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Gary Bruce on Battleground Berlin: CIA Vs KGB in the Cold

Gary Bruce on Battleground Berlin: CIA Vs KGB in the Cold

David E. Murphy, Sergi A. Kondrashev, George Bailey.. Battleground : CIA vs KGB in the . New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997. xxv + 672 pp. $30.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-300-07233-4.

Reviewed by Gary Bruce

Published on H-German (October, 1998)

The wealth of archival material available extent on a vast array of sources from both Soviet from Eastern continues to make the Cold and American archives. To be sure, much of the War a fertile topic of examination for historians. story is based on the recollections of the co-au‐ The latest works on the Cold War based on new thors, but these are tempered by supporting evi‐ archival sources tend to have an immediate im‐ dence. pact on Cold War historiography by virtue of the In this work, the reader is treated to a sober details they provide on events which had been and balanced account of major Cold War events poorly illuminated. There is, of course, a consider‐ in as interpreted by the American and able range in the scholarly treatment of the new Soviet intelligence services. The authors' smooth material. Battleground Berlin has virtually no narrative touches on the primary events that will counterpart in the historiography, although in be familiar to most historians of post-war Europe: terms of intriguing revelations one is inclined to the Berlin , the and its efect compare it with Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher on Germany, the 17 June 1953 uprising in East Andrew's KGB: The Inside Story (New York: Harp‐ Germany, the Otto John case, the Berlin Tunnel, er Collins, 1990). Battleground Berlin represents and the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961 which culminat‐ the frst time in the post-Cold War era that former ed in the building of the . CIA and KGB ofcers have come together to write The authors portray in an interesting manner about the history of American and Soviet intelli‐ the intelligence organizations in Germany in the gence operations in Berlin from the end of the initial postwar years. The view put forth is one war until the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. that has long been accepted but not documented The work is not simply the memoirs of David to the extent it is in this work: The fedgling CIA Murphy, former chief of the CIA's Berlin Opera‐ was naive and unprepared compared to the sea‐ tions Base (BOB), and Sergei Kondrashev, former soned opponent in the KGB. The authors point head of the KGB's German department and active out, for example, that BOB did not receive its frst measures department, but relies to a considerable H-Net Reviews

Russian speaker until 1947 (p. 23). In contrast, the ern counter-blockade as contributing to the Soviet Soviets in Germany were preparing for intelli‐ decision to lift the . gence operations in the West "as the fronts ad‐ The reluctance on the part of Soviet intelli‐ vanced into Germany (p. 33)." The authors at‐ gence ofcers to pass on intelligence that ran tribute this position to the deep-seated paranoia counter to Stalin's expectations is a theme that which characterized Soviet (p. 26), as per‐ runs through the discussion on the Korean War. sonifed in . Institutionalized suspi‐ The reader is astounded by the degree of Soviet cion in the is becoming one of the penetration of governments, and by the more intriguing revelations of the post-Cold War high-grade intelligence which the Soviets pos‐ era, as accounted masterfully in 's sessed. The Soviet foreign intelligence agency, the The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (New York: Committee of Intelligence (KI), for example, pos‐ , 1996). sessed detailed accounts of a conversation be‐ Battleground Berlin sets out to describe in de‐ tween the frst West German chancellor, Konrad tail the major Cold War events in Germany, and Adenauer, and the High Commissioner specifcally Berlin, as they related to intelligence. Andre Francois-Poncet on the subject of rearma‐ The account of the Berlin Blockade makes clear ment. As a rule, KI reports on West German rear‐ that the Soviets had reliable information on the mament did not reach Stalin, for the simple rea‐ position of the Western governments, but that this son that the rearmament programme had been information was not translated into useful knowl‐ prompted by Stalin's decision to support the edge because the Soviet leaders rejected intelli‐ North's invasion of South Korea. Such reports gence that did not conform to their preconcep‐ would have been unacceptable to Stalin, because tions. As a result, Soviet intelligence ofcers often they would have exposed his Korean initiative for "appropriately" adjusted negative intelligence be‐ what it was--a disaster for Soviet policy in Ger‐ fore distributing it to higher levels of the Commu‐ many (p. 89). The internal politics of Stalin's Sovi‐ nist Party, or simply did not distribute discourag‐ et Union meant that raw intelligence was ‐ ing intelligence. On the other hand, the authors ly not translated into a useful product. argue, the West opted to continue the in Operation Gold, the joint American/British part because of reassurance by BOB reports that Berlin Tunnel operation also receives prominent the Soviets did not intend to take military action consideration in Battleground Berlin. The tunnel, against the West for continuing the Airlift (p. 62). built in 1955, ran from the American sector in This analysis of the efect of BOB intelligence on southern Berlin into the Soviet sector, allowing American policy during the Berlin Airlift is the CIA to tap Soviet military communications. provocative, but the evidence to support it is dis‐ The authors do not attempt to dispute the fact that appointing. The authors cite an interview with the Soviets knew about the Tunnel at an early Gordon Stewart, the head of the German mission stage through , the British intelli‐ in Heidelberg, as their primary evidence that "se‐ gence ofcer who was working for the KGB (Blake nior policymakers in Germany and Washington" was handled by co-author Kondrashev). The au‐ were making extensive use of BOB reporting (p. thors do seem intent, however, on dispelling the 62). This is insufcient evidence to support the au‐ myth that the Soviets sent across thors' contention: "Information obtained by CIA's the lines and that, therefore, the West received no Berlin Operations Base had a signifcant and im‐ intelligence of value from the tapped lines. They mediate efect on US decisions about provide a list of valuable intelligence which was and (p. 78)." Furthermore, the transmitted in the course of the 443,000 conversa‐ reader might have expected mention of the West‐

2 H-Net Reviews tions recorded during the Berlin Tunnel's 11 suggests that this omission may not have been en‐ months in operation (Appendix 5). tirely due to negligence. It is striking, for example, Battleground Berlin provides the greatest de‐ that the East German secret police, the Ministry tail presently available on American and Soviet for State Security (MfS) (chapter six, chapter ff‐ intelligence organizations during a number of sig‐ teen) receives considerable attention, but the nifcant Cold War events. It successfully untangles creature of the CIA, the Gehlen Org and its succes‐ the numerous Soviet bureaucratic agencies and sor the BND do not. The authors do not provide a departments involved in foreign espionage from citation for the claim that the Americans did not one another. Its main strength, however, lies in its employ ex-Gestapo or SS ofcers in their intelli‐ portrayal of the inner workings of the Soviet sys‐ gence services, but say that the "Soviet services tem which efectively hindered reliable intelli‐ were never so constrained (p. 19)." Although this gence from becoming a useful product in policy- may well be the case, recent evidence on the MfS making. Stalin's Soviet Union by its very nature suggests that the East German police, which was broke the intelligence cycle. ultimately run by the Soviets, did not employ Nazi intelligence ofcers on the permanent rolls. Stylis‐ The weaknesses of this work, however, de‐ tically, it is odd that crucial analysis would be rel‐ tract from its overall contribution to the feld. Per‐ egated to appendices, rather than incorporated haps the most disappointing aspect of this work is into the main text, as is the case in the discussion that it falls short of its billing in the introduction: of the Berlin Tunnel. Lastly, the repeated explicit "The great story of this book is how information references to the novelty of the material in the becomes knowledge and how this knowledge gets form of phrases like "never before revealed" (pp. transmuted into political policy (p. xxv)." As men‐ 38, 40, 49, 51, 65, 79, 87, 103, 113, etc.) is tiresome. tioned above, the account of the Soviet side shows precisely how information does not become politi‐ Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ cal policy. This, at least, is an important conclu‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft sion. The same cannot be said for the American educational use if proper credit=20 is given to the side. There is little evidence of the ultimate efect author and the list. For other permission, please of BOB information on American policymaking contact [email protected]. regarding Berlin and Germany during the Cold War. The authors provide suggestions of such an efect in the discussion of the Berlin Blockade and of the Berlin Wall, but certainly not sufcient evi‐ dence to support the claim in the introduction. The work also contains a number of errors or omissions. The authors discuss the role of the Eastern Bureaus of the CDU and SPD, but curious‐ ly omit the FDP's Eastern Bureau (pp. 112-113). The authors' portrayal of the vote held by the SPD in Berlin in 1946 on fusion with the is misleading (p. 13). SPD members rejected immediate fusion with the KPD, and voted over‐ whelmingly to continue to work closely with the Communists, neither of which the authors men‐ tion. The general pro-American stance of the work

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Citation: Gary Bruce. Review of Murphy, David E.; Kondrashev, Sergi A.; Bailey., George. Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War. H-German, H-Net Reviews. October, 1998.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=2393

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