Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Language

Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Language

Chapter 1 Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Language Mørt'in Døv'ies Unguistic expressions are meaningful. Sentences, built from words and phrases, a¡e used to communicate info¡mation about objects, properties, and events in the world. In philosophy oflanguage, the study oflinguistic meaning is central. I Meaning a¡rd Communication: Semantics and Pragrnatics Just connecting meaning with communication does not yer tell us rvhicìr proper- ties ofexpressions and rheir uses a¡e to be brought under the umbrella oflinguistic meaning, For tìe¡e is often an intuitive distinction to be drav'n be¡veen the message that a speaker communicates and the meaning of the sentence that the speaÌer uses. Offered coffee after dinner, Nigel may utter the sentence, 'Coffee keeps me awake,' and thereb,v decline the offer. But declining an offer is no part of the linguistic meaning ofthe sentence. ln a diffèrent context - imagine that there is an after dinner speaker who is kno\r'n to be boring bur that the occasion demands thar people not doze off the very same sentence could be used to accepr an offer of coffee- In yet another context, the sentence mìght be used in a simple factual report about l¿ctors rh¿t ex¿cerb¿te insomnia. It is usual, in philosophy oflanguage, to distinguish between properties that are strictly aspects ofan expression's literal linguistic meaning and other properties of ùe expression or its use that ma,u'' cont¡ibute to the message that is communicated. The study of literal lingìristic meaning is te,rlantics. The studl' of the use of language to communica¡e messages - very often, messages that go far be,vond the literal meanings of the expressions tsed - rs prøgmøtics. As a rough guide to the semantics-pragmatics distinction, we can say that seman¡ics is conce¡ned witì t}le properties of expressions that help to dete¡mine the conditions unde¡ which an utterance would be literall.v true, rather than faise. In contrast, pragmatics focuses on the conditions unde¡ which a¡ utte¡ance ¡¡'ould Ma¡tin Davies Foundational Issues napru, ¡athe¡ than nisleading, or more generallv ffi¡il.,U" appropriare, ¡arhe¡ than of logic, that ,but' .and, inappropriare.. The semantic properties i.off.., diffe¡s f¡om in some aspect of fll,ilr' of the English'r"oå, ,o on, cont¡ibudon meaning bur nor io the i a¡d the rr¡ rrords "nd rhat ir maÌes to t¡uth condidonr.'Th; .8..,.. t}¡r the a¡e put together, deteimine that an uÍerance ;;;',;il in i, .Lotfee ofthe Australia¡ but he is cuitwed, ca¡ries sentence keeps mc awake, is rrue unde¡ the conditions the implication .fr".,f,.r. i. r"-. kr"a that coffee keeps cont¡ast between being i:, tie speaker arake, ald false othe¡wise. _{ustraliaa and being àltured. Ii.i._ "f So if coffee keeps Nigel arvake then his con¡rasr. *j" ,.o,.r, .r.f, , ìÌterance is rhen this is a misreadìng thing ". tue. But àn uterarce ¡hat is true ma,v to sa,v But thar d.", _"ì. ,, be'misleãding. Late ìn the t¡uth r .buti ,¿r.. ,r," evening. rvirh alue of the senrence wirh is the "", no afte¡-dinner speaker scheduìed, Nigel,s utterance su¡oe .h. ,rJ ..allr; of rhe ¡no¡e ma,v give the nei¡rrat'B¡uce is Àustralian "s impression rhat he is declìning the ,I,d a¡d he.is cultu¡ed_, ,but, offer ofcoffee, so tlat his next ¡emark, like .¿nd.'nor h ¡;.;;';;ì"otog,r,, some,' djffers from in sense, bur comes as â surprise. The fact that the utte¡ance in rone. bas the truth conditions that We have it does is explained disringuished be¡veen two distinc¡ions_ bv semandcs. The fact thar rhe umerance grves the The¡e is t}re disrinction be- misleading twern IiLeral linguisric meaning impression rhat ir does is explained bv pragmatics. a¡d communicared _.rr"g., go bevond Jireral mearing. "r'ì"i,,.¿úons rh¿r llou,eÌer, jt is important to recognize A¡d ú¡ere is rhe disrjncrion U.'*=* that equating semanttcs vith the ing thar contribure "rja.,, orrn..n- studv of literal linguistic meaning to the determinuoo' or *o,¡ .o,l;;;;; does not quite g,_r"r"ia.. rhar semantics is generare ;i racors that concerned 'rvith truth (ondirions implications that a¡e not directll, relevant to qo...ior* rvhile pragmatics derls r.rirh appropriareness We J.ì,,.t o. f"f.;*. conditions. hare inrroduccd rhe rerms ...m.nrics. -prr;"rr;.;:-; One kind of example that heJps to make rhis ..d ;;;iil;if; point is provided by disrincrion. But rve shoutd pairs of expressions thar apply to the nore rhar .orn. ,rr.o.å* ïig;;orJfe;'," same things but cliffer in literal meaning ,n" use these because one rvord second disrincrjon. resuicring sem¿nLics. is a polire or neurral fo.m *-Àil. rhe orher is an impolite or ::::'.91 å. ri"i",, sense r¿Lhe¡ derogator,v and erpanding ¡he form. Thus, for example, the English word.cu¡, applies ïll-,I?ii. domain of pragmarrcs. These to the rn€onsts musr. of"correspondìngLy course. recognize ,1 ,ll.gr as rhe wo¡d ,dog'; but, rvhile ,dol, a difference, within the domain"of.pragmaúcs, : is rhe neurrai form, rt rs parr berween implicarions of the lite¡al meaning of .cur' rhar are generared bu ,"p.cs ofl;r..J rn.'"rJngi that its .,r. e*f,.erses contempr. Suppose thar utterance) ," f,o""., Rover is a and those tl-rat resulr trom some kind of inrerac¡ion "r dog of mixed, or even indeterminate, breed. SoÅe people night -;;berween lire¡al meaning and co¡ìrcxtual factors (as Nigel,s). feel conrempt torvards Rover, but suppose thai Fiona,s in &..h.; ;. of attirude is oDe of rurns on this terminologicat "nything admi¡arjon and affection. Then an ae.¡i-on, it t, i_port".,t to'ù. uterance b,v Fiona, pointing at Rover, of :::r:i::.ur( orrrerence .1.". 'This befween Lhe rwô riisrinctions. In some wriri¡g5 "bo,rt cur siept all night, rvould be seriously miileading aì to hei on philosophi,of attitude. Bur language the difference is apt to . if Rove¡ did sleep a[ night then Fiona's be obr.u..a b..".,.. .h.;-i.i;ä;;i;;;"; urreÍance *orild ,ro, be farse. It rvould set aside, \'i¡tually without be true bur misleading. commenc. In thar respecr, Fiooa,s utterance rvould be similar to Nigel's. But the¡e is also an importanr dìfference benveen the cases. someone s.ho hears Nigel's utterance and grasps the lite¡a.l meaning ofu.har he says may ve¡v rvell fail ro 2 Meaning, philosophy: drarv the misleading infe¡ence that he is ãeciining the offe¡ of Science, and Semantics and coffee. The hearer might know that Nigel u,ants to sta1, awake to w¡ite a Metasemantics philosophv essa¡ for example. But someone who has no tendency ro drarv the inference rh¡¡ Fion¿ is contemptuous of Rove¡ has faìled / Tirl:"ding ro grasp lVe have taken some time to desc¡ibe the Lne trteral meantng of the word .cu¡.' domain of semantics. Bu¡ ir mav seenr that, whater.er rhe details of the demarcation, rhere lt appears' then, thar nvo rvo¡ds may differ ìn theìr is a puzzie as t, i.;;;ì:l , riteral meaning even though could be of central inreresr / the-v make for philosophy,, oftanguage. f".r, the same cont¡ibution to t¡uth conditions. He¡e we can make use i"t of a sions a language conrains, how those exprcssions "io", ", "rp..r_ distinction dram by Frege (1892) betrveen are used in utterances, and what sel7se) oD Íhe one hand, and iliumin- those expressions refe¡ ation, coloring to or mea¡ a¡e empirica.l facts about the or roøe, on tlte other (Dummert l9Z3: ch. l). Many complex naturaÌ o¡de¡. l¡ is issues aa empirical fact about the ianguage spoken in surround Frege's notion of sense. But for present purposes, ltaly that there is a _ord.pro_ the only aspects of sciutto,' pronounced wirh the .sci. meaning that belong to st¡ess on.u. and witÀ sounding the sense ofan expression are thàse rhar help to determine Engluh much like th,' rhat reÍèrs to a particular kind of ham. ¡he t¡urh conditions ofsentences in which the expression f, i, .rnpi.rä'äct rhar this occurs. Fråge,s notion of rr.1 has been "" tone is mo¡e heterogeneous, incorporated into our l*s""s. including even rhe various ideas that ¡¡ial, be evoked ]j1lï ;.-;;'.h. iå ¡", u".r, mco¡porated inro oui diet_ lt is an empirical in indiridual readers by the eloquence fact that-the lt..li"¡ _oJc"¡l U. ,.rsed of a poet. But Frege also memons that in the sentence ,prosciufto conjunctions such as .but,' .akhough,' ,yet, è buono con melon, to mean thar this kind and. itløtniiør¿ rhe sense of rhe good ofham is with melon. These facts are surely limited fòllolv'ing clause 'in a peculiar fashion., This is the point, of pfrif.r.pfrìll ì"ì...r,. r, i, familiar to every student difficrrlr to regard them as belonging alongside facts .¡.-',]ir. o¡ c". 20 "uoui ')1 Ma¡tin Davies Foundational lssues âgeDcy or about thc conditions for a conception of objecrs as existing independ_ expresslons endl are scientific questìons. Indeed, lvherher scmantics is a ofour perceptior of them, for example_ So, how could the study screuce is a of meaning metalevel quesrion that debared ard refe¡ence be a dis¡incriveh, philosophical is in conremporarv philosoph_v of language.

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