I I 74-3200

HOEKSTRA, Ronald Bennett, 1943- THE'GOVERNOR AS POLICY MAKER IN EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1973 Education, administration

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1973

RONALD BENNETT HOEKSTRA

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. THE GOVERNOR AS POLICY MAKER IN EDUCATION: A CASE STUDY

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University ♦

By Ronald B. Hoekstra, B.S., M.Ed.

The Ohio State University 1973

Reading Committee: Approved By Raphael O. Nystrand Ivan C. Rutledge Advisoi Faculty of Educational Richard C . Snyder Administration ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The inception of this case, study occurred during an internship in the office of Governor John Gilligan. Ejqperiences in Ohio's Statehouse constituted a significant component in a study of the governance of education. The guidance of Raphael 0. Nystrand was especially helpful in structuring and facilitating a unique program concerned with issues of politics and education. His role of inquisitor has served to sharpen the author's perception of the context and process of educational administration. As critic he has prompted a refinement of personal and professional skills and abilities which successful practice in the field requires. His assistance in this research effort has been vital to its completion. The author wishes to acknowledge the efforts and cooperation of Robert E. Cecile who undertook sponsorship of an intern in the governor's office. The author is grateful to Walter G. Hack who initially arranged the internship with Dr. Cecile and who critiqued drafts of selected chapters. A special "thank you" also is due Jack P. Taylor who has aided the author over the past year with support, with counsel and with colleguial understanding. Finally the sustained commitment of the author's wife, Linda, has been an especially important ingredient in the work of the past three years. Her devotion to and stewardship of a shared dream has made possible a distinct mutual accomplishment. Her willingness to join in a common effort has added a special significance to a deeply held partnership.

R.B.H. VITA

January 2, 1943...... Born — Paxton, Illinois 1965...... B.S., English Education, University of Illinois, Urbana 1965-1969...... Teacher of English, Public Schools in Illinois and Indiana 1969...... M.Ed., Educational . Admininstration, University of Illinois, Urbana 1969-197 0...... Teacher of English, York Community High School, Elmhurst, Illinois 1970-197 1 ...... Graduate Research Associate, National Program for Educational Leadership, The Ohio State University, Columbus 1971...... Education Intern, Ohio Governor's Office, Columbus 1971-197 2...... Acting Executive Secretary, The Ohio College Association, Columbus 1972-1973...... Administrative Intern, Office of the Superintendent, Saginaw Public Schools, Saginaw, _ Michigan FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Educational Administration Studies in the Governance of Education Professor Raphael 0. Nystrand TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... ii VITA...... , . . . iv Chapter I. THE CASE STUDY: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES, SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS...... 1 Background of the Problem...... 2 Statement of the Problem...... 5 Objectives ...... 6 Significance of the Study...... 7 Limitations...... 9 Organization ...... 10 II. REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH AND CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE S T U D Y ...... 12 Review of the Literature...... 14 Framework For the Study...... 31 Methodology...... 36 III. GUBERNATORIAL BEHAVIOR AND EDUCATION _ ' POLICY MAKING: A STUDY OF CONTEXT AND ROLE DEFINITION...... 42 The Context of Gubernatorial Behavior...... 42 Role Definition and Gubernatorial Behavior...... 77 IV. GOVERNOR RHODES: EXECUTIVE BEHAVIOR AND EDUCATION POLICY...... 93

V V. THE GOVERNOR AND EDUCATION FINANCE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SCHOOL FOUNDATION FORMULA...... 117 VI. THE GOVERNOR AND EDUCATION FINANCE, MR. GILLIGAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK OF THE SENATE EDUCATION SUBCOMMITTEE...... 156 VII. GOVERNORS GILLIGAN AND RHODES AND EDUCATION POLICY MAKING: ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON...... 193 VIII. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN EDUCATION POLICY MAKING, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY AND PRACTICE...... 234 Summary...... 234 Conc3,usions...... 246 Implications ForFurther Study .... 254 Implications For Practice...... 258 APPENDIXES...... 260 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 277

vi

./ CHAPTER I

THE CASE STUDY: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES, SIGNIFICANCE AND LIMITATIONS

Introduction

The role of the state in the tripartite structure of government in the United States has undergone considerable change and modification. Nevertheless it consistently has served a critical function as a bridge between local governments responsible for local concerns and a federal government occupied with national affairs. The apparent disposition of current national leaders to shift many of the federal government1s responsibilities to the states has served to underscore the vital role which state government has to play in providing social services. Despite the increasing importance of state government its citizens generally have been reluctant to accept its involvement in public education. For example the popular conception of state government's responsibility has been greatly influenced by the notion that local governmental control of public schools was absolute and necessary. In whatever fashion state government has become involved in the education affairs of a community its action most often is perceived as an encroachment on the autonomy of local government.

Background of the Problem

Education is, however, one of the most important of the functions of state government.^ The state plays a central role in how school districts conduct their affairs. School buildings belong not to a particular district, but to the state. The district school board is an agent of the state legislature and exists, along with the geographic dimensions of its school district, at the pleasure of that body.^ The state governor has responsibility for proposing allocations of state monies to individual school districts. The state department of education is empowered to approve or disapprove proposed curricula, use of school busses, school calendars, lunch programs and has merged a bankrupt

^Frank W. Lutz, "The Politics of Education," Politics and Education (Washington: American Association of School Administrators, 1971), p. 6. 2This idea was clearly articulated by Roald F. Campbell and Walter G. Hack in "A Revolution in School Finance?," Theory Into Practice. XI (April, 1972), p. 73. district with an adjacent solvent district, forcing one to assume the debts of the other.^ In approving teacher education programs, establishing licensing and certifica­ tion standards and in enforcing state minimum teacher salary requirements the state has greatly influenced the school district. Yet while education clearly is a plenary function of state government only in the past few years have education researchers begun to study state government as an integral part of policy making in education.2 The neglect of state government by education researchers was due in large part to a long held belief that education was unique and that its governance structure was separate from the structure of state government generally. The dogma that education was above state government's political conflict is especially strong. Few educators acknowledge that public schools are entangled with the politics of state government. _

^This rule of law has been well established in cases involving the merger of districts of which one may be financially bankrupt. For a representative example of such litigation see Fisher v. Fay, 122 N.E. 811 (1919), Moore v. Board of Education, 193 N.E. 732 (1937).and Wiliiam Fruit v. Metropolitan School District of Winchester, 172 N.E. 2d 864 (1961). 2Thomas Dye, "Politics, Economics and Education Outcomes in the States," (Washington: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of the Budget, 1967), p. 1. Research into the development of state education policy has been of interest to only a handful of scholars. Most of them have focused on the interface of state legislatures and education interest groups.'1-. A modicum of research interest in state departments and state boards of education has been displayed. Even less attention has been paid to the executive branch of state government and its relation to education policy. Most education researchers have examined decision making structures and relationships in frameworks which have focused on state actors other than the governor.^ They offer little documentation of the governor's involvement in educational matters. On the other hand substantial literature exists which suggests that the governor is a pivotal figure in the development of most policy at the state level.^ Thus it seemed that he would influence state education policy in

^In his chapter entitled "State Politics of Education" Iannaccone discusses four major patterns of interaction which he synthesized from previously conducted atheoretical studies of politics and education at the state level. Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1967), pp. 37-63. ^A discussion of this research follows in a review of the literature in Chapter II. ^Joseph E. Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. xi. particular. Yet little attention has been given to the potential impact that a governor might have in education policy making. Research has indicated that his influence ("influence" is used synonymously with "power") in state policy making has been growing.^- This growth suggests that the governor may have been important in education affairs which previous researchers examined. Thus research which examined the involvement of a governor in the development of education policy was considered to be appropriate.

Statement of the Problem

This case study explores the question of the extent to which two governors influenced education policy making at the state level. It focuses especially on the activities of John Gilligan who as governor proposed the use of a personal and corporate state income tax, forty four per cent of which was to have been allocated for state support of elementary and secondary schools. In conjunction with his proposals for tax reform he recommended a reformed state school foundation formula which was to have increased the state's share in the cost of education and which was to

1See/ for example, William J. Keefe, "The Functions and Powers of the State Legislature," State Legislatures in American Politics, edited by Alexander Heard (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966)„, p. 60. have worked to equalize the educational opportunities of school districts across the state. An important element in the revised formula was the change from a per teacher unit factor to a per pupil factor. Students of state government observe that the governor has greatly influenced development of state policy. On the other hand there is an absence of literature which treats the role of the governor in education policy. It is the purpose of the present study to extend the literature in this direction.

Objectives

Objectives of the case study included the following: 1. To explore the role of the governor in state education policy making by studying the actions of two governors in relation to education issues 2. To examine the gubernatorial behaviors of Governors Gilligan and Rhodes and to compare those behaviors in relation to education questions and 3. To document the activities of Governor Gilligan in the development of a segment of school foundation formula legislation and to analyze and explain his executive behavior in terms of the resources he brought to bear and his means of applying them. 7

Significance of the Study

This documentation of the activities of a governor as he involved himself in making state education policy represents the first contribution of its kind to the literature concerned with state politics and education. Previous work by education researchers does not provide much detail about the governor as a determinant in shaping public education policy. This case study serves to provide a point of departure for additional study of the state chief executive and his influence in education policy outcomes. The case study helps to explain the development of a segment of the 1971-1972 Ohio school foundation formula. Set against the larger political, social and economic environment of the state, it helps to explain the development of the entire school foundation formula. It also establishes a perspective from which to view the more expansive subject of education reform in Ohio. While education finance presently has become the single most critical problem which has hastened the visibility of state government's responsibility in education other issues of an equally critical nature have surfaced. The general credibility of the entire system of public education has become severely strained, particularly in urban centers, and executive leadership at the state level has become an important ingredient in re-establishing trust and confidence in public education.^" The case study serves to underscore and acknowledge that leadership role which the state and its governor are openly assuming as education problems overwhelm and transcend school districts and their boards of education. Finally the case study highlights activities and strategies which in some instances appear not to have been productive. It points out apparent mistakes in judgment or tactics. At the same time it reports plans and actions which appear to have produced significant benefits. It suggests the utility of such research to governmental officials in reflecting on their behaviors as one possible means of guiding future activity.

•^-Harold Howe II, "State Government and the Education Challenge," An Address Before the Midwestern Governors' Conference, Cincinnati, Ohio, June 21, 1966, p. 8. 9

Limitations

As a research tool the case study has inherent and commonly accepted weaknesses. While case study methodology allows an indepth exploration of a number of variables, it also sacrifices some amount of generalizability and finite prediction. Case studies typically develop out of complex, dynamic and unique circumstances and yield data essentially probabilistic in nature. The case study attempts to view events and circumstances as wholes and to depict patterns of interaction. It does not attempt to select and analyze individual variables. The study is largely exploratory and is viewed as a functional form of research which yields some insight into a problem. The study is intended to serve as a point of departure for more rigorous and detailed research and its findings and conclusions apply only in Ohio. It is limited to an indepth study of a single state chief executive. The political, social and economic environment of Ohio was unique. Nonetheless an effort to generalize beyond the bounds of Ohio would not appear to be an unreasonable extension of the heuristic limitations of the case study. 10

Organization

Chapter I presents an introduction and a statement of the problem, a list of objectives of the study, a discussion of the significance of the study and a record of its

limitations. Chapter II reviews literature concerning state government and education policy and literature concerning the state chief executive. It establishes the framework for the study and also discusses the methodology of the case study. Chapter III reviews the political, social and economic contexts in which Governor Gilligan and Governor Rhodes were elected and served as Ohio1s chief executive. Chapter IV reviews the executive behavior of Governor Rhodes generally and examines his actions in relation to education policy in particular. Chapter V traces the development of a school foundation formula and presents an overview of Governor Gilligan's involvement in that process. Chapter VI focuses on the actions of Governor Gilligan as he worked to influence the shape of the Senate Education Subcommittee's version of the 1971-1972 school foundation formula. Chapter VII provides an analysis of the behaviors of Governors Gilligan and Rhodes and compares each as he was involved in education policy making. Chapter VIII presents a summary and conclusions of the case study and offers implications for further study and for practice. CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH AND CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

Introduction

Responsibility for the formation and execution of public policy generally is not equally distributed. Some persons appear to exert more power or influence than others. Those who exercise greater influence also seem to have greater potential for precipitating change. Multiple sources of data exist in the study of public policy formation, e.g. state education policy. Fruitful data can be generated by examination of those individuals with greater amounts of power. Discussing methodology in the study of policy formation Kenneth Gergen equates "power" or "influence" with the term "leverage" which he relates to any social system constituted by a set of interacting subunits. He holds that the subunits of greatest importance are individual persons rather than organizations or institutions. Noting a functional relationship between those subunits he observes that some subunits may be less 12 1 3 functionally dependent and more autonomous and concludes that the modification of a system of subunits may depend to a greater extent on the degree of leverage that some subunits exert compared to that of others. He suggests that on an empirical level, such a subunit might be the city mayor who prevents the execution of urban renewal within his jurisdiction. Professor Gergen also reviews methodological procedures for identifying those subunits who exert power or influence.-** He lists the reputational approach first used by Hunter, the positional approach which selects those who occupy formal positions of public leadership, the social participation approach which centers on the degree to which an individual participates in various aspects of public life, the opinion-1eadership approach which concentrates on persons who seem to influence the opinions of those around them and the demographic approach which involves identification of a power elite and an examination of that elite's demographic characteristics. The instant case study uses the positional approach to identify a state governor in order to study the influence or power or leverage he exerts in matters of state education policy.

■^Kenneth J. Gergen, "Methodology in the Study of Policy Formation" in The Study of Policy Formation edited by Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 182, 195-198, 201. 14 The case study focuses on the office of governor and the individual(s) who occupied that position. While the literature on state government generally and on the office of governor in particular esqplicitly identifies the governor as a central figure in state policy making^- his behavior and activities in education largely is u n k n o w n . ^ One of the underlying assumptions of the case study is that because the governor ultimately is responsible for almost all matters of state policy^ he likely would have a tangible stake in the outcome of a specific item of state education policy.

Review of the Literature

A principal task of the case study was to carefully describe and document the activities and behavior of a governor as he became involved in education affairs. In that regard literature by political scientists who have

-^•Coleman B. Ransone, Jr. .The Office of Governor in the United States (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1966), p. 155. p The dearth of research into the role of the state governor in making education policy has been underscored in a footnote by Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 263. JG. Mennen Williams, A Governor1s Notes (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1961), p. 2. 15 studied state government in general and the office of governor in particular was helpful in establishing a taxonomy for discerning, categorizing and labeling observed and/or reported gubernatorial behavior in policy making. These researchers report that the involvement of the governor in policy affairs generally is played out in three conceptually independent, but interrelated, roles. They are chief administrator, legislative leader and party chief.1 A second principal task of the case study was to explain the behavior of a governor engaged in education affairs. That behavior for the most part was rooted in one or more of the three major roles, facets of which have been weighed and described by those same political scientists. A synthesis of their work suggests both a means of explaining the governor's behavior and a possible historic perspective for whatever influence he might have exerted. The Governor As Chief Administrator In regard to his role as chief administrator most of the literature on the state chief executive projects a gubernatorial profile in policy making which is outlined by constitutional powers and/or constraints. Most state governors have common powers, constitutional terms and

^-Ransone, pp. cit., p. 157. 16 responsibilities. In appearance the office of governor is vested with much constitutional power and authority which tends to confirm the general notion that the man at the top of a state's governmental and/or political hierarchy possesses all the power. The assumption of responsibility for preparing, promoting and executing policy, however, does not fall solely to the governor, simply because his time commitments do not allow it. A modern governor could not function at all without assistance and advice from his staff. Surveys of the activities of the governor's office^- suggest that a great number of policy making responsibilities fall to the governor's staff. Despite the fact that an executive staff, might exercise considerable influence in policy making the governor himself in the last analysis makes his administration's policy decisions.^ Nonetheless severe constraints impinge upon his apparent power. The very constitution which gives him power ironically acts to restrain his exercise of it. Short terms of office, restrictions on re-election, election of lessor executives, restraints on the governor's appointive and removal power and overlapping terms of other elected

■^Alan J. Wyner, "Staffing the Governor's Office," Public Administration Review, XXX (January-February, 1970), p . 9. Ransone, op. cit., p. 155. 17 and appointed individuals prevents the governor from garnering too much control.^" In most states the governor is not the sole elected executive in the government and is chief executive only in the sense that he is first among many.2 The legislatures of the states jealously guard their perogatives of advising and consenting to guberna­ torial appointments and often freely challenge legislative proposals by amending them at will or by introducing legislation to preempt them. The Governor As Legislative Leader The governor's most visible activity in policy making occurs in his submission of proposed legislation to the state's general assembly where he fulfills his expected and

^-Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," Politics in American States, ed. by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1965), p. 123. 2in his test of the validity of the original findings of Joseph Schlesinger reported in the volume cited in fn 1 supra. Thad L. Beyle reported that a lack of control over the executive branch of state government, i.e. power of appointment, was perceived as being the major problem con­ fronting the 39 governors who responded to his question­ naire. 65 per cent of the governors felt that their lack of appointive power was the single greatest constitutional constraint which faced them. Thad L. Beyle, "The Governor's Formal Powers: A View From the Governor1s Chair," Public Administration Review (November-December, 1968), 540-545. 18 constitutional role of legislative leader. 1 In his constitutionally-mandated role of recommending legislation the governor often initiates change and most major legislation approved by the average state legislature emanates from the governor's office. As chief legislator the governor shapes and influences policies in the legislative arena and employs a variety of formal and informal powers in that regard. The composition and profile of the state legislative body may present the governor with a great amount of opportunity. At the same time if partisan politics is a major concern of the legislature the governor may encounter serious pitfalls. He may confront a legislature made up of two parties and controlled by either the governor's party or the opposition. On the other hand, especially in the Southern states, he may confront a one-party legislature made up of his party. T

^-Alan Wyner has reported that "A legislative session, in fact, probably absorbs more attention and energy of the governor's office than any other facet of state politics and government." Alan J. Wyner, "Gubernatorial Relations with Legislators and Administrators," State Government (Summer, 1968), p. 200. ^Sarah P. McCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party," The American Political Science Review, LX (December, 1966), p. 923. 19 When a legislature is controlled by the governor’s party, particularly in the single party state, the potential for difficulty facing the governor is great.^ He may be confronted by legislative leaders who, like himself, wish to assume leadership of the party. In two-party states where the legislature is controlled by the opposition party the chances for a governor’s success are greatly enhanced. He has access to the legislature through its leaders— particularly in the case of the governor's party, in the majority or not— where he is able to use his position as party leader to secure election of members of his choice to legislative leadership posts. Another potential advantage lies in a state legislature's possible inability to lead itself. In that event the governor is in a prime position to fill the leadership void which, as Lipson points out, has occurred many times. Should the leadership void not develop,

^■Wyner also has reported that data collected by interns working in fourteen gubernatorial offices have confirmed the notion that control of both houses by the governor's party gives him the most success in terms of various combinations of legislative, gubernatorial and party control. Wyner, State Government, op. cit., p. 202. j Ransone, pp. pit., p. 202. ^Leslie Lipson. The American Governor: From Figurehead to Leader (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 206. 20 however, the governor still has tremendous influence potential. For example Governor Franklin Roosevelt1s actions with a Democrat minority in the New York General Assembly demonstrated his manner of influencing the passage of legislation entirely antithetical to. the Republican's stated position. Bellush recounts how Roosevelt, clearly the leader of the Democrat Party in New York— having risked election as governor while A1 Smith was a candidate for the presidency— worked to neutralize a sizable majority which the GOP held. To insure an alert and competent minority, he invited Democrat legislators to weekly meetings in his office. Bellush notes that because of this discussion on key legislation, followed by specific assignments to legislators, debate on the floors of both houses was elevated. The GOP leadership suddenly, and apparently for the first time, was confronted with aggressive, argumentative and well-organized Democrat spokesmen. ■** Much the same circumstance occurred in Illinois. It was Governor Stevenson's practice to keep his Democrat legislative leaders well informed via regular weekly meetings. That practice, as had Roosevelt's, resulted in

i Bernard Bellush, Franklin D. Roosevelt As Governor of New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 34. 21 increased power for the Democrats in the traditionally Republican-controlled Illinois General Assembly. An added benefit was reported to have accrued to the Illinois governor as a result of his regular meetings with the Democrats' leadership: to some extent all of the Democrat legislators became more resistent to the influence of special interest groups and lobbies.*1* A governor's legislative leadership is consummated when he either approves or rejects all or parts of specific legislation. His power to veto bills passed by the legislature is considered to constitute the absolute capacity of a governor's formal strength. It gives to the governor considerable control over legislation since less than two per cent of a governor1s vetoes ordinarily are overridden by a legislature.^ The potential of a veto leads many legislators to sound out the governor's wishes before they throw their own proposals into the hopper.4 Threat of a veto or discriminate use of the veto is a means of insuring that legislators are reminded of that power of

Kenneth S. Davis, The Politics of Honor: A Biography of Adlai E. Stevenson (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967), p. 233. Schlesinger, pp. cit., p. 227. O JRansone, pp. cit., p. 213. ^Lipson, pp. cit., p. 211. 22 a chief executive.^ Another constitutional authority over legislative activities which most chief executives possess is power to summon special legislative sessions. In most states the governor has the authority to limit legislative considera­ tion to a single item or issue. In doing so he focuses public attention on his program and makes it difficult for recalcitrant legislators to fail to at least respond to his specific proposals. In some instances the special session deliberately is used as a device to influence legislation— sometimes just the threat of a special session produces needed votes.^

^Richard E. Neustadt. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., I960), p. 84. It has been reported that as President Franklin Roosevelt occasionally asked his aides for a piece of legisation he could veto in order to remind Congressmen that he had that power, a practice which he was reported to have originated during his tenure in the governor's office in Albany. Bellush, pp. cit., p. 92. 2 Lipson, op. cit., p. 215. O Ransone, pp. cit., p. 212. 23 Perhaps the most undefinable and elusive, yet potentially most important, power in legislative affairs is his power of persuasion.^ The governor has to be a p e r s u a d e r . ^ one of the most critical abilities of Governor Stevenson reportedly was his talent for face-to-face negotiation.^ Even a governor with great constitutional power ultimately has to rely on persuasion.^

] Frank Bane commented "Whether the persuasion is entirely intellectual or based on personal loyalty, or the result of charm or a combination of these and other factors, the governor has to practice it most of the time." Frank Bane, "The Job of Being Governor," ' State Government, (Summer, 1968), p. 200. ^Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 150. ^Davis, op. cit., p. 233. ^Dwane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1969), p. 334. 24 • The Governor As Party Chief The office of governor is pre-eminently a political office.Because he is elected on a partisan platform he is expected by the people of his state to assume the status of party leader.^ His expected role of partisan leader becomes intertwined with virtually everything he does in the exercise of his constitutional authority.^ The blend of his partisan and constitutional responsibilities is most evident in the field of legislation.4^ As party leader he normally has the general perogative of choosing his party's legislative leadership. While he may be the most potent political power in his state, his actions in selecting the legislative leadership have to be played out in a most delicate fashion, since the legislature may regard his selection as an interference

Former Illinois Governor Stratton has commented "In my estimation, to be a good governor, you have to be political and partisan. It's absolutely a necessity; there is no way to get around it." William G. Stratton, "A Former Governor Views the Office," The Office of Governor (Urbana: University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1963), p. 90. This view has been reinforced by Robert B. Highsaw in "The Southern Governor: Challenge to the Strong Executive Theme," Public Administration Review XIX {Winter, 1959), p. 9. ^Kallenbach, pp. cit., p. 286. ^Charles R. Adrain, Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 275. ^Kallenbach, pp. cit., p. 298. 25 in legislative affairs.^- Sometimes it is not possible for the governor to choose his preferred leader. The role of party chief carries with it definite constraints and while the governor is the leader of his party he also is its prisoner.^ He has to work to preserve party harmony and is under compulsion to avoid courses of action likely to seriously disrupt his party. He has to seek to strike a balance between what he personally may feel public interest requires and what can be achieved/ given conditions imposed by the necessity of his maintaining a substantial degree of unity and support among his party's members. The governor finds that he is the party's prime fund-raiser. Fund-raising activities require that up to one half of his time may be spent away from his office, little of which can be spent in administrative duties. His party leadership always is temporal which means that the governor constantly has to keep his "political fences mended" which consumes much time and energy.

■^•Ransone, op. cit., p. 204. ^Kallenbach, op. cit., pp. 298-299. 26

It seldom is likely than an individual becomes governor without incurring extensive political obligations.^- Thus he finds himself as chief dispensor of patronage which he uses to pay off political debts, expecially to rank-and-file party workers. While patronage generally has been restricted by establishment of civil service employment systems the governor usually is able to retain at least one department or agency for 2 patronage employment. He often chooses to not limit patronage to his party, but moves across partisan lines to lure support of opposition legislators. He also withholds patronage. Chief executives often make careful tabulation of legislative votes on gubernatorial programs and tell dissenting legislators that if attitudes and votes are not changed they will get no jobs for constituents, no more state assistance for roads in their districts and no more executive favors that are the life blood of state legislators."^ The relationship is not subtle, but is

^■Russell W. Maddox and Robert F. Fuquay, State and Local Government (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 89. o Chester Bowles, "A Governor’s Job As Seen By a Governor," American Government in Action: National. State. and Local, ed. by Karl M. Schmidt (Belmont: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1967), p. 344.

O Highsaw, op. cit., p. 9. 27 direct and brutal. It is fair to conclude that the governor generally is the single most important policy maker at the state level. The governor usually sits at the very center of the "who gets what, when and how" scheme of state affairs.-*- The literature which focuses upon gubernatorial roles makes clear that the governor ordinarily makes final decisions on almost all matters of state policy.^ The Governor In Relation to Education Questions However as was noted in the preceding chapter, the literature of researchers who studied the development of state education policy says relatively little about the role of the governor. The primary focus of this literature has been upon the interaction between education interest groups and the legislature. In short, education researchers who studied development of state education policy have focused on agents in the policy making process other than the governor.

1James Holderman, "The Modern Governor: Limits of Effectiveness," The Office of Governor (Urbana: University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1963), p. 57. ^Kallenbach, op. cit., p. xi. For example Usdan, Minar and Hurwitz examine the relationship of elementary and secondary education to higher education in the context of state politics in twelve states in 1968. Despite substantial variations in political structure among the states they conclude that legislatures maintained active interest in public school affairs, generally responding to the stimulus of education interest groups.'1' They observe that "Regular participation in education policy making has been characteristic of the state office, state board, 'education coalition', and the legislature. . . . "2 On the other hand they note that governors in those twelve states tended to have been less active in education policy making, that the governors were somewhere on the periphery of policy making activity. They write that the governor's apparent lack of direct involvement in education policy making may have been the result of an inadequate staff and a traditional institutional isolation of education.2

^Michael D. Usdan, David W. Minar and Emanual Hurwitz, Jr., Education and State Politics (New York: Teachers College Press, 1971), p. 177. 2Ibid.

^Although never stated explicitly the authors imply that the governors of the states they studied were, however, involved actively in other areas of state policy making. See, for example, their discussion on p. 176. Ibid. 29

Masters, Salisbury and Eliot conclude that in two of the three states they studied the governor generally was removed from education policy making. In Missouri the governor remained aloof from education legislation until it had come to his desk for his signature.^* Institutional limitations prevented the Michigan governor from exercising influence in legislative affairs.2 In the third state the governor was found to have much potential influence in education affairs, but was involved only to the extent that he exercised his power of appointment to the Illinois School 3 Problems Commission. In their study of the politics of education finance in eight northeastern states, Bailey, et. al. give little direct attention to the governor's involvement in education policy making. He comes under their scrutiny only as his executive budget was relevant to school finance.4

^Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury and Ihomas H. Eliot, State Politics and the Public Schools {New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 47. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Stephen K. Bailey, Richard T. Prost, Paul E. Marsh and Robert C. Wood, Schoolmen and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962), p. 50. 30

In a discussion of state politics and public education Iannaccone utilizes a post factum analysis of the studies of Masters, et. al. and Bailey, et. al. and synthesizes four types of linkage structures which appear to have facilitated the process of making state education policy. He, too, neglects the state chief executive and excludes him from the interaction between the legislature and the education profession which he studies. **" James Conant discusses the shaping of education policy and concludes that despite the almost totally political nature of the policy making process the primary participants in struggles over education policy are state departments of education, legislatures and education lobbies.2 In Pennsylvania, according to Conant, the question of central coordination of higher education facilities and program was decided between the Pennsylvania Department of Education on the one hand and the Pennsylvania State Education Association on the other. Conant mentions the governor, but assigns him a minor role played out in his appointment of the state superintendent of public instruction.

^•Iannaccone, pp. cit. , pp. 47-50. ^ James B. Conant, Shaping Educational Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964) , p. 54. 31

Framework For the Study

Absence of documentation of gubernatorial behavior regarding education policy in the literature presents an opportunity to explore a relative unknown in the perception of the process of policy making in state government. Opportunity also is afforded to add to the literature on the governor where one finds a paucity of systematic description and documentation of the behavior of the state chief executive as he goes about his work. Occasion to describe and document the extent to which a governor involved himself in the development of state education policy and to explain his behavior in that regard also is afforded. The behavior of the governor in education affairs was of principal research interest. Recording his influence and explaining his behavior in education policy making were primary tasks of the case study. The case study focuses on what the governor did and attempts to explain why he behaved as he did. It also attempts to compare the behavior of one governor with that of his immediate predecessor. 32

The shape of gubernatorial behavior in policy making is molded by what Theodore Sorenson labels "a multiplicity of factors" which circumscribe the three general roles of the chief executive. As chief administrator the governor ordinarily is charged with the tasks of preparing, promoting and executing almost all of the policy of state government. To accomplish those tasks the governor is invested with considerable constitutional authority, notwithstanding, in some instances, significant constitutional constraints on that authority.^ As chief legislator the governor is empowered and, in most instances, required to submit legislation for consideration by state lawmakers. Effective relations with members of the legislature in large measure depends upon his persuasive abilities. They are a function of a willingness to esqpend substantial amounts of his resources which among others include his making personal contacts with influential legislators, his granting or withholding of patronage, his willingness to bargain or his willingness to

■^■Those factors include the limits of permissibility, limits of available resources, limits of available time, limits of previous commitments and limits of available information. Theodore Sorenson, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 10 and 23. ^Por example the governor of North Carolina is required to seek election every two years and possesses no power of veto. 33 attempt to defeat legislators in their bids for re-election. -*■ Much of his legislative prowess often is rooted in his capacity as a partisan political figure of considerable stature. At the same time his commitment to partisan ideologies or to preferred political tenets may serve to restrain his abilities to move toward or away from legislative trends. As party chief the governor often gives sizable portions of his time to preserving sound relations with members of his party and to maintenance of adequate financial resources with which to support the party's activity statewide. Consideration of these factors which shape gubernatorial behavior in policy making suggests the need to gather data about background variables which may influence the governor's behavior as administrative, legislative and party leader. The first variable is the collective impact of the social, political or economic circumstances which existed at a particular time. The second is the governor's definition of his role. (A model of the framework for analysis and explanation of gubernatorial behavior is shown at Figure 1 on page 34.)

^■William V. Holloway, State and Local Government in the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951), pp. 174-175. 34

Figure 1

A Model of the Framework For Analysis and Explanation of Gubernatorial Behavior

Context

Political Social i Economic

Executive Behavior

Administrative Chief ♦ Legislative Chief Policy * Outcomes Party Chief

Role Definition 35 Social, political and economic forces at work during the time that a particular individual has occupied the governor's office often has served to explain, in part, why specific policy decisions were made. One example of how economic forces influenced gubernatorial behavior occurred during the Roosevelt administration in New York. Faced with the advancing and numbing effects of an economic depression Governor Roosevelt proposed sweeping, and then considered radical, solutions which were to foreshadow his legislative proposals during the first years of his Pre sidency. *** Of equally great importance is an understanding of a governor's role definition. Each governor circumscribes for himself a role which may or may not coincide with role esqpectations of others. Each governor has the opportunity to make his office largely what he chooses.^ it was of value to interview the governor to gain some understanding of his expectations for his office. While focusing particularly on the activities of Governor Gilligan the case study first compares Governors Gilligan and Rhodes in terms of the two general variables discussed above. In so doing attention is paid to their sources of information, to their ways of ordering that

^•Bellush, op. cit., p. 285. ^Keefe, op. cit., p. 60. 36 information and to their methods of choosing among alternatives in making policy decisions. The case study also focuses on a single item of education policy, monitors the bargaining and decision making of several individuals, particularly Governor Gilligan, which produced it and attempts to explain Governor Gilligan's behavior during that process.

Methodology

The case study was chosen as a means of research because it allows an indepth exploration of a number of variables. Interest in the study developed out of an internship in the office of Governor Gilligan. The case method appeared to offer the best structure with which to capitalize on research opportunities which grew out of the internship experience, during which time it became apparent that reform of state education policy was being attempted.^ The case study method of research sacrifices generalizability and finite prediction in its effort to view events and circumstances as wholes and to depict

^•Edith Mosher has noted that the case method typically has been used when opportunities for research have been presented by "willing informants and a set of noteworthy events:" Edith K. Mosher, "State Decision-Making For Federal Aid to Education: Methodological Considerations," An unpublished paper on case study methodology. Prepared for the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 5, 1972, p. 2. 37 patterns of interaction rather than the operation of selected analytically segregated variables.'1' The variables of the study were not controllable to the point that it can be replicated in a different setting with predictable results. The study largely is exploratory and is viewed as a functional form of research which yields some amount of insight into a problem. The study also is intended to serve as a possible point of departure for more detailed research.

Much of the data for the case study was drawn from experiences and observations of a five month internship in the office of Governor Gilligan.^ Further data were

generated from interviews with persons involved in the

-*-The strategy of the case study was not unlike that of the Masters, Salisbury and Eliot study of education and politics in three states. Those authors have observed that making education policy generally was a major task in state politics and involved many interests. ’To have accounted for all of the interests and to have analyzed all of the issues would have been beyond the capabilities of their research effort. Nonetheless they have asserted that their research methodology was appropriate for the nature of their task. The internship provided a means of observing the activities of persons involved in development of education policy. At the end of each day of the internship a detailed record of activity was collected, recorded and filed. The content of that record provided the basis upon which the study of Mr. Gilligan's involvement in developing the Ohio Senate Education Subcommittee1s version of the 1971-1972 school foundation formula was conducted. 38 formulation of education policy in the Rhodes and Gilligan administrations.*** Particular attention was given to persons who developed the Ohio Senate Committee on Education and Health version of the 1971-1972 school foundation formula. Additional data were gleaned from review of other documents including newspaper reports, testimony delivered before legislative committees, gubernatorial speeches and press releases, gubernatorial campaign literature and pertinent papers from gubernatorial files. Participant Observation The internship provided an opportunity to collect data using the methodology of participant observation. Participant observation has been established as a reliable method of gathering data from the field for many years.^ Its prime advantage is that it often provides access to a wide range of information, sometimes'including

***See Appendix A and Appendix B for the lists of questions which made up the interview schedules used to gather data about the Gilligan and Rhodes administrations. Appendix C lists the names of persons interviewed and the dates on which they were interviewed. All of the interviews were tape-recorded,* except the interview with Governor Gilligan, and later were transcribed. Of the persons contacted for interviews five declined to meet with the author. They were Oakley Collins, Harold Eibling, Martin Essex, James Rhodes and James Shocknessy. ^Sveryn T. Bruyn, The Human Perspective in Sociology: The Methodology of Participant Observation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 3. 39 confidential information.1 Nevertheless the method's validity always has been subject to question by those who would choose a more rigorous means of collecting data. Bruyn, however, has formulated guidelines which provide a reasonable degree of validity to the methodology: 1. The greater the time spent in observation, the more likely is an accurate interpretation of what is observed, 2. the closer the proximity of the observor to his subject, the more accurate his interpretations, 3. the more familiar the observor is with the language of his subjects, the more accurate his interpretations will be and 4. the more the observor confirms a consensus of his subjects, either directly or indirectly, the more accurate will be his interpretation of them.3 The internship ranged over a period of approximately five months and the author most often observed* the individuals engaged in policy making activities first hand and usually was never more than once removed from them. Having studied the processes of policy making at the state level the author was conversant with the language of state government and the

^Ibid., p. 16. ^Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology of Social Research (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) , p. 160. ^Bruyn, op. cit., pp. 88-90. 40 legislative process. The author frequently debriefed the subjects of his observation and was able to establish an understanding of any consensus which might have existed at any particular time. Focused Interviews Interviews provided a major segment of the data. Based on a review of the data generated out of participant observation and a perusal of other written documents interview schedules were constructed. Use of the focused interview allowed the researcher to play an active role in introducing explicit verbal cues to a prior experience which the interviewee had had. As related by Merton, et. .al.-** the focused interview requires that the persons interviewed are known to have been involved in a particular situation. It requires that an interview guide be constructed. It requires that the interview focus on the subjective experiences of persons exposed to a pre-analyzed situation in an effort to ascertain their definitions of the situation. Interview schedules became increasingly focused as data were collected and reviewed. For example new information was produced through the interviews and as a

■^Robert K. Merton, Marjorie Fiske and Patricia L. Kendal, The Focused Interview (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 3. 41 result the schedules were modified to incorporate different cues and stimuli. While the focused interview schedule provided structure its adaptability and flexibility permitted considerable leeway in following the responses of persons being interviewed. CHAPTER III

GUBERNATORIAL BEHAVIOR AND EDUCATION POLICY MAKING: A REVIEW OP CONTEXT AND ROLE DEFINITION

The Context of Gubernatorial Behavior

Introduction As was noted in Chapter II the literature on the governor suggested that the political/ social and economic context of gubernatorial behavior was an important variable in helping establish a perspective from which that behavior might be viewed. The collective impact of that variable always has been helpful in explaining, in part, why governors behaved as they did or why they made particular policy decisions. A general review of the political, social and economic conditions in the decade of the 1960's and in the early 1970's perhaps serves as an instructive preface to a later examination of the behaviors of Governors Gilligan and Rhodes in relation to education policy. Ohio Politics Distinguished By Conservatism In 1849 Ohio Republicans were a new party in a state dominated by an alliance of Whigs, liberal Democrats and a Free Soil Party pitted against a strong regular Democrat Party. By 1856, however, the estate of the Republican

42 43 Party had improved and Ohio was solidly in the Republican fold. Not only did Ohio vote for John C. Fremont in the 1856 presidential election, it also elected a Republican governor— Chase— an event which marked the first of eight successive gubernatorial victories. Between 1854 and 1970, over a hundred years, Ohio has voted for all but four Republican presidential candidates.2 However Ohio is not a one-party state. In the period since 1854 Ohio has elected some fourteen Democrat governors including Frank Lausche, who served a total of five two-year terms. Lausche was elected twice more than the Republican governor with three (and up to 1944 the longest) successive elections, Rutherford B. Hayes of Cincinnati. While Ohio has been a two-party state since the 1920‘s both parties have been especially conservative in regard to the role and function of state government. One of the most popular governors in Ohio was Democrat'Frank Lausche, but the politics he pursued were as conservative as those advocated by any of his Republican opponents. Lausche was noted for his policies of minimizing esqpenditures for state services such as education and welfare and for his

^■John M. Taylor, Garfield of Ohio: The Available Man (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1970), p. p. 58. 2 Ohio gave its electoral votes to Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and 1916, to Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 and 1936, to Harry Truman in 1948 and to Lyndon Johnson in 1964. 44 investment of substantial sums in highway construction. In 1948, when he was elected governor for the second time, Ohio's per capita expenditures were about the same as the average for all states. In 1956 when he left for the United States Senate, Ohio's per capita state expenditures were $22.48 compared with the all state average of $34.75.1 The conservatism of Ohio's elected officials and of its state government emerged to a considerable degree out of the issueless character of the politics of the two parties in the state. Republicans and Democrats most of the time have failed to provide voters with policy alternatives in statewide elections. A notable exception to this general pattern was the campaign of Michael DiSalle of Toledo who, following service as head of President Truman's board of price stabilization, was elected governor in 1958. Governor DiSalle campaigned principly on his concern for the poor condition of Ohio's education and health programs. When he took office he persuaded a Democrat- controlled legislature to appropriate several million more dollars in tax revenues. The combination of higher taxes and a bitter factionalism which DiSalle fostered within the

Ijohn H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 148. 45 Democrat Party led to his defeat in the 1962 gubernatorial

election.^ The overwhelming defeat of the Democrat Party in Ohio in 1962 in large degree was due to the peculiar composition of its members and the geographic and demographic uniqueness of Ohio. While Ohio was the fifth most productive industrial state in the union it also was a leader in agricultural production. Ohio's industrial strength was located in its eight large cities spread out across the p state. Agriculturally productive areas were interspersed with a fair amount of regularity among its eight urban centers. The effect of such a geographic and demographic distribution has produced some unusual effects in politics in Ohio. For example the national Democrat Party, since Franklin Roosevelt's election in 1932, has been composed of a coalition of labor, liberals, poor whites and blacks. In Ohio the same coalition existed but was considerably weakened by the wide geographic distribution of its members. Most of the urban centers had Democrat mayors, but because

-^-Robert Giles, "Austerity in Ohio," The Reporter, XXIX (November, 1963), p. 39. 2Those cities were Akron (east central), Canton (east central), Cincinnati (southwest), Cleveland (north central), Colunibus (central), Dayton (west central), Toledo (northwest) and Youngstown (northeast). 46 of the great distance between them no single city organization was able to dominate the statewide Democrat Party. Each Democrat city leader preferred to enjoy the role of prince of his own province to that of satrap in an effective state organization.^ Urban Democrat leaders enjoyed substantial patronage from city and county governments and were relatively unconcerned with the fate of the party on a statewide basis. Similarly the labor unions in Ohio seldom were united. In each of the eight urban centers were scores of small and large unions and, like the mayors, no single union was able to dominate the labor movement on a statewide basis. Each labor leader preferred to negotiate his own political arrangements with candidates. Compared to their brethren in Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin Ohio's labor unions were relatively weak. They were primarily "bread and butter" oriented and concentrated their energies on the relatively narrow objectives of higher wages, shorter hours and improved working conditions. Ohio's labor unions did not seriously contest control of state government with the business community.

■^Fenton, op. cit. , p. 139. 2Ibid. 47

Moreover the labor movement in Ohio was without a large core of liberals which distinguished the national Democrat Party coalition. Many of the labor leaders in Ohio looked with suspicion on liberals and had little in common with them. Since little interaction occurred between these two groups and since liberals lacked institutional support the labor movement was without backing beyond the confines of its member ship. On the other hand the post-World War II Republican Party was exceedingly well-organized across the state. It was well-organized because rural and small-town Republican leaders, who lacked local job and money resources, looked to statewide victories to provide the plums of patronage. With Democrats and Republicans alike patronage was a necessary commodity with which to insure continued service in party affairs. The Ohio Republican Party also was well-organized because a concentration of Republican votes, jobs and money 2 resources were in only one large city— Cincinnati. Republicans in most of the other major cities were relatively powerless. As a result Cincinnati Republican leaders enjoyed power which generally was unchallenged by

^■Ibid. , p. 140. 2Ibid., p. 142. 48 other Republicans in the state, primarily people from small towns and suburbs. '/ Within the statewide Republican Party the business community, unlike its counterpart in labor, used its financial and propaganda resources very skillfully. Given leadership by considerable banking and financial interests in Cincinnati and Hamilton County the business community, primarily through newspapers, successfully sought and often secured the nomination of conservative Republicans— and Democrats.^ Conservatives such as Democrat Governor Frank Lausche enjoyed a good press in Ohio and in the absence of effective counter propaganda on the part of labor organizations often received the vote of low-income Democrats in the cities as well as the vote of rural and suburban Republican conservatives. The net result was conservative dominance of the state. As a consequence in the 1960's Republican Party dominance of Ohio almost was complete and despite its existence in the cities no statewide Democrat Party was

1 The strong conservative character of Cincinnati in both politics and business has been noted by Alvin F. Harlow in his book, The Serene Cincinnatians, a romantic, but nonetheless accurate, treatment of the birth and development of the Queen City. In his opening pages he discusses the conservative bias of the city and recalls that during the period following the crash of 1929 Cincinnati had only one bank failure in which 83 per cent of its depositors' money was saved. Alvin F. Harlow, The Serene Cincinnatians (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 10-16. 49 visible. Republicans were dominant in most of the rural counties. Well over half of the eighty-eight counties were particularly one-sidedly Republican. They controlled Hamilton County in which is situated Cincinnati which they also controlled and in 1960 received a large vote in the corn-belt cities and towns. Regional and Social Detachment The disunity of unions and the Democrat Party in Ohio was a faithful reflection of the social disorganization of its members and the rest of the inhabitants of the state. The demographic and geographic distribution of Ohio's populus served to socially isolate groups of people. Rural agricultural communities were isolated from one another by a traditional ignorance and distrust of cities and those who lived in them. The eight urban centers generally were separated by great enough distances to insure their insulation from one another as well. In the east

1The principal components of the corn-belt voters .were persons descended from New England and Kentucky Whigs who settled much of Ohio, German immigrants and small­ town Anglo-Saxon Protestants who objected to World Wars I and II, Roman Catholic Democrat candidates and the New Deal's farm, civil rights and spending policies. These people tended to suffer less than most of the nation's citizenry during the Great Depression and were relatively more prosperous thereafter. ^John H. Fenton, "Ohio's Unpredictable Voters," Harper's. CCXXV (October, 1962), p. 64. central part of the state was found "little Switzerland" and several Amish communities. In the rural southeast were parts of Appalachia. In the southwest the splendid meld of the arts, high finance and corporate might of the Queen City overlooked the northern border of Kentucky. Within the eight urban centers social isolation of families generally was demarcated by neighborhoods. And within neighborhoods, a majority of which were lower-middle- income neighborhoods,1 people appeared to have known one another infrequently. While in some cases next-door neighbors were well-acquainted, many of these next-door- neighbor interactions were reported to have been of the casual "over-the-fence" variety, even when families had lived side-by-side for perhaps ten years or more.3 In many ways the resident of the lower-middle-income Ohio urban neighborhood was kith and kin of the suspicious, isolated French peasant. He was very nearly totally absorbed in his one-half acre, his family and his television.3 Perhaps one reason for the social isolation of such . families was that they often had little in common. The postman in one house did not talk the same language as his accountant neighbor. The accountant was in a world

•IIbid., p. 63. ^Ibid. 3Ibid. 51 different- from that of the skilled workman at Timkin Roller Bearing who lived across the street. Conversation among them often might have been confined to the weather or to the future of the Cleveland Indians. Perhaps another reason for the social isolation was the peculiar, possibly unique, working patterns of workers in Ohio's cities. For example in Akron, the rubber center of America, the rubber plants operated on a four shift day, six hours per shift, with six working days in a week. In his book, A Nation of Strangers, Vance Packard observes "This segmenting of life into shifts not only dictates patterns of daily living for families geared to them but largely determines socializing patterns. It can leave one I feeling he is a stranger on his own street, if his neighbors are geared to different shifts."*^ .Packard reports that almost all of the rubber workers he encountered during his research said they did not know much about people living near them on the block. He relates the observation of the head of the Firestone local of the rubber workers' union who commented that he did not know most of the people living near him and explained, "People in neighborhoods today really don't socialize much

IVance Packard, A Nation of Strangers (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), p. 47. ^Ibid., p. 55. 52 anyhow. The union leader added that the lack of knowing one1s neighbors was a trend of the times.2 An Economy National in Character Not only was conservatism reflected in the political character of the state it also was reflected in the state1s economy. Perhaps Ohio's early and successful beginning led to a conservatism in business and finance. Ohio had, after all, produced such presidents as McKinley and Harding, Senator Robert A. Taft, Sr. and treasury secretary George M. Humphrey— all identified in one way or another with conservatism and in Harding's case, "normalcy". Ohio was the first Midwestern state to be settled and was a leader in industrialization. With Lake Erie on the north and the Ohio River forming its southern border the state was well served by low cost water transportation.

Ohio's predominantly flat terrain made it easy to build canals in the early days and to construct a later network of railroads and highways to physically link Ohio's towns^ and cities. Ohio also was endowed with wood, coal, oil, natural gas, clay for industrial uses and other nonmetallic minerals. That endowment was of such magnitude that in

3-Ibid. 2ibid. 53 the 1960's Ohio ranked sixteenth among the states in value of mineral production.^ And despite extensive industrialization Ohio continued to rank as one of the leading agricultural states where farming remained a stable element in the state's economy. Heavy industry and manufacturing, however, dominated Ohio's economy in the 1960's. Leading industries, in terms of value added by manufacture, were transportation equipment, primary metals, electrical and non-electrical machinery, fabricated metal products and food products. Ohio ranked in the top four states in manufacturing and was a pioneer in applying science and technology to the manufacture of consumer goods and a leader during World War IX in turning out weapons and material. As might have been expected Ohio economic fate was tied directly to the national economy and consequently the state was vulnerable to the ups and downs of recession and recovery. In 1962 a national recession was the primary cause of some 3.6 million unemployed persons in Ohio. Several counties in the southeastern part of the state were included in the economically depressed area of Appalachia.2

^■John Walsh, "Ohio: Old Laissez-Faire Attitude on Linking Education, Research and Industry Undergoing Change," Science, CXLV (July, 1964), p. 469. 2Ibid., p. 470. 54 Ohio had been a major recipient of federal defense contracts following the Korean War. But due to the recession in the early 19601s and the defense spending cutbacks ordered by Secretary of Defense MacNamara Ohio, along with other Midwestern states, lost ground to East and West Coast states in competition for defense contracts. While other Midwestern states suffered by those lost contracts and their federal tax dollar created jobs, the loss of them was particularly acute to Ohio who was not on an economic or productivity par with its Great Lakes neighbors. One measure of that productivity and economic disparity was that from 1948-1956 Ohio's per capita total general revenue increased forty-five per cent compared with 1 sixty per cent for the all states' average. Political, Social and Economic Upheaval in Education Between the commencement of the decade of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's remarkauble changes swept the nation. A decade of violence, political revolution arid social cataclysm precipitated a profound transformation in the education milieu of the states and the nation. Public elementary and secondary schools and higher education institutions became embroiled in the political, social and economic disquiet which became particularly acute from 1968

^Fenton, "Ohio's Unpredictable Voters," op. cit., p. 62.

/ 55 to 1970. A critical focus on education was generated not just in Ohio but was a function of a larger national expression of concern over public schools and colleges and universities. The three years of 1968, 1969 and 1970 witnessed considerable restlessness in schools generally. Ohio was not without visceral evidence of an uneasy and tenuous bond between communities, schools, students and government. Brought about by a revulsion of the Vietnam War student protests on campuses of the state's high schools and colleges and universities increased in number and intensity during those three years and climaxed in the Spring of 1970. In May of that year student protests and rioting erupted at Kent State University, Miami University, Ohio University and The Ohio State University and Governor Rhodes ordered national guardsmen onto the Columbus and Kent campuses. On the Kent State University campus four s’tudents were shot to death and across the entire nation protesting students reeled in a convulsive, shuddering paroxysm.^- That tragedy in Portage County perhaps marked the zenith of student protest and violence on campuses in Ohio and nationally.

^■In his study of that tragedy James A. Michener reported that immediately following the shootings at Kent State some 760 colleges and universities either closed or came close to doing so. James A. Michener, Kent State, What Happened and Why (New York: Random House, 1971), p. vii. 56 * Unrest in schools was not confined to colleges and universities. Powerful and deep undercurrents of doubt, disappointment, disillusionment, frustration and class and racial discord began to tug at the foundations of public schools in the cities. Disbelief at the inhumaneness of public education and its inability to equip students with even basic skills of reading, writing and mathematical computation turned to rage and city schools became a "no man's land" where battles for control of buildings, finances, curriculum and right of selection and rejection of professional staff were waged among parents, administrators, teachers and politicians.*** Born out of the civil rights movement in the early 1960's and christened by the Birmingham demonstrations of 1963, a wide-ranging politicization of education and public schools swiftly developed. Initially given impetus by efforts to racially desegregate public-schools, the

■*-The classic example of this struggle for control of schools occurred in the decentralization effort in Ocean Hill-Brownsville schools in New York City. For a review of that series of incidents set in the framework of the labor movement among public school teachers see Martin Mayer, The Teachers Strike (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), especially pp. 88-104. Also see "Power Struggle Racks New York City Schools," Washington Post, July 30, 1972. 2 For an account of the strategies of confrontation which have grown out of that politicization see Tom Wolfe, Radical Chic and Mau-Mauing the Flak Catchers (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), especially pp. 117-184. 57 momentum of political activism in them increased and turned to issues of achievement and expenditures of education finances in an attempt ". . .to control the gateways to affluence and social position."-*- Television news broadcasts and newspaper headlines almost daily chronicled angry confrontations between communities— mostly black— and schools administrators— mostly white. Those same television news programs and newspapers also heralded a revolution among public school teachers who in the 1960's began to organize to demand higher salaries and increased involvement in the governance of local schools. During the period from 1962 through early 1966 almost forty instances of strikes, sit-downs, extended picketing or impositions of professional sanctions by teacher organizations occurred. Ohio schools did not escape that increasing teacher militancy and were faced with a statewide professional sanction by the Ohio Education Association in the early months of 1970. The unrest among students, parents, teachers, administrators and political leaders prompted the public to train its attention on public schools. An increasing militancy on the part of each of these groups raised the

-^-Charles E. Silberman, Crisis In the Classroom (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 69. 58 frightening visage of open confrontation, aggressive activity, hard conflict and open warfare in the public schools.^" Undermined by an alarming increase in drug abuse in public schools and in colleges and universities the public's trust and confidence in public education came under considerable strain. Superimposed on that initial visage was the spectre of public schools closing their doors because they had exhausted funds for continued operation. Costs of operating schools outstripped revenues generated by local taxes and state foundation support. As a consequence in 1971 thirty-six Ohio school districts requested audits to p verify their states of pending financial insolvency. As early as 1968 periodicals began reporting school closings in Youngstown*^ and in November of 1971 Dayton's schools

1For an extended discussion of this militancy and its effect on teachers' associations see Alan Rosenthal, "New Voices in Public Education," ed. by Alan Rosenthal, The Politics of Education At the Local, State and Federal Levels (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1970), pp. 101-110. p See Appendix D for a listing of those thirty-six school districts. ^See, for example, "Penny-Pinching in Youngstown," Time, XCII (November, 1968), pp. 89-90 and "Youngstown Shuts Its Schools," Nation, CCVII (December, 1968), pp. 713-716. 59

closed for six weeks.^ Racial desegregation of schools was given national recognition with the entry of federal courts into local school district affairs. Likewise federal court concern with finance patterns in a considerable number of states also gave national recognition to the issue of alleged unequal expenditures of education funds among school districts within state boundaries.2 The decisions of those federal courts generally came to be consistent in their disapproval of funding patterns which served to give credibility to the notion that increased state support— perhaps total state support— was in the best interests of

•^Dayton's schools closed on November 5, 1971 and because of the failure of a 10.5 mill additional operating levy proposal on November 12, 1971, stayed closed for the remainder of the year. 2The first reported litigation challenging the constitutionality of severe discrepancies in school spending between rich districts and poor districts occurred in 1968 in Illinois. In that suit a three-judge federal court was asked to declare Illinois' school finance law unconstitu­ tional because it did not allot school funds according to pupils' needs. The panel refused such a declaration. "A Law School Project Led to School Ruling In the Serrano Case," Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1972. 60 the taxpayer as well as students. Certainly education finance was an issue of burgeoning national concern during the three years of 1968, 1969 and 1970.^ A Shift in the Power of Ohio's Education Community The increasing militancy and political activism on the part of public school teachers was not confined to just local salary disputes or issues of local governance of schools. The Ohio Education Association which represented nearly all of the public school teachers in the state began to exert increasing political power in Columbus. That

-*-To date some thirty-two states and their patterns of distributing education funds have been challenged in federal courts. Recently the U. S. Supreme Court in a five to four decision ruled that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution did not extend to matters of distribution of education expenditures. Despite this decision the California Supreme Court's ruling in Serrano v. Priest which declared that quality of education cannot be a function of the distribution of the state's wealth ordered the state legislature to write new laws to distribute education dollars on an equitable basis. The decision of that California court may well have impact on those other state courts which now may be asked to rule on the same issues in their states. William Grant, "School Finance Reform Remains a Must," Detroit Free Press. March. March 20, 1973, p. 5-A. ^That concern was of great enough national concern that in early Spring of 1970 President Nixon appointed a President's Commission on School Finance. Two years later that Commission recommended, among other things, that state governments should assume substantially all of the non- federal outlays of funds for public schools and that local communities be permitted to supplement state funds only up to a maximum of ten per cent. Roger A. Freeman, "Should States Finance the Schools?," Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1972. 61 movement appeared to have precipitated a quiet, but dynamic, struggle between the interests of higher education and those of elementary and secondary education. That struggle reached its zenith during the last years of the Rhodes administration. An apparent result of that shift was that for the first time in the history of the state the percentage increase in education appropriations was greater for elementary and secondary education than for higher education in the legislation approved by the first session of the 109th General Assembly. In a state where the interests of higher education always had received the bulk of state education appropriations that shift in the power differential may have been very significant. Presidents of the state universities for some time had wielded considerable power in always winning the bulk of education appropriations.• The apex of their power occurred during the early 1960's during which time enrollments and 2 _ facilities in higher education rapidly increased. Yet

■^The high degree of influence which the state university presidents commanded in matters of education appropriations compared with the efforts of their counter­ parts in public elementary and secondary education was recorded in a discussion of the organization of education in Ohio by Usdan, et. al., op. cit., pp. 132-142, particularly p. 137. ^Howard Collier remarked that "Higher education forces had overwhelming influence during the time that we were expanding higher education." Interview with Howard Collier, Toledo, Ohio, April 19, 1973. 62 within a short time their power appeared to have been fragmented and atomized by a blend of adverse conditions, of which the most dominant appeared to have been creation of a state board of regents. Prior to creation of a board of regents to govern the state's higher education facilities, The Inter-University Council, made up of the presidents and fiscal officers of the six state universities, had been the unofficial agency which spoke to the legislature on higher education matters. When The Inter-University Council convened in Columbus to discuss appropriations it decided what total.appropriation amount would be recommended and agreed on how that appropriation was to be allocated among the six. When the board of regents was established its first chancellor, John Millett, had been a member of The Inter-University Council as president of Miami University and knowing its tremendous influence, quickly moved to supplant The Inter-University Council as the spokesman for the state universities.1 Millett was successful in that regard and the Inter-University Council surrendered its role of spokesman to the chancellor and the board of

1Usdan, et. al. note that . .university presidents were not much in evidence in Columbus any more." Usdan, op. cit., pp. 134-135. 63 regents.^- At about the same time student enrollments began to level off and decline and the costs of operation began to sharply increase. Paced with increased costs and relatively smaller state appropriations (based in part on numbers of full-time students) the state university presidents began to compete with one another and the cohesion of the

Inter-University Council almost entirely disintegrated.^ Another factor which served to diminish the influence of the state universities was the emergence of a coalition of colleges and universities in the private sector. Brought together under the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Ohio and given initial leadership by President Harold Yockum of Capital University the private sector began to openly compete with the public sector for state higher education appropriations. As a result of an intense lobbying effort the 108th General Assembly approved legislation which established Ohio Instructional Grants,

■^■Howard Collier also remarked that with the creation of the board of regents the power of the university presidents . .may have been reduced. . .almost totally. . .in matters of education policy." Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. O ^For a longer discussion of the politics of the higher education community in Ohio, based on interviews with sixty-eight college and university presidents and with state governmental leaders, see author, "Toward Ad-Hocracy or Planned Revitalization," a report to The Ohio College Association, Columbus: The Ohio College Association, 1972. 64 quasi-vouchers which students were awarded to defray tuition costs at colleges and universities, including those in the private sector. The private sector, with available classrooms, dormitories and programs waiting to be utilized, also provided a viable alternative to the state universities' clamor for more appropriations for expanded programs and services. A combination of an over-expansion of facilities and a dramatic drop in enrollments during the late 1960's served to mark one of the first concrete instances of major error in planning for Ohio's higher education needs. Legislators regularly besieged with requests for increased higher education appropriations were aghast at the unfilled classrooms and dormitories, the result of overbuilding which they had supported during the early Rhodes years. The popularity of higher education institutions and their presidents with members of the legislature also was badly tarnished by the outbreak of student protest and ~ violence. To the conservative legislators of Ohio such violence and protest was incomprehensible and few state politicians embraced the students' cause or attempted to show sensitivity to their demands. As most college and university presidents had been caught between a felt need to preserve the freedom of thought and inquiry, however radical, on the one hand and the calls by many state 65 legislators to establish order on campuses on the other, so were the presidents of the state universities in Ohio.^ Summary The prevailing mood of the decade of the 1960's in Ohio was one of emerging change sharpened by the trauma of violence and revolution. The epicenter of that movement perhaps reached Ohio later in the decade than in most other major industrial states. Yet once its shock breached the provincialism and conservatism of the state's towns and cities and their political, social and economic institutions its momentum rapidly increased. That initial shock was followed by a kaleidoscopic rush

See, for example, Michener's discussion of Dr. Robert White who was president of Kent State University and under­ went considerable strain during and following the rioting and shootings on his campus. Michener*, op. cit*, pp. 115- 120. The depth of animosity which many members of the Ohio legislature evidenced toward those presidents was measured on the occasion of a proposed resolution by the House of Representatives to honor the retirement of the president of Kent State University. When the chair asked for a voice approval of that resolution commending Dr. White the question was met with a chorus of boos and catcalls. The author was sitting in the gallaries of the House and observed this action on August 2, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 85. Another example of the disfavor in which the state university presidents found themselves occurred when the general assembly promptly responded to the student violence and protest on Ohio's state university campuses by enacting House Bill 1219, a campus disruption law, which became effective on September 16, 1971. That legislation was quickly approved by the legislature over the vigorous opposition of the state university presidents. 66 of economic and social contradictions which swept into the cities and industries of Ohio. Its force produced high unemployment in an expanding economy stimulated by the needs of war. It generated record high wages gutted by rampant inflation. It offered the promise of equality of opportunity to the state's minorities, a promise which was consumed in the firestorms of rioting in six of Ohio's eight cities^ which were fed by the insult of indifference and fanned by the hostility of closed labor unions and segregated neighborhoods. The vortex of those contradictions appeared to converge most visibly on Ohio's system of public schools. The spectre of bankruptcy and closings began to stalk a large number of the state's 600 school districts. Urban school systems began to be choked by rapidly depleting tax duplicates and rapidly rising costs. They began to be paralyzed by students who either rebelled or dropped out and by angry parents of children who held high school diplomas but were functionally illiterate. Rural school districts, usually void of industry and generally high tax bases, approved high millages, but struggled to provide adequate educational programs for steadily decreasing

•^In 1966 rioting erupted in Cleveland and Dayton, in 1968 in Akron, Cincinnati and Youngstown, in 1969 in Columbus and Youngstown and in 1970 again in Cleveland. Michener, op. cit., pp. 229-230. 67 numbers of students. The partisan political structure of the state did not go unaffected by this change. A re-emerging Democrat Party in Ohio was given substantial boosts by entry of young persons tested in the practice of the "new politics" generated by Eugene McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy. The state's traditional and historic political conservatism which had circumscribed the function of state government began to give way to a more activist philosophy of government. Finally a distinct shift in the political power shared by Ohio's larger education community appeared to be evident. Where higher education interests had commanded great respect and regard from members of the legislature and the governor's office, those interests began to yield to an emerging political force composed of interest groups in public elementary and secondary education. As such greater political resources appeared to lay with public school teachers, administrators and members of boards of education.

Role Definition and Gubernatorial Behavior

Introduction The second variable which the literature on the governor suggests is important in examining gubernatorial behavior is the role which a governor defined for himself. 68 In Chapter II it was pointed out that almost every state chief executive enjoyed the opportunity to make his office just about what he chose. It was noted that it was of value to interview the governor, in order to gain some understanding of his expectations for his office. Another helpful means of discerning his expectations was to generally review his personal and political history which served, in part, to define his choices of role.1 Personal and Political Histories James Allen Rhodes In 1962 James Allen Rhodes was elected the sixty-first governor of the state of Ohio. His successful challenge of the incumbent governor, Michael DiSalle, was consummated in a 556,000 vote plurality over his Democrat opponent. At age fifty-two Rhodes capped a career of some thirty years in elective office. Rhodes was born on September 13, 1909 in Coalton, located in Jackson County in south central Ohio. The son of a coal miner, Rhodes attended elementary school in Coalton and then moved to Springfield where he attended high school. Following graduation from high school he enrolled at The Ohio State University where he attended classes for a single quarter.

^Gergen, pp. cit., p. 231. 69 Rhodes began his career in partisan politics in 1933 when he was elected as a Republican committeeman from Columbus. Pour years later he was elected to the Columbus board of education. He later was elected city auditor of Columbus and later still became mayor of Columbus. In 1952 he began his career in state government with election as auditor of state. The position of state auditor gave Rhodes the opportunity to view the expanse and depth of the entire state governmental structure. In the ten years that he served as auditor of state, as one of his aides recalled, he had a ". . .chance to think about alternatives and had already decided to go for governor."^ During his tenure as state auditor he twice ran unsuccess­ fully in 1950 and in 1954 against the popular incumbent governor, Frank Lausche. The central issue in the 1962 gubernatorial campaign was taxes and expenditures. In his first term Governor DiSalle, a Truman liberal, advocated and worked for increased taxes and spending for state services in education and welfare. Governor DiSalle campaigned on his record of improved services and more humane treatment of welfare recipients, but was labeled as "Tax Hike Mike" in large part which seemed to defeat him. Rhodes' position simply was

•^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, Columbus, Ohio, June 8, 1972. 70 that of "No New Taxes", a position which had been the secret to the success and popularity of Frank Lausche. He defeated DiSalle by the biggest majority ever amassed by a Republican candidate in Ohio. Rhodes was a politician ripe for the governorship, a man who carefully had plotted his course in public life which was to climax in his election as governor. It was acknowledged and accepted by Ohioans that Rhodes was ideally suited for the demands of the state1s highest elective office.^* He recognized that the conservative tone of the urban establishment was endorsed by the stolid and prosperous farmers in Ohio's rich agricultural regions. The materialism, social indifference, racial intolerance and economic discrimination which was common to most of the nation in the early 1960's appeared to have been somewhat magnified in the peculiar conservatism which flourished in Ohio. Political leaders, like Rhodes, 'who were sensitive to that state of affairs and who understood it were most likely to succeed. In that regard Rhodes was immensely successful and his record pluralities in 1962 and 1966 were testaments to his sensitivity to and understanding of the people of Ohio.

■^■Richard G. Zimmerman, "Rhodes 'Unforgettable', Backers, Critics Agree," Cleveland Plain Dealer. January 1, 1971. ‘ 71 Rhodes was of the lineage of successful conservative politicians like Mark Hanna, John Bricker and Frank Lausche, who accommodated themselves to the interests of big business where tremendous power, resided in the directories of Ohio's giant mills, banks and insurance companies.^ They were able to move skillfully among the state's power blocs and to establish strong relationships between them and the state1s powerful newspapers which historically have operated largely as extensions of the banking-industrial elite. Like Frank Lausche Rhodes was adept at using such friendships to escape criticism when possible or to cushion it when the editorial axe simply had to fall.^ Rhodes was pragmatic and alert to opportunity— "Jim Rhodes will borrow anybody's idea if it is a good one. . . and will just start to push it."^ Rhodes often asked for much more than he ever ejqpected to get. He often seemed most interested in legislative approval of his general concepts and worried least over winning approval of specific details.^-

^■David Hess, "The Decline of Ohio," The Nation, CCX (April 13, 1970), p. 432. ^Ibid. ^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. ^Zimmerman, pp. cit. 72

His appeal to the Ohio electorate largely was based on positive, unabshed boosterism-~"The attitude we took, into the 1962 campaign was 'Don't tell us why we can't do something! tell us how we can. ' "■*■— and opposition to high taxes. Much preferring to attend county fairs to staying

in The Statehouse,^ he lauded his state's mighty industrial complexes, its beautiful sublime hills, its agricultural might, its proud frontier history, its firsts in flight and tomato juice production, its sauerkraut and rubber production and its best-in-the-world state fair. He believed simply that all of the ills of mankind— fascism, neuroses, crime— could be traced to -unemployment and perceived his chief task as governor as working to assure a 3 healthy economic climate that produced jobs for everyone. Although he had been immensely successful in the legislature's approval of his programs and ideas toward the end of his second term he began to encounter difficulty. In 1967 his proposed constitutional amendment to allow creation of an Ohio Bond Commission was soundly defeated in a May referendum. The gubernatorial-appointed board would have been empowered to have continuously borrowed and spent

^•Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. ^Joe Rice, "The Rhodes Years," Akron Beacon Journal. December 20, 1970. ^Abe S. Zaidan, "'The Wonderful World' of Governor Rhodes," The Reporter, October 6, 1966, p. 44. 73 millions and millions of dollars for state building projects including highways. Rhodes reportedly "bludgeoned"^ the amendment through the general assembly and then vigorously campaigned for its approval by the voters. However he was unable to transfer his popularity to the proposal. It perhaps was his most gaping and painful political wound. Rhodes' second serious political setback, given impetus by Life magazine's allegations that he had been less than fastidious about his income taxes and that he had ties to the Ohio underworld,^ occurred when he entered the Republican senatorial primary contest in the Spring of 1970. His opponent in that election was Robert A. Taft, Jr., son of the famous Ohio senator. Rhodes lost the primary election and Taft went on to become the junior United States senator from Ohio. Although he had given much to his ‘state in terms of capital improvements Rhodes left his tenure as governor with Ohio beset by problems which had been developing and growing worse during the 1960's. Ohio's water and air were polluted, its schools faced financial crisis, its tax structure was archaic and, in most cases, was regressive.

■^Zimmerman, pp. cit. 2 Denny Walsh, "Leniency for a Hoodlum, Slush Fund Income," Life. LXVI (May 2, 1969), 28-32A. 74 The cities in Ohio were faced with major problems of rising crime and inadequate housing. The state's mental hospitals and prisons were in much need of improvement. John Joyce Gilligan Democrat John Gilligan based his campaign on, and set as the major theme of his administration, the restoration of public confidence in state governmental institutions.^- The issues which he raised were simple and straightforward— he proposed an increase in state spending for public schools, for pollution control, for local law enforcement agencies and for the state's mental health system. To pay for those increases he proposed thorough-going tax reform, including a state-collected and graduated personal and corporate income tax. His election may have been interpreted as an acknowledgment that Ohio required leadership of a pattern different from the past. Perhaps motivated by that reality Gilligan, the forty- nine year old former one-term Congressman from Ohio's first congressional district and resident of Cincinnati, began a campaign for governor which echoed much of the campaign of another Democrat candidate for governor almost ten years before. Many of the basic issues had not changed:

1John J. Gilligan, speech to the Ohio Federation of Teachers, Columbus, Ohio, March 1, 1971. O "John Gilligan Speaks Out On the Issues," Columbus Dispatch, October 4, 1970. 75 increased spending for state services, especially for public elementary and secondary education and tax reform were given total support by Gilligan as they had by Governor DiSalle. Yet while the issues might have been similar an intervening eight years had substantially increased the severity of Ohio's taxation and education finance problems. Changed also was the state Democrat Party. Where 1962 found a Democrat Party fragmented and in disarray, described by Governor DiSalle as a "loose confederation of local organizations",^" 1970 marked the emergence of a revitalized statewide group of Democrats. Immediately following his victory in the Spring primary, Gilligan assumed overt leadership of the party and held a series of $100 per plate dinners and cocktail parties that netted some $200,000 and his campaign budget was reported to have been close to a million dollars. An incident of major political significance also occurred right after the Spring primary in May. A scandal broke which involved the state1s revolving investment loan fund. Three statewide candidates out of the seven nominated by the GOP, including state auditor Roger Cloud, the nominee for governor, were caught up in it. A state grand

^Zaidan, op. cit., p. 46.

^ P a u l R. wieck, "Going For Gilligan," The New Republic, CLXIII (October, 1970), p. 10. 76 jury was called, but none of the Republican hopefuls were summoned and finally the grand jury's warrant expired. Despite the fact nothing further developed in the loan scandal its existence served to drape a pall over the Republican candidates and Democrats continued to point out to the voters its dark countenance. That no one was indicted apparently was not as damaging to the GOP slate as was an inability to refute the charges that had been made. As a result many Republicans, especially those in rural areas, were reported to have abstained from voting.^ Almost certainly the loan scandal overshadowed the rest of the issues which were debated during the course of the seven month c a m p a i g n . ^ Whether the loan scandal served to tip the election to Mr. Gilligan has not been established. John Joyce Gilligan was born on March 22, 1921 in Cincinnati and was educated in Roman Catholic parochial schools. A Roman Catholic whose father was a prominent mortician in Cincinnati, Gilligan graduated from St. Xavier High School and continued his formal education and received a bachelor's degree from Notre Dame University in 1943. He later earned a master's degree in literature from the University of Cincinnati.

■^Wieck, "Going for Gilligan," op. cit. Interview with John C. MacDonald, Columbus, Ohio, December 13, 1972. 77 He taught literature at Xavier University in Cincinnati from 1948 to 1953. He first was elected to the Cincinnati City Council in 1953. He was re-elected to the council in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961 and 1963. In 1964 he was elected to the United States House of Representatives from Ohio's first congressional district. He served only a single term and in 1966 was defeated in a hid for re-election to his House seat by Robert A. Taft, Jr. He returned to the Cincinnati City Council in 1967. In 1968 Gilligan sought the Democrat primary nomination for United States senator. In a primary upset of national news interest Gilligan defeated the incumbent Democrat senator, Frank Lausche. Gilligan lost the Fall election to William B. Saxbe. Role Definitions Governor Rhodes^ In the simplest terms possible Governor Rhodes appears to have defined his role as that of chief salesman for the state of Ohio. His primary and over-riding concern as governor was to insure that as many of Ohio1s men and women as possible were working and were gainfully employed. Most

^-Since Governor Rhodes declined to be interviewed this discussion of his role definition and later discussion of his other activities in education affairs are based on interviews with his former administration staffers and on reviews and analyses of him by journalists and newspaper reporters. 78 of his time and energies appear to have been consumed by activities to achieve that goal. According to Howard Collier, Rhodes' director of finance, he was deeply committed to the concept that it was government1s responsibility to establish a climate or environment by which employers could be attracted and could estpand their operations to hire more people.^- His thinking in that regard appears to have been rooted in his reflections on growing up in Jackson County— then one of the most economically depressed areas of the state. The image of miners being thrown out of work and proud families being forced to accept relief and welfare payments was permanently imprinted on his mind.2 As a consequence he appeared to believe that jobs and employment were a panacea for the state' s social and educational ills. Howard Collier recalled Rhodes' discussions of his early life in Jackson County

^•Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 2Ibid. 79

. . .his family lived well as long as his mother, his sister and he were all three working and putting their earnings in a common pot. He knew that then they lived above the poverty level. But anytime that one of the three of them was sick and could not work, he knew their income and living standard was at a horrendously low level. In that regard he will not change.! Rhodes was convincing as Ohio * s chief salesman because he totally believed every word he uttered about the value and worth of jobs and full employment. In turn education became the vehicle through which Ohioans were to be prepared to qualify for jobs which required skilled or technical abilities. Rhodes' interest in vocational education and its preparation of young men and women for the world of work was great. Rhodes also vigorously supported technical and vocational education at the post secondary school level. He campaigned and worked for creation of vocational and technical institutes established on a multi-county basis and often attached to joint vocational school centers. Governor Gilligan Governor Gilligan defined his primary role of governor as that of establishing a range of policy alternatives for the people of Ohio. In regard to education policy he noted his awareness of a traditional separation of education and

XIbid. 8° politics.^" Yet he observed that ". . .education competes in the political arena for public monies." and as a consequence was a single element in a larger political framework.2 As governor he noted that he carried most/ if not all/ of the responsibilities for public education. At the same time Mr. Gilligan observed that he had little direct authority with which to carry out those responsibilities. He felt his most important responsibility in education was that of funding and that of establishing priorities in the distribution of education monies.3 He revealed little interest in assuming direct responsibility for what he labeled the "minutia" of education policy. In matters of the ". . .structure of school districts/ process and standards of certification of teachers and content and design of curricula. . .", he felt that the state department of education should properly assume leadership and responsibility.4 Nevertheless he was concerned that the state department of education be brought under the purview of his appointive power so that he might

1 Interview with the Honorable John J. Gilligan/ The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, May 24, 1973. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 81 exert more direct forms of leader ship. **■ Gilligan and Rhodes: A General Comparison A comparison of Governors Gilligan and Rhodes is not difficult in terms of style, manner, campaign behavior or philosophy. Each came from a remarkably different background— Rhodes from the coal mines of south central Ohio and Gilligan from the comforts of an upper middle class Irish Catholic family in the Queen City. Rhodes attended public schools and enrolled only a single quarter at The Ohio State University. Gilligan primarily attended parochial and church-related schools and received a master's degree. Rhodes held elective office for over twenty years before he became governor, all of them in Ohio and ten of them in state level government.^ Gilligan on the other hand served twelve years on a city council and two years as a United States Representatives and had no experience in

J-Ibid. ^In his text on state and local government G. Theodore Mitau reports that in 1965 of the fifty state governors Rhodes ranked third in years of prior service in state and local government with twenty-two years. He was preceded in ranking by Connecticut1s Governor Dempsey with twenty-seven years and by Delaware's Governor Terry with thirty years, twenty-six of which were as a member of the state judiciary. Using a factor of governmental experience as a measure of aptitude for gubernatorial service, Rhodes appears to have been amply qualified. G. Theodore Mitau, State and Local Government: Politics and Processes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 115. 82

state level government. Rhodes was described as an "old style freewheeler with a pocketful of political IOU's who was noted as one of the state's best vote getters."-** Gilligan lost almost as many elections as he won, was a relatively unknown political figure outside Cincinnati and then was unable to carry his home county of Hamilton in the election for governor. Gilligan*s election margin was narrow enough that he was unable to carry many Democrat candidates for the Ohio House or Senate with him. As a consequence Gilligan faced a Republican-controlled general assembly little changed from what it was during the second Rhodes administration. All of its GOP leaders were the same and Gilligan was confronted with a group of Republicans, along with some Democrats, who were ready to do battle.2 The manner in which Gilligan structured his office staff and accounted for their costs and staff responsibilities provides another means of comparing him to Governor Rhodes. While Rhodes listed only seven persons on the payroll of the governor's office Gilligan listed forty- four. Gilligan directed public attention to his administration's making known the "true cost" of running his

-*-"The Patrician and the Pol," Newsweek, LXXV (May, 1970), p. 30.

^"More Taxes For Education In Ohio Ejected," Cincinnati Enquirer, June 12, 1970. 83 office. In so doing he was pointing to the generally known fact that Governor Rhodes kept governor's office employees on other payrolls, thereby saving the state's general fund money while other departments with their own sources of revenues picked up the cost of their salaries. While Rhodes enjoyed a national reputation as a powerful Republican he rarely ventured outside the bounds of Ohio to speak, even though as a spectacularly successful politician he was much in demand.2 Yet he turned down most invitations to appear at out of state party functions.^ On the other hand Gilligan within three months of his inauguration was traveling out of state for speaking engagements. Six days before he delivered his proposed budget to the Ohio General Assembly Gilligan spoke to the Ohio Society of New York at a banquet in New York City. On the next day Mr. Gilligan flew to Washington, D. C. to address the National Press Club and that evening flew back to New York City to address the annual banquet of Americans for Democratic Action.^"

^•Gene Jordan, "Gilligan Staff Cost Up 52%," Columbus Dispatch, August 15, 1971. 2Denny Walsh, op. cit. 2Zaidan, op. cit., p. 47.

^Doug Walker, "Gilligan Promises to Rescue Schools," Davton Daily News, March 11, 1971. 84 Certainly there was a difference between the two governors relative to the styles of their speeches and their manners of delivery, both in terms of their prepared addresses and in extemporaneous remarks. Rhodes has been described as having had a tendency to deliver "pedestrian" speeches-1- and was plagued by a heavy nasal accent which reflected his upbringing in Ohio's poor south central coal fields.^ Rhodes never claimed to have been a great debater or a verbal swayer of public opinion,3 nor was he particularly glib.^ Gilligan, on the other hand, was given to a formal and polished rhetoric, filled with literary and philosophic allusions which reflected his academic interest in literature. Described as energetic, articulate and knowledgeable3 he depended upon the work of his speechwriter, Kevin Connorton, who lived at the governor's mansion and usually drove Mr. Gilligan 'to and from The Statehouse, for drafts of speeches and addresses, which Mr. Gilligan often edited and reviewed immediately prior

^•Giles, op. cit., p. 41. ^Zimmerman, pp. cit. 3Ibid. 4Hess, pp. cit., p. 432.

3 "Top Gilligan Aides Tend To Recede Into Background," Journal Herald, August 9, 1971. 85 to speaking. Gilligan's speeches ranged from the serious and somber to the witty and light and often were couched in philosophic and literary frameworks.^* It was reported that Governor Rhodes disliked confrontation politics and preferred the ". . .warm amiability of empty banter and clubhouse camaraderie."2 Gilligan, on the other hand, was less prone to avoidance of confrontation in public. It was reported that Rhodes "ducked out of town" the weekend of a civil rights protest by Blacks from across the state.2 in a similar circumstance a demonstration by representatives of Ohio public employees was staged on the west steps of The Statehouse on June 24, 1971. The group of about 300 were protesting the reluctance of the House of Representatives to increase their wages and salaries to a level their union was demanding. Mr. Gilligan went out to them and spoke from the steps of the Capital.^- It was reported that Governor Rhodes, whenever in doubt, would say little or nothing about particular issues,

^"See, for example, Governor Gilligan's address to the Jennings Foundation which he delivered on April 19, 1971 or his speech to the Ohio Federation of Teachers, delivered on March 1, 1971. See also prepared remarks which he made to Xavier University Young Democrats on September 29, 1970. 2Hess, op. cit., p. 432. ^Zaidan, pp. cit., p. 47. ^The author observed the governor's speech to the demonstrators. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 33. 86 especially on those issues that could drag him into controversy.^- Mr. Gilligan generally was prepared to discuss almost all issues and attempted to keep abreast of current developments by requesting a constant stream of

memoranda from his aides and assistants. ^ As a result most often he was able to respond to most questions in an informed manner. Mr. Gilligan outlined the role of his assistant for education affairs as that of collecting and processing information and data, of drawing up policy alternatives for gubernatorial attention and consideration and of providing regular briefings on developments in education on both state and national levels. Cecile often represented the governor at meetings of educators and most always accompanied the governor when Mr. Gilligan anticipated discussion of education issues. In the event of a crisis or emergency Cecile has been dispatched by Mr. Gilligan to meet with school officials to determine if and in what

^-Zaidan, op. cit., p. 47. ^The author observed much of that memoranda and helped to prepare some of it. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 134. 87 manner the governor1s office could have provided assistance.■** Dr. Cecile regularly served as an intermediary between the governor and education leaders across the state. The creation of a position, of assistant for education affairs in the governor's office marked the first time that a modern Ohio governor openly expressed a need for that particular type of staff assistance. According to staff members Mr. Gilligan decided to employ his own advisor on education because the state's chief school officer, Martin Essex, was identified with a Republican administration and because the governor had no direct control oyer that office, since the state superintendent of public instruction was appointed by an independently-elected state board of e d u c a t i o n . ^ Dr. Cecile was an unsuccessful primary candidate for the Democrat nomination for secretary of state and following the primary balloting was invited to join the

^■For example on June 29, 1971 Dr. Cecile traveled to Dayton to confer with Dr. Wayne Carle, who was superintendent of the Dayton City Schools. The governor asked Cecile to determine what the school situation was there relative to operating funds and desegregation efforts and to determine what the governor might be able to do to help. The author accompanied Dr. Cecile to Dayton and observed his meeting with Dr. Carle on June 29, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 37. o Conversations with Robert E. Cecile and Thomas Menaugh on June 29, 1971 and August 9, 1971, author, "Internship Journal," at pp. 38 and 113. 88 Gilligan campaign staff.^ Prior to his unsuccessful primary campaign he was an erstwhile candidate for the seat of Clarence J. Brown, United States Representative from the solidly Republican seventh district.^ He also was a professor of political science and chairman of that department at Wright State University where he was president of a fledgling local of the American Federation of Teachers. Dr. Cecile consulted frequently with representatives of the education interest groups in Ohio. Cecile's experience with the American Federation of Teachers helped to establish a working relationship between that affiliate of the AFL-CIO and a labor-oriented administration. When representatives of the American Federation of Teachers were invited to a meeting of education leaders from across the state following Mr. Gilligan's election the Ohio Education Association was greatly distressed sincfe that rival organization never had been included in the few such meetings held during the Rhodes years.^

^ u g h McDiarmid, "Columbus Comment— Hall's Selection Surprises Couple of Good Democrats," Journal Herald. August 2, 1971. 2 The seventh congressional district was composed of Logan, Union, Champaign, Clark, Marion and part of Montgomery Counties. Wright Patterson Air Force Base was located in the seventh congressional district. 3 Conversation with Robert E. Cecile on July 31, 1971, author, "Internship Journal," at p. 79. 89

. The Ohio Education Association never enjoyed a close relationship with the Rhodes administration and whatever relationship had existed apparently was strained at best. John Hall's predecessor in governmental relations, executive secretary Thomas O'Keefe, who served in that position from 1947 to 1965, publicly criticized and alienated Rhodes because Rhodes had not made the type of commitment to education that O'Keefe apparently thought he should have. O'Keefe had alienated Prank Lausche in much the same manner which resulted in Governor Lausche's fighting the Ohio Education Association the whole time he was in The Statehouse. He reportedly criticized the school lobby and publicly imputed to the Ohio Education Association evil schemes to capture all the public funds. Rhodes publicly never criticized the Ohio Education Association, although as one aide remarked . .maybe he should have."-1- It has been reported that Governor' Rhodes sought the advice of selected city school superintendents on matters of education policy and during the early years irregularly sought the counsel of the chief state school officer, Edward E. Holt. Governor Rhodes apparently had no staff members specifically assigned to education affairs.^ it was

-^-Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, pp. cit. Interview with Oliver Ocasek, Columbus, Ohio, December 13, 1972. 90 reported that his major administration advisor on education was Howard Collier, but only as education policy involved fiscal affairs, since Collier served first as state budget director and later as director'of finance.1 Summary The contexts in which Governor Gilligan and Governor Rhodes were first elected and in which each began his service as Ohio's chief executive were markedly different. As a result of stresses created by shifts and movements in the social and economic strata of the state, its political structure, for so long a bedrock of isolation and conservatism, began to undergo basic and fundamental change. A state Democrat Party, which lay in a moribund state for at least twenty years, began to exhibit vital life signs and in a period of two years— from 1970 to 1972— elected a governor and gained control of the Ohio House of Representatives. During his tenure as governor James Rhodes observed that change and responded to the pressures it created. Yet the gravity of problems in education finance, for example, seemed not to weigh in deliberations in the governor's office. Rhodes witnessed the near collapse of Ohio’s system of public elementary and secondary schools starved by underfunding and wracked by fiscal devils immune to

^Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 91

exorcisms of increased productive worth of the state. Late into his second term his attempts to inject more money into the public school system paled in the face of wide-spread school closings. In keeping with his commitment to full employment as a cure for all of the state's ills Rhodes directed enormous energy to selling vocational education across the state. He also channeled bond monies into higher education whose physical facilities were more than doubled. The physical presence of education in Ohio was grand and euqpansive. Yet the veneer of buildings and campuses was unable to mask the hollowness of serious underfunding of the state's entire system of public education. As a candidate Governor Gilligan capitalized on the critical state of Ohio's social institutions/ particularly education. He offered what he felt to be realistic solutions to those problems. Casting himself in the role of reformer^ Gilligan argued for basic tax reform and increased funding for public schools. As the contexts were different so were the men and the roles they circumscribed for themselves as governors. Each was from a fundamentally different background and educational level and experience. One was wizened to the

^-Interview with the Honorable John J. Gilligan/ op. cit. 92 infrastructure of state government and politics; the other was a comparative novice. Rhodes conceived his primary role as governor to be one of working to insure that as many of Ohio1s people as possible were able to find jobs. As chief salesman Rhodes was confident that importation of industry and business into Ohio would serve to expand the productive wealth of the state and make it and its people richer. He was convinced that Ohio could support state services not by taxing recipients of those services, but by increasing revenues from new and expanded business and industry. Gilligan, on the other hand, argued that such a plan had not worked in eight years and was not likely to work in eight more. Based on his belief that people would financially support governmental services and programs if they knew what was being spent, how funds were utilized and that they were recipients of those programs and services, Gilligan defined his primary role as that of reformer. It was his primary mission to restore a faith and confidence in the integrity and honesty of government, which he perceived had been seriously shaken over the preceding eight years. CHAPTER IV

GOVERNOR RHODES: EXECUTIVE BEHAVIOR AND EDUCATION POLICY

Introduction

In Chapter III the political/ social and economic context of gubernatorial behavior was examined in an effort to establish a perspective from which to view that behavior. A singular trait of the decade of the 1960's— a decade which encompassed the eight years of service by Rhodes as governor and the election and beginning of the administration of Governor Gilligan— was one of massive change. In a state distinguished by an historic conservatism in politics and in business and finance and by a provincialism and isolation in its demographic and socialization patterns, the change began slowly but hurtled with increasing speed toward the 1970's, loosing forces which perhaps produced irreversible effects on the state’s institutions. It was pointed out that the effects of that change in the political, social and economic status quo struck most visibly at the education system of the state. The politicization of young people and minority groups seeking to enact a social revolution found an effective medium in 94 the education institution.^- Combined with an inflation that cruelly hamstrung urban schools besieged by demands for more effective services funded by shrinking tax dollars which were becoming more scarce, the public schools became a point upon which political issues turned and their plight became a major issue in the gubernatorial election of 1970.

Governor Rhodes, Ohio1s Chief Salesman

As he was sworn in as the sixty-first governor of Ohio few persons doubted James Rhodes' ability to administer complex state government. As Columbus city auditor and as the youthful mayor of Columbus Rhodes learned well the use of the political spoils system. He had honed his ability to call together and harness the prestigious services of civic leaders. He experienced the rigors of administering a large political bureaucracy and had learned well the art of legislative compromise. As state auditor Rhodes oversaw every state department operation.^ ~

His first official moves as governor were to foreshadow the direction and thrust of the Rhodes administration for the next eight years. Within days of his

^-Michener observed that national leaders of the youthful revolutionary movement had, as early as 1965, begun to give Ohio special attention. He remarked "The choice of Ohio, with its sixty four major universities and colleges, was no accident." Michener, op. cit., p. 159. ^Zimmerman, pp. ext. 95 inauguration Rhodes' finance director/ Richard Krabach, announced the firing of some 3,500 employees hired during the last four months of the DiSalle administration. Rhodes and Krabach continued to slash payrolls and expenses with the slogan "Let's Make Saving Contagious". Following the first round of firings Krabach ordered a nine-point-one per cent cut in every department to eliminate a projected state deficit of that magnitude.^ Within the framework of his austerity program Rhodes set out two major goals: to create new jobs— 200,000 of them— and to balance the budget. With the austerity program already in initial operation Rhodes submitted to the Ohio General Assembly his plan for industrial growth the key to which was the creation of a governor-appointed industrial development authority with power to issue bonds and lend money for industrial esqpansion. The new department of development with its members under direction of George Wilson soon became known as the home of "Rhodes' Raiders".' Department of development staff members traveled to every part of the nation seeking to bring industry into Ohio. Described by The Wall Street Journal as "one of the nation's most unorthodox political figures"1 Governor Rhodes

repeated time after time his belief that "... every man and

^iles, op. cit., p. 39. 2 Zaidan, op. cit., p. 44. 96 woman is entitled to a job at a decent wage."^- It was reported that he felt the best way to help the working man was to provide a good economic climate that would encourage business and industry to locate, and expand in Ohio.^ His critics charged that he tended to equate everything with jobs: even questions about education usually drew answers q * about industrial growth. The issue of state support for elementary and secondary education was dealt with by Rhodes in his 1962 campaign. He stated publicly many times that he believed that education should be supported by the state on a fifty per cent basis and noted that . .the means to accomplish this goal are now under study.He observed that a fifty per cent support level by the state could be accomplished either by increased state aid or by enabling school districts to provide additional operating revenues from sources other than real p r o p e r t y . ^ one of Rhodes' campaign

•*-"Rhodes Sees Climate for Ohio Growth," Toledo Blade, January 5, 1971. Andy Cota, "How Has Ohio Fared Under James Rhodes?," Toledo Blade, January 10, 1971. q Giles, op. cit. ^James A. Rhodes, "Plans for Progress in Ohio," Ohioans For Rhodes For Governor Committee, Carl R. Johnson, Chairman, 4298 Central College Road, Westerville, Ohio. ~*Ibid.

/ 97

advisors, who later became one of his close associates in The Statehouse recalled "The language of his proposal with regard to bringing the state matching funds up to fifty per cent was sufficiently specific that he did not necessarily mean that the state would directly contribute that money." The question of support for elementary and secondary schools, however, never was as important in the 1962 campaign as were issues involving higher education. Rhodes developed two goals for higher education. The first was the creation of a board of regents intended to become the controlling agency for the state's six universities.2 The second was ejqpansion of higher education facilities in terms of new four year institutions and additional branch campuses, community colleges and technical institutes. His call for increased education facilities was well within his overriding promise that no new taxes were to have been created to support state services. Higher

^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, pp. cit. Howard Collier recalled that "The figures that were put together for him during the campaign anticipated only moderate cost increases— in 1962 costs were relatively constant— and someone calculated that with local spending remaining relatively constant and with a rated increase in state support over a four or five year period, support would join at about fifty per cent from each source." Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 2 Bowling Green State University at Bowling Green, Central State University at Xenia, Kent State University at Kent, Miami University at Oxford, Ohio University at Athens and The Ohio State University at Columbus all were four year residential campuses. 98 education was the main recipient of huge amounts of money— some $800 million for construction of new higher education facilities— raised by Rhodes-proposed bond issues, the first of which he presented in 1963. ■ By 1970 Ohio boasted an additional six universities,1 twenty branch campuses, four community colleges, thirteen technical institutes and a new medical school in Toledo. Administrative Chief During his first term as governor Rhodes demonstrated that he was a skillful executive in administering the state's political bureaucracy. In order to end what Rhodes apparently perceived as confusion in the governor's office and throughout state government generally he installed a smoothly running office staff which was described as loyal and hardworking. ^ Rhodes was reported to have been an "idea man" who preferred to talk in general terms while

Those new state universities included Cleveland State University at Cleveland, University of Akron at Akron, University of Cincinnati at Cincinnati, University of Toledo at Toledo, Wright State University at Dayton and Youngstown State University at Youngstown. Only Wright State University was a new facility; the other five originally had been municipal institutions for which the state assumed responsibility and over which it maintained control. The University of Cincinnati still enjoyed some amount of independence from the board of regents since it was partly supported by the Cincinnati city government. 2 Zimmerman, op, cit. 99 letting his staff work out details.^* His staff was directed by his administrative assistant John McElroy who, by most reports, kept the governor's office functioning on a day- p to-day basis. Rhodes also was reported to have been most comfortable traveling and visiting around Ohio. Abe Zaidan observed in 1966 that "Most of the time Rhodes can be found at an 'industrial appreciation1 dinner in one Ohio town or another, patting the local merchants on the back and urging the chamber of commerce to go out and find new business. To encourage tourism in the state he has led newsmen on tours of Ohio's historical sites and state parks and has ice fished on Lake Erie with shivering reporters in an effort to make his point that sports fishing is a $20 million b u s i n e s s . This behavior clearly was in keeping with Rhodes' notion that his primary role as chief executive was to be Ohio's most active salesman who chose to move from border to border, to travel from Lake Erie to the Ohio River, . .happily and continuously and unflaggingly accentuating the positive about Ohio."^

^•Rice, pp. cit. ^Interview with Oliver Ocasek, pp. cit. 3Zaidan, op. cit. ^"Zimmerman, op. cit. 100 Rhodes was reported to have possessed an expert sense of public relations. His critics charged that he presided over the "grandest publicity machine" ever assembled by an Ohio governor.1 It was reported that his administration spent about $300,000 annually to publicize its activities on behalf of Ohio. According to newspaper accounts some twenty experienced publicists were scattered around state offices in Columbus.2 Their task was to ". . .convince Ohioans they were living in a Twentieth Century paradise where tomato juice flowed red and free and everyone happily worked at a good job when not attending the grandiose, revitalised state fair.^ While Rhodes had an acute sensitivity to public relations, he was not, himself, comfortable in the give and take of media news activity. One of his first moves upon becoming governor was to discontinue regularly scheduled news conferences which had been held routinely by his immediate predecessor.4^ He reportedly had been awkward in parrying incisive or hostile questions from newsmen.^ It . was observed that he avoided meeting reporters, particularly

1Ibid. 2Hess, pp. cit., p. 429. Q # Zimmerman, pp. cit. ^Zaidan, op. cit. 5Ibid. 101

those who regularly covered state government.^* Instead he preferred to distribute daily news releases with the standard lead, "Gov. James A. Rhodes announced today that. . and during his eight years as governor he held no more than a half-dozen full-blown news conferences.2 Legislative Leader Rhodes also was considered by most every observor to have been a master at working in legislative affairs. After his first year in office it almost uniformly was reported that ". . .the General Assembly has given him most of what he has asked f o r . "3 Rhodes rarely suffered a public defeat in the legislative arena and was reported to have explained his success in that regard: "We jjie shunned the use of l] never get so mad at anyone that we can’t sit down the next morning and make a deal."^ One Cleveland journalist observed that ". . .when Rhodes really wanted a program— no matter how general its phrasing— he was' capable of using every trick from the proverbial carrot to the proverbial stick."5

Hess, op. cit., p. 432. 2Ibid. 3Giles, pp. cit.. p. 41. ^"Cota, pp. cit. 5 Zimmerman, pp. cit. 102 Aside from newspaper accounts of his legislative prowess it is fair to conclude that Governor Rhodes was extremely active in legislative affairs. Nevertheless his activity and working contact with legislators generally was quite limited. Instead of meeting with individual members he preferred to work with his leadership in the House and Senate. He frequently met with the Democrat leadership, especially in the Sepate whose composition in numbers was small. In education legislation, for example, Senator Oliver Ocasek was considered to have been a more valuable ally than the Republican chairman of the Senate Education and Health Committee, Oakley Collins.^ Because Rhodes enjoyed the luxury of a House and Senate heavily Republican and because he enjoyed working relationships with most legislative leaders he did not have to work with individual members. For instance in 1967 an air pollution control bill was given legislative approval. It was reported that before its passage Governor Rhodes contacted Republican Ralph Cole of Findlay, a member of the Rhodes leadership team, and advised him that punitive aspects of the bill would discourage industrial growth. Cole was able to remove that "objectionable language" in a compromise bill and Governor Rhodes was able

■1*Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, pp. cit. 103 to sign the bill into law.1 Governor Rhodes reportedly vetoed few bills in his eight year tenure. He stopped bills he did not like before they got going.2 He did not stop them with their authors or in the committees; he stopped them in the rules committees with the assistance of the leadership.3 Senator Ocasek recalled that "Senator Gray— president pro tern— was always loyal to Jim Rhodes and normally would not bring bills out of committee the governor did not want. If a bill he did not like came out of committee, he would ask Senator Gray, who was chairman of the rules committee, to stall it in the rules committee."^ Party Chief As uncontested leader of the Republican Party in Ohio Rhodes enjoyed great stature in both state and national partisan affairs. His dominance of state Republican Party affairs was so complete that few of his' intra-party rivals ever were have known to have been successful. Thus when

%ess, pp. cit., p. 431. 2Interview with Oliver Ocasek, op. cit. 3In both the Ohio House and Senate the rules committees were the final committees through which bills must have passed before they were sent to the floors for debate and voting. The rules committees were chaired by the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tern of the Senate respectively. ^Interview with Oliver Ocasek, pp. cit. 104 one of his Republican adversaries was elected Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives Rhodes directed his support to Rep. Charles F. Kurfess who was successful in ousting Speaker Robert Reckman of Cincinnati after his service in that position for only one term.’1’ Rhodes1 eminence in national affairs was such that he was touted as a dark horse for the Republican national ticket in 1968. Although he repeatedly denied such ambitions his actions sometimes belied his total commitment to state level office. In Cincinnati in late June of 1966 at a meeting of the Midwest Governors' Conference of which he was elected chairman, he chose to have his finance director announce a $28 million surplus in the state treasury— a gambit apparently designed to show his out of state peers, as well as Ohio's citizens, how well things were going back at The Statehouse.* At a later National Governors' Conference in Los Angeles, where interest in GOP prospects quickened in the presence of Ronald Reagan and George Romney, Rhodes kept ■ himself in the background and let his finance director release still another glowing statement on Ohio finances. He, along with William Scranton, failed to attend a Reagan breakfast and when the conference ended Rhodes had given no

^Rice, op. cit. 2 Zaidan, op, cit., p. 44. 105 hint about his preference for a 1968 Republican presidential nominee.-1- His customary standoffishness toward national Republican affairs was at once a liability and an asset: while identified as a loner within his political family and hence not a zealot in the Republican cause, he enjoyed considerable national prestige as a hard-working and successful governor of an important industrial state— historically a swing state in national elections.

Rhodes and Education Policy

The first Rhodes administration provided increased financial aid to public schools in total dollars. Nevertheless the state's percentage of contribution to local school districts slipped. In the eight years of his administration the state provided more money for elementary and secondary education— some three billion dollars— than all of Rhodes' predecessors combined since the school

foundation system was established in 1 9 3 5 .^ Faced with a conservative state whose taxes were very low at the beginning of his term and having won election on a simple and primary pledge of "No New Taxes", Rhodes was not willing to propose any new business taxes, any personal or corporate income tax or to reform Ohio's admittedly

3-Ibid. ^Rice, op. cit. 106 outdated property-based tax structure.^* During his first term he relied on his ability to esqpand Ohio1s industrial base and productivity, thereby increasing taxable valuation and increasing tax revenue. He also relied on providing capital improvements, primarily in higher education, by successfully promoting a series of bond issues that were to have been paid off sometime in 1999. In 1966 he ran for re-election and was opposed by a state senator from Toledo, Frazier Reams. Senator Reams, a lawyer and proponent of liberal causes who was portrayed in the Kennedy image, attempted to generate support of statewide groups who he pointed out were being short­ changed by Rhodes' austerity policies. He also worked to develop a strong Democrat-labor coalition which traditionally and historically enjoyed no more than a nominal relationship. Reams was confronted with the same fundamental predicament which Governor DiSalle encountered four years’ earlier. To pay for the improvement of lagging state services he was forced to propose new taxes to an electorate which consistently had shown its disfavor of the idea. Rhodes continued to remind Ohio's voters that he had kept his pledge of "No New Taxes" and repeated his familiar

^■He deliberately worked to keep business taxes low in order to attract industry. Ibid. 107 slogan that "In Ohio profit is not a dirty word." Rhodes won re-election by an unheard of 700,000 vote plurality. An interesting aspect of that campaign was that Rhodes ran on his record and never spoke to issues that his opponent raised. Instead of responding to Reams' assertion that elementary and secondary schools needed greater financial support from the state Rhodes simply pointed to his record. He noted, for example, that during his first term he had provided the "Largest increase in Ohio history for operating money for elementary-secondary schools— a 31 per cent increase since January 1963 and a record 20 per cent increase in per pupil support."-^ Despite a rising absolute amount of financial support for public schools, the cost of operating those schools was accelerating more rapidly than in the past. No more than a year into his second term Rhodes began to encounter the fact that bond issues were providing ample money to build needed facilities, including public schools, but the supply of money needed to operate them was growing shorter with each passing year.^ Rhodes consequently was faced with a need to raise more state revenue.

1 James A. Rhodes, "Keep Ohio on the Go," Republican State Central and Executive Committee, Columbus, Ohio. ^Cota, pp. cit. 108 Because he unalterably was opposed to a state income tax^* his options for raising more revenue were considerably narrowed. In 1967 he proposed legislation that raised cigarette and liquor taxes. That legislation also gave to counties the right to tax license plates for automobiles, utilities, real estate transfers and to add half a per cent to the state rate of sales tax. In 1967 he also supported increased funding for education in legislation which was popularly referred to as Senate Bill 350. That bill provided an allocation of $190 million for elementary and secondary education. A part of the bill which was not approved by the legislature was the governor’s plan for a county income tax which was opposed by labor organizations across the state.^ The ill-fated proposal for a county-based and -collected income tax stemmed from a belief by Governor Rhodes that responsibility for financing public schools essentially was a local matter and that the taxation structure had to be essentially non-regressive. The county

Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. ^Labor's position on the county income tax proposal was clear-cut: "Since Big Business is immune from taxes from Big Brother, that only leaves one group left. So hold on to your wallets, fellas, Jim's coming again." focus. Ohio AFL-CIO, Vol. 1, No. 5, Columbus, Ohio, November, 1967, p. 2. ^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. 109 income tax proposal— which was to surface in the tax battle in the 109th General Assembly— also related to Governor Rhodes' larger strategy for providing equal educational expenditures across the state. ‘ Noting that the accident of residence determined whether a student attended a well- or a poorly-financed school, the governor created a two-part plan. The first part involved reorganizing school districts to conform to general economic and productivity regions. The second involved the placement and distribution of industry in such a fashion that children in a particular region would have approximately equal valuation in taxable productivity supporting them.**- In accordance with this reorganization plan when the administration first came into office the executive staff separated the state into several regions based on balance of economic factors. Those economic regions became conceptual boundaries for school districts. Recognizing pre-determined imbalances in the various regions the .administration had as its goal the task of importing industry from out of state to provide a balance and a concommitant approximately equal per capita tax valuation for students. The administration was concerned not just

•^"Rhodes Sees Climate For Ohio Growth," op. cit. 2 Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit.; • Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 110 with industrial valuation, but also about the total productive capabilities of the economic areas.^- Despite the increase in foundation support for public elementary and secondary schools costs of education continued to rise and fueled by a nationwide inflationary spiral increased at a rate greater than a concurrent rise in state and local support. Between 1964 and 1970 property taxes increased almost forty two per cent and to many tax-conscious Ohioans property taxes seemed too high. As a result on November 3, 1970 only twenty eight per cent of school levies on ballots were a p p r o v e d . ^ In 1969 Ohio reached two point six billion dollars in industrial capital expenditures and led the United States for the fifth year in that growth. In November and December of that same year an "industry-oriented" governor watched ten school districts close because of lack of operating monies. In May of 1970 Ohio voters rejected ninety of one hundred seventy five local referenda to increase property taxes to pay for increased costs to s c h o o l s . ^

•^•Ibid. O Rice, pp. cit. ^"Where New Plants Don't Cure Tax Ills," Business Week. June 6, 1970. Ill Despite the notion that in education policy making the decision that always is central to statecraft in any i governor's office pivots on financing Governor Rhodes was involved in matters of education policy other than finances. His most publicized involvement in education affairs was, of course, the creation of the board of regents and its appointment of a chancellor.^ Of less media interest was his involvement in creation and support of vocational education in Ohio. When Rhodes first came to the governorship a one-room high school still was operating in Morgan County in southeast Ohio. With well over six hundred school districts in the state Rhodes became concerned about the quality of services that students who were not desirous of study at a four year college or university were receiving. Since industry needed people to employ and since Ohio needed more

^-Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. o The first chancellor of the Ohio Board of Regents was John Millett who prior to being appointed to that post served as president of Miami University, one of Ohio's well- known four year institutions. Chancellor Millett served in that capacity from 1963 until 1972. JR. Dean Jauchius recalled that all of the information that the administration was receiving from small, large and medium sized corporations was that graduates of Ohio high schools were unemployable due to a lack of skills in reading and simple computation. Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. Jauchius' recollection was attested to by Howard Collier. Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit.

. { 112

and more industry the education of potential employees became important to Rhodes. As a result the governor promoted vocational and technical education. In fact he became so interested in it that he regularly sought the advice and counsel of Beryl Shoemaker a proponent of vocational education in the state department of education. Former Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction Edward E. Holt recalled that Governor Rhodes ". . .was forever quoting Dr. Shoemaker and would often go to his office. While Holt was Ohio1s chief school officer Governor Rhodes consulted with him on matters of education policy, but Holt was not an official member of the Rhodes cabinet and did not attend cabinet meetings regularly.^ Holt was appointed to the state superintendency in 1957 and served through the terms of Governors O'Neill and DiSalle and retired from public service in 1966, the last year of Rhodes' first term. Despite his status as a noncabinet member Holt remarked that he ". . .could get into Jim Rhodes' office in five minutes anytime. If he was not

^•Interview with Edward E. Holt, Columbus, Ohio, December 12, 1972. 2Ibid. Howard Collier recalled that Holt's being older than Rhodes— Holt was superintendent of the Springfield school district where Rhodes attended high school— caused the governor always to treat Holt with special deference and courtesy because of his age. Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 113 available, John McElroy was.11^ Besides Shoemaker his chief advisors in education, excepting his finance director, Howard Collier, were superintendents of the large city school districts in Ohio.3 The governor often would telephone the school superintendents in Cleveland, Columbus and Toledo.3 The superintendent of the Columbus City Schools, Harold Eibling, was reported to have been an especially close advisor to Rhodes.^ During his many travels across the state Rhodes was reported to have spent a large portion of his time 5 discussing education policy. During the Rhodes years elementary and secondary education interest groups by and large had been excluded from deliberations in the governor's office. The representatives of those interest groups confined and

Interview with Edward E. Holt, pp. cit. — o Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, pp. cit. Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. 3Those superintendents were Paul Briggs in Cleveland, Harold Eibling in Columbus and Frank Dick in Toledo. ^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. ^Ibid. Howard Collier observed that "Rhodes met with Frank Dick, Paul Briggs and Harold Eibling to discuss education policy— they had had their feet to the fire and could relate to the governor about how they needed help and how we could be the most helpful with whatever amount of money we had available." Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 114 directed their efforts to working with legislators. But since Rhodes was able to exercise great influence with legislative leaders, who in turn defined the essential shape of education legislation, the public school interest groups generally were unable to modify education legislation already approved by the governor. An apparent exception to this general pattern of ineffectiveness, however, was fostered in the character of the Senate Education and Health Committee. Its chairman, Senator Collins was reported to have wielded tremendous power in matters of education policy. It has been observed that he was one of the few legislators with whom Rhodes had difficulty in working. But Collins, however, had developed trust in and friendship with the Ohio Education Association. The Ohio Education Association provided him with data and information and because the Association donated campaign funds and speakers on his behalf to assist his re-election, the Association played a major role in shaping education policy which emerged from the Senate, particularly state foundation support legislation.

^-Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 2 Interview with John Hall, Columbus, Ohio, July 27, 1972t Interview with John G. Hauck, Columbus, Ohio, July 17, 1972 and Interview with Oliver Ocasek, op. cit. 115

Summary

At a press conference in November of 1970 Rhodes was reported to have remarked "There is nothing left I believe could be done for the State of Ohio."-*- As a candidate eight years earlier Rhodes had promised that the state's share of public school support was . .one of the first problems to be taken up after the new administration takes office in January.1,2 Then he talked in terms of one hundred thirty million dollars more for public schools in the upcoming biennium— a bare minimum according to testimony delivered to the House Committee on Finance and Appropriations3— but only forty three million dollars more actually appeared in the budget. With Governor Rhodes at the helm Ohio made unprecedented strides in education, but as he left office Ohio's schools were facing financial disaster.4 Despite his drive for more industry built around a low tax structure and his constant opposition to new tax levies he was forced by rising costs of state expenses to raise the sales tax, the corporate franchise tax and the taxes on beer,

-**Rice, op. cit. 2Giles, pp. cit. 3Ibid. 4Cota, op. cit. 116 cigarettes and liquor. Finally it has been fairly well established by various independent studies that Ohio's economic growth had not kept pace with neighboring states despite its low tax rate and its aggressive industrial development program.^- In October of 1970, three months before the end of his tenure as governor, Rhodes was faced with the harsh fact that in the 1969-1970 school year Ohio spent $680 a pupil and ranked thirty second nationally in such expenditures. New York was first with an expenditure of $1,251; Pennsylvania spent $876; Michigan $842; Illinois $831 and Indiana $685. Ohio which ranked fourth in the nation in the number of public school children and which ranked fifth among all the states in wealth in terms of natural resources and economic production ranked forty sixth among the fifty states in per capita state spending for education.2

^Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 2Richard C. Widman, "If Taxpayer Wants 'Premium' Schools, He Must Pay," Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 13, 1970. CHAPTER V

THE GOVERNOR AND EDUCATION FINANCE AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SCHOOL FOUNDATION FORMULA

Introduction

In Chapter IV the active involvement of Governor Rhodes in the development of several items of education policy was discussed. A review of Governor Rhodes' activities in regard to education suggests that he was most concerned with expansion of post-secondary education facilities. Rhodes' advocacy of the value and worth of vocational education also was a planned and ongoing task to which he devoted much time and energy. Reinforcement of the finding that a state chief executive was closely involved in education policy would he helpful. The instant case study is premised on the notion that the governor has a tangible stake in the effects of education policy because as chief executive he generally is responsible for almost all state policy. Careful documentation of gubernatorial activity in a specific item of education policy was undertaken to test that notion.

117 118 In keeping with that task and with the objectives of the case study Chapters V and VI are given to a discussion of Governor Gilligan's activities in the development of the 1971-1972 state school foundation formula which he signed into law in December of 1971. Chapter V presents an overview of Mr. Gilligan's involvement in the development of the school foundation formula from its inception to its enactment into law. Chapter VI focuses on one segment of the foundation formula's development and documents Mr. Gilligan's involvement in the deliberations on Amended Substitute House Bill 475 by an Ohio Senate Education Subcommittee.

Mr. Gilliqan and Education Finance

Prior to the 1970 Ohio gubernatorial primary campaign Warren Wheat, bureau chief for The Cincinnati Enquirer, mused about the future of the state's next governor who would inherit, among other things, . . . a school system ' almost bankrupt and ill-equipped to meet the demands of the next decade. . . He observed that should the next governor attempt to solve the state's problems in school finance and to reform its tax structure his effort would be singularly self-defeating. Indeed were he successful in

■^Warren D. Wheat, "Pity Next Governor— Poor Guy," Cincinnati Enquirer, December 28, 1969. 119 implementing tax reform and increased state financial support of public elementary and secondary schools he would occupy the governor's mansion for only a single term of four years. In December of 1971, nine months after his submission of a budget to the 109th Ohio General Assembly Governor Gilligan signed into law the state's first income tax and, among other things, a revised school foundation formula. The revised school foundation formula increased the state's support of public elementary and secondary schools to an all-time high of six hundred dollars for every student in grades one through twelve plus three hundred dollars for every child enrolled in kindergarten. The newly-approved legislation provided an average increase of eighty-two dollars more per pupil than had any previous education finance law and was hailed by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Dr. Martin Essex, as landmark legislation.^" The Candidate Discusses School Finance Despite the Ohio General Assembly's historic nine- month debate of Governor Gilligan's proposed changes in the state's tax structure and in the state school foundation formula, development of the foundation formula began long

^■Ohio Department of Education, Press Release, December 10, 1971, p. 1. 120

before March 15, 1971. To trace the development of the school foundation formula one can go back to the 1970 Spring Democrat Party primary campaign. While he did not outline specific recommendations on the school foundation formula, per se, Mr. Gilligan spoke to the issue of increased state support of education. On March 31, 1970 he met with members of the Gem City Democrat Club in Dayton and disclosed his thought that the state should be responsible for greater funding of elementary and secondary education.^" Mr. Gilligan was not without support in his general call for increased state funding of elementary and secondary education. In its consideration of his appearance in Dayton, the Dayton Dally News editorially embraced the notion of substantial increases in education funding, but drew short of endorsing Mr. Gilligan as a primary candidate. The Daily News predicted that education would be a major issue in the gubernatorial campaign and observed that ". . .the unpleasant reality is that kids in most Ohio schools are getting two-bit educations."^ As soon as Mr. Gilligan became the Democrat candidate for governor his campaign staff assembled a task force of persons who were asked to prepare papers and analyses of

■^•Keith McKnight, "School Tax OK Urged By Gilligan," Dayton Journal Herald, March .31, 1970.

^"New Figures Chart Crisis of Education in Ohio," Dayton Daily News. April 1, 1970. 121

critical issues which Mr. Gilligan wished to debate in the upcoming campaign.^- Some task force members were asked to discuss a wide range of problems confronting primary and secondary education in Ohio. The collective result of this task force effort was a series of working papers defining Mr. Gilligan's position on selected issues, including education finance. Dr. Walter G. Hack, professor of educational administration at The Ohio State University and an expert in matters of school finance, was asked by the Gilligan campaign staff to prepare an analysis of the school foundation formula then in use and to propose an alternative(s) to it. Professor Hack recalled that "... my position paper stated that a different type of formula was needed. The existing formula was not adequate in terms of dollars or the distribution of those dollars."3 Dr. Harold A. Hovey, a campaign advisor to Mr. Gilligan and a professor of administrative sciences at The Ohio State University, remarked that ". . .at that time, he |~Mr. Gilliganj was not aware of how the formula actually operated."3 Nevertheless Dr. Hovey reported that at that

■^-Interview with Harold A. Hovey, Columbus, Ohio, July 28, 1972. 2Interview with Walter G. Hack, Columbus, Ohio, July 13, 1972. 3Interview with Harold A. Hovey, op. cit. 122 time Mr. Gilligan had been committed to increased state funding of elementary and secondary schools and had been convinced that substantial revisions needed to be made in the existing formula. When the task force had completed its analyses and proposals on the several campaign issues, including education, campaign advisors met to discuss the papers and to formulate tentative campaign positions for Mr. Gilligan's consideration. On May 19, 1970 the staff met to discuss questions of campaign positions relative to education. Among others at that meeting were Drs. Walter G. Hack,

Harold A. Hovey and Frederick D. S t o c k e r . 2 Minutes kept by Anne Bingle, campaign research director, indicate the group agreed that a fundamental campaign argument would be that the bulk of the responsibility for financing public elementary and secondary education rested at the state level.3

1Ibid.

2Interview with Walter G. Hack, jop. cit. 3Anne Bingle, "Minutes of May 19, 1970 Meeting of Task Force on Educational Policy," Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 123 Out of that task force's work and the campaign staff's review and discussion of the task force analyses and position papers developed a series of issue-centered documents for use by Mr. Gilligan. He used them to memorize and rehearse his positions and their rationales. The documents provided him with a distillation of issues and his agreed-upon responses to questions about them. It also served to insure that Mr. Gilligan and his campaign spokesmen were consistent in their responses to questions and in their publication of campaign materials. In the matter of state support of public elementary and secondary schools that document noted We have relied too long and too much upon local property taxes for financing our schools. As a result, the disparities among Ohio school districts in ability to finance education have grown beyond reason and property tax burdens in some districts are clearly excessive. The solution is to increase the percentage of educational costs defrayed through state aid. This state aid should be distributed through a formula that recognizes the unique and difficult educational problems of our great cities and which targets assistance toward districts with low taxpaying ability.1 Contained elsewhere in that polemic was the caveat, "State aid formulas are inherently complicated, so it is generally better to keep options open throughout the campaign.

-1-Task Force on Educational Policy, "Notebook on Gubernatorial Campaign Issues and Positions," Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. ^ Ibid 124 Cognizant of that warning Mr. Gilligan spoke only to the disarray in education finance and cited descriptive statistics to support his position.He published a position paper in which he stated his views on several issues of interest in the campaign, including tax reform, economic development, education, law enforcement, health and welfare, housing, local governments, mental health, mental retardation, university education and water pollution. In positions and statistics which he would reiterate throughout the campaign Mr. Gilligan observed that

^•The disarray in Ohio's pattern of state foundation support was evident, for example, in a comparison of two county school districts in Hamilton County: North College Hill City District and St. Bernard City District. In school year 1969-1970 North College Hill City District enrolled 2144 students. Its tax valuation per pupil was $15,837, its local tax revenue per pupil was $621 and the state foundation assistance per pupil was $152. Its combined dollar support per pupil was $773. On the other hand St. Bernard City District enrolled 1324 students, had a tax valuation per pupil of $78,578, a local tax revenue per pupil of $1613 and a state foundation assistance per pupil of $157. Its combined dollar support per pupil was $1770. Instead of equalizing resources the foundation program served to exaggerate the disparity in the two districts' funding levels. The richer district actually received more state foundation monies per pupil than did the poorer district. The residents of the one district paid almost twice the millage (39.22 and 20.54) as the other, yet students in the poorer district had the support of two and one half times less available revenue. 125 Ohio, fourth in the nation in the number of public school children, ranks forty-sixth in per capita state expenditures for education. We spend $637 per pupil— $80 less than the average state— and pay our teachers $300 less per year than the average American public school teacher gets. We rank fortieth in pupils per teacher. Four Ohio school districts closed for financial reasons in 1968; ten closed in 1969; twenty-five or more are in serious financial difficulty and will remain open in 1970 only because of the poor fiscal policy of deficit financing mandated by the 108th General Assembly. The Rhodes Administration, although it promised fifty-fifty sharing of elementary and secondary education esqpenses in 1962, has steadily decreased state support to its present 31.6 per cent.-** Whenever Mr. Gilligan spoke at meetings and responded to questions in news conferences he was careful to point out his support of increased state funding for education, but generally was successful in avoiding specifics about state aid formulas. What he made clear was his belief that the state had a primary responsibility for providing _ education funds, a minimum support level being fifty per cent. At Kent State University, which was hosting an Ohio Education Association Leadership Conference, Mr. Gilligan suggested that the Rhodes administration had ". . .been the chief culprit. . refusing to provide its share of the

^Gilligan for Governor Campaign— "The Candidate's Position," published paper on Mr. Gilligan's position on selected issues, Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 126 basic cost of operating our schools. In an article in the Kettering-Oakwood Times, Mr. Gilligan was quoted in response to a question regarding the Ohio Education Association's professional sanction of the entire state . . .they put the finger right on the trouble spot: the abject failure of state government adequately to support public education in Ohio. Under our constitution the primary responsibility for supporting public education resides with the state. The local school districts were never intended to do anything more than supplement what the state was doing.^ The Columbus Dispatch quoted Mr. Gilligan as saying "The state must assume at least half of the costs of educating our children.

The position of each gubernatorial candidate on the issue of state support of public education was clear cut. In response to a question of expansion of state aid to elementary and secondary schools Roger Cloud, Republican candidate for governor, said "I would like to see it back up to the 40 per cent level. I wouldn't like to see it go

■^Speech by John J. Gilligan to the Ohio Education Association Leadership Conference at Kent State University, August 30, 1970, Kent, Ohio. 2"Gilligan: Ohio Needs Change," Interview with John J. Gilligan by Times editorial staff, Kettering-Oakwood Times, September 13, 1970. ^"Gilligan and Education," Columbus Dispatch, October 4, 1970. 127 any higher, because the legislature or the state then would be in a position of controlling the school system."^- Mr. Gilligan responded to the same query, "Under our constitution, the primary support is intended to come from the state."2 The Governor Prefers a New Foundation Formula On November 3, 1970 Mr. Gilligan was elected governor of Ohio. Immediately following his victory the governor- elect and his advisors began to formulate more substantive ideas on the various issues debated in the campaign, including questions of state financing of education. During the post-election period Dr. Harold A. Hovey, Mr. Gilligan's choice for director of finance, convened a meeting of educators to consider legislative alternatives to modify the existent school foundation formula. Among those in attendance were Dr. Walter G. Hack and Dr. Luvern L. Cunningham, Dean of the College of Education at The Ohio State University. Others among the approximately twenty persons at that meeting were representatives from the state department of education, the Ohio Education Association, The Ohio Federation of Teachers, the Buckeye Association of

^•"Where Do They Stand? The Candidates Say," Cincinnati Enquirer, October 18, 1970. 2Ibid.

^Interview with Walter G. Hack, op. cit. 128 School Administrators, the Ohio School Boards Association and the Ohio Association of Public Service Employees. Following the adjournment of that meeting— which some perceived as an advance look at legislation Mr. Gilligan would introduce to the 109th General Assembly1— Dr. Hovey invited Dr. Hack and Dean Cunningham to meet with him privately. In that private meeting Dr. Hack was asked by Dr. Hovey to develop a school foundation formula consistent with the ideas he had presented to Mr. Gilligan's education task force prior to and during both the primary and general gubernatorial campaigns.3 Because he was ". . .committed to an entirely different formula almost before he took office"3 as soon as he was inaugurated Governor Gilligan decided to not utilize the interim budget which had been prepared by outgoing finance director Howard Collier.^ At one of the first formal meetings which Mr. Gilligan called as governor the question of school finance was of prime interest and concern. The meeting was held in the governor's office in The Statehouse and was attended by Governor Gilligan, Drs. Harold A. Hovey

1Interview with David Martin, Columbus, Ohio, July 24, 1972.

^interview with Walter G. Hack, pp. cit. and Interview with Edgar Troyer, Columbus, Ohio, June 29, 1972. 3Interview with Walter G. Hack, pp. cit. ^Interview with Harold A. Hovey, op. cit. 129 and Paul Spayde and Mssrs. John C. MacDonald and Edgar Troyer.1 At that meeting Mr. Gilligan presented his thoughts on primary and secondary education, particularly in terms of school finance. He noted that Ohio schools were in a financial crisis and he wanted to design a pattern of financing which gave to every child in the state, insofar as possible, an equal educational opportunity. He gave broad range to the state department of education and the department of finance to develop the kind of formula to accomplish that goal. One of the participants recalled that Governor Gilligan wanted them to tell him what should have been done and to have let him worry about what was politically possible.2 The only specific comment which the governor reportedly made regarding the foundation formula was that ". . .he felt that the per pupil formula versus the per unit formula made educational financing more understandable and oriented educational financing more toward the person

■*-Hovey served as Gilligan's director of finance, MacDonald as his legislative liaison and Troyer as a budget analyst in the finance department. Troyer had held that same position during the Rhodes' administration. Spayde was an assistant to the superintendent of public instruction and was responsible for relations between the department of education and the legislature. 2Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. 130 who is the recipient of the services. . . . One of Mr. Gilligan's aides observed that the governor had difficulty understanding the current foundation formula and often had asked why it was not possible to simply allocate state support dollars on a per pupil basis.3 The governor also felt, according to this aide, that government was a service and that people would pay taxes if they knew what they were getting. From that point of view it became desirable to be able to say that ", . .Ohio is investing so many hundreds of dollars for each child in education."3 While he was roughing out a prototype formula for state foundation support Dr. Hack recalled that he had asked the governor's advisors about the extent to which Mr. Gilligan supported a formula based on a per pupil factor. The response to his inquiry was that ". . .the governor was committed-to the per pupil formula. Dr. Hack concluded that Mr. Gilligan understood that the use of the per pupil formula provided the advantages he

-*-Ibid. This feeling was reiterated by Mr. Gilligan during the author's interview with him. Interview with the Honorable John J. Gilligan, pp. cit. 3Mr. Gilligan noted that "I could not understand the formula." and noted that because of its complexity it had been a 11. . .weapon in the hands of selected legislators." Interview with the Honorable John H. Gilligan, pp. cit. ^Interview with John C. MacDonald, Columbus, Ohio, December 12, 1972. 4Interview with Walter G. Hack, pp. cit. 131 sought.*** Dr. Paul Spayde, assistant superintendent of public instruction, also noted that at this point in the development of the foundation formula 11. . .a basic consideration was whether or not the foundation formula should be on a classroom unit or a pupil basis. I think it would be fair to say that it was the governor who made the basic decision to go on a pupil basis." During the weeks in late January of 1971 Walter Hack, Harold Hovey, Edgar Troyer of the finance department and Jerry Hammet, a computer programmer in the state department of education, came together to write a new foundation formula. Several meetings were held in the evenings in the home of Edgar Troyer who had been given primary responsibility for coordination of the formula's development. Out of the work of that group emerged a model for a school foundation formula which was designed to meet Mr. Gilligan's expectations and requirements.^

1Ibid. 2Interview with Paul Spayde, Columbus, Ohio, July 20, 1972.

Q Interview with Harold A. Hovey, op. cit. ^Interview with Edgar Troyer, pp. cit. 132 A New Foundation Formula Is Written The foundation formula which emerged out of the work of those four individuals was composed of four major components. The philosophic understructure of the new foundation plan essentially was the belief that the state had a major responsibility to provide an adequate education for all its youth. In that regard the state's proper role was to furnish a financial support mechanism to achieve that end. The first component of the foundation plan was a basic program for all students. It included teaching/ supervisory and/or counseling, psychological and administrative services. Esqpenditures for operation of the school program were included with costs related to teacher substitutes and retirement.^ This component was financed at a level of $700 per pupil and assured each district a per pupil allocation for the above types of eaqpenditures. Revenues for the component were to have been raised by a 17.5 mill mandated property tax rate. If proceeds from that millage rate were not sufficient to have met the $700 allocation the difference was to have been made up by state imbursement.

-*-This discussion of the prototype foundation formula is based on a document prepared by Dr. Hack entitled "New Foundation Formula" which he prepared and presented to the governor in the early February meeting reported in later paragraphs. 133 It was intended that school districts with generally high tax valuations would have derived sufficient revenue from the mandated millage while generally poor districts would have received state assistance. The second component provided funds for programs which were required by students not uniformly distributed among all school districts. These students included the deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed and neurologically handicapped as well as students enrolled in vocational education programs, students whose families received ADC funds, students who required transportation or who were participating in experimental programs. This special needs component was to have been funded at the state’s full cost per pupil. Revenues for its support were to have been derived from the mandated property tax or from state appropriations if necessary. The third component of the plan was designed to have facilitated exercise of local initiative to allow for program enrichment or for extension of education services beyond basic and special services. Expenditures for this component excluded increases in teachers' salaries. Its funding was to have been derived from a local property tax override of three mills. A resource equalizer was included to insure that all districts would generate at least the state's median district's capability. An additional facet of this component allowed an additional local 134 initiative millage for use to improve teachers' salaries. However no state resource equalizer was provided for this element. During the first week in February a second meeting with Governor Gilligan was convened at the Governor1s Mansion to allow the governor to look at the model and to listen to presentations by Drs. Hack and Hovey and Edgar Troyer. Each of the three presented an alternative funding level of the model formula. Besides these three Dr. Robert E. Cecile, Mr. Gilligan1s newly-appointed assistant for education, John C. MacDonald, Mr. Gilligan's chief legislative liaison, and Rep. A. G. Lancione, newly-elected minority leader in the House of Representatives, also were in attendance. Dr. Hovey presented a zero-increase appropriation, Mr. Troyer presented an 800 million dollar increase and Dr. Hack presented a 1500 million dollar increase. After he had listened to the presentations and accompanying arguments Mr. Gilligan selected the 800 million dollar increase level. Following that meeting with the governor work on the formula continued. The first major modification of the prototype occurred when the resource equalizer was abandoned.**• In its place a property tax roll back provision

■^Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. 135 was Inserted. The provision for reducing property taxes was cast in an "either/or" option. Property taxes could have been reduced either by one half of the increase in new money generated by the proposed income tax or by twenty five mills whichever was less. The "either/or" option encompassed those districts who did not have high millages or those who had high millages and would have used the roll bach provision to channel the bulk of the foundation money into reducing property taxes rather than into school services. The Governor Submits His Budget From mid-February to mid-March the governor's budget proposals, including the school foundation formula, were printed. On March 15, 1971 Mr. Gilligan submitted his formal budget to the 109th General Assembly. His budget was introduced as House Bill 402 by Reps. James Flannery and A. G. Lancione along with seventeen other Democrats. Ostensibly because of the length, complexity and .comprehensiveness of House Bill 402 the leadership of the House of Representatives headed by Republican Speaker Charles F. Kurfess decided to separate the bill into three parts. Given new numbers the administration's budget became House Bill 475, the school foundation formula became House Bill 476 and the governor's proposed revenue-raising structure— a state income tax— became House Bill 477. 136 House Bill 402 authorized the establishment of up to forty education resource centers and provided for the powers, duties and financing of those centers. It provided for the dissolution of county boards of education in areas served by the resource centers. It changed the basis of foundation payments from classroom units to average daily membership, beginning in fiscal year 1971-1972 at $680 per pupil and increasing to $800 per pupil in fiscal year 1974-1975. House Bill 402 also increased the millage required for participation in the foundation program to 22.5 mills and the formula charge-off to 25 mills and set a penalty adjustment in school foundation payments for districts which employed fewer teachers per pupil than the statutory standard, which fell to 23 teachers per pupil by fiscal year 1974-1975. It included upward and downward adjustments in a district's school foundation payment, depending upon whether its teachers' salaries were more or less than the state average. It provided for the payment of school foundation monies from the proceeds of the local share of the state income tax and specified that if the local share was not sufficient to make the school foundation payments the balance was to have been paid from legislative appropriations. 137 House Bill 402 eliminated the concept of the "guarantee" or "flat-rate" or "non-additional aid" district which was in the existing formula.^ The hill required school districts to certify the availability of revenue before adopting wage and salary schedules for teachers. Finally the bill established a penalty clause that encouraged minimum pupil enrollments of 2,000 to qualify for full state funding support.^ House Bill 476 Undergoes Committee Scrutiny On April 13, 1971 the House Committee on Health, Education and Welfare opened hearings on House Bill 476 at 1:30 p.m. in Room Eleven on the House side of the The Statehouse. The Health, Education and Welfare Committee was chaired by Norman A. Murdock, Republican representative from the 70th district in Hamilton County. Mr. Murdock's vice chairman was Republican representative Morris L. Boyd from the 93rd district in Summit County.^ The first person to testify at the hearing chaired by Rep. Boyd of Summit

■^See Appendix E for a calculation form to determine aid to a single school district based on provisions of Amended Substitute House Bill 531, 108th General Assembly. 2 See Appendix F for a calculation form to determine aid to a single school district based on provisions of House Bill 402 submitted by the Gilligan administration to the 109th General Assembly. 3 See Appendix G for a list of the membership of the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, 109th General Assembly. County was Harold Hovey, finance director, who had become according to those involved in legislative affairs, "Gilligan's chief budget spokesman."1 In his prepared statement Dr. Hovey noted "The system we propose will put educational funding on a new income base and provide greater equity in the distribution of state monies. We propose a foundation formula concentrating on the total costs required to fund an adequate education program with 2 the calculation based on the child." On April 19, 1971 three days before the second House Health, Education and Welfare Committee hearing on House Bill 476 Governor Gilligan addressed a meeting of the Jennings Education Foundation in Columbus. Mr. Gilligan told that assemblage "Our plan to finance elementary and secondary education through a new income tax carefully graduated will reduce reliance on the inequitable local property tax and at the same time eiqpand the resources available for support of our public schools."^ He added

Buckeye Association of School Administrators, "The Much Discussed Governor's Budget," Legislative Report, Number Four, April 6, 1971, Columbus, Ohio. J Statement of Harold A. Hovey, Director of Finance, Before the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, April 13, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 3 .John J. Gilligan, "Speech to the Jennings Foundation, April 19, 1971, Columbus, Ohio. 139 "Using a new simplified school formula in place of the old complex one, our program will inject an additional $100 per pupil into our public school system.Commenting on the strong emphasis which was made on the per pupil formula Dr. Paul Spayde observed ", . .with the major increase in funding it was fundamentally important to have the formula have a new look. I think the switch to the per pupil base did help to sell it because it's communicable."2 Prior to the governor1s speech to the Jennings Foundation Republican and Democrat members of the House caucused separately on April 16, 1971. The Republican caucus discussed alternatives to Mr. Gilligan's income tax proposal, including a county collected income tax, a concept apparently held over from the 108th General Assembly. The Democrat caucus met to discuss ways in which the administration's proposals could be moved along. It was rumored that because state appropriations for fiscal years 1969-1971 ran out on June 30, 1971 the administration might .employ the Pennsylvania tactic of closing down state services to force i s s u e s . ^

^•Ibid. 2interview with Paul Spayde, pp. cit. ^Buckeye Association of School Administrators, "Republicans Considering Alternatives," Legislative Report, Number Five, April 21, 1971, Columbus, Ohio. 140 On April 21, 1971 the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, chaired by Rep. Murdock, heard testimony on school building assistance provisions of House Bill 476. Members of the State Task Force for School Building Assistance testified at the hearing. The entire hearing was given to matters of school building assistance and no attention was paid to school finance or the school foundation formula. On April 22, 1971 the education subcommittee of the House Committee on Finance and Appropriations heard testimony on House Bill 475 and House Bill 476. Chaired by Rep. John A. Galbraith, Republican from the 76th district in Lucas County,'1' the subcommittee listened to John Hall, director of governmental relations for the Ohio Education Association, . speak to elements of House Bills 475 and 476. When asked by Rep. Levitt if the Ohio Education Association favored a per pupil based formula Hall replied that his Association had no preference for either a per pupil or per .unit factor. Dr. Walter Hack also testified as an expert in matters of school finance? his testimony was primarily

■^See Appendix H for a list of the membership of the education subcommittee of the House Committee on Finance and Appropriations, 109th General Assembly. 2 ''Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of the Education Subcommittee of the House Committee on Finance and Appropriations, April 22, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 141 technical in content.^ On April 27, 1971 Rep. Murdoch convened the House Health, Education and Weiare Committee to hear testimony relative to elements in House Bill 476. Testifying as proponents of House Bill 476 were John G. Hauck, assistant director of the Buckeye Association of School Administrators, Paul Briggs, superintendent of the Cleveland city schools, representing large city school districts and David Harcum, superintendent of Green Hills- Forest Park schools, representing suburban and joint vocational districts.^ In addition John Hall of the Ohio Education Association testified as a proponent of House Bill 476 and gave much the same testimony he delivered at the hearing of the education subcommittee of the House Finance and Appropriations Committee. In his testimony,

^-In that testimony Dr. Hack discussed four reasons for the Committee to support House Bill 476: (1) the state could have executed its responsibility for providing adequate educational opportunity by assuring adequate financial support and general program policy: (2) the bill clearly would have provided more money for public schools; (3) the bill embodied a new revenue system for schools; (4) the allocation formula would have provided a vehicle for operationalizing the state-local partnership in a way that each could have best fulfilled its appropriate role. Walter G. Hack, "Testimony Presented to House Committee on Finance and Appropriations," April 22, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. Buckeye Association of School Administrators, "BASA to Testify," Legislative Report. Number Five, April 21, 1971, Columbus, Ohio.

/ 142 however, he mentioned neither the per pupil nor the per unit factor in the foundation formula.^- John Hall returned to the next hearing of the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee and completed his testimony on April 28, 1971. The hearing was short, lasting from 8:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. John Hall was the only person to have testified. Chairman Murdock convened the fourth hearing of testimony regarding House Bill 476 by the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee at 10:00 a.m. on April 29, 1971. David Martin, executive director of the Ohio School Boards Association, appeared as a proponent of House Bill 476. In addition members of the Ohio School Boards Association testified including the president of the Canal- Winchester Board of Education, the president of the Westerville Board of Education and the clerk-treasurer of the Cleveland Board of Education. During the hearing the committee chairman appointed a subcommittee (composed of four Republicans and one Democrat) to work exclusively on House Bill 476.2

■^Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, April 27, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. J Members of the subcommittee to consider House Bill 475 were Reps. Murdock, chairman, Kindness, Scott, Speck and Sweeney. 143 On May 4, 1971 the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee convened at 2:00 p.m. to hear testimony from legal counsel for the Homan Catholic Conference of Ohio. That group's representative spoke to the issue of providing state funds for parochial schools. He dealt little with the foundation formula since funds for parochial schools were to have been allocated outside the formula. The committee adjourned at 3:30 p.m. The Committee Makes Final Revisions and Reports Out House Bill 476 By the second week in May the subcommittee appointed to work on House Bill 476 began to hear testimony and the shape of the subcommittee's version of the bill began to emerge. The subcommittee kept the foundation distribution on a per pupil basis and increased the charge-off and qualifier by retaining the administration's recommendation of 25 and 22.5 mills respectively. The subcommittee reduced the total dollar support of the bill to somewhat less than $680 per pupil.^ On May 24 the subcommittee reported its work to the full committee which accepted the report by a vote of eleven to eight— eight Democrats voting "no" and eleven Republicans voting "yes".

^•Buckeye Association of School Administrators, "The Chips Are Down In the House," Legislative Report, Number Six, May 10, 1971, Columbus, Ohio. 144

The next day the full House Health, Education and Welfare Committee met to hear final testimony on House Bill 476. At that last meeting John Hauck of the Buckeye Association of School Administrators appeared as a proponent of the bill. John Hall of the Ohio Education Association appeared as an opponent of the bill. David Martin of the Ohio School Boards Association appeared as a proponent. Rep. Polcar moved the favorable recommendation of House Bill 476 which was approved by a vote of thirteen to eight along party lines. House Bill 476 was now Substitute House Bill 476 and was forwarded to the House rules committee, chaired by the Speaker of the House, Charles F. Kurfess, Republican from the 4th district in Henry and Wood Counties. Amended Substitute House Bill 476 Approved By House of Representatives Four days later on May 28, 1971 the full House of Representatives passed Amended Substitute House Bill 476 and sent it to the Senate. Of great importance to the administration at that time was the fact that the basic formula was not changed. Nevertheless the House did impose a ceiling on increased appropriations to $75 per pupil in fiscal year 1972 and to $90 per pupil in fiscal year 1973 which served to prohibit the formula from working. Notwithstanding the spending limits the formula was almost 145 intact.^ The spending limit on the distribution formula decreased the administration's proposed budget of nine O billion dollars by close to one billion dollars. At a press conference in Parma in Cuyahoga County and home of Gertrude E. Polcar, a Republican member of the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, Governor Gilligan criticized the Republicans in the Ohio House of Representatives for imposing the funding ceiling. Mr. Gilligan observed "Under the Republican program[Amended Substitute House Bill 476~jthe wealthier districts will gain and the poorer districts will be deprived."

^Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. 2Actual total budget ejxpenditures for FY 1972-1973 were 9,170.6 million dollars. John J. Gilligan, The Budget of the State of Ohio, 1972-1973, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. _ O Richard L. Maher, "Gilligan Raps GOP for School Fund Cuts," Cleveland Press, June 21, 1971. A measure of the disparity between the gain and deprivation to which Mr. Gilligan referred perhaps could have been appreciated by an awareness of the remarkable variation in the amounts of tax valuation upon which school districts depended for raising operating revenues. For example in 1969-1970 assessed valuation per pupil ranged from a low of $3,092 in Ross County's Huntington Local School District to a high of $183,279 in Cuyahoga County's Cuyahoga Heights School District. Source: Ohio Education Association, "Basic Financial Data of Ohio School Districts, 1971," Ohio Education Association Research Report. February, 1971. For further examples of disparities in ability-effort measures in Ohio school districts see Appendix X. 146 Amended Substitute House Bill 475 Assigned to Senate Education and Health Committee As soon as the amended foundation formula— Amended Substitute House Bill 476— was sent to the Senate the majority leader in the Senate and president pro tern, Theodore M. Gray, Republican from the 3rd senatorial district, referred the bill, now labeled Amended Substitute House Bill 475 because it was the first of the three companion bills to reach the Senate, to the Senate Committee on Education and Health chaired by Oakley Collins, Republican from the 18th senatorial district.^ In the words of one of the administration members working on the education bill "Once the bill went into the Senate, we entered a different world."3 To the representatives of the education interest groups it was clear that the House version of the bill would undergo many changes, the most fundamental being the change from a per pupil formula to a per unit formula.3 On July 14, 1971 the Senate Education and Health Committee heard testimony on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. The first witness to testify in this opening hearing

•1-See Appendix J for a list of the membership of the Senate Committee on Education and Health, 109th General Assembly.

Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. O ■^Interview with David Martin, pp. cit. 147 was Rep. Norman Murdock, chairman of the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee. Rep. Murdock observed that some of the governor's original proposals still were in the bill and he supported their continued inclusion— of primary interest to him was the per pupil formula.-** Following Rep. Murdock's testimony Dr. Harold Hovey, director of finance, read a prepared statement to the. committee. In that statement of partial support of Amended Substitute House Bill 475 Dr. Hovey stated * "The per pupil distribution formula is a basic link in the chain connecting the expenditure of state funds with the programs needed to improve the management of school resources and the accountability for educational programs."2 He continued . .the formula has been simplified so that all parties interested in educational financing will be able to understand how monies are distributed and what the minimum level will be for educational programs!"3

Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of the Senate Education and Health Committee, July 14, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 2Statement of Harold A. Hovey, Director of Finance, Before the Senate Education and Health Committee, July 14, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 3Ibid. 148

At the same time Dr. Hovey was testifying the House of Representatives approved a compromise, bipartisan tax bill. Important elements of that bill included a state collected graduated personal income tax of four to eight per cent. It provided tax relief for property owners which amounted to 160 million dollars and established homestead exemptions of $1,000 to $2,500 for homeowners over age 65. It allowed a total of $621 million for education for the biennium. It provided a total increase of 1.4 billion dollars before relief adjustments and was a new net tax of slightly more than one billion dollars.^ Appearing as proponents of Amended Substitute House Bill 475 on July 21, 1971 at a regular hearing of the Senate Education and Health Committee were John Hauck, representing the Buckeye Association of School Administrators, Paul Briggs, superintendent of the Cleveland Public Schools, David Harcum, superintendent of the Green-Hills Forest Park Schools, George Hargraves, superintendent of Meigs Local .District schools, Smith Runyan, superintendent of Delaware County Schools and Edward Foster, president of the Toledo Board of Education. John Hall testified as neither a proponent nor an opponent.

Buckeye Association of School Administrators, "Tax Bill Passed By the House," Legislative Report, July, 1971, Columbus, Ohio. One week later Chairman Collins convened the Committee on Education and Health to hear further testimony on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. On July 28, 1971 the lead-off witness was David Martin, representing the Ohio School Boards Association. The first item of his testimony dealt with his support of the per pupil based formula.**■ At about this same time, an administration worker related, the Senate was in a "no win" position in terms of spending levels and the foundation formula. Historically the Senate appears always to have increased the amount of education appropriations approved by the House. However if the Senate would have removed the spending ceiling imposed by the House taxes to meet spending needs would have had to have been raised above the House level. The House would have gotten credit for the per pupil based formula. If the Senate did nothing to alter the bill the House still would have gotten credit for the formula.^ As a consequence of finding itself in this "no win" dilemma the Senate Education and Health Committee began to work on two types of formulas which were referred to as the "Senate high and low" formulas. The "high" formula was based on an income tax— more modest than the House version—

•1-Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of the Senate Education and Health Committee, July 28, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 2Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. 150 and on a per pupil distribution basis. The Senate "low" formula contained an increased salary schedule for teachers, was based on an increased sales tax and on a per unit distribution factor.^ Apparently it had become clear to most of those who were involved in working on the shape of the formula that Senator Collins and the Education and Health Committee would approve only a per unit based distribution formula. Not unexpectedly some felt that Senator Collins would not approve the per pupil based formula because it was ". . .something new and different to him." Senator Collins, according to some observors, perceived himself as the founder of the per unit distribution formula in the past and it was thought that he just hated to see any deviation from it. Another observor noted that Senator Collins simply felt that there was no chance to fund the House bill because the income tax would never be approved.^ It was reported that . .Oakley (jSenator CollinsJ was saying that his people [meaning the schools in his district? would get enough new money out of a new formula based on Amended

1Ibid. Interview with John G. Hauck, op. cit. 3 Ibid.

^"Interview with Walter G. Hack, pp. cit. 1 5 1

Substitute House Bill 531 [[t^e existing foundation formula approved by the 108th General Assembly~j that would satisfy them. With that level of spending an income tax would not have been necessary and he would have had the best of both worlds."1 Senator Collins Appoints a Subcommittee On August 4, 1971 Senator Collins appointed a subcommittee to begin work on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. He named himself chairman of the subcommittee and appointed Senators Guyer and Ocasek as members. The following week on August 11, 1971 the subcommittee of Senators Collins, Guyer and Ocasek met to hear testimony on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. Despite the fact that testimony on the bill was being heard it apparently was generally known that the school foundation formula was being rewritten in executive session and that the hearings by and large were perfunctory. By the first of September, 1971, the subcommittee's version increased aid to schools by some $27 million more than the House1s version and increased foundation support to $431 million. The foundation formula support was funded with an income tax.

1Ibid. 152 In case the income tax was not enacted the subcommittee also prepared a second bill which increased allocations to education by about $306 million. This version was funded by a sales tax increase. In both bills the per pupil factor had been replaced by a per unit factor and the spending ceilings had been removed.-*- When the subcommittee reported its first "high" version to the full committee it was accepted. The full Senate Education and Health Committee approved a motion to recommend the bill for passage by the full Senate. The bill was sent to the Senate rules committee chaired by Senator Gray and conposed of, among others, Senators Collins and Guyer, who had served on the education subcommittee. The subcommittee's low version also found its way to the rules committee. The Senate Votes At his point a choice of either the "high" or the "low" distribution formula became tied to a choice of either an income tax or a sales tax increase. After substantial debate and political maneuvering which cut across party lines the sales tax increase and the "low" foundation formula were approved by the full Senate. Because the two Houses of the General Assembly were in obvious disagreement

^•William Merriman, "Education Plan Gets Touch-Up," Columbus Citizen Journal, September 2, 1971. 153 the first of what was to be four conference committees was appointed to seek compromise so that concurrence by both Houses would have been possible. Conference Committees Appointed to Reconcile Differences To members of the administration and representatives of the education interest groups, all of whom supported the income tax proposals and increased funding for education through a per pupil based formula, the approval of those items, for the most part, was little more than a matter of endurance. When the legislation was sent to the conference committee the contest was one of finding the right combination of conferees. Senators who opposed the income tax and the per pupil formula were outnumbered. The administration, including Mr. Gilligan who used his considerable powers of publicity and his ability to focus statewide attention on that particular.problem, continued to apply pressure toward a resolution of the impasse which in the end stymied three different conference committees. Administration members observed that once the House had voted for an income tax, given studied leadership by the Republican Speaker of the House over the objection of a small but vocal number of Republican dissidents led by Rep. Netzley and one or two rebellious Democrats, it would not 154 have reversed itself.^* The problem was one of finding the right combination of conferees who collectively could persuade the dissidents to accept a compromise on an income tax and on a per pupil distribution formula. When that combination was found the legislation was approved.

Summary

The final legislation which the governor approved actually was a nineteen month appropriation funded with an income tax. Since the legislative debate continued for five months only nineteen months of the biennium remained to be funded. When the compromise between the two Houses was accomplished the low appropriation level— to have been funded by an increase in sales tax— was supported by the income tax for a period of nineteen months. In a fashion each House appeared to achieve part of its goal. The Senate retained its "low” appropriation level and the House retained its income tax structure. Although Senator Collins was on the conference committees he alone appeared to have consistently held out for a per unit

Interview with John C. MacDonald, op. cit.; Rep. Robert E. Netzley was a Republican from the 7th House district made up of Shelby and Miami Counties. 2 Interview with John Hall, op. cit. 155 distribution formula and always voted against the income

tax proposal.'1' The work of the conference committees relative to the school foundation formula also was a compromise. Senator Collins was partially successful in retaining a portion of the formula in a per unit framework. As related by Senator Ocasek who supported the partial retention of the per unit factor, the per pupil factor was used in the "top lines" of the formula— kindergarten and elementary and secondary— and the per unit factor was used for allocating expenditures for special needs, such as special education and vocational education.

■^Interview with John C. MacDonald, op. cit. 2 Interview with Oliver Ocasek, op. cit. CHAPTER VI

THE GOVERNOR AND EDUCATION FINANCE MR. GILLIGAN* S INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK OF THE SENATE EDUCATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Introduction

As was noted in the preceding chapter when the education bill and the school foundation formula were assigned by the Senate majority leader to the Senate Education and Health Committee persons involved in shaping that particular legislation entered a "different world".^ Once the bill was in the hands of the Senate Education and Health Committee and its chairman, Oakley Collins,^ the context of legislative behavior and interest group activity changed considerably from that observed in the House. Two major factors appear to have distinguished Senate

^■Interview with Edgar Troyer, pp. cit. ^Oakley C. Collins was a Republican from the 18th senatorial district composed of Athens, Gallia, Jackson, Lawrence, Meigs, Pike and Scioto Counties. Senator Collins served two years in the Ohio House of Representatives and since 1965 had served in the Ohio Senate. He was chairman of the Senate Education and Health Committee for some fourteen years and was the Republican in the Senate with the second longest seniority. Senator Collins also was the ranking Republican member of the Senate Rules Committee.

156 157 consideration of the education bill from its treatment by members of the House of Representatives: tradition and legislative personalities.

Mr. Gilligan and the Senate Education and Health Committee

Solons traditionally have regarded the Ohio Senate as the "upper" chamber and the House of Representatives as the "lower" chamber. A tangible and visible rivalry appears to have existed between the Senate and the House and members of the Senate, of which there are thirty three, sometimes reportedly have assumed a patronizing attitude toward the legislative work of their House colleagues, of which there are ninety nine.^ In matters of education legislation, for example, the Senate every biennium regularly has increased the level of appropriations for education approved by the House since the state has financed public education.2 The second factor which appears to have changed the context of legislative work on the education bill was the persons of the Senate Education and Health Committee

•^One of the representatives of an education interest group observed "The Senators have been there longer for the most part and they really feel they have to clean up a lot of legislation that comes over from the House. They feel more professional. ..." Interview with David Martin, op. cit. 2Mr. Martin added "Historically whatever would come over from the House, the Senate would pad a little." Ibid. 158 chairman, Oakley C. Collins, and the senior Democrat on the committee, Oliver Ocasek. Of the eight members of the Senate Education and Health Committee Collins and Ocasek enjoyed the longest tenure and were regarded as expert in working with the complexities of school foundation formulas.1 Both Collins and Ocasek were senior members of complementary committees— Collins was on the powerful rules committee and Ocasek was on the finance committee. Senators Collins and Ocasek Work Well Together Senator Collins was long regarded as a champion of the interests of his rural constituents in the legislative arenas in Columbus. The seven counties in his senate district comprised the Southern-most part of the state. An area once the center of pioneer iron making its topography is distinguished by hilly and rocky terrain in which are generously interspersed remnants of once-great forests, including the Shawnee Forest, largest of Ohio's state forests. ~ The region's iron ore deposits began to disappear around the turn of the century at about the time Lake Superior iron ore which was of a better quality and greater quantity had begun to be mined. With iron and steel mills being enticed North the seven county area began a slow

^•Senator Ocasek was an Associate Professor of Education at the University of Akron in Akron, Ohio where he taught graduate level courses in school finance. 159 economic decline which continues to present day. Agriculture, particularly apple-growing, is an element in the region's economy, but as an industry it struggles to survive. Stripmining of coal became a major source of income in the area, but mechanization prevents large-scale employment and prevents earnings from being widely distributed. School districts, some of which have enrollments of less than 300 students in kindergarten through twelfth grade, in the seven county area— all of which depend upon property taxes for operating expenses— are almost all uniformly poor. While mineral and coal deposits increase the potential value of real property the state1s tax structure exempts them from taxation. Property valuations are consistently low and comparatively high property tax millages produce few dollars for the schools. Senator Ocasek on the other hand is a Democrat from the 27th senatorial district and represents urban interests, particularly those of Akron which is his home. Akron is an industrial community whose economy almost entirely is dependent on major rubber industries, the largest of which is the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. An industrial- based community Akron is labor oriented and strongly ethnic. Senators Collins and Ocasek appear to have represented disparate points of view. One was a conservative Republican 160 from a rural constituency; the other is a literal Democrat from an urban constituency. In matters of appropriations Senator Collins consistently supported lower spending levels while Senator Ocasek consistently supported higher appropriations levels. Not surprisingly Collins and Ocasek would seem to have been at opposites on most matters of education finance; yet their long service together and a mutual trust and confidence which developed appears to have promoted a close and harmonious relationship.^" What appears to have been a tradition of private negotiation between the two has facilitated the passage of most of the education legislation approved by the Senate in the last decade. Committee Chairmen Exercise Great Power The power of the committee chairmen of the Senate1s standing committees also appears to have been a strong factor in the shaping of the Senate version of the school foundation formula. In the Ohio legislature the committee chairman exerts great influence on those bills which pass through his committee. He decides which bills are heard. If they are going to be re-written he decides who on the committee will re-write them. He names subcommittees. He decides whether a bill is going to be voted on and whether an amendment is going to be voted on. He can refuse or

^■Interview with Oliver Ocasek, pp. cit. 161 accept an amendment and he can recommend a bill.^ The Senate's standing committee chairmen appear to have more power than their counterparts in the House of Representatives. One reason for this greater power is the small size of the Senate, one third that of the House membership. In the Senate the committee chairman receives a great amount of strength from his leader in the majority party. Because of the small size party leaders exert more influence in the Senate and to a very large extent, standing committee chairmen control what happens to a bill o in their committees. In regard to the education bill representatives of the education interest groups and staff members in the Gilligan administration worked consistently with just two members of the Education and Health Committee— Senators Collins and Ocasek. Discussion and debate on the House-approved foundation formula was conducted on two levels— one public and one private— and Collins and Ocasek both functioned at those two levels. Because he was a Democrat Senator Ocasek was most openly identified with the administration and was, in some fashion or other, a legislative spokesman for the

Interview with John Hall, op. cit. 2Ibid. 162 administration' s proposals. It was most apparent that once the House-approved education bill was consigned to Senator Collins1 committee it was to be changed drastically. For example the House left in the bill a provision for establishing regional resource centers which were to supplant some county school district superintendents— seven of whom were in the 18th senatorial district. It was reported that Senator Collins was amused when he saw the resource center provision^ because he had succeeded in blocking that kind of legislation for at least ten years.^ The Per Pupil Factor Becomes a Bargaining Issue One of the most important items in the House version of the bill, an item which originally was proposed by the administration, was the per pupil distribution factor in the foundation formula. The question of whether or not the per pupil distribution factor was to remain in the formula became the single item of debate around which other elements in the formula, including spending levels, appeared to

^Interview with Jay Tepper, Columbus, Ohio, December 12, 1972. 2 Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. ^Former Superintendent of Public Instruction Edward E. Holt, who served under Governors O'Neill, DiSalle and Rhodes recalled that ". . .bills for reorganization of school districts going through committees he headed got stopped." Interview with Edward E. Holt, op. cit. 163 revolve. The per pupil factor in the formula became the quid pro quo for several demands made of its proponents.^ In that bargaining context that Mr. Gilligan*s proposal to revise the school foundation formula was the first serious attempt to change the teacher-unit element in the formula was significant. It also was significant that not only was Senator Collins the most powerful member of the education and health committee,3 the Ironton Republican always wrote the final version of the formula and was considered to be the founder of the per unit distribution system in Ohio. Indeed because it was something new and different to him, Senator Collins' immediate response to the per pupil distribution formula apparently was to change it.^ Apparently he did not understand how the per pupil formula worked as well as he understood the per unit formula. He appears to have been unsure about how the formula effected his rural constituency. A politician who was described as having gotten ". . .his pound of flesh out

■*-The author attended a meeting of the interest group representatives where this notion became quite evident.,* August 9, 1971, author, "Internship Journal," at p. 106. ^Interview with Jay Tepper, op. cit. 3Interview with John G. Hauck, op. cit. 4ibid. 164 of every appropriations bill"^- Senator Collins . .felt very uncomfortable with the per pupil formula because he did not know how his poor school districts would do if a factor in the formula was changed."2 Senator Collins conducted a series of public hearings on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. Privately he, along with Senator Ocasek, wrote the final form of the bill receiving information, data and advice from administration spokesmen and representatives of the education interest groups. The manner in which Senator Collins conducted the affairs of the education and health committee enabled the representative of the Ohio Education Association to be extremely active in the process. He was, in fact, Senator Collins1 spokesman to the administration and to the individuals representing other education agencies. The OEA and the Legislature Since 1966 John Hall has served as director of governmental relations for the Ohio Education Association whose state headquarters are located in Columbus two blocks from The Statehouse. An affiliate of the National Education Association the Ohio Education Association over the years has become increasingly involved in overt political affairs across the state and since 1966 has become a contender in

^Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. ^Interview with John Hall, op. cit. political activity in Columbus.^- Hall who is particularly close to many members of the Senate directs Ohio Education Association funds to individual campaigns and travels to both House and Senate districts to personally campaign for selected candidates. The Association’s visibility in statewide politics was heightened during the 1970 gubernatorial campaign when, for the first time in its history, the Association endorsed John Gilligan as a candidate for governor. His activity during legislative deliberations was given to publicly supporting or opposing specific items and to providing information to legislators. Over the past few years computer technology has allowed policy makers to examine many and complex legislative variables and to receive in very short periods of time projected results of selected policy decisions. The capability of the Ohio Education Association’s computer services in providing data on what specific changes in legislation might produce appears to have been particularly critical in the debate on the school foundation formula..

^Howard Collier observed that the Ohio Education Association was as powerful a lobby as was the Ohio AFL-CIO or the Ohio Association of Manufacturers, two lobbies which Collier considered extremely influential in the state's legislative affairs. Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 166 In Ohio state legislators have two primary sources of computer-based information in matters of education— the state department of education and the Ohio Education Association. Ordinarily one might assume that the state department of education would be able to provide the most complete, current and accurate data because of its routine collection of individual school district information which is digested by its various divisions and departments. The state department of education, however, does not have its own computer facilities. It shares with the other major state agencies a state-operated center. The Ohio Education Association has its own computer center and is able to direct his staff time and energies to produce answers to legislative queries. It appears to do so more quickly, more reliably and often more accurately than does the state department of education. Senator Ocasek who was a member of the executive committee of the Ohio Education Association observed . . .1 deplore the fact that government is not able to give us current up to date information as legislators need it in the drafting of legislation. . . .When I ask the state department " ' of education to give me a run-down on what a formula or a print out would do, the state Cbther state agenciesj was using the machines and I might not get it for several days. OEA would keep their staff on all night and would bring it back in the morning and give you what you asked for.

^■Interview with Oliver Ocasek, op. cit. 167

Senator Ocasek noted that possession of the ability to provide that service was to have influence.*^- The Governor and His Staff Intervene It became apparent early in Senate consideration of the school foundation formula that deliberations and negotiations on the bill were being conducted primarily among John Hall, Senators Collins and Ocasek and the Gilligan administration. One week after Senator Collins 2 opened hearings on Amended Substitute House Bill 475 Governor Gilligan convened a morning meeting in his office in The Statehouse to discuss the disposition of the Senate

version of the school foundation f o r m u l a . ^ The governor reportedly called the meeting because the administration suspected that John Hall of the Ohio Education Association was re-writing the foundation formula for Senator Collins and that he was removing the per pupil factor and inserting a per unit factor.

^Ibid. ^The hearing opened on July 7, 1971 and the committee heard testimony from representatives of teachers' associations in Dayton and Cleveland. Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of Senate Education and Health Committee, July 7, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 3 At that meeting were Governor Gilligan, Robert E. Cecile, Harold A. Hovey, Oliver Ocasek and John Hall. Conversation with Robert E. Cecile, July 14, 1971, author, "Internship Journal," at p. 48. 168

During that meeting Mr. Gilligan related to both Hall and Ocasek that he supported the continued inclusion of the per pupil factor in the foundation formula. He expressed his belief that the per pupil factor would allow him to go to the people of Ohio with a less complicated formula. He told them that it was easy to calculate and demonstrate state foundation support for a particular school district— he simply had to multiply the number of the district's pupils times the foundation per pupil allotment.^ Both Hall and Ocasek responded to Mr. Gilligan's comments by suggesting that neither of them had a preference for either the per pupil or the per unit factor. Both Hall and Ocasek related to the governor that it was their belief that Senator Collins was the key to the choice of factor. They pointed out that whatever Senator Collins wanted would be the primary determinant. Hall and Ocasek both suggested that Senator Collins would be more amenable to a per pupil factor should the amount of property tax roll back, which which was then twenty five mills, be lowered or if the local property tax millage rate required for participation in the state foundation program were lowered. The governor reportedly agreed to a lowering of the participation level

-*~Ibid. Mr. Gilligan repeated this same argument during the author's interview with the governor. Interview with the Honorable John J. Gilligan, op. cit. 169

*1 in exchange for Collins' support of the per pupil factor. At the second Senate Education and Health Committee hearing on Amended Substitute House Bill 475 held that evening, Rep. Murdock, who chaired the committee which wrote Substitute House Bill 476, testified first. Rep. Murdock reviewed the legislative history of the bill on the House side and suggested that he was supportive of some of the principles which the governor had incorporated in his original proposals. Among those principles which he supported were the proviso for a teacher-effectiveness study, the establishment of a pilot of an educational resource center, a qualifier of not less than twenty mills, a municipal overburden based on average daily membership count rather than on numbers of children receiving Aid to Dependent Children funds, a statewide teacher salary adjustment to reflect a thirty five professionals to every one thousand average daily membership, the "hold harmless" clause and finally the per pupil factor.2 Mr. Murdock specifically recalled that the numbers of witnesses who criticized the per pupil factor were about equal to those who criticized the per unit factor.

1Ibid. 2Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of Senate Education and Health Committee, July 14, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 170 Following Rep. Murdock's testimony the committee heard testimony from Dr. Harold A. Hovey, director of finance. In his prepared remarks Dr. Hovey testified as a partial proponent of Amended Substitute House Bill 475 and commented that "The per pupil distribution formula is a basic link in the chain connecting the esqpenditure of state funds with the program needed to improve the management of school resources and the accountability for educational programs. Dr. Hovey listed four concepts which Amended Substitute House Bill 475 embodied and which the administration supported: (1) it promoted equity in school finance by increasing the charge-off and removing the distinction between additional and non-additional aid districts; (2) it encouraged flexibility and enhanced the decision making ability of local boards of education and administrators; (3) it permitted development of accountability measures by funding the total costs of education programs on a per pupil base where data could be developed to permit decision makers at all levels to make more meaningful choices in educational policy; and (4) it insured that all parties interested in educational finance would be able to understand how monies were distributed and what the minimum

•^Statement of Harold A. Hovey, Director of Finance, Before the Senate Education and Health Committee, July 14, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 171

level would be for education programs.^- Two days later Dr. Hovey met with Governor Gilligan in his office in The Statehouse. In that 4:00 p.m. meeting Dr. Hovey briefed Mr. Gilligan on what he and his staff members— primarily Edgar Troyer— were anticipating Senator Collins was preparing to do to the foundation formula. Dr. Hovey told Mr. Gilligan that Senator Collins most likely would make substantial changes in the House bill. The administration staff also had achieved consensus in an evaluation of John Hall's position on the formula. Despite his assertions that he had no preference for either a per pupil or a per unit based formula Mr. Gilligan*s aides felt that Hall did have a greater interest in the per unit formula. Since it was important to his constituency— member teachers of the Ohio Education Association— that salary minimums be increased the use of the teacher unit in the formula helped Hall demonstrate, in terms of his constituency, what gains for them he had achieved. He had succeeded in increasing the state minimum base for beginning teachers by $500 in the House deliberations and was able to tout that increase to his Ohio Education Association membership.

J-Ibid. 172

Committee Hearings Continue On July 21, 1971 Senator Collins held the third committee hearing on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. That evening a team of members‘of the Buckeye Association of School Administrators testified as proponents of the bill.1 Smith Runyan, superintendent of Delaware County schools, also testified about concerns of county superintendents and the lack of emphasis which the bill gave to funding county boards of education. That same evening Edward Foster, president of the Toledo Board of Education, spoke as a proponent of the House version of the bill and was careful to point out his support of the per pupil factor in the formula. He noted that schools educated children and not "units". Senator Ocasek responded to this comment by suggesting that he was not disposed to abandoning the per pupil formula in favor of the per unit formula. John Hall of the Ohio Education Association also testified at the hearing. Speaking as neither a proponent nor an opponent of the bill he spent most of his time arguing for an increase in teachers1 salaries and urged that they be set at a minimum of $6400 in January of 1972 and

1Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of Senate Education and Health Committee, July 21, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 2Ibid. 173 $7000 in July of 1973. He did not mention his position on the issue of a per unit or a per pupil based formula.^ The following week, on July 28, 1971, the Senate Education and Health Committee met for the fourth time to hear testimony on Amended Substitute House Bill 475. First to testify that evening was David Martin of the Ohio School Boards Association who appeared as a proponent of the bill. Although he spoke to many elements in the bill his opening remarks gave strong support to the per pupil base of the formula.^ Following his testimony Senator Collins asked Paul Spayde and John Hall to provide the committee with computer runs to show what specific per pupil expenditure could be substituted for an $840 per unit figure which would achieve full funding without increasing appropriations. At the fifth hearing on Amended Substitute House Bill 475 the Senate Education and Health Committee listened to Charles Lindbergh who was president of the Cincinnati Board of Education. Mr. Lindbergh complained that under provisions of the House-passed bill Cincinnati would contribute some 38 million dollars in taxes, but would receive only five million dollars from the foundation

•^Ibid. Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of Senate Education and Health Committee, July 28, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 174 formula. He pointed out that local taxes would have to generate about eleven million dollars just to maintain Cincinnati's current program.-** At the sixth hearing on Amended Substitute House Bill 475 the Senate Education and Health Committee met to hear testimony regarding special education funding provisions of the bill. The most important development of the evening session occurred when Senator Collins announced his appointment of a subcommittee to write a committee version of the formula. Named to that subcommittee were Senators Collins, chairman, Guyer and Ocasek.

-**The discontent that school officials and board of ... education members in Cincinnati felt in regard to the governor's proposed school foundation formula and his proposed income tax led the president of the Cincinnati Board of Education, Charles Lindbergh, to write a letter of complaint to Governor Gilligan's father, a resident of Cincinnati, asking the senior Gilligan to intercede with his son on the board's behalf. The governor's father forwarded the letter to The Statehouse where it was answered and returned to the board. The author was involved in the drafting of the answer to the board's letter, author, July 16, 1971, “Internship Journal," at pp. 51 and 58. 2 Chase W. Crawford, Record of Hearing of Senate Education and Health Committee, August 4, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio. 175

John Hall Calls For Private Negotiations On the next day John Hall of the Ohio Education Association telephoned Edgar Troyer to reguest that he arrange a meeting for August 6,-1971 to begin at 10:00 a.m.^ He specifically requested that both Dr. Cecile and Mr. Troyer attend and wished to invite John Hauck of the Buckeye Association of School Administrators, David Martin of the Ohio School Boards Association and Paul Spayde of the state department of education. Immediately following his first telephone call he telephoned Troyer a second time to request a meeting between Cecile and Troyer himself at 2:30 p.m. on that day. At 2:30 p.m. Cecile and Troyer went to the main conference room in the department of finance located in an office building at 62 East Broad directly North of The Statehouse. The conference room looked out over Broad Street and was adjacent to the office of the director of finance. It was a small room which accommodated a conference table which comfortably seated no more than eight persons. One end of the room was paneled and was dominated by a United States flag and a flag of Ohio.

^Conversation with Edgar Troyer, August 5, 1971, author, "Internship Journal," at p. 95. 176 Hall arrived twenty minutes late. After he apologized for being late he began the meeting by reporting an earlier morning meeting he had with Senators Collins and Ocasek. They discussed progress that the subcommittee was making on the bill. Hall reported that the subcommittee and the full committee would bring out a per unit bill which would match the budget the House had approved. He predicted that the Senate would then work very hard in conference committee for an increased appropriation based on a per unit formula. Hall opined that Senator Ocasek was the key to choosing either a per pupil or a per unit factor in the formula.^" At 10:00 a.m. on August 6, 1971 Edgar Troyer and Dr. Cecile met with John Hauck, John Hall, Paul Spayde and David Martin in the conference room of the finance department. The meeting was called to discuss the education bill and as the group deliberated it became evident that these six men would write much of what was the education subcommittee's final product. The four representatives of the interest groups— the Ohio Education Association, the Buckeye Association of School Administrators, the Ohio School Boards Association and the state department of education— had met earlier at breakfast and apparently had

■*-The author attended that meeting on August 5, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 97. 177 smoothed out enough differences to enable them to reach a consensus, however shaky it might have been, on the bill.1 John Hall was the unofficial chairman of the meeting and dominated it, not only in terms of personality, but also in terms of computer printouts to show what various school foundation formulas would do to large city districts, to rural districts and to suburban districts. Hall reported to the group that on the day before the Senate Republicans had caucused to discuss the tax and education bills. According to Hall Senator Gray, the Senate president pro tem, wished to have the Senate approve an education bill with a $630 base. Hall reported that Senator Collins wanted the Senate to approve a $650 base. Collins reportedly stormed out of the caucus and was considering reporting a $650 figure out of his committee and letting the full Senate accept responsibility for cutting it back to the $630 level. The meeting adjourned because Paul Spayde's computer runs did not agree with those of John Hall. Just prior to its adjournment a smoldering rift between Spayde and Hall surfaced in an exchange over the Ohio Education Association's report of testimony delivered by Paul Spayde on August 4, 1971 before Senator Collins' education

1The author attended that meeting on August 6, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 100. 178

subcommittee. According to the Ohio Education Association's legislative report. Dr. Spayde suggested at the hearing that one means of saving money in the education bill involved a delay of foundation support payments until January 1, 1972.1 When Spayde made the same suggestion in the meeting Hall lashed out at Spayde in opposition. Spayde then complained that Hall had misrepresented his testimony before the education subcommittee.3 Following the exchange between Hall and Spayde and before the meeting adjourned David Martin ashed John Hall if the group could agree on the essentials of a bill, could Hall "sell" it to Senator Collins. Hall replied that he 3 not only could, but that he would. The group agreed that a per pupil formula was acceptable to everyone, provided that it allowed Senator Collins to insure that the poor school districts in his district received additional

^Ohio Education Association, Legislative Report. No. 26, August 5, 1971, Columbus, Ohio, ‘‘•Theo author attended that meeting. August 6, 1971, author, "Internship Journal," at p. 102. 3Ibid. 179 funding. ***

Later on that same day the same group of individuals reconvened at 4:00 p.m. in the conference room of the finance department. Paul Spayde brought along a computer run based on discussion and decisions of the morning meeting, but once again his calculations and those of John Hall, who also had a new print out of the formula based on the same data, could not agree on the price out of the formula. Hall's final figure was some $80 million higher than Spayde1s total. The group decided that it would be wise to let everyone study the two print outs in order to discover the cause for the $80 million discrepancy. Edgar Troyer decided to review the formula and other data so that he could verify the accuracy of the figures and totals. It was agreed that the group would meet at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday, August 8, 1971, in the conference room at the finance department.

Both John Hall and Oliver Ocasek commented that they felt Senator Collins evaluated the education bill in terms of its effect upon his schools: ". . -he basically wants more money in rural areas, the poor additional aid district. ..." Interview with Oliver Ocasek, op. cit. "I don't know of anyone that can react more quickly than Collins can in terms of how a change in the formula will effect his poor school districts." Interview with John

Hall,* pp. ■ i ^ ii ■cit. ■ i i. ■ 180 John Hall again dominated that afternoon meeting and was fully in control of the agenda. During the afternoon meeting most items in the education hill appeared to he close to general approval except for matters of minimum salaries and staffing requirements. A possible major point of contention between Hall and John Hauck and David Martin was the question of a clerk's certificate provision. This provision required the clerk of a hoard of education to certify in writing that monies which the hoard might agree to spend during salary negotiations were, in fact, available. The provision was intended to prevent hoards of education from bargaining away money they did not have. Hall wished to modify the provision so that it would not effect contractual agreements already in force. Hall wanted the wording changed to require that a clerk's certificate he issued only when salaries were increased relative to their present contractual levels. School hoards were required by Ohio law to approve salary schedules annually, whether they had already been negotiated and contractually agreed to or not— e.g. the second year of a three year contract— or whether salary levels changed at all. Hall's position was that the salary schedules had been negotiated in good faith and that the clerk's certificate could be properly issued whenever salary increases occurred outside of existing 181

contractual agreements. David Martin of the Ohio School Boards Association concurred with Hall on this issue.^ The meeting which began at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday was brief. When John Hall arrived the discussion centered on the issues of salary and staffing. Hall brought with him two state minimum salary schedules which had as bases for a bachelor *s degree with no teaching experience or its equivalent figures of $6400 and $7000. Dr. Cecile pointed out that a beginning salary of $7000 boosted the state salary average for teaching to close to $9300 which was .more than the average for workers across the state. Cecile pointed out that such a figure likely was unacceptable to labor and thus was unacceptable to the administration.

Conversations with Robert E. Cecile and Edgar Troyer, August 6, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 105. 2It was critical that organized labor in Ohio, led by Frank King, chief executive of the Ohio AFL - CIO who was the former minority leader in the Ohio Senate, supported the administration's proposals because only by a coalition of Republicans and Democrats could Mr. Gilligan muster a simple majority in the Senate. Frank King was said to have controlled at least eight of the thirteen Democrat votes in the Senate, including those of Senators Applegate, Calabrese, Mottl, Novak and Valiquette. Interview with Edgar Troyer, pp. cit. 182

Hall persisted with argument for a minimum salary base of $7000. David Martin also objected to the figure and suggested that a tax increase would have been required during the next biennium. Because of that alone he felt that the $7000 figure was too high. Hall responded that unless the group agreed to the $7000 minimum he would go to Senator Collins with a per unit formula and "sell it to him". David Martin accused Hall of "blackmail" and the meeting broke up.-** On the following Monday afternoon John Hall met with Dr. Cecile and Edgar Troyer in Troyer's office in the finance department. Although nothing was agreed to the three spent the meeting time discussing the subject of salary schedules. Cecile and Troyer had begun to move toward a compromise with Hall on the salary schedule and the minimum base, but Dr. Hovey entered the meeting and pushed Cecile and Troyer away from a definitive agreement with Hall.^

-*-0ne of the participants in that meeting recalled, "When the Sunday meeting broke up, we were asking John Hall what he would settle for and wanted to sit down and negotiate the dollar amounts. . . .We knew that John had the aces in his hand in dealing with the Senate education subcommittee." Interview with John G. Hauck, op. cit. ^Conversation with Edgar Troyer, August 10, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 113.

, / 183 At that meeting Hall reported to Cecile and Troyer that the subcommittee had removed the provision for a pilot resource center from the bill. That provision had been part of the governor1s original proposal and was left in by the House. Hall also reported that he understood that the municipal overburden factor had been removed from the formula. The Subcommittee Completes Its Worh The final public hearing on Amended Substitute House Bill 475 by Senator Collins’ subcommittee was held on August 11, 1971. At this point it was generally concluded that the hearing was pro forma and that Collins already had written the bill and simply was going through the motions of hearing testimony. Edgar Troyer observed that at that A * ” time Collins had succeeded in writing the bill in such a fashion that he insured that at least two senatorial districts would have received substantially less increased funding than the rest of the state.^ The minimum salary

^Because they had opposed him in the Republican caucus on the education appropriation level Senator Collins wrote the bill so that Senators Gray and Aranoff would have been faced with e:xplaining why schools in their districts received less money than other school districts in the state. Such action was consistent in terms of the way in which Collins operated in the Senate: "People just did not cross Oakley too often." Interview with John G. Hauch, op. cit. 184

schedule base for teachers was reported to have been set at $6400. By August 17, 1972 the shape of the Senate subcommittee version of the foundation formula became more visible. The question of the per unit or per pupil based formula was answered and it appeared highly unlikely that a per pupil factor was to be included in the bill. Administration staffers generally concluded that John Hall had gone to Senator Collins and supported a per unit formula.-*- The Governor Continues to Persevere Because of the delay in Senate approval of tax legislation and of a new school foundation formula past the expiration of the state's fiscal year Mr. Gilligan and the House and Senate resorted to implementing interim budgets of one month each. During the months of- July and August Mr. Gilligan was in contact with the Senate president pro tern, Mr. Gray, and the chairman of the Senate Ways and Means Committee, Mr. Maloney, who was coordinating the writing of the tax bill.^ Mr. Gilligan reported that he

^"Conversation with Edgar Troyer, August 17, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 124. 2 Michael J. Maloney was a Republican from the 7th senatorial district in Hamilton County. Besides serving as chairman of the ways and means committee, he also served on the environmental affairs committee and was Senate majority whip. t / 185 had ". . .received the assurances of the legislative leaders that svift action on a permanent budget. . ." was to he consummated shortly.-*• In a special statewide television broadcast aired late in the afternoon of August 19, 1971^ Mr. Gilligan announced that he would accept no more interim budgets without first reducing eaqpenditures for state operations and services. He spoke first to curtailments of state spending by noting that payments to school districts were to be reduced by three per cent beginning with the September p a y m e n t s . ^ He then announced that support payments for nonpublic schools

■*-«John J. Gilligan, "Special Message By Governor John J. Gilligan," Office of the Governor, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, August 19, 1971, p. 2. _ The governor video-taped his address on the afternoon of August 18, 1971. The broadcast had been labeled by administration staffers as "top secret" and no advance information on the speech was provided. The governor's special message was written primarily by Dr. Harold Hovey and by Kevin Connorton, Mr. Gilligan1s speech writer. The broadcast was aired in late afternoon so that it would be replayed on evening television news programs. The secrecy was intended to insure that his speech would gain maximum impact and to insure that initially only a single set of facts and statistics were presented to the people of Ohio. Conversation with Robert E. Cecile, August 19, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at pp. 126-127.

3John J. Gilligan, "Special Message," op. cit. 186 wore to be ended entirely.^ He went on to enumerate other spending reductions to insure that the people of Ohio understood precisely what he was attempting to do— pressure the Senate toward a resolution of its debate on the tax bill and the education bill. He noted in his closing remarks "The legislature has before it a budget bill, already approved by one house. . . .If it is passed before September 1, we can. . . avoid the drastic cuts I have announced today.Mr. Gilligan appeared to have been clear in his use of the education funding cuts as a means of mounting support for his proposals.

Earlier on that same day Mr. Gilligan met in his office in The Statehouse with John C. MacDonald, Edgar Troyer, Robert E. Cecile and Harold A. Hovey. At that meeting, called by the governor to discuss the education bill and the school foundation formula, Mr. Gilligan reiterated his strong support of the per pupil based formula and repeated his desire that the per pupil factor be incorporated into

-*-Ibid. Additional reductions occurred in (1) payments to scholarship students enrolled in Ohio colleges and universities, (2) various forms of financial assistance to universities, (3) closing of a large number of state parks, (4) payments for dependent children, the aged, the blind and the disabled by 1% per cent, (5) health care for welfare recipients and (6) layoff of about 3,000 state employees Qnost of whom were Republicans}. ^Ibid. 187

the school foundation formula then being re-written by Senator Collins' education subcommittee. ■*■ The governor recalled that he had been most impressed with the remarks of a Canadian Ministry of Education officer who pointed out that the per pupil factor allowed an easy shift from a 2 minimum support level to a maximum support level. The administration, through finance department staffer, Edgar Troyer, arranged to have Dr. Walter Hack meet with both Senators Collins and Ocasek on August 17, 1971. The meetings were intended to provide Dr. Hack— ostensibly an impartial academician, expert in matters of school finance— an opportunity to answer any questions about the House- passed formula and to gently attempt to persuade both senators of the worth and value of a per pupil formula. Dr. Hack met first with Senator Ocasek who was reported to have been favorably disposed to the per pupil formula as long as it was funded at a level he preferred which was a full 3 — funding level of $404 million.

^-Mr. Gilligan recalled that "I would have given up almost everything £in the bil^ but the per pupil factor." Interview with the Honorable John J. Gilligan, op. cit. 2 Mr. Gilligan had just returned from a Conference of Great Lakes Governors and Premiers which was held on Mackinac Island, Michigan on August 16, 1971. ■^Conversation with Edgar Troyer, August 19, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 129. Interview with Walter G. Hack, pp. cit. Dr. Hack also met with Senator Collins and was greeted with the statement that the administration did not have a chance of funding the House-passed per pupil formula because the Senate would never pass an income tax bill. The position of Senator Collins regarding his refusal to accept any form of an income tax led some administration officials to put him in a ''no" column and to avoid a wastage of resources trying to persuade him of the value of an income tax.^ on the day that Dr. Hack met with Senator Collins a delegation of superintendents from school districts in his seven-county senatorial district were in Columbus to meet with their senator and representatives. Senator Collins told Dr. Hack during their meeting that those superintendents were opposed both to an income tax and to a per pupil distribution formula."^ Dr. Hack recalled that even after he had pointed out to Senator Collins that Amended Substitute House Bill 475 would give more money to his school districts than the per unit formula which was being developed by the education subcommittee the Senator remained intransigent, referring to the opinions of the

^■Interview with Walter G. Hack, op. cit. ^Interview with John C. MacDonald, pp. cit. ■^Interview with Walter G. Hack, op. cit. 189 i school superintendents in Southeastern Ohio. On that same day Edgar Troyer and John Hall met again in the finance department offices. They met to discuss the issue of an increase in the minimum state teaching salary schedule and arrived at a compromise. Hall's earlier demands for an increase to $7000 for beginning teachers with no experience was an increase of about thirty per cent over the existing schedule. Hall and Troyer agreed to an 18.4% increase.^ The Senate Prepares Two Sets of Alternatives By the end of August it appeared that the Senate Ways and Means Committee would report out two bills which were to be sent to the rules committee. In like fashion the Senate Education and Health Committee also was ready to report out two bills to the rules committee. In the rules committee the Republican caucus attempted to muster support for either one means of revenue raising and a corresponding education appropriation or an alternative tax structure and education spending level. When one set of bills gained

^•The great influence that the school superintendents in Senator Collins' district exerted upon him was noted by Dr. Paul Spayde who remarked ". . .he has a key group of superintendents in his area that he relies on for advice and they advised him to stick with the classroom unit formula and he did." Interview with Paul Spayde, pp. cit. ^Conversation with Edgar Troyer, August 19, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 129. 190 support in the rules committee it was to he sent to the Senate floor for debate and a vote. If that set failed to meet with Senate approval the second set was to be sent to the Senate floor. The education subcommittee prepared the first of its two bills to accompany the income tax proposal. The first school foundation formula was a per pupil formula which set spending at 431 million dollars. This amount was $27 million more than the House authorized in Amended Substitute House Bill 475. Should the income tax proposal have failed the subcommittee wrote a per unit formula to accompany a sales tax increase proposal. The second school foundation formula set spending at $306 million, an amount 98 million dollars less than the House had authorized in May of 1971. In both bills the education subcommittee made the following changes in Amended Substitute House Bill 475: (1) all House language authorizing regional education resource centers was removed; (2) teacher salary minimums were raised from the House base of $5700 to $6400; (3) the $40 million municipal overburden factor which was to assist the state's eight largest school districts^* plus East Cleveland was halved to $20 million, so that instead of receiving an additional twelve per cent for overburden, big

^•Those school districts were located in Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo and Youngstown. 191 city districts were to have received $30 per pupil: (4) a provision for establishing a citizens1 task force to study teacher efficiency was deleted: (5) a provision was incorporated that required the .superintendent of schools and the president of the board of education to certify that money was available for teacher salary increases prior to their being granted.

Summary

In the waning days of the Senate1s consideration of the education and tax bills, to the administration and the education interest groups/ the importance of the school foundation formula and the intracacies of its design diminished. The proposed changes in Ohio's tax structure drew the state1s strongest and most powerful lobbies into a struggle which was to determine funding levels for all of the state's programs and services including education. Thus a more vigorous effort on the part of the governor's office in pressing for a foundation formula— a small segment of a much larger entity— more like its original proposal was 'not undertaken. Yet during most of the Senate Education and Health Committee's deliberation on the foundation formula the governor's office and the education interest groups actively

^William Merriman, op. cit. 192 sought to influence the shape of the funding distribution pattern. At some times the governor1s office deferred to interest groups, especially the Ohio Education Association, and its leadership in the rewriting process. At other times the governor's office initiated proposals and counter-proposals. Allies in support of the governor's original foundation formula most often included the Buckeye Association of School Administrators, the Ohio School Boards Association and the state department of education with the Ohio Education Association operating between the administration's camp and that of Senators Collins and Ocasek. CHAPTER VII

GOVERNORS GILLIGAN AND RHODES AND EDUCATION POLICY MAKING: ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

Introduction

Chapter IV describes the activities of Governor Rhodes as he went about his work as Ohio1s chief executive. It also describes his gubernatorial behavior in relation to specific items of education policy. Chapter V reviews Governor Gilligan1s involvement in the development of a school foundation formula from its inception to its becoming law. Chapter VI focuses on one item of education policy and documents his activity in attempts to retain a per pupil factor in the Senate's version of that school foundation formula. Chapter VII consists of two parts. The first offers an analysis of the behaviors of Governor Gilligan and Rhodes relative to the three gubernatorial roles discussed in Chapter II. The second compares the behaviors of the two as they both were involved in education policy making.

193 194

Executive Behavior and the Literature

Rhodes and the Literature on the Governor In regard to the various components of the three primary roles which the literature by political scientists prescribed for gubernatorial behavior, Rhodes provided almost a textbook model. The Ohio constitution delegated fairly common administrative responsibilities to him. Included in those mandated functions were major tasks of reporting on the condition of the state, of commanding its military and naval forces and of recommending legislation to the general assembly.^ Evidence was presented which suggests that Rhodes1 immediate staff was responsible for much of the development of policy. Rhodes sponsored ideas and looked to his assistants to transform them into either possible executive actions or legislative proposals. It was apparent that Rhodes then made final decisions on whatever the staff had generated.

For a review of constitutionally-mandated or -derived duties and functions of the governor in Ohio see “Duties and Functions of the Governor," Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Committee to Study the Staffing of the Office of the Governor, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, August 3, 1962., pp. 1-7. 195 The literature pointed out that the governor1s most visible activity in policy making usually occurs in his submission of legislation. Rhodes initiated considerable legislation, yet he conducted his legislative leadership in subdued fashion. He projected an outward deference to legislative independence. Yet evidence was provided which indicates that he was intimately involved in the work of the general assembly. As the literature suggested when the governor's party holds control of the legislature his potential for success sometimes is blunted by lawmakers vying for control of party affairs. Rhodes, however, enjoyed such stature in the Republican Party that no contenders for his leadership appeared to openly challenge him. Because of his extreme effectiveness in' legislative matters, Rhodes reportedly rarely used his power of veto. The literature points out that the potential of a veto has been an effective tool for governors to use in shaping legislation. It was established that Rhodes most often was able to shape legislation with the assistance of his leaders and committee chairmen and little evidence was discovered which suggests that threats of possible vetoes ever were used by Governor Rhodes. 196 The literature pointed out that a governor's persuasive power potentially was his. most important power in legislative activities. It was reported that Rhodes privately was extremely persuasive. It was observed that in private meetings few legislative leaders could resist the zeal, enthusiasm and energy with which he supported his proposals.^- The literature on the chief executive suggested that since the governor was elected on a partisan platform, he was expected by the people of his state to assume his party's leadership. By almost any standard Rhodes met that expectation. As the literature pointed out was most often the case, Rhodes' role as partisan leader was intertwined with virtually everything he did as governor. Rhodes appears to not have been constrained by his role of party leader. Instead he relished his party activities. His dominance of GOP affairs in Ohio apparently was so complete that the party's image virtually was an extension of Governor Rhodes' personality and style. In regard to the governor's use of patronage which the literature suggests was becoming increasingly restricted by establishment of civil service systems, Rhodes appears to have developed to a fine art the exercise of executive perogatives as a reward for service to him or in his behalf.

■^Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. 197

It was reported that his offers of state projects, state roads and state institutions constituted a major portion of his patronage. His dispensation of patronage appears to have crossed party lines. Gilligan and the Literature on the Governor As might be ejected Mr. Gilligan was delegated the same mandated functions of Ohio1s chief executive as his predecessor, Governor Rhodes. Since no changes in the constitution were made during the transition of their respective administrations their constitutional tasks were the same. Although Mr. Gilligan employed a new staff in the governor's office he did retain one clerk who was hired during the Rhodes administration and who was responsible for processing and keeping extradition records.^ Mr. Gilligan depended upon his immediate staff for development of administration policy. Unlike Rhodes, Gilligan structured his executive staff by tasks and assigned individuals to four major areas: legislation,

Her name was June Simonds and she held the title of Extradictions Clerk at an annual salary of $7,833. Gene Jordan, "Gilligan Staff Cost Up 52%," op. cit. administration, federal relations and communications. Between the governor and his assistants in those four areas was his executive counsel, James Friedman. The bulk of Mr. Gilligan's time as governor, particularly in the first months of his administration, was given to involvement in legislative leadership. Initially Mr. Gilligan spent a great deal of time deciding upon alternative legislative proposals and later, after his budget was submitted, he invested countless hours in working to move legislation first through the House and later through the Senate. The governor recalled that he totaled some sixty hours of his time wrestling with the shape of the foundation formula before it was submitted in the budget to the legislature.

As is shown in preceding chapters Mr. Gilligan was deeply involved in legislative affairs. As the literature pointed out when the legislature is controlled by other than the governor’s party, his leadership of legislative

^■The organizational structure was designed by Thomas Menaugh, who served as the governor's administrative assistant. Others included John C. MacDonald who was legislative assistant: Mark Shields was assistant for federal relations and was headquartered in Washington, D. C. and Robert Tenenbaum was assistant for communications. Robert Daley served as a special assistant to the governor and kept the governor's appointments. This information was provided the author by Thomas Menaugh on August 10, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 113. ^interview with the Honorable John J. Gilligan, op. cit. ! 199 affairs can be challenged. Mr. Gilligan was confronted with a hostile legislature who opposed not only his party but his policies. Gilligan evidenced no tendency or movement to threaten with use of the veto. Instead he went to the media and via publicity exerted pressure on the legislature. He noted that his use of publicity was his . .most effective tool" in moving the legislature toward approval of his proposals. Because his party was in a minority in both Houses Gilligan was forced to seek bipartisan support of his programs. As such, while he clearly differentiated between Democrat and Republican positions, he attempted to transmit i his appeals to the public across and/or above party lines. His arguments often were couched in frameworks omitting references to political parties altogether. For example his special message broadcast on August 19, 1971 contained but a single reference to each party. 2 — Gilligan's position as party leader appears to have been tested on a number of occasions. Yet evidence shows that he gave careful attention to building support among county Democrat chairmen. Despite the attempts of some labor leaders to challenge his party leadership he generally

J-Ibid.

2Gilligan, "Special Message," pp. cit. 200

was successful in maintaining the image of the top Democrat in Ohio.

Governors Gilligan and Rhodes; A Comparison

Introduction Mr. Gilligan attempted to make education a major issue in his campaign and the media cooperated in the effort by identifying him as an educator. As such it was not difficult for him to be perceived as a former professional educator who had more than a casual expertise in education affairs. That apparent perception helped to give considerable credibility to his discussion of reform of the school foundation formula and of increased funding for

* elementary and secondary schools. Along with the issue of taxes Mr. Gilligan's campaign was spearheaded by a two-pronged argument for reform in both areas. Whether or not these issues were able to rise above the larger issue of the Republican loan scandal was open to conjecture. Substantial doubt existed as to whether Mr. Gilligan would have been as successful without the loan

For example see a record of an interview conducted by the editorial staff of the Ketterinq-Oakwood Times where a series of questions was premised on reference to Mr. Gilligan's service as a college instructor. "Gilligan: Ohio Needs Change/" Ketterinq-Oakwood Times, September 13, 1970. 201

scandal's debilitation of his Republican opponent.^* The notion that increased state support of education was appropriate and needed might well have been supported by beleaguered taxpayers who apparently had reached a point where they were unwilling to approve additional millages for school district operating monies.2 To many state government1s assumption of greater funding for public schools might well have been appealing, particularly in terms of Mr. Gilligan's campaign argument that an "income O tax, carefully graduated" was a progressive tax compared to a regressive property tax. To some extent Mr. Gilligan's election perhaps was a mandate for change and reform in the tax structure and a call for increased state support of local public school districts. In light of a remarkable.difference in the political, social and economic aspects of education between 1962 and 1970 it was not surprising that the two governors approached the tasks of developing education policy in few similar ways. Yet it is critical to note that each actively became involved in education affairs. While each was

■*-Interview with John C. MacDonald, op. cit. Interview with Walter G. Hack, pp. cit. 2In Chapter IV it was reported that in May of 1970 Ohio voters rejected 90 of 175 local referenda to increase property taxes to pay for increased costs to schools. ^John J. Gilligan, Speech to the Jennings Foundation," op. cit. 202

concerned with different aspects of education it is clear that each participated in decision making which directly effected education. Administrative Chiefs In 1962 Governor Rhodes called for increased support for public elementary and secondary schools, sought support for his proposal to create a board of regents for governing the state's six universities and pledged an esqpansion of higher education institutions. Rhodes had a greater interest in higher education affairs than in matters of public elementary and secondary schools. His interest was logical in terms of his ability to greatly expand capital facilities at no cost to the general revenue fund of the i * state.A The creation of the board of regents to govern and and master plan operation and expansion of higher education facilities was in keeping with the actions of most of the

^■Rhodes' former finance director, Howard Collier, recalled that because of problems encountered in attempting to increase the percentage of the state’s share of education funds for elementary and secondary schools and because the governor was unable to exert control over local spending which increased at a rate greater than the state's increase, "Our emphasis did shift to higher education because we did have the tool kit to really do something— both massively and quickly." Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit.

./ 203 states excluding Delaware and Vermont-*- and was by most accounts a sound proposal.2 The political returns in establishing six additional four year state universities, twenty branch campuses, four community colleges and a new medical school in Toledo were measurable and manifold. Location of technical institutes, for example, became rewards for lawmakers who supported

Rhodes' legislative proposals.^ Jobs created by massive amounts of construction were tangible evidence of the success of his administration1s efforts to keep more Ohioans working. His extensive statewide construction and building program did nothing to prevent tacit labor approval of

1 ■ For a discussion of master planning in higher education among the several states see Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education (Washington: American Council on Education, 1971), especially the first three chapters, pp. 3-236. 2Interview with Oliver Ocasek, pp. cit. 2 In response to the question "Do you feel there was more of a return in your investment in higher education than in elementary and secondary schools?", Howard Collier replied "There was no question about it." Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. ^It has been reported that when Governor Rhodes' education proposals were stalled in Senator Collins' education and health committee and while the two were flying to Athens, Rhodes allegedly offered Collins a three million dollar vocational school for Ironton. Rice, pp. cit. The accuracy of that report was attested to by Howard Collier who remarked "That reference is technically correct." He continued "If he would not have, Qoffered the vocational school^ I would have. That's part of the realism of the system." Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 204

Rhodes' ideas and proposals by skilled trade union members. In 1970 Mr. Gilligan called for increased state support of elementary and secondary education and for a state income tax to finance that increase. He pledged an effort to roll back property taxes in exchange for dollars generated by the income tax. He also pledged relief for property tax payers who because of retirement were on fixed incomes2 and who represented a classification of taxpayer most victimized by the regressivity of a property tax.2 Both governors turned to their finance directors for assistance in developing policy in matters of school finance. Rhodes almost totally relied on Richard Krabach and later on Howard Collier for advice and allowed them to set spending levels for the distribution formulas for school

*Cota, pp. cit. o ^For a discussion of basic taxation principles in general and of concepts of progressivity and regressivity in tax: structures in particular see "Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Canada) 3-12, 20-22 (1966) and "Bitker, A 'Comprehensive Tax Base' As a Goal of Income Tax Reform" in Readings in Federal Taxation, ed. by Frank E. Sander and David Westfall (Mineola: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1970), pp. 219-227 and 91-152 respectively. 3The provision to alleviate taxation of property owned by retired persons is popularly called the "homestead exemption" which is a tax law deviation given effect by exempting taxation of retired persons' property to a maximum level of assessed taxable valuation. 205

funds.^ As far as can be determined neither Krabach nor Collier systematically sought information or suggestions from education interest groups except the Ohio Education

n Association. Gilligan also relied heavily on his finance director as the new foundation formula was being prepared. The nature of the process was changed considerably by the Gilligan staff in that experts in school finance were asked to provide alternative conceptual models of foundation formulas. In addition the finance department, primarily through the office of Edgar Troyer, actively sought the advice of several education interest groups who, for the most part, had seldom had entree to this particular phase

1 Interview with John Hall, pp. cit. Interview with Oliver Ocasek, pp. cit. Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 2That the Ohio Education Association became involved with school finance questions in large part was due to the fact that both Senators Collins and Ocasek were members of the Association, with Ocasek holding a seat on its executive committee and because the Rhodes administration appeared to have been satisfied with establishing appropriation spending levels and then allowing the legislature— primarily the Senate education and health committee with the support of the Ohio Education Association— to work out the details of the formula. Interview with John Hall, pp. cit. Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 206 of policy making in education. Certainly Gilligan and Rhodes differed in their attempts to establish equitable distribution of education funds. Rhodes was wedded to the notion that it was possible to adjust and locate industrial productivity and valuation to insure that the taxable wealth of the state was distributed equitably on a geographic basis.2 Gilligan proposed a state income tax and a revised, strongly equalizing school foundation formula intended to distribute education dollars on a per pupil basis.

3-It was interesting to note that it was the staff of the finance department who administered the development of the foundation formula rather them the governor's assistant for education. It was likely that Dr. Cecile did not assume coordination of its development because he did not join the staff until mid-January and because he became engrossed in handling the remarkable workload which was generated by the governor's proposed Ohio Plan. 2In his proposals entitled Solutions For the Seventies Rhodes summed up this policy, ". . .there must be one county wide tax base with each pupil sharing equally in that base. Each county must make a greater effort at industrial development to relieve the property taxes on home owners in each county." James A. Rhodes, Solutions For "the Seventies, op. cit., p. 7. 207 Both Gilligan and Rhodes, however, supported continued state support of the state's private and parochial schools.^ Both Gilligan and Rhodes argued that aid to parochial schools was a fiscally sound practice in that it saved the state a great deal of money. They suggested that it was less expensive for the state to support a pupil in a parochial school at a $150 level than to support that same pupil in a public schools at a $680 level.^ Mr. Gilligan's original proposal for state support of parochial schools involved the appropriation of salary supplements for lay teachers who taught secular subjects. With the United States Supreme Court decisions involving state assistance to parochial schools in Pennsylvania and

-*• Andy Cota reported that Rhodes ". . .has been a good friend of private and parochial schools. He secured legislation to provide nonpublic schools with bus transportation, teacher salary substitutes and visual aids and other teaching materials." Cota, pp. cit. Howard Collier concurred with Cota's remarks and recalled that "Governor Rhodes was deeply involved with the Roman Catholic bishops in the state. ..." Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. 2In the text of his budget, Governor Gilligan wrote: "We are also recommending increased support for non-public schools. These schools currently educate over 330,000 elementary and secondary children, but are on the verge of bankruptcy. The level of support proposed to allow these schools to continue is less than half of what it would cost the state alone to provide support for such pupils in public schools, and less than one fourth of what it would cost state and local taxpayers combined to support the same pupils in the public schools." The Budget of the State of Ohio, 1972-1973. op. cit., p. 26. 208

Rhode Island the administration decided to formulate a policy which would have met the latest constitutional tests.*** On July 16, 1971 David Young, counsel for the Roman Catholic Conference of Ohio, met with Mr. Gilligan and Dr. Cecile in the governor's office in The Statehouse to plan a strategy which would have circumvented litigation of Ohio's parochiaid statute and a constitutional O substitute.

federal district court in Rhode Island ruled that a Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, which provided for payment of state funds to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools resulted in excessive governmental entanglement with religion and violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp 112 (1970) In Pennsylvania the state supreme court ruled that a subsidy which constituted support to children attending nonpublic schools, not to the schools themselves, was a prohibited appropriation of public funds for support or benefit of a sectarian or private educational institution. Spears v. Honda, 449 P. 2d 130. n During the months of June, July and August no payments were being made to parochial schools and thus no court test could have been made of the statute. When the payments were to have begun in September the Ohio chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union had announced its intention to file suit to challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio law. The administration also ashed Young to insure that no applications for the aid were made so that no substance for litigation would have been possible. Conversation with Robert E. Cecile, July 16, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at pp. 52-59.

J 209 At that meeting two alternatives to the administration's salary supplement policy were discussed. One was a voucher plan to provide for the issuance of vouchers to the parents of children enrolled in parochial schools. The other was a plan to allow tax credits to parents whose children were attending private schools.^ It was decided at that meeting that among other things the voucher plan was politically more beneficial since it placed money directly into the hands of parents.^ Nevertheless Mr. Gilligan indicated that he was prepared to publicly support either plan. He also suggested that if the Roman Catholic Conference of Ohio wished him to say nothing publicly he would provide support out of the public eye as he noted his predecessor, Governor Rhodes,

-*-The notion of the "voucher plan" was based on the "child benefit" theory which allowed that public monies were not expended for private schools per se, but rather for individual children who attended those schools. Conversation with Robert E. Cecile, July 16, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 53. The administration was successful in establishing the voucher plan for parents of children attending parochial schools. Five months after the plan went into operation a three judge federal court panel struck it down as unconstitutional. The suit challenging the reimbursement practice was filed by the Ohio Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union the day the new law went into effect. The ruling prevented continuation of payment of some $61 million appropriated for the biennium. William Merriman, "Nonpublic School Tax Credit Under Study," Columbus Citizen Journal, April 8, 1972. 210 had done.**- John C. MacDonald, the governor's legislative liaison, interjected that although Governor Rhodes had quietly supported parochiaid he always had been careful to point out to the supporters of state assistance to parochial schools that he actively was working in their behalf. MacDonald was concerned that the supporters of parochiaid understood that Mr. Gilligan also was working in behalf of their cause.^ Support of Roman Catholic voters in Ohio, of course, was important to the Gilligan administration. Gilligan, himself a Roman Catholic and educated almost exclusively in parochial and church affiliated schools, was unable to carry his home county and city, both heavily Roman

^■See remarks by Howard Collier in footnote 1 on page 236. 2MacDonald's concern was prompted by mail from Toledo area Roman Catholics who were complaining that Mr. Gilligan was not supporting state assistance to parochial schools. Conversation with Robert E. Cecile and John C. MacDonald on July 19, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 57. . t 211

Catholic,^* during the gubernatorial election and the administration was anxious to build support among that constituency. They hoped that Gilligan*s support for parochiaid could be exchanged for the Ohio Roman Catholic Conference's support of the income tax proposal. Parents of parochial school students might have been more inclined

^The historical mix of partisan politics and religion has been especially onerous in Cincinnati. German Protestants, for the most part Lutherans, were a majority in Cincinnati during its very early years and it was reported that in 1817, when the first Roman Catholic priest assigned to Ohio was sent to Cincinnati, erection of a Roman Catholic church was forbidden by city ordinances. In 1841 only two Roman Catholic churches existed in Cincinnati, but because of a concentrated effort at missionary work, conversion of Protestants and openings of schools who actively solicited pupils, Roman Catholic numbers grew very: rapidly. Relatively high conversion rates and greatly increased numbers of Roman Catholic immigrants, mostly Irish, caused great alarm among Protestants and an antagonism between the two groups developed into open conflict. In the late 1840's and early 1850's differences in religious beliefs spilled over into city politics and a letter to the Cincinnati Gazette was a measure of the violent emotions which were displayed. It declared that ' the number of Roman Catholics soon would have outnumbered the Protestants and would have swept the city elections and observed that ". . .ninetenths of the people who are hired in the city are Catholic. . .driving out and superseding Protestant laborers and servants." For a detailed account of the history of churches and religious conflict in early Cincinnati see Harlow, op. cit., pp. 35-56. Also see The Ohio Guide compiled by workers of the Writers' Program of the Works Progress Administration in the State of Ohio (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 93-94.

, i \ 212

to support an income tax proposal knowing that their tax dollars were to be returned to support parochial schools.

Both Gilligan and Rhodes were interested in education, but were interested in different aspects of education. Rhodes took an active interest in higher education, primarily in regard to creation and placement of physical facilities. Evidence exists which suggests that Rhodes consulted frequently with the presidents of the state universities on matters of higher education policy, particularly appropriations. It was reported that Rhodes regarded the higher education leaders as men of goodwill and honesty. R. Dean Jauchius recalled "We had an excellent working relationship with the presidents of the * universities, although they did not like some of the things we were doing and said so. But at least we worked with them and I think that they got more from us as a consequence

■*-Often school operating millages were not approved because blocks of Roman Catholic voters, who had children enrolled in parochial schools, voted against increased taxes for schools, feeling that to approve increase taxes for public schools was to pay for services they did not receive. In cities where parochial school enrollments were high— some as high as fifty per cent— passage of school levies has been difficult, particularly in cities with relatively low industrial tax bases. This voting behavior was discussed at length by the Rev. William E. McManus, director of Catholic education for the Archdiocese of Chicago School Board, who spoke as a proponent of continued state assistance to parochial schools at the Seminar on Law and School Finance, sponsored by the University Council on Educational Administration, April 30 and May 1, 1972 in Indianapolis, Indiana. j 213 of that than if they would have had their own lobbyists in Columbus vying against each other."I Rhodes also took an active interest in developing vocational education in Ohio. Because of the information he received from his meetings with business and industrial leaders in the state relative to the fact that too many high school graduates were ill-equipped for the world of work Rhodes moved to give priority to vocational schools because, one might infer, of his over-riding belief that full employment in Ohio was a panacea for most of the state's ills. It was Rhodes' desire to see every boy and girl in the state with ". . .a diploma in one hand and a job in the other. In his last state of the state report to the combined membership of the general assembly Rhodes commented that ". . .Ohio school children have more educational opportunities than ever in the state's history, with the most advanced vocational program of any state."3 He continued "In 1963, there were only 330 students enrolled in technical education in Ohio. Today, there are 25,000

^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. 2 James A. Rhodes, Solutions For the Seventies, op. cit. 3james A. Rhodes, "Speech By Governor James A. Rhodes Before Joint Session of the 109th General Assembly," January 5, 1971, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, p. 2. 214 and the program is geared to provide for 100,000 within a few years.-*- Rhodes even went so far as to recommend changes in curriculum in secondary schools, suggesting during a speech to the Cleveland Growth Board on November 28, 1968 that it was advisable to ". . .eliminate 'general' courses in high schools and strengthen vocational and college preparatory courses."2 Rhodes also drew public attention to his interest in vocational education by well-publicized forays across the state in support of the establishment of joint vocational districts.3 in speaking on behalf of the notion of vocational education Rhodes attempted to make clear to the public school community where his priorities were in terms of appropriations for public elementary and secondary education. His public embrace of vocational education was intended to make an impact on individual school district planning, particularly in those districts whose superintendents understood that the governor had more than

•IIbid., p. 4.

^James a . Rhodes, "News Release," Ihe Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, November 28, 1968, p. 3. ^Interview with Howard Collier, op. cit. 215 a little influence in matters of school finance.1 Gilligan's interest in vocational education was not discernible in terms of his public statements or his concern with legislative policy in that regard. It was doubtful that he opposed vocational education since his Democrat constituency largely was composed of working men and women. On the other hand his background as a college level instructor in literature placed him on the "intellectual" side of a popularly conceived dichotomy between education for college and education for work. Nor was Gilligan, as was Rhodes, able to claim a working-class heritage since his father was a prominent and successful mortician in Cincinnati and Gilligan was a partner in his own successful Cincinnati insurance firm of Sauter-Gilligan Associates. Recognizing the severely limited resources of some of Ohio1s more than six hundred school districts Rhodes proposed that school districts be reorganized to conform

* primarily to county units. In his omnibus legislative package labeled Solutions For the Seventies Rhodes proposed that "By 1980 there should be 88 or less school districts, one for each county or broader area with convenient

Howard Collier recalled that Rhodes’ travels across the state in support of vocational education were part of a larger, massive public relations effort to lay groundwork for voter and legislative support for raising funds to support vocational education. Ibid. 216 attendance centers in each county. Despite his support of that idea his assertions never were translated into legislative proposals and never were submitted to the general assembly. Likewise Mr. Gilligan supported the notion that significant consolidation of school districts was necessary and imperative if increased state funding was to be utilized in a fashion where economies of scale could be brought into play. Although a policy decision in that regard never was approved with any specificity with respect to optimal numbers of school districts the governor’s staff was in general agreement that county school districts would have been highly advantageous. Unlike Rhodes Gilligan inserted a provision in his proposed school foundation formula which was intended to financially reward school district consolidations.^

^■James A. Rhodes, Solutions For the Seventies, op. cit. ^Conversations with Robert E. Cecile and Edgar Troyer, June 3, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 12. ^Specifically House Bill 402 established a penalty clause which encouraged minimal pupil enrollments of 2,000 to qualify for full state support. To school districts with enrollments of no more than 300 the governor's intent was clear. See a more complete discussion of the provisions of House Bill 402 in Chapter V.

•s * 217 While Governor Rhodes actively solicited advice and counsel of selected city school superintendents in matters of school finance and other education affairs, it was reported that he generally disregarded most of the rest of the school superintendents in the state. R. Dean Jauchius recalled that with the exceptions of selected city school superintendents Rhodes reportedly found little time to meet with other public school chiefs.-*- Rhodes also was reported to have thought that meetings with the large numbers of superintendents in the state geherally were less productive than his meeting with the small number of higher education leaders.^ Gilligan appears to have established little dialogue with the state's school superintendents. As was the case with the university presidents Gilligan directed Dr. Cecile to serve as his intermediary with the public school superintendents. A frequent visitor to Dr. Cecile's office was Paul Briggs who was superintendent of the Cleveland

■*■ Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, pp. cit 2 ibid. 218

City Schools.1 Gilligan actively promoted the involvement of public education interest groups in developing elementary and secondary education policy. Because he was faced with a Republican-controlled legislature and because he was proposing relatively sweeping changes in education and tax laws, he recognized the need for broad-based support for his ideas. Calculated involvement of those interest groups was helpful in building visible broad-based support among educators including members of boards of education, administrators and teachers. For the most part the governor was content with working through the Buckeye Association of School Administrators via Dr. Cecile and John G. Hauck, the Association's assistant executive director, to orchestrate school superintendents' support during legislative debate on his proposals. Gilligan's interest in higher education policy did not, however, lead to involvement of higher education interest"

Dr. Briggs often telephoned Dr. Cecile to advise him of developments in the Cleveland schools or to ask questions about specific legislation or to solicit the governor's or Dr. Cecile*s support of specific legislative measures. In Dr. Cecile's absence the author often took those telephone calls and on occasion met privately with Dr. Briggs when he visited Dr. Cecile's office, for example, on June 23, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 29. 219 groups.While he had no power of appointment to the state hoard of education which is a popularly elected body, he did have that power in selection of the members of the board of regents and of members of the state university boards of trustees. As such he apparently felt less compelled to develop broad-based support for his

controversial Ohio P l a n . ^

^■In his case study of the politics of financing higher education in Ohio Henderson has observed that "Neither the Governor nor any members of his staff sought to secure any input or support for this proposal from higher education administrators." He continued, "Throughout the formulation stage of the development of the Ohio Plan, agencies and organizations with higher education in the state were never consulted. The originators of the bill completely by-passed the Ohio Education Association, the Ohio College Association and the American Association of University Professors (Ohio Chapter)." John P. Henderson, "Public Higher Education Policy-Making in State Government: A Case Study of the Ohio Plan." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1972. ^Henderson has established that in the Ohio Plan Mr. Gilligan saw an opportunity to balance his call for — increased funding for elementary and secondary education with a means of decreasing the state’s appropriations commitment to higher education. According to Henderson Gilligan's intent was ". . .to search for ways to save money and to generate other financial resources." His plan simply was to institute a deferred tuition plan for public higher education as a means of reducing expenditures in the higher education portion of the budget. One of Henderson’s conclusions was that the dismal fate of the Ohio Plan was due in large measure to the administration's decision to not bring the university presidents in to consult as the Ohio Plan was being written. See especially pp. 117-120, Ibid.

./ v, * 220

It also was established that Rhodes had little formal contact with the state department of education or the chief state school officer. Rhodes infrequently consulted with the state's first superintendent of public instruction, Edward Holt, and rarely, according to nearly all accounts, sought the advice of Holt's successor, Martin Essex. Described by one of Rhodes' close aides as a "child of itself" the state department of education was viewed with considerable skepticism and was regarded as unreliable as an advisor in matters of education policy.

-^This notion was supported during an. interview with Dr. Paul Spayde who recalled that "We never knew where the governor stood. . .because he usually just turned to. . . Krabach or to the Collier element." Interview with Dr. Paul Spayde, July 20, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. This observation was supported by Howard Collier. Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. ^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. Howard Collier observed that the Rhodes administration had "... kept the state department of education at arm's length." Collier recalled a great amount of frustration in the administration's inability to exert control over the state department and its consistent lack of responsiveness and responsibility to the governor's office. He remarked, "The people within the state department of education only say something is the governor's responsibility when it is a damn hard bullet to bite, like raising taxes. . .: everything they want to give the governor is a negative policy issue— they want to have their hands free to spend the money the governor raises." Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. . 221

The Gilligan administration, especially during its first year, gave little attention to either the chief state school officer or the state department of education. Dr. Cecile was Gilligan1s primary advisor on elementary and secondary education except in matters of school finance where finance director Hovey was the governor's chief advisor. Relationships between the state department of education and the governor's office generally were amicable whenever specific requests were made by Dr. Cecile or the finance department.^ Nevertheless Dr. Essex was reported to have been somewhat uncomfortable with the governor's appointment of a staff advisor on education. The attitude of Dr. Essex appears to have been one of resignation toward the work of Dr. Cecile, but as Cecile's credentials in higher education affairs were challenged by the presidents of the state universities they were even less credible among department

One of Dr. Cecile's responsibilities involved his service as an ombudsman for persons who had encountered' • problems with the various agencies and divisions within the bureaucracy of the state department of education. Letters and telephone calls of complaint or inquiry regarding, among other things, certification practices, matters of placement of special education students and decisions about uses of school busses were regularly received by Dr. Cecile. The author often was assigned to investigate the complaints or inquiries with personnel of the state department of education and to either remedy a problem or compile specific answers to constituent questions. 2Henderson, op. cit., p. 127. of education administrators. To the chief state school officer and his staff assistants Dr. Cecile's involvement in the affairs of elementary and secondary education apparently was perceived as a violation of the ideal of an education policy making framework unsullied by partisan politics. That latent uneasiness about Dr. Cecile surfaced on the occasion of a meeting of public school superintendents from across the state which was called by Dr. Essex on August 25, 1971. The purpose of the meeting was to brief the school administrators on developments in.the Senate's work on the tax and education bills and to organize a series of meetings between groups of superintendents and their senators. Dr. Essex did not directly inform the governor's office of the meeting, but instead chose to contact Edgar Troyer in the finance department. Despite the fact that both Cecile and Troyer advised Dr. Essex that they wished to attend the meeting, Essex specifically requested that Cecile not attend, reportedly because he felt that Cecile was too well-known and that his presence might have served to inhibit what the superintendents might have wished to say.2

1Interview with Paul Spayde, op. cit. 2This account was provided by Edgar Troyer on August 24, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at pp. 135 and 137. 223 Legislative Leaders The context of a hostile legislature required that Mr. Gilligan find a chief spokesman, other than himself, for his administration's proposals. That spokesman was his finance director, Harold A. Hovey. Hovey not only was the primary spokesman for the administration, other than the governor, but also was one of the two closest advisors to the governor on most matters of policy. Administration staff members generally considered Hovey and David Sweet, director of the state's department of development, to have been of greatest influence in most of Mr. Gilligan*s policy decisions.1 Hovey was particularly effective in the adversary setting that often distinguished legislative committee hearings and won the grudging respect of many of the administration's opponents in the legislature.2 Rhodes, of course, never had the problem of an adversary relationship with either house of the legislature. Any legislator who approached opposition to his ideas was invited to . .sit around the table. . .and try to

i This observation was offered by Anne Bingle on August 19, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 126. ^Interview with John G. Hauck, op. cit. Interview with Oliver Ocasek, pp. cit. Interview with Edgar Troyer, op. cit. . i 224

reason. . . . Rhodes* aide, R. Dean Jauchius, also recalled that ", . .reapportionment occurred while we were there |i.n the governor's office] and that changed a lot of things. ..."2 The Gilligan administration also had the opportunity to reapportion the legislature in late Summer of 1971. Gilligan evidenced use of the possibility of unfavorable reapportionment to persuade selected legislators to support administration proposals.2 That reapportionment dramatically changed the context of legislative affairs where the Democrats won control of the House of Representatives and fell two seats shy of a majority in the

■^Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, pp. cit. Interview with Howard-Collier, pp. cit. 2Ibid.

2One of the selected "victims" of that reapportionment plan was Oakley Collins who was forced to choose between opposing his Senate Republican colleague, Harry Armstrong, in a primary election and giving up his Senate seat to run for a seat in the 92nd House district. His chances of winning the primary were guarded since the new 17th district included three counties where Armstrong was especially popular, while it excluded two of Collins' solid districts and left only four of his old counties, of which only his home county of Lawrence was thought to have solidly supported him. Collins who had been harassed by .. environmental protection groups for his strip-mining activities was charged with strip-mining federal forest land and the unfavorable publicity apparently served to erode some of his popularity. In the end Collins was elected as a Representative from the 92nd district and ended his tenure in the senate which had begun in 1953.

J 225 Senate. In 1970, however, Mr. Gilligan faced a House of Representatives made up of forty seven Democrats and fifty two Republicans. In the Senate Democrats held thirteen seats and the Republicans held twenty seats. In the House the administration had to muster a total of fifty votes to gain a majority and in the Senate, seventeen votes. Finding a majority in the House was somewhat easier since a greater percentage of seats in the House were occupied by Democrats.^ Gilligan also was faced with a Democrat Party not united on the administration's proposed income tax. Because of the rather consistent opposition of the Ohio AFL-CIO, led by Frank King, Gilligan was forced to seek the votes of Republican liberals in order to establish majorities in both houses. King's influence and opposition to the income tax was especially strong in the Senate where he had served as minority leader and where he was reported to have controlled at least eight of the thirteen Democrat

In the Senate 16 Democrats were elected along with 17 Republicans. In the House 58 Democrats were elected along with 41 Republicans. ^Democrats held 47 per cent of the seats in the House compared to 39 per cent of the seats in the Senate. t

226 votes.^ The Gilligan administration was required to seek compromise in regard to King's demand that the direct use exemption be repealed and in regard to Republican refusal to agree to an outright repeal of the rather substantial tax deviation which allowed manufacturers to exempt from property taxation machines and equipment used directly in 2 the manufacture or production of goods.

The issue of tax reform was closely tied to the issue of increased support for elementary and secondary education. It might be argued that one could not have existed without the other.^ Indeed increased education funding for public schools became the prime rationale for the need for a state

Mr. Gilligan met with Frank King on several occasions and notes from the "Internship Journal" indicated that Gilligan and King met in the governor's office in The Statehouse on August 25, 1971. King refused to support a compromise tax bill. King repeated labor's request that the direct use exemption be repealed before he would support a one to three per cent personal income tax. Conversation with Robert E. Cecile, August 26, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 141. __ Administration aides felt reasonably confident that at least five of the eight Democrats whose votes labor controlled favored the income tax, but would not vote for the proposal without King's approval. One strategy which the administration attempted was to convince those five that a revitalized, well-organized and well-financed state Democrat Party might have been of more benefit to them than labor's support. King, of course, threatened those eight Democrats with labor opposition in their attempts to gain re-election. Conversation with Jeffrey Rich, August 31, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 150. ^This notion was supported by John Hall. Interview with John Hall, op. cit. 227 income tax. The administration's argument almost bordered on the fallacy of circular reasoning when it intoned that with an income tax increased education spending for public schools would be made possible‘and with that increase in education appropriations an income tax was required. Party Chiefs Rhodes appointed the original eleven members of the Ohio Board of Regents in 1963 when the board was first established. The terms of the members, some of whose terms were seven years in length and some five years in length, began to expire in 1970 and Gilligan's appointments to fill those vacancies became a subject of intense interest to the higher education community, particularly the state university presidents. Because the Rhodes appointees were felt to reflect a loyalty to Rhodes politically and philosophically it was not surprising that Gilligan was anxious to appoint members to the board who reflected his ideologies.His anxiety in that regard was considerably heightened because of the very vocal opposition of the regents' chancellor, John Millet, to the Ohio Plan.^

^Conversation with Robert E. Cecile, September 2, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 153. 2 Henderson, op. cit., p. 100. Gilligan appeared to establish at least two criteria for his appointments to the board of regents as well as his appointments of members to the state universities' boards of trustees. The first was an assurance that the appointees favored the governor's notion that the recipients of the benefits of higher education should repay the state for a share of the costs of their instruction. Second Gilligan was concerned with what he perceived as a disproportionate number of individuals from the business and professional communities who served on the board of regents and on university boards of trustees. When vacancies occurred the governor attempted to appoint individuals from working-class backgrounds. His rationale for that purpose­ ful change was that state universities primarily served students from working-class backgrounds while children of business and professional types most often attended private schools. Appointments by both Gilligan and Rhodes to those boards of trustees and to the board of regents appear to ■ have been generally highly political and evidenced substantial partisan overtones. Appointments to boards of trustees and to the various commissions around the state apparently were major forms of patronage which still were

**-This notion was supported during many conversations which the author had with Dr. Cecile, including one on July 8, 1971. author, "Internship Journal," at p. 43. 229 available to the governors. While they provided little or no financial remuneration the prestige and honor which accompanied such appointments made them very much sought after by party members. For example the appointment of Dayton's ex-mayor David Hall to a vacancy on the Wright State University Board of Trustees was reported by The Journal Herald to have been a political pay-off for Hall's son, a state representative from Dayton who was described as a ". . .conscientious young Democratic legislator, loyal to the governor's programs.At that time, as the newspaper account related, Dr. Cecile officially was responsible for recommending to the governor the names of qualified candidates for vacancies on the boards of trustees of state universities. As the news story also pointed out Cecile was unaware that the appointment of Hall had been made.2 What that news story did not reveal was that Cecile's recommendations did not go straight to the governor. They first passed through the office of James Friedman who served as executive counsel to the governor and who reportedly was the highest paid staff member. Among Friedman's responsibilities was the ongoing task of

-*-McDiarmid, op. cit. ^ibid. 3 Ibid. dispensing patronage for the administration. Friedman apparently decided to appoint the elder Hall as a reward for the loyalty and support which his son had provided the administration and apparently failed to advise Cecile of that action.

Summary

In light of his primary role as number one salesman for the state of Ohio-*- Rhodes was an especially able chief administrator. He also demonstrated strength as an effective legislative leader. He enjoyed extraordinary popularity among state Republican Party members and enjoyed a prominent position in the national GOP. Governor Rhodes' commitment to establishing full employment in Ohio subsumed public education as an integral part of that larger process and motivated him to work for considerable increases in funding for education. To support that increased funding he devised a plan to reorganize the state's some six hundred school districts on the basis on roughly equal tax valuation districts, disregarding historic geographic-based boundaries. Yet his reorganization plan never was fully developed and he abandoned attempts to increase the state1s share of

Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. Interview with R. Dean Jauchius, op. cit. 231

elementary and secondary education costs in favor of expanding higher education facilities. His great interest in vocational education stemmed from his overriding thrust toward promoting full employment across the state. His conclusion that vocational education needed to enjoy a positive, worthwhile image in the eyes of the state's electorate led him to vigorously campaign in its behalf. His notion that education to prepare high school graduates for entry into four year colleges and universities monopolized curricula in most school districts led him to advocate specific changes in school programs to include education for the world of work. Administrative Chiefs In the opening months of their administrations, both Governors Gilligan and Rhodes were greatly concerned with meeting critical needs of education. Rhodes evidenced great interest in quickly moving to establish a board of regents to govern higher education institutions and to greatly expand existing post-secondary education facilities. Gilligan, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with increasing the state's support of elementary and secondary schools and with efforts to reform the state's distribution formula for school aid. 232 Each governor approached the problem of equitable distribution of state education monies. Rhodes devised a plan to reorganize school districts along economic and industrial productivity lines. * Gilligan advocated reform of the distribution system by establishing a new foundation formula. Both were acutely sensitive to the disparity in funding and spending abilities and levels among the state's school districts. Both governors supported the notion of state assistance to parochial and private schools. Rhodes initiated the inclusion of parochial school funds in the state's budget in 1965. He continued to expand the parochiaid concept to include state monies for supplies and later for teacher salary supplements. Gilligan continued to support the programs Rhodes had begun in that regard and diligently sought alternative forms of state parochiaid when federal court intervention nullified existing support laws.^- The administrative structures of both governors excluded from most policy deliberations the chief state school officers and the state department of education. Both Gilligan's and Rhodes' general disinclination to consult with the state department of education and its administrative leaders stemmed from their sense of a lack

"^See discussion of the Gilligan administration's efforts to find a constitutional form of state assistance to parochial schools at pages 207-212. 233 of appointive control over the direction and policies of the department of education. Mr. Gilligan formalized his concern in that regard by his appointment of an assistant for education affairs. Legislative Leaders Rhodes' ability to persuade the leadership of the Ohio legislature to support his ideas and proposals was extraordinary. Gilligan/ on the other hand/ was presented with an adversary setting which decreased his chances to exert strong leadership of the legislature. Both Gilligan and Rhodes capitalized on an opportunity to reapportion state legislative districts as a means of applying leverage on behalf of programs they supported. Party Chiefs Rhodes1 leadership of the Republican Party in Ohio was nearly absolute. Gilligan, however, was rather consistently challenged by members of the Democrat Party, particularly on the issue of tax reform. In regard to patronage both Gilligan and Rhodes used their powers of appointment to university boards of trustees as one means of rewarding party loyalty. CHAPTER VIII

THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN EDUCATION POLICY MAKING SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY AND PRACTICE

Summary

Introduction In Chapter I three major objectives of the case study were set down. Those objectives grew out of an unattended area in literature concerned with state government and with education policy making at the state level. Political scientists observed that the governor greatly influenced development of state policy generally. Scholars concerned with education policy making at the state level have directed their primary research interests to agencies and institutions other than the governor. Methodology _ The lack of specific literature on the involvement of state chief executives in education policy making presented the opportunity to explore generally unresearched aspects of gubernatorial behavior. The case study method was used because it permitted exploration of a large number of issues in the making of education policy* at the state level. In

234 235 focusing on the involvement of two governors in education affairs the case study served to extend the literature on education policy making at the state level. Data were gleaned from review of state documents and other reports. Testimony presented before legislative committees, gubernatorial speeches, campaign literature, press releases, pertinent papers from gubernatorial files and newspaper and periodic reports offered rich sources of data. Perusal of the Ohio Constitution and of relevant documents by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission provided valuable data, especially in regard to the formal powers of and constraints upon the governor. Much of the data for the case study was drawn from observations made during a five month internship in the office of Governor John Gilligan. In addition persons involved in the formulation of education policy in the Rhodes and Gilligan administrations were interviewed. From those interviews were generated both factual and subjective data. A total of fifteen persons were interviewed. Persons were initially selected for interviews on the basis of their reported involvement in education policy making activites under investigation. Those persons in turn occasionally identified other individuals as participants in those policy making activites.

.'( 236 Of the twenty persons contacted for interviews, five declined. Those who declined included Oakley Collins, Harold Eibling, Martin Essex, James Rhodes and James Shocknessy. Four of those individuals were identified as having played important advisory roles in the Rhodes administration. The inability to interview them presented a limitation on the case study. Framework For the Study The primary focus of the case study was directed to the governor's role in shaping education policy. Understanding the governor and his behavior within that context was basic to the purpose of the study in extending the body of relevant literature. The context of policy making was viewed in broad terms as providing general direction for specific actions, which perhaps was a more general definition than employed by other researchers. The framework for analysis and explanation of gubernatorial behavior grew out of a review of the literature on the governor. Three composite roles were assigned to the state chief executive: administrative chief, legislative chief and party leader. Those roles were assessed in light of two background variables: the political, social and economic context in which a state chief executive functioned and his definition of his gubernatorial role. 237 The framework was most useful in discerning and categorizing observed and/or reported gubernatorial behavior. It also was useful because it provided a basic means of ordering data. Nevertheless it offered little benefit in explaining gubernatorial behavior with regard to the policy outcomes which were studied. On the other hand it did provide a starting point from which to explore the topic. These explorations produced some interesting and, in some respects, unanticipated findings regarding the roles' of certain interest groups and the state department of education. Findings In terms of education policy outcomes at the state level, the governor was found to play an important role. This role was particularly important regarding broad policy questions such as establishing the board of regents or creating a new state foundation program. As policy questions became more narrow and focused, the direct involvement of the governor appeared to diminish proportionately. Yet some narrow items did come under the bead of the governor1s interest, apparently because they were critical to considerations of a greater expanse. For example Governor Gilligan evidenced keen interest in the per pupil distribution factor in the school foundation formula. That 238 interest stemmed from his belief that its use would enhance his ability to communicate what the formula did for a selected group of people. In another instance his concern with the level of state minimum teacher salary requirements reflected on the one hand a commitment to the Ohio Education Association for an increased level and on the other hand his desire to keep the average teaching salary amount at a level no higher than the labor union members' average income. The statewide political context in which each governor functioned was found to be essentially dissimilar and the social and economic circumstances of the beginning of each governor's first term was remarkably different. Within the context of statewide partisan politics# changing slowly over three decades, the politics of the education community changed rapidly. Given impetus by a wide-ranging and national politicization of social institutions, including education, a shift in political power from the higher education community to the elementary and secondary education community in Ohio occurred. That apparent shift tended to esqslain, in part, why each governor was interested in different aspects of education policy.

A chief task of the case study was to examine the role and function of the state chief executive in the development of education policy. As such the role of the interest group in the policy making process was outside the primary focus of the research effort. Yet as the data were examined it became evident that the activities of Governor Gilligan in support of the per pupil factor in the Senate version of the school foundation formula were significantly constrained by efforts of two interest groups— the Ohio Education Association and the Ohio AFL - CIO. The Ohio Education Association was singularly influential in the Senate’s deliberations on the foundation formula and the Ohio AFL - r CIO was deeply involved in the Senate's deliberations on the question of tax structure. In order to influence the work of the Senate on the foundation formula, it was apparent that Governor Gilligan had to seek accommodation with the interests of the Ohio Education Association. At no time in the Senate's work on the education bill did the administration enjoy operational control over the rewriting of the foundation formula. Such control was shared between Senators Collins and Ocasek and John Hall. The effective working relationship which existed between Collins and Ocasek and their trust and confidence in Hall and their reliance on him for technical data and information forged a formidable alliance distinguished by a closed membership.

^Mr. Gilligan's actions in this regard were consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter II, especially that by Iannaccone and Bailey, et. al. 240

Hall served as an intermediary between Collins and Ocasek and the administration and the other education interest groups. In that capacity he acted to call meetings between the administration staffers and himself, between the other interest group representatives and himself and established agendas for those meetings. His currency with Collins and Ocasek was sound which allowed him to orchestrate the actions of the interest group representatives and of administration staffers. Hall used the per pupil distribution factor as a quid pro quo in bargaining over other elements in the formula in which he was interested. As a representative of a teachers* organization he was concerned that funding levels were substantially higher than in past appropriations bills. He also was concerned that minimum salary schedules for teachers were increased'1’ and that mandated staffing ratios were low enough to insure that school districts were required to employ adequate numbers of teachers.

-*-The annual state convention of the Ohio Education Association had approved a $7000 base for a beginning teacher with no experience for a state minimum and the Association's executive committee had approved the same figure. Thus Hall was required to publicly support and work for the $7000 base, although he reported that he was working for a base of around $6500. The bill1s final base was $6400. Interview with John Hall, op. cit. Hall exchanged his support of the per pupil factor in return for increased state salary minimums and for low staffing ratios and for increased appropriations. At any time that the administration or the education interest groups' leaders appeared to retreat from their commitments to Hall regarding minimum staffing and salary levels, Hall threatened to persuade Collins to write the formula with a per unit distribution factor. What David Martin of the Ohio School Boards Association described as "blackmail" was a successful strategy and in the end Hall was supported on the staffing and salary reguirements which he sought. What the administration and the interest group representatives apparently did not realize was that privately Hall was unconcerned with the matter of the distribution factor. Hall recalled that he never had argued with either Collins or Ocasek on the matter of a per unit or a per pupil factor. His reported advice to them was that the nature of the factor was not important.^" Hall's concerns were not with how the foundation monies were distributed— on the basis of individual pupils (per pupil) or on the basis of groups of pupils (classroom teacher units with a maximum ratio of one professional to every thirty students)— but on the total dollar increase to school districts. As long as Rep. Murdock and Senators 4

1 Ibid. 242 Collins and Ocasek remained committed to the notion that class sizes (teacher/pupil ratios) had to be controlled and that the training and experience of teachers had to be a factor in their salaries, Hall was unconcerned with what kind of distribution factor was written into the formula. Without their continued support of those two items, however, Hall would have had to have openly and vigorously opposed the per pupil factor because the per teacher unit factor protected teachers from overloaded classrooms. In the end Hall succeeded in writing into the formula penalties for those districts whose teacher/pupil ratios dropped below thirty five professional staff members per one thousand students. As Hall1s influence in shaping the Senate version of the school foundation formula suggests, the education groups played substantial roles in determining the composition of the foundation plan. On matters of salary and staffing minimums they were especially successful. Another factor in the formula which the interest groups successfully implanted was a modification of additional aid for school districts with substantial numbers of children who

i Hall was especially concerned that some sort of control over class size be written into the foundation formula because, according to Hall, when school districts received state monies on a flat per pupil basis, they reduced salary expenditures by increasing class sizes to fifty or sixty pupils and, in Hall's words, ", . .just made money off of them." Ibid. 243 were recipients of aid for dependent children funds. As a matter of process the interest group representatives were at odds on the issue of additional aid to those urban school districts. Any restriction on the use of that additional aid money generally was opposed by the representative of the school boards and of the superintendents because those groups naturally sought maximum flexibility in utilizing state funds. Hall, as a representative of a teachers' group, was a vigorous proponent of the control of those funds and advocated categorical uses of them. Nonetheless both sides agreed upon control of funds because Senator Collins opposed the additional aid to cities entirely and agreement among the interest groups was required to present to Collins a united front. Their success in that regard was evident in Collins' willingness to include half of the amount approved by the House in the Senate's version of the bill. Without their agreement Collins might1well have omitted it entirely. Certainly the Ohio Education Association exerted the most influence of the education interest groups. Not only did John Hall represent numerically the largest membership, he also was supported by a well financed and extensive staff and facilities. Hall also had the advantage of his association's endorsement of the candidacy of Mr. Gilligan who in return gave his commitments to minimum state

. '( \ * 244 teaching salaries.1 Hall also had the advantage of being able to personally make decisions and commitments while John G. Hauck and David Martin always had to consult with their respective executive committees before they were able to support or oppose any items of importance. The state department of education was least influential of the groups involved in writing the Senate's version of the school foundation formula. The evident rancor between the state department of education and the Ohio Education Association contributed in part to apparent competition between the two agencies for influence with the administration and the legislature. A consensus of most of those involved in developing education policy in Columbus indicated that the state department often was enibarassed by an inability to provide information and data for legislators when the Ohio Education Association enjoyed a reputation for providing quick and accurate information and computer print outs whenever they were requested. Despite his concern for retention of the per pupil distribution factor the bulk of Mr. Gilligan's time and effort was given to searching for a way to break the impasse

^ a l l reported that Mr. Gilligan had been interviewed by the Ohio Education Association prior to the gubernatorial campaign by the Association's executive committee. During that interview Gilligan reportedly told the executive committee members that he would support increases in the state minimum salary schedule to a base of between $6500 and $7000. Ibid. Interview with Jay Tepper, op. cit. 245 which prevented Senate approval of the income tax

"I proposal. As one of the Gilligan staff assistants commented "There weren't ten people in the state who knew how the formula worked. . .; he wasn't going to lose or gain any votes by going per pupil or per unit. The political gain or loss was in the overall dollars for education."2 Gilligan's legislative liaison, John C. MacDonald, observed that in regard to the administration's preference of the per pupil distribution factor ". . .we held out for changes we proposed about as long and hard as we could and it finally got down to the fact that. . .we weren't going to get anything if we didn't back off and we did."3

That the passage of the income tax proposal was the priority item of legislation for which Gilligan sought approval was noted by Henderson in his case study of the Ohio Plan., Henderson, op. pit., p. 108. All of the persons interviewed for the instant case study concurred with the observation of John Hall who commented "The big fight was not over how much they were going to put into education, but how they were going to raise it. . . ." Interview with John Hall, pp. pit.

3Interview with Jay Tepper, pp. cit. 3Interview with John C. MacDonald, pp. cit. Conclusions

The first objective of the case study was to explore uncharted areas which lav between literature on the governor and reports by researchers who focused on education policy making in states, including Ohio. Study findings support the conclusion that Governors Gilligan and Rhodes were directly involved with certain matters of education policy. Data and evidence reviewed in Chapters III and IV suggested that Rhodes, who was governor in 1968, was actively involved in education. Rhodes was at the center of activity which led to the creation of a board of regents, to the e^qpansion of the state's higher education system and to the establishment of vocational education as a vital component of Ohio's comprehensive education program. It also was established that well before 1968 Rhodes was publicly involved in education affairs and campaigned for re-election in 1966 on the advancements he had made in meeting what he perceived to have been Ohio1s education needs. Considerable evidence was presented which suggested that the governor's office assumed a leadership role in education policy making. It actively solicited information and data about specific education questions. As in other policy areas Rhodes' office guided legislative consideration 247 of education matters. A review of data presented in Chapters V and VI also clearly demonstrates the involvement of Governor Gilligan in education affairs. Mr. Gilligan evidenced a consistent commitment to reform of the funding pattern for public schools. He provided sustained leadership for his proposals to reform Ohio’s system of school finance to make it equitable and to support that financing with a graduated, personal state income tax. Little evidence was discovered which would indicate that the state department of education or the chief state school officer played a major role in developing the policies which were studied. It has been established that the Ohio Education Association served the legislature, particularly the Ohio Senate, in a staff support function and in so doing appeared to displace the state department of education in that regard.^- Considerable evidence was presented which underscored Governor Rhodes' disinclination to consult with the chief state school officer and his staff's reluctance to involve the state department of education in policy matters which effected education. This

^Howard Collier perhaps summed up best the observations of most of the interviewees when he noted that "The OEA in the past eight years has served a staff function for the Ohio General Assembly, instead of the state department of education." Interview with Howard Collier, pp. cit. 248 circumstance tended to confirm the findings of Thad Beyle who reported that a constraint under which a majority of the governors he surveyed appeared to chafe the most was a lack of appointive power over important departments.^- The second objective of the case study was to examine the gubernatorial behaviors of Gilligan and Rhodes and to compare the behaviors of the two governors in relation to education questions. Evidence suggested that both Governors Gilligan and Rhodes commenced their service as Ohio chief executive in a fashion intended to clearly distinguish them from their predecessors. Rhodes' initial action as governor involved his immediate implementation of an austerity plan which he alleged was required to right the fiscal imbalance caused by the DiSalle administration's excessive over-spending. One of Governor Gilligan's first decisions involved his rejection of a continuation budget prepared by the outgoing Rhodes administration in favor of a new and substantially increased budget which was based on an income tax and which contained a revised school aid formula. Evidence suggested that Rhodes was an extremely able administrative chief. His extensive prior service in state and local government prepared him well for the task of being governor. Most reports and observations indicated that he

^See footnote 2 on page 17. 249

was sensitive to the bureaucratic structures of government and was shillful in motivating the departments under his

control to perform well. Because of the relatively short tenure of Governor Gilligan little reported evidence was available regarding his abilities as Ohio’s administrative chief. Gilligan brought together an efficient and smoothly functioning executive staff. He also drew heavily on the academic world for his cabinet and staff appointments. As legislative leader Rhodes achieved remarkable success. He enjoyed a legislature dominated by his political party. His understanding of the legislative process and his personal interaction with legislative leaders and committee chairmen enabled him to exercise substantial control over the work of the general assembly. Governor Gilligan, on the other hand, encountered a hostile legislature where his party was in a minority. Mr. Gilligan generally was somewhat removed from members of the legislature and appeared to rely upon his legislative liaison and his deputy in working with the general assembly. Evidence suggested that the Gilligan administration generally was able to exert more influence with members of the House of Representatives fhan with the Senate membership. 250 As party chief Rhodes was immensely successful. He enjoyed extraordinary popularity among Ohio Republicans and his record pluralities in 1962 and 1966 served to enhance his strong position in the national GOP. His position as party chief substantially increased his influence in legislative affairs. As party chief Gilligan*s position was much less secure. While he was the visible spokesman for the Democrat Party in Ohio evidence suggested that he was, on occasion, challenged in his leadership role. Nevertheless he led efforts to elect Democrat candidates to the Ohio House and Senate in 1972 and was successful to the point that Democrats gained control of the House— in a presidential election year when Ohio gave heavy pluralities to Richard Nixon. In regard to Rhodes1 executive behavior in relation to education questions, his commitment to promoting full employment in Ohio was a primary reason for his involvement in education policy. Evidence suggested that Rhodes was convinced that it was the state1s responsibility to provide both a favorable tax climate for business and industry and to provide that business and industry with well educated and/or well trained employees. His active support of vocational education and his campaigns for establishment of joint vocational school districts across the state were 251 tangible evidence of his commitment in that regard. Rhodes also was actively involved in efforts to establish a board of regents to govern Ohio's state universities. A major component of his 1962 gubernatorial campaign was his call for a board of regents and for an expansion of the state's post-secondary education institutions. The physical reality of six additional state universities along with scores of technical institutes and community colleges is testament to his commitment as governor toward providing higher education facilities to meet the needs of the state. Apparently no less vigorous was Governor Gilligan's commitment to increasing the state's support of public elementary and secondary education. Gilligan was instrumental in articulating need to reform the state school foundation formula in an effort to distribute education appropriations more equitably among the state's some 600 school districts. He also provided direction and leadership— both as a candidate for governor and as governor— in the development and implementation of that concept.

./ \ * 252 The third objective of the case study was to document the activities of Governor Gilligan in the development of a segment of school foundation formula legislation and to analyze and explain his executive behavior in terms of resources he brought to bear and his means of applying them. An overview of the development of the school foundation formula was presented which provided evidence that as a candidate Mr. Gilligan made decisions which determined the initial thrust of the new formula. Other evidence suggested that at each critical point in the foundation formula's development Gilligan made important decisions about alternatives in its shape and scope. As a candidate, as governor-elect and as governor he played an active role in shaping the school foundation formula. He articulated the initial concept of equalization of state expenditures to insure equity in education opportunity as measured in expenditures per pupil which was the framework upon which the school foundation formula was built. Gilligan clearly made the initial decision to reform the foundation formula by changing the per unit distribution factor to a per pupil distribution factor. Gilligan also translated his concept of the essential function of state government into concrete legislation by proposing substantial increases in state funding of elementary and secondary education. 253 Gilligan was consistently and strongly supportive of an initial and continued inclusion of the per pupil distribution factor in the foundation formula. From the initial discussions about alternative formulas to day to day laboring with the leadership of the legislative committees, Gilligan was personally committed to the per pupil factor. He was pivotal in its support and had he decided, at any point in the process, to "retain the per unit distribution factor, the per pupil factor likely would have been quickly abandoned altogether. The administration's efforts on behalf of its proposals for education and tax legislation generally were productive in the deliberations by committees in the House of Representatives. A greater Democrat percentage in the House and generally younger and relatively inesqperienced committee and subcommittee chairmen helped the administration to retain much of its fundamental and reform- oriented proposals. As has been pointed out in Chapter V the basic structure of the foundation formula emerged from the House almost intact. The general openess of the House

The chairman of the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, Norman A. Murdock, had served only three terms for a total of six years and as chairman of the committee was in his first year of its membership. Rep. John A. Galbraith, chairman of the subcommittee on education for the House Committee on Finances and Appropriations, had served only two terms for a total of four years. Neither Galbraith nor Murdock had held previous elective office.

. / 254 deliberation and committee work enabled the administration to play a generally directive and initiatory role. In the Senate, however, the administration confronted seasoned veterans of the legislature many of whom had amassed considerable personal stature and power, The administration also encountered a tradition of deliberation characterized by an air of assumed legislative professionalism ensconced in senatorial convention. Where it had initiated bold, offensive action with members of the House of Representatives, the fragile alliance of the Senate1s liberal Democrats and Republicans caused the administration to move cautiously and to assume a less aggressive posture.'*’

Implications For Further Study

Hopefully this case study will serve as a point of departure for continued research into the dynamics which appear to constitute the making of education policy at the state level of government. This research effort attempted to view the process of making policy and its component events and circumstances as a whole and made an effort to identify and examine broad patterns of interaction. Thus perhaps it will be of some interest to other researchers to select and analyze individual variables which appear to

■^Interview with John C. MacDonald, op. cit. 255 have impinged on the development of education policy. For example research into the interrelationships among the several education interest groups and the constituencies which they represented might be helpful in determining the motivations for their coalition on some items of education policy and in explaining their separation on others. A measure of their collective impact on the policy making process also might be helpful in achieving a more complete understanding of how education policy is developed in Ohio. Within the context of the effects of education interest groups on education policy in state government, a clearer understanding of the role of the state department of education and the chief state school officer in that policy making process might be helpful. This case study alludes to what appeared to have been a generally minor role for that agency. An indepth study of its role during the same time frame covered in the instant research effort or in a different context might be helpful in establishing a more precise notion of its conceptual and actual role. The relationship of the state department of education to the office of the governor also might be of interest to researchers in education. This case study observes that one of the causes for both Governors Gilligan's and Rhodes' apparent disinclination to include the state department of

i 256

education and its personnel in many of their deliberations on education affairs seemed to stem from their sense of powerlessness in providing direction to that agency. A closer examination of some governors' lack of appointive power over state department of education might serve to substantiate whatever impact, or lack of impact, state education agencies have in matters of education policy. In addition a close examination of the role of the governor in relatively narrow education policy questions might be in order. For example study of the extent to which, if any, he influences matters of teacher certification or issues of the state's minimum curricular requirements would serve to more carefully define his behavior in education affairs. Another possible item of research interest might be the extent to which the governor interjects himself into matters of racial desegregation of professional staff and students in school districts which serve minority groups. Another item of research interest perhaps might include a closer examination of the apparent shift in the power relationship within Ohio's education community in Ohio. As a result the study suggests that much of higher education's power was transferred to public elementary and secondary education. Research into this apparent phenomenon perhaps would be helpful in explaining in part why participants in 257 the policy making process generally behaved as they did. In regard to the larger question of the process of making education policy at the state level in Ohio another comparable study of Mr. Gilligan in a different context or of another governor in Ohio perhaps would be helpful in establishing a more complete base from which to draw generalizations. It might be of research interest, for example, to trace the involvement of Ohio's chief executive in education affairs over a longer period of time. It also might be of value to review the actions of Governors Bricker, DiSalle, Lausche or O'Neill in that regard. In an effort to expand the study of gubernatorial activity in education policy making another research effort might include a comparable examination(s) of governors of different states. Perhaps selection of those states could be based on comparability in governmental structure and organization or commonality in gubernatorial powers and/or perogatives. Such a comparison perhaps would be helpful in establishing a broader perspective of the governor's role in making education policy. 258

Implications For Practice

The critical role of education interest groups in the observed policy making process was underscored. Education interest groups present to the practitioner a clear point of entry into the bargaining over education policy items and priorities. In issues of elementary and secondary education their number is small and their constituencies clearly defined. The transfer of power from higher education interests to those of public elementary and secondary schools portends increased influence on the part of public school lobbyists. Utilization of the potential power that is accruing to the public school interests may require increased budgets and association expenditures. It also may necessitate increased overt political activity. In the past— and presently to a great extent— the number of persons who shaped education policy has been small— often no more than a dozen. Increased power and activity may serve to bring additional participants into the process. Additional numbers of participants may serve to widen the scope of the interest groups and may broaden the issues of education policy determined by state government. Thus it may be that educators interested in shaping policy outcomes will need to forge new and more diverse coalitions 259 than have existed in the past. Finally to individuals who seek to influence education policy at the state level, the findings of this case study suggest that the governor's office plays an important role in the policy making process. Without question the governor and his staff are deeply involved in education affairs and leadership in that regard. The governor and his staff thus represent a potentially important point of entry into the process of shaping education policy at the state level. APPENDIX A

Interview Schedule For the Gilligan Administration

1. What do you expect the role of the governor in education policy making to he? 2. Who should bear primary responsibility for the formulation of education policy at the state level? 3. What is the proper role for the state department of education in matters of state education policy? Of the education interest group? 4. Would you relate the chronology of the development of the school foundation formula from the time it was conceptualized to its enactment into law? What was your role in that entire process? 5. What did you perceive to be the governor's role in the development of the school foundation formula? 6. What did you perceive to be his specific aims and goals in regard to that formula? 7. Who were the individuals involved in the formulation and development of the school foundation formula? 8. Who was most influential in thp development of the formula? 9. Who was responsible for the re-inclusion of the per unit factor instead of the per pupil factor in the Senate Education Subcommittee's final version of the formula? 10. What was John Hall's medium of exchange in the bargaining over the per pupil factor? 11. What was the political capital which Mr. Gilligan had to expend in support of a per pupil factor? 12. What were the trade-offs among the education interest groups?

260 261

13. What exchange was Oakley Collins willing to accept in return for an eaqpanded education appropriation figure? 14. What kind of exchange was made between Oliver Ocasek and Oakley Collins? Between Mr. Ocasek and Mr. Gilligan? APPENDIX B

Interview Schedule For the Rhodes Administration

1. What position did you occupy in the Rhodes administration and what role did you play? How long did you serve in the Rhodes administration? 2. What do you expect the role of the governor in education policy making to he? 3. Who should bear primary responsibility for the formulation of education policy at the state level? 4. What is the proper role for the state department of education in matters of state education policy? Of the education interest group? 5. To what extent did Governor Rhodes involve himself directly into education policy making? If his primary involvement was in developing the school foundation formula, was there any other elementary and secondary education policy making in which he was active? 6. In 1968 Rhodes proposed his "Solutions for the Seventies" program in which were found elements of basic change in elementary and secondary education, i.e. school district reorganization on a county and multi-county basis. He remarked, "I intend to use my personal influence and my position of Governor to enact the initial phases of this massive program into law.11 What did he mean by that and how would he have played out his pledge? 7. Who were Governor Rhodes1 chief advisors on matters of education policy? To what extent did Mr. Rhodes depend upon the state department of education for advice? Upon interest groups— OEA, OSBA, BASA? 8. In his 1967 "state of the state" address to the general assembly Governor Rhodes iterated that "Education must remain a number one priority of this administration and the General Assemby." Had it been the number one priority and did it continue to be for the rest of his term?

262

i 263

9. Did John McElroy record the governor's position on legislation in a little black book called the "red light - green light" book? 10. Joe Rice in an article entitled "The Rhodes Years" referred to Governor Rhodes' "wheeling and dealing" with legislators while publicity maintaining he never interfered. In reference to his "pork barrel" politics, Rice related an incident in 1969 when Governor Rhodes' education proposals were stalled in the Senate Education and Health Committee, chaired by Oakley Collins. While the two were flying to Athens, Rhodes reportedly offered Collins a $3 million vocational school for Ironton. Was this typical of Governor Rhodes1 involvement in education policy making? 11. When he was first elected Mr. Rhodes pledged to reverse and upgrade to 50% the state's 30% participation in support of elementary and secondary education. He did not achieve the 50%; the state's contribution when he left office remained around 30%. Why did he not fulfill that pledge? 12. Governor Rhodes spoke many times on the necessity of equalizing education expenditures across the state. How sensitive was he to the issue of equal educational opportunity in terms of allocations of state monies? 13. Who, as director of finance, undertook to study problems of elementary and secondary education which Mr. Rhodes referred to in his "Solutions for the Seventies" proposals? What was the result of that study? APPENDIX C

List of Persons Interviewed

Dr. Robert E. Cecile, Assistant to the Governor for Education, May 24, 1973, Columbus, Ohio. Howard Collier, former Director of Finance, Ohio Department of Finance, April 19, 1973, Toledo, Ohio. The Honorable John J. Gilligan, Governor, State of Ohio, May 24, 1973, Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Walter G. Hack, Professor of Educational Administration, The Ohio State University, July 13, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. John G. Hauck, Executive Director, Buckeye Association of School Administrators, July 17, 1973, Columbus, Ohio. John Hall, Director of Governmental Relations, Ohio Education Association, July 27, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. Edward E. Holt, former Ohio State Superintendent of Public Instruction, December 12, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Harold A. Hovey, former Director of Finance, Ohio Department of Finance, July 28, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. Dr. R. Dean Jauchius, former aide to Governor Rhodes, June 8, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. __ John C. MacDonald, former legislative liaison to Governor Gilligan, December 13, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. David Martin, Executive Director, Ohio School Boards Association, July 24, 1972, Columbus, Ohio.

264

/ 265

Senator Oliver Ocasek, 27th District of Ohio, December 13, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Paul Spayde, Assistant Superintendent, Ohio Department of Education, July 20, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. Jay Tepper, Budget Director, Ohio Department of Finance, December 12, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. Edgar Troyer, former budget analyst in Ohio Department of Finance, June 29, 1972, Columbus, Ohio. APPENDIX D

Schools Requesting Audit for Closing November 11, 1971

City School Districts

Bellaire Gallon City Bowling Green Mansfield Claymong North Royalton Dayton Sidney Findlay Urbana Fostoria Wilmington Franklin

Exempted Village School Districts Caldwell Newton Falls Clyde Yellow Springs

Local School Districts Ansonia Northmont Arlington Northmor Beavercreek Northwest Coventry Ostego C . R . Coblentz Preble-Shawnee Eastwood South Central Elmwood Southeastern Highland Southwest Indian Creek Lake Local Parkway

SOURCE: Ohio State Department of Finance/ "Schools Requesting Audit for Closure/" Finance Department Files, November 10, 1971, Columbus, Ohio.

266 APPENDIX E

Calculation Form to Determine Aid to a Single District Based on Provisions of Amended Substitute House Bill 531. 108th General Assembly

Approved Classroom Units ADM* Legend Divisor Number of Units 1. __ Kindergarten 60 ______2. ___ Grades 1 - 12 30 '______2A. ___ 1 and 2 Teacher Schools ______3.______Vocational Units______4. ___ Deaf* Blind, Emot. Disturbed, Neurologically Handicapped, Crippled ______5. ___ Educable Mentally Retarded ______6. Speech and Hearing Units ______7. Child Study Units ______8. Total ______9. Administration and Special Instruction Line 8/8______10. Supervision Line 8, 1st 50/50 — Excess of 50/100 ______11. ___ Total ADM and Approved Classroom Units

"average daily membership"

267 268

State Support Calculations

Number Calculation Minimum Cumulative Employed Based On Training Salary Years 12. ______Master $5700+____ x $250 ___ 13. ______5 Yrs W/0$5400+____ x $225_____ 14. ______Masters Bachelors$5200+ x $200____ 15. ______Less Than Bachelors$4500+ x $180 ___ 16. ______Total Allowance for Certified Salaries ______17. Line 16 x 13% ______18. Approved Extended Service + 13% ______19. Line 16 Column B x $2625 ______20. Transportation______21. Total— Lines 16, 17, 18,- 19 and 20______22. 17.5 Mill on Tax Valuation of ______23. Basic State Support— Line 21 Minus Line 22 Plus $1000 x Units on Lines 3,4 and 5 > ______24. Line 16 Column B x $3400 Plus $1000 on Lines 3,4,and 5 ______25. Reppraisal Guarantee Plus $425 x 16B______26. Consolidation Guarantee______27. 1968-1969 Gurantee______28. Total State Support— Largest of Lines 23, 24, 25, 26 or 27 ______APPENDIX F

Calculation Form to Determine Aid to a Single District Based on Provisions of House Bill 402, 109th General Assembly

ADM* (A) Basic Program

Kingergarten x $340 (Excluding pupils on lines 5 and 6) $ Grades 1 - 12 x $680 (Excluding pupils on lines 3/5 and 6) $ (B) Special Needs Program Vocational x $1500 (Full-time equivalent pupils in vocational programs) AFDC pupils/ ages 5 - 17 x $650 (Including pupils counted on lines 1 z 2/3,5 and 6) $ Educable mentally retarded x $1375 $ Deaf/ blind, crippled, emotionally disturbed, and neurologically handicapped x $1365 $ Pupil transportation $ Approved extended service $ Adjustment for number, training, and experience of teachers $ Total ADM (lines 1,2,3,4,5 and 6) $ average daily membership" 270

11.. Total education program costs (Sum of amounts on lines 1-9) (C) Local Effort and State Support 1 2 . 25 mills x tax valuation of $______13. County income tax distribution $_ 14. Basic state support (lines 11 minus 12 and 13) $_ 15. Guarantees for reappraisal and consolidation $_ 16. Total state support (larger of lines 14 and 15) $ APPENDIX G

Members of Committee on Health, Education and Welfare Ohio House of Representatives 109th General Assembly

David D. Albritten, Republican, 85th district, Montgomery County John O. Baker, Republican, 31st district, Homes, Coschocton and part of Tuscarawas Counties Morris L. Boyd, Vice-chairman, Republican, 73rd district, Summit County Kenneth B. Creasy, Republican, 18th district, Delaware, Morrow, Knox and part of Richland Counties Michael DelBane, Democrat, 99th district, Trumbull County Claude M. Fiocca, Democrat, 95th district, Summit County Phale D. Hale, Democrat, 63rd district, Franklin County Robert W. Jaskulski, Democrat, 45th district, Cuyahoga County Casey Jones, Democrat, 78th district, Lucas County Doris J. Jones, Republican, 62nd district, Franklin County — Thomas R. Kindness, Republican, 40th district, Butler County Don S. Maddox, Democrat, 25th district, Fairfield, Hocking and Vinton Counties Frank H. Mayfield, Jr., Republican, 67th district, Hamilton County

271 272 Norman A. Murdock, Chairman, Republican, 70th district, Hamilton County Jack P. Oliver, Republican, 3rd district, Darke, Preble,and part of Mercer Counties Donald J. Pease, Democrat, 75th district, Lorain County Gertrude E. Polcar, Republican, 51st district, Cuyahoga County James E. Rankin, Democrat, 69th district, Hamilton County John M. Scott, Republican, 10th district, Greene County Sam Speck, Republican, 29th district, Guernsey, Morgan, Noble,and Washington Counties Ethel G. Swanbeck, Republican, 14th district, Erie and Huron Counties John G. Sweeney, Democrat, 54th district, Cuyahoga County

The committee was composed of thirteen Republican members and eight Democrat members. APPENDIX H

Members of Education Subcommittee of Committee on Finance and Appropriations Ohio House of Representatives 109th General Assembly

John A. Galbraith, Chairman, Republican, 76th district, Lucas County David L. Headley, Democrat, 96th district, Summit County Joseph F- Hiestand, Republican, 20th district, Madison, Fayette, Highland and Adams Counties William E. Hinig, Democrat, 32nd district, Harrison, Carroll and part of Tuscarawas Counties Robert E. Levitt, Republican, 91st district, parts of Stark and Summit Counties William H. Mussey, Republican, 12th district, Clermont and Brown Counties Mack Pemberton, Republican, 61st district, Franklin County Walter A. Rutkowski, Democrat, 57th district, Cuyahoga County Myrl Shoemaker, Democrat, 21st district, Pickaway and Ross Counties Sam Speck, Republican, 29th district, Guernsey, Morgan,. Noble and Washington Counties Ethel G. Swanbeck, Republican, 14th district, Erie and Huron Counties

The subcommittee was composed of seven Republicans and four Democrats.

273 APPENDIX I

Abilitv-Effort Measures In Ohio School Districts. 1969-71

Table 1 Assessed Valuation Per Pupil, City Districts, 1970-71 Low - Brunswick $ 6,324.00 High - Lockland 91,758.00

Table 2 Assessed Valuation Per Pupil, All Districts, 1970-71* Low - Huntington Local (Ross Co.) $ 3,092.00 Weighted Mean 16,419.00 High - Middle Bass (Ottawa Co.) 155,661.00 Cuyahoga Heights (Cuyahoga Co.) 183,279,00

Table 3 Total Current Esqpenses Per Pupil, City Districts, 1969-70 Low - Circleville $ 485.00 Mean 719.00 High - St. Bernard 1.050.00 Shaker Heights 1.189.00 Beachwood 1.093.00

274 Table 4 Total Current Expenses Per Pupil, All Districts, 1969-70 Low - Maysville (Muskingum Co.) $ 413.00 Brown (Carroll Co.) 444.00 Mean 670.00 High - Kelly's Island (Erie Co.) 1,685.00 Middle Bass (Ottawa Co.) 1,505.00 Bratenahl (Cuyahoga Co.) 1,436.00 Cuyahoga Heights (Cuyahoga Co.) 1,483.00

Table 5 Assessed Valuation Per Pupil and School Tax Rates, Selected Ohio School Districts (1970 Property Tax Rates, Payable in 1971) Assessed Tax Rates Total School . Valuation Current All School All District Per Pupil Expenses Purposes Purposes

St. Bernard $ 78,578 19.41 20.54 31.90 Cuyahoga Heights 183,279 9.10 11.60 29.70 Kyger Creek 87,420 37.61 45.60 68.90 Chagrin Falls 13,954 44.30 53.40 76.10 Kirtland 13,477 44.50 48.40 65.70 Portsmouth 14,145 24.36 27.65 45.00 New Boston 78,685 10.81 11. 21 24.60 Median School District 12,576 27.55 32.30 43.70 Weighted Mean 16,419 29.71 34.35 48.28

SOURCES: *Basic Financial Data of Ohio School Districts, 1971, Ohio Education Association Research Report, February, 1971.

-J- -JT- Costs Per Pupil in Average Daily Membership in Ohio's City, Exempted Village and County School Districts From July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970. State Department of Education, Columbus, Ohio, 1970. APPENDIX J

Members of Committee on Education and Health Ohio Senate 109th General Assembly

Stanley J. Aronoff, Republican, 8th district, Hamilton County Oakley C. Collins, Chairman, Republican, 18th district, Athens, Gallia, Jackson, Lawrence, Meigs, Pike and Scioto Counties Tennyson Guyer, Republican, 2nd district, Allen Auglaize, Hancock, Hardin, Paulding, Putnam, Van Wert and part of Mercer Counties Donald E. Lukens, Republican, 4th district, Butler, Darke, Preble,and part of Mercer Counties M. Morris Jackson, Democrat, 21st district, Cuyahoga County Oliver Ocasek, Democrat, 27th district, Summit County John Poda, Democrat, 28th district, parts of Stark and Summit Counties Clara E. Weisenborn, Vice-chairman, Republican, 5th district, Montgomery County

276 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Harlow, Alvin F. The Serene Cincinnatians. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950.

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Spears v. Honda, 449 P. 2d 13 0.

William Fruit v. Metropolitan School District of Westchester, 172 N.E. 2d 864 (1961).

Documents

Bingle, Anne. "Minutes of May 19, 197 0 Meeting of Task Force on Educational Policy," Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio.

Gilligan for Governor Campaign. "The Candidate's Position," published campaign document, Gubernatorial Files,... The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio.

Gilligan, John J. The Budget of the State of Ohio. 1972- 1973. The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, March 15, 1971.

Hack, Walter G. "New Foundation Formula," from the files of Walter G. Hack, undated.

______. Testimony Presented to House Committee on Finance and Appropriations, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, April 22, 1971, from the files of Walter G. Hack. "Memorandum from Robert E. Cecile, Assistant to the Governor for Education, to Legislative Candidates, Subject: Education in Ohio." Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, Fall, 1972.

News Release. Office of the Governor, Thursday, November 11, 1971, Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio.

Ohio AFL-CIO. focus. Columbus, Ohio, November, 1967.

Ohio Department of Education. Press Release, December 10, 1971.

Ohio Education Association. Legislative Report, Columbus, Ohio, August 5, 1971.

Ohio Legislative Service Commission. "Duties and Functions of the Governor," Committee to Study Staffing of the Office of the Governor, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, August 3, 1962..

Rhodes, James A. "Keep Ohio on the Go." Republican State Central and Executive Committee, Columbus, Ohio.

. "News Release." The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, November 28, 1968.

______. "Plans for Progress in Ohio." Ohioans For Rhodes For Governor Committee, Carl R. Johnson, Chairman, 4298 Central College Road, Westerville,. Ohio. "

• Solutions For the Seventies. The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, undated.

Statement of Harold A. Hovey, Director of Finance, Before the House Health, Education and Welfare Committee, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, April 13, 1971.

Statement of Harold A. Hovey, Director of Finance, Before the Senate Education and Health Committee, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, July 14, 1971. 286 Task Force on Education Policy. "Notebook on Gubernatorial Campaign Issues and Positions," Gubernatorial Files, The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio.

Reports

Buckeye Association of School Administrators. "The Much Discussed Governor’s Budget." Legislative Report, Columbus, Ohio, April 6, 1971.

______. "BASA to Testify." Legislative Report, Columbus, Ohio, April 21, 1971.

"Republicans Considering Alternatives." Legislative Report, Columbus, Ohio, April 21, 1971.

"The Chips Are Down In the House." Legislative Report. Columbus, Ohio, May 10, 1971.

"Tak Bill Passed By House." Legislative Report. Columbus, Ohio, July, 1971.

Dye, Thomas. "Politics, Economics and Education" U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Bureau of Research (March, 1967), 1- 20.

Hoekstra, Ronald B. "Toward Ad-Hocracy or Planned Revita­ lization. “ A Report to The Ohio College Association, Columbus: The Ohio College Association, 1972. Henderson, John P. "Public Higher Education Policy-Making in State Government: A Case Study of the Ohio Plan." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1972.

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Speeches

Gilligan, John J. Address to the Jennings Foundation. Columbus, Ohio, April 19, 1971.

______. Remarks to Xavier University Young Democrats. Cincinnati, Ohio, September 29, 1970.

______. "Special Message By Governor John J. Gilligan." The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, August 19, 1971.

______. Speech to the Ohio' Education Association Leader­ ship Conference. Kent, Ohio, August 30, 1970.

______. Speech to Ohio Federation of Teachers. Columbus, Ohio, March 1, 1971.

Howe II, Harold. "State Government and the Education Challenge." An Address Before the Midwest Governors' Conference. Cincinnati, Ohio, June 21, 1966.

Rhodes, James A. Speech By Governor James A. Rhodes Before Joint Session of the 109th General Assembly. The Statehouse, Columbus, Ohio, January 5, 1971.

Speech to the Cleveland Growth Board, Cleveland, Ohio, November 28, 1968.