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Canadian Army Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine in the 1950S: Force Development in the Pre-Professional Era

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Canadian Army Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine in the 1950S: Force Development in the Pre-Professional Era DND 536-IMG005 An Honest John nuclear artillery round mounted on its mobile transporter/launcher. CaNadiaN arMy TacticaL Nuclear WarfarE Doctrine in ThE 1950s: Force Development in ThE PrE-PrOfessionaL Era by Peter Kasurak Introduction combat. The advent of nuclear weapons and their adoption by the Soviet Union, however, posed just such a challenge. he development of combat doctrine represents the highest level of corporate intellectual skills While sometimes regarded as the golden age of Canadian needed to manage an armed service. It requires military professionalism,1 the 1950s are more accurately seen the assessment of national goals and the deriva- as the beginning of a lengthy developmental phase for the tion of required military capability. That capabil- army. A colonial fragment, the army struggled to stand on its Tity must be shaped by intelligence of enemy means and inten- own two feet. Not only was it incomplete, but it had inherited tions, knowledge of present and future technology and an the culture of the British Army, whose concepts of leadership, appreciation of national priorities and resources to fund the staff doctrine, and organization were to contribute to its diffi- force. A force must then be designed and trained to implement the doctrinal choices made by the high command. The Canadian Army that emerged from the Second World War had Peter Kasurak received his PhD in diplomatic and military history from been reduced from 478,090 men and women to only 15,852 Duke University in 1976. The last two decades of a subsequent career in personnel. It had existed up to that point as a sort of branch the Canadian Public Service were spent at the Office of the Auditor operation of the British Army, dependent upon the head office General, where he headed groups responsible for National Defence and at Horse Guards for intelligence and doctrine. By the early National Security. Over the years, he has published articles on Canadian- 1950s, it was faced with raising, deploying, and sustaining a American relations, the Canadian Army, counter-terrorism, parliamen- brigade to fight in Korea, and then a second brigade to meet tary oversight of defence, and police governance. He occasionally NATO commitments in Europe. The need to increase its size teaches Defence Management and Policy at Carleton University, and is and to conduct combat operations created major management currently working on a history of the Canadian Army, 1950-2000, focus- challenges, but did not require rethinking the fundamentals of ing upon its social and intellectual development. 38 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 culty in resolving military policy challenges. The Canadian senior official personal solutions, and no staff organization Army exited the decade much larger than when it had entered. focused upon army-level doctrine. RY Size, however, should not be confused with professional attainment. While the effort to develop nuclear warfare doc- Exercise Gold Rush trine resulted in the creation of new – and hitherto missing – ISTO staff capabilities, the product itself was not a success, offering he army’s first effort to adapt to the nuclear age was at the h little hope of battlefield victory over Soviet opponents. T tactical level. The nuclear battlefield posed obvious prob- lems for conventional forces and Army Headquarters recog- Adapting to Nuclear War nized these first. The initial problem was how to support troops in the forward area of the nuclear battlefield. The use of ARY Growing Up British nuclear weapons would require combat forces to be widely dispersed to avoid creating an attractive target. It also meant recent study of the military effectiveness of major pow- that the large numbers of ground vehicles in the logistic train A ers awarded the British Army a ‘D’ in tactical perfor- presented just such a target. mance in both world wars, a ‘D’ in operational performance in MILIT the First World War, and a ‘C’ in operational performance dur- Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, the Chief of the ing the inter-war period and the Second World War.2 The General Staff (CGS), initiated a study in February 1955 to British Army had rejected a doctrinal approach which spelt determine how field forces at or below the corps level should out the details and instead issued manuals which stated only be organized, and what the logistic implications would be of general principles. Senior officers were supposed to be able to future war, conventional or nuclear. This study was entitled figure things out for themselves. Bernard Montgomery com- Exercise Gold Rush.4 Simonds informed the Minister that mented that the army as a whole had no clear doctrine, and British and American studies did not go far enough into the that when one changed one’s commander, one changed one’s future, and therefore it was essential that the Canadian Army doctrine.3 The British Army, therefore, could not delegate begin its own study of the problems presented to an army in decision making and expect a standardized result. As a conse- the field by the new weapons of war.5 In commissioning the quence, its style became autocratic, and it favoured attritional, study, Simonds overrode concerns expressed the previous set-piece battles emphasizing infantry and artillery. Armour month by Major-General H.A. Sparling, the Vice-Chief of the was used as infantry support, rather than for exploitation. General Staff (VCGS), who had conducted a preliminary study of the feasibility of using fixed-wing air- craft in lieu of wheeled vehicles to sup- port combat formations in the forward area. Sparling concluded that a large number of aircraft would be required. There would be a concomitant need for continuous ground control, and also for a landing area that would require support. However, a forward air base would be difficult to protect from enemy aircraft, costly to construct, and expensive to maintain. If helicopters were used, a con- siderable portion of the lift would be con- sumed simply by moving fuel for aircraft forward. Sparling’s assessment did not deter Simonds, who thought that since the British and Americans were already researching the use of helicopters, the Canadian Army should concentrate on fixed-wing aircraft. According to him, all ©Corbis Corporation/HU005037 previous studies had been done ‘the Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. wrong way,’ and he was not convinced there was any requirement for fixed air- Canada relied upon the British Army for all its higher fields. He sought a radically different solution, in essence, staff functions, including doctrine. All manuals and tactical ‘just in time’ air logistic support of forward combat elements.6 training were British. And since the British Army did not regard doctrinal development as one of the fundamental func- Gold Rush was based upon the concept of supplying tions of the staff, its staff organization (and consequently, that infantry division and armoured brigade areas day and night by of Canada) had no top-level agency devoted to the develop- vertical-lift aircraft. An experimental helicopter unit was to be ment of tactical concepts for the army as a whole or for their formed, and a fixed-wing ‘flying truck’ developed. The time- implementation. Its British Army heritage had therefore left table was ambitious: the study phase was to be completed by Canadian Army Headquarters with little or no experience in December 1956 (less than two years), the helicopter experi- dealing with army-level development problems, a bias towards ments completed by 1957, ‘flying truck’ trials were to start the Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 39 summer of 1958, and overall conclusions were to be reached While the concept depended upon air transportability and by 1959. The study team was chaired by Brigadier Robert W. rapid cross-country land vehicles, the ‘flying truck’ had dis- Moncel, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS), and appeared.10 Mobility, however, remained the key to the con- included director-level representatives of all branches, plus a cept, as was the reduction of the size of units. The concept Scientific Advisor. It was given a permanent staff and author- called for fully tracked amphibious reconnaissance vehicles ity to draw upon the Army Headquarters, 1 Canadian Infantry with only limited fighting capability, so that “… every oppor- Division, and the Staff College.7 tunity to use the nuclear weapon can be taken.” Infantry were to be fully mobile in their own armoured personnel carriers, The project soon ran into difficulties. The de Havilland also with greater amphibious ability than those then under Company challenged the specifications for the flying truck development. Fire support was to be provided by self-pro- as being beyond the state of the art. Simonds insisted upon pelled weapons with nuclear shells, as well as ballistic rock- take-off and landing capabilities within 500 feet, but exist- ets and guided missiles. Planners wanted a light anti-tank ing piston engines were insufficiently powerful, turbine weapon effective up to tank gun range, which would probably engines too new a development, and propeller and wing be a guided missile. Gold Rush also called for tactical avia- designs immature. The Defence Research Board (DRB) rep- tion and logistics aircraft for certain missions under the con- resentatives expressed concern that industry was being trol of army commanders.11 pushed to produce something beyond its capabilities. Ultimately, Simonds agreed only to back off the 500 foot requirement until 1959, and to work against an interim goal of 1200 feet by 1957.8 Simonds was equally dissatisfied with the proceed- ings of a project working group examining tactical con- cepts. On receipt of their product, Simonds found that they had still concentrated troops too greatly, and that they would consequently present too compelling a nuclear target.
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