DND 536-IMG005

An Honest John nuclear artillery round mounted on its mobile transporter/launcher. Tactical Nuclear Warfare Doctrine in the 1950s: Force Development in the Pre-Professional Era

by Peter Kasurak

Introduction combat. The advent of nuclear weapons and their adoption by the Soviet Union, however, posed just such a challenge. he development of combat doctrine represents the highest level of corporate intellectual skills While sometimes regarded as the golden age of Canadian needed to manage an armed service. It requires military professionalism,1 the 1950s are more accurately seen the assessment of national goals and the deriva- as the beginning of a lengthy developmental phase for the tion of required military capability. That capabil- army. A colonial fragment, the army struggled to stand on its ityT must be shaped by intelligence of enemy means and inten- own two feet. Not only was it incomplete, but it had inherited tions, knowledge of present and future technology and an the culture of the , whose concepts of leadership, appreciation of national priorities and resources to fund the doctrine, and organization were to contribute to its diffi- force. A force must then be designed and trained to implement the doctrinal choices made by the high command. The Canadian Army that emerged from the Second World War had Peter Kasurak received his PhD in diplomatic and military history from been reduced from 478,090 men and women to only 15,852 Duke University in 1976. The last two decades of a subsequent career in personnel. It had existed up to that point as a sort of branch the Canadian Public Service were spent at the Office of the Auditor operation of the British Army, dependent upon the head office , where he headed groups responsible for National Defence and at Horse Guards for intelligence and doctrine. By the early National Security. Over the years, he has published articles on Canadian- 1950s, it was faced with raising, deploying, and sustaining a American relations, the Canadian Army, counter-terrorism, parliamen- brigade to fight in Korea, and then a second brigade to meet tary oversight of defence, and police governance. He occasionally NATO commitments in Europe. The need to increase its size teaches Defence Management and Policy at Carleton University, and is and to conduct combat operations created management currently working on a history of the Canadian Army, 1950-2000, focus- challenges, but did not require rethinking the fundamentals of ing upon its social and intellectual development.

38 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 culty in resolving military policy challenges. The Canadian senior official personal solutions, and no staff organization Army exited the decade much larger than when it had entered. focused upon army-level doctrine. RY Size, however, should not be confused with professional attainment. While the effort to develop nuclear warfare doc- Exercise Gold Rush trine resulted in the creation of new – and hitherto missing – ISTO staff capabilities, the product itself was not a success, offering he army’s first effort to adapt to the nuclear age was at the H

little hope of battlefield victory over Soviet opponents. T tactical level. The nuclear battlefield posed obvious prob- lems for conventional forces and Army Headquarters recog- Adapting to Nuclear War nized these first. The initial problem was how to support troops in the forward area of the nuclear battlefield. The use of ARY Growing Up British nuclear weapons would require combat forces to be widely dispersed to avoid creating an attractive target. It also meant recent study of the military effectiveness of major pow- that the large numbers of ground vehicles in the logistic train A ers awarded the British Army a ‘D’ in tactical perfor- presented just such a target. mance in both world wars, a ‘D’ in operational performance in MILIT the First World War, and a ‘C’ in operational performance dur- Lieutenant-General , the Chief of the ing the inter-war period and the Second World War.2 The General Staff (CGS), initiated a study in February 1955 to British Army had rejected a doctrinal approach which spelt determine how field forces at or below the corps level should out the details and instead issued manuals which stated only be organized, and what the logistic implications would be of general principles. Senior officers were supposed to be able to future war, conventional or nuclear. This study was entitled figure things out for themselves. com- Exercise Gold Rush.4 Simonds informed the Minister that mented that the army as a whole had no clear doctrine, and British and American studies did not go far enough into the that when one changed one’s commander, one changed one’s future, and therefore it was essential that the Canadian Army doctrine.3 The British Army, therefore, could not delegate begin its own study of the problems presented to an army in decision making and expect a standardized result. As a conse- the field by the new weapons of war.5 In commissioning the quence, its style became autocratic, and it favoured attritional, study, Simonds overrode concerns expressed the previous set-piece battles emphasizing infantry and artillery. Armour month by Major-General H.A. Sparling, the Vice-Chief of the was used as infantry support, rather than for exploitation. General Staff (VCGS), who had conducted a preliminary study of the feasibility of using fixed-wing air- craft in lieu of wheeled vehicles to sup- port combat formations in the forward area. Sparling concluded that a large number of aircraft would be required. There would be a concomitant need for continuous ground control, and also for a landing area that would require support. However, a forward air base would be difficult to protect from enemy aircraft, costly to construct, and expensive to maintain. If helicopters were used, a con- siderable portion of the lift would be con- sumed simply by moving fuel for aircraft forward. Sparling’s assessment did not deter Simonds, who thought that since the British and Americans were already researching the use of helicopters, the Canadian Army should concentrate on fixed-wing aircraft. According to him, all ©Corbis Corporation/HU005037 previous studies had been done ‘the Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. wrong way,’ and he was not convinced there was any requirement for fixed air- relied upon the British Army for all its higher fields. He sought a radically different solution, in essence, staff functions, including doctrine. All manuals and tactical ‘just in time’ air logistic support of forward combat elements.6 training were British. And since the British Army did not regard doctrinal development as one of the fundamental func- Gold Rush was based upon the concept of supplying tions of the staff, its staff organization (and consequently, that infantry and armoured brigade areas day and night by of Canada) had no top-level agency devoted to the develop- vertical-lift aircraft. An experimental helicopter unit was to be ment of tactical concepts for the army as a whole or for their formed, and a fixed-wing ‘flying truck’ developed. The time- implementation. Its British Army heritage had therefore left table was ambitious: the study phase was to be completed by Canadian Army Headquarters with little or no experience in December 1956 (less than two years), the helicopter experi- dealing with army-level development problems, a bias towards ments completed by 1957, ‘flying truck’ trials were to start the

Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 39 summer of 1958, and overall conclusions were to be reached While the concept depended upon air transportability and by 1959. The study team was chaired by Robert W. rapid cross-country land vehicles, the ‘flying truck’ had dis- Moncel, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS), and appeared.10 Mobility, however, remained the key to the con- included director-level representatives of all branches, plus a cept, as was the reduction of the size of units. The concept Scientific Advisor. It was given a permanent staff and author- called for fully tracked amphibious reconnaissance vehicles ity to draw upon the Army Headquarters, 1 Canadian Infantry with only limited fighting capability, so that “… every oppor- Division, and the Staff College.7 tunity to use the nuclear weapon can be taken.” Infantry were to be fully mobile in their own armoured personnel carriers, The project soon ran into difficulties. The de Havilland also with greater amphibious ability than those then under Company challenged the specifications for the flying truck development. Fire support was to be provided by self-pro- as being beyond the state of the art. Simonds insisted upon pelled weapons with nuclear shells, as well as ballistic rock- take-off and landing capabilities within 500 feet, but exist- ets and guided missiles. Planners wanted a light anti-tank ing piston engines were insufficiently powerful, turbine weapon effective up to tank gun range, which would probably engines too new a development, and propeller and wing be a guided missile. Gold Rush also called for tactical avia- designs immature. The Defence Research Board (DRB) rep- tion and logistics aircraft for certain missions under the con- resentatives expressed concern that industry was being trol of army commanders.11 pushed to produce something beyond its capabilities. Ultimately, Simonds agreed only to back off the 500 foot requirement until 1959, and to work against an interim goal of 1200 feet by 1957.8

Simonds was equally dissatisfied with the proceed- ings of a project working group examining tactical con- cepts. On receipt of their product, Simonds found that they had still concentrated troops too greatly, and that they would consequently present too compelling a nuclear target. He lectured them that he appreciated how difficult it was to divorce oneself from current concepts of war, but told them it would be necessary to make the exercise a success. He ended by virtually dictating the tactical concept to the team, including details of the dis- tribution of armour. The working group was allowed to choose the types of guns needed.9

It was left to Simonds’ successor as CGS to com- plete Gold Rush. In June 1956, the study team advised Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham that the tactical con- cept had been presented at the divisional study period, at command and corps conferences, and was to be used as the basis for the summer’s divisional exercise at Camp Gagetown. The team recommended that the CGS approve the tactical concept as the basis for staff discussions with Britain and the United States. Graham agreed, as well as to further development. Library and Archives Canada/DND/Paul E. Tomelin/PA-184640

Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds (right), and Brigadier-General John M. The final concept at least partly reflected Simonds’ Rockingham, January 1952. early direction. A battalion group covering force was to occupy a front of 10,000 yards – much greater than the 1600 Gold Rush was primarily defensive in orientation. This yards originally proposed. The concept was that the forward was a natural outcome of NATO’s strategy, British doctrinal zone of resistance would be set up on a major river obstacle. preferences and the relatively small size of the Canadian con- The covering force would detect the enemy and pressure tingent in Europe. Gold Rush included an offensive phase car- would be exerted on the enemy during crossing so it would ried out by a massive nuclear attack on enemy air installations bunch up and present a worthwhile target for nuclear weapons. all the way back to Soviet main support areas.12 Planners expected congestion to ripple through enemy rear areas, creating additional nuclear targets. The Canadian main Graham’s opinion was that Gold Rush was sound, but he defensive zone would be far enough back that it would not be was in no hurry to implement significant force structure harmed by the initial nuclear bombardment and it would be changes. He directed that the concepts not be used in exercises difficult for the enemy to locate main units – perhaps 10 to 25 with troops, but allowed that they might be discussed with the miles behind the main obstacle. The corps reserve would con- British and Americans at an early date. Possibly with an eye sist of mobile armoured and infantry units of regiment/battal- on the Army budget, he noted that NATO political leaders did ion size supported by self-propelled artillery. not think a major war was likely in the next ten years, and that

40 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 thinking should therefore be focused upon post-1966 require- The Gold Rush/Fire-Fly working group struggled with ments.13 Following Simonds' example, he exercised his ‘divine this new direction. The main problem was the lack of strate- RY right’ as CGS and totally redirected force development efforts. gic airlift capability that would likely result in piecemeal He told Major-General N.E. Rodger, the VCGS, that he would commitment of forces too small to be effective. The team had like to have studies initiated and completed within six months doubts that any unit smaller than a division was really viable ISTO on the organization of an air transportable brigade group, on the battlefield. They also did not know how do to logistics H

abandoning the heavy mechanized infantry force Gold Rush analysis without a commitment or operation to plan against. had recommended. Graham further directed that the organiza- Throwing up their hands, they commented that provided the tion should be based upon ‘threes.’ That is, on three battalions Canadian Army was well-trained in combined arms tactics, of infantry with one armoured regiment of three squadrons “… it appears that we shall have done as much as we can do.” ARY (and perhaps a fourth for reconnaissance). Each battalion itself The staff had little or no idea of the strategic airlift potential would be based upon three companies of three platoons of of Canada, but was pessimistic that sufficient resources three sections each of ten men. He wanted the Gold Rush team existed to move anything but personnel and light equipment to continue working on this project under the code name Fire- over modest distances. Moving armour by air was out of the

Fly.14 He then informed the Minister that he would be in a question. The likelihood that no airfields would exist in the MILIT position to provide advice with respect to re-equipping the operations area meant that vertical- lift aircraft would be army in early 1957.15 required. These did not exist and helicopters could not lift heavy equipment. As this situation would likely persist for The objective of Fire-Fly was to determine a practical air some years to come, the team concluded it would be transportable field organization for the Canadian Army, to “unsound” for the army to be structured entirely as air trans- establish a date by which this might be achieved, and to portable units. They were also pessimistic that Canada had develop a phase-in plan for this new structure. It stated that the wherewithal to develop the new weapons and equipment the roles of this force would be the rapid reinforcement of required by the concept. Finally, the team rejected an organi- NATO in Europe; the defence of North America; and engage- zation based on ‘threes,’ and concluded that ‘fours’ was supe- ment in peripheral wars and police actions as part of a larger rior. They conceded that the British Army had adopted international force. It was assumed that only part of this force ‘threes,’ but claimed this was based upon “… national rather would be air portable in the short term, and that the balance than tactical considerations.”17 would have to be stored overseas, or rely upon sea transport. Like the Gold Rush brigade, air transportable units were to be Shortly after Graham received this report, he turned the capable of operations with or without nuclear weapons.16 entire study over to Brigadier M.P. Bogert, the of the Canadian Army Staff College at Fort Frontenac, Kingston, with the direction that by May 1957, he should advise the CGS on the types of weapons and equipment that will be available to British and American forces, on British and American tactical concepts, and on the organization up to the divisional level that would enable the application of such tactical concepts by the Canadian Army.18 And with that, Gold Rush/Fire-Fly and the army’s first attempt at thinking through a force structure for itself was officially ‘dead.’

Two exercises that had been held at Camp Gagetown in 1956 and 1957 illustrate the difficulty the army’s staff sys- tem had in developing and testing warfare concepts. The exercises were neither well-planned nor adequately assessed. Exercise Eastern Star in 1957 was expressly to test the Gold Rush concept. Army Headquarters issued an observer pro- gram directive that listed specific aspects upon which exer- cise staff were to report. Yet, the final exercise report con- tained little or nothing of a critique of the central concepts. Rather, it was a commentary on the administration of the exercise. In spite of the concepts’ dependence upon air mobility, the RCAF air liaison had not been included at planning conferences. Field formations and units gave lit- tle consideration to air support and did not make good use of what was available. Even then, the two helicopters assigned to the exercise could not meet minimum requirements, and two more had to be borrowed on short notice from the Royal Canadian Navy. More ominously, the exercise deliberately DND325-IMG0003 ignored fallout caused by the nuclear strikes, since avoiding The tri-service officer representation in front of this Honest John is contaminated areas would have required the exercise plan to misleading. have been changed. The post-exercise report did not draw

Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 41 any conclusions regarding the viability of nuclear warfare, combat development was the future of five years and more save that the number of nuclear strikes allowed in future from the present. This made doctrine the preserve of existing exercises should be severely reduced.19 staff organizations, primarily the Directorate of Military Training. DCD consisted only of a director and four other The doctrinal product developed by Gold Rush/Fire-Fly professional staff, plus support staff. It nevertheless developed was consistent with British tactical preferences in that it was a program of over 40 staff studies.21 both defensive and attritional, although the substitution of nuclear weapons for artillery created certain qualitative Gold Rush had left behind important unresolved issues. changes. It is interesting to note that the army had developed The role of aviation has already been mentioned. The second its doctrine without apparent assistance from the air arm. Both was the lethality of tactical nuclear war. The army operations the Gold Rush and Fire-Fly concepts had huge air transport research staff continued to war game the Gold Rush concept implications, but the army did not consult with the appropriate with various levels of nuclear strike. By 1958, they had con- experts. While nuclear weapons greatly enlarged the battle- cluded that tactical nuclear warfare was impossible and that field, neither of the two staff studies addressed tactical avia- land battles as previously known would not develop. In their tion in any detail, except for transportation. war games, as soon as conventional forces concentrated, a nuclear strike or two would overwhelm conventional weapons. The process had also been too heavily driven from the top They concluded that “… the force with no or low nuclear of the organization. There is a dividing line between inspired capability will survive but a short time and a clash between leadership and ‘pigheaded dilettantism,’ and both Simonds and simultaneously alerted forces, both with nuclear plenty, will Graham had crossed over that line. Given the British Army result in mutual annihilation.” The best that could be hoped for culture of “… doctrine is the opinion of the senior officer was that a force would endure long enough to “make a contri- present,” and the weaknesses of the British-style staff system bution to success in other theatres.”22 which did not, at the time, recognize the need for a separate, future-oriented development cell, perhaps this could only be expected.

Staff had recognized that the Gold Rush exercise was both important and qualitatively different from staff studies which had pre- ceded it. The working group had recom- mended that the study team be made perma- nent, and, at the conclusion of the two studies, N.W. Morton, the Scientific Advisor to the CGS, recommended that a permanent plan- ning cell was needed. Morton believed that technological development had quickened to the extent that equipment did not merely replace old types, but called into question operational concepts, organization, and logis- tics procedures. He thought this process was likely to be continuous in the future, and that the army faced a major risk of “gross waste” DND photo 287-IMG0025 if it did not create a planning cell that could Minister of National Defence (MND) (left) and General in look three-to-fifteen years into the future. front of a brand new CT-114 Tutor jet trainer. Morton pointed to the US Army, which already had established a combat development function at the The army dealt with these studies by ignoring them. top level of its staff.20 Major-General Jean Victor Allard, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, merely forwarded the paper to senior officers, The Combat Development Era Begins commenting that it contained impressions and not conclu- sions, and that it would be wrong to use it as the basis for new more rational and systematic approach to planning the doctrine. He directed their focus to the apparent ineffective- A future army finally emerged in the Directorate of Combat ness of infantry in the forward zone. “They seem to be there Development (DCD), which the army established in early only to become casualties.”23 However, no strategic re-thinking 1958 to institutionalize the Gold Rush staff. However, the was undertaken, and the army remained wedded to NATO’s Canadian Army did not copy the American approach of a com- concept of tactical nuclear war, using the combat development bat development function, which was self-contained, and process to refine it. which drove school and exercise programs. It adopted a more modest approach which grafted the combat development cell The third problem was equally intractable. The nuclear onto the General Staff and gave it the task of “… encouraging warfare concept the army adopted was based on small, com- thought, study and work on the future but not monopolizing pany-sized groups fighting autonomously on a dispersed bat- this activity.” Its mandate made it clear that the mandate of tlefield. This increased the ability to improvise at the com-

42 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 pany level, with officers requiring greater abilities at oppor- Europe, no matter how infeasible that would have been. The tunism, subtlety, and deception. At the brigade level, com- problem was solved by being taken off the table. Other prob- RY manders were met by ‘information overload’ by having to lems, such as close air support, could not be solved by the coordinate more units at a faster pace of decision. Neither army because NATO air forces (including that of Canada) current training nor personnel selection appeared to be geared were not interested in maintaining suitable aircraft, and a sin- ISTO to producing the required type of combat leader. The army’s gle nation could not unilaterally alter NATO’s airpower doc- H

social scientists asked, “Can the rigid authority structure of trine – especially if its own air force saw no need to change it. the army, designed to produce groups tailored to meet pre- Ultimately, the army accepted a concept that pinned its hopes dictable situations in more or less standard ways, function upon superior leadership without a clear idea of how to achieve flexibly enough in peacetime to develop and maintain the that superior leadership. ARY kind of cohesive, autonomous groups and the delegated leadership needed to ensure quick action and group survival in battle crises when the objectives may be clear, but the means con-

fused, or clear only to the leader?” While the MILIT status quo was no longer acceptable, the social scientists believed it was “unrealistic” to expect the army to make any radical change.24

The first major product of the combat devel- opment process was The Canadian Army 1966-70 Tactical and Logistic Concept, completed in August 1961. Based upon the ABC [America – Britain – Canada] Armies Operational Concept 1966-70, the 1966-70 Concept was a comprehen- sive and detailed plan for the Canadian Army. It was deeply pessimistic in that it assumed that NATO forces would be facing Soviet armies just as well armed and much more numerous than the NATO defenders. Canadian society was dedicated DND photo 583-IMG0061 to the dignity and preservation of the individual, MND Paul Hellyer with senior army officers in front of an Honest John. and the combat developers believed that “… this type of society does not usually produce hard, rugged sol- Conclusion diers.” However, without any other advantage, tactical leader- ship was the “only real resource” remaining. The concept he Canadian Army had taken a decade to develop a pro- called for careful leadership selection, strenuous training, and T cess to think about its future and to develop high-level ruthless elimination methods. institutional plans. It had left behind its total dependence upon both a mother country, and also upon individual senior leaders On the material side of the battle, the concept envisioned to do its corporate thinking for it. In the process, it had made waves of Soviet forces driving forward, attempting to over- a major advance in professionalism. whelm the defenders. Anticipating the US Army’s Air/Land Battle by 20 years, the combat developers identified the need Improvements in process, however, had not solved the to strike deep in the enemy support zone to stop, divert, or problems of fighting a nuclear war. The combat development damage reinforcements, and to blind the enemy’s target acqui- staffs recognized that their model for a mechanized infantry sition systems. Unfortunately, the provision of air support was brigade was no better than an even match for a Red Army still unresolved. Modern aircraft were regarded as too fast to opponent, and they had to pin a faint hope for success upon allow pilots to do close air support, and the ground battle too leadership and the moral superiority of Canadians. Canadian confused to allow for adequate control. The concept therefore combat developers recognized the need for ‘netcentric’ opera- limited close air support to “general support tasks,” and shuf- tions and deep battle, but lacked the technical means and insti- fled it off for further study.25 tutional support from the air force to make significant progress on either concept. The failure of the combat development pro- The 1966-70 Concept represented an advance in process cess to solve the problem of nuclear warfare should have led over its Gold Rush predecessor. It was comprehensive and to a strategic re-evaluation of the role of the army. Instead, more disciplined in its approach, and it was less prone to vic- concept development issues were raised and went nowhere, timization by the pet ideas of senior officers. It also contained while the army remained chained to the central front of NATO. flashes of real insight regarding the importance of deep battle An attempt to integrate national strategy and the force struc- at the theatre level, and the need for, and advantage of, real- ture of the army lay in the future with the creation of Mobile time information regarding the disposition of its own troops. It Command. Although that would also prove to be an unhappy advocated a “tidy battlefield” made so by electronic position tale, it would not be because the army lacked the capacity to reporting of all vehicles.26 However, the army remained develop force concepts. chained to Canada’s commitment to fight a nuclear war in

Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 43 NOTES

1. J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War within 590 feet with a 20 miles-per-hour headwind. 19. Outline Observer Programme, Exercise Eastern and Keeping the Peace (: University of 9. Ibid. Unfortunately, the actual working papers of Star, Appendix A, AHQ 2001-92/E (Trg) April Toronto Press, 202), p. 341. the various study groups are yet to be located. At 1957, DHH, 114.3Q1 (D6); Report, Exercise 2. Lieutenant-General John H. Cushman, “Challenge this point the complete findings of the study Eastern Star, ECS 201-91/E7 (G), 31 December and Response at the Operational and Tactical groups and their methodology are not known. The 1957, DHH, 432.003 (D1). Levels, 1914-1945” in Allan R. Millett and files reviewed include primarily the CGS’s corre- 20. N.W. Morton to VCGS, Army long range plan- Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, spondence in reaction to the Gold Rush studies. ning, SA/CGS BDF13-1, 4 April 1957, DHH, RG Volume III, The Second World War, (Boston: 10. Disappeared from the planners’ concept, but evi- 73/292; Canadian Army Combat Development Unwin Hyman, 1980), pp. 320-341. dently not from the real world. De Havilland Guide, HQS 2100-2 (DCD), 1 June 1961, DHH, 3. David French, “Doctrine and Organization in the continued to develop the DHC-4 Caribou trans- RG 72/722. British Army, 1919-1932,” The Historical port. The V/STOL Canadair CL-84 tilt-wing 21. Canadian Army Combat Development Guide, Journal, 44:2 (June 2001), pp. 514-515. transport also seems to have been funded through HQS 2100-2 (DCD), 1 June 1961, Annex ‘A’, 4. Exercise Gold Rush, Terms of Reference for a this initiative. This aircraft first flew in 1965, and History of Combat Development in the Canadian Study of the Organization of field formations to stayed in development into the early 1970s. Army, DHH, RG 72/722. meet conditions of future war, HQS 1200-G9 Although prototypes were successful, it did not 22. Land Combat in a Nuclear War, CAORE Working (ACS), 15 February 1955, Department of National find a customer. Paper 58/18, DHH, RG 73/1327. Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage, RG 11. Brief for the Chief of the General Staff, Exercise 23. Major-General J.V. Allard to all GOCs and 73/1299. All subsequent references to Defence Gold Rush, HQS 2001-91/G9 (Ex GR), 12 Jun Brigade Commanders, December 1958, DHH, archives will be cited as “DHH.” 1956, DHH, RG 73/1299; Gold Rush, Tactical RG 73/1327. 5. Simonds to MND, 14 March 1955, cited in Brief Concept of Operations, n.d.[1955?], DHH, 24. Canadian Army Operations Research for the Chief of the General Staff, Exercise Gold 400.0199 (D1). Establishment, Leadership Requirements Tactical Rush, HQS 2001-91/G9 (Ex GR), 12 June 1956, 12. Gold-Rush Tactical Concept of Operations. Concept 1966-70, Report No. 120, July 1961, DHH, RG 73/1299. 13. Record of a meeting to discuss both the tactical DHH, RG 81/5. 6. Record of a meeting held in the office of the Chief concept and the future of Exercise Gold Rush, 25. The Canadian Army 1966-70 Tactical and of the General Staff on Wednesday, 19 January ACS/M (56)11, 21 June 1956, DHH, RG 73/1299. Logistic Concept, Third Draft, CDY 59-2-1, HQS 1955, to discuss logistic support by aircraft in the 14. H.D. Graham to VCDS, 26 June 1956, DHH, RG 2100-2-1 (DCD), 8 August 1961, DHH RG forward area, ACS/M(55)1, 21 January 1955, 73/1299. 81/616. The Concept is too voluminous to be fully DHH, RG 73/1299. 15. H.D. Graham to Minister of National Defence, 26 discussed here. It anticipates both Air/Land Battle 7. Exercise Gold Rush Terms of Reference. June 1956, DHH, RG 73/1299. and ‘netcentric’ warfare. 8. Army Council Secretariat, Record of a meeting to 16. Exercise Gold Rush, HQS 2001-92/F15 (Ex GR), 26. How this would have been achieved prior to the discuss the military characteristics of a light cargo 3 July 1956, DHH, RG 73/1299. invention of GPS is unclear, especially since the sig- aircraft, ACCS/M(55)5, 10 June 1955, DHH, RG 17. Operation Fire-Fly, HQS 2001-91/F15 (Ex GR), nals part of the concept already expressed concerns 73/1299. Simonds proved to be correct in his opti- 28 Sep 1956, DHH, RG 73/1299. about channel capacity. Nevertheless, the Concept mism regarding performance. By 1958, the de 18. H.D. Graham to Brigadier M.P. Bogert, postulated “vehicle navigation aid,” a “simple hook- Havilland Caribou was flying in US Army service. Commandant, Canadian Army Staff College, Fort up to the rear link radio set” and a display with “three It could take off in zero wind within 1040 feet and Frontenac, 27 November 1956, DHH, RG 73/1299. dials showing a six-figure map reference.” DND photo ZK 1926-2

44 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010