus- all three Baltic people, but especially of tion that was under Russian control was

116 more strongly oppressed economically and to greater hopes among the Baltic peo- of incompetent and corrupt Russian gen- culturally than the other Baltic people. ple; the majority of the local leaders, how- erals. Right from the beginning of the Although the political goals of the Latvians ever, even then only hoped for an au- war, the soldiers showed excellent brav- and Estonians were not as far-reaching as tonomy of their peoples Only unusually ery, steadfastness, and contempt for death. those of the Lithuanians, these peoples big international changes could help the Observers of the Battle of Augustova com- were able to create a solid economic and Baltic peoples to gain the longed-for in- pared the 20 Russian Corps, which was cultural foundation for greater self-deter- dependence. Extremely favourable condi- almost completely comprised of the Bal- mination and, eventually, for independ- tions were created by World War I, the tic soldiers, to Napoleon’s guards. The suc- ence. 33 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the col- cess of the Baltic soldiers was described as lapse of the German Empire, the right of the Russians’ success by the press. Roughly The lessons of World War I and self-determination of the people pro- 20.000 Latvians, as many Lithuanians, and the fight for freedom claimed by the Entente and the wide- many Estonians fell in the name of Rus- spread economic and political prepared- sia’s glory, their people not gaining any Since 1795, all the Baltic states, with ness of the Baltic peoples for an independ- advantages by that.34 In the big rearguard the exception of a small area in Prussia ent life. actions, however, two Latvian garrison- inhabited by Lithuanians, were under Rus- The Baltic region – just like in earlier battalions were able to draw attention; 70% sian rule. Except for the short period of great wars – became a battleground right of the men were wiped out.35 Napoleon’s invasion, the Baltic peoples at the beginning of World War I, a fact Latvian politicians achieved the crea- did not have the slightest hope of getting that did harm especially to Lithuania and tion of national Latvian light-infantry rid of the Russian control. A pact with Latvia. The native soldiers that were mo- units. From 1 August 1915 and onwards, Germany would only have meant strength- bilized in the Baltic area had to withstand they consisted of some battalions, later of ening of the local German oligarchy. Be- first the advance of the German army, but eight combat regiments and one reserve cause of the Polish weakness and lack of later also had to undertake the first inva- regiment that were combined in two bri- understanding, the Lithuanians bitterly sion into East Prussia. Tens of thousands gades, for a short period in one divi- regretted their co-operation with them of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sol- sion.36 These units, commanded by their during the revolutions of 1830 and 1863. diers were put into Russian units, where own officers, broke through the German The Russian Revolution of 1905 gave rise they fought bravely under the command front lines several times by using new tac-

117 tics and rescued Russian units out of hope- two Latvian regions – Vidzeme and tablish an Estonian division, something less situations. Due to their bravery and Kurzeme – get autonomy; Latgale did not they had really done already. In contrast successes they were so different from Rus- receive it, and the whole area of Latvia to the Latvian brigades, who were pure sian units, that they drew the attention was not united into one national terri- infantry units, the Estonian division was not only of Western military observers, tory. After all, the Russian government allowed to raise an artillery brigade, a cav- but also of the international press.37 Un- had to take into account the morale among alry regiment and a technical unit.44 fortunately, these excellent Latvian units the Latvian units.40 Maybe because the units were formed so were thirsty for glory and wanted to get The Estonian political leaders were long late, the commanders of the Estonian di- attention and thus let themselves get ma- in doubt whether it was worthwhile hav- vision (in contrast to the Latvian com- noeuvred into hopeless situations, pay- ing the Russian government draw up Es- manders) managed to avoid militarily and ing a high toll of lives during the offen- tonian national units. They were afraid politically unnecessary bloodshed and to sive of July 1916 and the heroic offensives that all Estonian units might be annihi- prevent a distribution of the Estonian of Christmas 1916 and New Year 1917. lated in one single battle, whereas with a units across Russia after the breakdown They all led to negative reactions among distribution of the soldiers along the of the front. Some Latvian units broke the soldiers. The complete national-Latvian whole, long Russian front, there was hope up; others were transferred to Russia, units consisted of approximately 45,000 that the basis of the Estonian people where, after the Bolshevik Revolution, men. About 10,000 Latvian soldiers found would survive.41 Yet in the end, the opin- they were forced to fight as a special divi- their death in these units, e.g. during the ion prevailed that national units would sion for the Bolsheviks, while their home defence of Riga in September 1917.38 All be necessary for the achievements of their was being occupied by German troops.45 together about 35,000 Latvian soldiers fell political goals. On 21 April, the first Es- Later, an Estonian soviet-division was in Latvian and Russian units during Word tonian infantry regiment was formed.42 formed in Russia.46 War I.39 The Latvian soldiers found a way Due to the weakness and the retreat of As the representatives of the Lithua- of drawing the attention of the Russians neighbouring Russian units, this regi- nian people abroad had demanded full and their allies to their victims, but the ment suffered a great deal when defend- independence right at the beginning of Latvian people did not gain any advan- ing its positions, just as the Latvian regi- the war, the commanders of the Russian tages from these victims of World War I. ments did.43 Only as late as 19 December, armed forces tried to prevent the forma- Only after the Revolution of 1917 did did the Estonians get permission to es- tion of national Lithuanian units. The

118 first four Lithuanian battalions and two it was immediately disbanded.50 The Ger- forces during critical times.54 Latvian units squadrons were created as late as August man authorities did not approve of the held the front and won the battles of and September 1917.47 Many Latvian and formation of Lithuanian self-protection Kasan’j, Orla, Perekop and others, that Estonian officers were in the Russian units. As the Latvians were considered to decided the outcome of the Civil War.55 army, even in the highest ranks, but there be the most radical, all men fit for service Military observers of the Entente and Ger- were only few Lithuanian officers. Towards that had been in the Russian army were many acknowledged the importance of the the end of the war, Lithuanians were brought into prison camps.51 Latvian units and tried to win them over. trained as officers in spite of their reli- The Latvian light-infantry units that All of them, however, made a crucial mis- gious belief. Now there were some Lithua- were distributed across all of Russia were take because they regarded the Latvians as nian officers among the lower ranks, but of greatest importance on the front in mercenaries that would fight in the name there were virtually none in the higher the Russian Civil War. To a certain de- of anything for money, but they did not ranks. Those soldiers who remained on gree, this was also true of the Estonian promise independence and social justice.56 the Bolshevik side after the revolution dis- Soviet-units. These units showed extraor- Two Latvian regiments and a Lithuanian persed for the most part.48 dinary bravery, discipline, and sense of battalion nonetheless fought for the allies In February and March 1918, units of responsibility in the fulfilment of mili- in the Far East, where they sustained heavy the Estonian division – in co-operation tary tasks under the command of their losses, while the Estonian legion played a with the Germans – helped liberate the own officers. They also differed very much role in Northern Russia. later proclaimed Estonian Republic, but in from the revolutionary Russian units, that When the German Empire collapsed, March the German military administra- – for the most part – were very undisci- the national governments of Estonia, tion disarmed the Estonian units; only plined. 52 Some Latvian and Estonian Latvia and Lithuania had the chance to badly armed militias remaining.49 officers who were cast away in Russia were start their work. Although Soviet Russia The Lithuanians did not do any bet- also appointed to highest position in the had given up the Baltics in the Treaties ter. In January 1918, a Lithuanian battal- armed forces of Soviet Russia. They com- of Berlin and Brest-Litovsk, its govern- ion deserted to the Germans in the Rovno manded brigades, divisions, armies and ment nonetheless tried to re-conquer them area in the Ukraine. Until August, the even army groups and fronts.53 The after Germany’s breakdown. Germans used this battalion for garrison Latvian Colonel Joachims Vacietis was World War I was over. The right of duties, but then sent it to Lithuania, where even in command of the whole armed self-determination for the people had been

119 declared, and the League of Nations had ence in principle, was too weak to influ- Battle of Cesis (Wenden) in June 1919 been founded. But several small states, ence the huge administrational and mili- against the Estonian and Latvian troops. among them the Baltic States, still had to tary machinery, which for the most part The German armies could have gained the fight hard to protect their independence. was led or influenced by people who were status of liberators of the Baltic States, as The Baltic States were dragged into the in favour of imperialism. Some of the had happened in Finland. But instead they conflict between the communist and anti- German revolutionary forces on their part earned the eternal hatred and suspicion of communist powers, into the imperialis- sympathized with or were against any con- Estonia and Latvia. If the Battle of Cesis tic contest of several states and into the tinuation of the war against Soviet Rus- had ended with victory for the German attempts by the communist and anti-com- sia in the interest of the Entente. The lat- troops, this would have been reason enough munist Russian governments to get the ter did not promise any support for Ger- for an occupation of Germany by the ar- Baltic States under their control again.57 many’s victims nor consider any compen- mies of the Entente. We have to empha- The proclamation of independence by sation in the peace treaty.60 The eigth and size that the attack on the Estonian and the Baltic States was not sufficient. The tenth German armies were supposed to Latvian troops was made although the Ger- Baltic States had to use their own armed defend the Baltic region until the Baltic man command had given contrary orders. forces in order to defend their national States were able to defend themselves. But A disadvantageous outcome of the Battle interests. The leaders of the Baltic States war-weary and influenced by Bolshevik at Cesis would have exposed the Baltic had to recognize that the Western powers propaganda, they retreated to the German States to a complete pincer movement by ignored the right of self-determination borders and dispersed.61 The voluntary the Bolsheviks. But the national forces won, that they themselves had declared58 and units that took their place came under and the German reputation was severely that they only took advantage of the Bal- the influence of politically short-sighted damaged.62 tic States in their own national interest and reactionary people. After some suc- All of the above shows that the Baltic and in order to get support for the anti- cessful battles against the Bolshevik forces States could not rely on any declarations. communist forces in Russia. Moreover, that threatened not only the Baltic States They really needed their own armed forces. these leaders did not get any promise of a but also Germany, these people manoeu- Similarly, strong co-operation was essen- future independence for the Baltic peo- vred the voluntary units into the fight tial. ple.59 The democratic government of Ger- against the anti-communist forces in the When World War I was coming to an many, which approved of Baltic independ- Baltic States. The best example was the end, only Estonia was practically able to

120 form a small army in a short period of This situation was aggravated by the nega- The Baltic States, that were virtually time. The largest part of the forces, in- tive attitude of the leaders of the German foreign to one another, started some kind cluding the commanding ranks, had sur- civilian government and of the majority of diplomatic co-operation, especially vived, but they were lacking arms and of the military commanders towards Latvia, Estonia and Finland, whereas money. German help was very reluctant Latvian independence and the creation of Lithuania was only partially involved. But and small. Support by the British fleet the national Latvian forces. These people the newly formed military forces oper- and the Finns was most important, but were still influenced by imperialistic and ated independently from one another.68 nevertheless the Estonians had to rely colonialistic ideas.65 Yet, some remarkable examples of co- mainly on their own abilities, their re- In Lithuania, the military units were bet- operation should be mentioned as they sourcefulness and their toughness.63 ter preserved, but they did not have any always ended with important military or The majority of the Latvian soldiers qualified officers, weapons, or money. As political victories that gave the states in- were in Russia or in German Prisoner of Lithuania was right on the Russian-German volved the same advantages and sense of War camps. The Latvian troops that were border and as Germany as well as Lithuania security. The co-operation between the in Russia were used by the Russian Soviet was in conflict with Poland, the German Estonian and the Latvian Northern Army government to oppose in the name of a government agreed upon partial support for in the battles at Cesis and Jugla (Jegel) in Soviet Latvia the Latvian national gov- the state of Lithuania. This support dropped June and July 1919 should be especially ernment. At that time, the Commander- when Lithuania made official claims for the mentioned, although the neutrality of the in-Chief of the armed forces of Soviet Klaipeda (Memel) region.66 Latvian Southern Group, which was un- Russia was the Latvian Colonel Joachims All the Baltic States were economically der German control, was a negative fac- Vacietis, who was a Latvian patriot, but extremely weakened. Furthermore, Latvia tor.69 The Estonian army also covered and still was loyal to Russia’s Soviet govern- and, to a large extent, Lithuania were very protected a part of the Latvian border in ment, hoping to find support for Latvia’s much destroyed. Financial and economic the East until December 1919. In the sum- independence there.64 At first, there were support by the Western powers was very mer of 1919, it actively took part in the no soldiers, no weapons, and no money small and came under very unfavourable fights against the Bolshevik forces that were in Latvia. There was a very radical atmos- conditions. Weapons and other material threatening Latvia.70 The Lithuanian army phere among the population, who had delivered was mostly worn out and dam- on its part held its ground against the suffered tremendously during the war. aged.67 Bermondt Army without any Estonian or

121 Latvian support for a long time and fi- units liberated Western Latvia, helped Soviet troops was the violent and short nally defeated it. This was in the interest with the formation of new Latvian troops sighted politics of the Soviet government of all the Baltic States.71 Unfortunately, from January until May 191975 and sup- and the aversion of the troops themselves one has to point out the belated co-op- ported the Lithuanian army just as long, to fighting against national forces. Most eration between the Latvian and Lithua- did not receive any compensation.76 of the Baltic soldiers mobilized by the nian armies in November 1919 in this The considerable help to Estonia by Soviets found ways of going over to the connection. The Lithuanians are not re- the Royal Navy from December 1918 un- national forces in order to continue their ally to blame for their late involvement til January 1920 has to be mentioned as fight together with them.78 because they had to fear possible aggres- well as the support by British and French Viewed in its entirety, another nega- 72 sion by the Polish troops. Despite the naval units during the fights of the tive factor was the insignificant mutual fact that Poland did not recognize an in- Latvian army against the Bermondt Army demands by the Baltic States to correct dependent Lithuania, but was aiming at a in October and November 1919. The pres- the borderlines that were a disadvantage Polish-Lithuanian Union, Poland prom- ence of the British fleet itself was some to the common military and political ised not to take advantage of Lithuania’s kind of guarantee and moral support for outline.79 However, the Baltic States were situation during the threat by Bermondt. the independence fighters in the Baltic able to solve their problems rather early, Its army even protected the Eastern bor- States.77 der of Lithuania, while the largest part of in 1920 and 1921. Lithuania’s troops was involved in fights The Russian Soviet government, who - During the wars of liberation of the with Bermondt.73 Co-operation between at the beginning of the invasion – had Baltic States, only two attempts were the Latvian and Polish armies during the tolerated the formation of military forces made to consolidate the action of the offensive in January 1920 against the So- by the Soviet governments in Latvia, armed forces. The British General Frank. viet forces was very successful. We have to Lithuania, and Estonia for political rea- G. March initiated the first one on 26 stress that Poland was the only big state sons, later tolerated their disintegration August 1919. The anti-Bolshevik troops that did not demand any payment for its because of new political considerations of General Yudenich, Estonian and help.74 and made peace with the national gov- Latvian troops, the anti-Bolshevik Rus- To be historically true, we must also ernments of the Baltic States. The real rea- sian-German troops of Bermondt as well emphasize that Germany, whose voluntary son for this disintegration of the Baltic as the Polish and the Lithuanian armies

122 were supposed to start a common offen- bility in Lithuania. The interference in At the end of the war, the Estonian sive against the Bolshevik troops.80 The politics by the army often created dan- national army consisted of 74,500 men second attempt, initiated by the British gerous situations that could have ended and had 39 artillery batteries, 10 armoured General Arthur J. Turner, was made on with a catastrophe.83 Latvia and partly trains, 8 armoured cars, 28 aircraft and 6 January 1920 and was supposed to cre- Estonia, too, were negatively influenced 10 warships. During the war of libera- ate a military alliance among the Baltic by the service of some of their troops in tion, the Estonian army lost 3,588 soldiers States. Representatives of the Estonian, the Latvian and Estonian Soviet divi- (2,236 of them fell at the front) and had Latvian, and Lithuanian armies agreed sions. However, these divisions, which 13,775 injured.85 The Latvian army had – in Valga/Valka (Walk) upon regular meet- fought at the heart of the Red Army and at the end of the war – 76,394 men, 91 ings and the standardization of war ma- won crucial victories over anti-Soviet Rus- pieces of artillery, 707 light and heavy terial, but a political agreement or a de- sian forces that were averse to independ- machineguns, 5 armoured trains, 8 ar- fensive alliance did not follow this meet- ence of the Baltic States, indirectly helped moured cars, 5 tanks and 19 aircraft. It ing. The political leaders of the Baltic to secure the independence of the Baltic lost 3,046 men and had 4,085 injured.86 States missed a unique chance to gain States.84 Yet, one has to keep in mind At the time, the Lithuanian army had greater security and international pres- that the Baltic States had to fear an at- 60,000 men in four divisions and 3 cav- tige for their states.81 tack by Soviet Russia through the pe- alry regiments, 48 pieces of artillery, 450 After initial misjudgement of what was riod of their independence. The Soviet heavy machineguns, 4 armoured cars, 1 happening and apathy in the history of government was only waiting for the armoured train, and 18 aircraft. During the wars of liberation, one could witness right moment to consolidate its power the war, Lithuania lost 614 men and an- a spontaneous growth and more strength in the Baltic States. Such favourable con- other 822 died of their injuries. There among the national forces. A clear exam- ditions developed in 1939/1940 and then were 1,175 injured and 154 invalids. 87 In ple is the formation of a national army again in 1944/1945. World War I, the Latvians had lost about in Latvia.82 Estonia showed the greatest Though poorly armed and their ac- 35,000 men, the Lithuanians approxi- stability. Latvia showed the same level of tions often impeded by foreign politi- mately 15,000. The exact number for Es- stability after it had overcome difficul- cians, the armies of all three Baltic States tonia is not known. During the Russian ties that originated from external and were enormously successful on the bat- civil war, the Latvians lost at least 20,000 internal negative forces. There was less sta- tlefield. men. The Estonian casualties were high

123 in number, as well. Lithuanians also fought In their resistance to the Soviet Union in the British and American units that The Situation of the Baltic States and, later, to Nazi Germany, the Baltic fought for the Entente in Siberia. after the War of Liberation States defended the goals of the League of This overview shows the military spirit Nations and remained members up to the and the absent fear of death among the In the first decade of independence, last day of their independence.90 Baltic peoples. It also shows that, because the leaders of the Baltic States were some- The political leaders of the Baltic States of the unfavourable geographic situation what optimistic about their military situ- tried to forget that they had not been and the historical conditions, the Baltics ation. They had full confidence in the accepted into the League of Nations in lost a great part of their “national strength” League of Nations and believed that the 1920 only because the other states feared in the battle for the interests of foreign people of the world seriously wanted peace that due to their prominent geographi- powers, without gaining a real advantage after the extraordinarily destructive and cal situation, they might have to help for their own states. Considering the bloody World War I. They were fully con- defend the independence of these states.91 overall political and military situation fident also not only about the treaties In 1921, at last, the majority of the mem- as well as the conditions that were unfa- made, but also about the self-interest of bers of the League of Nations had the vourable for the independence of the the great powers, which would not allow courage to accept the Baltic States into Baltic States, one has to say that the Bal- one state or a bloc of states to gain con- their number.92 The lack of a common tic politicians and their military leaders trol over the Baltic States.88 spirit and courage was typical of the ac- were very successful and showed extraor- The leaders of the Baltic States did eve- tions of the League of Nations during its dinary competence in securing the inde- rything imaginable to foster peace, over- entire existence. It was paralyzed by the pendence of the Baltic States. Their co- all co-operation and disarmament. They exaggerated egoism of its member states operation could have been more exten- not only signed, but also ratified all in- and by the lack of intention to seriously sive, but we have to admit that the Bal- ternational treaties that had these goals.89 co-operate and support peace. The mem- tic States were not really able to help one It was not the fault of the Baltic States, bers soon realized that they had to rely another as they all had to suffer from but because of the egoistic interests of on their own moral, economic and mili- the collapse of the economy that the the great powers that all these treaties re- tary power. Thus, the smaller states always World War I and the exploitation by the mained no more than paper and were not emphasized their complete neutrality in occupying powers had brought about. brought fully to life. cases of conflicts.

124 Hopes that the League of Nations nomic ties with them, it was clear that the Baltic organizations in Russia repeatedly would guarantee the Baltic States’ inde- loss of the Baltic coast was very painful, promised the re-introduction of the so- pendence grew weaker. Yet, the leaders of not only because of political prestige, but viet system in the Baltic States by revolu- these states believed the victorious pow- also for practical reasons. The Gulf of Fin- tionary means. 96 ers of World War I would be able to main- land, which also meant the Russian part Spies, saboteurs and political agitators tain their leadership position for a long of the Baltic Sea, was covered with ice for were continuously pouring across the time and that it was in their interest to six to seven months of the year. During borders of the Soviet Union into the support the independence of the Baltic these months, the navy as well as the mer- Baltic States. This could not lead to good States, directly or indirectly.93 chant fleet of Russia were captives of the relationships between the Baltic States and But the Baltic States were mistaken in ice and they could not be stationed in the Soviet Union, although the latter had this respect, as well. They viewed with con- the ports of the Baltic States. It was very been the first one to recognize the inde- cern the disagreement between the UK, inconvenient for a great power to be de- pendence of the Baltic States and had France, the USA, Japan and Italy as well as pendent upon the small Baltic States for waived all claims to their territory.97 their economic and even military compe- the transport of goods, especially as it really The Baltic States’ fear of the Soviet tition and their lack of co-operation. How- had to fear that these states might soon Union was later somewhat calmed by the ever, the two biggest potential threats to be under the influence of hostile great fact that the most extreme groups were Baltic independence, Germany and the powers or power blocs.95 removed and those in power wanted to Soviet Union, were weak due to war and Another concern was the aim of world avoid wars as long as the social system was revolution, a fact that somewhat lessened revolution declared by the Soviet Union. not consolidated and the armed forces these worries. Until 1933, the Baltic States A seventh of the Latvian population as well were not ready for an offensive.98 even saw a democratic Germany as a guar- as a large number of Estonians and Lithua- The growing military power of Nazi antor of independence.94 nians had remained in the Soviet Union. Germany was a real concern as well as its The gigantic neighbour in the East, the Among these Balts, the flames of hate aggressive ideology and its open efforts Soviet Union, caused the greatest concern. against the democratic governments of the to expand which were also aimed at the Although the Baltic States did everything Baltic States were fanned and the Commu- Baltic States and Eastern Europe in gen- to give the Soviet Union convenient ac- nist Information Bureau (KOMINFORM) eral. From 1933 and onwards, military cess to their ports in order to build eco- supported by the Soviet Union as well as planners in the Baltic States had to reckon

125 with an invasion from the West as well as est ally, whereas Lithuania saw the same vented the possibility of far-reaching co- from the East. in Germany and Poland in France. To- operation.102 At least there was some hope that the wards the end of World War I, the Brit- Representatives of the UK admonished neighbouring quarrelling powers would ish were without doubt interested to sup- the Baltic as well as the Scandinavian States not allow each other to take up position port the efforts undertaken by the Baltic repeatedly during the first post-war years in the Baltic region, but would rather keep States to reach independence in order to to build closer political and military con- it as a kind of a buffer zone between each weaken their enemy, Germany. Moreover, nections, but all in vain. It did not only other, at least as long as they did not in- they wanted to create possibly long-last- seem to be unwise, but also dangerous to tend any open conflict.99 ing chaos for their potential competitor make treaties of military support with The self-destructive policy of the West- Russia, no matter whether it was Bolshe- several small states that did not get along ern powers and the real, ideological, de- vik or anti-Bolshevik.101 Later, the UK with one another.103 The British did not mographical, and military weakness of supported the Baltic States only to pre- want to get involved in the meaningless Poland, the “fifth European great power”, vent the Soviet Union from invading quarrels among the Baltic States, but they created real concern among the leaders of Europe through their territory and in used them, especially Estonia, as a base the Baltic States during the last years be- order to tie them to itself economically. for spying against the Soviet Union.104 fore World War II. In Latvia and Estonia, From the point of view of the UK, After the emergence of the Third Reich they did not fear any military conflict the Baltic States were too far away, geo- of the Nazis, the British were aiming at a between Lithuania and Poland because of politically too endangered and economi- confrontation between the latter and the the Vilnius area conflict. Still, the latter cally too unimportant. British military Soviet Union, hoping both totalitarian was a senseless hindrance to political and bases in the Baltic region would have been powers would destroy each other with- military co-operation between all the small in constant danger. They would have been out the UK getting involved.105 When it states situated between Germany and the right on the border zone of Russia and became fully clear that German policy was Soviet Union and to a concept of some Germany, far away from the British Isles, more dangerous for the Western powers kind of defence system in an obviously and their access would have been very than the Soviet Union, the UK reluctantly hopeless situation.100 complicated because of the “closed” char- approached the Soviet Union shortly be- During the first post-war years, Latvia acter of the Baltic Sea. The missing agree- fore the war to induce Germany to come and Estonia regarded the UK as its strong- ment between the Baltic States also pre- to an agreement with the Western pow-

126 ers. In this connection, the idea of a guar- France was prepared to leave Poland and nia off politically against Poland. Although antee for the Baltic States was initiated by the other East European states to their Lithuania felt safe from further aggression the Soviet Union. This suggestion was fate.108 by Poland because of its co-operation with dangerous for the Baltic States due to sev- Nevertheless, there was some exchange them, Germany and the Soviet Union did eral suspicious conditions. The UK and of information between the general staffs not help Lithuania re-gain the Vilnius re- France were in reality unable to give ef- of France and the Baltic States. Several gion nor did they plan to protect Lithua- fective guarantees to the Baltic States as Latvian officers were trained at French nia from potential further aggression by Germany lay between them.106 military academies, and most of the Latvian Poland. Germany’s only intention in case The interest of France in the Baltic war ships were built in France.109 But that of a Polish attack was to take back the States was different from that of the UK. was all. Klaipeda (Memel) region that it had lost Both powers were political and economic In the first post-war years, Latvia and to Lithuania in the Treaty of Versailles.112 competitors. As long as Germany did not Estonia refused to enter a military alli- The aggressiveness of Nazi Germany in go directly against the UK economically, ance with Poland as long as the latter did the question of re-gaining the Klaipeda the latter was interested in a relatively not settle the conflict with Lithuania in a (Memel) region put an end to the close strong Germany as a useful business part- way that satisfied both states. Because of military co-operation between Germany ner. However, it was France’s interest to that, Latvia and Estonia were not even and Lithuania.113 With the Soviet Union, keep the weakened Germany down as long indirectly integrated into the French sys- Lithuania did not maintain any military as possible and to build up a group of tem of military alliances.110 co-operation at all. It only bought a lim- new allies under the leadership of an en- Latvia and Estonia did not directly co- ited number of expensive field guns.114 larged and strengthened Poland east of operate with Germany militarily, but Ger- As the Western powers were not interested Germany replacing Russia, which had man military literature and German mili- in an obligation to defend the East Euro- been lost as an ally. Moreover, France tried tary know-how were used to a large extent. pean states and the League of Nations was to get back the enormous amounts of Lithuania had close connections with not a safeguard for safety and peace, the money invested in Russia by putting pres- Germany for some time concerning mili- only option was a regional military bloc. sure on the state.107 Should it have been tary supply and the qualification of high- There were two realistic possibilities: a possible to come to a direct agreement ranking officers.111 For a long time, Ger- neutral Nordic bloc of the Scandinavian with Germany or the Soviet Union, many and the Soviet Union played Lithua- and Baltic States, or a defensive alliance of

127 all states from the Arctic Ocean to the Black nant in Finland; then its orientation of the Baltic States and Poland in the 1920s Sea that had a common border with the shifted towards Scandinavia. Finland’s and the beginning 1930s. The most senior Soviet Union.115 politicians regarded the Baltic States as officers of Finland, Estonia and Latvia vis- To the Baltic States, a Scandinavian- more endangered than their own state. ited each other several times and observed Baltic bloc seemed to be the best solu- Finland is so far up north that it cannot military manoeuvres. In individual cases, tion. This bloc would have been situated have the linking function that is so charac- Estonia and Latvia took advantage of the wholly ti the north of the Central Euro- teristic of the Baltic States. Historically and recently created Finnish armaments 118 pean area of conflict between Germany politically, Russia had already previously industry. Except for Lithuania, the Bal- and the Soviet Union, and the problems considered Finland to be an autonomous tic States did not make use of the highly concerning territory between Poland and entity. Moreover, it would not see the cru- developed Swedish armaments industry. Rumania on the one hand and the Soviet cial necessity of having bases in Finland if Economic considerations were the reason. Union on the other would not have af- it could have them in the Baltics. In case Sweden did not need the products of the Baltics; thus, the expensive weapons and fected it directly either. But the politi- of a war, the Gulf of Finland, which sepa- ammunition would have had to be paid cians of the Scandinavian states were of rates these states from Finland, would have with cash, which the Baltic States could the opinion that the Soviet Union would made an alliance with the Baltic States dif- not afford because of their financial diffi- soon try to take up its position on the ficult. The united navies of Finland and culties. The British as well as the French Baltic coast again and thus absolutely re- the Baltic States were also too weak to keep demanded that the Baltic States should buy fused to enter into any kind of connec- the strong Soviet navy in the Eastern part weapons and ammunition primarily from tions with the Baltic States. The of the Gulf. But especially, the Finns feared their states if they wanted to sell their goods Scandinavian states felt quite safe in their a co-operation with Poland, which they in the UK and France. However, it was isolation as a peninsula and in their long- regarded as a danger to their security. That mainly used and very old weapons that lasting tradition of neutrality.116 There- is why Finland wanted to get as close as were sold to the Baltic States. In case of a fore, Finland and the Baltic States had possible to the neutral Scandinavian bloc war, there would have been no hope of only one option, to come to an agree- and refused to co-operate militarily with securing a continuous supply with spare ment among each other and to find a the Baltic States.117 The only element of parts and ammunition from these coun- better solution. Until 1922, the orienta- co-operation was that Finnish military ob- tries. The traffic with Sweden was much tion towards the Baltic States was predomi- servers took part in general staff meetings less disturbed and safer.119

128 For military protection, the Baltic The border with neutral Latvia was only There were only two alternatives left: a States either had to join together or they 106 km long. The latter had been Poland’s military union of Estonia, Latvia and had to seek co-operation with the strong- ally during the wars of liberation. But Po- Lithuania; and the union Estonia-Latvia. est neighbour of the Soviet Union: Po- land’s action against Lithuania, whose his- For many years, Lithuania demanded that land, and its ally, Romania. Such co-opera- torical capital and wide border areas it had a military union of the Baltic States be tion would automatically have dragged the occupied in 1920, as well as the threat posed armed mainly against Poland. But Latvia Baltic States into the Polish border dis- to Lithuanian independence in general and and Estonia rejected this demand. Poland putes with Germany and the Soviet Un- territorial claims also against Latvia forced might have been the only source of fairly ion, and further into the conflicts in the it to avoid closer relations with this state.120 reliable support against an attack by Ger- Balkans and the border disputes of Roma- Theoretically, Lithuania and Poland were many or the Soviet Union. Until 1933, nia and the Soviet Union. Seen from the even at war, and in 1926 Lithuania was the Lithuania was also little interested in a outside, Poland was a big and powerful only one of the Western neighbours of closer union of the Baltic States as it re- state, but in reality, it was unstable and Russia to conclude a non-aggression treaty garded Germany and the Soviet Union as weak. A large part of the Polish territory with the USSR.121 Poland protected Lithua- natural allies against Poland, which was not ethnically Polish, especially along nia against a possible attack by the Soviets Lithuania considered to be its main en- the border with the Soviet Union. Only with its territory which stretched north- emy.123 two thirds of Poland’s population were wards to the east of Lithuania. But the A military union of Estonia and Latvia Polish, the rest was composed of Ukrain- military leaders of the Baltic States did not was the only option left. So it was; but ians, WhiteRussians, Germans, Lithuanians have a high opinion of the big Polish army this union was not a very important fact, and Jews. Only five percent of Poland’s because of its old-fashioned organization. as we will see later.124 In the long line of border was common with friendly Roma- From a strictly practical point of view, neighbours of the USSR, each state con- nia. With the latter, Poland did not main- Estonia would have been willing to ap- sidered itself to be less endangered than tain close relations although a military con- proach Poland, but Latvia as Lithuania’s the others for some reasons. For each state vention had been concluded. Everywhere neighbour refused to do so. Because of its own, often egoistic, interests were more else Poland bordered hostile states: Ger- Latvia’s opposition, the project of a mili- important than the common ones. The many, the Soviet Union, and Lithuania, tary alliance between Estonia, Latvia and feeling of a common destiny and a com- with all of which it had border disputes. Poland failed.122 mon region was still poorly developed.

129 areas and further along the Daugava Polish, 1.4% White Russians, further Latvia’s Military Situation (Düna), which would also have been an Lithuanians, Estonians and others. The important natural hindrance in case of a minorities had complete cultural au- After the overview of the unfriendly German invasion.126 tonomy and in the Latvian army their general situation, we have to take a closer Concerning food and clothing, Latvia sense of Latvian citizenship was strength- look at the military conditions in each of was self-sufficient. But it was completely ened.128 The Latvian army was comprised the Baltic States. Latvia (65,791.4 km2) was dependent on foreign states for fuel and of 2,200 officers and 23,000 sergeants and the largest of the Baltic States and was situ- heating, disregarding the large supply of other ranks in 1938. The annual draft was ated in the middle of this group of states. wood and the power generation started about 13,500 men, but it decreased dur- With regard to population (1939: in the last years of Latvia’s independence. ing the last years of independence. The 2,001,900), it was in second place. The Latvia’s industry was the most developed police had only about 3,100 men, the common border (1939) with friendly Es- of all the Baltic States. The metallurgical border guard had about 100 officers and tonia was 374.6 km long (19.94%), the one industry, the car-parts industry, precision 1,100 men. The Voluntary Home Guard with the hostile Soviet Union 351,3 km engineering, the manufacture of appli- reached 35,000 men. According to (18.66%). The common border with Po- ances and instruments (e.g. the world’s American information, the trained re- land was 105,9 km long (5.64%), and the smallest camera “Minox”), aircraft and ship serves were about 170,000 men, whereas one with friendly Lithuania 570.4 km construction in Riga and Liepaja and the the untrained reserves were 20,000. In (30.3%). The coast was 479 km long arsenal in Riga have to be mentioned. The theory, Latvia could deploy an army of (25.46%), one fourth of the overall latter built guns and machine guns as well 200,000 men, but in reality only 130,000 length.125 No natural obstacles, disregard- as infantry- and artillery-ammunition. to 180,000 could be armed. In times of ing small rivers, lakes, marshland, and small Latvia also produced mines and anti-sub- peace, 10 out of 1,000 inhabitants of woodlands, protected this state boundary. marine weapons.127 Latvia were members of the armed forces, In case of an invasion by the Soviets, the 75% of Latvia’s population were the ratio for the Home Guard was 28 defence was planned to really start in the Latvians, the rest was made up of several out of 1,000 citizens. These figures middle of the state, along the line Pededze, nationalities who were represented only changed from year to year, of course. Lake Lubans and Aiviekste (Ewst), an area in small percentages (1938): 10.6% Rus- Latvia was divided into 15 defence re- with broad marshlands and large wooded sians, 4.8% Jews, 3.2% Germans, 2.5% gions. During the last years of independ-

130 ence, the troops were supposed to be mo- ment. The four field artillery regiments regiments also received 47 mm Böhler anti- bilised within three days (i.e. 72 hours). mentioned above, the heavy artillery regi- tank guns and 7 cm Skoda infantry guns. In times of peace, the armed forces had ment, the anti-aircraft regiment, the spe- Further, they were equipped with 81 mm four infantry divisions, with a total of 12 cial artillery section, the tank regiment and Stoks mortars. Each regiment had recon- infantry regiments and one cavalry regi- the coastal artillery regiment were under naissance companies; some also had bicy- ment. Each infantry division had one field the control of the Chief of Staff of the cle and ski companies. The cavalry regi- artillery regiment. The First, Second and Artillery concerning training, weapons ment had five squadrons and one heavy Third Infantry Regiments and the Kurzeme and organisation. The Staff Battalion, machinegun squadron, the remount Artillery Regiment belonged to the First which corresponded to an elite guard unit squadron, two bicycles squadrons and one Division, whose headquarters was in Liepaja in other armies, was independent. All na- battery, all together 1,200 horses and 1,200 (Liebau). The Second Division consisted val forces were united in a squadron un- men, four cannons, English Lee-Enfield of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Infantry der the command of the Commander-in- 7.7 carbines, Madsen light machineguns Regiments as well as the Vidzeme Artillery Chief of the Fleet. and Vickers heavy machineguns. At an ex- Regiment. This division’s headquarters was In times of peace, an infantry regiment perimental stage, there were also bicycle in Riga. The Third Division consisted of had two battalions – 50 officers, 700 ser- battalions and motorcycle companies that the Seventh, Eight and Ninth Infantry Regi- geants and men, the reinforced regiments were planned to join the army. ments and the Zemgale Artillery Regiment. had three battalions – 80 officers, 1,220 Each artillery regiment had two units The Fourth Division had the Tenth, Elev- sergeants and other ranks. In case of a war, with two gun batteries and one howitzer enth and Twelfth Infantry Regiments the each regiment would have been enlarged battery; thus the whole regiment had six Cavalry Regiment and the Latgal Artillery up to three battalions. The weapons con- batteries with 24 guns and six howitzers. Regiment. Its headquarters was in sisted of English Ross-Enfield M-14 rifles, All regiments had English 18 Pounder Daugavpils (Dünaburg). The Technical Lewis-light-machine-guns and Vickers- (8.38 cm) guns and 4.5" (11.43 cm) howit- Division consisted of the Engineer Regi- Bertier heavy machineguns, all with cali- zers. English 13 Pounder (7.62 cm) and ment, the Tank Regiment (later the motor- bre 7.7 mm. The production of light Russian 75 mm (M-02) guns were in re- ized brigade), the Air Force Regiment, the machineguns of the type “Bren” had been serves. For war times, three units (36 guns) Intelligence Unit, the Armoured Train started in the state. They were more use- and one to two anti-aircraft batteries (four Regiment and the Coastal Artillery Regi- ful in combat. During the last years, the to eight guns), which was 40 to 44 guns

131 altogether, was intended for each field search light battery and one auxiliary ship. intelligence battalion had four companies. artillery regiment. As weapons, they had Russian 3", 6" The air force regiment had three units, The heavy artillery regiment consisted Vickers and 6" Canet Guns and one anti- 100 to 150 aircraft in three fighter squad- of three units, including the anti-aircraft aircraft battery. In times of peace, the regi- rons in Riga, one reconnaissance squad- batteries that were organized into an in- ment had 500 men. Mobile railroad coastal ron in Gulbene, one long distance recon- dependent anti-aircraft battalion. In the batteries were in preparation. The anti- naissance squadron in Krustpils and one heavy artillery regiment, there were at aircraft regiment had 15 batteries – Rus- naval aviation wing in Liepaja. least 30 heavy guns or howitzers of dif- sian 3" (76-mm) and 40 mm Bofors anti- The Latvian navy had one minelayer ferent type and production country. Ex- aircraft guns. It had about 1,000 men. Anti- gunboat, two minesweeper-minelayer cept for some German howitzers, all these aircraft batteries were also formed for all boats, two submarines, one auxiliary sub- were out-of-date. Out of the four trains divisions, except the Third. marine and some motorboats. A mine- of the Armoured Train Regiment, three The Autotank-Regiment had six ar- layer (3,000 tons), four submarines and were in Daugavpils (Dünaburg) and one moured cars, two heavy, one medium and twelve hydroplanes were planned. There in Riga. With regards to material, six six light tanks as well as 18 tankettes (a was also a coastal observation service. armoured trains and 6" Canet ship guns small tracked reconnaissance vehicle). Al- The border guard brigade had five were intended for two batteries of rail- together six armoured cars and 27 tanks. battalions and one fast patrol boat. The way artillery. Moreover, it had 40 trucks and 15 mo- self-defence organisation was divided into The overall firepower comprised: six torcycles. For times of war, each division 19 Home Guard regiments and consisted 10.5 cm, one 152 mm (6"), 10 77 mm, was supposed to have three tankettes (21 of cavalry and motorcycle-units with a three 12 pounder howitzers and five 6" altogether). In 1938, the regiment was re- tankette, one railroad Home Guard regi- Canet Guns, two 38 mm anti-aircraft guns structured into a motorized brigade with ment, one aircraft Home Guard regiment and 36 heavy machineguns. In times of five battalions in three motorized groups. as well as several Home Guard Battalions. peace, the regiment had 40 officers and Furthermore, motorized anti-tank units It also included 12,000 women. The Air 245 sergeants and other ranks. were planned. Home Guard had 24 aircraft. In contrast In the sea coastal fortress Daugavgriva The engineer regiment consisted of two to the other Baltic States, the Home (Dünamünde), the Coastal Artillery Regi- battalions and 500 men, including the Guard organization in Latvia was not sub- ment had five batteries (20 guns), one bridge and the pontoon company. The ordinate to the Ministry of War, but to

132 the Ministry of Social Affairs. Neverthe- Should the Soviet Union attack the – in their centre - by using the natural less, 150 active officers and 100 sergeants covering force would consist of one bat- defence line in the marshland around the provided military training in the organi- talion and one company of the Seventh Lake Lubans and the widespread forests zation.129 Regiment in Vilaka and Liepna, one bat- in the north. Should the Fourth Divi- Of all the Baltic States, Latvia had the talion and two companies of the Ninth sion still be able to move east if necessary, best traffic network. In 1940, there were Regiment in Ludza, Zilupe and Karsava, the command of the Third Division could 1.880 km of highways, 9.621 km of first- one battalion and one company of the easily lose connection to the Seventh and class roads, 7.625 cars, 4.321 motorcycles, Tenth Regiment in Daugavpils, later in Eight Regiments that were further north. 3,466 km of railway tracks, 294 locomo- Kârsava and Dagda. Together with three To subordinate these regiments to the tives, 11 motor wagons and 6.684 wagons. to four battalions of the border guard Third Division after the arrival of the First Further, there were three large seaports and and a mounted battery these forces would and Second Division at the front would several small ones. In 1940, the Latvian have had to defend a front line of 200 to have been very problematic. A retreat of merchant fleet had 89 steamers, seven mo- 260 km from the Estonian border to the Fourth Division along the left bank tor ships and seven sailing ships, altogether Piedruja and Semgallen respectively. Thus, of the Daugava into the area of the Aiviekste 103 ships with 120.676 register tons. The real defence was not planned for the first would have been very difficult, too. The civilian aviation system had a large number days, just a delaying action. Second Division was supposed to deploy of training and sport planes as well as two The Fourth and Third Division with east of Rezekne. The fourth mobilization middle-sized passenger aircraft.130 the First Cavalry Regiments, but without plan had three prepared alternatives: A, D, In times of war, Latvia planned to op- the Eight and Twelfth Infantry Regiment and K. Alternative A intended a deploy- erate with 130.000 men in seven divisions, were supposed to cover the mobilization ment of armed forces for a defence against two regiments of special cavalry squadron of the forces and the occupation of the an attack by the Soviet Union, whereas op- with a strength of two regiments, three defence line Malupe – Pededze – Litene – tion D planned the same if Germany at- motorized brigades, three to four bicycle Lubana – Varaklani – Livani – Daugavpils tacked. Alternative K consisted of simulta- battalions, three to four special artillery and to withdraw to the line Pededze – neous defence against the Soviet Union and units, and one fleet. A Supply Divison Lake Lubana – Krustpils. They were sup- Germany. and garrison unit would be kept in re- posed to accomplish that by following the Option A had been worked out in all serve. Estonian troops with their left wing and details; option D had been prepared rela-

133 tively thoroughly. Option K was only would have received one unit of heavy ther retreat to Lithuania and a follow- outlined in rudiments as a co-operation artillery and a certain number of recon- ing internment in Germany was between Nazi Germany and the Soviet naissance flight hours. Positions were sup- planned.131 Neither Latvia nor the other Union appeared to be hardly imaginable. posed to be occupied by the fifth day of Baltic States believed that each or all to- According to option A, the main mobilization, which seems to have been gether would have to fight without any forces should be deployed on the line too optimistic. support by one or the other great power. Skrudaliena-Lielborna-Izvalta-Andrupene- Option D comprised the defence Treaties or even plans, however, for such Kaunata-Stocerova-Berzgale-Nautreni- against Germany. The main idea was to a co-operation did not exist, not even with (Rogovka)-Tilza-marshes north of Tilza- deploy the armies some kilometres north neighbouring Poland. Military observers Kuprova-Liepna-Pededze River, with of the southern state border as protec- of the great powers classified the Latvian other troops covering them. After this tion by the Lithuanian army was ex- armed forces to be behind the Finnish deployment, the following was planned: pected. Engineer plans did exist, but only and Estonian forces regarding the degree either a defence on this line, an offensive for limited works. The forces were sup- of readiness. Soldiers and regular officers in order to re-gain the third of Latgale posed to operate in two division groups, were considered to be good to very good. lost during the mobilization or a retreat whereas the cover units should remain at Their endurance and courage were to the line of the Lake Lubana in order the eastern border. praised, but cruelty that had been sup- to prepare the decisive defence battle. The Option K existed only in outlines. Three posedly noticed was criticized. The assess- First Division Group (three divisions) divisions were supposed to operate towards ment of higher officers was altogether bad, would have operated on the right and the south, four towards the east. with some remarkable exceptions. Reasons the Second Division Group (two divi- After the ceding of bases to the So- were old age, insufficient training, lack- sions) on the left. The border between viet Union in 1939, a fifth mobilization ing initiative and bureaucratic mentality. these two division groups would have and defence plan was worked out, but Regarding supply and weapons, Latvia’s been the northern bank of the Lake now a defence of the state was almost army was considered to be better than Lubans-Karsava. The Supreme Com- impossible. According to options A and Estonia’s, but worse than Lithuania’s. In mander would have had two divisions in D of plan four, a further defence of the the opinion of the US observers, the di- the areas of Madona, Barkava, Lubana and Daugava line was provided for. In case visions that would have had to be estab- Cesvaine at his disposal. Each division of an attack by the Soviet Union, a fur- lished after the beginning of the war could

134 have moved to the front as late as 30 to The section between the Gulf of Fin- The navy and the coastal batteries alone 60 days after the proclamation of the mo- land and Lake Peipsi was relatively easy to could defend Tallinn, which was also pro- bilization. Active divisions could have protect, the Narva River being a natural tected by several islands. With the help of reached the front within 24 hours. The obstacle. The area north as well as south the Finnish fleet, Estonia could close off morale and composure of the Latvian of the river is marshy and wooded. Only the Gulf of Finland between Tallinn and army were rated high. Thus, success was a seven to eight km broad gap along the Porkkala with a mine field.134 expected not only in defensive, but also West-East railroad and the highway was Concerning food and clothing, Esto- in offensive battles.132 easily accessible for a potential enemy. The nia was self-sufficient. Yet, the situation chain of lakes made up by the Lake Peipsi concerning food was not as good as in The Military Situation in Estonia and the Lake Pskov was a great advantage. Lithuania or Latvia. Shale (about 5,500,000 Regarding defence, the area south of the tons [sic]), out of which petrol and ma- Regarding the area (47,549 km2) and Lake Pskov was less favourable, but not chine oil were produced and which was population (1939: 1,133,917), Estonia was hopeless. The area is sandy and without also used as fuel, was an important natu- the smallest Baltic state, but its borders any transport routes. In the middle sec- ral resource. were the longest. The common border with tion, there was a deep valley in a north- Regarding the ethnic composition of friendly Latvia was 374.5 km (9.4%) long, south direction that could be used for the population, Estonia was the most the one with the hostile USSR 258 km defence. The marshy and wooded area of homogeneous. 88.2% of the population (6.3%), of which 145 km went across the the Lida and Vruda Rivers extended were Estonians, 8.2% Russians, 1.5% Ger- 84 km long and 31 km broad Lake Peipsi, widely. Should these positions be lost, the mans, 0.7% Swedish, and 0.5% Latvians.135 a further two km across the endangered Estonian army could retreat to the line Usually 0.98% to 1.2% of the population Mehikoorma Strait and across the Lake Pjusa-Pskov-Pankjavitsa-Laura-Liepna, the were in the armed forces. The number of Pskov, which was a little more narrow 9 km wide middle section between Pskov those drafted was 12,000 men, but it de- than the Lake Peipsi. The coastal border and Pankjavista being the most endan- creased in the last years. In earlier years, comprised 1,159 km as the crow flies. Be- gered. Furthermore, the Estonians could the armed forces consisted of 14,000 to cause of the many bays and 818 islands, retreat to the line Lake Võrtsjärv-Emajõgi 17,000 men, but in 1938 there were only the coastal border was some 3,449 km River-Lake Peipsi. A defence of the long 11,358 men (1,358 officers). The police long (84.3%).133 coastal border was virtually impossible. had 1,200 men, the border guard 1,200

135 men, and the Home Guard units 60,000 Eighth Infantry Battalion, the Partisan regiments each were planned. The normal men. According to the Intelligence Serv- Battalion Kuperjanov, the Cavalry Regi- personnel strength of a division in peace- ice of the USA, the total number of peo- ment, the Third and Fourth Artillery time was 100 officers, 400 sergeants, and ple organized, including police, border Group and two tank platoons belonged 2,500 men. In peacetime, the regiments guard and Home Guard unit was 51,000 to this division. The staff of the Third had two battalions each; in wartime it men, including reserves 121,000 men and Division was in Tallinn. The defence coun- would have been three. The weapons of including untrained reserves 161,000 men ties Harju, Pärnu-Viljandi and Lääne-Saare the infantry were obsolete: Russian 7.62- (14.2% of the population). The whole state belonged to it. The Sixth, Ninth, and mm-rifles from 1891, Madsen light had three defence districts (correspond- Tenth Infantry Battalion and the Partisan machinegun, calibre 7,69 mm and Rus- ing to the number of divisions in times Battalions Kaleva, Scouts and Sakala, the sian Maxim heavy machinegun, calibre of peace) and eight defence counties (cor- Fifth Artillery Group, the Tank Regiment, 7.62 mm, from 1905 and 1910. There were responding to the number of brigades in the Engineer and Intelligence as well as also English 7.7-mm Lewis light times of war). the Guard Battalion were in this division. machineguns in reserve. The arsenal of the In times of peace, the Estonian army At the beginning of 1940, the Fourth War Department started to standardize the had three infantry divisions. The staff of Division in Viljandi and Pärnu was cre- calibre to 7.69 mm. Towards the end of the First Division was in Rakvere and ated. independence, it was planned to equip the comprised the defence counties Narva and The First and Seventh Infantry Regi- infantry with infantry guns and anti-tank Võru-Järva. The First Infantry Regiment, ments were active units. Each regiment weapons. Experiments with heavy mor- the Fourth and Fifth Infantry Battalion, had 2.000 men. The recruits were trained tars, calibre 81 mm, with anti-tank rifles the First and Second Artillery Group and in independent battalions that were sup- from Solothurn, with anti-tank cannons two trains of the Armoured Train Regi- posed to be transformed into regiments from Bofors, calibre 37 mm, and with ment in Tapa belonged to this division. in case of war. Half of the staff and line heavy anti-tank guns from Rheinmetall The staff of the Second Division was lo- officers of these regiments were regular were undertaken. In Võru and Narva, there cated in Tartu (Dorpat). The defence coun- officers. In case of war, there would have was already anti-tank batteries. ties of Tartu, Petseri-Võru and Valga were been 14 infantry regiments, each one hav- The First Cavalry Regiment was in under its command. The Seventh Infan- ing 3.331 men (107 officers). In each di- Tartu. It had three sabre, one machinegun, try Regiment, the Second, Third and vision, two brigades with two infantry and one skiing and bicycle squadron, one

136 combat vehicle company (six tanks and coastal defence batteries. The division-ar- man 150 mm and Russian 152 mm howit- six tankettes) as well as a technical unit. tillery was organized in artillery groups. zers (the latter from Schneider, 1909). The weapons were: English Ross-Enfield- The First Division had the first artillery- Horses were used to tow all guns. Towing Mid. 14 rifles, calibre 7.7 mm, six heavy group (four batteries) in Olgino and the vehicles were still in an experimental stage. machine guns, 16 light machineguns and second group in Rakvere – heavy artillery According to Estonian information, the weapons of the armoured vehicles. In and material for another four batteries. the coastal artillery had 10 batteries: one case of war, the regiment would have had The third artillery-group (with four ac- 30.48 cm (12") battery in Äigna, 20.32 cm to operate together with Latvian units in tive batteries in Pskov) and the fourth (8") batteries in Suuropi and Viimsi, two the area of Laura between Boberikova and group belonged to the Second Division 152.4 mm batteries in Äigna, two in Vöborka. As a quick retreat was planned – two batteries in Tartu and one in Võru. Naissaare, one in Suuropi and two 13 cm for the Latvian army at the beginning of The fifth artillery-group of the Third Di- batteries in Viimsi. The anti-aircraft artil- the war, the Estonian cavalry might have vision, with material for four new batter- lery had three batteries with twelve guns, been able to form a link between the ies, was under the command of the Fourth one searchlight and one chemical defence Latvian and the Estonian armies. The First Division that was to be created. In its place, company. Cavalry Regiment was also the basis for a new, sixth group was created in Tallinn In the last years, the tank regiment had the Second Cavarly Regiment, which (Reval). This group was supposed to have three tank and armoured car companies, would have been raised in Tartu at the towing vehicles, which did not arrive by one transport company, one training com- beginning of a war. the beginning of the war. Thus, old Rus- pany, and two batteries. One unit had In the Estonian army, there were five sian guns had to be used. four old heavy English tanks Mark V, artillery units. The first and the third Each battery had four guns or howit- twelve old light Renault-17 tanks, six mod- group were active units. According to the zers and 90 men (four officers) with 60 ern Polish TK 3 tankettes, 12 self-made League of Nations and to information horses in peacetime. Most guns were out- Crossley-Austin armoured cars. In reserve, from the German Intelligence Service, Es- dated, Russian 76 mm guns from 1902, there were several heavy armoured vehi- tonia had more than 70 field guns and 60 English 84 mm and French 76 mm can- cles of the type Garford. The regiment heavy guns besides anti-aircraft guns and nons, English light howitzers, calibre 114 had about 400 men. In 1924, Estonia still infantry guns in 1938. The artillery was mm, Russian heavy 102 mm cannons from had two armoured trains regiments, later divided into 11 field, six heavy and 17 Schneider (1910), English 102 mm, Ger- only one with 350 men. The regiment had

137 one heavy broad-gauge armoured railway- The base for the Estonian navy was Peipsi), two patrol boats (one on the Lake train with one 152 mm, two 119 mm, two Tallinn. The fleet comprised the Sea and Peipsi), one customs cutter, five icebreak- 105 mm cannons and four heavy-machine the Peipsi Divisions, the coastal artillery ers, four hydrographical ships, five ten- guns, two light broad gauge and one nar- and the garrison administration, altogether ders and one tug. Altogether the tonnage row-gauge armoured train, each with two 2.100 men (of whom 900 were in the coastal was 5.200 tons, not including the icebreak- 76 mm guns, eight heavy machineguns artillery). Initially, the fleet had two large ers and those ships that belonged to the and six light machineguns. destroyers, one torpedo boat, six gunboats sea route Civilian Maritime Administra- The air force consisted of three air (two on the Lake Peipsi), two minelayers, tion.136 The Estonian merchant fleet had divisions, in Rakvere, Tartu, and Tallinn, two mine boats, two patrol boats (one on 304 ships (143 steamboats, 60 motor ships as well as of the naval aviation division in the Lake Peipsi), four icebreakers, three and motor sailing ships as well as 101 sail- Tallinn with auxiliary units. Each divi- vessels of the hydrographical service, five ing ships) with 214.000 register tons.137 sion had two reconnaissance squadron and tenders and one tug. The largest part of In Tallinn, there was a large arsenal with one fighter squadron with nine aircraft these ships was old and worn-out. The main- departments for machineguns, artillery, each, the naval aviation division had one tenance of this fleet demanded tremendous optics, foundry, smithy, handguns, elec- reconnaissance squadron (six aircraft) and resources. tronics, carpentry, leather goods, and one fighter squadron (four aircraft). Al- In 1933, the Estonian government sold much more. Ammunition for rifles and together, there were 54 reconnaissance and the two large destroyers and agreed upon artillery was produced there, shells and 27 fighter aircraft as well as 10 naval air- a programme for the development of a army rifles as well as light and heavy ma- craft, a total of 91, but 125 when count- new fleet. Two submarines, eight patrol chine-guns were produced for the Home ing the training aircraft. In 1937, there boats, twelve torpedo boats and ten fast Guard units.138 were 540 men in the air force. patrol boats were planned. As funds were The number of cars in 1940 was 3,618; The engineer regiment had three engi- scarce, the programme was cut down to there were 2,476 trucks, 285 busses and neer battalions, each having one gas-war- two U-minelayers, four motortorpedo- 1,401 motorcycles. Estonia had 195 steam fare, railroad, search light, transport, work, boats, and twelve aircraft. During the last and 22 electric and motor locomotives, training, and reconnaissance company. The years of Estonia’s independence, the navy 529 passenger and 5,633 goods wagons, reconnaissance battalion had three recon- had two submarines, four motortorpedo- three radio stations, six commercial naissance and one other company. boats, four gunboats (two on the Lake airplanes, eleven ports and twelve airports.

138 The total length of the railway system was to the line Mustvee-Oudova, where the Haapsalu. However, the US observers as- 1,702 km.The total length of first order area of responsibility of the Second Di- sumed that the Estonian army would not highways was 2,531 km and second-order vision began. 50 steel-concrete bunkers be completely ready for war in less than highways 8,168 km.139 were erected at the threatened sector be- seven to 10 days after the beginning of In case of a war, 100,000 men in eight tween Riigi and Kulgu. The staff of the the war. brigades and in the navy were supposed army had calculated that the Soviets were The Seventh Regiment, the Third Ar- to be mobilized. The amount of uniforms able to move three to four divisions to tillery Group, the First Cavalry Regiment, and equipment was sufficient, but the the Narva front within seven days. The one anti-tank company, one armoured car weapons were generally bad and outdated. active units of the Estonians were able to and tank company, one armoured train The Estonians relied on the competence take their positions on the first day and and the Second Air Division were planned of their intelligence, who would have dis- to counter the attack by the enemy for to be at the front of Petseri. These forces covered any movement of Soviet troops the next three days. Although the Soviet would have had to defend the line Lake towards Estonia early. They also believed air force might be able to attack main Pskov-Irbosk Valley-Velje Lake, then for in the ability of their defence county of- targets, they would not be able to con- five days the line Piussa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa- ficials to mobilize the soldiers within one fuse the decentralized Estonian system of Laura, then Piussa-Lepssaare-Vastsellina- to 24 hours. mobilization. The regiments would have Misso. They also would have had to watch The First Infantry Regiment and the gathered by train, by car, and through the movements by the enemy on the First Artillery Group were in Narva, night marches. They could have been Latvian territory. In the south, there were Narva-Jõesuu, Kuurtna and Vasknarva, two mobilized within three days, and within no fortifications. Instead, artillery and armoured trains were in Tapa, and one the next two days they would already have field fortifications would have had to do air force squadron was in Rakvere. These been at the assembly points. On the fifth the job. The enemy was expected to need forces had to reinforce the border guard day, the First, Fourth and Fifth Infantry five to seven days to move three to four units, to occupy the line of defence along Regiments, the First and the Second Ar- divisions and tank and artillery units from the Narva River, to close off the river tillery Group would have reach the front, Pskov to Ostrov. In order to absorb the crossings at Narva-Jõesuu, Krivasoo and the Tenth Infantry Regiment would be in offensive, the Estonians would have had Vasknarva, and to observe the enemy’s Rakvere, the Reserves-Regiment in Tallinn, the Kaleva and the Põlva-Sakala Regiment movement in the Gulf of Finland and up and the Scouts-Regiment in the area of at their disposal on the sixth day, the Sec-

139 ond Kuperjanov Regiment from Pskov tion of the Russian fleet, the Estonian be possible; they also thought that Latvia to Misso, the Seventh, Eighth and Third fleet could only start laying mines after might be endangered. But even shortly Infantry Regiment, the First Cavalry Regi- the start of hostilities. The submarine before the World War II, they were con- ment, the Fifth, Fourth and Third Artil- minelayer would protect the area around vinced that for the next ten years Ger- lery Group, the Sixth Infantry Regiment the island of Suursaar and Tütarsaar and many was not interested in an occupa- close to Ape, and the Ninth Infantry Regi- the minelayers on the line Äigna- tion of the Estonian islands as a base for ment in the area of Pärnu-Mõisaküla. This Porkkala. With support by the Finns, their actions against the Soviet Union.140 would be all of Estonia’s forces. another mine field in the area of Suur- Estonia’s military planners saw danger only As the Soviet Union had only very weak saar, Tütarsaar and Lavansaar could have in an attack by the Soviets. Estonia regarded forces on the Lake Peipsi (some landing been laid out, while submarines and a its other neighbours and Poland as its natu- crafts), the two gunboats of the Estonians large Finnish armoured vessel (with 8" ral allies and hoped for a German inter- and three more sent by the base in Tartu guns) would have offered protection dur- vention, but it did not expect any help could have defended the shore line rea- ing the operation. from Western European powers. The Esto- sonably well for two to three days, espe- At worst, the Estonians would try to nians were worried because the Finns cially the dangerous strait of Mehikoorma, retreat to their capital and to fight a final avoided any relationship with the Baltic where the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pskov battle of despair, or to flee to their is- States to protect their Eastern borders and meet each other. Local self-protection units lands. According to calculations of Ameri- sought protection in the Scandinavian would have supported the war ships. can observers, the ammunition could last bloc. The Scandinavian States publicly pro- In the Baltic Sea, the Estonian navy for about two weeks of fighting. But sup- claimed that they did not wish to get into could not compete with that of the So- posedly the army could only defend Es- any kind of relations with the highly en- viet Union. Nevertheless, it was widely tonia one or two weeks if no other states dangered Baltic States. Moreover, the Es- known that the Soviet Navy Command than Latvia supported them. tonians were worried about the unsteady was afraid of the strait between Aegna In case of an attack from the Soviet foreign policy of Latvia. Estonia’s military and Porkkala. Soviet submarines could Union, Estonia intended to co-operate with planners doubted whether Latvia really pass this strait in order to sink Estonian Latvia, something it did not want to do intended to resist any ultimatum or an supply vessels, and ships could launch in case of a German attack. Estonians con- open invasion. Estonians were especially landing crafts. To prevent any provoca- sidered a German attack on Lithuania to worried by missing fortifications on

140 Latvia’s eastern border and by the Latvians’ for defensive, but also for offensive ac- Klaipeda (Memel) region (2,848 km2). Ger- plan to retreat to the line Pededze-Lake tions.142 many did everything possible to keep the Lubans, which opened the whole south- idea of separatism alive in this region. ern front of Estonia and virtually destroyed The Military Situation Because of the lost, nationally mixed its defence system. There were also prob- in Lithuania Vilnius region (3,244 m2), Lithuania was lems with direct co-operation under com- technically at war with her second largest mon command. Until the abrupt change With a population of 2,575,300, neighbour, Poland.143 in the Latvian military command in 1940, Lithuania was the largest Baltic state. Its Concerning food supply, Lithuania was Estonia’s military command did not rely area (55,670 km2) was the second largest. not only self-sufficient but even exported upon Latvia’s preparedness and ability to The length of the border was 1,367 km. food. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, command the armed forces under mod- Lithuania did not have a common bor- however, its industry was not very devel- ern combat conditions. The Estonians be- der with the Soviet Union, but 525 km oped. lieved that in case of co-operation, the (37.7%) bordered hostile Poland, 272 km The population was more uniform than Latvian Supreme Command would try (20.5%) the dangerous German Reich, and in Latvia. 80.6% were Lithuanian, 7.15% to use the Estonian army not to defend its only 570.4 km (41.8%) bordered friendly Jewish, 4.1% German, 3.04% Polish, 2.3% own country, but Latvia.141 Latvia. The border regions were in the Russian, 0.7% Latvian, 0.2% White Russian, Western observers all agreed that the main completely open, except for a small etc. 80% of the population were Catholic, Estonian army was the best one of all section from Zarasai to Giedraiciai in the in contrast to Lithuania’s northern neigh- Baltic States although it was most poorly northeast, where a group of lakes was situ- bours, who were mainly Lutheran.144 armed and had the shortest training for ated, and another section in the South- In 1939, the army of Lithuania con- soldiers. The Estonian officers were be- west, where the Nemunas River formed sisted of 24,000 men (1,100 officers, 500 lieved to be highly qualified, the Esto- the natural border to Germany. In the war administrators, 1,400 sergeants). On nian soldiers were said to be tenacious, coastal area, the Lithuanian part of the average, 1.25% of the population were in brave, intelligent and patriotic. In co- Kurzeme Spit was separated from the rest the armed forces; 13,000 to 17,000 men operation with the armed forces of the of Lithuania by the German part and the were drafted each year. The police had great powers, the Estonian army was re- Kurzeme Lagoon. Furthermore, Lithua- 4,000 men, the border guard 3,500 men, garded to be a potential force not only nia had only limited sovereignty in the and in the Home Guard units there were

141 55.000 men. In theory, Lithuania could were experiments with Stokes-Brandt no armoured trains anymore, as they were have mobilized up to 250,000 men. Out trench mortars, infantry guns and anti- considered to be impractical. of technical and financial considerations, tank guns. One infantry regiment had In Kaunas there was a tank battalion only 120,000 to 135,000 men were sup- 2,279 men. with twelve light French Renault M 26/ posed to be mobilized. The cavalry brigade with headquarters 27 tanks and 51 Swedish tankettes made The Lithuanian army consisted of three in Kaunas had three regiments: The Hus- by Skoda as well as one armoured car com- infantry divisions; a fourth division was sar Regiment in Kaunas, the Ulan Regi- pany with twelve armoured vehicles made being formed. The First, Third and ment in Alytus, later in Taurage, and the by Renault and Landskrona. Fourth Infantry Regiment as well as the Dragoon Regiment in Taurage, later in Each of the three divisions had one First and Second Artillery Regiment be- Vilnius. There was also a unit of mounted engineer battalion. A reconnaissance bat- longed to the First Division in Panevezys. artillery, three bicycle companies and one talion was also planned for each division, In the Second Division, whose headquar- armoured car company. Each cavalry regi- but up to the end of the independence ters were in Kaunas, were the Second, ment had about 1,000 men. there were only two such battalions. Fifth and Ninth Infantry Regiment and The field artillery had about 120 guns The Lithuanian army had the strong- the Third Artillery Regiment. The Sixth, in 10 units. These guns were mostly out- est air force of all the Baltic States. Some Seventh and Eighth Infantry Regiment dated: French 75 mm Schneider M. 97 and of the reconnaissance, training and fighter and the Fourth Artillery Regiment were Russian Putilov M. 02 75 mm cannons. The aircraft (of the type “Anbo”) were pro- in the Third Division, whose headquar- heavy artillery had 48 pieces in six units. duced in Lithuania. The air force had eight ters were in Siauliai. Towards the end of The weapons were 155 mm and 105 mm air stations and four landing strips at its independence, only one artillery unit had howitzers made in Germany. In reserve, disposal. It was divided into reconnaissance been formed in the Fourth Division, there were also English 127 mm and French (three squadrons), fighter (four squadrons), which was being established in Kedainiai. Schneider guns, calibre 155 mm. The anti- bomber (one squadron) and training Most of the infantry weapons were aircraft unit had 150 modern Swiss Oerlikon groups (two squadrons) and had schools, obsolete, but modernization did take 20 mm and 12 old English 75 mm cannons workshops and supply units. Some of the place. The army had 7.9 mm Mauser-Mod. from Vickers, modern sound detectors and aircraft were out-dated, but in their place 24 rifles, Praga light machineguns and searchlights. During the last years of inde- modern machines were arriving. In 1937, Maxim M. 08 heavy machineguns. There pendence, there was no fortress artillery and 795 men served in the air force. In 1939

142 the air force had 110 air craft, 80 in the est of the Baltic States. In 1939, Lithuania an active unit; then it was transferred to units and 30 in reserve. had only 1,526 km of railroad and 1,481 Telsiai. The fleet had only one patrol vessel with km of solid roads. It had 205 locomo- Until 1935, the mobilization plans con- mine laying capability and six armoured tives, 313 passenger and 4,351 goods wag- sisted of mobilizing the units within one customs boat. Six submarines, several fast ons, 1,765 cars, 298 trucks, 298 buses and week after the beginning of the war (12 patrol boats, minelayers and coastal bat- 619 special cars. The merchant fleet con- days according to the US information). teries were planned. But the loss of sisted of only 11 ships with 10,299 regis- Stasys Rastikis achieved a decentralization Klaipeda destroyed these plans for arma- ter tons. Moreover, Lithuania had only of the mobilization and thus shortened ment. two ports, i.e. in Klaipeda (Memel) and the time span to 24-72 hours. Weapons The weapon factory Radviliskis had Sventoji. In the whole state, there were and clothing were divided among the mo- produced rifle, machinegun and artillery only two radio stations, in the last year bilization points. A quick modernization ammunition since 1938. It also repaired just one.146 of the equipment now also took place. rifles and completed orders of the air In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, Although Lithuania sought to reclaim force. Lithuania really had only one friendly the Vilnius region from Poland, its plans In contrast to Latvia, the Home Guard neighbour: Latvia. It had to reckon with for war against Poland were of completely organization in Estonia and Lithuania was a direct attack by Germany or Poland and defensive nature. Just as defensive were subordinate to the War Ministry. Lithua- with an indirect attack by the Soviet Un- the plans for a resistance to potential at- nia’s Home Guard unit was divided into ion through Latvia or Poland. In case of tacks by Germany or the Soviet Union. 12 infantry regiments and one dragoon a war, Lithuania could only operate with The Lithuanian army hoped for a sup- regiment. There were also engineer, recon- five infantry divisions and two cavalry port by Latvia in these two cases or even naissance, air and Naval Home Guard brigades. Active units were the First Regi- for an active involvement of the Western Units that were partly motorized. Plans ment in Ukmerge, the Seventh in Taurage powers. The defence plans against Poland that included the training of Home Guard and Zemaiciu Naumiestis and the Ninth and Germany had priority, those against members for partisan war were not real- in Marijampole and Vilkaviskis. Their the Soviet Union were of second impor- ized.145 stock was enlarged and they were rein- tance. The Lithuanian Army Command Concerning traffic routes and means forced by artillery. Until 1939, the Sixth hoped to be able to fight for two weeks of transportation, Lithuania was the weak- Regiment in Klaipeda and Plunge was also without foreign support.

143 In case of an invasion by Polish or nian army command transferred the First However, there was no doubt that it was Soviet troops, a retreat to the line Kaunas- Infantry Regiment and the Third Dra- suitable for a defensive war. The opinion Nevezis was planned, later to the Dubysa goon Regiment to that place.147 that the Lithuanians would be more fit River. With its high banks, this river was Western observers did not judge the for a partisan war than the other Baltic almost the only natural obstacle in the Lithuanian army in friendly terms. They peoples is interesting. Observers viewed the inner part of the country. A defence line regretted the unusual influence of politics extraordinarily frequent change of the War with bunkers also existed there. In case of and chauvinism in the Lithuanian officer Minister, the Supreme Commanders and a German attack, a retreat to the Dubysa corps. According to their judgement, many the Chiefs of Staff as well as the intrigues was planned, as well. The retreat to the high-ranking officers of Lithuania were in the army undertaken by various politi- Dubysa after an attack from the East political creatures who were incompetent cal groups negatively. All of this not only would have meant the giving up of the to fulfil their tasks and were not interested influenced the officers’ morale, but also largest part of the state and a simultane- in their completion. Positive changes in the morale among the soldiers in an unfa- ous opening of the southeast front of the command of the Lithuanian army could vourable way.148 Latvia. In case of a Polish or Russian at- only be noticed in the very last years of As a gap in the defence system along tack, a retreat towards Germany after the independence. In contrast to the other ar- the border with the Soviet Union had loss of the Dubysa-line was intended. mies of the Baltic States, the Lithuanian developed due to the politically independ- During a German attack, the Lithuanians soldiers’ quality was judged to be only sat- ent line of Lithuania, it can be assumed wanted to retreat into the Latvian terri- isfactory, the main reasons being the low that western military observers regarded tory after the loss of the Dubysa-line. general education and insufficient train- this aspect as highly important. Nobody, During the last two years of their in- ing. Nevertheless, the soldiers were regarded however, blamed Poland. dependence, Lithuanians started the en- to be tenacious, physically strong, modest largement of the peace time strength of and especially suitable for the partisan war. The Military Co-operation of the the armed forces. The Third Infantry Regi- Although everyone acknowledged that the Baltic States ment was intended to be the basis for a equipment of the Lithuanian army was fourth division in the region Kedainiai- more modern than that of the other Baltic Latvia and Estonia were the only states Raseiniai-Seredzius. When the Vilnius re- States, they still assumed that this army in Northeast Europe that had concluded gion was regained in 1939, the Lithua- could not be used in offensive actions. a military alliance. This alliance was based

144 on traditions from the war of liberation. Latvia was really very meagre. There was – the Soviet Union. A military union of The basis of this alliance was the treaty of to a small extent – an exchange of officers the Baltic States was considered to be 7 July 1921, which was extended in the to learn about the military training of possible reason for an attack by the So- treaties of 1 November 1923, and 17 Feb- the other state, to establish connections, viet Union. Yet, there are indications that ruary 1934. The alliance was of a defen- and to learn the language of the neigh- at the time of the creation of the Baltic sive character. The Estonian-Latvian de- bour. In 1930 and especially in 1931, large, Entente in 1934, it was in the interest of fence treaty of 1934 gave similarly inter- common army and navy manoeuvres of the Soviet Union to have a Baltic military ested states the opportunity to join.149 both states took place, but were not re- bloc between itself and emerging Nazi On 12 September 1934, all three Baltic peated in the following years. In individual Germany. This view changed later, of course. States – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – cases, the three Baltic States exchanged From 1933 on, the Baltic States also avoided came together in the Baltic Entente, but weapons or sold them to one another. To provoking Nazi Germany, which did not the treaty only consisted of a general co- a small extent, the arsenals of all three states want to see a Baltic military bloc come into operation among the states and regular also co-operated. existence. The German diplomatic repre- conferences of the Foreign Ministers, but During the whole period of their in- sentatives repeatedly pointed out the hos- not of military co-operation.150 Estonia dependence, the Baltic States were not able tile relationship with Lithuania because of and Latvia categorically refused to con- to agree upon common defence plans in the Klaipeda (Memel) region to Latvia and clude a military treaty with Lithuania case of a threat. The self-interests of each Estonia, and tried to use the disagreement before the latter had solved its conflicts state seemed to be more important than between Latvia and Estonia by showing with Poland and Germany. However a the common interests. Each Baltic state itself as the understanding and benevolent military treaty was not concluded when hoped - for little convincing reasons - that great power to the latter. Poland too re- Lithuania was forced in March of 1938 it would be able to prevent the loss of its peatedly pointed out to Latvia and Esto- to re-establish diplomatic relations with independence, even if one or both of the nia that it did not want any military agree- Poland and when it lost the Klaipeda others had already lost it. Western observ- ment of the Baltic States with Lithuania. (Memel) region to Germany in March of ers pointed out the extraordinary fear that Therefore, all three Baltic States tried to 1939. showed in all foreign policy actions of remain absolutely neutral and even weak- Despite the existing military treaty, the Baltic States. Each Baltic state had the ened their conditions to the League of military co-operation between Estonia and strong wish to avoid any provocation of Nations (refusal of the obligations of the

145 members of the League of Nations men- the common interest and for the protec- fate and the common goal, and very little tioned in Article 16). tion of security. The great powers took was done to foster mutual respect and A Baltic bloc could have mobilized an care not to reach any military agreements friendship as well as the development of a army of 550,000 men, which would have with the individualistic, small Baltic States, co-operation. Such efforts came too late, been a notable force even on an interna- which were not connected to one another. were too small and too “official” to reach tional scale. One has to remember that Of course, the question arises how larger parts of the population. Much more neither the Soviet Union nor Germany much the Baltic States could have co-op- could have been done! or Poland, because of the constant threat erated militarily and what they could have Each Baltic state had a different national to their borders, would have been able to done to foster such a co-operation even language. There was no common lingua turn their entire forces or a substantial before a treaty had been concluded. The franca. Older generations were partly able part of them against the Baltic States un- answer is: A lot! to communicate in Russian, to a small ex- der any conditions. The Vilnius and the It is a sad fact that the Baltic States – tent also in German, but in Lithuania in Klaipeda (Memel) problems were tricky during the whole period of their inde- Polish. It would have been perfect if the and dangerous, but a military union of pendence – felt very foreign to one an- citizens of the Baltic States would have the Baltic States could have been formed other and that they really did not know understood the language of the other two because of the international situation with- each other. It often happened that the states, but this was virtually impossible. out being influenced by threats of cer- Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians Because of the geographic situation, it was tain states, threats that were not serious treated each other not only with benevo- important for the population of the Bal- anyway. Among the international commu- lent humour, but even with sarcasm. Un- tic States to learn international languages, nity, self-confidence, unity, and power is fortunately, the latter happened a lot on making it even more difficult to learn the rated higher than the splitting up of an international level, during talks between languages of the neighbouring states in forces and the idea of neutrality. Western representatives of these peoples and those addition. Sure, there were people that spoke observers have made many ironic remarks of the great powers. Measures that sup- these languages, but they were only a few. about the extreme individualism of the ported mutual learning of history, cul- After the war, the Baltic States stressed their Baltic politicians, about the exaggerated ture, and economy of the neighbours independence from Russia and Germany emphasis on solely nationalist interests, started late and remained small. There was and their attachment to Western Europe. and about the inability to co-operate in almost no understanding of the common Thus, Russian or German were rejected as

146 the first foreign language. However, they peted with each other economically and chines and food posed no problems. But could not decide which of the western lan- were unfit for broader economic co-op- weapons were a very great problem. They guages, English or French, should be cho- eration. Estonian shale could have partly had been acquired during the struggle for sen as the first foreign language. So, Eng- solved the fuel problem, but the quarry- liberation in insufficient amounts. They lish and French were taught at the same ing started too late and was too little. Re- consisted of different systems, were for the time, German being the second foreign garding fuel, the Baltic States were depend- most part out-dated, and partly even de- language. School graduates, however, had ent upon Poland and even more so upon fective and without spare parts. only acquired a basic knowledge of these the western powers, which on their part The weaponry had to be standardized languages and did not normally use them were far away from sources of raw mate- and modernized. If the three states had in everyday life. The majority of the high- rial. Latvian water power also remained acted together, it would have been easier, ranking officers could also communicate unused for common economic measures. more convenient, and also cheaper. Be- in Russian, but the younger ones hardly Without any effort, a standardization cause of political and economic combi- understood the language. On the other of the organization of the armed forces nations, the governments of the Baltic hand, the majority of the older officers – could have been implemented, as well as a States and their troops did not co-oper- with few exceptions – spoke neither Eng- unifying of ranks, badges, etc., but noth- ate, though. The weapons of the armed lish nor French, and a large part did not ing happened. forces of the Baltic States were, thus, var- speak German, either. An agreement on a Each of the Baltic States spent about ied and made up of very different sys- common foreign language that could have one fifth of its budget on weapons and tems, which also limited the possibilities been used for mutual communication in the daily needs of the armed forces. These of a co-operation extremely. Not even an the Baltic States would have been highly amounts were tiny compared to the pur- agreement on the standardization of am- necessary. Scandinavians understand with- pose aimed at, but they were tremendous munition was reached. The Estonians used out difficulty all their languages; never- for the small states that had suffered a lot Russian ammunition; the Lithuanians theless they can all also communicate in and had to do it without any international used German, and the Latvians English English and mostly in German. help, especially when compared to the larger ammunition. In case of a war, ammuni- During the whole period of independ- and luckier countries. Thus, the resources tion supply would have been very limited ence, the Baltic States did not develop an had to be used wisely. The supply of the and in Estonia’s and Latvia’s case even im- economic union. The small states even com- armed forces with uniforms, towing ma- possible. If the three states had been able

147 to agree on common ammunition for light not need. Moreover, Sweden demanded if the Baltic States hoped to co-operate weapons, they would have become inde- payment in cash. The UK and France, on with some great powers, which would have pendent from foreign states at least in this the other hand, threatened not to take taken over command then, of course. There respect and would have saved a lot of products from the Baltic States if weap- were no treaties between the Baltic States money by producing the material needed ons were not bought from them. Usually, and the western powers nor any plans for in their own state. In addition, they could the Baltic States received only out-dated potential co-operation in wartime. There have helped each other out. Finland pro- weapons for a price that was at least twice were arrangements between Latvia and Es- duced light artillery and mortars herself. as high as for the English and French tonia for a potential common supreme The Baltic States, with nearly double the forces. Lithuania also bought a few weap- command in wartime. But questions of population, could have accomplished that ons from the Soviet Union, but their guns prestige and about military qualification even more easily. During all years of its were also out-dated and very expensive. as well as political considerations and independence, Lithuania built fairly good The Baltic States also feared to have rela- memories from the war of liberation were training and fighting aircraft. Latvia did tions to a state whose political leaders sup- brought up. Estonia regarded its supreme so as well during the last years of inde- ported elements that were aiming at their command as more competent, which west- pendence. But the Baltic States did not co- eventual incorporation into the Soviet ern military observers confirmed in their operate in this respect either, but wasted Union. The weapons became more and evaluations. The Latvian forces, on the resources in mutual competition. more complicated and more and more other hand, would have been nearly twice The supply of heavy weapons had to expensive, making a close co-operation as strong. The Estonians had a low opin- be concentrated on states that were acces- between the Baltic States essential. In 1939, ion of the long-time Latvian War Minis- sible most conveniently in terms of traf- a modern English destroyer already cost ter, who had not supported them in the fic and from which spare parts could also a fortieth of the whole Latvian defence Battle of Cesis (Wenden) and in times of be received in wartime. Sweden would budget. Today twice the annual budget peace had not cared about the completion have been the best choice. Due to eco- of 1939 would be needed to buy one sin- of his military knowledge, but - according nomic considerations, the Baltic States gle supersonic aircraft, to say nothing of to several observers – wanted to become ordered nearly no weapons in Sweden. missiles. supreme commander. The Estonians also The latter had few economic relations to The question of a supreme command remembered how they were forced during the Baltic States, whose products it did in wartime was also important. It seems as the war of liberation to hold a consider-

148 able part of the Latvian front although supreme command only started to put re- not the only ones, the “regional guilty”. their forces were urgently needed some- ally highly qualified and gifted officers The Scandinavian States as well as the states where else. The fact that the Latvians were into leading positions during the last year in the Balkans had to learn the hard way in an extraordinarily unpleasant situation before the catastrophe. They would have during World War II. At any rate, the had been forgotten. The Latvians on their been able to command troops under armies of the Baltic States had a great moral part had the suspicion that the Estonian modern combat conditions. Names shall importance for the strengthening of na- supreme commander would try to use the not be mentioned in this article. tional self-confidence of the Baltic people Latvian forces mainly for the defence of The Baltic States shared a common fate. and could have posed a considerable threat Estonia, whereas the Estonians thought the A militarily advantageous situation would to a potential attacker. Latvian supreme commander would use the have come up for them in connection 1 Estonian forces mainly for the defence of with a democratic and liberal Russia be- Offprint from Acta Baltica 1969, INSTITUTUM BALTICUM. Latvia. The defence plans of both states were hind them, as many Western observers 2 For a general overview, the following sources diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, the pointed out. But such a situation did not can be referred to: Royal Institute of International plans provided for co-operation between exist. If the Soviet Union threatened Eu- Affairs (London), The Baltic States (London: Ox- ford University Press, 1938); Louis Tissot, La Baltique the Latvian Eighth Daugavpils Infantry with rope, only a common resistance of all (Paris: Payot, 1940); Max Friederichsen, Die its Fourth Battalion and the Estonian First European states would evoke hopes for Zentraleuropäischen Randstaaten mit besonderer Cavalry Regiment at the beginning of a deliverance. In the opinion of Russian and Berücksichtigung des Baltischen Dreibund-Problems war. Western observers, the individual Baltic Lettland, Estland und Litauen (Rifa: Selbstverlag, 1921). 3 United States of America National Archives, Shortly before World War II, the States were militarily without value, but Record Group 165 – Military Intelligence Divi- Lithuanians did not raise any objections joined together they would have been a sion (Hence: USA, N.A., R.G. 165) – General Analy- that a Latvian general would command significant enemy. Much could have been sis. 4 Already during World War I did Theobald the combined forces of the Baltic States, done to consolidate this defence power von Berthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Ger- but the Latvian government did not want over 20 years, but almost nothing hap- man Reich, comment on General Ludendorff’s to be politically connected with Lithua- pened. External factors are partly respon- project of the annexation of the Baltic territory, pointing out the difficulties such an incorpora- nia. Thus, the question of a common su- sible for this, but to a large extent the tion would implicate. preme command remained unsolved. leaders of the Baltic States have to take 5 Such views were already met with response in Western observers pointed out that the responsibility, too. The Baltic States were German Reichstag-discussions from 1916-1918. See

149 ed. Andersons, Latvijas vçsture 1914-1920, Stock- versity of Chicago, August 1956, pp. 59, 110, 146, November 16, 1968. holm: DAUGAVA, 1967), pp. 165-166, 216, 272- 229, 309, 311. 35 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 47-49. 273, 286-287. 21 Dunsdorfs, 1500-1600, pp. 127, 129. 36 Ibid., pp. 78-85, 92-93. 6 Royal Institute, pp. 30-38. 22 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Latvijas vôsture 1600-1710 37 Ibid., pp. 90-92, 96-97. 7 Edgars Andersons, “Toward the Baltic Entente (Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), pp. 50, 100-102, 159- 38 Ibid., pp. 97-104, 107-109, 113-133, 218-225. – The Initial Phase”, Pro Baltica, Mélanges dédiés à 165. 39 Ibid., p. 225. Kaarel R. Pusta (Stockholm: Publication du Comité 23 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Mûþîgais latvieðu ka?avîrs 40 Ibid., 186-189. des amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965), pp. 41-42, 50. Hence: [Eternal Latvian Soldier] (Melbourne, Australia: 41 Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920 [Estonia’s Fight Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente – The Initial Generâïa Kârïa Goppera fond, 1967), pp. 189-192; for Freedom 1918-1920], Tallinn: Vabadussõja Phase. Edgars Andersons, Latvieðu cîòas vçstures notikumos Ajaloo komitee, 1937-1939; I, pp. 53, 63-70, 525- 8 Marija Gimbutas, The Balts (New York: [The Latvians’ Fights in the course of history], in 526; E. Andersons, 1914-1920, p.207. Frederick A. Präger, 1963), pp. 21-29, 43-172. LAIKS, XIX, No. 26 (1959), April 1, 1967. 42 Ibid. 9 Ibid., pp. 153-158; Alfred Bilmanis, A History of 24 Edgars Andersons, “Krimas kaºš Latvij┠43 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 70-71, 93-95; Kindral Latvia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, [Crimean War in Latvia], in Ceïa Zîmes, No. 9, [General] Johan Unt, Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi, 1951), pp. 33, 35; Ewald Uustalu, The History of March 1952, pp. 367-372; No. 10, July 1952, pp. VI, Osakonna kirjastus, 1931, pp. 28-29, 31. Estonian People (London: Boreas Publishing Co., 450-455. 44 Eesti, Haridusministeerium [Estonia, Depart- 1952), pp. 31-32. 25 Jurgela, pp. 385, 394. ment of Education], Eesti Maa, Rahvas ja Kultuur 10 Uustalu, pp. 32-48. 26 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December [Estonia, People and Culture], Tartu, 1926, pp. 17- 11 A. Bîlmanis, pp. 53-83. 20, 1963. 19, 34-37, 62, 268. 12 Constantine R. Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian 27 Jurgela, pp. 408-416, 427-456. 45 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 225-226, 276- Nation (New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute, 28 Uustalu, pp. 109-110. 277, 301. Historical Research Section, 1948), pp. 45-145. 29 Bruno Kalnins, De Baltiska staternas frihetskamp 46 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 123-124; Johannes 13 Ibid., pp. 146-160. [The Fight for Freedom of the Baltic States], Stock- Tipner, Punaarmee Eesti vaeosade võitlustest 1917-1920 14 Ibid., pp. 161-163, 229-250. holm: Tidens Förlag, 1950, pp. 33-42. [The Fights of the Estonian Units in the Red Army], 15 Ibid., pp. 265-352. 30 Dr. Constantine R. Jurgela, personal inter- Tallinn: Eesti riiklik kirjastus, 1957, pp. 20-22. 16 Edgar Dunsdorfs, Arnolds Spekke, Latvijas view on November 21, 1968. 47 Kari Archyvas, I, pp. 73-79, 84, 100-101, 234, Vçsture 1500-1600 [Latvia’s History 1500-1600], Stock- 31 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December 268, IV, 182-190. holm: Daugava, 1964, pp. 67-73, 172-184. 20, 1963. 48 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209. 17 Uustalu, pp. 54-56. 32 Ibid. 49 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 84-86; Unt, p. 34. 18 C. R. Jurgela, p. 100. 33 Ibid. 50 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209. 19 Dunsdorfs, Spekke, 1500-1600, pp. 41-42, 67- 34 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 34-38; Pulkv. 51 Ibid., pp. 226-226. 73, 127-141, 172-184, 678-680. [Col.] Dr. Gustavs Grînsbergs, letter from Janu- 52 Ibid., pp. 257-260, 301-309. 20 Edgar Anderson, The Couronians and the West ary 22, 1962; Colonel Elmar Lipping, letter from 53 Ibid., pp. 310, 592. Indies, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Uni- April 17, 1963; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, interview on 54 Ibid., p. 307.

150 55 Ibid., pp. 586-591. The Initial Phase, p. 44. (Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, 56 Ibid., pp. 328-330; Winfried Baumgarten, 69 Ibid., pp. 43-44. Division des relations internationales et de Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918, München: Oldenbourg, 70 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 553, 556, 568. l’éducation, Bulletin, No. 8/9, Publications de la 1966, pp. 240-241. 71 Ibid., pp. 506-536. Conciliation internationale, 1934), pp. 731-732; 57 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 624-626. 72 Ibid., pp. 536-537. Frank Percy Crozier, Impressions and Recollections 58 Edgars Andersons, “British Policy Toward 73 J. Þukauskas, Jonas Steponavièius, Lietuvos (London: T. W. Laurie, 1930), pp. 245-246. the Baltic States”, Journal of Central European Af- kariuomené, Kaunas: Iðleido Sajunga ginkluotoms 82 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 566-567, 584, fairs, Vol. XIX, No. 3, October 1959, pp. 276-283, kraðto pajegoms remti [Lithuania’s Army, edited 615. 285-286. by the Association for the Support of the Armed 83 Ibid., p. 600. 59 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 475-494, 499- Forces of the Country], 1938, p. 8; Konstantinas 84 Ibid., pp. 586-592. 500. Þukas, Þvilgsnis i praeiti [Look into the Past], Chi- 85 Ibid., pp. 566-567. 60 Ibid., pp. 343-346. cago: Terra, 1959, p. 394. 86 Ibid., p. 584. 61 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 277-278. 74 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 568-575. 87 Ibid., p. 615. 62 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 394-398, 406- 75 Ibid., pp. 367-375, 378-383, 394-398, 406-414, 88 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. P 00/115; Germany, 414, 427-441, 456-471. 434-441. Foreign Office, Microcopy T-120, R. 1466, D 63 Ibid., pp. 415-417; Edgars Andersons, “An 76 Forschunganstalt für Kriegs- und 596533; 3. 2783, E 378494-95; Latvju Enciklopçdîja, Undeclared Naval War”, Journal of Central Euro- Heeresgeschichte, Darstellungen aus den Stockholm: Trîs Zvaigznes, 1950-51, I, pp. 108- pean Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1962, pp. 41- Nachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps 109, 528-529. 50. [Research Institute for War and Military History, 89 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. I.00/71; 860. M.00/56; 64 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 367-376. Descriptions of the Post-War Fights of German Fçlikss Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ [The Change of 65 Ibid., pp. 352-363. Troops and Volunteer Corps], Berlin: E.S. Mittler Times], Stockholm: Memento, II, pp. 256-260, 349- 66 Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos deðimtmetis 1918- u. Sohn, 1936-1939, I, p. 128; II, p. 58; III, pp. 159, 374. 1928, Kaunas: Iðleido Vyriausias Lietvuos 161-162, 167-168, 203, 206-208. 90 Bîlmanis, pp. 386-387. Nepriklausomybés 10 metu saukakatuvéms 77 Edgars Andersons, An Undeclared Naval War, 91 League of Nations, The Records of the First As- komitetas, 1930 [The First Ten Years of Lithuania pp. 43-78. sembly, 1920, Plenary Session, 27th Meeting, Annex 1918-1928, Kaunas: Highest Committee for the 78 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 404-406, 445, 6, pp. 634-636; John Spencer Bassett, The League of Preparation of the Tenth Anniversary of Lithua- 552. Nations. A Chapter in World Politics, London: nia’s Independence, 1930], pp. 64-65; Karo Archyvas 79 Edgars Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente – Longman, Green & Co., 1928, pp. 101-102. I [War Archives], pp. 140, 161-; Friedrich Janz, Die The Initial Phase, pp. 50-51. 92 British Documents, First Series, XI, pp. 714-715, Entstehung des Memelgebietes [The Origin of the 80 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 732-737; League of Nations, Records of the Second Memel-Region], Berlin-Lichterfelde: Edwin Runge, First Series, 1919-1929. ed. Ernest Llewellyn Wood- Assembly, Plenary Sessions, 16th Plenary Meeting, 1928, pp. 59-60. ward, Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (London: H. M. pp. 318-319, Annex A, 334; Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ 67 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 490-492. Stationery Office, 1947-1961), III, pp. 54, 69, 72-73, [The Change of Times], II, pp. 181-191. 68 Edgars Anderson, Toward the Baltic Entente – 81-82, 86-87, 93, 225. 81 Les Problémes de la Baltique 93 Former long-term Secretary of the War Minis-

151 try of Latvia, Pulkv. [Col.] Pçteris Kaòeps, letter 101 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 276-289. ion, 1927-1934”, Lituanus, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1967), from March 24, 1962. 102 Edward W. Polson Newman, Britain and the pp. 6-8; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. 00/105; Germany, 94 Edvards Virza, ed. Z. A. Meirovics, Riga: Z. A. Baltic, London: Methuen & Co., 1930, pp. 224- Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2311, E 154-226; R. 2777, Meirovica piemiòas fonda izdevums, 1935, pp. 226; John Duncan Gregory, On the Edge of Diplo- E 374025-26; R. 2779, E 374974-76. 85-86, 90-91; Vilhelms Munters, “Meirovica macy (Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928), London: 113 Capt. Jerzy Niebrzycki, interview on July 11, ârpolitikas orientâcija [Orientation of Meirovics’ Hutchinson & Co., 1929, pp. 87-88. 1964. Foreign Policy], in Sçjejs, Vol. I, No. 3 (1937), pp. 103 United States of America, Department of State, 114 USA, Nat. Arch., RG, 165, DD 21/8, from 235-236; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United September 20, 1935. D 595311-12. States, Russia, 1918, Washington, D.C.: Govern- 115 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 95 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24, ment Printing Office, 1931-32, II, pp. 839-841, 849. 1962. 104 1962. Interview with the leader of the former intel- 116 Ibid. 96 Latvijas PSR Zinâtòu Akademija, Vçstures un ligence service of the Eastern part of Poland, Jerþy 117 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 37, 49-50; materiâlâs kultûras institûts, Latvijas PSR Vçsture, Niezbrzycka (pseudonym: Richard Wraga) on Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 1962. III [Scientific Acadamey of the Latvian SSR, Insti- July 11, 1964. 118 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/60, 61; 760. I. 6111/ tute of History and Material Culture, History of 105 Ibid. 119, 120, 121; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. the Latvian SSR, Vol. III], ed. K. Strazdiòð, Riga, 106 Jânis Ritenis, “Great Britain and the Baltic 1466, D 596349, 51-52, 62, 68-71; R. 3605, E 685 1959, pp. 338, 356-361, 370-372; Jürgen von Hehn, States During the Anglo-French and Soviet Talks 736; Latvijas Saeima, VIII Session, 10th meeting, Die Entstehung der Staaten Lettland und Estland, der of 1939”, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Depart- kol. 354-355; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomâtija, pp. 132, Bolschewismus und die Großmächte [The Origin of ment of Politics, University of Adelaide, Febru- the States of Estonia and Latvia, Bolshevism and ary 1966. 133, 139, 217, 220. 119 Great Powers], ed. Horst Jablonovski, Werner 107 Cap. Jerþy Niezbrzycka, interview on July 11, Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, Philipp, Vol. IV (Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien 1964. 1962. 120 Universität Berlin, Historische Veröffentlichungen, 108 Ibid. Ibid. 121 1956, pp. 127-128, 163. 109 Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11, USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/141; 860. P. 00/102; 97 Latvijas PSR Vçsture, III, pp. 232-239, 244-245, 1964; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2781, E. Leonas Sabaliûnas, “The Politics of the Lithua- 247, 249, 156-258, 274; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. pp/ 377014-16; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomatija [Secret Di- nian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926”, 18, 21; 860. P. pp. B/8, 14, 32, 860. I. 00/92; 860. N. plomacy], pp. 81-84, 90-91, 96-98, 215-216; USA, Lituanus, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 101. 00/62; 860. P. 00/50; 860. I. 00/31, 33, 45, 60; 860. Nat. Arch., R. G. 165. 122 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, N. 00/55; 860. N. 00/B./3; Germany, Foreign Of- 110 Edgars Andersons, “Toward the Baltic Un- 1962. fice, T-120, R. 2778, E. 374516. ion, 1920-1927”, Lituanus, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1966), 123 Edgars Andersons, 1927-1934, pp. 17-19, 22-28. 98 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24, pp. 37-38, 44-45, 48. 124 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 356-357, 1962. 111 Col. Edvîns Mednis, letter from March 11, 42-44. 99 Ibid. 1964. 125 Latvia Country and People, ed. Jânis Rutkis (Stock- 100 Ibid. 112 Edgars Andersons, “Toward the Baltic Un- holm:: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), p. 154.

152 126 Lt. Col. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 19, 1967; Capt. Edgars Mittenbergs, February 19 Imanta, 1959, II, pp. 91-92. 27, 1967. and August 26, 1962, March 18, 1967; Capt. Roberts 142 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6. 127 Ibid. Riks, December 16, 1960; Capt. Kârlis Ercums, 143 Anicetas Simutis, The Economic Reconstruction 128 Latvia Country and People, pp. 302-303. November 2, 1968; Capt. Arvîds Strazdiò, No- of Lithuania After 1918, New York: Columbia Uni- 129 USA, Nat. Arch., Rg 165, 10641-355/5, 2621- vember, 1962. versity Press, 1942, pp. 15-16. 74/1, 2587/52-6, 2621-53/7, 2667-D-59; Col.-Lieut. 130 Rutkis, pp. 237, 451-457; Latvijas Tirdzniecîbas 144 Ibid., pp. 12-14. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967, May Flote [Latvia’s Merchant Fleet], 1934, 1940; Former 145 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-55/1; 2587-53/ 5, 1967; League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book Minister Dr. Alfreds Valdmanis, letter from Feb- 6, 7, 11; 2724-DD-21/9; 10641-342/3; Gen Stasys 1938 (Geneva: Series of League of Nations Publi- ruary 15 and March 10, 1963; Air Pictorial, 1957, Rastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4, cations, IX, Disarmament, C. 206, M. 112, 1938, pp. 254-257; H. Volck, “The Irbîtis Line”; Eng. K. 1963; interview on June 12, 1959; Gen. Mikas IX), pp. 566-567; Kurt Passow Taschenbuch des Heers, Irbîtis, letter from April 19 and 28, 1967. Reklaitis, letter from February 3 and 14, 1964; Ausgabe 1939 [Pocketbook of the Army, 1939 edi- 131 Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from Col.-Lieut. Kazys Alikšauskas, “Lietuvos tion] (Munich, 1939), p. 229; Latvija i ejo armija August 8, 1962, April 27 and May 2, 1967; USA, kariuomene” (ms., 1958) (Moscow, 1938), pp. 60-61, 80-81; Col. Pçteris Nat. Arch., RG 165, 1064-355/5; Germany, Foreign 146 Royal Institute, pp. 191-194. Kaòeps, letter from January 23, 1963; Col.-Lieut. Office, T-454, R. 92, 53 (Gen. Oskars Dankers). 147 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-52/7; 10641- Jânis Druvaskalns, letter from March 19, 1963; 132 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-41/1; 2587-52/ 342/3; Gen. Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12, Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Plûmanis, MS. 1962 (Mobilisa- 6; 2584-67/2; 10641-355/5. 1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12, tion); Col.-Lieut. Jûlijs Íikulis, letter from January 133 Villibald Raud, Estonia, New York: The Nor- 1959. 13, 1964, February 17 and March 2, 1964; Gen. dic Press, 1953, p. 33. 148 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/ Voldemârs Skaistlauks, letter from March 21, 1962; 134 Maj. Kohn Madise, letter from April 4, 1966; 6; 2584-67; 10641-342/2. Gen. Eduards Kalniò, letter from August 20, 1962; USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, S. 2503-118. 149 Ibid., 2584-67/2; Sîpols, Dzimtenes nodevîba Col.-Lieut. V. Ginters, letter from March 7, 1963; 135 Raud, p. 34. (Betrayal of the Fatherland), pp. 140-141. Col.-Lieut. K. Zîverts, letter from February, 1963; 136 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; Capt. Elmar 150 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2584-67/1, 2731-10/ Capt. Adolfs Blâíis, letter from August 26 and Lipping, correspondence from 1966; USA, Nat. 1; RG 84, 760. M. 605/48 Bangerskis, II, p. 93. October 19, 1963; Capt. Kârlis T. Dakteris, letter Arch., RG 165, 2780-1; 2775-3/9; 2780-1, 2, 3, 5/1; from April 29, 1967; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, letter 2881-DD-2. 7/1; 2584-44/7, 9, 10; 2737-18/1. from July 12, 1962; Col.-Lieut. Pçteris Dzçrve, let- 137 Raud, pp. 73-76. ter from December 10, 1962, and February 4, 1963; 138 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, Estonia - passim. Capt. Antons Buls, letter from October 15, 1962, 139 Raud, p. 76. and August 4, 1967; Capt. Teodors Dreimanis, 140 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; USA, Nat. letter from January 24, 1962, and March 2, 1967; Arch., RG 165, November 20, 1937. Col.-Lieut. Vilis Hâzners, January 31, 1967 (con- 141 Germany, Foreign Office, MC T-120, R. 1807, nection); Col.-Lieut. Jânis Rucels, August 3 and 411573-75; Gen. Rudolfs Bangerskis, Mana mûþa 16, 1962, March 18, 1967; Eng. Kârlis Irbîtis, April atmiòas [Memories of My Life], Copenhagen:

153