DONOR-PATRONS AND AID CLIENTS: THE CASE OF FRANCE AND CAMEROON Nikolas G. Emmanuel Oklahoma State University
[email protected] Abstract: Under a political conditionality approach donors use foreign assistance to leverage liberal-democratic reforms in their aid recipients. However, such efforts are frequently undermined by donor self-interest. This paper attempts to illustrate this general point by examining the “donor-patron” relationship between Cameroon and France during the early 1990s. Key Words: political conditionality, development assistance, democratization, France, Cameroon Résumé: Sous une approche de conditionnalité politique, les pays donateurs utilisent leur aide pour faciliter les réformes démocratiques. Cependant, ces efforts sont fréquemment réduits par le donneur lui-même. Cette recherche essaie d’illustrer cette hypothèse en examinant la relation proche entre le Cameroun et la France pendant les années 1990. Mots clés: conditionnalité politique, aide au développement, démocratisation, France, Cameroun. Introduction Donors can have a significant impact on their aid recipients, far beyond the development projects they finance. This influence can be used to encourage reform, or it can be deployed to shield aid recipients from change. As a part of this process, a political conditionality approach can support moves in aid bene - ficiaries towards better governance and democratization. Such an effort to invoke political change using aid as a tool flourish in an environment where donors and domestic actors work together in a coordinated effort to achieve a common goal (Emmanuel Nikolas, 2008). Donors and recipients, however, frequently have mixed motives in their relations. These partners’ complex, sometimes intimate relationships frequently impede the application of the type of pressure associa - ted with conditionality.