Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Language

Chapter 1 Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Language

Mørt'in Døv'ies

Unguistic expressions are meaningful. Sentences, built from words and phrases, a¡e used to communicate info¡mation about objects, properties, and events in the world. In philosophy oflanguage, the study oflinguistic meaning is central.

I Meaning a¡rd Communication: Semantics and Pragrnatics

Just connecting meaning with communication does not yer tell us rvhicìr properties ofexpressions and rheir uses a¡e to be brought under the umbrella oflinguistic meaning, For tìe¡e is often an intuitive distinction to be drav'n be¡veen the message that a speaker communicates and the meaning of the sentence that the speaÌer uses. Offered coffee after dinner, Nigel may utter the sentence, 'Coffee keeps me awake,' and thereb,v decline the offer. But declining an offer is no part of the linguistic meaning ofthe sentence. ln a diffèrent context - imagine that there is an after dinner speaker who is kno\r'n to be boring bur that the occasion demands thar people not doze off the very same sentence could be used to accepr an offer of coffee- In yet another context, the sentence mìght be used in a simple factual report about l¿ctors rh¿t ex¿cerb¿te insomnia. It is usual, in philosophy oflanguage, to distinguish between properties that are strictly aspects ofan expression's literal linguistic meaning and other properties of ùe expression or its use that ma,u'' cont¡ibute to the message that is communicated. The study of literal lingìristic meaning is te,rlantics. The studl' of the use of language to communica¡e messages - very often, messages that go far be,vond the literal meanings of the expressions tsed - rs prøgmøtics. As a rough guide to the semantics-pragmatics distinction, we can say that seman¡ics is conce¡ned witì t}le properties of expressions that help to dete¡mine the conditions unde¡ which an utterance would be literall.v true, rather than faise. In contrast, pragmatics focuses on the conditions unde¡ which a¡ utte¡ance ¡¡'ould Ma¡tin Davies Foundational Issues napru, ¡athe¡ than nisleading, or more generallv ffi¡il.,U" appropriare, ¡arhe¡ than of logic, that ,but' .and, inappropriare.. The semantic properties i.off.., diffe¡s f¡om in some aspect of fll,ilr' of the English'r"oå, ,o on, cont¡ibudon meaning bur nor io the i a¡d the rr¡ rrords "nd rhat ir maÌes to t¡uth condidonr.'Th; .8..,.. t}¡r the a¡e put together, deteimine that an uÍerance ;;;',;il in i, .Lotfee ofthe Australia¡ but he is cuitwed, ca¡ries sentence keeps mc awake, is rrue unde¡ the conditions the implication .fr".,f,.r. i. r"-. kr"a that coffee keeps cont¡ast between being i:, tie speaker arake, ald false othe¡wise. _{ustraliaa and being àltured. Ii.i._ "f So if coffee keeps Nigel arvake then his con¡rasr. *j" ,.o,.r, .r.f, , ìÌterance is rhen this is a misreadìng thing ". tue. But àn uterarce ¡hat is true ma,v to sa,v But thar d.", _"ì. ,, be'misleãding. Late ìn the t¡uth r .buti ,¿r.. ,r," evening. rvirh alue of the senrence wirh is the "", no afte¡-dinner speaker scheduìed, Nigel,s utterance su¡oe .h. ,rJ ..allr; of rhe ¡no¡e ma,v give the nei¡rrat'B¡uce is Àustralian "s impression rhat he is declìning the ,I,d a¡d he.is cultu¡ed_, ,but, offer ofcoffee, so tlat his next ¡emark, like .¿nd.'nor h ¡;.;;';;ì"otog,r,, some,' djffers from in sense, bur comes as â surprise. The fact that the utte¡ance in rone. bas the truth conditions that We have it does is explained disringuished be¡veen two distinc¡ions_ bv semandcs. The fact thar rhe umerance grves the The¡e is t}re disrinction be- misleading twern IiLeral linguisric meaning impression rhat ir does is explained bv pragmatics. a¡d communicared _.rr"g., go bevond Jireral mearing. "r'ì"i,,.¿úons rh¿r llou,eÌer, jt is important to recognize A¡d ú¡ere is rhe disrjncrion U.'*=* that equating semanttcs vith the ing thar contribure "rja.,, orrn..n- studv of literal linguistic meaning to the determinuoo' or *o,¡ .o,l;;;;; does not quite g,_r"r"ia.. rhar semantics is generare ;i racors that concerned 'rvith truth (ondirions implications that a¡e not directll, relevant to qo...ior* rvhile pragmatics derls r.rirh appropriareness We J.ì,,.t o. f"f.;*. conditions. hare inrroduccd rhe rerms ...m.nrics. -prr;"rr;.;:-; One kind of example that heJps to make rhis ..d ;;;iil;if; point is provided by disrincrion. But rve shoutd pairs of expressions thar apply to the nore rhar .orn. ,rr.o.å* ïig;;orJfe;'," same things but cliffer in literal meaning ,n" use these because one rvord second disrincrjon. resuicring sem¿nLics. is a polire or neurral fo.m *-Àil. rhe orher is an impolite or ::::'.91 å. ri"i",, sense r¿Lhe¡ derogator,v and erpanding ¡he form. Thus, for example, the English word.cu¡, applies ïll-,I?ii. domain of pragmarrcs. These to the rn€onsts musr. of"correspondìngLy course. recognize ,1 ,ll.gr as rhe wo¡d ,dog'; but, rvhile ,dol, a difference, within the domain"of.pragmaúcs, : is rhe neurrai form, rt rs parr berween implicarions of the lite¡al meaning of .cur' rhar are generared bu ,"p.cs ofl;r..J rn.'"rJngi that its .,r. e*f,.erses contempr. Suppose thar utterance) ," f,o""., Rover is a and those tl-rat resulr trom some kind of inrerac¡ion "r dog of mixed, or even indeterminate, breed. SoÅe people night -;;berween lire¡al meaning and co¡ìrcxtual factors (as Nigel,s). feel conrempt torvards Rover, but suppose thai Fiona,s in &..h.; ;. of attirude is oDe of rurns on this terminologicat "nything admi¡arjon and affection. Then an ae.¡i-on, it t, i_port".,t to'ù. uterance b,v Fiona, pointing at Rover, of :::r:i::.ur( orrrerence .1.". 'This befween Lhe rwô riisrinctions. In some wriri¡g5 "bo,rt cur siept all night, rvould be seriously miileading aì to hei on philosophi,of attitude. Bur language the difference is apt to . if Rove¡ did sleep a[ night then Fiona's be obr.u..a b..".,.. .h.;-i.i;ä;;i;;;"; urreÍance *orild ,ro, be farse. It rvould set aside, \'i¡tually without be true bur misleading. commenc. In thar respecr, Fiooa,s utterance rvould be similar to Nigel's. But the¡e is also an importanr dìfference benveen the cases. someone s.ho hears Nigel's utterance and grasps the lite¡a.l meaning ofu.har he says may ve¡v rvell fail ro 2 Meaning, philosophy: drarv the misleading infe¡ence that he is ãeciining the offe¡ of Science, and Semantics and coffee. The hearer might know that Nigel u,ants to sta1, awake to w¡ite a Metasemantics philosophv essa¡ for example. But someone who has no tendency ro drarv the inference rh¡¡ Fion¿ is contemptuous of Rove¡ has faìled / Tirl:"ding ro grasp lVe have taken some time to desc¡ibe the Lne trteral meantng of the word .cu¡.' domain of semantics. Bu¡ ir mav seenr that, whater.er rhe details of the demarcation, rhere lt appears' then, thar nvo rvo¡ds may differ ìn theìr is a puzzie as t, i.;;;ì:l , riteral meaning even though could be of central inreresr / the-v make for philosophy,, oftanguage. f".r, the same cont¡ibution to t¡uth conditions. He¡e we can make use i"t of a sions a language conrains, how those exprcssions "io", ", "rp..r_ distinction dram by Frege (1892) betrveen are used in utterances, and what sel7se) oD Íhe one hand, and iliumin- those expressions refe¡ ation, coloring to or mea¡ a¡e empirica.l facts about the or roøe, on tlte other (Dummert l9Z3: ch. l). Many complex naturaÌ o¡de¡. l¡ is issues aa empirical fact about the ianguage spoken in surround Frege's notion of sense. But for present purposes, ltaly that there is a _ord.pro_ the only aspects of sciutto,' pronounced wirh the .sci. meaning that belong to st¡ess on.u. and witÀ sounding the sense ofan expression are thàse rhar help to determine Engluh much like th,' rhat reÍèrs to a particular kind of ham. ¡he t¡urh conditions ofsentences in which the expression f, i, .rnpi.rä'äct rhar this occurs. Fråge,s notion of rr.1 has been "" tone is mo¡e heterogeneous, incorporated into our l*s""s. including even rhe various ideas that ¡¡ial, be evoked ]j1lï ;.-;;'.h. iå ¡", u".r, mco¡porated inro oui diet_ lt is an empirical in indiridual readers by the eloquence fact that-the lt..li"¡ _oJc"¡l U. ,.rsed of a poet. But Frege also memons that in the sentence ,prosciufto conjunctions such as .but,' .akhough,' ,yet, è buono con melon, to mean thar this kind and. itløtniiør¿ rhe sense of rhe good ofham is with melon. These facts are surely limited fòllolv'ing clause 'in a peculiar fashion., This is the point, of pfrif.r.pfrìll ì"ì...r,. r, i, familiar to every student difficrrlr to regard them as belonging alongside facts .¡.-',]ir. o¡ c". 20 "uoui ')1 Ma¡tin Davies Foundational lssues

âgeDcy or about thc conditions for a conception of objecrs as existing independ_ expresslons endl are scientific questìons. Indeed, lvherher scmantics is a ofour perceptior of them, for example_ So, how could the study screuce is a of meaning metalevel quesrion that debared ard refe¡ence be a dis¡incriveh, philosophical is in conremporarv philosoph_v of language. pro.ject rather than simply a part of Third, it is not natu¡al sciencel to be ruled our that engagen.rent *i,f, g.o,rna_i.u"t quesrions abour the To this question. semantic properries of expressions may also be philosophicat put in this wa¡ an answer immediately suggests irself. i pro;ecr, lftlte¡e In the remainde¡ of rhis section, we is a science of meaning and reference rhen, shall b¡iefl.v-Eu.lop th. first nvo of these presumabll,, rh. püosoph,v of s.i.nce points. includes a dir.ision The third poinr has a secdon ofirs own. that offers philosophical commenra¡v ãn the key concepts deploved bv thar science. So philosophy of language .ur, .orr..rn irseif l\,irh meaning and reference just as philosophv of biolog,r, concerns itself ruith species and selection. 2. I À[etøsetnøzttic qrrestilns; ntetø¡thysics ønd epistenaologl, lioq in fact, there a¡e reasons to hesita¡e over rhis assim ation of rhe philosophv oflang.age ro ph osoph.v ofscience. l-here is indeed a science of Metasemantic questions language, namely about the nature cf linguistrc meaning include meta_ lir.rguìstics, and philosophl, oflinguisrics is a division ofphiloso_ physical quesdons. For example, are phv ofscience. Bur rve are not obliged meanings enrìries; and, if sã, rvhat kincls of to hol<1 thai philosophy oflingursrics is all entiries there is philosophy are theyl Intuitively, utrerances ofsentenc.. to.r,i..ss thoughrs, 7 ro of language. For philosophy of làjlr"ge also includes "...rs.d and so the meaning of a complete senrence se€ms questions that arise from our ordinar¡ evervday concepdon, to be something like rhe of lu,rgrr"g. *d contenr of a complete thought. neaning. (ln a similar way,, This idea might lead ro rhe p¡oposâl rhar rhe u,e should not hold rhar philosophv of mind is meanings ofcomplete sentences âre p/ exhausted bv philosophv of cognitive opositions, and rtøtproposal ioultì lead, ìn science.) However, -. åo not need to turn, to questions emb¡ace about the nature of propositìons themselves_ The¡e a gratuitous sciendsm in order to respond to the apparent puzzle mav be about othe¡ proposals about what kinds ofentities holl'5ç¡¡3¡¡¡içr could be ofimporrance meanìngs are, assuming thar the1, arc to philosoph¡ entities at âll. Br¡t an ahe¡narìve vierv lyould have it rhat r.ve There is a fàmilia¡ distinction ber\a,een questions of fi¡st_o¡de¡ do not need to ethics (,How include meanings as entities should I behavel') and questions in our ontolog,v. Earlier, u.e gale an example of a¡l of metaethics (,\41-rat is rhe narure of erhical Italian judgmentsì') sentence with a particular meaning propern. The senrence .prosciutto similarly, there is a distinction between aestheric è questions abour buono con mclon' meâns that prosciì.ltto lr orks ofart ('Is this a beautiful paintingì,) is good with meion. lf meanrngs are and quesrions in aestÀetics (,What is entities then rhis the l.la¡ure sentence stands in the mea[ing relation to such aD enùtv, of beautyl'). So also there is a dístinction to be drarvn between perhaps the proposition rhar p¡osciutto is good wìth qrestiorìs about the meanings of parricula¡ lìnguistic melon. But, on the alte¡, expressions and questions native !iew, the meaning properry about the of the Italian sentence rs not to be concei'ed nature oÊ linguistìc meaning itself. euestions oi the frrsr kind belong ro * | as a relatiolr ro an abst¡act entitl,, thorÌgh it may involve ¡elarions to u,orldÌv I s?rnt¿fitt(t qùe(üons of the second l

objects>Prope>cs. ¿ndJvents. To see 2.2 Is sencøntics ø science? how the t o¡rv arises, suppose rhat rve set out to dcscnbe rhe mearing properties ofrhe idiolect of Ma¡ia. an Italian soeal

One reason for philosophical interest in semântics is that spellir.rg out thc suppose that we courd provide a composirional scman¡ic tl-reo¡r, r. u.hich conditions for a putative seman!ic description to l:e corrcctis away ofapproaching me aning-speci!,.ing theorems fo¡ the infinirell manv senrences of so¡le language nletâsemantic quesrions of uDdoubted philosophìcal imporrance. An_v elucidation could be derived f¡om finirelv many axioms specifi,ing the meaning pr_ope¡ries ol of the concept of ìiteral lingrristic meaning ärrnishes a co¡recrness condition on r¡,o¡ds and of *'avs of putting rvords together. This \lould corsd;; a relati\.clv 1t semantic descriptions. And converseh,, correctness conditions on sentaotic descrip- p¡ecise ans$'er to the quesrion horv understanding an infinire langlLagc ts patsiúle. tions can be transposed into elucidations of, or constraints on, the concepr of For-knowle dge of the finitel,v manl, fac¡s stated bt the axìoms of tÁ e lheort, wa*Itl meanìng. A phìlosopher of langÌrage r,r'ho adopts this approach to merasemanric søffice. givet an abiliry ro carq¡ our ìogical derivarions, for knou,ledge of the qLÌcs¡jons ob\-iorìsh'llecds to know something abour thc scmantic descriprions for meaning of anl' senrence of the Ìanguage. lt is fo¡ ¡his reason rhar philosophers \rhLch cor¡ectness conditìons are to be fo¡mulated. of language engage in the cons¡¡ucrior.r of formal semanric rireories subjecr to a l{ou'ever, tbc possibilitl of this approach ¡o netasemanric questions does rot rttuh€ ø*io7nøtizîLti.on conttîøint (Da\idson l9g4). reallv explain u,hi' detailed and subs¡an¡il-e engagemcnt lrith the construction of semantic dcscriptions could be a philosophical projecr. For rbe fo¡mulation of correctrÌess co¡ditiol'ts on senlartic descriptions requires only very gencrâl kno\\- .1.2 A çruoural const¡,øinr on scmønric rheoric¡ ìedge about the forn-r that the descriprions are ro takc. In o¡der to go furrher, we musr take account of the clrnpositilnølih, of linguistic meaning. Itis notclear, however, thatfinite âxiomatization reallv goes to che hca¡t ofthe notion of compositionaliw. In a finiteiy atiomatized semanúc theory for an infinìte la.nguage, a single axiom may be involved in the canonjc¿l deriv¿¡ions of meaning_specifving 3. 1 Compositiotr.ø.lit! ttnd øxionøøtized. setø.øntic the 0 r,i es rtn¿tuh, theorems for man,v sentences. Indeed, in general, an axiom wiil frgure in the derivations for inf,nitely manv senrences. This gives clear content to the idea ¡hat a \yord The meanirg ofa senteDce is determined bi' the ¡1""n;ntr ofits constituent wo¡ds makes a repeatable contribution to che meanings ofsenrences ìn r¡,hich it occurs. It is and the rval's in rvhich they a¡ç pu¡ ¡ggethe¡. lt is part ofour everyda_v conception because the cons¡ituents ofsenrences make repeatable coÍtt¡ibudons to the mcaniags of krorvìng a language that, because of this compositionalitv, it is possibÌe to of sentences that it is possible to unde¡stand a sentence thât one has never hea¡d u¡lde¡stand a completelv novel sentence on first hearing if ir is built out of familiar before prorided thar it is builr Íiom fâmiliar rvords in fan.rilia¡ wavs. The probìem rvith r,r'or ds pur together in famiiiar t'a_vs. So the compositionaliw of meaning promises the finite axiomatìzation consrrâinr is thar these featu¡es of the compåsitionaliq- of an înswer ¡o the epistemological question of how understanding a language with meaning mav be present in â finire lânguagc, no less than in an ìnfinite larrguage. potc¡tiâllj' infinitell' manv seDrences is so nluch as possible. The general form of lmagine a toy language with one hu¡dred sentences built f¡om ten rân:es (.a,, the ânslrrer must be rhat the meanings of finircl_v many llords and finitel,v man1. ... and predicate .G,' .H,, 'b,"c,' ) ten tcrms (.F,, ... ). A particular namc makcsa u'ars of putting rords together determine the meanings of infinitely fitâny sen repeatable cont¡ibution to rhe meanrDgs of the ten sentences in u.hich it occurs; tences. But it is not a ¡¡ivjal mattcr to give substance to this answer. and rhe same goes ftrr a particular predicate tcrm. Someone n,ho is fa¡¡iliar wi¡h The most cor.ì\'incing way to devclop the idea coÍnpositionality ofmean- ofthe thc name 'a' as it is used in several sentenccs (ro ralk about Harr\,) âûd $,ith the ing is to provide, for the language or idiolect unde¡ inr.estigation, not jr¡st ¡ predicate 'F' as it is used ìn scve¡al sentcnces (to mean thar r,arious pcolrìe arc baJd) semanric desc¡iption, but a certain kind of formal, axiomatized semantic theor)¡. ma¡'understand the sentence 'Fa, on fi¡sr hearing as meaning that Ha¡n,is bald_ Thc axionrs theor,v should spccif,i the meauing properties and ofthjs oft'o¡ds of But rhe finite axiomâtizadoD constraint does not require that a semalltic theo¡\, rvavs of putting rvords togethcr. Tl.re backgrour.rd logic of the theor_v should then should dispÌai' rhe way in rvhich the mearing of,Fa, is determined b), the meanings perorir the derir'ation, f¡om thesc axioms, of thcoren:s thar speciô¡ the mcanjng of'F' and of'a' and the wav in u'hich theY are put together. It does not require that properties oacomplete sentences- For any particular sentence, the derivation ofa a semaDtìc theor.v should be compositiona.l. For â sema¡tic descripdon rhat simp!,l, neuring-specif ing theorem should drarv specificaÌl1' on the axioms for the u,ords lists the meanings ofall the sentences: ancì r,r,a-rrs of p',rtting u'ords together that are invoÌvec{ in the const¡uctìon ofthat .Fa' senteDce. Furthermore, rhe derìr'atìon should follow a natu¡al and direct kind of means thar Harr!. is bald route that can be specified b,v a canonical proof procedure. In a formal, axioma- 'Fb' means thar B¡ucc is bald tizcd semantic theo¡y oft}ris kind, rlìe canonical deriva¡ion ofa meaning-speciE ing theorem for a sentence displals how the meaning sentence is determined by ofthe ¿nd so on. counts as a finj¡elv axiomatized scmantic theory The onc hund¡ed the meanings ofits constit[ent rvords aDd wals in u'hich the)'are put fogether. the aluoms slmplv coi¡cìde ui¡h the one hùndred meaning-specì!,-ing rhco¡ems fo¡ Snch a semantic theorl' coulcì irself l¡e caìled compositionø\. complete sentences.

).? Martin Davies Foundational lssucs

It appeârs that \ve neecl some fìtrthe¡ constrâinr on fo¡mal, axiomatized semantjc In practice, there are tw-o wavs theories if rhev are to explain horv it is possible to proceed in which this empiricaÌ componenr cal be from understanding of facto¡ed sorì-ìe senrcnces out. On the one hand, a semantic ticorist might (of cven a ûnite language) to understanding of othe¡ sentences focus on abstract, fòrmal built from t1g""a:r tòr which the meanings of sentences cr., thc samc consrirùents. In rhe case of the to,y Ìanguage with just one t. stip,rt"r.a tiom ¡he â¡m- chair. The theorisr could address the epjsremologicâl hundred sentences, rhe composirionalirv of meaning would Jloiv someone who qìestion uborrt r,"tu..l .a' languages indirectly b,v devising axiomatizeci se-",i-ri. understood several sentences containing and several sentences containing.F, to thåo.i.. for progressivelv more complex formaÌ languages thât contai,-' the same p¡oceed, bl- inruirivelJ' ¡ationâl means of inductive, abductivc, a¡d deductive kinds of te¡ms and con, .Fa.' structio¡rs as natural languages do. On rhe othe¡ inference, to knorvledge of rhe meaning of \4trat we rvan¡ hand, a senanric theorisr mighr of a semantic focus di¡ectlv rireorv is on progressiveh more complex íìagmenrs ofhls that, in such a case, the axionìs (and orher deductive resources) thàt are or hcr orvn ¡atu¡al language. It is an empirìcar fact about English rhar 'Harr_v uscd i¡ the de¡ir.ations ofmeaning-speciÂ,ing rheoren.rs for tle initiallv unde¡stood is bard, neans tha¡ Harrv is bald. But rhe theo¡ist can srill àvoid sen¡ences should suffice for the de¡iv¿rion ofa meanìng-speciñ.ìng rhe need to ¡ise t¡om the lrmchai¡ and rhiorem for the to conduc¡ cor'ìseque¡tl,\i substan¡ive empìrìcal investigations. This is because unde¡stood se¡tence. .{ theorv meeting this conditìon Í,ould displal, ¡he Janguage f-or ,F,' which rhe semantic theo¡v is to be provided is the h;y; a name, such as 'a,' and a predicate, such as make repeatabÌe contributions same as the language in which the ¡heorv is ¡o be cast. The¡e is ûo more accurate way ofspeciÂ,ing, to the meanings ofsenrences in rvhìch rhe,v occur. Given such a theor'\,, rve could ìn Englisl_r, rhe meaning ofthe EngÌish senrence 'Ha¡rv see ho\\'someone might proceed, bt, ¡ational ìnductjve is bald' than to use rhat ie¡r. 5E¡1¡ç¡..- .,., o¡ abduc¡ì\,e means, from as to proride ìsubject. A semantic and episre mologl of meaninþ. theor\'- neeting fhis const¡aint shorvs how s)¡stematic master,v of a language, a maste¡r' narked b.v the abilin' to move f¡om understanding of some sentences to ruderstanding ofothers and, in principle, ofinfinìtelv manv orhers - could be a rational âchievement (Davies l98l: ch. 3; Wright I987)_ 4 Approaches to euestions in philosophy of Langrage

Foundational questions in philosophv oflanguage concern 3.3 Theories of rneø.ning the n¿rure of meaniÌìg, frlnl the ønnchøir understanding, and communication. But approaches to these questiolìs var,v along several dimensions. ln this section, u,ç 5hall The const¡ucrion of composirional b¡ieflv conside¡ some fâctors rhat mav semantic rheo¡ies is thus a philosophìcal pro- condition choices benveen these va¡ious approaches. First, the¡e are vieqs abour ject. lt makes a contribùtion to anslvering the epistemological question horv order of explanatorv prioritv as beflveen philosoph_v knou'ledge ofianguage in pa¡ricular, knorvledge {¡.l.oe¡. of iarguage and - of mearling - is possible_ philosophy of nind- Second, there are conceprions ofrhe relaúonship berween the I)erising an axiomatizatìon rhat ìs finite aud that satis6es the structural consüaint is philosophical study and the scientific srLrdy oflanguage and mjnd. a fairh,technical rask for rhich largelr,a priori metl.rods, similar to those ofÌogic and mâihematics, are appropriare. But it may seem that tl-ìere must srill be a substanúal empiricai, rather than phiiosopl.rical, component in the p¡olect since it is an empirical 4.1 Orders of priority guestion ruhcther rhe meaning-specif.ing rheorems that are derived f¡om tÌle axioms are.orrect- ltìs, fo¡ example , an empincal fact about haljan that,llarr,yè cal\o'means \4/hen rve use ianguage to communicate informatior-r abour rhe rvorld n e sap¡655 tha¡ Har¡v is bald. So the construcrion ofan axiomatized semantic theory even for a 9¡¡ thoughts, and thesc are also about the rvorld. as, philosophv ¡ov version ofltalian seems to be partll, an empirical project. Just in of Ja.r.rguage, founda¡ion¿l issues conce¡r the notion ofmeaning, .o in phiiosophl of mind, "tso, MartiD Davies Foundational Issues fbundational issues conce¡n the norìon semantic of intentionø\iry, the rva.v in tvhich our thcorisr whosc objects of stuci,v arc purel.r, formal, abstract languages tlÌoughts are aboutj or rep¡esellr, B'orldlv states of affairs. l¡ ìs natural to suppose (Katz 1984). that issues concerning linguistic meaning and the inrencionality of thoughts are closelv connected. Bur it is not obvious rvhich should take prioriry. lVe a¡e conce¡ned he¡e rvìth prioritv in the order of philosophical explan 4.2 pbilosopht, ønd science ation, anal,ysis, or elucidatioù. Let us say thar rhe norion of X rs ønølyticøll1 prior rc rhe norion of Y if Y can be philosophicall¡, Ii/e have explained, analyzed, or been considering possible viervs of rhe ¡elationship berween phrlosophv of eiucidated in terms of X, rvhìle the explanation, language anal)'sis or elucidation of X and philosophy of mind. Norv \ve rurn ¡o the relationship beru,een itseÌf does not have ro advert to Y. TÌris philosoph_v kind of prioriry is to be disringuished oflanguage and mind, or the one hand, and rhe sciences oflanguage from selcral otlrers including onrological prioriw. *,here X is ontologicølly prior and mind, on :he orher. For conceptions of chìs relationship also condition ¡o Y ii X can exist rvirhout Y, although Y cannot exist without X_ It is, for approaches to foundational issues in philosoph_v oflanguage. exampLe, one rhing to ask wherher thoughr can exist without Torva:-ds one end language and ofa spectrum ofpossible viers is a posidán that sats thet rhe onlv qurte ânother rhing to ask whether thought can be philosophicallv questions about lalguage explained and mind rh¿r are sr]sceptible of ¡arional inresdgarion are $'ithout adve¡tjng to language. rhe question qùestiolìs On of the order of analyrical that belong to the sciences oflanguage ald mind_ According to rhrs position prioriõ'âs benveen language (linguisric t}re business meaning) and mind (the inrentionaliqv ofrbe phiJosoph,v oflanguage and mind ìs simp\, to harã aiì the substar.r, of thoughts) four viervs scem ro bc possible: tive questions mind first, language trsr, inrer over to cognitive science_ l\¡e might call tlrls Êrst positton cognrnvc dependence, and independence. scientisøø. (We menttoned and rejected this kind ofview at the end ofsection 2.2. ) According to the wiød-rtrtt oprion, it is Towa¡ds possible to give a philosophical accounr the opposite end of the spectrum is a positiorr rhat maintarns thar the ofthe ¡ntentionaLiw without philosophv ofrhouglrts essenriallv adverring to language, and the oflanguage a¡d mind offè¡s a dis¡inctive merhodologl.. for rnresrigar- notiol of jinguistic mcauing can thcn be ing a class analyzed o¡ elucidated il terms of the ofsubstantive questions about the notions ¡hat figu.e ir our e.,eryda.., tiroughts that language is used to express. thinking abour The mind first vierv finds irs boldesr and linguistic and menrâl mar¡ers. The occupants of this position sa1 nlost sophistic¡ted development in rhe u.ork ofPaul Grice (Ì 989; sce also Schiffc¡ that cognirive science has little or nothing ro contribure ro the philosophe¡,s 1972). wav prolect One of dcnvìng the mind-fi¡st vierv is to sa]. rhar the philosophical ofplotring the contours ofour conceptual scheme. Ler us caii this second explanations of language and mind are interd.epentlent. The¡e is no rvay of eluci- posit\o it p b i I o s op b ic ø I is o Løti.o n isøt.. dating the notion of linguisrìc meaning *.irhout bringing in the intentionaÌiw of These opposed conceptions-of the inrerdisciplìna¡,v relationship go naturallv thoughts, no¡ the otìle¡ wa_v aror.rnd. Tíis no priori,tl, vierv is cha¡ac¡e¡istic ofthe with similarlv opposed views about ou¡ ever,rdav descrìptiorx of ã.,r."iu., tork talking, "s of Donalcl Davidsor (1984). Wc shall clescribe rhe contrasting programs thinkitg, acting, feeling, conscious and seif-conscious pcrsons. CogDi ofD¿ridson and Grice in rhe nerr sec¡ioo. tive scientism goes naturally wtth a reducti.onist vieu, of these personal_ÌeveÌ descriprions. ,{ccolding ro the htngTarL4¿-first option, an account of the nature of linguistic Philosophical isolationìsm goes naru¡ally with the l,iew.rhar rhese mcaning descriptions, can bc gilen rvirhont bringing in rhe inrenrionalirl' of rhoughts, and pa¡ticularlv the o¡les tha¡ are of p.imarr, inrerest ro philosophl,, are t'hat a person's thoughrs a¡e aboi¡t can rhen be philosopl.ricall¡' explained in ø.at1n1woas in the sense that rheir correctness is not ansrve¡able -I'his to empiricaÌ ¡erLrs of thc use of language. option fincls expression in the rvritings of discoveries about cognitive sffuctu¡es and processes. Michacl Dumnett (Ì993). lncteed. Dummert holds the vieu,, nor only rhat But ihere are positions that a¡e inte¡mediate berween cognitive scientism and philosophv of language takes prioriry over philosoph,v of mind, but also rhat it philosophical ìsolationism, and the¡e are vie,,r,s of our ever,vday personal lerel is'the fì¡undarion ofrhe rest ofthe subject' (1978:441). Aphilosophical account descriptions that are intermediate betveen ¡eductionism ald auronomy Accord_ of thc natu¡e of linguistic meaning in accordance lvith the Ianguage first view ing to one kind of inte¡mediate position, philosoph,r,, wìth its dis¡inctive method, cannot, ofcourse, be o\-ertly nrentalistic. So it would be unsurprising to find that, ologv, rev'eals that some personalJevel descriptions of great ìmporrance for once this vierv is adopted, artempts to explain meaning in other terms ar€ apt to philosophical rheory carry a commitmerr ro the exisrence of panicular kinds of sound rathe¡ behavioristic. cognitive sr¡uctu¡es and processes. yer, ú-e cannot fully reconstÍuct the personal- The fourth possible vie*' is that phìlosophical explanations of language and level descriptions in cognitive scientific te¡ms. ln the case of philosophv of ofnrind are guite independent ofeach other. Language is one thing and rhought language, ân occupant of this inte¡mediate position could maintain tbat ou¡ is ¡¡rothe¡ unrciated thing. This seco¡ci kind of no priorjq, r'ie\Ã' is not pÌausible personal-levcl descriprions ofou¡seÌves as having knouledge oflinguistic meaning all a¡e rt so long as we reqa¡d the objccts of study iD philosophv of languagc as neithe¡ ¡educible to, nor independent from, descriptions ofthe st¡uc¡u¡es and bcing communicario|r svstems in use. But the vieu, might be adopted b.v a Proces(cs invesúgâred bv cog¡i1ir e ra;çr... 30 Martin Davies Foundational Issues

specifing t¡uth condi¡ions 5 Two Programs in Philosophy of Language: Davidson and Grice for comprete sentences can be de¡i'ecr fiom axioms assigning semantic prope¡ties wo¡ds to aDd \r,avs of pu¡ting words togethe¡ can) to a considerable exrenr) be ca¡¡ied ove¡ from the rvo¡k oi Aìfred Grice approacbes the metasemaDtrc Tarski (1944, question about the nature oflinguistic mean I95ó) on certain formal languages. ing head on. He aìms to provide an anal_vsis of literal linguistic meaning in tc¡ms of Davidson imposes both formal and empirica.l condìtions of adequacy, on truth_ conYentional prâctices of comlnunicating messages, and to define the notions of conditional semantic theo¡ies. The formal conditions of adequacv include the conventional pracrice and cornmnnicating a messagc in te¡ms of familia¡ mental finite ¿xioma¡ization consrrainr (section 3.1). But our concern ia this section noiions such as belief and inten¡ion_ Davidson, is in cont¡ast, does not attempr to with the enrpirical c orlstraint of i/ttetpretrrtionøl ødeqrrø.c!.This savs, ¡oughlv. rhar a provicle an anah,sis of the concept of meaning ìn other rerms, bur approaches semantic theory,0, for a la'guage in use is adequare to the ex¡ent rhat irs theo¡ems questjons about the :rature ofiinguisrìc meaning indirectl¡ bv way of condìtions of contribute to the best overall interpretation of speakers _ theû ufierances, adequacY orÌ sen'lantic theories. One kev fearcrre ofDavidson,s program is that the thoughrs, and behavior: seman¡ic theories ro be conslde¡ed are theoúes of b ath condìtions. Ãnother ts that the conditions ofadequaq' on these theo¡ies are fo¡mulared in terms ofthe use ofa lfO delivers (by a canonical proof) a theorem sal,ing that senre¡ce S is true rffp semântic theor\¡ in an imaginecl projecr ofoverall inteyl)letøti\n. then it shouid be the case that inrerprerjng rrnerances ofS as erpressions ofthe proposition rÌìat p conÍibures ro the besr ove¡all inte.pret"tion ofspeakers.

5.) Daùdson's prllrøm: The¡e a¡e th¡ee truth clntlitilns ønd interltretøtion things to norice about this interpretational adequacl, constrainr on semantic theo¡ies. The Â¡sr is thar, sr¡ictl,v speaking, it ìs nÁt formulare,l as a The basic idea ofau axiomarized co¡rectness semanric rheory is rhar dre theorems ofthe rheor_v condition on the semanric descriptions thar âre pro\,idcd I¡r,theo¡ems. should specifi'the meaning properrìcs ofcour¡rlere sentences. A rheorem do Theconst¡aint does not treat a mighr specificarion oftrurh conditìåns as a surrogate for a this bi'statìng that a seÍìtencc stands in the mcaning relation to some entin.: speciÊcation of meaning. Tl.ris is jusr as rvell since the logicaì properries of.iff, gua¡antee that ¡he¡e is a massive gap benveel: The meaning of sentence S is eotiry m. Sentence S ìs tru.e iJf p Alte rnariveÌ_r', rvithout an,v commitment to meanings as enrides, a theo¡em might and adopt the formar: SenteDce S wed.ns thøt p.

Sentence S means that p. The closest that we conìe to a surrogate .Sentence for S means dlat 7r. in the Davidsonian Íìamework .A is, perhaps, semantic theor,r,,0, meeting such and such Daridson rejects ttre 'meanings as entities' vierv; but he also rejects the'S means formal and empirical constraints, has a canonical rheo¡em stating th"at S is true iffp., that fo¡mat. (This idea ofa near-surrogate I' for.Sentence S means thatp,u,ithj-n rhe f¡anreu,o¡k of The problem rhat he finds t,ith explicit use ofthe notion of meaning is that rhe t¡uth-conditional semantics could be inspired b,v what Frcge sa,vs ìn a lanous 'means rhat p' consrruction presents logical diffrculties with the ¡esuk rhar fo¡mal passage in Grøndgesetze (1893: I:32) abour rhe sense and trurh condirio.s of derilations of meaning specifiing theorems rvould be problematic. Nor', in fact, it sentences.) is a matte¡ of dispute lr-hether insuperable technical obstacles 6tand in the wa.v of The second thing to notice is that rhe imagined proj€ct ofove¡all inte¡prerarion axiomatized semartic theo¡ies rhar adopt rhe 'S means thar p' fornlâr. But, ho\Ã- involves simulra¡eously assigning meanings ro ur¡erances ¿nd conre¡ìß ro eve¡ that dispute may tu¡n oùt) the format that Davidson favors, and the fo¡mat thoughrs. The dm of the interpretation is to r¡ate rhe best possible sense of the adopted for most philosophìcal work in semantics) ìs: totaliry of a pcrson's lìngurstic and non-linguisric behav-ioi given rh€ person,s circÌlmstanccs. The interpretational adequacy const¡ain¡ can be transposed into a Se¡tence S is t¡ue ifl' ¡. partial elucidation of rhe concept of meaning fì:r sentences ofa publrc language:

The logical properties of rhis tru¡h conditional fo¡mar are certainl,v u.ell under If sentence S means (in the publìc language L) thar then interprerrng stood. First, 'is true' is a predicate and is rhe material biconditional of 7, 'iff' utte¡ances of S as expressious of the proposition rhat p should con¡¡ibute pro¡rositronal predicatc and logic. And second, rhe \,r'a)'in $'hjch rheorems to the best overaÌi interpretation ofL-speakers. Ma¡tin l)avies Foundational Issues But rhe same norion ofove¡all iDterpretadon would figu¡e ìn an elucidarion ofthe ofa sound that has no literal meaning intentionalir.v ofrhoughts. Therc night get across the messâge thar he or she is is no anal¡tical priorif. ofthoLrght over language; algr.r' b,v rclying on some resemblance between the sound produied Do¡ the orher wav around. Lir.rguistic meaning and the and the sound intentiolnalitv of thoughts made by an angry dog. have i6 þç elucidated rogether. Horvevç¡, the¡e is a problem wirh tle suggestion. The thì¡d thing to rìotice aboùr rhe empirical Suppose that, nor lusr one consrraint of interpretatronal member, eve¡v adequac,v but member, of the group .r..s this ,"m. kind of sound is that it provides onÌv a thjn eluciàation of the concept of to get meaning- It across the message that he or she js a¡gry. According does Irot tell us r¡,hat makes aD ìnterp¡etation ro the pu¡arive anaivsis, rhis ofspeakers a good interpretation. A¡ should be sufficient interpretation will for the sound to have rhe literal meaning rhat rhe p.rperraror involve the description ofspeakers as eniaging in årtain speech is angrr''. But, inruitivell; it is nor sufficier)r. Indeed, acts (savìng and asserting rhìngs, for example) the intui"tion rhat rhis is nor a and h"ulig"cerlain propositional case "s oflite¡al meaning is strong ifeach person u,ho uses a sound atrìtudes (believing and intending things, example)_ like an angry dog for Ti. const."rnr ..q.,i.es to communicate anger tl", art¡ibutions takes himself o¡ he¡sellto be making an innovaúr.e use ofa of speech acts and attributioìs of propositional attitudes :!"-.. ¡esemblance berween sounds (Schiffer l9Z2: ch. 5), shouid fit togerher to make best sense ofthe speake.s. B,riit åoes not rell us, fo¡ \4/hen we have a case oflite¡al example, rvhich combined meaning, in conr_rasr, it seems thàr the ¡eason \r,hv aftributions of speech acrs and propositional atritudes we use a particular sound is just rhar ir does have rhe make good sense, and which do nor. appropriate literal meaninj. Howevcr, if the air¡ is to provide an analvsis \4/hat seems to be missìng of ti.re ånc.pt of literal linguistic f¡om the Davidsonian f¡amewo¡k is an account of meaning in other te¡ms then 1ve ca¡not appeal directly to this reason \\'hich combinations ofspeech act att¡ìbutions and whv rire propositional aftirude atrribù- sound is used- For the resulting tions a¡e cohe¡ent. analysis rvJd be clearl,r, circular: On rhe face of it, this would be provided bv articulating the anal,r'tical connections between the concepts ofvarious speech acts iike saying and Mernbe¡s ofG use the senrence S to communicate asserdrg.and rhe concepts ofpropositional the message that p and do arritudes lik; believing and inrending. so becøøse There might, S nt¿ø.ns tha,t p. for example, be conceprual connections that reqriire that anyone rl'ho assens rhar p inrends an audience to take him o¡ he¡ (the sieaker) to believe We can do bettcr by appeaÌing to rhe idea of a convention as a løtion,rlly th¿t p. The¡e migl.rt also be conceptual connecrions b"t*à.r, self_ .ån..pt, of speech Perp¿ttløting regùIarity in the practices ofa group acts and the notion of lite¡al ofpeople (I_ewis l9ó9). In an meaning or some surrogate notion. analysis ofthe concept of conventíon there is a clause saying thar the fact ofpast conformiry to t¡e ¡egula¡it,v pror,-ides members of the group with a ¡eason to conform to the ¡egularity in the fuû¡e. 5.2 Gricls progrøro: The clause do.s ,rot ,a,. ¡hat the ¡eason ønølying tbe clncept 0f T.vrenning rvhy members of the group conform ro the regularitv is that rhe¡e is such a convention) fo¡ such a clause rould make The bold proposal thc anall,sis circular. But, once thc ol Grice's p¡ogram is rhat the¡e are conceptual connections a¡alysis has been provided, we can say) harmlessly enough, ¡har membe¡s of the that actually permit the analysis of rhe concept of literal .as meaning in a public group conform io the ¡egularitv a matter of conventìon' .because language (and the concepts or 1t rs a of the varìous speech acts) in rerms of"proposiuonal convention .' attitudes. We can combine the concept ofconvenrion with rhe concept of communicating Ifl,e ars ¿irn¡¡g at an analysis of the notion: a messagie to provide an aaaþis of lireral linguistic meaning along the fòitowing lines: Sentence S meâns rhar p in rhe language ofgroup G

In the pracuces ofG there is a reguiarity ofusing the sentence S to commu_ then a firsr suggestion might be thìs: nicate tìe message that p and this ¡egula¡itv is a conven¡ion,

Membe¡s of G use the sentence S fo col,nrntunicøte tbe ,nerrøøe fha' p. So, çthcn a membe¡ of G commrrqicales the mcssage that he or she is angr1, by using an expression thar lite¡allv means .just Lhat, rhe speaker does not rely on any Thìs suggestion is in acco¡dance with the mind-first vier¡,. The¡e seems ro be a resemblance be¡v,een the sound produced and the sound reasonable prospect ofexplaining ofan ang4, dog. Rarher, the norion of commirnicating (or getting across) the speaker relies on rhe fact, knor-n ro both speaker and hearer,lhat rhc exp¡es- a message in terms ofpropositionâl aftirudes, without having to re_introduce the sion has regularl¡'been used to communicate that concept of literal meaning. Certainl¡ message. There is no evidenr someone can g., a message even cìrcuiarity in such an anaþis. (Once though ".aos rhe anal,vsis has been pro.r,ided, wc can sa\¡) the sounds used have no literal meaning at all. For example, the perpetrator harmlessly enough, that members ofthe group use the expression to com¡¡unicate N{artin Davies Foundational lssucs

that ûlcssage 'because there is stch a con',,ention' or, indeed, 'because that is what have a dete¡luita¡e meaning onl1, rvhen I fi¡st hea¡ o¡ use it. IfS means ùat / iû m\, the expressiol-r literall-r' nea¡s.') ìanguage then this is whar it does and did and wouìd mea¡ r.heth., o. no, I .,,", This, in barest or.rtiine, is horv rhe Gricean ar.ral,vtical project is supposed to go. heard or used it_ But it wi1Ì be clear, even from tl.ris sketchy account, thar such an ambirious projecr faces manv challenges. Indeed, one ofthe mosÌ authoritative exponents of Grice's prog{anr Stcphen Schiffèr (Ì972, 1987), has reached the conclusion tha¡ rhe 6.1 Ti¡¡o solwtions: tãcit hntwled.øe ø"nd. concposit.ionølìttt project of analyzing líteral meaning in te¡ms of beliefs and intentions cannor be carricd through. In the next secrion, we pr€senr one problem for the projecr, lhe C)ne kind_ofsolution ro the problem ofmeaning rithout use involr.es ideas that go prol:Iem of tøeøning u,ithout øse. belond G¡ ce's program in the di¡ecdon of cognitive science. Acco¡ding to the mind-first viev'. as rve jnt¡oduced it.(sectìon 4.1), the nodon ofiinguistrc meaning is to be anaÌ1.'zed in te¡ms of mental notions that figure rn our p..ronut_ level descriptions ofou¡selves. "l..ina"" ó The P¡oblem of Meaning witJrout IJse But, according to this fi¡st kind ofsolurion, rve need to mention, r.rot onl.v beließ and inrentions, bur also cognitive structures al)d P¡OCCSSeS. The general idea that literal meaning is a matter ofthcre being conventions to use The envisaged solution would proceed in tirree steps. First, s,e wouÌd make rhe expressions in ce¡tain r"ays conl¡onts a dilemna. Either the link betrveen meaning Gricean^ link betw-een meaning and conrrndon oniv at the Ìe,.el of compt.te ,.n- and conlention is to be made onl1' at the level of complete sentences or else the tenccs. This would avoid attributing to ordinar.v speakers knolrledge of regularities link is to be ¡racie ar the leveÌ ofrvo¡ds and t'avs of putting rvords together. in the use and rvavs _ofrvords ofpunìng u,ords rogether. Then, seiond, rve rvould If u'e opc tb¡ the first alternative, then li¡e¡al meaning will be grounded in appeal to rhe cognitive strucftires and processes thar underpin speakers, assrgnmenrs rationall¡' seLf-psÌ?etuating reguÌarides ìn the use of compiete sentences. Thc of meanings to sentences that arc actually used. we n.uii ,.rrr-" rhat rhese problcm is that thcre a¡e maDv sentences that are never ¡.rsed at all. These unused cognitive strucrufes and processes corresporrd closeiv to aúoms ofa sema¡rtic theo¡r, sentences, built from familia¡ rvo¡ds in familiar u,a,vs, are perfectly meaningful. But and to deducúr.e resources used in (canonical) derivations of nr."nirlg-rp..;n ir_.,g the anal-r,sis ofliteral meaning 1òr sentences in terms ofconventional regularitìes of theorems f¡om those axioms. Fìnalì1,, third, lve rv-ould appeal to rhese sâme axloms communicative use has nothing to sa_v about them. and deductive resources to fix the literal meanings ofs.rri"rr..s that a¡e unused but Ifrve shift to the second ahernative, tllen hteral meaning will be grounded in are built from the sâme wo¡ds,.ând in the same ways, as sentences rhat a¡e used_ râtionall,v self-perpetuating regularities in the use of words and u'ays of putting ,A natu¡al wav of developing this fi¡st solution rvould be to make use of ¡he rvords together. This alte¡native seems to promise a solution to the problem of cognitive scientìûc norion ofracir knowledge (Choms\, l9ó5; Evans l98l; Ðaries meaeing lvithout use. Wo¡ds and rval's 6f pr.Ìt¡ing words togerher have literal 1987). Instead of saying, rather vagueh,, that the¡e srructu¡es and rneanings in vi¡tue of thei¡ use in complete sentences. Arld then, because of the p¡ocesses rhat correspond "r..ogrriai". to axioms ofa sema¡tic theory anà ¡o ¡ules of infe¡ence compositionalit\' of meaning, these literal meanìngs for the constituents of sen- used in derivations' we could sa-v that tr-re axions and ¡ures a¡e racitr' lqrou,.n. tences dete¡minc literal meanings even for senÌences that are never used. llorvever, The possibiiiry an of alte¡native solution becomes clear if u c considc¡ hor., the there is a price to be paid for adopting this second alte¡native. problem of meaning wirhout use rvould a¡ise within Daridson,s program. lÍ a Iftbe rcgularities ír the use ofu,o¡ds a¡d rvays ofputting w-ords together are ¡o sentence, S, is never used then a theorem sal,ing tltar S is true iffp cannot make mv be rationall¡' peryetuating theD lve must c¡edit members ofthe group (that is, contribution an self to overall interpretation ofspeakers. So the emf,irical constraint of use¡s of thc language) u'ith knorvledge that they and others particip¿te in these interprctationai adequacy provides us with no clue as to what S means. But a regr.rlarides. But is not reall-v pÌausible that ordinary speakers knou'r,rhat these solution to the problem it is available rvi¡hin Davidsot,s program because semanric theories regtrlariries of use ¡re. Ir ìs more plausible to say that ordinary speakers |ust hnon, are subject ro formal consrrajnß u, *ell consr¡ainrs. /¡ol¡' to use rvo¡cls and ways of putting q'ords togethe¡ in the context of complete The fo¡mal corstraints "s.miiriãl a¡e ìntended to ensure that a semantìc theo¡v rs com, sentences, positional. a compositional In semantic theor),, ¡he canonical tìreorems specii-r,jng It seems that rhe problem of meaning l'ithout use cannot be solved rvithin the truth condi¡ions ofused sentences u,ill be derived from axioms thar spcciñ the Grice's program. But equall¡,, our everyda,v conceptjon oflite¡al meaning seems to semantic properties ofthe constituents of those sentences. From those axroms, require that the problem mus¡ have a soiution. Suppose that S is a sentence of m,v canonical derirations r¡,ill leaci to theorems speciñ,ing the truth condjrio¡s of other language, built fìom familiar rvords in famiÌiar wavs, and that I understand it on sentences buil¡ from the same constituents, rvhether those seqtences are used or frrsi hearing. It is part ofour conception ofliteral meaning that S does not come to unused. 36 Martin Davies Foundational Issues

Athough rhis second solution is suggested by Davidson,s program, it can be There is a second difference bet¡.r,.een ¡he r\\.o solùrions applicd ro thar ìs mctaphvsicâl the problem of neaDing i,r,ithorit use rhat a¡ises for Grìce's program. It rather than episremological. The nvo accounts offe¡ different ans\{:ers ro q!Ìesttons aloids the attribntion to ordinary speakers of an,v knotledge, explicit or tacit, about the meanìngs of unused sentences. lntagine abou¡ ¡he that both Charle¡Ìe ancl Bruce meaning or use of $.ords and rva1,s ofputting rv9¡d5 ¡6gç¡her. Someone have just used fifw - the same fifo' - of the one hu¡dred sen¡ences in rhe ro! $ho :rdopts this solutjo¡ follorvs the 6¡st solurion in its fi¡st step, bv frakjng the language consìdered earlier, anci ¡har each name and each prcdicatc te¡m Gricean Ljnk benveen meaning and convention onh, occu¡s at the level of complete several times in this corpus. Charlene has a structured -dsed mas¡erl, of these 6fü, senrences. But the projection ofmeaning from sentences to unused sentences scnlcn.e(. u hich is narurallv gloc.ed in rernls ofcognirile structure" a,,d proccsr., is no¡ ¡chieved b)'foliorving thc coDror-rrs ofa semantic rheorv thar is embodied in that embody tacir lurowledge ofa comoositional semantic theori, for the language. cognitile structurcs and processes. Rather, rhe p¡ojection ofmeanìng foljows the con¡¡ast. ln B¡uce has an ùnsrrì.tcturecl mastert, of these se'rences, acqur.ed inducrive, abductive, and dednctìr'e reasoning a of hlpotbetical ìdealized rational sentence,bv sentence from a phrasebook. subject (secrion 3.2 ). The fi¡st solurion, rvhich appeals . to cognitive sûuctures and processes, savs thât each ofthe one hundred sentenccs has a dete¡mìnare meaning in Charlene,s language, evcn though fiftv ofthem have nor been used and perhaf,s never u,ill be used- But rhe siruation with Bruce is quite different. Ifhe has racii knou4edge of 6.2 Cowpøring the two solut¿ons a semantic theo¡y, it is a theor,v l.ìth fifty sepa¡ate axioms) one specifuing the meaning ofeach sentence, So appeal to cognìtìr,e structu¡es and processcs does The const¡uction ofcompositional semantic theodes contributes to the epistemo- not deiermine a meaning for any sentence beyond Ìogical project the fifw rhat Brucc actuaÌl¡ of explaining hou' knowledge of meaning is possible and how uses. mas¡e¡lr of a Ìanguagc could be a rationâl achievement. But const¡uction of a While the firsr solu¡ion t¡ears rhe cases of Cha¡lene and B¡uce diffc¡enrh,, compositional semantic theor,v for a language does not involve any commitmenr the second solution groups rhem together, for it takes Do accourt oi acltÌal to the idea thâr o¡dinarv speakers ofthe language acrually know the facts stated by cognitive structures and processes. Meaning for senrences that a¡e no¡ used is the arioms ofthe theory. Indeed, attributing this knorvledge to ordinary speakers determined b-v a semantic theorv. But it is not a theory that (¡6rl,¡ rvould is racitll, 61, seen as ìmplausible as arrributing to ¡henì k¡owledge ofthe regularities in speakers. Rather, it is a theory thât displa,vs rhe..mar]ti. structu¡e rhat coulci the use ofrvo¡ds and ways ofputting words together. lt u,ould ove¡,intellectualize be used by a hypothetical idealized ¡ational subject; the sr¡ucture to r.hich ordìnarv language use. Cha¡lene is sensitil'e, bur to rvhich B¡uce is blind. So, as in rhe fi¡sr solurion,s Suppose that rhe problem of meaning lr.ithout usc is soh,ed in the second rvay, treatmcnt of Charlene's case, all fifq unused sentences have dete¡minate bv appeal to the compositìonalitv ofmeaning. Then rve have an account of hou.,ir meanings. ¡,oulcl be possible for someor)e a hvporherical idealized rational subject ro - The¡e a¡e philosophers of language q,ho think that ìt is definirel,v. w¡ong come ¡o knorv ro the meaning ofa hitherto unuscd sentence. But ¡his does not b¡ing attribute to Bruce, rvith his phrasebook knorrledge of6fn sentences, a language in u,ith it anv account of how ordinary speakers actuall,v arrive ar: such knou,ledge. Ii, thich a further fift,v sentences, of which hc knorvs nothing, have determinare hou'ever, the problem is solved in the first rva_r', b1'appeal to cognitive strucrures meanings (Schiffer 1993). If we agree, rher rve shall prefer the first solution ro and processes) then an account of the epistenrolog.v of understanding is naturall,v the problem of meaning wìthout use over the second solurion. Iñve thirk rhat the snggested. \\¡tren a hitherto ullused sentence is hea¡d for ¡he fi¡st time, the same case fo¡ rhe first solution is compelling, then rve shall agree with Brian I_oar rhen cogniúve st¡ucrures and processes uhose preselìce has provided the sentence with he says that 'the Chomskvan idea of rhe in¡e¡nalization [tacit kaorvledge] ofthe its mcaning come into play to underpin the speaker,s assignment to the sentence of gene.ative procedures of a grammar has got to be invoked to ... make sense of that \.erv n'leaniDg. literal meaning' (Ì981 : 259). Thìs epistemological diffe¡ence berween the two solutions might counr in We cannot settle this issue he¡e. But the artractiol.rs of the fi¡st solution a¡e also favou¡ of the first solution- It mìght also persuadc someone u,ho srarts rvith attractions ofa more general position, encompassing a conceptìon ofthe relarion- l)avidson's program ro add somc cognitìr'e scientìfic commitments that so ship benveen phiiosophy and science and a view allout our evervdav personal,level ordinarl' speakers a¡e c¡edited with racir knowledge of the axioms of à semandc descriptions of o'¡¡selves. A.ccording ro this posjtion, inte¡mediare berwcen cog_ theoni lndeed, rhe¡e ìs a program in philosophy of language that combines nitive scientism and philosophical isolationism, the philosophicall,v foundarional Dar.idsonian rrurh-condirìonal semanrics rlirh the idea of tacit knov,ledge of description ofourselves as understa¡ding a language is not reducible to, but is also rules and principles that is cha¡acteristìc of Chomskl,an theo¡etical linguistics not independent from, descriptions of the st¡uctu¡es and process€s (Higgìnbotham thar cognirive t 986, Ì989). science investigates.

38 Ma¡tin Davies