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Daring Secret Mission Reaps Soviet Gold ‘Vulnerable From Above’ Rising Drone Attacks Drive New Technology, Tactics PRODUCING EXPERT SOLDIERS WITH DIGITAL COACHES PAGE 8 MEDEVAC PILOTS GO ABOVE AND BEYOND PAGE 18 GAME ON FOR SYNTHETIC TRAINING PAGE 26 Reviews Daring Secret Mission Reaps Soviet Gold Betrayal in Berlin: The True Story where phone lines would be tapped. The of the Cold War’s Most Audacious tunnel was dug mostly using the Army Espionage Operation. Steve Vogel. entrenching tool because it was suitable Custom House. 530 pages. $36.99 for working in small spaces. Working eight-hour shifts, with officers By Rick Maze often digging alongside the enlisted mem- Editor in Chief bers, the team reached the border to the Soviet Zone in November. They reached resented as a true-life spy story re- the critical spot to tap the communications Pcounting the damage done by notori- line by the end of February, and British ous British traitor George Blake, a new soldiers stepped in to dig up to the cable book by historian and former Washington lines and tap them. On May 11, 1955, they Post reporter Steve Vogel provides new tapped the first of three cables, each car- details about Operation Gold, a Cold rying 98 telephone or telegraph circuits. War mission undertaken by the U.S. Signal Corps soldiers began the process Army Corps of Engineers and the Army of recording communications and sending Signal Corps to tunnel from the Ameri- them off for translation. They were des- can sector of divided Berlin into the So- ignated the 22nd Army Security Agency viet sector to tap communications lines. Detachment, 7222nd Defense Unit. Betrayal in Berlin: The True Story of Much of the information was gossip, the Cold War’s Most Audacious Espionage but there were also details about equip- Operation recounts that Operation Gold audience, it also benefits from Vogel talk- ment shortages, budget problems and was a success as the U.S. and Britain re- ing with retired U.S. Army Col. Keith Soviet politics. ceived mountains of intelligence over an Comstock, one of the Corps of Engineers The tapping continued for 11 months 11-month, 11-day period thanks to the in- officers who oversaw the digging of the and 11 days, ending when Soviet officials genuity of American and British engineers tunnel (he was a captain at the time), and determined their spy, Blake, wouldn’t be who dug by hand a more than 1,400-foot reading the papers of former Army Capt. uncovered and after heavy flooding caused tunnel that ended up exactly under a cable Robert Williamson, another engineer who shorts in the communications lines, giving junction. promised an interview but died before it them an excuse to go looking for the com- Undertaken as a secret mission by the could be scheduled. munications leak. On April 22, 1956, the U.S. Army, the rub in the story is the tun- The Army digging unit formed begin- nel and monitoring of phone lines weren’t ning in May 1954, known as the 8598th a secret to Soviet intelligence. They knew Engineer Support Team, consisted of about it before the first shovel of sandy soil three officers and 15 enlisted soldiers was removed, but they kept quiet—not picked in part because they already had even telling senior Soviet officers whose secret security clearances in a bid to avoid calls were clandestinely transcribed for any delays or extra attention. They later American and British intelligence agen- re-formed as the 9539th Technical Service cies—because they wanted to protect Unit, part of the Signal Corps, to deceive Blake, their well-placed spy whose job their true purpose. in the British Secret Intelligence Service, The digging of what ended up being known as MI6, made him valuable. Blake the more than 1,400-foot tunnel began was one of the few people aware of the tun- on Sept. 2, 1954, from inside a warehouse nel plans, and the KGB feared he’d come built in a farmer’s field. They hit water after under immediate suspicion if efforts were a few feet, an unexpected development made to interfere with the bold initiative. that delayed work for a month while they Vogel’s story benefits from interviews came up with new plans to create a 6-foot- with Blake, now a 96-year-old KGB pen- diameter tunnel 16 feet below the surface WIKIPEDIA sioner living in Moscow, but for an Army that would end at a critical junction box George Blake in the 1950s. November 2019 ■ ARMY 65 tunnel was “discovered,” with U.S. Army in espionage. But this didn’t work exactly Vogel writes that the officers, includ- soldiers told to retreat to American-held as planned, as news reports described in ing Comstock and Williamson, received territory but take no actions that might wonder the expertise shown in the con- Legion of Merit medals and the enlisted start a war. struction of the tunnel and praised the engineer soldiers who dug the tunnel Discovery of the tunnel created an inter- daring U.S. effort. On May 3, 1956, the received Army Commendation Medals national incident, with American soldiers tunnel was opened to visitors. Some sec- while also being sworn to secrecy. The end sworn to secrecy. Soviet authorities tried tions of the tunnel remain on display in of the Cold War led to the declassification to give the U.S. a black eye for engaging the Allied Museum in Berlin. of the tunnel project. ✭ WWII Leaders Intent on Bettering Themselves Generals in the Making: How backs—shaped the leaders. He spends a Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and significant amount of time covering the Their Peers Became the Commanders role that Maj. Gen. Fox Conner played Who Won World War II. in their lives, and how Conner set Eisen- Benjamin Runkle. Stackpole Books. hower on a course to be Supreme Allied $34.95 Commander. Runkle also does an excellent job of By Maj. Joe Byerly illuminating the Army officer networks that were present before the outbreak of hen we think about Gens. Dwight war that proved critical to the United WD. Eisenhower, Douglas MacAr- States’ success during the war. They cre- thur and George S. Patton Jr., we re- ated a foundation of trust that is neces- member them as the great commanders sary during conflict. For example, Gens. they were during World War II. We tend Omar N. Bradley, Walter Bedell Smith, to forget that they were once lieutenants, J. Lawton Collins and Maxwell D. Tay- captains and majors. We forget their des- lor all worked for Chief of Staff of the tiny was not preordained, and there were Army Gen. George C. Marshall during institutions, people, events and experi- pre-war mobilization. Eisenhower served ences that prepared them for their war- in MacArthur’s front office in multiple time leadership. assignments, and the friendship Eisen- In his latest book, Generals in the Mak- hower and Patton developed while serv- ing: How Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, erals in the Making, Runkle makes three ing together as field grade officers proved and Their Peers Became the Commanders important contributions to the profes- vital in keeping Patton in position during Who Won World War II, Benjamin Runkle sion of arms. First, he helps us better the war. examines the careers of several World War understand how American World War I recommend this book not only for II commanders to discover what influ- II leaders developed into successful war- World War II history buffs, but more enced them to successfully lead the men time commanders. Second, he validates importantly, also for company and field and women of “the greatest generation.” the Army’s leader development model by grade officers. Too often, officers rely on Runkle uses the current Army leader showing how the influences of all three the lessons they learn and skills they de- development model as the holistic lens domains are important in the develop- velop in the operational and institutional through which to view their careers. This ment of operational and strategic leaders. domains, putting little effort in the self- model takes into account the institu- Finally, he points out that of the three development domain. tional, operational and self-development domains, it’s the self-development do- In reading Generals in the Making, mili- domains. main that sets these leaders apart from tary leaders will see the important role the The institutional domain includes pro- others: “In the end, variables that today nontangible aspects of the profession play fessional military education and the pro- would be classified as falling within the in leader development: the time we spend motion process. The operational domain ‘self-development domain’ appear to have reflecting, the books we read and the men- includes specific assignments in units. been the most significant for America’s tors we listen to. ✭ Finally, the self-development domain World War II generals.” includes the investment the individuals This book is not a heavy academic tome; Maj. Joe Byerly is an armor officer and re- make in themselves by absorbing lessons Runkle is a great narrator. His description cently served as a special adviser with the from books and mentors and by reflecting of events is easily readable, and he moves U.S. Special Operations Command. He is on their own experiences. beyond military experiences to also show a Non-Resident Fellow at West Point’s By using the Army’s leader develop- how real-life experiences—divorce, the Modern War Institute and is the founder of ment model as the framework for Gen- loss of children and other personal set- the website From the Green Notebook.
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