DOCSLIB.ORG

Cameroon: Fragile State?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cameroon: Fragile State? CAMEROON: FRAGILE STATE? Africa Report N°160 – 25 May 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. FROM MANDATE TO MODERN CAMEROON – CONTINUITIES OF POWER AND RESISTANCE ..................................................... 1 A. FROM GERMANY TO FRANCE AND BRITAIN TO INDEPENDENCE .................................................... 1 1. 1884-1945: the beginnings of modern Cameroon ........................................................................ 2 2. 1945-1955: the emergence of Cameroonian politics ................................................................... 3 3. 1955-1961: the turbulent path to independence ........................................................................... 5 B. INDEPENDENT CAMEROON 1961-1982: THE IMPERATIVES OF UNITY AND STABILITY .................. 7 1. The UPC’s annihilation and the establishment of a one-party state ............................................ 7 2. Centralisation of the state and all its powers ................................................................................ 8 3. Co-option, corruption and repression as a system of governance ................................................ 9 III. PAUL BIYA IN POWER: THE CHALLENGES OF PLURALISM ........................ 10 A. 1982-1990: FALSE START .......................................................................................................... 10 1. 1982-1984: a model transition turns sour .................................................................................. 10 2. 1985-1989: the failure of single-party democracy ..................................................................... 11 B. DEMOCRATISATION AND MULTI-PARTY POLITICS ........................................................................ 12 1. 1990-1992: the explosive emergence of democracy movements............................................... 12 2. 1992-1997: constitutional debate and partial decentralisation ................................................... 13 3. 1997-2004: authoritarian restoration .......................................................................................... 14 IV. HOW IS CAMEROON GOVERNED? ......................................................................... 16 A. POLITICS .................................................................................................................................... 16 1. The regime ................................................................................................................................. 16 2. Opposition .................................................................................................................................. 18 B. PERIPHERIES AND NEIGHBOURS ................................................................................................. 19 1. The north .................................................................................................................................... 20 2. The Anglophone minority .......................................................................................................... 21 3. Relations with neighbours: diplomatic successes but remaining risks ...................................... 23 V. IS CAMEROON FRAGILE? ......................................................................................... 24 A. RESILIENCE ................................................................................................................................ 25 B. WEAKNESSES ............................................................................................................................. 25 1. Conflict factors ........................................................................................................................... 25 2. Scenarios .................................................................................................................................... 27 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 28 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CAMEROON ........................................................................................................................ 29 B. MAP OF CAMEROON 1919-1961 ....................................................................................................... 30 C. HISTORY OF CAMEROON – TIMELINE................................................................................................ 31 D. ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................... 34 E. ELECTORAL RESULTS 1992-2007 ..................................................................................................... 35 F. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 36 G. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2007 ..................................................... 37 H. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 39 Africa Report N°160 25 May 2010 CAMEROON: FRAGILE STATE? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Cameroon’s apparent stability in a turbulent region can- In the early 1990s, opposition parties emerged, and multi- not be taken for granted. The co-option of elites through party elections were held. For two and a half years, the the distribution of state largesse, and the emigration of regime was seriously threatened at the ballot box and in many educated young people provide a certain safety the street, and frustrations led to widespread violence in valve for tensions, but the failure of reform and continued 1991. But having pulled through, President Biya and his poor governance mean people no longer believe in the ruling party started to push back on reforms and restore rule of law or peaceful political change. Multiple risks of authoritarian rule behind a façade of democratic practice. conflict exist in the build-up to presidential elections in 2011 and beyond. This background report, Crisis Group’s Today, the nation-building project has become frayed, as first on Cameroon, analyses the historical roots of the cur- the economy has stagnated, and unemployment and ine- rent impasse. quality have risen. The economy is weighed down by cor- ruption and inertia, and the population sees very little from Cameroon’s history shows a pattern of apparent stability what economic growth there has been, mainly through followed by violent crisis. For long periods (early 1950s, exploitation of natural resources. While potential organis- 1970s), problems have been masked but not dealt with. In ing forces are weak and dissipated, popular anger is high. the late 1950s, widespread unrest occurred as the main party opposed to French rule was banned, leading to a The regime retains its old conservative reflexes, but the bloody and protracted guerrilla war. Independence came experiences and expectations of a youthful population in 1960, but in the context of extensive violence. In 1961, have moved on. The political opposition is weakened by though the southern region of British-controlled Anglo- internal fractures and an erosion of democratic space, phone Cameroon voted to re-join Francophone Camer- leaving few channels to express legitimate discontent. oon, the north voted to remain with Nigeria. The explosion of anger in February 2008, stimulated by Biya’s decision to alter the constitution to seek a further The late 1960s and the 1970s was a period of relative term in office, showed the dangers of this situation. peace. The regime was obsessed with unity and stability following the traumas of the 1950s, but, having fought Cameroon has many features of other countries which against the only genuine liberation movement, lacked his- have fallen into conflict, including highly centralised and torical legitimacy. It was autocratic, and pluralism and personalised leadership, political manipulation of ethnic diversity were considered unacceptable threats to the tensions and very widespread corruption. Even if it over- nation-building project. Nevertheless, the economy grew, comes its near-term challenges, the possibility of longer- and some genuine development took place. term deterioration leading to more open conflict cannot be excluded. In Côte d’Ivoire a protracted struggle for The resignation of President Ahidjo in November 1982 succession of a long-serving president laid the ground for and the hand-over of power to his prime minister, Paul a civil war. With President Biya now 77, and in the ab- Biya, initially passed off smoothly. But tensions soon sence of any clear signals over his intentions, the question emerged, culminating in a coup attempt in April 1984, of presidential succession also looms large. blamed on Ahidjo loyalists. It was violently put down, no process of reconciliation followed, and the trauma of this Events in Guinea in December 2008, when weak rule of period is still a source of bitterness for many from the law and manipulation of the constitution were seized on by north, Ahidjo’s home area. Equally, some from the south, junior officers with disastrous consequences, should be including in the security forces, fear communal reprisals sobering for anyone concerned about Cameroon. Respect stemming
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Understanding French Foreign and Security Policy Towards Africa: Pragmatism Or Altruism Abdurrahim Sıradağ1
    Afro Eurasian Studies Journal Vol 3. Issue 1, Spring 2014 Understanding French Foreign and Security Policy towards Africa: Pragmatism or Altruism Abdurrahim Sıradağ1 Abstract France has deep economic, political and historical relations with Africa, dating back to the 17th century. Since the independence of the former colonial countries in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, France has continued to maintain its economic and political relations with its former colonies. Importantly, France has a special strategic security partnership with the African countries. It has intervened militarily in Africa more than 50 times since 1960. France has especially continued to use its military power to strengthen its economic, political and strategic relations with Africa. For instance, it deployed its military troops in Mali in January 2013 and in the Central African Republic in December 2013. Why does France actively get involved in Africa militarily? This research will particularly uncover the main motivations behind the French foreign and security policy in Africa. Key words: Francophone Africa, France, Foreign Policy, Africa, economic interests. The Role of France in World Politics France’s international power and position has shaped its foreign and security policy towards Africa. France has been an important actor with its political and economic power in Europe and in the world. It was one of the six important founding members of the European Community after 1 International University of Sarajevo, Department of International Relations, Ilidža, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Email: [email protected] 100 the Second World War and plays a leading role in European integration. France plays a significant role in world politics through international or- ganizations.
    [Show full text]
  • Re Joinder Submitted by the Republic of Uganda
    INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA REJOINDER SUBMITTED BY THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA VOLUME 1 6 DECEMBER 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1 : THE PERSISTENT ANOMALIES IN THE REPLY CONCERNING MATTERS OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE ............................................... 10 A. The Continuing Confusion Relating To Liability (Merits) And Quantum (Compensation) ...................... 10 B. Uganda Reaffirms Her Position That The Court Lacks Coinpetence To Deal With The Events In Kisangani In June 2000 ................................................ 1 1 C. The Courl:'~Finding On The Third Counter-Claim ..... 13 D. The Alleged Admissions By Uganda ........................... 15 E. The Appropriate Standard Of Proof ............................. 15 CHAPTER II: REAFFIRMATION OF UGANDA'S NECESSITY TO ACT IN SELF- DEFENCE ................................................. 2 1 A. The DRC's Admissions Regarding The Threat To Uganda's Security Posed By The ADF ........................ 27 B. The DRC's Admissions Regarding The Threat To Uganda's Security Posed By Sudan ............................. 35 C. The DRC's Admissions Regarding Her Consent To The Presetnce Of Ugandan Troops In Congolese Territory To Address The Threats To Uganda's Security.. ......................................................................4 1 D. The DRC's Failure To Establish That Uganda Intervened
    [Show full text]
  • The Plight of German Missions in Mandate Cameroon: an Historical Analysis
    Brazilian Journal of African Studies e-ISSN 2448-3923 | ISSN 2448-3907 | v.2, n.3 | p.111-130 | Jan./Jun. 2017 THE PLIGHT OF GERMAN MISSIONS IN MANDATE CAMEROON: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS Lang Michael Kpughe1 Introductory Background The German annexation of Cameroon in 1884 marked the beginning of the exploitation and Germanization of the territory. While the exploitative German colonial agenda was motivated by economic exigencies at home, the policy of Germanization emerged within the context of national self- image that was running its course in nineteenth-century Europe. Germany, like other colonial powers, manifested a faulty feeling of what Etim (2014: 197) describes as a “moral and racial superiority” over Africans. Bringing Africans to the same level of civilization with Europeans, according to European colonial philosophy, required that colonialism be given a civilizing perspective. This civilizing agenda, it should be noted, turned out to be a common goal for both missionaries and colonial governments. Indeed the civilization of Africans was central to governments and mission agencies. It was in this context of baseless cultural arrogance that the missionization of Africa unfolded, with funds and security offered by colonial governments. Clearly, missionaries approved and promoted the pseudo-scientific colonial goal of Europeanizing Africa through the imposition of European culture, religion and philosophy. According to Pawlikova-Vilhanova (2007: 258), Christianity provided access to a Western civilization and culture pattern which was bound to subjugate African society. There was complicity between colonial governments and missions in the cultural imperialism that coursed in Africa (Woodberry 2008; Strayer 1976). By 1884 when Germany annexed Cameroon and other territories, the exploitation and civilization of African societies had become a hallmark 1 Department of History, University of Bamenda, Bamenda, Cameroon.
    [Show full text]
  • Were German Colonies Profitable?
    Were German colonies profitable? Marco Cokić BSc Economics 3rd year University College London Explore Econ Undergraduate Research Conference February 2020 Introduction In the era of colonialization, several, mainly European, powers tried to conquer areas very far away from their mainland, thereby creating multicontinental empires. One of these European powers was the German Empire which entered the game for colonies in the 1880s and was forced to leave it after World War I. Still, these involvements had a significant impact on several aspects of the German Empire. This essay discusses the question if the colonial policy of the German Empire until 1914 was an economic success. The reason for this approach is twofold. Firstly, economics can be seen as one of the main motivations of colonial policy (Blackbourn, 2003). Hence, looking at the economic results of this undertaking as a measure of success seems reasonable. Secondly, economic development can be measured relatively accurately and is a good proxy for defining success of the German colonial policy. Therefore, economic data will be used and tested against the economic hopes of advocates of colonialism during that period. The essay is split up into three main parts. In the first part, the historical background behind German colonialization and the colonies is introduced. After a brief explanation of the empirical strategy for this paper, data will be used to show if the German hopes were fulfilled. Theoretical background The German economy of the 1880s and German aims in the colonies In the 1880s, Germany was an economic leader. Several branches such as the chemical industry were worldwide leaders in their sectors and economic growth was, compared to other countries, very high (Tilly, 2010).
    [Show full text]
  • The International Possibilities of Insurgency and Statehood in Africa: the U.P.C
    The International Possibilities of Insurgency and Statehood in Africa: The U.P.C. and Cameroon, 1948-1971. A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2013 Thomas Sharp School of Arts, Languages and Cultures 2 Table of Contents LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 3 ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... 5 DECLARATION ....................................................................................................................... 6 COPYRIGHT STATEMENT .................................................................................................. 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... 8 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 9 The U.P.C.: Historical Context and Historiography ......................................................... 13 A Fundamental Function of African Statehood ................................................................. 24 Methodology and Sources: A Transnational Approach ..................................................... 32 Structure of the Thesis ....................................................................................................... 37 CHAPTER ONE: METROPOLITAN
    [Show full text]
  • “Investigating the Causes of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa” Case Study: the Central African Republic and South Sudan
    al Science tic & li P o u P b f l i o c l A a f Journal of Political Sciences & Public n f r a u i r o s J ISSN: 2332-0761 Affairs Review Article “Investigating the Causes of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa” Case Study: The Central African Republic and South Sudan Agberndifor Evaristus Department Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey ABSTRACT Civil wars are not new and they predate the modern nation states. From the time when nations gathered in well- defined or near defined geographical locations, there has always been internal wrangling between the citizens and the state for reasons that might not be very different from place to place. However, the tensions have always mounted up such that people took to the streets first to protest and sometimes, the immaturity of the government to listen to the demands of the people radicalized them for bloodshed. This paper shall empirically examine the cause of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa having at the back of its thoughts that civil wars are most times associated to political, economic and ethnic incentives. This paper shall try in empirical terms using data from already established research to prove these points. Firstly, it shall explain its independent variables which apparently are some underlying causes of civil wars. Secondly, it shall consider the dense literature review of civil wars and shall look at some definitions, theories of civil wars and data presented on a series of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, it shall isolate two countries that will make up its comparative analysis and the explanations of its dependent variable by which it shall seek to understand what caused the outbreaks of civil wars in those two countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Voting for the Devil You Know: Understanding Electoral Behavior in Authoritarian Regimes
    VOTING FOR THE DEVIL YOU KNOW: UNDERSTANDING ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Natalie Wenzell Letsa August 2017 © Natalie Wenzell Letsa 2017 VOTING FOR THE DEVIL YOU KNOW: UNDERSTANDING ELECTORAL BEHVAIOR IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES Natalie Wenzell Letsa, Ph. D. Cornell University 2017 In countries where elections are not free or fair, and one political party consistently dominates elections, why do citizens bother to vote? If voting cannot substantively affect the balance of power, why do millions of citizens continue to vote in these elections? Until now, most answers to this question have used macro-level spending and demographic data to argue that people vote because they expect a material reward, such as patronage or a direct transfer via vote-buying. This dissertation argues, however, that autocratic regimes have social and political cleavages that give rise to variation in partisanship, which in turn create different non-economic motivations for voting behavior. Citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status have the resources to engage more actively in politics, and are thus more likely to associate with political parties, while citizens with lower levels of socioeconomic status are more likely to be nonpartisans. Partisans, however, are further split by their political proclivities; those that support the regime are more likely to be ruling party partisans, while partisans who mistrust the regime are more likely to support opposition parties. In turn, these three groups of citizens have different expressive and social reasons for voting.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Article [PDF]
    60 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ELECTIONS ELECTION MANAGEMENT IN CAMEROON Progress, Problems And Prospects Thaddeus Menang Thaddeus Menang is Advisor at the National Elections Observatory P O Box 13506, Yaoundé, Cameroon Tel.: + 237 771 55 71 e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT Judged by internationally accepted norms and standards election management in Cameroon stands out as peculiar in more than one respect. Firstly, election management tasks are performed by a multiplicity of bodies and institutions, making it difficult to determine who is really responsible at each stage of the process. Secondly, the conduct of elections is governed by a battery of cross-referencing laws which election stakeholders often find hard to interpret and apply. The problems arising from this situation need to be and are, presently, being addressed within the framework of reforms that target, on the one hand, the adoption of a single, updated and enforceable electoral law and, on the other, the setting up of a viable election management body and the introduction of modern management methods. INTRODUCTION Whereas in the older and better-established democracies of the world election management has become a routine that, more often than not, produces satisfactory results, most of the budding democracies of the Third World are still grappling with the problem of determining which election management procedures are best suited to their specific national contexts. The older democracies themselves tend to differ one from the other, not only in terms of the electoral systems they have put in place but also as regards the specific election management procedures they have adopted. These variations raise the question of whether the management of elections in a democratic context can be said to be governed by a set of internationally accepted norms and standards.
    [Show full text]
  • Technique of Empire
    CAST1543917 Techset Composition India (P) Ltd., Bangalore and Chennai, India 11/2/2018 Technique of empire: Colonisation through a state of exception Gerard Emmanuel Kamdem Kamga University of Pretoria & University of the Free State CONTACT: Gerard Emmanuel Kamdem Kamga, [email protected] Abstract The main argument of this article lies in its conceptual framing which is a contextualisation of the problem of exception in the colonial and ‘postcolonial’ period of Cameroon. The country was technically colonised by Germany and following the Versailles treaty, was later transferred to France and Britain under a mandate of the League of Nations. Following legal and historical investigations, I assess how the permanent recourse to a state of exception within the colony was central to Europeans’ tactics in their strategies of control and domination of colonised people. I further examine how the country’s colonial past strongly influences current state structures through a basic reliance on emergency laws which have become normalised to a point where the law’s force has been reduced to the zero point of its own content. Keywords state of exception; state of emergency; colonialism; Cameroon; violence; rule of law; human rights; democracy In this article,1 I intend to expand on a technique repeatedly used by French colonial authorities to weaken and annihilate the struggles of independence in Cameroon, a technique which is still in force today and aims essentially to sideline political challengers and paralyse democracy. This technique is a legal institution which appeared for the first time in medieval canon law and is currently known as a state of exception.
    [Show full text]
  • The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: a Geopolitical Analysis
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by European Scientific Journal (European Scientific Institute) European Scientific Journal December 2019 edition Vol.15, No.35 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: A Geopolitical Analysis Ekah Robert Ekah, Department of 'Cultural Diversity, Peace and International Cooperation' at the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) Doi:10.19044/esj.2019.v15n35p141 URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2019.v15n35p141 Abstract Anglophone Cameroon is the present-day North West and South West (English Speaking) regions of Cameroon herein referred to as No-So. These regions of Cameroon have been restive since 2016 in what is popularly referred to as the Anglophone crisis. The crisis has been transformed to a separatist movement, with some Anglophones clamoring for an independent No-So, re-baptized as “Ambazonia”. The purpose of the study is to illuminate the geopolitical perspective of the conflict which has been evaded by many scholars. Most scholarly write-ups have rather focused on the causes, course, consequences and international interventions in the crisis, with little attention to the geopolitical undertones. In terms of methodology, the paper makes use of qualitative data analysis. Unlike previous research works that link the unfolding of the crisis to Anglophone marginalization, historical and cultural difference, the findings from this paper reveals that the strategic location of No-So, the presence of resources, demographic considerations and other geopolitical parameters are proving to be responsible for the heightening of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon and in favour of the quest for an independent Ambazonia.
    [Show full text]
  • Cameroon Sub-Saharan Report
    Marubeni Research Institute 2016/11/14 Sub -Saharan Report Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the focal regions of Global Challenge 2015. These reports are by Mr. Kenshi Tsunemine, an expatriate employee working in Johannesburg with a view across the region. Vol. 26 - Cameroon November 11, 2016 Speaking of Cameroon, at the joint FIFA Japan-Korea World Cup in 2002, the delay in the arrival of the Cameroon team to their camp in the village of Nakatsue in Oita Prefecture was a real hot topic in Japan and Japanese people may also recall that at the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa the Japanese team met Cameroon in their first match (group) of the tournament. So, it is the country of Cameroon that I am introducing this time, which most Japanese people know the name of because of their soccer team (note 1). Table 1: Cameroon Country Information Cameroon is located in Central Africa bordered by Nigeria in the northwest, Chad in the northeast, the Central African Republic in the east, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo in the south and opens to the Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Guinea) in the west. The country is just a little north of the equator and encompasses most of Africa’s climates from a dry zone in the north to its rainforests in the south. Cameroon’s capital of Yaounde is located about 300 kilometers east and inland from the coast and is 700 meters above sea level with a comfortable climate that has an average annual temperature of around 24 degrees centigrade and low humidity.
    [Show full text]
  • Triggering Nationalist Violence Triggering Nationalist Adria Lawrence Violence Competition and Conºict in Uprisings Against Colonial Rule
    Triggering Nationalist Violence Triggering Nationalist Adria Lawrence Violence Competition and Conºict in Uprisings against Colonial Rule What causes nonstate actors to take up arms and wage war against the state? Despite a burgeoning literature on civil war, extrasystemic war, and terrorism, scholars continue to lack compelling explanations for the onset of civil violence. The existing litera- ture has examined variation in political violence along a number of different dimensions, including the incidence of rebellion and civil war,1 the distribu- tion of violence within civil wars,2 the behavior of violent actors toward civil- ians,3 popular support for violent actors,4 and the use of particular types of violence.5 Yet less is known about how and why violence erupts in the ªrst Adria Lawrence is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and a research fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies. From 2007 to 2008, she was a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. The author would like to acknowledge Ana De La O, Thad Dunning, Jeff Goodwin, Jenna Jordan, Stathis Kalyvas, Harris Mylonas, David Patel, Roger Petersen, Mustapha Qadery, Keven Ruby, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, Susan Stokes, Lisa Wedeen, Elizabeth Wood, the anonymous reviewers, and participants at workshops at Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy, and Yale University for comments and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. Special thanks are owed to Matthew Kocher for his advice and feedback. Many thanks to Younes Amehraye for research assistance in Morocco. 1. For examples, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoefºer, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economics, March 2002); Nicholas Sambanis, “What Is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Deªnition,” Journal of Conºict Res- olution, Vol.
    [Show full text]