No easy thing Senior Command in the , 1939-1945

Randall Wakelam

istorians have tended to equate generalship.”3 Nonetheless, generals success with winning battles, Abstract: There is relatively little also needed a range of personal H Canadian military history which looks failure with defeat, and yet there attributes: mental and physical specifically at the questions and is much more to being successful themes surrounding senior command robustness, physical courage, health in senior appointments than just (commanders of large formations and youth, courage of convictions, battlefield victory. Success seems to of troops – normally generals knowledge of humanity and fighting call for a trilogy of abilities: the ability or lieutenant-generals). Current spirit.4 These were necessary to “keep interpretations call for a trilogy to defend national interests in the of abilities: the ability to defend strict, though not necessarily stern highest military (and often political) national interests in the highest discipline,…[and give ungrudging] circles; the ability to organize and military (and often political) circles; praise where praise is due,” be visible manage forces both before and the ability to organize and manage to the troops, avoid sarcasm and keep during combat; and the ability to forces both before and during combat; the soldiers informed.5 These things, and the ability to lead both directly lead both directly and indirectly and indirectly those who have to he said, were hard to do given that those who have to implement the implement the plans. Were generals were far less visible to their plans. Are we right to apply this then, and are historians today, right soldiers than in times past. Finally, three-pillared standard? This article to apply this multiple standard? This Wavell reminded his audience that attempts to answer that question article looks at the three officers the and the politician worked who commanded First Canadian by reviewing the performance of Army during the Second World War: in unique yet overlapping spheres the three generals who commanded Generals A.G.L. McNaughton, H.D.G. and that cooperation was of vital during the Crerar and G.G. Simonds. Where these importance for the successful conduct Second World War: Generals A.G.L. commanders might well possess one of the war.6 Wavell painted a picture McNaughton and H.D.G. Crerar, and or two of these abilities they could as of a complex and demanding range 1 easily have little competence in the Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds. third. Overall Crerar comes out as the of competencies. While the junior man of the group best of the three. In February 1944 , – Guy Simonds – appeared from shortly after assuming command the historical record to be the most of 2 , prepared a successful and best regarded, what on three aspects of generalship: summary of what he saw as the criteria have been used in these personal qualities; subordinates; “Essential Qualities in the Leader.”7 determinations? and political masters. But he also All were necessary for success. It is worthwhile to consider quoted from Socrates who had said Some, such as knowledge, physical the thoughts of three distinguished that “the general must know how fitness and weapons skills, could be thinkers (two of them practitioners): to get his men their rations and learned or “acquired” while others Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, every other kind of stores needed were “inherent.” Among the latter historian Martin van Creveld, and for war.”2 Wavell felt that effective were “moral” qualities including Guy Simonds. In the 1939 Lees administration – providing for an “resolution” and “determination”: Knowles Lectures Wavell focussed army’s needs – was the “real crux of “A man who originates good ideas

© Canadian Military History, Volume 20, Number 1, Winter 2011, pp.21-30. 21 and intentions but who instilling confidence is unable to get them and providing guidance put into practice may be and direction, and useful in a pure research be managers of large or in an advisory and multidimensional capacity, but is quite organizations. They useless in any executive must have a mastery command.”8 In addition of the nature and to understanding functions of military warfighting doctrine organizations and of a commander “must warfighting, and when know how to command needed of the interface – how to delegate to his between military and subordinates and his political controls. , how to control, During the war there how to position himself was one other criterion on the battlefield which was used to and make use of his assess Canadian and all communications, and, Commonwealth senior most importantly commanders and that of all, he must have was the British penchant an understanding of for experience. It was human nature and seen by the British as how to ‘get at’ men.”9 somewhere between Simonds’ successful odd and unacceptable commander thus to appoint senior seemed to be someone commanders who had who could use his not experienced combat knowledge of warfare and commanded to come up with at lower levels. For appropriate solutions Canadians, who had to problems and then lived in peace for two use the people around decades this was a hard him to turn these ideas Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton was the first to command First hurdle to get over. into effective results. Canadian Army. He was found wanting in a number of areas and replaced When “Andy” Historian Martin in 1943. McNaughton was van Creveld wrote in appointed general Command in War that “First, command says, the challenge is to find answers commanding-in-chief (GOC- must arrange and coordinate to these questions without resorting in-C) of First Canadian Army on 6 everything an army needs to exist… to a few examples as this sampling April 1942 it marked the culmination Second, command enables the army can “distort reality.” To study of almost three decades of military to carry out its proper mission [– the command and commanders is not service to . After a stint efficient destruction of the enemy an easy undertaking he concludes. as head of the National Research force].”10 Van Creveld believed that “To make the task manageable, it is Council in the late 1930s McNaughton history is not like social science and necessary to limit the analysis to the returned to uniformed service in 1939 that there should be no reluctance to purely military side of things.”12 first as GOC of 1st Canadian look at specifics rather than broad Synthesizing these models, and then as commander of 1st trends: “a study of command cannot it seems that commanders must, Canadian Corps. Serving in avoid asking the down to earth implicitly or explicitly, demonstrate McNaughton was responsible for questions: who ordered whom to do a considerable and well developed both training the growing Canadian what, when, by what means, on the intellect which permits them to deal army and for representing the needs basis of what information, what for, with complex situations. They must and interests of the army to Canadian and to what ends.”11 Conversely, he also be able to lead their subordinates, politicians and British leaders. When

22 he was relieved of command of the deficiency in training and was subordinate formations to adequately First Canadian Army at the end no judge of the qualities required prepare for the next day’s action.21 of 1943 there were two principal of a Commander.”15 McNaughton’s Brooke was in McNaughton’s HQ, reasons: his disagreement with the training programme did not include just as the Canadian was cancelling Canadian government over the subunit or unit training and as a 2 Corps’ move across 1 Corps’ rear.22 splitting of the Army, which would result leaders at those levels had no After seeing McNaughton in action allow 1 Canadian Corps to gain chance to develop their skills in doing Brooke recorded: “He does not battle experience in while at the quick estimates and hasty attacks. 16 know how to begin to cope with the same time demonstrating Canada’s McNaughton “lacked the required job and is tying his force up into the resolve in the conduct of the war, and qualities of command.”17 most awful muddle!” “I felt that I his miscues as the head of an army McNaughton’s first and only could not accept the responsibility sized formation during a field experience where he actually of allowing the Canadian Army to exercise in England earlier that year. commanded First Canadian Army in go into action under his orders.” McNaughton did not seem able the field took place in 1943. Exercise This level of detail is exactly the or willing during 1943 to accept Spartan has been well documented precision which historians should ’s decision that it was in and allows us to look specifically at strive to find and use if we want Canada’s best interests to send a McNaughton’s personal role during to really begin to understand what corps to the Mediterranean theatre. these large manoeuvres. Prior to the commanders thought, said, and did Rather, the nationalistic general saw exercise he decided to include the as they attempted to command. the splitting of the Canadian army fledgling 2 Canadian Corps in his Fate led to the political/military as blow to Canadian prestige. This three corps force even though it had and operational challenges which situation, and other disagreements never exercised even on its own. confronted the general at virtually the with political leaders and bureaucrats, McNaughton’s biographer views same time.23 Always acknowledged suggest that McNaughton could be this decision as well reasoned, the as a popular leader McNaughton prone to seeing things his own way general feeling that the learning had nonetheless failed on at least two regardless of what the government opportunities would more than offset counts within our model. wanted.13 His actual falling out over any teething problems .18 Historian A junior officer in the Great War, the despatch of 1 Corps to Italy left Jack English on the other hand calls H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar remained him in clear opposition to confirmed the value of 2 Corps’ participation in uniform becoming known as government policy. He might have “questionable.”19 Canada’s pre-eminent interwar staff weathered these debates but for his During the exercise the real weak officer. Rising to CGS in the early war ineffectiveness as commander of First link turned out to be McNaughton years he developed and subsequently Canadian Army. himself. He has been criticized, gained government approval for the McNaughton’s ability as a particularly by English, for his structure of the Canadian Army. In battlefield commander had been decision and counter-decision to December 1941 he moved to England a concern since 1941. General Sir pass 2 Corps through the rear area of to command 2nd Canadian Infantry Alan Brooke, the British chief of the 1 Corps; he seemed to have no sense Division, taking command of 1 imperial general staff (CIGS) cast a of the possible catastrophe of such Canadian Corps in April 1942. He critical eye on all senior commanders a manoeuvre. English also criticizes took that corps to Italy at the end of and was not afraid of culling those the general for being all too ready 1943 and then returned to England whom he thought incapable of to become engrossed by technical replacing McNaughton as Army their tasks.14 Brooke had started to details, citing McNaughton’s decision commander. He commanded the question McNaughton’s effectiveness to visit bridging operations rather Army during the entire campaign in as early as April 1941 when he than remain focused on army level North West except for two watched an exercise commanded matters.20 periods of illness. by McNaughton: “Rather depressed The full extent of McNaughton’s Crerar had an ability to sense at the standard of training and difficulties as a commander are the political direction of the efficiency of the Canadian Divisional apparent in eyewitness accounts government and then factor with it and Brigade Commanders.” which cite periods of indecision, the related military and international “Unfortunately as long as orders issued and rescinded, trips considerations.24 During his time as MacNaughton [sic] commanded forward for insignificant reasons, and CGS he provided advice on three the Corps there is not much chance daily instructions transmitted so late major issues: the implementation of for improvement. He could not see that it was virtually impossible for the National Resources Mobilization

23 Act; the creation of a conference called by five division army in Montgomery. While Britain along side a C.P. Stacey believes the robust domestic defence conference was of little force; and the decision value, Montgomery to despatch troops to could not accept that Hong Kong.25 In the Crerar’s presence at latter circumstance Dieppe with 2nd Crerar had examined Canadian Infantry the defence of Imperial Division was of more interests in the Pacific importance to the as part of his year at Canadian national the Imperial Defence commander. Crerar College in 1934 and refused to back down subsequently stayed and threatened to take abreast of issues while the matter to higher director of military ZK 10 Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) Canadian Forces authorities. To his operations and credit, Montgomery intelligence in Ottawa.26 sent a written apology. In 1941 he did a While Brooke’s detailed reassessment: biographer indicates he did not dismiss the that the CIGS was happy risks, but based his to see Crerar, a friend advice on strategic and colleague since the level intelligence.27 First War, take over Once the government from McNaughton,33 accepted the request Montgomery was Crerar examined the apparently more tactical and technical Lieutenant-General H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar succeeded McNaughton cautious. Reporting to aspects of the matter. and led First Canadian Army until the end of the war. Brooke at the end of Concluding it to be a 1943 he said: “The more relatively low risk task I think of he approved the use of two battalions British superiors and particularly the more I am convinced that he is then doing garrison duty elsewhere, Montgomery could not seem to quite unfit to command an army in thus minimizing any impact on the accept.30 Crerar was as determined a the field at present…he wants a lot of raising of nationalist as McNaughton, but that teaching; I taught him about training; which was going on at the same he used “a more balanced approach” [the Commander of time.28 In hindsight Hong Kong ensuring that he maintained good Eighth Army in Italy at that time] was not a low risk situation, but relations while also exercising his will have to teach him the practical the British and the Americans, both prerogative a senior Canadian.31 side of war.”34 At the end of July 1944 of whom had long experience in Crerar got into two flaps early on Montgomery was again reporting to the region, were caught similarly as Army commander. On his first day Brooke on Crerar’s progress, this time unprepared by the “magnitude of in Normandy he became embroiled after the Crocker incident: Japanese irrationality.”29 in an argument with his immediate The other half of Crerar’s war subordinate Lieutenant-General J.T. fighting his first battle and it is involved his time as corps and army Crocker of 1 British Corps. After the first appearance in history commander. Many criticisms have Montgomery’s intercession they of a Canadian Army H.Q. He is been heaped on his performance. smoothed over the issue and got desperately anxious that it should Some have to do with his personality on well until Crocker’s corps left succeed. He is so anxious that he and others are related to the fact that First Canadian Army the following worries himself all day!! like McNaughton he was caught March.32 Crerar fell afoul of Monty by between being a field commander and later attending a Canadian ceremony Montgomery’s biographer concludes a national commander, something his at Dieppe, which conflicted with a that “Crerar’s naïveté about battle

24 was something Monty felt he could the exact opposite to Montgomery. officer, was the “brain” behind cure…”35 We are left to assume that He hated publicity, but was full Crerar’s success in England.47 Despite while Crerar was not a shining light of common sense and always this criticism Kitching reports that he was not so bad that he needed prepared to listen to the views of Crerar was “kindness itself” when replacing as had McNaughton. his subordinate commanders.40 offering moral support after Kitching These comments were much had been sacked in July 1944 by different than those which Monty Horrocks was equally complimentary Simonds.48 Similarly, Crerar used and others had made in 1942 and about the extensive Canadian a “considered” approach when 1943. Speaking of Crerar’s Beaver build-up and deception plan for replacing Major-General Dan Spry exercises run in early 1942 when the operation.41 Horrocks was not as head of 3rd Canadian Infantry he was replacing McNaughton the only one to notice. Eisenhower Division. Simonds insisted that Spry as corps commander, the British offered praise that Crerar had be replaced after poor performance in general found them to be “logical commanded the largest force ever the Hochwald. Crerar, as he had done and progressive.” During this same grouped under a Canadian general: in other cases, orchestrated the move period Montgomery made the rounds “It speaks volumes for your skill so that it would achieve the desired of Canadian formations and units and and determination.”42 Terry Copp effect with minimum impact on the produced his list of those who should commented that while Crerar was man.49 In selecting the new GOC of be relieved. Crerar was given the task not close to operations, in his role 5th Canadian Armoured Division in and got on with it.36 Shortly after, as army commander “he managed early 1944, Crerar listened to what Montgomery recorded praise for a highly effective staff that proved others had to say and amended Crerar at the end of the Canadian’s capable of meeting the most difficult his choice, selecting B.M. first test as a corps commander in challenges.”43 British officers posted Hoffmeister. Then, in announcing the Exercise Tiger in May 1942. “‘You to Crerar headquarters after D Day job to Hoffmeister he met the man at did splendidly … when I say you came to recognize that Crerar’s a set of map coordinates, shook hands did well I mean it.’” At the same time staff “were an outstanding group of and sat down for a chat. This does not Monty did not report any issues to men who could hold their own with represent a standoffish leadership Brooke, a technique he used often any army HQ under Eisenhower’s style.50 From these examples it can be when displeased with subordinates.37 command.”44 We can perhaps seen that Crerar was ready to reward The next year, Brooke, Montgomery presume that after six months in and replace. That he did so in a careful and Paget also noted Crerar’s abilities operations Crerar had settled down and quiet way, compared to the during exercise Spartan. Crerar’s to the business of running an army. more sensational Montgomery and personal development and training Canadian biographies and Simonds, “obscured his willingness” plan for the corps paid off, Brooke memoirs present a different, to do so.51 noted that “Crerar had ‘improved the perhaps more personality driven, By the end of 1944 Crerar had corps out of all recognition.’”38 view. Dominick Graham, Simond’s returned from a bout of dysentery Lieutenant-General Sir Brian biographer, wrote that during the and was in charge of an army that Horrocks, Britain’s most successful opening phases of the fall 1944 had grown to close to half a million and respected corps commander, was Scheldt campaign “Crerar had shown men with several British and allied attached to First Canadian Army for no initiative. A plodding man who divisions under his command. in the Rhineland had not been given a positive order Crerar was well suited for the task: and came to respect Crerar during the his response to Montgomery’s call to “Few commanders were as qualified fighting. mask the lesser ports and get on with to handle an operation of such the Scheldt was not dynamic.”45 complexity – and precariousness.”52 [Crerar] was always very well- Major-General , Indeed, as the battle began to go informed because, in spite of the who had been a senior staff officer wrong Crerar was obliged to make bad weather, he made constant and divisional commander under a decision about whether he would flights over the battlefield in Simonds, called Crerar a kind but throw support behind Horrocks a small observation aircraft…I uninspiring commander, who in should Simonds not achieve the found myself getting very tired 1943 and early 1944 had become anticipated advance. This has been and irritable. But Crerar bore with increasingly jealous of the younger described as a “threat” to Simonds,53 me patiently.39 Simonds.46 Kitching suggests that but clearly Crerar was stating the …Crerar… has always been much this jealousy had begun even earlier obvious. He had two axes of advance underrated, largely because he was when in 1942 Simonds, then a staff within his sector and if one failed

25 he would logically the respect of Sir Brian reinforce the other. Horrocks. These same Ultimately he would examples would also place Simonds in the van appear to demonstrate in an assault through a competency of the Hochwald.54 warfighting and of Paul Dickson’s the military-political PhD thesis on interface. Did he meet Crerar, “The Limits the challenges of of Professionalism,” leadership? He quietly offers some additional got on with selecting, perspectives.55 For developing, and, where example, Crerar’s necessary, replacing his lack of operational subordinates. Did he activity and apparent pass the British opinion attention to paperwork test? Both Montgomery while commanding and Brooke appear 1 Canadian Corps to have found him briefly in Italy can adequate. If not, why be explained, says did he keep his job Dickson, first because during Normandy and the corps was not in the go on to command line for most of the time nearly half a million Crerar was in command men in the Rhineland? and also by the fact In reaching this that Crerar had a new conclusion we must brigadier-general staff base our assessment and was thus forced on only the barest to take on more of the witness of Crerar’s day to day coordination actual performance. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds briefly commanded First Canadian Army of corps activities than during the fall of 1944 when Crerar required hospitalization. What did he do during he might normally the Rhineland battles? have done.56 Dickson concentrations which he We know that he made reports how Crerar matured as a had developed in Italy and which daily flights over the battlefield corps commander shaping his staff Dickson has not found used by other and that he commanded the largest by juggling between giving them armies.59 Dickson concludes that army ever put under the control of some leeway and lecturing them while at 1 Canadian Corps Crerar a Canadian general. Paul Dickson’s in something of a teacher-student “steadily immersed himself in the work has begun to give us detailed manner.57 Crerar’s suggestion practice of command…To his credit, insight into the man and his actions, that Italian operations bore some he proved to be flexible and open to but there are many questions which resemblance to Great War conditions new ideas. The inclusive nature of remain, and which need to be was misinterpreted by those ignorant his professionalism was evident as he answered if we are to obtain a precise of the mobile operations conducted in absorbed and implemented training understanding of Harry Crerar’s the closing stages of that war. “Crerar policy and operational developments apparent success. was not attempting to force thinking throughout the Corps.”60 Guy Simonds was the third and towards rigid , but Crerar may have been criticized last to have command, if temporarily, towards the flexible but coordinated but he did seem successful in staff of First Canadian Army. An acting strengths of [1918 mobile] doctrine.”58 and line appointments. Did he major when war broke out he Crerar went on to use similar tactics have intellect? Apparently so, if we advanced at an amazing rate to take in the Rhineland battle, employing accept that he was a key player in command of 2 Canadian Corps in counter battery techniques based defence policy formulation and if January 1944. Later that year, and on proven tactics from 1917-18, we acknowledge that he learned again in the spring of 1945, he would and also instituting “pepper-pot” enough on the battlefield to gain replace Crerar when the latter fell ill.

26 Despite these accomplishments, failures, Simonds was very capable World War - Guy Simonds.”75 To read Simonds had both command and in exploiting the strengths of the just this statement would suggest, leadership problems in Sicily while fighting arms, but, says English, he perhaps, that Monty found no fault leading . Even did have to use a directive approach with the young Canadian, but this George Kitching, Simonds’ GSO 1, when working with less capable was not the case. Having earlier feet that his boss made some tactical subordinate commanders. One overturned Simonds’ decision to errors. Simonds’ performance in Sicily could conclude that Simonds was sack a brigadier in Italy, Montgomery has been described as that of a young forced into a command style that wrote: “Simmonds [sic] is a young general who was innovative and was skewed towards autocracy by and very inexperienced Divisional daring, but overly rigid in sticking to presence of subordinates who were general and has much to learn about a plan that might not be working.61 He in need of being led. command.”76 Later, in and would develop a plan himself without Terry Copp’s The Brigade gives , Horrocks found him to be input from staff or subordinate us a balanced view of the young a “first-class commander with a most COs before issuing orders. This Canadian citing the general’s own original brain and full of initiative.”77 would have had a negative impact chief of staff, Brigadier N.E. Roger, Canadian biographies and on morale. By comparison many who appreciated Simonds’ ability memoirs carry two themes: innovative British commanders within Eighth to reduce a problem to the essential, and hard driving commander; cold Army were less formal and more establish a “clear-cut objective” and and uninspiring leader. Major- collaborative.62 Admittedly, Simonds issue direction in “simple and direct General Harry Foster’s comments are was under considerable stress: this terms.”70 On the other hand, Simonds indicative. was his first time in command in seemed to possess “overwhelming battle, with Canadian and British self-confidence and a degree of He had that amazing ability of seniors watching and testing him.63 arrogance which did not encourage being able to analyze any given From Normandy to the Rhineland expressions of dissent. Simonds did situation swiftly and accurately, Simonds led both corps and army. not attempt to lead; he sought only to cutting through irrelevancies to In doing so he has been described command.”71 On the matter of errors the heart of the problem, then as “tough, young, smart ruthless during , Copp feels making up his mind. His orders and intolerant of inefficiency.”64 that Simonds acted properly based were always clear, concise – Early on, to solve the problems of on the fragmentary information straight to the point. But he was a cracking through the Germans south he had available: “He was wrong hard man to work for. of Caen, his “fertile mind conjured but this was not an unreasonable The performance standards up a hat full of tricks, many of them decision.”72 Moreover, Copp says and expectations he set for his untried.”65 In the Scheldt campaign, that while Simonds’ Operation subordinate commanders were so he is again credited with a brilliant Spring was a failure the general high it was impossible to satisfy solution, which he had to push took the hard lessons from it and him. …I tried to talk to him forward with determination until applied them effectively in Operation privately as a friend about the way his seniors accepted it.66 Dickson, Totalize. This “demonstrate[d] that he ran roughshod over one of my though a proponent of Crerar, Simonds could learn and grow as a own and a regimental concludes, that Simonds did well corps commander.”73 Looking at a commander. He seemed genuinely in replacing his superior: “by most tough and inflexible reinforcement surprised. “Somebody had to accounts, Simonds’ assumption of reception programme, intended speak to them, Harry. I did it command reinvigorated the army to minimize immediate casualties because you didn’t.”78 HQ; where Crerar managed, Simonds among new soldiers, Copp records commanded.”67 an empathetic Simonds: “I fully Indeed, Simonds was not even English believes that Simonds’ appreciate…that Commanding above sacking his protégé George policy directives “reflected originality, Officers have had little time to think Kitching when the latter proved clarity and completeness.”68 about things other than the battle in incapable of running 4th Armoured Similarly, Copp says “Simonds was which they are engaged.”74 Division in Normandy.79 Despite an innovative leader who approached Both Horrocks and Montgomery this Kitching remained a believer in each operation in a problem solving spoke highly of Simonds. Montgomery Simonds, calling him “a first-class mode.” The general “did not hesitate recorded: “The Canadian Army commander” who reached “the top to modify…doctrine and improvise produced only one general fit to rank” amongst his peers. Kitching new methods.” 69 While not free from hold high command in the Second took pains to point out Simonds’

27 Library and Archives Canada PA 134281 Canada PA Library and Archives

By the criteria set out in this article, Crerar rates as Canada’s best senior commander. He got on well in and with Ottawa, had a firm understanding of the military profession, displayed an ability to manage large, complex organizations and battles and employed a command style that earned the respect of his fellow commanders. This photo shows the senior officers of First Canadian Army photographed at the end of the war. (l. to r. - seated) H.S. Maczek, G.G. Simonds, H.D.G. Crerar, C. Foulkes, B.M. Hoffmeister; (standing) R.H. Keefler, A.B. Matthews, H.W. Foster, R.W. Moncel, S.B. Rawlins.

reservation and shyness, often seen as abrupt.” Personal relations between record, I consider that the losses were aloofness while in fact friends knew the two were “not good.” “Simonds unnecessarily heavy and the results him to be “warm and generous.”80 used fear; Hoffmeister built teams.”82 achieved disappointing. Such losses Perhaps these traits influenced him to In 1946 Simonds set down were not inherent in the plan nor in keep on Major-General in his own retrospective analysis of its intended execution.84 Normandy; here he was not prepared Operation Spring. He wrote with to sack one of his subordinates conviction that “non-observance of The sorts of “policy in the despite the concerns of his seniors.81 [a number of] tactical measures was tactical handling of troops and But more often Simonds rubbed in my opinion the cause of the failure in administration generally” the wrong way. Major-General Bert … in operation ‘SPRING.’”83 His that Simonds wanted he had Hoffmeister, arguably Canada’s best conclusion was cautious: described personally to officers of division commander, did not enjoy 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and working for Simonds. “[Hoffmeister] I would prefer to make no statement 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade found Simonds rigid, fond of calling on the subject for I dislike even when those formations joined the commanders back for direction, suggesting criticism of those who Corps on 16 July 1944.85 While there less likely to delegate responsibility lost their lives, but if a statement is some discussion of tactical doctrine to subordinate commanders and is required from me as a matter of the tone of the address is akin to a

28 commander giving his subordinates inexperience of those over whom he Horrocks, the pre-eminent British a refresher on what to expect. That was given command. His job, after corps commander. Least known of Simonds took the time to have this all, was not to be popular but to help our three generals Crerar seems, sort of “chat” is an indication of the win the war while getting as many nonetheless, to have been the most importance he placed on being a as possible of those for whom he was effective of the three commanders visible and proactive commander. responsible back to Canada in one when our criteria for success are Conversely, we see little humanity in piece. applied. Simonds in telling officers who had Was Simonds a successful Terry Copp and others remind us just come out of some hard fighting commander? Yes, but perhaps only that battle breaks down into a series that he was prepared to incur up to in the circumstances. As Terry Copp of small unique combats.89 If, then, 70 per cent casualties if that meant concludes, “Simonds lacked the soldiers do not fight for their nation winning a battle. Copp believes human touch that distinguishes or regiment, but rather for those with that this callous approach “must great leaders, but no other corps whom they serve, is it not reasonable

Library and Archives Canada PA 134281 Canada PA Library and Archives have met with a mixed reception,” commander displayed such technical to modify this model to suggest particularly to men who were not competence and flexibility.”88 that commanders do not command new to Normandy, but new to Two questions were asked at the their armies directly, but rather they Simonds’ corps.86 beginning of this article: was it right influence and direct a small group How then should we measure to apply a three facetted measure of immediate subordinates through Simonds’ success as a commander? It of success when assessing senior whom the commander’s intent is, seems clear that he had a considerable military commanders; and, if yes, hopefully, successfully transmitted. intellect and that he applied it to which of the three army commanders If this is so, then surely it leaves us well developed effect in the conduct had been the most successful? with important questions for the of large scale military operations. It seems clear that Andy accurate measurement of command His innovations, both technical McNaughton – while a man of great effectiveness and a commander’s and tactical, in France and Belgium intellect and personal popularity – success. We are a long way from a remain examples of what generals are was not suited either to command complete picture of success in high supposed to do: find ways to resolve (and manage) a large and complex command. battlefield impasses. Commander of field army, or to be that army’s the army on only two occasions and spokesman when dealing with the for limited periods he did not have to national government in Ottawa. Notes deal in any significant way with the Guy Simonds was never faced, in Canadian government and thus we a protracted way, with that political 1. I had originally intended to include two cannot make any conclusions about challenge, although when his time other officers, Lieutenant-Generals E.L.M. Burns and C. Foulkes, in this list. Both his success in this area. It is worth came in the 1950s he experienced were corps commanders and thus might noting, however, that after the war he mixed success. As a battlefield be included in this senior command was not selected as CGS, apparently manager he was the best Canada group. This was a selection which I 87 learned, subsequent to having composed at Crerar’s suggestion. When he did produced and was apparently as these lines, was shared by Charles Stacey. assume that appointment in 1951 his good as any the British could field. As The text of his Thompson Lecture at the tenure while of reasonable length was one charged with the development Royal Military College was published: “Canadian Leaders of the Second World not smooth. of an effective working relationship War,” Canadian Historical Review 66, no.1 While Simonds was a brilliant with his subordinates he seemed able (March 1985), pp.64-72. master of the military art, he was to direct with cold precision, but was 2. Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship: The Lees Knowles Lectures less than perfect as a leader. His generally unable or unwilling to lead Cambridge, 1939 (: Penguin, 1941), run-ins with subordinates, and with a human touch. He was not a pp.14-5. superiors, suggest that he was not failed commander, but he was less 3. Wavell, p.15. 4. Wavell, pp.15-23. particularly comfortable in the sorts of than ideal. 5. Wavell, pp.46-7. interpersonal relationships required This leaves Harry Crerar who 6. Wavell, pp.57-62. of high command. He knew what got on well in and with Ottawa, had 7. G.G. Simonds, “‘Essential Qualities in the Leader’ Annexure to letter GOC, 19 Feb he was looking for in his followers, a firm understanding of the military 44.” This reproduction was provided to but got it more by direction and profession, displayed an ability to newly-promoted brigadier-generals and commodores during a lecture by Terry intimidation than by cooperation and manage large complex organizations Copp at the in collaboration. This may well have and battles and employed a command October 2000. been a direct result of the relative style that earned the respect of 8. Simonds, “Essential Qualities,” p.1. 9. Simonds, “Essential Qualities,” p.2.

29 10. Martin van Creveld, Command in War 33. Fraser, p.442. 73. Copp, Fields of Fire, pp.182-3. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 34. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: Master of the 74. Copp, The Brigade, p.169. Press, 1985), p.6. Battlefield 1942-1944 (London: Hamish 75. Hamilton, p.507. 11. van Creveld, p.12. Hamilton, 1983), p.476. 76. Hamilton, p.341. 12. van Creveld, p.13. 35. Hamilton, pp.780-1. 77. Horrocks, A Full Life, p.254. 13. These include Lester Pearson, Mike: The 36. Delaney, pp.39-40. 78. Tony Foster, Meeting of Generals (: Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. 37. Dickson, Crerar, p.195. Methuen, 1986), p.340. Pearson, Volume I: 1897-1948 (Toronto: 38. Dickson, Crerar, p.217. 79. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, pp.118-9. University of Toronto Press, 1972); C.P. 39. , Corps Commander 80. George Kitching, “General Guy Simonds Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: (Toronto: Griffin House, 1977), p.182. – In Appreciation,” Canadian Defence A History of Canadian External Policies; 40. Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (London: Quarterly 4, no.2 (Autumn 1974), pp.9-10. Volume 2: 1921-1948 – The Mackenzie King Collins, 1960), p.253. 81. Copp, Fields of Fire, p.115. Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 41. Horrocks, Corps Commander, pp.177-9. 82. Delaney, pp.123, 224-5. 1981); John English, Shadow of Heaven: The 42. Dickson, Crerar, p.381. 83. G.G. Simonds, “Operation ‘Spring,’” Life of Lester Pearson, Volume One: 1897- 43. Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadian Military History 1, nos.1&2 1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orphen Denys, Canadians in Northwest Europe (Toronto: (Autumn, 1992), p.67. 1989). University of Toronto Press, 2006), p.290. 84. Simonds, “Spring,” p.68. 14. David Fraser, Alanbrooke (London: 44. Copp, Fields of Fire, p.116. 85. G.G. Simonds, “General Simonds Speaks: Collins, 1982), p.187. 45. Graham, p.179. Canadian Battle Doctrine in Normandy,” 15. Fraser, p.188. 46. George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields: Canadian Military History 8, no.2 (Spring 16. Douglas Delaney, The Soldiers’ General: The Memoirs of George 1999), pp.69-80. Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver: UBC Kitching (Langley, B.C.: Battleline Books, 86. Copp, Fields of Fire, p.118. Press, 2005), pp.30, 39. 1996), 178. 87. Dickson, Crerar, p.433. It should be 17. Fraser, p.189. 47. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, p.123. remembered that the job did not go 18. John Sweetenham, McNaughton Vol.2 48. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, p.229. to Crerar either, but rather to Charles (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), p.274. 49. Dickson, Crerar, pp.402-3. Foulkes who went on to become the 19. J.A. English, The Canadian Army and the 50. Delaney, Hoffmeister, pp.120-1. chairman of the chiefs of staff committee. Normandy Campaign: A Study in the Failure 51. Dickson, Crerar, pp.191. 88. Copp, Cinderella Army, p.289. of High Command (New York: Praeger, 52. Dennis and Shelagh Whitaker, Rhineland: 89. Terry Copp in Whitaker, Victory at Falaise, 1991), p.144. The Battle to End the War (Toronto: p.304. 20. Both of these faux pas are described in Stoddart, 1989), p.32. some detail, see English pp.145-6. 53. Whitaker, pp.220-1. 21. John N. Rickard, “The Test of Command: 54. Dickson Crerar, pp.390-2. McNaughton and Exercise ‘Spartan,’ 4-12 55. Paul Dickson, “The Limits of March 1943,” Canadian Military History 8, Professionalism: General H.D.G. Crerar no.3 (Summer 1999), pp.22-38. See also and the Canadian Army, 1914-1944,” PhD Dickson, p.218. Thesis, University of Guelph, 1993. 22. Rickard, p.30. 56. Dickson, “Limits,” pp.460-4. 23. Sweetenham, p.316. 57. Dickson, Crerar, p.190. 24. J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: the Canadian 58. Dickson, “Limits,” pp.465-6. Army’s Senior Commander in the second 59. Dickson, Crerar, p.387. World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), p.89. 60. Dickson, “Limits,” p.484. Col. (ret’d.) Dr Randall Wakelam 25. Granatstein, The Generals, pp.95-9. 61. D.G. Dancocks, The D-Day Dodgers: the teaches history and leadership at the 26. Paul Dickson, “Crerar and the Decision to Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945 (Toronto: Royal Military College of Canada. Garrison Hong Kong,” Canadian Military McClelland and Stewart, 1991), p.81. Before coming to RMC Wakelam had History 3, no.1 (Spring 1994), pp.98-101. 62. Delaney, pp.176-7. extensive flying experience in army 27. Dickson, “Crerar and…Hong Kong,” 63. Dancocks, pp.96-7. helicopters, including command of 408 pp.104-5. 64. Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Squadron, was a member of faculty at the 28. Dickson, “Crerar and…Hong Kong,” Victory at Falaise: The Soldiers’ Story Canadian Forces College, the military’s pp.105-6. (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2000), p.108. joint staff and war college, and a senior 29. Dickson, “Crerar and…Hong Kong,” 65. Whitaker and Whitaker, Victory at Falaise, administrator at the Canadian Defence p.108. p.110. Academy, the military’s “ministry 30. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians 66. Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, of education.” Wakelam’s research in Normandy (Toronto: University of Tug of War: The Canadian Victory that focuses on the air force and on matters Toronto Pres, 2003), p.114. Opened Antwerp (Toronto: Stoddart, 1984), of leadership. His writing includes The 31. Paul Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian pp.108-117. Science of Bombing: Operational Research General: A Biography of General H.D.G. 67. Dickson, Crerar, pp.354-5. in RAF Bomber Command (University of Crerar (Toronto: University of Toronto 68. English, pp.237-8. Toronto Press, 2009) and The Report of the Press, 2007), p.189. 69. Copp, Cinderella Army, p.10. Officer Development Board: Maj-Gen Roger 32. C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: 70. Terry Copp, The Brigade: The Fifth Canadian Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Operations in North-West Europe, 1944- Infantry Brigade, 1939-1945 (Stoney Creek, Forces (LCMSDS Press, 2010). This year 1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), ON: Fortress Publications 1992). promises a volume on Canadian fighter pp.196-8. See also J.A. English, 183, 194. 71. Copp, The Brigade, p.46. See also Copp aircraft procurement in the decade before English is much more critical of Crerar Fields of Fire, p.117. the AVRO Arrow saga. saying that he lacked judgement or was 72. Copp, The Brigade, p.85. naïve.

30