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With Financial Support from USAID Page 1 ________________________ Human Rights House, Block 15 Plot 1853 Lulume Road, Nsambya P.O Box 11027 Kampala, Uganda Tel: +256 – 414 510 263/ 510 498/510 276 Fax: +256-414-510498 THE KENYA GENERAL ELECTIONS - 4th MARCH, 2013 REPORT OF THE CCEDU ELECTION OBSERVATION/STUDY MISSION 26th February – 6th March, 2013 With Financial Support from USAID Page 1 Contents 1.0 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 5 2.0 Background ....................................................................................................................... 7 2.1. Electoral Background ...................................................................................................... 7 2.2. The New Constitution and Electoral Reforms: .............................................................. 7 2.3. Coalitions: .......................................................................................................................... 9 3.0 Kenya - Facts and Figures: ............................................................................................ 11 3.1. General Information ....................................................................................................... 11 3.2. Final Presidential Results: ................................................................................................ 11 4.0 Election Environment: Perceptions: Myths and Reality ............................................. 15 4.1 Youth factor .................................................................................................................... 15 4.2 Generational factor: ...................................................................................................... 15 4.3 Ethnic factor: ................................................................................................................... 16 4.4. Economic factor: ............................................................................................................ 17 4.5. Special interest factor: ................................................................................................... 17 4.6 Political parties: ............................................................................................................... 18 4.7 Security apparatus: ........................................................................................................ 19 4.8 Observers ......................................................................................................................... 20 4.9 Presidential candidates ................................................................................................. 20 4.10 Media ............................................................................................................................... 21 4.11 Civil Society Organizations: .......................................................................................... 23 4.12 Ethnicity: .......................................................................................................................... 24 4.13 Political Part and Campaign Financing…………………………………………………24 5.0 Challenges and opportunities ...................................................................................... 25 5.1 Challenges ...................................................................................................................... 25 Page 2 5.2 Opportunities ................................................................................................................... 27 6.0 Meetings .......................................................................................................................... 30 6.1 Manager Partnerships – Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Ms. Ann Nderitu - Nairobi Serena Hotel .......................................................... 30 6.2 Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) ...................................... 32 6.3 United Democratic Forum (UDF): ................................................................................. 33 6.4 Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) ................................................................. 36 6.5 IEBC Technical Briefing to the International Election Observers .............................. 37 6.6 Election Observers Group, and the Centre for Governance .................................. 39 6.7 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) ................................. 40 6.8 Interaction with the local community; Mr. George Atinga, aka Chairman .......... 42 6.9 Ushahidi/ i Hub ................................................................................................................ 43 7.0 Overall assessment and General Conclusion ............................................................ 45 8.0 Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 47 i) List of Meetings Attended ............................................................................................. 51 ii) CCEDU Mission Team ..................................................................................................... 53 Mission Pictorial Page 3 Acronyms AU African Union BVR Biometric Voter Registration CCEDU Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda CRECO Constitution and Reform Education Consortium CSO Civil Society Organization CORD Coalition for Reforms and Democracy EALA East African Legislative Assembly EAC East African Community ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States E- day Election Day EISA Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa ELOG Election Observers’ Group EU European Union GSU General Service Unit ICC International Criminal Court ICT Information Communication Technology IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission PPLC Political Parties Liaison Committee PVT Parallel Vote Tallying PWDs Persons with Disabilities UDF United Democratic Forum Page 4 1.0 Executive Summary The Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU) is a non- partisan, non-profit making and broad based civil society coalition that brings together like-minded civil society organizations to advocate for comprehensive electoral democracy in Uganda. The paramount agenda of the coalition is to advocate for and promote integrity, transparency and active citizen participation in Uganda’s electoral process. In preparation for the 2011 general elections in Uganda, CCEDU engaged in an electoral reform campaign; and also ran a mass multimedia messaging campaign. The aim was to motivate active citizen participation in the electoral process and to bring the issues and concerns of ordinary Ugandan citizens to the attention of political aspirants through debate forums at the district and national levels. In its post 2011 election activities, CCEDU identified a technical team of experts who carefully studied the recommendations and proposals made by various election observer groups and individuals. The team came up with eight key proposals which herein form the basis for CCEDU’s electoral reform advocacy efforts for the period, 2011 – 2016. In efforts to craft a comprehensive strategy to push forward the electoral reform agenda, especially ahead of the 2016 elections, CCEDU has made election observation/study missions to some countries in the African region like Sierra Leone and Ghana. The study missions have been made possible by the kind financial support from USAID – Uganda; and are ostensibly geared towards enabling CCEDU benchmark best practices that can be applied to the Uganda situation to enable a credible electoral process. It is against this background that CCEDU sent an 8 member team to observe and study the electoral process in Kenya. The elections that were held on 4th March, 2013 were a milestone in the political history of Kenya especially after the 2007/08 post election violence. Of specific significance, the elections were held under a new constitution promulgated in August 2011 that ushered in a raft of reforms including electoral, judicial and land reforms, among others. The team which was in Kenya from 26th February – 6th March, 2013, comprised 3 women and 5 men, representative of the CCEDU membership and secretariat. During the mission, the team interacted with different stakeholders in the electoral process from the IEBC, political parties, civil society organizations, the media and the general public. Lessons were picked on various components of the Kenyan electoral process; ranging from the Page 5 electoral reforms, civic/voter education, election observation, ICT in elections, Parallel Vote Tallying, the media and elections, among others. As a membership platform, CCEDU will engage with the different respective stakeholders; to share experiences and lessons learnt with a view of drawing a winning formula to achieve credible and democratic elections in Uganda. Page 6 2.0 Background 2.1. Electoral Background Kenya’s last general election held on 4th March, 2013 was the fifth election held under a multi party dispensation since the repeal of Section 2A of the constitution which had hitherto made Kenya a de-jure one-party state. The election attracted lots of attention primarily because it followed the disputed 2007 presidential elections whose contentious results triggered riots in Nairobi, Kisumu and the Northern Rift Valley regions. In the end, over 1300 people were killed
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