DOCSLIB.ORG

Gary Bruce on Battleground Berlin: CIA Vs KGB in the Cold

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Gary Bruce on Battleground Berlin: CIA Vs KGB in the Cold David E. Murphy, Sergi A. Kondrashev, George Bailey.. Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997. xxv + 672 pp. $30.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-300-07233-4. Reviewed by Gary Bruce Published on H-German (October, 1998) The wealth of archival material available extent on a vast array of sources from both Soviet from Eastern Europe continues to make the Cold and American archives. To be sure, much of the War a fertile topic of examination for historians. story is based on the recollections of the co-au‐ The latest works on the Cold War based on new thors, but these are tempered by supporting evi‐ archival sources tend to have an immediate im‐ dence. pact on Cold War historiography by virtue of the In this work, the reader is treated to a sober details they provide on events which had been and balanced account of major Cold War events poorly illuminated. There is, of course, a consider‐ in Germany as interpreted by the American and able range in the scholarly treatment of the new Soviet intelligence services. The authors' smooth material. Battleground Berlin has virtually no narrative touches on the primary events that will counterpart in the historiography, although in be familiar to most historians of post-war Europe: terms of intriguing revelations one is inclined to the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War and its effect compare it with Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher on Germany, the 17 June 1953 uprising in East Andrew's KGB: The Inside Story (New York: Harp‐ Germany, the Otto John case, the Berlin Tunnel, er Collins, 1990). Battleground Berlin represents and the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 which culminat‐ the frst time in the post-Cold War era that former ed in the building of the Berlin Wall. CIA and KGB officers have come together to write The authors portray in an interesting manner about the history of American and Soviet intelli‐ the intelligence organizations in Germany in the gence operations in Berlin from the end of the initial postwar years. The view put forth is one war until the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. that has long been accepted but not documented The work is not simply the memoirs of David to the extent it is in this work: The fedgling CIA Murphy, former chief of the CIA's Berlin Opera‐ was naive and unprepared compared to the sea‐ tions Base (BOB), and Sergei Kondrashev, former soned opponent in the KGB. The authors point head of the KGB's German department and active out, for example, that BOB did not receive its frst measures department, but relies to a considerable H-Net Reviews Russian speaker until 1947 (p. 23). In contrast, the ern counter-blockade as contributing to the Soviet Soviets in Germany were preparing for intelli‐ decision to lift the Berlin Blockade. gence operations in the West "as the fronts ad‐ The reluctance on the part of Soviet intelli‐ vanced into Germany (p. 33)." The authors at‐ gence officers to pass on intelligence that ran tribute this position to the deep-seated paranoia counter to Stalin's expectations is a theme that which characterized Soviet Russia (p. 26), as per‐ runs through the discussion on the Korean War. sonified in Joseph Stalin. Institutionalized suspi‐ The reader is astounded by the degree of Soviet cion in the Soviet Union is becoming one of the penetration of Western governments, and by the more intriguing revelations of the post-Cold War high-grade intelligence which the Soviets pos‐ era, as accounted masterfully in Vojtech Mastny's sessed. The Soviet foreign intelligence agency, the The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (New York: Committee of Intelligence (KI), for example, pos‐ Oxford University Press, 1996). sessed detailed accounts of a conversation be‐ Battleground Berlin sets out to describe in de‐ tween the frst West German chancellor, Konrad tail the major Cold War events in Germany, and Adenauer, and the French High Commissioner specifically Berlin, as they related to intelligence. Andre Francois-Poncet on the subject of rearma‐ The account of the Berlin Blockade makes clear ment. As a rule, KI reports on West German rear‐ that the Soviets had reliable information on the mament did not reach Stalin, for the simple rea‐ position of the Western governments, but that this son that the rearmament programme had been information was not translated into useful knowl‐ prompted by Stalin's decision to support the edge because the Soviet leaders rejected intelli‐ North's invasion of South Korea. Such reports gence that did not conform to their preconcep‐ would have been unacceptable to Stalin, because tions. As a result, Soviet intelligence officers often they would have exposed his Korean initiative for "appropriately" adjusted negative intelligence be‐ what it was--a disaster for Soviet policy in Ger‐ fore distributing it to higher levels of the Commu‐ many (p. 89). The internal politics of Stalin's Sovi‐ nist Party, or simply did not distribute discourag‐ et Union meant that raw intelligence was general‐ ing intelligence. On the other hand, the authors ly not translated into a useful product. argue, the West opted to continue the Airlift in Operation Gold, the joint American/British part because of reassurance by BOB reports that Berlin Tunnel operation also receives prominent the Soviets did not intend to take military action consideration in Battleground Berlin. The tunnel, against the West for continuing the Airlift (p. 62). built in 1955, ran from the American sector in This analysis of the effect of BOB intelligence on southern Berlin into the Soviet sector, allowing American policy during the Berlin Airlift is the CIA to tap Soviet military communications. provocative, but the evidence to support it is dis‐ The authors do not attempt to dispute the fact that appointing. The authors cite an interview with the Soviets knew about the Tunnel at an early Gordon Stewart, the head of the German mission stage through George Blake, the British intelli‐ in Heidelberg, as their primary evidence that "se‐ gence officer who was working for the KGB (Blake nior policymakers in Germany and Washington" was handled by co-author Kondrashev). The au‐ were making extensive use of BOB reporting (p. thors do seem intent, however, on dispelling the 62). This is insufficient evidence to support the au‐ myth that the Soviets sent disinformation across thors' contention: "Information obtained by CIA's the lines and that, therefore, the West received no Berlin Operations Base had a significant and im‐ intelligence of value from the tapped lines. They mediate effect on US decisions about West Berlin provide a list of valuable intelligence which was and West Germany (p. 78)." Furthermore, the transmitted in the course of the 443,000 conversa‐ reader might have expected mention of the West‐ 2 H-Net Reviews tions recorded during the Berlin Tunnel's 11 suggests that this omission may not have been en‐ months in operation (Appendix 5). tirely due to negligence. It is striking, for example, Battleground Berlin provides the greatest de‐ that the East German secret police, the Ministry tail presently available on American and Soviet for State Security (MfS) (chapter six, chapter ff‐ intelligence organizations during a number of sig‐ teen) receives considerable attention, but the nificant Cold War events. It successfully untangles creature of the CIA, the Gehlen Org and its succes‐ the numerous Soviet bureaucratic agencies and sor the BND do not. The authors do not provide a departments involved in foreign espionage from citation for the claim that the Americans did not one another. Its main strength, however, lies in its employ ex-Gestapo or SS officers in their intelli‐ portrayal of the inner workings of the Soviet sys‐ gence services, but say that the "Soviet services tem which effectively hindered reliable intelli‐ were never so constrained (p. 19)." Although this gence from becoming a useful product in policy- may well be the case, recent evidence on the MfS making. Stalin's Soviet Union by its very nature suggests that the East German police, which was broke the intelligence cycle. ultimately run by the Soviets, did not employ Nazi intelligence officers on the permanent rolls. Stylis‐ The weaknesses of this work, however, de‐ tically, it is odd that crucial analysis would be rel‐ tract from its overall contribution to the feld. Per‐ egated to appendices, rather than incorporated haps the most disappointing aspect of this work is into the main text, as is the case in the discussion that it falls short of its billing in the introduction: of the Berlin Tunnel. Lastly, the repeated explicit "The great story of this book is how information references to the novelty of the material in the becomes knowledge and how this knowledge gets form of phrases like "never before revealed" (pp. transmuted into political policy (p. xxv)." As men‐ 38, 40, 49, 51, 65, 79, 87, 103, 113, etc.) is tiresome. tioned above, the account of the Soviet side shows precisely how information does not become politi‐ Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ cal policy. This, at least, is an important conclu‐ served. This work may be copied for non-profit sion. The same cannot be said for the American educational use if proper credit=20 is given to the side. There is little evidence of the ultimate effect author and the list. For other permission, please of BOB information on American policymaking contact [email protected]. regarding Berlin and Germany during the Cold War. The authors provide suggestions of such an effect in the discussion of the Berlin Blockade and of the Berlin Wall, but certainly not sufficient evi‐ dence to support the claim in the introduction.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Maoism Versus Opportunism in Turkey
    Maoism Versus Opportunism in Turkey The article below is excerpted from a letter written by the Committee of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (CoRIM) to the Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) in mid-2001. The TKP/ML is one of several political centres that emerged from the formerly united Communist Party of Turkey Marxist-Leninist (TKPML), which was a founding participant of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement in 1984. During the course of a series of splits and realignments among Party forces, several centres of the TKPML have emerged, each of which continues to use the name of the Party and claim its heritage. The names of the two largest groupings that exist today are distinguished only by punctuation marks: the TKP(ML) and the TKP/ML. In the RIM Committee letter, reference is made to other centres that have existed in the course of the Party’s history, in particular the TKP/ML (Maoist Party Centre), which continues today, and the TKP/ML East Anatolia Regional Committee, usually referred to by its Turkish initials DABK, which merged with the TKP/ML Central Committee to form the TKP/ML Provisional United Central Committee in 1994 and which subsequently split into the above-mentioned TKP/ML, which publishes Ozgur Gelecek, and TKP(ML). To minimise confusion concerning the names of the different Party centres, no punctuation is used when referring to the previously united TKPML of 1984 and earlier, and the other centres are referred to by the punctuation they use themselves. As the letter makes clear, from the formation of RIM onwards serious differences emerged between the TKPML and RIM, and a long process of discussion and struggle has gone on involving the different centres that emerged from the previously united TKPML.
    [Show full text]
  • John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University
    Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Master's Theses (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin Nicholas Labinski Marquette University Recommended Citation Labinski, Nicholas, "Evolution of a President: John F. Kennedy and Berlin" (2011). Master's Theses (2009 -). Paper 104. http://epublications.marquette.edu/theses_open/104 EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN by Nicholas Labinski A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Milwaukee, Wisconsin August 2011 ABSTRACT EVOLUTION OF A PRESIDENT: JOHN F. KENNEDYAND BERLIN Nicholas Labinski Marquette University, 2011 This paper examines John F. Kennedy’s rhetoric concerning the Berlin Crisis (1961-1963). Three major speeches are analyzed: Kennedy’s Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis , the Address at Rudolph Wilde Platz and the Address at the Free University. The study interrogates the rhetorical strategies implemented by Kennedy in confronting Khrushchev over the explosive situation in Berlin. The paper attempts to answer the following research questions: What is the historical context that helped frame the rhetorical situation Kennedy faced? What rhetorical strategies and tactics did Kennedy employ in these speeches? How might Kennedy's speeches extend our understanding of presidential public address? What is the impact of Kennedy's speeches on U.S. German relations and the development of U.S. and German Policy? What implications might these speeches have for the study and execution of presidential power and international diplomacy? Using a historical-rhetorical methodology that incorporates the historical circumstances surrounding the crisis into the analysis, this examination of Kennedy’s rhetoric reveals his evolution concerning Berlin and his Cold War strategy.
    [Show full text]
  • 2 the Reform of the Warsaw Pact
    Research Collection Working Paper Learning from the enemy NATO as a model for the Warsaw Pact Author(s): Mastny, Vojtech Publication Date: 2001 Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-004148840 Rights / License: In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more information please consult the Terms of use. ETH Library Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Nr.58 Vojtech Mastny Learning from the Enemy NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact Hrsg.: Kurt R. Spillmann und Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich CONTENTS Preface 5 Introduction 7 1 The Creation of the Warsaw Pact (1955-65) 9 2The Reform of the Warsaw Pact (1966-69) 19 3 The Demise of the Warsaw Pact (1969-91) 33 Conclusions 43 Abbreviations 45 Bibliography 47 coordinator of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw PREFACE Pact (PHP), closely connected with the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research (CSS) at the ETH Zürich. The CSS launched the PHP in 1999 together with the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project in Washington, DC, and the Institute of Military History, in Vienna. In 1955, the Warsaw Pact was created as a mirror image of NATO that could be negotiated away if favorable international conditions allowed Even though the Cold War is over, most military documents from this the Soviet Union to benefit from a simultaneous dissolution of both period are still being withheld for alleged or real security reasons.
    [Show full text]
  • THE BERLIN-KOREA PARALLEL: BERLIN and AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY in LIGHT of the KOREAN WAR Author(S): DAVID G
    THE BERLIN-KOREA PARALLEL: BERLIN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN LIGHT OF THE KOREAN WAR Author(s): DAVID G. COLEMAN Reviewed work(s): Source: Australasian Journal of American Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (July, 1999), pp. 19-41 Published by: Australia and New Zealand American Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41018739 . Accessed: 18/09/2012 14:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Australia and New Zealand American Studies Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Australasian Journal of American Studies. http://www.jstor.org AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES 19 THE BERLIN-KOREA PARALLEL: BERLIN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN LIGHT OF THE KOREAN WAR DAVID G. COLEMAN The Korean War had a profoundimpact on the ways in which American policymakersperceived the Cold War.Nowhere was thismore fact evident than in the case of Berlin. Despite the geographicalseparation between the two countries,policymakers became concernedwith what theyidentified as the 'Berlin-Koreaparallel.' Holding the Soviet Union responsible for North Korea's aggression,Washington believed that in NorthKorea's attackit was witnessing a new Sovietcapability that could give theUSSR a decisiveedge in the Cold War.
    [Show full text]
  • August 17, 1945 Draft Message from Joseph Stalin to Harry S. Truman
    Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified August 17, 1945 Draft Message from Joseph Stalin to Harry S. Truman Citation: “Draft Message from Joseph Stalin to Harry S. Truman,” August 17, 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGASPI Fond 558, Opis 11, Delo 372, List 111. Translated by Sergey Radchenko. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122330 Summary: Stalin requests that the Soviet Union gain possession of the Kurile Islands and the northern half of the island of Hokkaido, Japan. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation I received your message with “General Order No. 1.” In the main I do not object to the content of the order. With this, one has in mind that Liaodong Peninsula is a constituent part of Manchuria. However, I propose to introduce the following amendments to “General Order No. 1”: 1. Include all of the Kurile Islands, which, according to the decision of the third powers in the Crimea must pass into the possession of the Soviet Union, into the region of surrender by Japanese armed forces to Soviet forces. 2. Include the northern half of the island of Hokkaido, which adjoins in the North the Laperouse Strait, located between Karafuto and Hokkaido, into the region of surrender by Japanese armed forces to Soviet forces. The demarcation line between the northern and southern halves of the island of Hokkaido is to be drawn along the line, extending from the town of Kushiro on the eastern coast of the island until the town of Rumoe [sic] on the western coast of the island, including the said towns in the northern half of the island.
    [Show full text]
  • History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement 145 History, Grand Strategy And
    History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement 145 History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ John Lewis Gaddis Some principles of strategy are so basic that when stated they sound like platitudes: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to acknowledge error. All fairly straightforward, one might think. Who could object to them? And yet – consider the Clinton administration’s single most important foreign-policy initiative: the decision to expand NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. NATO enlargement, I believe, manages to violate every one of the strategic principles just mentioned. Perhaps that is why historians – normally so contentious – are in uncharacteristic agreement: with remarkably few exceptions, they see NATO enlargement as ill-conceived, ill-timed, and above all ill-suited to the realities of the post-Cold War world. Indeed I can recall no other moment in my own experience as a practising historian at which there was less support, within the community of historians, for an announced policy position. A significant gap has thus opened between those who make grand strategy and those who reflect upon it: on this issue at least, official and accumulated wisdom are pointing in very different directions. This article focuses on how this has happened, which leads us back to a list of basic principles for grand strategy. First, consider the magnanimous treatment of defeated adversaries. There are three great points of reference here – 1815–18, 1918–19 and 1945–48 – and historians are in general accord as to the lessons to be drawn from each.
    [Show full text]
  • WHO's WHO in the WAR in EUROPE the War in Europe 7 CHARLES DE GAULLE
    who’s Who in the War in Europe (National Archives and Records Administration, 342-FH-3A-20068.) POLITICAL LEADERS Allies FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT When World War II began, many Americans strongly opposed involvement in foreign conflicts. President Roosevelt maintained official USneutrality but supported measures like the Lend-Lease Act, which provided invaluable aid to countries battling Axis aggression. After Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war on the United States, Roosevelt rallied the country to fight the Axis powers as part of the Grand Alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. (Image: Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-128765.) WINSTON CHURCHILL In the 1930s, Churchill fiercely opposed Westernappeasement of Nazi Germany. He became prime minister in May 1940 following a German blitzkrieg (lightning war) against Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. He then played a pivotal role in building a global alliance to stop the German juggernaut. One of the greatest orators of the century, Churchill raised the spirits of his countrymen through the war’s darkest days as Germany threatened to invade Great Britain and unleashed a devastating nighttime bombing program on London and other major cities. (Image: Library of Congress, LC-USW33-019093-C.) JOSEPH STALIN Stalin rose through the ranks of the Communist Party to emerge as the absolute ruler of the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, he conducted a reign of terror against his political opponents, including much of the country’s top military leadership. His purge of Red Army generals suspected of being disloyal to him left his country desperately unprepared when Germany invaded in June 1941.
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of the Cold War
    Timeline of the Cold War 1945 Defeat of Germany and Japan February 4-11: Yalta Conference meeting of FDR, Churchill, Stalin - the 'Big Three' Soviet Union has control of Eastern Europe. The Cold War Begins May 8: VE Day - Victory in Europe. Germany surrenders to the Red Army in Berlin July: Potsdam Conference - Germany was officially partitioned into four zones of occupation. August 6: The United States drops atomic bomb on Hiroshima (20 kiloton bomb 'Little Boy' kills 80,000) August 8: Russia declares war on Japan August 9: The United States drops atomic bomb on Nagasaki (22 kiloton 'Fat Man' kills 70,000) August 14 : Japanese surrender End of World War II August 15: Emperor surrender broadcast - VJ Day 1946 February 9: Stalin hostile speech - communism & capitalism were incompatible March 5 : "Sinews of Peace" Iron Curtain Speech by Winston Churchill - "an "iron curtain" has descended on Europe" March 10: Truman demands Russia leave Iran July 1: Operation Crossroads with Test Able was the first public demonstration of America's atomic arsenal July 25: America's Test Baker - underwater explosion 1947 Containment March 12 : Truman Doctrine - Truman declares active role in Greek Civil War June : Marshall Plan is announced setting a precedent for helping countries combat poverty, disease and malnutrition September 2: Rio Pact - U.S. meet 19 Latin American countries and created a security zone around the hemisphere 1948 Containment February 25 : Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia March 2: Truman's Loyalty Program created to catch Cold War
    [Show full text]
  • The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan
    LSE Research Online Article (refereed) Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe The tragedy of American diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan Originally published in Journal of Cold War studies, 7 (1), pp. 97-134 © 2005 MIT Press. You may cite this version as: Cox, Michael and Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline (2005). The tragedy of American diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan [online]. London: LSE Research Online. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000764 Available online: May 2006 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk Contact LSE Research Online at: [email protected] CoxThe Tragedyand Kennedy-Pipe of American Diplomacy? Special Forum: The Marshall Plan and the Origins of the Cold War Reassessed The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan ✣ Rethinking the Cold War If we take seriously E. H. Carr’s dictum that history is not a single, well- deªned narrative but a terrain of contestation between competing and evolv- ing interpretations whose inºuence is as much shaped by time and place as by any given set of facts, it should come as no great shock to discover that the past is constantly being reassessed or, to use the more familiar term, “revised” by successive generations of historians.1 The post-1945 period in general, and the Cold War conºict in particular, has been no exception to this simple but im- portant historiographic rule.
    [Show full text]
  • John F. Kennedy at American University: the Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace
    The College of Wooster Open Works All Faculty Articles All Faculty Scholarship 2014 John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace Denise M. Bostdorff The College of Wooster, [email protected] Shawna Ferris The College of Wooster Follow this and additional works at: https://openworks.wooster.edu/facpub Recommended Citation Bostdorff, Denise M. and Ferris, Shawna, "John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace" (2014). Quarterly Journal of Speech, 100(4), 407-441. 10.1080/00335630.2014.989895. Retrieved from https://openworks.wooster.edu/ facpub/239 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Faculty Scholarship at Open Works, a service of The College of Wooster Libraries. This article is a(n) Accepted Manuscript and was originally published in Quarterly Journal of Speech (2014), available at https://doi.org/10.1080/00335630.2014.989895. For questions about OpenWorks, please contact [email protected]. John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace Denise M. Bostdorff and Shawna H. Ferris Abstract: In his American University address, Kennedy employed epideictic progression, a pedagogical process drawing upon dissociation and epideictic norms to convince listeners, gradually, to embrace a new vision—in this case, a world in which a test ban treaty with the USSR was possible. To do so, Kennedy’s words: (1) united the audience behind the value of “genuine peace”; (2) humanized the Soviets as worthy partners in genuine peace; (3) established the reality of the Cold War and the credibility of US leadership; and (4) connected lessons on genuine peace to domestic civil rights.
    [Show full text]
  • Stalin Revolutionary in an Era of War 1St Edition Pdf, Epub, Ebook
    STALIN REVOLUTIONARY IN AN ERA OF WAR 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Kevin McDermott | 9780333711224 | | | | | Stalin Revolutionary in an Era of War 1st edition PDF Book It was under this name that he went to Switzerland in the winter of , where he met with Lenin and collaborated on a theoretical work, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question. They argue that in the article On the Slogan for a United States of Europe the expression "triumph of socialism [ Seller Rating:. Vladimir Lenin died in January and by the end of that year in the second edition of the book Stalin's position started to turn around as he claimed that "the proletariat can and must build the socialist society in one country". Modern History Review. Refresh and try again. Tucker's subject, however, which isn't Mont I have admired Robert Tucker's work for decades now, and I am glad at long last to take up the first of his two volume study of Stalin. Brazil United Kingdom United States. Retrieved August 27, Egan The major difficulty is a lack of agreement about what should constitute Stalinism. Stalin and Lenin were close friends, judging from this photograph. He wrote that the concept of Stalinism was developed after by Western intellectuals so as to be able to keep alive the communist ideal. Retrieved September 20, Palgrave Macmillan UK. Antonio rated it it was amazing Jun 04, Retrieved 7 October During the quarter of a century preceding his death, the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin probably exercised greater political power than any other figure in history.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolving Interpretations of the Origins of the Cold War
    Háskóli Íslands Hugvísindasvið Rússneska The Evolving Interpretations of the Origins of the Cold War Have Historians Reached a Consensus on the Origins of the Cold War? Ritgerð til B.A. prófs Saga Helgason Morris Kt.: 011097-3329 Leiðbeinandi: Jón Ólafsson 1 Abstract The Cold War and its origins have been a constant source of debate among historians and quite rightly so. With no access to Soviet archives until 1991 and the outcome of the hostilities unknown, historians were left to draw their own conclusions from official documents and published propaganda. Hence, as with any historical event, interpretations have changed over time. In this paper, I set out to explore whether assessments have shifted to a degree whereby historians today have come together in their understanding of the origins of the Cold War. In order to answer this question, an investigation is required to explore how and why these historical perspectives have changed. First, the two traditional viewpoints of the Cold War are discussed, namely the orthodox and revisionist interpretations. The orthodox view places responsibility on the USSR for the development of the Cold War whereas the revisionist view argues that the hostilities developed as a result of reacting to one another’s actions. Subsequently, the viewpoints of a selected group of post-Cold War historians are explored. Gaddis argues that hostilities between the United States and Soviet Union had their roots in the nations’ different perceptions of security. Zubok and Pleshakov maintain that Stalin’s character and diplomatic actions were of particular importance in the onset of the Cold War.
    [Show full text]