Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

Turkey’s Policy toward Syrian Refugees WP Domestic Repercussions and the Need for International Support

Souad Ahmadoun S

Turkey’s humanitarian activities toward Syrian refugees are part and parcel of its over- all policy in the Syria conflict. Yet, it has become increasingly clear that the Turkish government has overestimated its capacities, and thus failed to deliver sufficient assis- tance to Syrian refugees on its territory. At the same time the government’s handling of the refugee issue has led to stark tensions among Turkey’s political and societal forces, as Turkey’s border regions contend with increasing security and economic challenges. Germany and its European partners should support Turkey in maintaining and im- proving services to Syrian refugees in Turkey, and in delivering aid more effectively to internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Syria. They should also push Turkey to adopt a long-term strategy for dealing with Syrian refugees.

The recent flow of Syrian-Kurdish refugees comed refugees and provided humanitari- from the region of Ayn al-Arab (in Kurdish: an assistance to civilians and IDPs inside Kobanê) to Turkey is just one of many epi- Syria. sodes in which Turkey has been affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. Indeed, ever since the militarization of the Syrian uprising Turkey’s Handling of the Crisis in mid-2011 Turkey has seen an influx of While Turkey has hosted refugees before refugees from its neighboring country. In (for example from Iraq), since April 2011 it early 2011, after the Turkish government has for the first time followed an uncondi- failed to convince Syrian President Bashar tional “open door policy” toward Syrian al-Assad to engage in profound reforms that civilians fleeing from the conflict. At the could have contained the crisis, Ankara beginning of the conflict, Syrian refugees took a clear stance against the Assad regime: were considered guests rather than legal it sought the international isolation of the refugees, but since late October 2011 Tur- regime; it hosted, supported and overtly key has afforded them “temporary pro- influenced the armed and unarmed oppo- tection” status, ensuring no forced return sition; it tried to shape the international and imposing no limit on their duration coalition through the so-called “Group of of stay. In April 2014, a new migration law Friends of the Syrian People”; and it wel- entered into force granting them “condi-

In 2014 Souad Ahmadoun was an intern in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the SWP Comments 47 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation November 2014 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PhD grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 tional refugee status”, or temporary asylum, At the beginning of the crisis Turkey under the newly established General Direc- rejected any international assistance for its torate of Migration Management (GDMM). humanitarian effort, as it wanted to prove From April 2011 to September 2014 an that it could deal with matters on its own. estimated total of 1,350,000 Syrians fled to By mid-2012, however, Ankara started to Turkey – around 77 percent of them women ask the international community to share and children – according to the Disaster the burden. In October 2014 the Turkish and Emergency Management Presidency government announced that it had received (AFAD), the main governmental body only $250 million from international donors managing the Syrian refugee issue. Some in the four years since the beginning of the 220,000 are hosted in 22 relatively well- crisis. It also blamed the international com- equipped camps, including 13 tent cities munity for failure to fulfill refugee quotas and two container sites located in ten requested by the UN, and for failure to pro- provinces of southern and south-eastern vide even half of the funds requested to Turkey: Adiyaman, Adana, Hatay, Gazian- help Turkey in its humanitarian effort. tep, Kahramanmaras, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, Osmaniye and Sanliurfa. Some 630,000 refugees are registered outside the camps Key Actors and Domestic Dynamics by the AFAD and the United Nations High Aid to Syrian refugees has been affected – Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but and sometimes exploited – in political the others (an estimated 500,000) have struggles between Turkey’s governing Jus- remained unregistered. tice and Development Party (AKP) and its While conditions in the camps managed former ally, the Hizmet movement (also by the AFAD in collaboration with the known as the Gulen movement), on the one UNHCR and other UN agencies are extreme- hand, and between the AKP and the main ly good, the large numbers of refugees liv- opposition party, the Republican People’s ing outside the camps (also called “urban Party (CHP), on the other. The influential refugees”) are more vulnerable, as most of religious scholar and leader of the Gulen them do not benefit from services provided Movement, Fethullah Gulen, voiced his by the Turkish government or international opposition toward any Turkish involvement agencies. The exception is health care: in the Syrian uprising, calling instead for under a January 2013 governmental decree, gradual support for economic development all Syrian refugees can benefit from free and reform. primary health care. In early January 2014 police raided offices Like many other governments, Ankara of the government-backed charity organiza- assumed that the Assad regime would soon tion IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation collapse and refugees would return to in six provinces, and detained at least 23 Syria quickly. Yet, by mid-2014 Turkey had people on suspicion of links with the terror- already spent about $4 billion on humani- ist group Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-Qaida off- tarian aid for Syrians, and with no end in shoot in Syria) and of smuggling weapons sight as the refugee influx is not about to to the Syrian rebellion under the pretext abate. Consequently, Turkey has recently of humanitarian work. IHH, an NGO with made the admission of Syrians at official Islamist orientation, has been one of the border crossings conditional on the avail- main organizations active in supporting ability of places within the camps, or on Syrian refugees and IDPs, and has also specific humanitarian circumstances played a role in mediation efforts between (e.g. if emergency medical treatment is Turkey and rebels who kidnapped Turkish required). It has also temporarily closed journalists. IHH officials denied the accu- border crossings such as the one close sations of terrorist links, and portrayed to Kobanê/Ayn al-Arab. the raid as a “dirty plot” by police loyal to

SWP Comments 47 November 2014

2 the Gulen Movement, claiming it was just be a sectarian choice aimed at empowering another element in the latter’s conflict the Syrian Sunni majority. Indeed, tensions with the government. For its part, the gov- have been recorded between mainly Sunni ernment accused the “parallel entity” of the refugees and Arab Alawite locals. For Gulen Movement of disrupting its humani- example, some Syrian refugees have been tarian efforts toward the Syrian population, refused medical treatment by Alawite doc- using its infiltration of the state’s bureau- tors; others have boycotted local Alawite cracy, media, judiciary and police. shopkeepers, while the latter have ques- The AKP has also had to deal with criti- tioned Syrian clients about their sectarian cism from the main opposition party, the identity before serving them. In September CHP. The latter has called for a diplomatic 2012, as a response to growing tensions, the solution to the Syrian conflict, arguing that Turkish government adopted measures to support for the armed Syrian opposition avoid further sectarian escalation, such as represents a threat to Turkey’s national secu- transferring some Sunni refugees from rity, and that the refugee issue has polar- Hatay to other provinces after clashes with ized the Turkish population. Its leadership locals, and calling for “more patience and has also claimed that the Apaydin refugee hospitality for the brothers who will soon camp was used as a training base for fighters be going back to Syria”. from the Free Syrian Army and other Syrian The economic and social burden of the groups. In August 2012, the government refugee presence has also led to mounting refused to allow a CHP delegation to visit anti-refugee sentiments, as it is seen as the the camp to investigate these claims. In cause of higher unemployment and living turn, the AKP has accused the CHP of sup- costs for Turkish citizens, and of rising porting the Assad regime, for example with crime and prostitution. For instance, while visits to Damascus in early 2012 and March the practice of polygamy is considered a 2013. crime by the Turkish Civil Code, Syrian refugee women have agreed to become second wives of Turkish citizens, or to get Tensions with refugees married early (under 18 years of age) as this The Syrian conflict has sparked sectarian seems preferable to refugee existence, espe- tensions in Turkey. This has especially been cially in the south-eastern provinces of the case in Turkey’s southern provinces, Mardin and Şanlıurfa. A non-governmental first and foremost Hatay. Hatay province organization, the so-called Kilis Platform, was part of Syria until 1939 and has a has reported at least 4,000 cases of mar- mixed demographic – including Turks, riage since 2012 in Kilis (a province of some Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Arab Chris- 125,000 people), with Syrian women or girls tians, Sunni and Alawite Arabs – which becoming second or third wives of Turkish reflects the confessional and ethnic com- men through religious marriage, which is position on the other side of the border. not recognized under Turkish law. Yet, the vast majority of Syrian refugees Since late 2012, growing anti-refugee in Turkey have been Sunni Arabs. sentiments have led to sporadic clashes Arab Alawites (not to be confused with between Turkish citizens and Syrian refu- Turkish Alevis) are mostly secular Muslims gees. Also, Turkish citizens have repeatedly and, with a population of some 1.5 million, protested against the presence of Syrian are the largest Arab minority inhabiting refugees, mainly but not exclusively in Turkey’s border region with Syria. They southern and south-eastern Turkey, where have largely supported the Assad regime most of the refugees are concentrated. To and have sharply opposed Ankara’s recent date, tensions are still running high. policies toward Syria. They consider Tur- key’s support for the Syrian opposition to

SWP Comments 47 November 2014

3 Insecure Borders International Burden Sharing In early 2012, the Turkish government – in So far, Turkey has managed the Syrian refu- cooperation with Turkish NGOs involved gee influx with considerable hospitality; in humanitarian assistance within Syria – but given the gravity, scale and duration created a system known as “zero point of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, more delivery”. This method avoided infringing international humanitarian support is on Syria’s national sovereignty by deliver- needed. European countries in particular ing aid shipments to a border crossing, should offer to share the burden rather from where they were picked up by Syrian than hide behind Ankara’s earlier rejection humanitarian workers (from local councils of foreign support. The main challenges or NGOs) and taken to frontier camps with- will be to better provide for refugees out- in Syria, especially Atmeh camp. This ap- side the camps, and to plan for the long- proach also sought to reduce the influx of term residence and integration of refugees. refugees into Turkey, but had to be scaled Cooperation between the EU, Turkey and

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und back in November 2012, when the Syrian the wider international community should Politik, 2014 regime army bombed the area of Atmeh address an array of issues. In particular, All rights reserved camp. This was due to radical groups assum- European countries should: These Comments reflect ing control over border crossings, thus in-  Pressure Turkey to open the door for in- solely the author’s views. creasing the risk of kidnapping for aid ternational humanitarian NGOs (INGOs) SWP workers. to work on its soil, allowing them to Stiftung Wissenschaft und At the same time Turkish public opinion register more easily so that they can Politik German Institute for has been increasingly wary of attacks ema- assume a more effective role in relief International and nating from the border region. In February efforts. According to the UNHCR, ten Security Affairs 2012, a bomb killed 17 Turks at the Cilve- INGOs have been registered in Turkey Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 gozu border crossing. In May 2012, two car to date but only two have been allowed 10719 Berlin bombs exploded in Reyhanli town center, to operate in southern Turkey, while Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 only 5 km from the Cilvegozu border cross- officials have turned a blind eye to un- www.swp-berlin.org ing with Syria, leaving 46 dead and more registered INGOs working there infor- [email protected] than 100 injured. In June 2012, a Turkish mally. ISSN 1861-1761 fighter jet was shot down by the Syrian  Share the burden of the refugee crisis regime army over the Mediterranean, near by hosting more refugees themselves, the land border between the two countries. as well as bearing some of the financial And in late September 2014, three Turks costs incurred by host states, especially were injured when mortar shells landed Turkey. in Suruç in the province of Şanlıurfa, as  Support the Turkish government in Islamic State (IS) fighters clashed with devising a long-term policy toward Syrian Kurdish forces on the other side of the refugees. Along with other assistance, border. they should offer technical support to In addition, Turkish civilians have been adapt Turkey’s legal framework accord- worried about the amount of freedom their ingly. They should also encourage An- government has granted to fighters who kara to devise policies aimed at reducing have used the camps for recruitment and sectarian tensions in the southern region. recovery, and many others carrying weap-  Improve coordination with Turkey (gov- ons outside the camps. Many think their ernment and NGOs alike) and with UN government is also turning a blind eye to bodies to ensure that cross-border aid infiltration by fighters, and arms smug- is effective and serves civilians in Syria, gling to the Syrian opposition. They fear rather than being captured by militant that this could soon backfire, as Jihadist groups. groups could turn against Ankara.

SWP Comments 47 November 2014

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