DOCSLIB.ORG

Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds and Major-General George Kitching in Normandy 1944

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Canadian Military History Volume 11 Issue 4 Article 2 2002 A Re-Evaluation of Generalship: Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds and Major-General George Kitching in Normandy 1944 Angelo Caravaggio Canadian Forces College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Caravaggio, Angelo "A Re-Evaluation of Generalship: Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds and Major-General George Kitching in Normandy 1944." Canadian Military History 11, 4 (2002) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Re-evaluatioCaravaggio: A Re-Evaluationn of Generalshipof Generalship Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds and Major-General George Kitching in Normandy 1944 Angelo Caravaggio ajor-General George Kitching was General Is this assessment valid? George Kitching MOfficer Commanding 4th Canadian tried to do his duty as a general. He tried to win Armoured Division from February until August the battles he was ordered to fight and he tried 1944. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, to prepare his men as best he could for the commander of 2nd Canadian Corps to which battles they would have to fight in Normandy. 4th Canadian Armoured Division belonged, He was prevented from accomplishing both relieved Kitching of command on 21 August, objectives by his superior Guy Simonds. Taking ostensibly for lack of leadership. The story of a more multi-disciplinary approach to the Major-General Kitching and 4th Canadian question reveals that the command relationship Armoured Division in Normandy has so far not between Simonds and Kitching was beset with been portrayed in an especially positive light. serious problems. The personal performance of Most scholarship, including the official history Kitching as General Officer Commanding 4th of the Canadian Army, accepts that Simonds was Canadian Armoured Division was a direct result justified in relieving Kitching from command. of being forced to operate in what Ross Pigeau Criticism from contemporary American and and Carol McCann describe as a compromised British commanders, repeated by subsequent command environment and the resulting historians, claimed that attacks by 2nd Canadian emotional and physical strain that this situation Corps, with the object of closing the Falaise Gap, placed on him personally.3 This command were not pressed forward with sufficient resolve environment, created by Simonds, was derived and thereby resulted in the escape of some from the corps commander's mistrust of his quarter million German soldiers.1 The "poor" subordinate divisional commanders after his performance of 4th Canadian Armoured Division failed attacks of July. Simonds decided he would in general, and the supposed lacklustre maintain greater control and in so doing, command performance of Kitching in particular, stripped his divisional commanders of their have been convenient explanations for this command authority. Kitching was not failure. Simonds viewed the case as one of responsible for the resulting compromised leadership potential that was never achieved by command environment, but he was forced to Kitching. The expectation was that the Canadians command his division within it until 21 August. should have been more successful in Operations Lack of sleep, combined with the stresses of "Totalize" and "Tractable" and that 4th Canadian sustained combat and the high casualties in the Armoured Division, as the spearhead for the August 1944 battles, sapped what was left of Canadian advance, should have closed the Kitching's capacity to command effectively at the Falaise Gap sooner. John English even goes so divisional level under Simonds. far as to state that the lacklustre performance of the Canadian army in Normandy laid squarely 2 James Jay Carafano, in his book After at the feet of the divisional commanders. D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy ©CanadianMilitary History, Volume 11, Number 4, Autumn 2002, pp.5-19. 5 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2002 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 11 [2002], Iss. 4, Art. 2 Major-General George Kitching and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds. Breakout, observes:" We do not write the history have appeared on the July 1944 entry. The of what happened but the history of the records crucial documents that would have shed light that remain."4 The statement underscores the on the activities, conversations, and orders by limitations of writing operational and tactical Kitching are the armoured command vehicle history from the existing primary source logs, but these are missing entirely. Without these material, which in many cases is woefully logs, it is almost impossible to track Kitching's deficient. Most war diaries of the units and personal activities. Donald Graves asked regiments of 4th Canadian Armoured Division Kitching about these logs in an interview, and are incomplete and in some cases, totally Kitching seemed surprised that they were not missing. The state of 4th Canadian Armoured available, thus implying that they did exist at Division's war diary itself is of particular one time. The existing primary sources concern. It appears that existing documents for documenting 4th Canadian Armoured Division's July and August were rebuilt after the fact. The activities during August 1944 are neither incompleteness of the July and August 1944 consistent nor reliable. diaries when compared to the diaries before and after those months and the fact that Major- Most secondary sources support Simonds General Harry Foster signed off the diary for July and his decision to relieve Kitching. In fact, other 1944 are somewhat worrisome. Foster took than one paragraph at the end of Chapter 14, in command of 4th Canadian Armoured Division his book Mud and Green Fields, Kitching fails on 21 August after Kitching was relieved of to come to his own defence.5 Surprisingly, the command. Kitching had signed 4th Canadian battles of "Totalize" and "Tractable" are not Armoured Division war diary entries from discussed in any great detail inside the book. February 1944, when he assumed command, to Kitching told me during a 1990 tour of the June 1944 and his signature should therefore Normandy battles that the manuscript for his https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss4/2 2 Caravaggio: A Re-Evaluation of Generalship memoirs was actually much longer than that accurately and react properly to the conditions actually published. Given Kitching's close on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the existing association with Simonds and his actions once literature leaves a confused picture as to who relieved of command, Kitching probably would actually made the decision to reroute the 4th have not criticised Simonds in any way had there Canadian Armoured Brigade's forces. The most been further discussions of these battles. probable scenario is that Kitching recommended Kitching receives timid support in Reginald Roy's the change and Simonds approved. What is clear book 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, which from the literature is that Kitching, as a provides a detailed account of the Canadian divisional commander, lacked the latitude to actions and Kitching's troubles.6 Nonetheless, change a Simonds plan once it had been issued, Roy leaves readers to decide whether or not even when it involved movement within his own Kitching was fairly treated. Donald Graves' South divisional boundaries. Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War and John Marteinson's The Royal Canadian Another problem with the accepted history Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History have is the lack of a proper measurement tool to cast different lights on the events of August 1944, evaluate the command environment within and to some extent, on what happened to which Kitching and the other Canadian 7 Kitching. They have uncovered certain divisional commanders under Simonds fragments of information, which become operated. In order to offer a valid assessment of important in this reassessment. Notwith­ Kitching as a commander, an examination of his standing, historians have generally accepted command environment is essential. A Simonds' dismissal of Kitching without question measurement tool for assessing or quantifying or any detailed assessment of Kitching's side of a command environment has only recently the story. Any reconsideration of the command become available with development of the Pigeau/ relationship between Simonds and Kitching, McCann Command and Control model.8 The resulting in the latter's dismissal, requires model provides a workable definition of careful and critical reading of the war diaries command and control that can then be used to from 1st Canadian Army and 2nd Canadian guide policy and doctrine. The model represents Corps in light of new information presented by a rich tool for the assessment of commanders Graves and Marteinson. and their command environment. It includes two components that are critical to this evaluation, Among the principal problems with the the Command, Authority Responsibility (CAR) literature as a whole is the seemingly space and what is referred to as the Balanced indiscriminant interchanging of the names of Command Envelop (BCE). Simonds and Kitching in describing 4th Canadian Armoured Division's battles during The model examines the relationship August. In certain texts, Simonds is credited for between competency, authority and giving a specific
Recommended publications
  • 2013/14 Annual Report Celebrating 40 Years Fact

    2013/14 Annual Report Celebrating 40 Years Fact

    2013/14 Annual Report Celebrating 40 years Fact Students have come from 1,027 towns across Canada since 1974 Since 1974, Pearson College has brought students of exceptional leadership potential together from all over the world to live, work and serve collectively in a mission to build a more peaceful and sustainable future. Our education actively promotes intercultural understanding and the development of genuine concern for others, founded on shared life experiences and cooperative residential living. As Lester B. Pearson once said, “How can there be peace without people understanding each other; and how can this be if they don’t know each other?” We welcome students regardless of their socioeconomic background, politics, religion, ethnicity, language or gender. We encourage them to challenge assumptions, embrace different perspectives, genuinely connect with each other and learn how to live sustainably. Our program is intense and rigorous, designed to evolve our students into emerging leaders who understand that change is possible through skilled dialogue, courageous action and a determination to make situations better—whether local, national or international in scope. This annual report celebrates our 40 years with a sampling of the many, varied things our alumni are doing to make a difference in this world. Table of contents 03 04 06 12 18 Letter from Chair Letter from Head 1974-1984 1984-1994 1994-2004 of the Board of College 24 30 32 33 34 2004-2014 Calgary House Donors Donor Profile: Donor Profile: Cynthia Baxter Peter Dunn 39 42 46 48 49 Donor Profile: Donor Profile: In Memoriam: Endowment Funds In Memoriam: Peter Sands YR 5 Jean Drouin YR 15 Kwok Li Jim Coutts 50 54 56 57 60 Patrons Alumni Giving Board of Directors Financial Revenue & Statements Expenses Charts 3 What a year it’s been.
  • Canadian Official Historians and the Writing of the World Wars Tim Cook

    Canadian Official Historians and the Writing of the World Wars Tim Cook

    Canadian Official Historians and the Writing of the World Wars Tim Cook BA Hons (Trent), War Studies (RMC) This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW@ADFA 2005 Acknowledgements Sir Winston Churchill described the act of writing a book as to surviving a long and debilitating illness. As with all illnesses, the afflicted are forced to rely heavily on many to see them through their suffering. Thanks must go to my joint supervisors, Dr. Jeffrey Grey and Dr. Steve Harris. Dr. Grey agreed to supervise the thesis having only met me briefly at a conference. With the unenviable task of working with a student more than 10,000 kilometres away, he was harassed by far too many lengthy emails emanating from Canada. He allowed me to carve out the thesis topic and research with little constraints, but eventually reined me in and helped tighten and cut down the thesis to an acceptable length. Closer to home, Dr. Harris has offered significant support over several years, leading back to my first book, to which he provided careful editorial and historical advice. He has supported a host of other historians over the last two decades, and is the finest public historian working in Canada. His expertise at balancing the trials of writing official history and managing ongoing crises at the Directorate of History and Heritage are a model for other historians in public institutions, and he took this dissertation on as one more burden. I am a far better historian for having known him.
  • Canadian Infantry Combat Training During the Second World War

    Canadian Infantry Combat Training During the Second World War

    SHARPENING THE SABRE: CANADIAN INFANTRY COMBAT TRAINING DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR By R. DANIEL PELLERIN BBA (Honours), Wilfrid Laurier University, 2007 BA (Honours), Wilfrid Laurier University, 2008 MA, University of Waterloo, 2009 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in History University of Ottawa Ottawa, Ontario, Canada © Raymond Daniel Ryan Pellerin, Ottawa, Canada, 2016 ii ABSTRACT “Sharpening the Sabre: Canadian Infantry Combat Training during the Second World War” Author: R. Daniel Pellerin Supervisor: Serge Marc Durflinger 2016 During the Second World War, training was the Canadian Army’s longest sustained activity. Aside from isolated engagements at Hong Kong and Dieppe, the Canadians did not fight in a protracted campaign until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The years that Canadian infantry units spent training in the United Kingdom were formative in the history of the Canadian Army. Despite what much of the historical literature has suggested, training succeeded in making the Canadian infantry capable of succeeding in battle against German forces. Canadian infantry training showed a definite progression towards professionalism and away from a pervasive prewar mentality that the infantry was a largely unskilled arm and that training infantrymen did not require special expertise. From 1939 to 1941, Canadian infantry training suffered from problems ranging from equipment shortages to poor senior leadership. In late 1941, the Canadians were introduced to a new method of training called “battle drill,” which broke tactical manoeuvres into simple movements, encouraged initiative among junior leaders, and greatly boosted the men’s morale.
  • The Search for Continental Security

    The Search for Continental Security

    THE SEARCH FOR CONTINENTAL SECURITY: The Development of the North American Air Defence System, 1949 to 1956 By MATTHEW PAUL TRUDGEN A thesis submitted to the Department of History in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada September 12, 2011 Copyright © Matthew Paul Trudgen, 2011 Abstract This dissertation examines the development of the North American air defence system from the beginning of the Cold War until 1956. It focuses on the political and diplomatic dynamics behind the emergence of these defences, which included several radar lines such as the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line as well as a number of initiatives to enhance co-operation between the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). This thesis argues that these measures were shaped by two historical factors. The first was several different conceptions of what policy on air defence best served the Canadian national interest held by the Cabinet, the Department of External Affairs, the RCAF and the Other Government Departments (OGDs), namely Transport, Defence Production and Northern Affairs. For the Cabinet and External Affairs, their approach to air defence was motivated by the need to balance working with the Americans to defend the continent with the avoidance of any political fallout that would endanger the government‘s chance of reelection. Nationalist sentiments and the desire to ensure that Canada both benefited from these projects and that its sovereignty in the Arctic was protected further influenced these two groups. On the other hand, the RCAF was driven by a more functional approach to this issue, as they sought to work with the USAF to develop the best air defence system possible.
  • Download Download

    Download Download

    http://www.ucalgary.ca/hic • ISSN 1492-7810 2010/11 • Vol. 9, No. 1 The Americanization of the Canadian Army’s Intellectual Development, 1946-1956 Alexander Herd Abstract Canadian scholarship has detailed the impact of increasing American political, economic, and socio-cultural influences on post-Second World War Canada. This paper demonstrates that the Canadian Army was likewise influenced by the Americans, and changes to the army’s professional military education are evidence of the “Americanization” of the army. During the early Cold War period, Canadian Army staff officer education increasingly incorporated United States Army doctrine, ranging from the basic organization of American formations to complex future military strategy. Research is primarily based on the annual staff course syllabi at the Canadian Army Staff College in Kingston, Ontario, which indicate that Canadian Army leaders were sensitive not only to the realities of fighting alongside the Americans in a future war, but to the necessity of making the Canadian Army, previously historically and culturally a British army, compatible with its American counterpart. In the context of limited scholarship on the early Cold War Canadian Army, this paper advances the argument that the army’s intellectual capacity to wage war was largely determined by external influences. During the first decade after the Second World War, Canadian society underwent a distinct transition. While Canada’s various linguistic and ethnic groups — including the English-speaking majority – did not sever
  • The Canadian Militia in the Interwar Years, 1919-39

    The Canadian Militia in the Interwar Years, 1919-39

    THE POLICY OF NEGLECT: THE CANADIAN MILITIA IN THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1919-39 ___________________________________________________________ A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board ___________________________________________________________ in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY __________________________________________________________ by Britton Wade MacDonald January, 2009 iii © Copyright 2008 by Britton W. MacDonald iv ABSTRACT The Policy of Neglect: The Canadian Militia in the Interwar Years, 1919-1939 Britton W. MacDonald Doctor of Philosophy Temple University, 2008 Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin The Canadian Militia, since its beginning, has been underfunded and under-supported by the government, no matter which political party was in power. This trend continued throughout the interwar years of 1919 to 1939. During these years, the Militia’s members had to improvise a great deal of the time in their efforts to attain military effectiveness. This included much of their training, which they often funded with their own pay. They created their own training apparatuses, such as mock tanks, so that their preparations had a hint of realism. Officers designed interesting and unique exercises to challenge their personnel. All these actions helped create esprit de corps in the Militia, particularly the half composed of citizen soldiers, the Non- Permanent Active Militia. The regulars, the Permanent Active Militia (or Permanent Force), also relied on their own efforts to improve themselves as soldiers. They found intellectual nourishment in an excellent service journal, the Canadian Defence Quarterly, and British schools. The Militia learned to endure in these years because of all the trials its members faced. The interwar years are important for their impact on how the Canadian Army (as it was known after 1940) would fight the Second World War.
  • IN SEARCH of MINERVA's OWL Canada‟S Army and Staff

    IN SEARCH of MINERVA's OWL Canada‟S Army and Staff

    IN SEARCH OF MINERVA’S OWL Canada‟s Army and Staff Education (1946-1995) by HOWARD GERARD COOMBS A thesis submitted to the Department of History in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen‟s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada January, 2010 Copyright © Howard Gerard Coombs, 2010 ABSTRACT The intellectual history of the Canadian Army from 1946 to 1995 can be traced through the curriculum utilized by the Canadian Army Staff College and the Canadian Forces College to educate the Canadian Army staff officer in conducting warfare within theatres of war. This body of knowledge was analogous to what today comprises the operational level of war. It is a structured vision of conducting conflict that was reaffirmed and sustained by institutional memory created in the crucible of the Second World War and traces its antecedents to the military operations of the Napoleonic Age. These ideas were preserved almost unchanged throughout the Cold War until the introduction of operational art in the late 1980s, as a result of United States influence. The ability of the Canadian Army to maintain this professional knowledge, as a coherent, unchanging whole throughout a period buffeted by social and political change indicates the separateness of the military profession within Canada. This arose from the absence of consistent and durable political guidance during the immediate post war era. As a result the use of the Canadian military as an instrument of national power became disjointed. By default, the unifying factor in Canadian defence activities was maintaining relevance within alliances, particularly in supporting the Pax Americana.
  • The Canadian Forces' Decorations

    The Canadian Forces' Decorations

    The Canadian Forces’ Decoration Christopher McCreery Foreword by His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh CONTACT US To obtain more information contact the: Directorate of Honours and Recognition National Defence Headquarters 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, ON K1A 0K2 http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhr-ddhr/ 1-877-741-8332 DGM-10-04-00007 The Canadian Forces’ Decoration Christopher McCreery Foreword by His Royal Highness The DukeThe Canadian of Edinburgh Forces’ Decoration | i Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II wearing her uniform as Colonel- in-Chief of the Scots Guards during a ceremony of Trooping the Colour in London, United Kingdom. The Canadian Forces’ Decoration she received as a Princess in 1951 can be seen at the end of her group of medals The Canadian Forces’ Decoration Dedication ...............................................................................................iv Frontispiece ................................................................................................v Foreword H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh, KG, KT, PC, OM, GBE, AC, QSO, GCL, CD, ADC ..............................vii Preface General Walter Natynczyk, CMM, MSC, CD .........................ix Author’s Note ................................................................................................x Acknowledgements ...............................................................................................xi Introduction .............................................................................................xiii Chapter One Early Long Service
  • 49Er1999no102

    49Er1999no102

    r THE THE LOYAL I Canada's Armed Forces. Ericksen Nissan The Fort^niner NUMBER 102DECEMBER 1999 First Published in 1915 THE FORTY-NINER The Journal of The Loyal Edmonton Regiment "Fears No Foe" Produced for the Regimental Family by The 49th Battalion, The Loyal Edmonton Regiment Association c/o The Loyal Edmonton Regiment Museum #108 Prince of Wales Armouries Heritage Centre 10440 - 108 Avenue, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T5H 3Z9 e-mail: [email protected] phone/fax: (780) 421 -9943 International Standard Serial Number ISS 0701-2918 Editor; Major David Haas, CD This year's cover shows troops fivm The Loyal Edmonton Regiment at the Cenotaph in front of Edmonton City Hall on November II, 1999. This year marked the. Regiment's return to a Remembrance Day service in Edmonton, after several years attending the service m nearby St. Albert. The artwork for the new design of the Regimental badge has been revised by Sharon Haas to sve a more accurate rendition. Total confidence now and down the road. 13020-97 Street Edmonton 10301-100 Avenue Morinville 475-9237 939-2200 Complete Tire and Automotive Service @ Passenger Tiresires @ used Tires @ Front End @ Truck Tires @ Auto Repairs @ Shocks @ Custom Wheelsels @ Wheel Alignment @ Batteries @ Brakes WE OFFER MILITARY DISCOUNTS (onlinenlal 4 The Fortyniner CONTENT! The Regiment TQdayB.C. Branch President ^^ Donkey Derby ^^ The Unit YearB.C. Branch AGM Regimental Bet Page 6Page 15 Page 56 Honourary Colonel MathesonOrtona Visit Fortyniner Gallery #1 Page 9Page 77 Page 56 NUmegan MarchMore River Cemetery Paae 20Page 74 The Band Beat CadetSMuseum Update page ^ ^ 34Literary @, , .Museum Information Sheet Book Reviews Cadets on ExercisePane 0.0.
  • Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development

    Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development

    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2018-12-10 Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development Domansky, Katie Domansky, K. (2018). Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/34926 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109304 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development by Katie Domansky A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2018 © Katie Domansky 2018 ABSTRACT After the “Somalia Affair” of the early 1990s, a government investigation concluded that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had become dysfunctional as a professional military force and needed to be comprehensively reformed. It was perceived to
  • Canadian Army Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine in the 1950S: Force Development in the Pre-Professional Era

    Canadian Army Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine in the 1950S: Force Development in the Pre-Professional Era

    DND 536-IMG005 An Honest John nuclear artillery round mounted on its mobile transporter/launcher. CaNadiaN arMy TacticaL Nuclear WarfarE Doctrine in ThE 1950s: Force Development in ThE PrE-PrOfessionaL Era by Peter Kasurak Introduction combat. The advent of nuclear weapons and their adoption by the Soviet Union, however, posed just such a challenge. he development of combat doctrine represents the highest level of corporate intellectual skills While sometimes regarded as the golden age of Canadian needed to manage an armed service. It requires military professionalism,1 the 1950s are more accurately seen the assessment of national goals and the deriva- as the beginning of a lengthy developmental phase for the tion of required military capability. That capabil- army. A colonial fragment, the army struggled to stand on its Tity must be shaped by intelligence of enemy means and inten- own two feet. Not only was it incomplete, but it had inherited tions, knowledge of present and future technology and an the culture of the British Army, whose concepts of leadership, appreciation of national priorities and resources to fund the staff doctrine, and organization were to contribute to its diffi- force. A force must then be designed and trained to implement the doctrinal choices made by the high command. The Canadian Army that emerged from the Second World War had Peter Kasurak received his PhD in diplomatic and military history from been reduced from 478,090 men and women to only 15,852 Duke University in 1976. The last two decades of a subsequent career in personnel. It had existed up to that point as a sort of branch the Canadian Public Service were spent at the Office of the Auditor operation of the British Army, dependent upon the head office General, where he headed groups responsible for National Defence and at Horse Guards for intelligence and doctrine.
  • TRAINING to FIGHT and WIN: TRAINING in the CANADIAN ARMY (Edition 2, May 2001)

    TRAINING to FIGHT and WIN: TRAINING in the CANADIAN ARMY (Edition 2, May 2001)

    ttrainingraining ttoo fightfight andand wwin:in: ttrainingraining inin thethe canadiancanadian aarrmymy Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, OMM, CD (Retired) Foreword by Brigadier-General S.V. Radley-Walters, CMM, DSO, MC, CD Copyright © Ernest B. Beno, OMM, CD Brigadier-General (Retired) Kingston, Ontario March 22, 1999 (Retired) TRAINING TO FIGHT AND WIN: TRAINING IN THE CANADIAN ARMY (Edition 2, May 2001) Brigadier-General Ernest B. Beno, OMM, CD (Retired) Foreword By Brigadier-General S.V. Radley-Walters, CMM, DSO, MC, CD (Retired) TRAINING TO FIGHT AND WIN: TRAINING IN THE CANADIAN ARMY COMMENTS AND COMMENTARY “I don’t have much to add other than to support the notion that the good officer is almost always a good teacher.” • Lieutenant-Colonel, (Retired), Dr. Doug Bland, CD Queen’s University “ Your booklet was a superb read, packed with vital lessons for our future army - Regular and Reserve!” • Brigadier-General (Retired) Peter Cameron, OMM, CD Honorary Colonel, The 48th Highlanders of Canada Co-Chair Reserves 2000 “This should be mandatory reading for anyone, anywhere before they plan and conduct training.” • Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Chupick, CD Australia “I believe that your booklet is essential to the proper conduct of training in the Army, and I applaud your initiative in producing it. As an overall comment the individual training of a soldier should ensure the ability to ‘march, dig and shoot.’ If these basics are mastered then the specialty training and collective training can be the complete focus of the commander’s/CO’s concentration.” • Colonel (Retired) Dick Cowling London, ON “I think this is the first ‘modern’ look at training in the Canadian Army that I heard of for thirty years.