Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses(1) ―The Case of Ford Title Motor Co.―

Author(s) NISHIMUTA, Yuji

Citation The Kyoto University Economic Review (1997), 65(2): 13-26

Issue Date 1997-03

URL https://doi.org/10.11179/ker1926.65.2_13

Right

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

Textversion publisher

Kyoto University Nazi Economy and U ふBig Businesses (1)

- The Case of Ford Motor Co. 一

砂 Y 吋 i NISHIMUT A *

Introductory ーDefinition of the problem and new material

It has long been acknowledged that the recovery of the German economy under the Weimar system in the 1920s was fueled by the tremendous inflow of U.S. credit into the country based on the Dawes plan , which was intended for America to step in Germany's reparations problem after the cooling down of inflation in 1923. Large floods of credit from America helped German's economic recovery under the so-called “ industry rationalization movement" , which in turn allowed the country to make reparations to Britain and France. The injection of American capital to Gerｭ many took place actually in two forms; the granting of long-term and short-term creｭ dit to German businesses (and municipalities) by means of bonds or through banks , and American corporations' direct investment , or entry into Germany , which were made through the creation of German subsidiaries or acquisition of German firms , keeping some relations with the granting of long-term and short-term credit. The automobile industry was one of the fields in which American investment was most active. We cannot therefore discuss the development of German automobile indusｭ try since that time without giving consideration to the entry into the local market of U.S. corporations involving severe competition. Table 1 shows steps in which Ford and GM made inroads into the German market. Both companies had taken root in Germany following the steps of exporting , knock-down assembly , and formation of local production facilities. However , the outbreak of the 1929 world financial panic caused the United States to withdraw its long-term and short-term credit ぅwhich in turn aggravated Germany's difficulties , opening the way for the Nazi governmen t. This is a well-established argument. Then , how the situation about the American direct investments in Germany was? Direct investments remained where they were made , instead of being withｭ drawn. This naturally give rise to very interesting questions: how did the German subsidiaries of American corporations behave during Germany's economic recovery under Nazi control in the 1930s?; what roles did they play in the Nazi economy , and what relations did they have with the U.S. parent companies? Little work has so l far been done on these problems ). But even simple quantitative indexes (Fig. 1)

* Associate Professor , Faculty of Economics , Kyoto University. 14 Yuji NISHIMUTA

Table I Outline chronological data (Those shown in brackets are general events.)

Year Ford's German Operation GM's German Operation

1925 Knockdown assembly factory (Berlin) Knockdown assembly factory (Berlin) 1929 Recorganiza tion Acquisition of Adam Opel (80%) 1931 Manufacturing factory (Cologne) Acquisition of 100% of Opel shares 1933 [Hitler's taki 時of power] 1934 Reorganization 1935 Start of truck manufacturing 1936 Rubber agreement Meeting betweenJ.D. Mooney and Hitler 1937 1938 Agreement for construction of truck factory in Berlin 1939 [Breakout of WWII] 1940 Production conversion at Russel sheim factorγ 1941 Capital increase [America's entry into the war] 1942 “Bl itz" truck licensing 1943 1944 1945 [May , defeat of Germany]

suggest that in the field of automobile industry , no study could be complete without discussing these questions. And what was the situation after the start of World War II? To consider these problems , it is necessary to divide the war period into two , that is, before and after America's involvement in the war (September , 1939 to December , 1941 and December , 1941 to 1945). What behavior did the German subsidiaries of American corporations take during these periods? What were their relations with their headｭ 2 quarters in the United States? These questions have been little discussed so far ). 3 This paper and the one to follow ) are intended to consider these questions by focus-

1) This problem is to some extent discussed in the following works: Mira Wilkins and Frank Hill , Amerｭ ican Bz 川ness Abroad, Ford on Six Continents U apa町se translation published by Ogawa Publishing , 1964); Alfred P. Sloan , My Years with General Motors, Oapa 町se translation published by Diamond , 1963); F. Do 町 久 W o r l d Strategy of General Motors Uapa 町se translation by T. On 山na ラPelican ， 1967); T. Inoue , GM and Ford in terms of overseas strategies (,( (N ational Economy Magazine, 24-1 , 125-4, 1971, 72); B.C. Snell , American Ground Transport, 1974; N. Suzuki , Process of Formation of Multinational Businesses - Overseas Operations of American Auto Industry Between WWI and WWII - (National Economy, vo l. 133, 1975); S. Inoue , St叫y of GM , Minerva , 1982; C. Higham , Trading with the Enemy, 1983; S. Nakamura , Modern Auto Indust り ら Y u h i k a k u ， 1983; T. Abo , American Overseas Investments between WWI and WWII , Tokyo University Press , 1984; NHK , Document Showa 3, Keep American Cars from Japanese Market, Kadokawa , 1986; A. Kugler , Die Behandlung des feind1ichen Vermogens in Deutschｭ land und die ｻ Selbstverantwortu 時 < < der Riistungsindustrie. Darstellt an Beispiel der Adam Opel AG von 1941 bis Anfang 1943, 1999 Heft 2, 1988; S. Reich , The Fruits of Fascism, 1990; S. H. Lindner , Das Reichskommissariat rur die Behandlu 昭feindlichen Vermiigens im Zweiten 肋 lt k r i e g ， 1991; T. Oshima , Gerｭ man Auto Industry during WWII (2) , Aichi University Economics Bulletin, Vo l. 133, 1993. (Related papｭ ers by myselfwill be listed late r. ) 2) The above-mentioned works deal with this period but do not give in-depth discussion. 3) The Kyoto ι ヤ 町ersi~y Economic Review No. 140, 1997. Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses (I) 15

Figure I Changes in German automobile market (1922 ・1938) Number of cars 25 (ten thousand)

20

15

10

O Year 1922 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Note : .... Ovarall automobile sales ... Import of finished car .... Import of finished cars, puis local assembly -- Sales of Adam Opel -e- Sales of Ford Germany Source: H. C. G von Seherr - Thoss , Die Deutche Automobilindustrie , 1979 and others.

ing on Ford Motor's and General Motors' subsidiaries in Germany , which were Ford-Werke AG and Adam Opel AG , respectively. Evaluation of study history and new material One of the reasons why these questions have been little discussed is that only limited material has been available. Let us have an overview of the material which has so far been used in the study of American business in relation to the Nazi econoｭ my: The most comprehensive study to date ラmade by M. Wilkins and F. Hill , drew mostly on material available in Ford Motor's archive. This study gives a good coverage of facts about Ford's overseas operations. But it cannot be denied that some important relations between facts have been overlooked. Abo , Inoue and others depended primarily on A.P. Sloan Jr. 's memoirs “ My Years with General Motors" for their studies. A.P. Sloan Jr. had served as GM's president and then chairman. The book deals with GM's overseas operations in detai l. But he didn't explain how the company's overseas operations differed between the periods from 1939 to 1941 and from 1942 to 1945. Oshima used primarily the final report of USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Surveys). This is basic data about Gerｭ many's wartime production but shed no light on business activity. Recently , I found new material about Ford's and GM's operations in Gerｭ many. As for Ford ラI found “Investigation of Ford 16 Y 吋i NISHIMUTA

German business surveys submitted to the Office of Military Government for Gerｭ many , United States (hereinafter referred to as OMGUS)4). This is a comprehensive 522 ・page report comprising the text and hearings from German executives , plus attached confiscated documents. So far as I know , there has been no published study based on the report. It may be said that this paper is the first to use the materia l. As for GM , I was able to use James D. Mooney's papers kept under personal custody. While details would be discussed in the paper following this one , the material is important in that it supplements Sloan's writing. In this paper and the one to follow , I would like to clarify as far as possible the activity of German subsidiaries of Ford and GM during the period of Nazi adminisｭ tration with focus on their relations with the U.S. headquarters.

I Ford Motor and Ge rman market in the 1920s

Ford made inroads into the German market pretty after its entry into Britain. The company established a British organization and started knockdown assembly of its vehicles as early as 1911 before the outbreak of World War I. But it launched a similar operation in Germany in 1925 after World War I had ended. Both import of finished vehicles and local knockdown assembly had since increased rapidly as shown in Figure 1. But this did not take place as the headquarters of Ford Motor in Dearborn hoped. In this period , the British market presented a stage for severe competition between Ford ラwhich had already had the largest share , and Austin and other British companies trying to get back with their new “compact car"strategies5). In the German market , competition between Ford and local manufacturers started somewhat belatedly in the middle of the 1920s. Naturally , Ford's European strategy took shape with Ford Britain serving as the cente r. As part of the strategy , Ford Germany , originally formed as Ford's wholly-owned subsidiary , was reorgaｭ % 6 nized as a company in which Ford Britain had a controlling stake of 60 ). In 1925, General Motors , which allowed Ford to make a head start in Britain , went into the offensive in Germany. This was typically shown by its acquisition of 7 Adam Opel , the then largest vehicle manufacturer of Germany , from 1928 to 1929 ). Undeniably , in the German market , Ford was limited to a lesser position in 8 terms of market share , lagging considerably behind GM ). While Ford made a

1) RG 107 , Box 1032, National Archives and Record Administration , Washington , D.C. 5) Wilkins & Hill , op. ci t. 6) 40% of the stock was offered to the public in Germany. It is noteworthy that I. G. Farben , a leading chemical company , acquired 15% of the stock and obtained a post in the supervisory board (Aufsichｭ tsrat) 7) A.P. Sloan , Jr., My Years with General Motors, and others. GM's activity in Germany will be discussed in detail in my subsequent pape r. 8) However during this period , Henry Ford had a tremendous influe 町e in Germany in the fields of manｭ agement philosophy and social though t. This must be discussed in two aspects , that is, (1) “Ford• (Continued) Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses (1) 17 manufacturing plant in Cologne in 1931 ラthe outlook was not so bright. The situaｭ tion changed in the 1930s.

II Ford Germany and its American headquarters in the 1930s

The Nazis' taking power in 1933 marked a turning point in Germany's policies for automobile industry9). This had a substantial impact on the German autoｭ mobile market , leading to heated competition among motor companies vying for 10 greater shares in the rapidly expanding market with focus on small-size cars ). In this situation , Ford Germany underwent a major organizational restructuring , that is, the controlling stake of 60% held by Ford Britain was once again transferred to Ford Motor Co. of U.S.. The reorganization was critical because it triggered the

ism" as a management philosophy , and (2) Henry Ford's anti-Semitism. “ Fordism " as a management philosophy can be summarized as follows: “ Build a system (a managerial community) through managerial reform that ensures the sharing of beｭ nefits of business growth in order to achieve low prices in the market (principle of servicing) , high wages for the labor and high profitability for the management simultaneously by emphasizing the inｭ dependence of management while keeping financial capital (banks) and organized labor (reformists) from business administration. For Henry Ford's anti-Semitism , some explanation needs to be given. From the May 22, 1920 issue to the January 14, 1922 issue of his personally-owned newspaper “ The Dearborn Independent ぺ H e nr y Ford wrote articles (which in its character cannot be said anything but "anti-Semitism") every week without interruption. The first article started with the following words: TheJew is again being singled out for critical attention throughout the world. His emergence in the financial , political and social spheres has been so complete and spectacular since the war , that his place , power and purpose in the world are being given a new scrutiny , much of it unfriendly. Persecution is not a new experience to the Jew , but intensive scruti 町of his nature and superｭ nationality is.

In Russia he is charged with being the source of Bolshevism. In Germany he is charged with being the cause of the Empire's collapse. In England he is charged with being the real world ruler , who rules as a super-nation over the nations , ruled by the power of gold , and who plays nation against nation for his own purposes , remaining himself discreetly in the background. In America. The Jew is the world's enigma. Poor in his masses , he yet controls the world's finances. One does not fail to see that the “ logic" of Henry Ford's “perception of the Jews" is the same as that of Adolf Hitler's. In fact , a German translation of Henry Ford's articles (compiled and published laｭ ter in four volumes) was widely read as "a bible" of the Nazis in Germany in the 1920s. リ & S. Pool , Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler's Rise to Power 1919 ・ 1 9 3 3 ， 1978. A. Lee , Henry Ford and theJez 叫 1 9 8 0 . ) Another important fact is that Henry Ford's logic of anti-Semitism as a sγstem was in conformity with the management philosophy of Fordism. He envisioned , so to say , “a new capitalism". His “ recog­ nition" was that while a new capitalism based on “independent business administration" should be established by expelling the two m 吋or elements of traditional capitalism which oppress independent business administration internally and externally , namely ， “obedier悶to profit making , (i.e. , the domiｭ nance of bankers)" and “ hostile opposition of organized labor against capital" , these two elements were pushed , he thought , by the Jews. 9) Refer to my “German capitalism and the position of automobile industry between the Two World Wars" focusing on this policy conversion (The Kyoto University Economic Review, No. 130 & 131). 18 Yuji NISHIMUT A restructuring of Ford's overall operations in Europe. As a result of rapid economic growth ラGermany started suffering from foreign currency shortage from 1935-6. Germany was unable to procure strategic materials from abroad without foreign currencies. Due to government restrictions ラit became increasingly difficult to import rubber and other raw materials. To cope with the situation , the German government launched a scheme to give a premium for raw material allocations to businesses which had achieved increases in expor t. Accorｭ dingly ラFord Germany started discussing the possibility of exporting its products in order to acquire foreign currencies needed to import raw materials. In 1935 ラwith active coordination by Ford Motor Headquarter , its European organizations made 11 adjustments for their export territories ). Ford Germany obtained Scandinavia , Rumania , Holland , Switzerland and Spain , which had been sales territories of Ford Britain ラin addition to Germany , Austria ラCzechoslovakia and Hungary , which had been its traditional territories 12) . The company had since achieved a significant increase in export (Table 2). Moreover , to help increase the subsidiary's export ラFord Motor ins tructed its Latin American branches and Ford Japan to market German products 13). The problem of procuring strategic materials did not stop there. There were the so-called “ r ubber agreements" executed three times in 1937, 1938 and 1939. In June , 1936 ラthe following agreement was reached between Ford Germany and the Economic Department of GermanyI4):

Imports of Ford Germany: Crude rubber from Ford Motor Co. of U.S. Exports of Ford Germany: Motor vehicles worth 1 ，000 ラ000 RM to Holland annually; Ball bearings , roller bearings and other German-made parts to Ford Motor Co. of U.S.

This was essentially barter arrangement. In August ラ1936 ， Ford Germany cabled an urgent message to Edsel Ford , president of Ford Motor Co. of U.S. , and C.E. Solensen , manager in charge of production , saying that purchase of tires in Germany was in a catastrophic state. At the same time , the company sent a mes-

10) Refer to my “Manageme 則strategy of Daimler Benz in the 1930s" (Shakai Kagaku Ke 此yu ， Vo l. 39, No.3 , p. 185 and subsequent pages). It is often said that during the period , Ford Germany was eyed critically as a foreign-based company in Germany and was treated discriminatorily by the German governmen t. But a closer look at the problem shows that the main body staging a critical campaign against Ford Germany was made up of companies belonging to the German auto industry and their association , that is, Ford's competition. It can be said that the German government took advantage of this pressure in the grant of permits , etc. , but was not necessarily opposing as will be clarified late r. II) R.H. Schmidt , Export of vehicles and parts , August 3, 1945, Exh.51 of the Investigation of Ford- 、 Y e r k e . 12) Investigation of Ford- 、Yerke ， p. 3 & Exh.6 1. 13) Exh. 54 of the Investigation of Ford-Wedι 14) Interrogation of R.H. Schmidt (August 3, 1945) on Rubber deal closed in June 1936, Exh.65 of the Investigation of Ford- ¥Verke. Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses (1) 19

Table 2 Changes in Ford Germany's vehicle sales (units)

Year Domestic Export Total Passenger car

1930 13,736 9,993 31 6,728 4,513 32 2 ラ761 320 3,081 2,214 33 5,156 163 5,319 4,148 34 10,139 160 10,299 8,114 35 12,810 311 13,121 8,877 36 20,048 1,048 21,096 13,312 37 24,268 7,325 31,593 22,074 38 28,613 8,585 36,748 24,780 39 25,975 9,051 35,026 18,046 40 14,723 3,810 18,533 5,228 41 14,330 42 14,278 43 17,202 44 12 ラ915

Source: EXH. 52 of Investigation of Ford

senger to Dearborn where the headquarters of Ford Motor Co. was based. These 15 resulted in the following rubber agreement in 1937 ):

Ford Germany - To import crude rubber and cotton Ford Motor Co. (and Dearborn territory) - To import German-made products including wheels and bearings made by suppliers for Ford Germany , part of which would be for re-export

In 1938, a similar agreement was signed for the procurement of nonferrous metal and pig iron 16) . This benefited other German businesses as we Il l7) . The Economic Department of Germany requested Ford Germany to allocate 10,000vehiｭ cles for export from its annual production of 40,000. Similar raw material procureｭ 18 ment agreements were executed also in 1939 ). These were essentially barter arrangements. Valuable foreign currency was protected through coordination between Ford Germany , Ford Motor Co. Headquarｭ ters and the Economic Department of GermanyI9). In the same period , another negotiation was under way between the German

15) Exh. 75 of the Investigation ぱ0 f 品F o 吋r d 16) Ebe 叩n 吋da 17) Exh. 74 of the Investigation of Ford-Werke. 18) Exh. 88 of the Investigation of Ford-Werke. 19) An investigator of the Investigation of Ford- ¥Verke wrote as follows: The Reich thus used German Ford and its cooperative parent in Dearborn as a direct means of stocking the raw materials needed for wa r. The Investigation of Ford- 、Vereke ， p. 4 20 Yuji NISHIMUT A government and Ford Germany. It was for the construction of a munitions factory 20). in Berlin The negotiation started between the company and the Defense Departｭ 21 ment ofGermany in 1936 ). In October , 1937 , Heinrich Albert , chairman ofthe supervisory board of Ford Germany went to America to boil down the issue 22). The talk was finally settled in April , 1938 when C.E. Solensen visited Germany23). In July , 1938 Hitler awarded Henry Ford the Order of German Eagle , First Class , the highest honor to be granted to non ・Germans 2 4) . Judging from what we have discussed , it can be said that the implication of this event was multilatera l.

III Ford Motor Co. and its German subsidiary during World War II

(1) Before America's entry into the war (the period between September , 1939 and December , 1941) On September 1, 1939 the United Kingdom and France declared war against Germany for its invasion to Poland. World War II broke out. In May , 1940 , batｭ tle started on the western fron t. Germany brought under its control Denmark ラNor­ way , Holland ラBelgium and France in a very short period. Ford Germany had accounted for about one fourth , or the second largest share , of production of army and transport trucks in Germany25). It is estimated that of the 350 ,000trucks held by the German army in 1942 , about 120,000were made by Ford Germany26). We will later discuss in detail the company's war production. First , howeverぅwe should have a look at changes in Ford Motor's European organizations necessitated with the escalation of wa r. Ford Belgium (Antwerp) had been under control of Ford Britain with a 60% interest. On May 29 , 1940 , German Government appointed Ford Germany presiｭ 27). dent Robert H.Schmidt to be Kommisar (trustee) for Ford Belgium Also , on June 12 and on June 24 he was appointed to be Verwalter (trustee) for Ford Holｭ land (Amsterdam) , which was owned 60% by Ford Britain , and to be Kommisar for Ford France (Paris) , which was under control of Ford Motor Co. , having a dominatｭ ing 80% stake , respectively. Likewise , Vitgar , a German Ford director of Danish nationality , was sent to Ford Denmark to serve as a coordinator , and so forth. For

20) Located in a “safety zone". Cologne was adjacent to the western fron t. 21) Exh. 96 of the Inves tigation of Ford -W erke. 22) Investigation ofFord-Werke , p. 5. 23) Minutes of meeting of the Board of Ford Motor Co. AG , April 20 1938 at Cologne , Exh. 146 of the In- vestigation of Ford- 、Yerke. 24) M. Wilkins & F. Hill , op. cit. , (p. 366) 25) The largest share was held by Adam Ope l. 26) Exh. 89 of the Investigation of Ford 斗Yerke. 27) The Kommisar was a position to be assigned by the occupation forces authorities under the occupied area emergency act. The Verwalter was a position be assigned by the Enemy Assets Administration Bureau of the German government under the Enemy Assets Administration Ac t. Originally , its apｭ plication was limited within Germany but gradually expanded to occupied areas. Both were to assume the responsibility for managing the businesses concerned by replacing their boards of directors. Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses (1) 21

28 each of these ラR.H. Schmidt wrote to the American headquarters ). Quoted below is an October 31 , 1940 letter sent from Edsel Ford , president , Ford Motor Co ・ ラto 29 Schmidt ):

Edsel B Ford Deaborn Oct. 31 ラ1940 M r. R.H. Schmidt , Cologne-Niehl , Germany. Dear M r. Schmidt: Thank you for your letter of September 19th. Iam very glad to have up-to-date information regarding the status of our plants in the so-called occupied area. I note that you are endeavoring to do some manufacturing in the Belgian and Dutch plants in order to enｭ able them better to partly get into operation. These plants would be best protected when operating , and I note that you are doing everything possible to create that situation.

You have a very difficult task to carry out with regard to the comｭ panies that have come into your jurisdiction , and I note that you will have cooperation from the other Continental organizations in looking after the best interests of the Ford organization as a whole. With kindest regards , Yours sincerely , Edsel Ford

Below is a January 3, 1941 cable from Edsel to Schmidt:

3 JAN 1941, NLT = R SCHMIT FORDWERKE , A/G HENRY FORD STRASSE COLOGNENIEHL GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR GOOD WORK ON BEHALF OF COORDINATION OF FORD PLANTS ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TOWARDS REINｭ STATE 恥lENT OF MANAGERS BEST REGARDS = EDSEL FORD

In this way , Ford Germany , through close contact with the headquarters in Dearborn , had carried out its European strategies to cope with new situations emergｭ ing out of the wa r. The following , an extract from Ford Germany supervisor H. Albert's memoir 31 of November 25, 1941 ¥ gives a straightforward representation of these circumstancｭ es:

28) Exh. 198 & 187 of the Investigation of Ford- W erke. 29) Letter from Edsel B. Ford , Dearborn , to M r. R. H. Schmidt , Cologne-Niehl , Germany , Oct. 31, 1940, Exh. 188 of the Investigation of Ford-Werke. 30) Exh. 207 of the Investigation of Ford 曲Werke. 22 Y 吋i NISHIMUTA

Berlin , 25 Nov 1941 Dr. H.F. Albert Memo concerning Ford-Werke A.G. , as to whether a complete Germaｭ nization would be necessary or advisable.

As long as Ford-Werke A.G. have an American majority , it will be possible to bring the remaining European Ford companies under German inｭ f1uen ce, namely that of Ford-Werke A.G. , and thus to execute the Greater European policies in this field , too. As soon as the American majority is eliminated , each Ford company in every country will fight for its individual existence. The just now successfully accomplished joining of the potentialｭ ity of the non-German , European Companies to the potentiality of Fordｭ Werke A.G. , and with this to the general war-potentiality of Germany ラ would thus collapse more or less by itsel f. Amsterdam ラAntwerp ， Paris , Budapest , Bukarest , Copenhagen etc. are concerned.

Here we can see in a nutshell all the relationships centering Ford Germany and how management responded to them. In 1941, the company increased its capitae 3) while control of Ford Motor Co. of U.S. (52% interest) was retained. During the period , Ford Motor Co. declined to offer assistance to the United Kingdom under the Lend-Lease Act. Henry Ford announced that Ford Motor Co. 34). would not deal with any governments except the American government 同 T e have outlined above how things were around Ford Motor Co. and its European operations before America's entry into the wa r.

(2) After America's entry into the war The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 pushed America to enter the wa r. Four days after that Germany declared war against America. This naturally necessitated the reorganization of Ford Germany. Table 3 shows how the company's management changed before and after the opening of war between the United States and Germany. In November , 1942 Ford Germany was placed under control of the German government's Committee for Administration of Enemy Assets (Reichskommissariat fur die Behandlu 時feindlichen Verm るgens). But it was R.H. Schmidt who was assigned Verwalter (trustee). Also , Albert was assigned chairman of the Beirat (consulting committee)35) ラwhich replaced the board of supervisors.

31) Memo concerning Ford-¥ ¥Terke AG as to whether a complete Germanization would be necessarγor advisable , 25 Nov. 1941, by H.F. Albert , Exh. 1 of the Investigation of Ford-Werke. 32) The possibility of merger with Kreckner Humboldt , a heavy equipment manufacturer , was discussed in case complete Germanization was forced in order to avoid being acquired by competition or a Govｭ ernment cooperation. See H. Albert's letter ofDecember 30,1941 to R. H. Schmid t. (Exh. 191) 33) Increase in capital from 20,000RM to 32,000RM. 34) M. Wilkins & F. Hill , American Busi 附s Abroad , Ford on Six Continents, 0 apa町se translation , p. 397) Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses (1) 23

Table 3 Members of board of supervisors (Aufschistrat) and board of directors of Ford Moter Germany (1937-1941)

1937

Board of H.F. Albert (cha 汀man) Supervisors C. Bosch (vice-chairman , president of IG Farben) Sir J. T. Davies Edse l. B. Ford (president of Ford Motor Co.) Lord. Perry (president of Ford Motor Co. of Britain) A. Schurig C.E. Sorensen (Director of Ford Motor Co.) Board of E. Diestel Directors R. H. Schmidt E. Vitger

1938

the same persons

1939

Board of H.F. Albert Supervisors C. Bosch Edse l. B. Ford Lord. Perrv A. Schurig C.E. Sorensen Board of R.H. Schmidt Directors E. Vitger

1940

Board of H.F. Albert Supervisors C. Bosch Edse l. B. Ford G. Schmidt A. Schurig C. E. Sorensen Board of R.H. Schmidt Directors E. Vitger

194 1. 4.

Board of H.F. Albert Supervisors C. Krauch W. Bるtzkes Edse l. B. Ford H. Hiinemeyer C.E. Sorensen Board of R. H. Schmidt Directors E. Vitger

1942. 11.-1945.5.

Beirat H.F. Albert Verwa1ter R.H. Schmidt

Source: Ford-vVerke AG annual reports (Geschaftsberichte) うetc. 24 Y 吋 i NISHIMUTA

Basically , no change was made in the company's management except for American directors. That is ラFord Germany was able to keep its course of operation without external interference. Now , let us examine what position Ford Germany took up in Germany's muniｭ tion production.

(1) Trucks and half-tracks Figure 2 shows changes in production at Ford Germany from 1940 to 1944. It is known from the figure that the company's Cologne factory was a m勾or base for supplying engines ラas well as of trucks , across continental Europe. The factory also 36) 37 produced about 10 ぅ000 half-tracks from 1942 to 1944 ). The data is limited to the production of Ford Germany alone. Other Ford organizations of Europe , whose production was virtually integrated under control of Ford Germany ラneed to be counted separately. For the present , it is known , though spotty , that during the period from 1941 to 1944 Ford Belgium produced about 10,000 trucks; Ford France produced about 10,000 trucks , plus parts for 15 ラ000 to 18 ラ000 trucks to Antwerp and Amsterdam; and Ford Holland supplied about 8,000 3 8) trucks and 6,000 halιtracks .

(2) Production of purely war material (ammunition) by Arendt In December , 1939 W. Arendt ラa supplier for Ford Germany , and Sponholz & Co. , a private bank in Berlin ラjointly made a company named Arendt , holding a 24% and 76% share of stock , respectively. This was not reported to the Ford headｭ quarters. But as the company depended fully on Ford Germany for equipment and labor ラit should be regarded as part of Ford Germany's wartime production activity39).

(3) Aircraft parts Ford Germany's production of aircraft parts ぅincluding 20,000gears for Junkｭ ers , was limited in both volume and period (1 940-41)40). Finally , we should have a look at the labor required for these production efforts.

3S) S.H. Lindner , Das Reichsko 附nissariat jU r die Behandlung feindlichen れrmogens in Zweiten Weltkrieg, Zeischrtβ 戸 r U，巾rn仰nel吟eschichte Beiheft 67, 1991, s. 12 1. Oshima , op. cit., p. 130. 36) A military truck with caterpillar treads and wheels. 37) R.H. Schmid t's testimony (Exh. 91 of the Investigation of Ford 斗γerke.) 38) Both estimated based on R. H. Schmidts's testimony (Exh.90 of the Investigation of Ford みVerke.) The total production of Ford Motor's European operations during this period remains to be deterｭ mined in the future. 39) These amounted to 9,000,000RM in value for the entire period from 1939 to 1944, accounting 8.9% of total production. Exh. 161 of the Investigation of Ford-Werke. 40) Exh. 177 of the Investigation of Ford- 、Yerke. It is notable that while Adam Opel converted its peaceｭ time production almost completely to the production of aircraft parts , Ford-Werke AG nearly reｭ mained in automobile related production. Nazi Economy and U.S. Big Businesses (1) 25

Figure 2 Changes in production at Ford Germany during WWII (1940-44)

40.000 (units)

30.0 ∞

20.αm

10. ∞ o

1940 41 42 43 44 (year) E コ T ru c k s (No. of units) 園 田 Engines (No. of units) Source: Exh. 90 of the Investigation of Ford-Werke.

Figure 3 Changes in workforce at Ford Germany (1937 ・1944) (persons)

5,000

4 ，0∞

3 ，0∞

1937 38 39 I 40 Note: The graph shows monthly changes in the workforce. Source: Exh. 19A of the Investigation of FordWerke.

Figure 3 shows changes in the number of workers at Ford Germany. Its total workforce peaked during World War II , amounting to about 5,000. This was small compared with other motor manufacturers. For example , in 1944, Adam Opel had a workforce of about 20,000and Daimler Benz as many as about 90,000. However Ford Germany's workforce also included foreign workers. In 1944, as witnessed by R.B. Schmidt , the company used 800 Russian workers ラ 4 0 0 Italian war prisoners and 400 Dutch , Belgic and French workers , excluding , of course , those at European Ford factories outside Germany41). 26 Yuji NISHIMUTA

Summary

Despite the fact that German Ford なGerman behavior ω αs to be expected タit is startling to observe i 釘 r e s u l t s in terms of p αrticipation in the Reich なwar pr ψarations and ultimately the war. Even b φre the War α 戸 o r t i o n of German Ford had with Dearborn)s consent beｭ come αn arsenal of NI に お m ) at least for milita り ) vehicles. This was a conclusion made by H. Schneider given in his Investigation of Ford 42 Werke ). In conclusion of examination of this document we can say that at least before America's entry into the war , Ford Motor Co. not only extended cooperation to , but shared common interests with , the Nazi government through its German subsidiary. And through these activities Ford Motor Co. has been learning the organizational methods as Multinational Enterprise. 日 T e will examine the case of General Motors in the next pape r.

41) The Investi 巳ation of Ford-¥Verke succinctly pointed out as follows: It employed “foreign workers" who lived behind barbed wire. Th ぞInvesti 符ation of Ford-\Verke , p. I. Foreign workers were treated diι ferently depending on their nationalities. (C f. Exh. 160 ofthe Investigation ofFord-Werke.) 42) Investi 符ation of Ford-Werk 亡p.I-6.