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The political, ecological and organizational determinants of neighborhood action
Mesch, Gustavo Sergio, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1993
UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106
THE POLITICAL, ECOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF
NEIGHBORHOOD ACTION
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
Gustavo Sergio Mesch, B.A., M.A.
* * * * *
The Ohio State University
1993
Dissertation Committee: Approved by
Kent P. Schwirian
Simon Dinitz
Edward Crenshaw
Advisor
Department of Sociology FOR MY PARENTS,
MARCOS AND DORA MESCH
MY WIFE, ZIVA ZAVIHI
AND MY SONS,
DIEGO A. AND GABRIEL B. MESCH
ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many individuals have assisted me in my studies at The
Ohio State University. I express my deep gratitude to Dr.
Kent P. Schwirian, my advisor and chairperson of my dissertation Committe, for his support and encouragement in all my work. Also, my thanks to the other members of the committee, Dr. Simon Dinitz and Dr. Edward Crenshaw, for their assistance, remarks and willingness to help me. It was in Dr. Crenshaw class on community social organization that
I first began to think about neighborhood action.
This research depended on the cooperation and assistance of many individuals. I am indebted to the many municipal officials and neighborhood leaders in Columbus,
Ohio who gave so generously of their time and records. I appreciate their suggestions and insights as well as their encouragement.
I could not have accomplished this without the encouragement, support and faith in my abilities of my wife,
Ziva. Also my thanks to my sons, that were always willing to delay family activities to give me time to work. VITA
February 21, 1957 ...... Born - Cordoba, Argentina
1988 ...... B .A. (Cum Laude) University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
1990 ...... M.A., (Cum Laude) University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
1985 ...... Head Nurse, Tirat Hacarmel Hospital, Tirat Hacarmel, Israel
1987 ...... Director, Hostel for Mentally 111 Patients, Tirat Hacarmel, Israel
1988 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, University of Haifa, Israel
1990 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate Department of Sociology The Ohio State University
PUBLICATIONS
Mesch, Gustavo; Ronit Gross; Anat Langer-Berko and Yael Gershtansky. 1985. "The Characteristics of Nursing students in Israel: A Research Report". Tel-Aviv: Haim Shiba Medical Center.
Schwirian, Kent P. and Gustavo S. Mesch. 1993. Embattled Neighborhoods: The Political Ecology of Neighborhood Change. Research in Urban Sociology. Ray Hutchinson (eds.) Vol III.
iv FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Sociology
Studies in Human Ecology, Dr. Kent P. Schwirian Urban Sociology, Dr. Edward Crenshaw Urban Crime, Dr. Simon Dinitz Research Methods, Dr. Robert Jiobu
v TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii
VITA iv
LIST OF TABLES viii
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION 1
The Relevance of Neighborhood Action 2 The Origins of Local Action 5 The Theoretical Model 8
II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES 10
Human Ecology 12 Resource Mobilization 21 Political Economy of Voluntary Associations 23 Evaluation of Theoretical Models 26
III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 29
Environmental Threats 2 9 Population Social Composition 35 Human and Financial Resources 4 6 Organizational Complexity 48 Experts 4 9 Resource Exchange 52 Political Incentives 54
IV. THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 61
The City of Columbus 61 The Organizational Structure ofColumbus 65 Neighborhood Associations 66 Area Commissions 6 9 Area Coalitions 74
vi V. METHODOLOGY 77
Sample 77 Data Collection 80 Measures 84
VI. FINDINGS 97
Sample Description 97 Zero-Order Findings 100 Multivariate Analysis 107
VII. DISCUSSION 129
Environment and Action 131 Population Social Composition 132 Resource Mobilization 135 Political Incentives 137 Directions for Future Research 143
APPENDIX
Table 13 148 Table 14 149 Survey of Neighborhood Associations 150
REFERENCES 160 LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
1. Population, Housing and Labor Force Characteristics of Columbus and Cleveland SMSA'S (1970-1980) 62
2. Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Environmental Threats (Orthogonal Rotation) 87
3. Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Socioeconomic Status and Investments in the Neighborhood(Orthogonal Rotation) 90
4. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Neighborhood Associations 98
5. Regression of Neighborhood Action on Socioeconomic Status with Quadratic Term 108
6. Multiple Regression of Neighborhood Action on Ecological Variables for All the Sample 111
7. Multiple Regression of Neighborhood Action on Ecological Variables for Random Sample 115
8. Multiple Regression on Collective Action for Organizational Complexity and Political Incentives as Predictors For all the sample 118
9. Multiple Regression on Collective Action for Organizational Complexity and Political Incentives as Predictors for Random Sample 120
10. Multiple Regression of Action on Ecological Organizational and Political Variables For All the Sample 122
11. Multiple Regression of Action on Ecological Organizatinal and Political Variables for Random Sample 124
viii 12. Regression of Political Incentives on Environmental Threats and Socioeconomic Status Controlling for Organizational Characteristics for all the sample 126
13. Correlation Matrix of Collective Action For Predicted Variable 148
14. Zero-Order Correlations of Collective Action for Predicted Variable using Factors as Predictors 149
ix Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Neighborhoods, both in the cities and suburbs, face forces that threaten their social and physical environments.
Land development pressures, physical decline, population change and increasing crime can be threats to the integrity of neighborhoods, social relations, social life and the reputations of local areas. Faced with such threats, some neighborhoods become proactive, attempting to protect their physical and social landscapes. Others marshal their resources to stop physical decline and social disorganization. Still others, unable to respond, resign themselves to leaving the character of their areas subject to external forces.
The purpose of this research is to study the determinants of organized neighborhood action and to learn how this action has been enhanced by the incentives made available by the local government. In addition, this study explores the extent to which the incentives are made available according to community needs or community social composition. The Relevance of Neighborhood Action
Neighborhood organization is a central theme in urban research. The research in this area is extensive and mostly concerned with issues that reflect the basic dimensions of community social organization such as community attachment
(Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Sampson,1991), participation in local issues (Guest and Oropesa, 1984) and residential satisfaction (St. John, 1987). The main issue that guided these studies was the need to account for the meaning and significance of the territorial neighborhood in mass society. The increase in the spatial mobility of individuals offers the choice of shifting residence instead of acting to express local concerns (Peterson, 1981) .
The traditional position is the Linear Model of community social organization. According to this perspective, the correlates of urbanism (i.e. size, density and heterogeneity) lead to the decline of the significance of primary groups and neighborhoods as meaningful units of organization (Wirth, 1938). In this perspective, neighborhoods are communities where the participation of people in the local community is such that when their involvement fails to serve immediate needs or aspirations they will avoid or reduce participation and leave the community for alternative opportunities (Janowitz, 1967).
One implication of this argument is a conception of city politics as "groupless politics." This is, interest groups 3 that try to influence public policy and governmental decisions are lacking in the cities. As a result political processes are for the most part apolitical and consensual.
Well-designed studies have shown that urbanites are still very concerned with issues and conditions affecting their neighborhoods. They still express dissatisfaction with the quality of local services and facilities, population composition, housing characteristics, land use change and zoning. In dealing with these issues urban residents show a clear preference for organized neighborhood action rather than relying on direct personal contacts with the government or temporary personal networks (Guest and
Oropesa, 1984).
Neighborhood viability depends on the ability to make exchanges over time with external development groups and the government to provide the necessary services. In a modern society those exchanges require organized collective action, so the neighborhood can define the goals and push for the resources required from the large societal bureaucracies
(Schoenberg and Rosenbaum, 198 0).
The main agents of neighborhood action are neighborhood associations. They are civic associations whose goals are to maintain and improve neighborhood quality of life and to protect common economic and social interests (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990). Neighborhood associations are place specific, volunteer-driven (even though they may have paid staff), shaped by the direct participation of members and defined by problem-solving as their principal purpose for existence (Florin and
Wandersman, 1990) . Evidence suggests that neighborhood associations are less concerned with organizing social activities that increase the identification with the area, and more concerned with engaging in direct action to protect the neighborhood from unwanted change (Lee e t . al.,
1984).
Studies on the effect of development programs show that some neighborhoods mobilize and act while others do not
(Hutchenson and Prather, 1988). Neighborhoods that lack organizations are slower and ineffective in their responses.
Neighborhoods with pre-existing organizations respond faster and are more effective in rejecting or making important changes in development plans (Henig, 1982; Crenson, 1983).
Similarly, studies of neighborhood opposition to group homes show that the presence of a collective spokesperson facilitates a faster and a more intense and sustained reaction (Hogan, 1986).
New forms of neighborhood associations have developed in American cities over the last twenty years (Schwirian and
Mesch, 1993). Neighborhood associations have shifted from being protest groups and quasi-social movements to being place specific interest groups whose chief concerns include involvement in city policy related to growth control (Green and Schreuder, 1991) and economic development and service distribution (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1991).
Increasingly, neighborhood associations aim to be a force in urban affairs and to participate in the political arena in order to protect their interests and to shape policy.
The Origins of Local Action
Recently, researchers have been concerned more and more with the origins of local action. Most of the early work implicitly assumed that neighbors come together and create neighborhood associations to represent their interests to city government and local agencies to secure desired public services and programs (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990; Florin and Wandersman, 1990) . Recent work on the topic has developed a different view. Neighborhood associations may be externally-induced. Changes in transportation and communication have reduced the dependence of residents on the local area for a variety of needs like jobs, services and friendships. These changes seem to reduce the importance of residence as a source of social integration.
Resources are still allocated geographically, however.
External agents like city government, banks, universities and other institutions have an interest in neighborhoods.
This process inspires the formation of local voluntary associations that become more and more "externally induced and locally based" (Taub, et. al. 1977). 6
Agencies outside the neighborhood increasingly create and support local associations that they need as channels of communication with the residents, the legitimation of their actions, vehicles of social control and means to organize and direct resources. In many cities, urban governments have actively worked to regularize neighborhood participation
(Haberle, 1989; Thomas,1986; Schwirian, 1991). Past neighborhood battles have convinced city leaders that decisions are more acceptable when local groups are brought in on the process and when regular communication channels are established between City Hall and the neighborhoods.
Consequently, a number of cities, among them Columbus
(Ohio), have created or recognized neighborhood associations and have assigned them advisory status on growth and other important issues in the area.
In addition to the actions of the urban governments, the increase in the number of neighborhood associations and in their activities, have been stimulated by the federal government and by non-profit foundations (Milofsky, 1988) .
The Federal Government and non-profit foundations have granted functional and organization money to local areas.
Granting agencies increasingly require the participation of local representatives in the process of grant implementation
(Milofsky, 1988) . The growth of community organizations is very important in the urban milieu. Once in place, neighborhood associations are likely to expand their actions from the founding issue to any other threat to the local environment
(Logan and Rabrenovic, 19 90).
In sum, urban residents are concerned with local issues such as services, land use and safety. In certain areas, their interests are represented by formal neighborhood associations. The actions of external actors such as the local government created political and material incentives for neighborhood action. Organizational presence has been shown to increase the likelihood of action to protect the area's physical and social environment.
The purpose of this research is to study the determinants of organized neighborhood action. By organized action I mean any activity taken by neighborhood organizations to improve the neighborhood (crime watch programs, housing rehabilitation and clean-ups), or any action to influence decision makers (writing letters, petitions and organizing protest marches). Using data gathered from 105 neighborhood associations in the City of
Columbus (Ohio) and its suburbs, I investigate the factors conducive to neighborhood action. The Theoretical model
In studying the determinants of neighborhood response,
I suggest a model of local action that emphasizes the actions and policies of non local actors. Actions and policies that allocate material (like grants) as well as political resources(recognition and institutionalized status) for action to neighborhoods are included in the theoretical model. They are viewed as incentives for collective organized action. Although past studies recognize that the existence of incentives for collective action may be the reason for the increase in neighborhood organizations, the effect on neighborhood action has never been tested.
A tacit assumption of this research is that given the material and political incentives that are available to communities today to engage in collective action, traditional theoretical frameworks should be expanded to account for the effect of these variables on neighborhood action. In this model, neighborhood organized action is a function of environmental threats, population social composition, resources for collective action and political incentives available to the community.
The model is tested using data collected from neighborhood associations in the city of Columbus(Ohio) and
its surrounding suburbs. In recent years the city of
Columbus developed a system of neighborhood participation. The city code was changed to allow the creation of a particular type of organizations in an advisory status in zoning and land use changes. This initiative affected the field of neighborhood organization in the city. The formalization of neighborhood organization makes Columbus a perfect place to test the model.
In sum, the goal of this dissertation is to study the determinants of organized neighborhood action and to learn how this action has been enhanced by the incentives made available by the local government. This research will assess the importance of such incentives in increasing organized neighborhood action. The second goal of the research is to uncover the mechanisms that makes these incentives work. Do external incentives promote collective action of disadvantaged communities or is the propensity of stable, middle class communities to such action merely enhanced by them?.
This study should contribute to the understanding of the impact of external incentives on community action. It should also help to increase our understanding to which extent incentives increase the action of neighborhoods that traditionally do not mobilize, namely low income neighborhoods. CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
This research is concerned with neighborhood initiatives and responses to the powerful forces of growth, decline and population change that constantly redefine the nature of the social system in local areas. In this sense, the main question in this research is what are the determinants of neighborhood collective action?
In recent years, a number of scholars began addressing the role of neighborhood associations in urban politics.
Peterson (1981) opened this debate by arguing that city politics can best be characterized as 'groupless' politics.
First, the important decisions affecting urban areas are no longer made at the local level. Second, it is easier for many people to move to other places or cities rather than try to alter policies with which they are dissatisfied. In addition, the free-rider problem, (i.e., the ability of residents to enjoy benefits achieved by group efforts whether or not they contributed to those efforts), impedes group activity.
10 11
Referring specifically to neighborhood action, a number of critiques of this argument soon developed. First, to argue that people do not see significant stakes in local issues is unrealistic. If nothing else, investment in the homes is their single most important asset. Local policy decisions may have a substantial impact on that investment, a fact that makes local politics salient to the residents.
For example, zoning can determine land use next to their homes, and property taxes can determine neighborhood property values. While the policies of the local government may not be as important as those at other levels of government, they can be very important to neighborhood residents faced with zoning proposals and school bond issues.
Second, exiting is not always as easy as Peterson implies because there are "transaction costs" involved in moving. Selling the old house and finding and buying a new house in a different neighborhood contribute to these costs
(Thomas, 198 6).
Finally, the free-rider problem is not as important in small groups, such as neighborhood associations, as it is in larger, national organizations. Many people join organizations for reasons other than the search for tangible benefits, (e.g. for social and ideological reasons). In addition, the continuous contact with neighbors can also minimize the free-rider phenomenon. Integration in the 12 neighborhood setting may mean that residents will be pressured to give their fair share to the group effort
(Kweit and Kweit, 1990).
An important issue is whether neighborhood associations are the forums used by residents to express their concerns.
Past studies describe those groups as voluntary associations that are mainly concerned with internal processes in the neighborhoods. The usual depictions are of neighbors coming together to organize social activities to integrate new members. They use their limited resources to improve the area organizing clean ups, beautification programs and crime watch activities (Lee, et al.,1984; Mackenzie,R. 1923).
Although at one time these organizations may have had largely social functions, there has been a trend to instrumental political activities (Heskin, 1991; Guest and
Oropesa, 1984; Crenson, 1983). This shift in goals has been from a focus on internal activities that strengthen the neighborhood to actions that aim to influence social policy.
What accounts for local organization and action? Three theoretical perspectives deal with local organization and action: Human Ecology, Resource Mobilization and Political
Economy.
Human Ecology
The ecological perspective is concerned with the question of how a population organizes itself in adapting to a changing environment. The fundamental assumption is that 13 social organization is the result of the attempt of a population to survive in a changing environment. In that sense organization arises from the interaction of a population with the environment (Berry and Kasarda, 1977) .
In this interaction a system of relationships between the differentiated parts of the population emerge. It is this pattern of relationships that enables the population to maintain its identity (Hawley, 1968).
The ecological perspective emphasizes the role of population characteristics in the development of a particular type of organization. In this sense the approach is macrosociological. Organization is a property of an entire population as a whole and not of individuals (Hawley,
1968). The fact that community organizations are distributed in urban areas in an uneven geographical pattern, suggests that many of the determinant factors in organization reside at the community level (Perkins, et. al. 1990).
In traditional ecological theory, neighborhoods are a result of processes of urban social organization.
Competition is seen as the most important organizing principle. Industries, commercial institutions and residents compete for strategic locations. This gives rise to a struggle in which each type of land user ends up in the location which the user is best adapted. The geographical location of each land use maximizes efficiency for the community as a whole. Competition for land use is regulated 14 by the "hidden hand" of the free market. Each type of land use, (e.g. commercial, industrial or residential) achieves the location that best suits its needs. The needs and interests of each pattern of land use are assumed to be in the best interest of the community. The result is a pattern of urban organization that is functional to the community.
In sum, the ecological perspective assumes that urban organization is the result of the interaction of a population and the environment. The organizing principle is competition between different land uses. Inequality is inherent and an inevitable result of functional differentiation. The competition is between different land uses with different power given by their relative importance for community survival. The result is a system in equilibrium, where each land use is located in the place that best support the efficiency of the system (Berry and
Kasarda, 1977).
The ultimate result are "natural areas." These "natural areas" are relatively homogeneous social and cultural areas.
The term "natural" suggests that they were the result of ecological process rather than planning or the conscious actions of the government. The assumption is that when zoning regulations are established, they generally recognize the results of the ecological processes.
The ecological interest in community social organization is reflected in a large number of studies that 15 emphasized the identification of neighborhood types. Of particular interest for this study are the defended neighborhood and the community of limited liability.
The defended neighborhood is an area in which residents feel safe from external change. The central characteristic of this neighborhood type is a common residential identification. Neighborhood identity is the result of social and ethnic homogeneity. The high degree of internal community awareness and community attachment facilitates the action of the neighborhood to fight external threats such as a new population moving to the neighborhood, new commercial developments and crime( Suttles, 1972).
The concept of community of limited liability emphasizes the voluntary and limited involvement of residents in the local community. The amount of investment of time or resources is dependent on the degree to which the community meets the needs of individuals. If the needs are not met, the individual might choose to leave the neighborhood. The critical variables that explain community organization and action, according to this perspective, are residential stability, ethnic homogeneity, residents interests in locale, socioeconomic status and environmental threats.
The principal assumption of the defended neighborhood is that community organization is a temporal and internal process (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974). It is temporal, because the mechanism for the development of social cohesion, namely, local networks and participation in voluntary associations, are a function of community stability. The formation of social networks and the participation in local action requires a minimum residential tenure to allow social interaction. High residential turnover is a barrier to social cohesion, organization and consequently to community action.
Community organization is also an internal process. The degree of organization and action of a given neighborhood depends on the resources, skills and orientation of the population of a given local area. The geographically-based community reflects differential intensity and scope of participation, depending on the social composition of its population. Participation in organizations is more likely to develop under conditions of ethnic homogeneity. While black and white low income communities are not different in their level of organization (Berry, et . al. 1991), mixed racial and ethnic communities are less likely to engage in organized action. Social heterogeneity tends to create mistrust that is translated in structural barriers for communication and interaction (Sampson and Groves, 1989) .
While various ethnic groups may share values and goals, their organization is more likely to be segmented according to their different ethnic origins (Heskin, 1991; Suttles,
1968). The result is an inability to define and realize 17 common values and goals, weak and slow responses to land development pressures, resulting in physical decline (Henig,
1982), population turnover (Goodwin, 1979) and high crime
(Skogan, 1990).
The community of limited liability model assumes that certain social characteristics of neighborhood residents are instrumental in the development of interests in the community. Those interests may be the result of the economic investment or a particular stage in the life cycle of residents. Homeownership is an economic investment. For some individuals a home is the only substantial asset that are able to accumulate in their lives. Communities with a high percent of homeowners are more likely to be formally organized, to show high levels of participation in elections to neighborhood associations (Haberle, 1989) and to engage in collective action (Thomas, 1986) . Neighborhoods with a high proportion of homeowners have a relatively large group of people with a clear interest in conserving their economic investment. Neighborhood change in the form of new development or an unwanted population coming in may lead to a decrease in home values, jeopardizing the family assets.
The need to protect the economic investment in a home is assumed to be a powerful motivation for organization and action.
Families with young children have strong interests in the community. Young children are limited in their early 18 stages of socialization to the immediate geographical environment. They play and socialize with the neighbors and usually attend school in the neighborhood. At a very early age, the neighbors join the family as important agents of socialization. This centrality of place in the socialization process increases the interest of families with young children, more than any other types of families, to protect the environment from undesired changes.
The socioeconomic status of neighborhood residents is positively related to community participation and action
(Henig, 1982; Oropesa, 1989) . The explanation seems to be in the high costs of participation for the poor. Time and money are in short supply and the ability to organize depends in part on the ability to mobilize these scarce resources
(Oliver, 1984). Middle class communities possess more resources to absorb the costs of social involvement. These communities are more likely to establish neighborhood associations with a committed rank and file who can contribute needed skills, money and labor (Oropesa, 1989).
In the ecological models the source of change is external. Changes in the environment that affect the population are the primary source of social change (Hawley,
1968). According to the ecological approach, potential threats to a neighborhood's physical and social environment are the changes that increase the involvement and participation of local residents (Crenshaw and St. John, 1989). Neighborhood associations are created in response to those threats. Neighborhood residents are sensitive to physical and social changes that may endanger their home investment(Thomas, 1986). Thus, an increase in the percent of vacant units is perceived as physical deterioration and as a magnet for crime. An increase in residents of minority origin is associated with intense realtor activities and a potential decrease of property values. Large commercial developments near the neighborhood are perceived as increasing noise, traffic and crime, leading to the decline of the neighborhood and decrease in home values (Mesch and
Schwirian, 1993) .
The limitation of the human ecology model is that the approach is concerned with the context in which organization and action takes place. Change is a change from one population type to another population type in combination with a change in the cultural baggage of each population
(Schwirian, 1983) . As populations change so too do the physical neighborhood and the social system. But how neighborhoods became organized and how the organizations operate are largely ignored in this model.
In addition, Human Ecology is not concerned with the possibility that the action of political and economic actors may influence the process of neighborhood organization and action. Actions taken by local governments to increase citizen participation and action, like provision of 20 political recognition in zoning and land use changes, and money for local organization, are assumed to be a natural result of the action of ecological forces.
Recently, a different perspective emphasizes the need to understand the impact of the actions of powerful actors and the state on city organization. The new urban sociology highlights how powerful actors operate in the urban development process (Gottdiener and Feagin, 1988) . The fundamental assumption is that human activities are a force in the cities. The growth machine model (Logan and Molotch,
1987) argues that the central issue in the cities is the pursuit of intensive growth. A powerful coalition of economic interests ( i.e., developers, financial institutions) are interested in the intensification of land use and profit making. Their activities create conflicts between residents and developers. The result of conflicts shape the city, not always according to ecological principles.
The new urban sociology view of society is one of conflict among agencies and organized actors. Property entrepreneurs and residents make great efforts, often organized ones, to guarantee that commercial, industrial and residential uses occur in one place and that other activities take place in another area (Logan and Molotch,
1987). The major challenge to neighborhoods, comes from organizations and institutions (firms and bureaucracies) 21 that in their actions reorganize urban space. The outcome is seldom the most effective for the community, but the one that increase the profits of entrepreneurs (Logan and
Molotch, 1987).
The new urban sociology emphasizes the role of the state. The approach attributes an important role to the government in urban development. The state is linked to the economic process in the cities and in this sense has a semiautonomous role. The policies of the government such as tax abatement, road building and zoning help to define the local business climate. Government policies set the rules that may increase business profitability, supporting in that way the goals of the growth coalitions.
Therefore to overcome these limitations of the ecological perspective we must turn to alternative models.
Resource Mobilization
While Human Ecology points to the contextual variables related to neighborhood organization and action, the
Resource Mobilization perspective points to the proximate causes that shape the form, content, and to some degree, the outcomes of action. Resource mobilization is less concerned with organization and more concern with action. The basic assumption of this approach is that resources are a necessary antecedent to community action (Milofsky, 1988) .
The kinds and amount of resources are seen to structure the 22 issues and the form and content of community organization and action. The resource mobilization framework is particularly important in the study of community organizations that have a difficult time in recruiting resources.
Neighborhood associations possess three different kinds of resources: members, money and other resources such as skilled leadership and legitimacy that are, in part, the result of processes of exchange with other neighborhood based organizations (local churches, local business association). Past studies show that the level of resources of neighborhood associations influences the amount of time
invested in different activities. Neighborhood associations with small budgets are limited in the number and kind of actions in which they can engage. They are more likely to
invest a relatively large amount of time and effort in actions whose goal is survival, including raising funds, recruiting new members, providing information to the
community and arranging social activities. Neighborhood associations with bigger budgets can afford to allocate time and energy in productive activities like managing local projects, coalition formation and negotiation with the government (Rich, 1980). Monetary resources are also
important. Actions related to commercial and industrial
developments may require the hiring of outside experts to
advise the organization on the possible negative community 23 impacts of the proposed projects. Membership is an important variable that influences the number and kind of community activities. A large number of active members will increase the number of actions that can be taken by the neighborhood association. Membership increases the resource base and allows the organization to expand the number of issues promoted.
Another important resource is the existence of other neighborhood organizations in the area. The presence of similar organizations in the area can facilitate the formation and action of neighborhood associations. The main process is one of resource exchange. Important resources that can be exchanged are money, skilled board members, and facilities. Neighborhood based organizations can supply advice, skilled leadership, knowledge, networks and technical and administrative support(Wiewel and Hunter,
1985).
The Political Economy of Voluntary Associations
It is important to recognize that in the past a number of forces have worked to decrease interest and motivation in local action. For the most part, development promoters are very powerful; they usually enjoy the support of the government and other economic interests in the area. They
invoke the ideology of growth to convince the public that any commercial or industrial development is positive. Until
recently, it was common for the government to attempt to 24 hide development programs from public scrutiny. Major decisions were often taken without the knowledge of citizens in the neighborhood. Thus, there was little incentive for neighborhood action (Peterson, 1981; Thomas, 1986).
Recently, local governments started programs of citizen participation (Haberle, 1989; Schwirian, 1991). These programs create and/or recognize community organizations, allocating to them a role as advisory bodies to City Council on zoning and development issues. In addition, non-profit organizations and the Federal Government allocate money to neighborhoods. A requirement for such projects is resident participation in program implementation. At a more modest level, it is known that large institutions like banks and universities support local organization. They want local representation in discussions and decisions on a variety of issues of common interest.. In the absence of existing organizations, these institutions work for their creation
(Taub, et. al. 1977).
To measure the effect of the actions of those external agencies on community action, I propose to extend the political economy theory of voluntary associations. This approach assumes that collective action is not the natural state of things. Action is imposed by the fact that in a complex political economy, where huge organizational entities are the prime movers, individuals can realize significant advantage only by coordinating their actions. 25
Consistent with the assumptions of the new urban sociology, this perspective emphasizes the role of the state, institutions and organized individuals. The actions of the government and external institutions may affect the patterns of citizen organization and participation in urban issues.
The political economy approach argues that the fundamental question is what is the motivation for collective action?
According to this orientation the decision of individuals or organizations to engage in collective action is the result of a calculation of available resources and their costs
(Knoke and Wood, 1981) . When resources are low, the costs of action are very high, and, as a result, the likelihood of collective action is low.
In recent years, however, local governments, non-profit foundations and the federal government have created incentives that have significantly reduced the costs of collective action (Knoke, 1990) . The implementation of community participation programs that recognize the advisory status of neighborhood groups creates an institutionalized pattern of interaction between the residents and city council. For example, development programs or requests for re-zoning are first brought to the neighborhood association which makes recommendations to the City Council and calls for public hearings. As grant recipients, advisory entities and recognized representatives, neighborhoods thus gain power in the overall local political system. Once they gain 26 recognition they move to neighborhood issues like development, changes in land use and the distribution of services.
In sum, according to the political economy perspective, the support of the government is an incentive that motivates and facilitates the process of neighborhood organization and action. Once this involvement process is started, it develops its own dynamic and goals.
Evaluation of Theoretical Models
Each theoretical framework has a number of merits but is limited to partial aspects of the process of neighborhood organization and action. The human ecology model emphasizes the characteristics of the population that determine the social system created in the neighborhood, underestimating the action of external actors such as the government officials in the ability of a neighborhood to respond to the political economy of urban life. The fundamental assumption is that those social characteristics ultimately shape the ability of the population to accept or resist the changes that the environment brings. The fundamental question of how neighborhoods became organized and how organizations operate is largely ignored, becoming a black box that needs to be opened.
The resource mobilization perspective provides a partial answer. On the positive side, this perspective focuses on the proximate causes of organized action. The ability to mobilize resources is a necessary antecedent of community action. An interesting feature of this approach is that it complements the ecological. The mobilization potential of a group is largely determined by the degree of preexisting group organization. Groups sharing strong distinctive identities and dense interpersonal networks exclusive to group members are highly organized and hence readily mobilized. By providing prior solidarities and moral commitments, these identities and networks provide the basis for the operation of collective incentives for action.
Conversely, groups with weak identities, few intragroup networks, and strong ties to outsiders are less likely to mobilize. In that sense the resource mobilization approach supports the ecological view that organized neighborhoods are those where residents have strong feeling of attachment, identification and vested interests. These, in turn, are the ones that are able to mobilize the necessary resources for action.
The political economy theory adds an important element to this model. The most significant contribution of this approach is its emphasis on the role of outside contributions to the process of organization and action.
Traditionally, scholars assumed that the motivation for action come from the direct beneficiaries of the change or resistance to change. The political economy of voluntary associations assumes that the motivation for action is 28 collective incentives and those may came from external actors. This approach adopts an open system approach, suggesting that the outcomes of the action may be shaped by the political environment. The institutionalization of neighborhood organization in the city decision making process obviously enhances the ability of neighborhoods to achieve their goals.
In sum, this research is concerned with neighborhood initiatives and responses to the powerful forces of growth, decline and population change that constantly redefine the nature of the social system in local areas. A tacit assumption of this research is that given the political incentives that are available to communities today to engage in collective action, traditional theoretical models may have to be expanded to account for the effect of these variables on neighborhood action.
The model used in this study of the determinants of neighborhood action, is an integrative model that derives hypotheses from Human Ecology, Resource Mobilization and The
Political Economy of Voluntary Associations. In this model, organized neighborhood action is a function of the characteristics of the population and its environment, the resources and incentives available for collective action. CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
The theoretical model used in this research to explain the determinants of neighborhood action assumes three broad groups of variables. First, there are the variables that reflect the neighborhood context in which the action takes place. These variables are derived from the Human Ecological perspective. Second, there are variables that reflect the material and human resources available to the organization and its complexity. These variables are derived from the
Resource Mobilization perspective. Finally,there are variables that measure the incentives for local organized action. These variables are derived from the Political
Economy of Voluntary Organizations perspective.
Environmental Threats
Studies on neighborhood mobilization point to potential changes in the social or physical environment as the motivational forces for neighborhood organization and action. A number of studies describe the process of mobilization and action that results from plans for new developments in the neighborhoods (Henig, 1982; Crenson,
29 1983). This process of mobilization seems to occur also when the development is not in the neighborhood but in its surrounding area (Schwirian and Mesch, 1993). Other studies found that resident participation in neighborhood improvement associations increases when residents perceive or anticipate threats to their neighborhood even though no such change has yet begun. This positive relationship between perception of negative change in the future and participation in neighborhood associations holds even when controls for socioeconomic status, family life cycle and race are introduced. This effect is stronger in renovated neighborhoods than in city and periphery neighborhoods
(Crenshaw and St. John, 1989).
It seems that neighborhoods as social systems have a tendency to resist change and it is change or potential for change that starts the process of mobilization and action of the residents. Potential changes are perceived as either bringing a new and different population to the area or developments which adversely affect property values. These threats to the neighborhood social system tend to bring together residents with different social backgrounds, families at different stages in their life cycle and individuals with different occupational interests. The common tie is the desire to protect the neighborhood social system. 31
The potential for neighborhood change may be the result of the operation of external or internal forces. New developments in the surrounding area are usually perceived as potential threats to the social system and life style of the neighborhood (Mesch and Schwirian, 1993). New commercial developments bring with them an increase in traffic congestion, noise and a transient population that is perceived as increasing crime.
Residents perceive the proximity of apartment complexes as a threat to the neighborhood environment. Proposals for land use changes, as recent studies show, are at the top of the formative issues of neighborhood improvement associations (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990; Hogan, 1986).
Renters are considered to represent a transitory population without a clear interest in the conservation of the property in the area, lower in income and education than the established population, increasing the density of the area and the enrollment in the local schools. As one of the leaders of a broad coalition of neighborhood groups in the far north area of Columbus said:
"Our coalition was created first of all to fight zoning of non-developed land for apartments. That will increase the density of the area, bring families that are transitory without any interest in the conservation of the neighborhood and will increase the pressure on the local schools.
Definitely we do not want them here." 32
The belief that renters do not show much interest in the local neighborhood is supported in past studies. The rate of participation of renters in neighborhood-based organizations is very low, even when socioeconomic status is controlled, suggesting that this group is virtually uninvolved in local issues (Thomas, 1986; Heskin, 1991).
The evidence does not suggest that renters are discouraged from joining community organizations. They appear to lack the concerns that draw others to neighborhood groups. This lack of concern translates into low rates of participation in neighborhood-based associations such as the local Parents Teacher Association and other neighborhood associations (Haberle, 1989) . Furthermore, the increase in the proportion of renters in residential areas has the effect of increasing the participation of homeowners in local associations and to push these groups to oppose the expansion of apartment complexes and re-zoning of single units to multiple units (Thomas, 1986).
Other threats to the environment are internal changes that are brought about as part of the life cycle of the neighborhood. Hoover and Vernon (1959) argued that neighborhoods have a life cycle. They undergo a process of life cycle change that involves development, transition, downgrading, thinning out and renewal. As the housing stock becomes older, the status, racial and age composition of the population changes, and the intensity of land and dwelling use, population density and the quality and condition of housing also change. In this process, more housing stock becomes vacant as families move out from the area and the population is not replaced. Vacant units represent a serious concern to the neighborhood. As one leader in the west area observed: "Absent landowners do not take care of the property, the vacant units are a magnet for activities that are conducive to crime like vandalism, litter and trash in the streets and drug dealers".
Vacant units also represent a health hazard. As the
President of the Italian Village Commission commented: "
Vacant units start declining and with the decline they become a secure house for rodents, abandoned cats and dogs, representing a serious risk for children and youngsters that may play in the area."
Residents' concern with changes brought by the life cycle of the neighborhood support the findings of an extensive study on the effects of physical decline such as dilapidation, vandalism and the presence of litter and trash in the streets on community organization. The consequences are anger and demoralization. These conditions undermine the social fabric of the neighborhood. Residents start fearing crime, decreasing neighborliness and lose their sense of territorial responsibility (Skogan, 1990) . Increase in vacant units and deteriorating housing have been found to increase the membership in neighborhood associations 34 especially in the inner city (Thomas, 1986; Skogan, 1989).
Lately a controversy on the differential impact of neighborhood threats has emerged in the literature. The
Growth Machine theoretical model argues that the central issue in local politics or the issue that captures the essence of locality, is the pursuit of intensive growth
(Logan and Molotch, 1987) . The principal adversary of residents is a coalition of progrowth entrepreneurs against whom the interests of the city residents seldom prevail. The fundamental assumption of this approach is that any piece of real estate has both use and exchange values. An apartment building provides a home for residents (use value) while at the same time generates rent for owners (exchange value).
Individuals and groups differ on which aspect is most crucial in their lives. The sharpest contrast in the city is between residents that use place to satisfy essential needs of life and entrepreneurs who use place for financial return. The maximization of return is ordinarily achieved by intensifying the use to which property is put (Logan and
Molotch, 1987). This approach implies that neighborhood action is more likely to be motivated by threats related to land use change than by threats related to neighborhood aging.
The empirical evidence provides partial support for this expectation. Land use changes were identified as the most frequent issue mentioned for the formation of 35 neighborhood associations in a study on Albany, NY (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990) . Thus, I expect that:
Hx: Neighborhood associations where residents face
potential land use changes are likely to take a greater
number of actions than neighborhood associations where
residents face potential neighborhood life cycle
problems.
Environmental threats such as new developments, increase in the proportion of renters, vacant units and the aging of the housing stock have been identified in this discussion as factors that motivate neighborhood organization and action. However, the relationship between needs and action is not a simple one. Neighborhoods that face major changes in land use or deterioration of the housing stock do not always mobilize to act. The ability to mobilize is dependent on the characteristics not only of the environment but also of the population. As Henig (1982) found in his study of eight neighborhoods facing urban renewal, some neighborhoods were able to react rapidly while others were not.
The relationship between the neighborhood needs for action and actual mobilization and action seems to be affected by the social composition of the neighborhood.
Population Social Composition
The effects of socioeconomic status on local political participation has been the focus of a large number of 36 studies in the past. A central finding has been the positive relationship between socioeconomic status and participation in neighborhood associations. This finding holds also at the aggregate level. Neighborhoods with higher income levels are more likely to be organized than lower income neighborhoods
(Oropesa, 1989, Sampson, 1988; Sampson, 1991).
Regarding collective action, the higher the average income of the neighborhood, the more likely a fast and sustained reaction to redevelopment plans (Henig, 1982) .
This finding is supported by recent studies of neighborhood participation in the zoning process. Mean income of the neighborhood is positively related to participation in public hearings on zoning issues. This effect is significant when other contextual variables are controlled. Furthermore, mean income of the neighborhood is the only contextual variable that explains opposition to zoning changes
(Hutcheson and Prather, 1988). It is important to emphasize that while this effect is indeed significant, the explained variance is modest, suggesting that variables that do not reflect the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood may have strong effects as well.
Certainly participation by itself in the zoning process does not mean influence. Neighborhoods may participate and oppose zoning decisions, but ultimately the decision is made in city hall. The empirical evidence shows that not only were participation and opposition to zoning changes found 37 more often in higher income areas but that these areas were relatively successful in ensuring that undesired applications failed to pass (Hutchenson and Prather, 1988).
The higher ability of wealthy areas to mobilize resources may explain the relationship between income and action. Associations in low income areas are less effective in mobilizing members, money and skilled leadership
(Oropesa, 1989). Participation in local affairs creates costs for the poor. Time and money are in short supply and the ability to organize and act collectively depends in part on the ability to mobilize these resources (Oliver, 1984) .
Middle class communities posses more resources to absorb the costs of social involvement. These communities are more likely to establish neighborhood associations with a committed rank and file who can contribute money and labor.
In addition, an effective organization that engages in collective action for the improvement of the area requires a skilled leadership. Associations in low income areas usually lack individuals that have developed political experience and the effective communication skills necessary to be heard politically.
As some of the scholars associated with the new urban sociology had argued, higher incomes and prestigious occupations are resources that can be translated into political currency. Officials are likely to skew policy actions to suit the needs of residents that have those 38 resources (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983).
The relationship between socioeconomic status and neighborhood action may be curvilinear (Rich,1980).
Localized collective action may be a result of an evaluation of costs involved and available resources in the neighborhood for the achievement of goals. Residents have an idea of the resources they can mobilize and the costs involved to achieve the desired goals. For this reason a curvilinear relationship may be expected. In high income communities, the individual resources allow residents to solve problems individually and obviate the need to organize for collective action. Middle and lower middle class communities will be the better organized because the collective resources are higher than the costs involved in achieving goals. Low income areas will have a low ratio of resources to demands and will be less organized. Thomas
(1986) tested a modified hypothesis suggesting an
interaction between socioeconomic status and environmental threats. In his study on patterns of participation on local
issues in Cincinnati, the evidence supported the argument that those in the middle classes are more likely to be
involved in local issues because they have both the needs
(commercial developments, housing decline and crime) that the upper classes do not have and the initiative and
resources that the lower classes lack. In this research a
curvilinear relationship is expected between socioeconomic 39 status and action.
H2: Associations located in neighborhoods with a high proportion of residents from low or high socioeconomic status will take less actions than neighborhood associations located in neighborhoods with a high proportion of residents from middle income strata.
The concern with contextual factors that explain social organization of neighborhoods is central to community research. The defended neighborhood ideal type assumes that local political action is the result of the attachment and sentiments of residents to the area. This model assumes that the local community is a complex system of friendships and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes.
The key hypothesis derived from this conceptualization is that length of residence is the most important exogenous variable that influences attitudes and behavior toward the community. Since assimilation of newcomers to the community is a temporal process, the longer the residence the more the friends, acquaintances and the higher the participation in local issues (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974).
Kasarda (1977) tested this model and found that length of residence, controlling for social and demographic characteristics of the residents, is positively related to an individual's local friendships and participation in social activities. In turn, local networks have a positive 40 effect on community attachment and sentiments (Kasarda and
Janowitz, 1974). A more recent study used more refined measures of local participation and basically replicated the same finding. In this research, length of residence is found to have a positive effect on visiting friends and relatives, participating in social activities such as dances and sporting events and participation in local organizations controlling for socioeconomic status and family status
(Sampson, 1988) .
The concern with individual participation is a limitation of these studies. From these studies we can infer that in any given community, long term residents are more likely to participate in the neighborhood than newcomers. On the other hand, which communities are more likely to be organized is a very different question that studies on individual participation cannot answer.
One recent study partially addresses this problem
(Sampson, 1991). The theoretical idea in the study is that structural barriers such as community residential instability and ethnic heterogeneity impede the development of formal and informal ties that promote social cohesion and the ability to solve common problems. The assumption is that residents of areas characterized by frequent population turnover face constraints compared to residents in stable areas. An individual will have fewer opportunities to form friendships and participate in local affairs in areas of high residential turnover. And if residential mobility increases institutional instability then individuals in unstable communities will find fewer opportunities for organizational contact. The motivation to form local friendships may also be reduced in areas of high population turnover since residents know they will not last
(Freudenberg, 1986) .The specific hypothesis of the study was that community residential stability will have a positive effect on the participation of the individual residents in local social networks and local voluntary associations. The study found that controlling for socioeconomic status and family status of the individual, residential stability is positively related to the density of friendships and acquaintances and participation in local affairs of individuals (Simpson, 1988). Furthermore, the density of friendships in the community and participation in local social activities are positively related to community attachment( Sampson, 1991).
Another group of studies investigated the effect of community attachment on local political participation in neighborhood improvement associations. These studies found that neighborhood attachment and satisfaction is positively related to membership and participation in neighborhood associations, controlling for socioeconomic status and
family status (Oropresa, 1992). 42
To sum up, the evidence presented suggests that the greater the community stability the greater the participation in neighborhood associations. It is important to emphasize that these studies are concerned with the effects of contextual variables on individual participation.
Whether that participation is translated in collective action is not clear.
Another structural barrier is ethnic heterogeneity.
While black and white low income communities seem to have the same levels of participation (Berry, et . al., 1990), mixed racial and ethnic communities are less likely to engage in organized action. Heterogeneity tends to create mistrust that represents a structural barrier to communication, social interaction and action. While various ethnic groups may share values and goals, their organization is more likely to be segmented according to their different ethnic origins (Suttles, 1968; Heskin, 1991) creating fragmentation in local action (Sampson and Groves, 1989).
The result is an inability to define and realize common values, weak and slow responses to land development pressures and physical decline (Henig, 1982), population change and crime (Skogan, 1990). I expect that:
H3: Neighborhood associations in ethnically homogenous
neighborhoods are likely to engage in more actions that
neighborhood associations in ethnically heterogeneous
neighborhoods. One approach builds on the conception of community as a
Community of Limited Liability (Greer, 1962). In this perspective, the local community is primarily an instrumental response of those with the greatest economic and social stakes in the locality. This is so because advances in transportation and communication have reduced the dependence of neighborhood residents on the immediate community for social ties. In the community of limited liability, individuals are believed to rationally calculate ends which may be obtained by residence in specific territories; political activity is seen as a logical way to achieve desirable goals for the territory. Among the most important investments is home ownership, which encourages residents to be politically active as a means of protecting and enhancing their property. Parents have an interest in the locale because it is the site for rearing and the socialization of their children. From this perspective communities with high investments will be more likely to be effective in addressing their problems.
Consistent with this perspective in a study of Seattle,
Guest and Lee (1983) showed that those with homes and children are characterized by high political involvement in local issues. In a study of the redevelopment of urban neighborhoods, Henig (1982) investigated the relationship of a number of community characteristics to both the speed at which the neighborhoods mobilized and the degree of their 44 resistance to neighborhood change. Communities with a high level of homeownership are easier to mobilize and homeowners are more likely to be members of neighborhood improvement associations than renters (Oliver,1984).
The stage in the family life cycle affects residents involvement in voluntary associations. Family interests and obligations at each stage in the life cycle can promote or inhibit participation in extra-familial activities. From all the family types, families with young children have the greatest interest in the neighborhood. Most of the time of young children is spent in the neighborhood, playing and making friends with other children. The schools that children attend are most likely to be located in the immediate or adjacent area. In that sense, the neighborhood is an agent of socialization for young children.
Studies on the effects of individual stage in the life cycle on participation in voluntary associations support this argument. In the typical family life cycle sequence, unmarried adults and the married without children are usually more concerned with establishing a career than spending much time in associational activities. With the birth of young children, new familial roles provide greater incentives to expand participation in community activities.
Involvement is further stimulated when children reach school age and want their parents to participate in local organizations like the Parents Teacher Association (Knoke 45 and Thomson, 1977).
In this study, I expect that:
H4: The greater the proportion of residents with interest in
locale (e.g. high proportion of homeowners and families
with children) the greater the number of actions taken
by the neighborhood associations.
Of particular interest is a study that tests the defended neighborhood and the model of the community of limited liability. Using a sample of 40 neighborhoods in
Seattle, the study tests the relative importance of friendships, homeownership and family life cycle stage on participation in local collective acts. The findings suggest that the value of home is much more strongly related to various types of local political involvement than the friendship variables. Increased investment in home is positively related to political action. Furthermore, family status has a much stronger effect on political action than the friendship measure (Guest and Oropresa, 1986). Overall the findings suggest that both models are not contradictory but supplementary. The variation in localized political activity is explained by investments and the density of friendships in the area. However the effect of the investment variables is stronger.
The Resource Mobilization perspective emphasizes the proximate causes that shape the form, content and the outcomes of collective action. The basic assumption of this 46 approach is that resources are a necessary antecedent of community action (Milofsky, 1988).
Neighborhood associations posses three different kinds of resources: members, money and other resources e.g., skilled leadership. These latter are a result of process of exchange with other locality based organizations and resources that result from expertise. Past studies show that the level of resources of neighborhood associations affects the amount of time invested in different actions.
Neighborhood associations with limited resources are more likely to invest heavily in actions whose goal is survival including recruiting members, raising funds, providing information to the community and arranging social activities. Neighborhood associations with greater resources allocate more time and energy to actions like managing local projects and to relations with the government and other organizations (Rich, 1980).
Human and Financial Resources
Membership is an important variable that affects the number and kinds of community action. A large membership may increase the number of actions and arenas in which the neighborhood organization can act. Membership increases the resource base and allows the organization to expand the number of issues promoted.
As local communities and neighborhoods become organized, their initial mobilization strategies usually 47 center upon generating membership and mobilizing voluntary labor for mailing and lobbying and participation in public hearings. Not only is membership substantively important, it is also symbolically important as a claim to representativeness for various forms of collective action
(Hunter and Staggenborg, 1988). In general, officials and the city government are more likely to take seriously claims that come from organizations that are known to have a large membership (Thomas, 1986).
An important distinction should be made between "token" and "active" members. This distinction is relevant because membership in neighborhood associations is sometimes liberally defined as any person living in the area. For the purposes of this research, "active" members are those who contribute their time, energy and labor in advancing collective goals. This active-token distinction is more important in the low income communities. Some scholars argue that there is a trade off between money and membership. Low income communities have less money and, thus, membership is a critical variable in predicting social action.
In addition to members, local organizations are also dependent upon funds to engage in certain types of collective action. Funds are necessary for the maintenance and enhancement of the organization (e.g. renting office space and equipment); are also vital for specific types of collective action like renting buses to transport members to 48 public hearings or paying for the mailing of petitions.
Organizational Complexity
The level of resources available determine the structure of the organization. An important dimension of organization structure is its complexity. Organizational complexity refers to the degree of differentiation of tasks
(Drabeek and Haas, 1974) . Price and Mueller (1986) suggest that complexity is the degree of formal structural differentiation. This complexity can be conceptualized as the number of basic objectives or responsibilities of an organization (Blau, 1981) . In voluntary associations, the number of official positions, internal committees and tasks can be considered an indicator of structural complexity.
Complexity of structure may allow an organization to better deal with an unstable resource base by formally delegating responsibilities and activities (Austin,1991). Neighborhood associations with a more complex structure ( more internal committees, publishing a regular newsletter ) are more likely to define more tasks. On the other hand, this complexity is a function of a large and committed membership and financial resources that allow the organization to engage in a variety of exchanges with the environment.
Organizational age may affect its degree of complexity.
An older neighborhood association could be expected to have had more time to develop a complex structure. Time may permit more levels of organizational structure to develop. A 49 historical factor influencing organizations is a "liability of newness" (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983) which presumes that newer organizations are more likely to fail than older ones, assuming that all other factors are equal.
Older organizations have had a longer time period to develop structures which insulate the organization from environmental fluctuations and uncertainties. I expect that:
H5: Complex neighborhood associations (e.g. associations
that have internal committees and publish a
newsletter) are likely to take a greater number of
actions than simpler neighborhood associations.
Experts
Neighborhood associations need experts. The importance of experts springs from two sources. First, as society has become more complex, so have the problems with which society must deal. The value of experts, or those who can claim to know more than others about a particular subject area, increases with the increasing complexity of society. Second, because of the need for expertise, government bureaucracies have increased in size and importance at all levels of government. Bureaucrats are expected to have or to develop expertise. Since their jobs require that they be experts, they believe in using that expertise as a basis for making decisions. 50
The use of experts by governmental bureaucracies may create a problem for citizens who want to influence government decisions, unless the citizen can be seen as having comparable expertise (Kweit, R. and Kweit, M., 1990) .
Decisions on zoning changes to allow developments that may change radically the face of neighborhoods require impact assessment studies on traffic, crime and tax revenues. In their attempt to influence the decision makers, developers usually submit studies and assessments to document their case that the development will benefit the city and the surrounding areas. Successfully opposing these proposals means being able to show flaws in the assessment. This can be accomplished only when the neighborhood can mobilize experts whose work produces contrary results. A recent study shows that the use of experts to refute the assertions of a developer mobilized neighborhoods against the development of a proposed major amphitheater in downtown Columbus
(Schwirian and Mesch, 1993).
Expertise provides legitimacy in relations with city government. Increasingly, expertise is vital in reaching and influencing decision-makers. Many citizen groups use money or social networks to hire their own experts to do battle with the city.
The importance of experts may be illustrated in the area of building code enforcement. First, the neighborhood needs to document the deterioration of the building by 51 photographing it year after year. Second, the neighborhood must contact the owner, usually an absentee owner, to persuade him/her to act. Third, a law suit is instituted and only after these steps fail will the city act. This process documents the need for experts in architecture, the legal system and regulations involving code enforcement.
Neighborhood associations are voluntary organizations with limited funds to pay for the services of experts. They usually rely on the work that is done voluntarily by residents. A number of leaders of area coalitions explained that one reason for the creation of the coalition was to pull together resources to access information on the city regulations on land use and code enforcement. For example, neighborhood associations that join the Far North Columbus
Community Coalition pay a first time membership fee. In exchange, the coalition provides information on land use regulations and avenues for action open to the neighborhoods. When an issue affects the whole area, the coalition mobilizes experts to conduct independent studies on the impact of the change.
I expect that:
H6: Neighborhood associations that have experts on the
board are more likely to engage in collective actions
than those that lack experts. 52
Resource Exchange
Another important resource is the existence of other neighborhood-based organizations in the area. The ecological approach to organizations initially assumed that the existence of a number of organizations in the same environment would lead to competition among them, eliminating some and allowing for the growth of others.
However, the existence of similar organizations may facilitate the formation and action of neighborhood associations. Organizations within the same neighborhood environment come to constitute resources for each other and also may increase the level of resources available from the wider system. These process are shown in different studies as operating even without the active cooperation of the organizations involved (Wiewel and Hunter, 1985; Milofsky,
1988) .
Because of these processes, the emergence of organizations may be facilitated by the existence of similar organizations. There are a number of processes by which organizations, with similar goals, operating in the same environment, become resources for each other facilitating the establishment of new organizations like themselves.
Wiewel and Hunter (1985) , in their study of community organizations in Chicago, found that the main processes are of resource exchange and legitimacy. 53
Important resources for a new neighborhood association are money, members and a skilled board. These resources may be provided by existing organizations in the area like local churches and local business associations. Wiewel and
Hunter(1985) compare a successful and an unsuccessful neighborhood improvement association. The successful one was located in a neighborhood with dense interorganizational networks. The essential resources for the formation were provided by the local business association. The presence of other organizations also gave the new organization access to skilled people. The Board included members experienced in community organization through involvement with business associations or other self help organizations. Wiewel and
Hunter (1985) found that in the absence of related organizations, the unsuccessful organization did not have any of those resources, skills and contacts. No organization sponsored them and could make facilities available. None of the initiators had any experience with neighborhood organization. By contrast, the existence of a dense interorganizational network in the area where the successful organization was located meant that numerous organizational resources including money, members and skilled leaders could be brought together to form a new organization.
Relationships with other organizations in the area serve to provide legitimacy to the new organization and its activities, both inside and outside the neighborhood. This 54 legitimacy is enhanced when the board members present themselves by their present and former affiliation (e.g.
President of the Civic Association and former member of the board of the local business association, PTA or the local church). From this discussion, I expect to find that the strength of the local interoganizational networks is positively related to collective action.:
H7: The greater the number of local organizations that
provide technical and material support the greater the
collective actions taken by the neighborhood
association.
Political Incentives
There is increasing evidence that in a number of cities, local governments initiated programs of Community
Citizen Participation. These initiatives probably account for the increase in the number of neighborhood associations
(Haberle, 1989; Thomas, 1986). In these cities, the city government supervises the elections, provides material and technical support and allocates the status of advisory boards to those groups. In Columbus, Ohio, City Council had
formally recognized a number of Area Commissions (Schwirian,
1991), regulating their activities through ordinances.
It is important to recognize that the attempt of non-local agents to organize local areas is not new. Social
service agencies and political activists have done it before. However, the difference between past and present is the goal. Prior attempts of community activists and social service agencies were meant to create empowering organizations, ( i.e., community organizations that increase the leadership capabilities of individual members of disadvantaged groups). The current trend is for empowered organizations that influence the environment or community
(Florin and Wandersman,19 90). This empowerment is reflected in the allocation of a formally recognized status in the power structure of the city. Applications for zoning and architectural changes are referred to the local organizations for study and input in the decision process.
Residents are now informed of plans for neighborhood change well before a decision is made. This inclusion in the process allows residents to mobilize and express their opposition to unfavorable changes. Access to such information is critical because the sooner neighborhood residents are aware of a potential threat the more extensive and persistent their resistance can be (Hogan,
1986) .
City government sponsorship of citizen participation in local issues creates a new situation in local politics. In his influential work, Peterson (1981) conceptualizes city politics as 'groupless' politics. His central theme is that there is a lack of incentives for citizen participation in urban affairs. Part of this lack of incentives is a result 56 of the closed nature of the decision-making process. The city government used to reach decisions and to inform residents when action was no longer possible, i.e., after the fact. Consequently, government sponsorship of neighborhood associations gives voice, and sometimes veto, to the neighborhood organizations (Thomas, 1986; Kweit and
Kweit, 1990) .
Unfortunately, few studies have evaluated the effect of these citizen participation programs. The first question is whether those programs actually increase the participation of residents in local affairs. Some studies have found an increase in neighborhood organization and participation after the implementation of the programs (Haberle, 1989;
Thomas, 1986; Hutcheson and Prather, 1989). The recognition of neighborhood associations as advisory groups is positively related to increases in the number of local organizations and the number of individuals that report being members of neighborhood associations( Thomas,1986;
Haberle, 1989; Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990).
A second question is whether these political incentives increase the participation in traditionally non-active neighborhoods. On this point study results differ. Although all studies report that socioeconomic status significantly contributes to the explanation in the variance in participation, the direction of the effect depends on the dependent variable. When voting in neighborhood elections is 57 the dependent variable, residents participation increases as the income of the neighborhood decreases as well as when the proportion of whites in the neighborhood increases (Haberle,
1989). Also, participation in elections increases as the percent of homeowners in the neighborhood increases.
The results are different when the dependent variable is membership in neighborhood associations. Socioeconomic status and homeownership are found to be positively related to reporting membership in neighborhood associations
(Thomas, 1986) . The difference may be explained in terms of level of commitment. Voting in elections requires a minimal commitment of time, energy and money than membership. Low income groups may be willing to vote but, lacking resources, their overall participation is likely to be nominal.
Based on previous research, the most relevant question is how governmental sponsorship affects neighborhood associations. One possibility is that a relationship with city government creates a kind of resource dependency that can result in the displacement of goals as organizations modify and moderate positions to ensure the flow of political incentives (Jenkins, 1983). However, this would only be the case when the source of external support is the adversary or target of collective action. In the case of neighborhood associations dealing with unwanted changes to their environment, the government is not always perceived as the target of collective action. The city government is 58 perceived as a cooperating organization in half of the issues and as an adversary in the other half. Business and land developers are usually perceived as adversaries on land development and life style issues (Logan and Rabrenovic,
1990). Jenkins and Perrow (1977) note that the support of other external actors may be critical in directly providing resources to a movement organization.
Neighborhood associations seek various resources that most cannot generate internally: technical and political information, financial assistance and public and elite acceptance of their claims as legitimate. Government sponsorship offers a regularized flow of essential resources from the public sector to a voluntary one (Knoke,1983).
Empirical evidence shows that participation of neighborhood association groups in the process of zoning has an impact on zoning decisions. This participation increases as a result of city government incentives. More areas are represented in zoning public hearings, more information is provided to residents, and the outcome is more favorable to the neighborhoods after their participation (Green and
Schreuder, 1990).The experience of neighborhood planning sensitizes community residents to land use issues and mobilizes communities for participation in the zoning process(Hutcheson and Prather, 1988). Once they experience the power to influence decisions affecting them they may move to other issues in which the government is the target. 59
Thus I expect that:
H8: The greater the political incentives the greater the
actions taken by neighborhood associations.
In terms of social policy, the relevant question is how political incentives for action are allocated. The allocation of political incentives may be related to the structure of community power. Students of community power claim that power is differentially distributed in the city and that the distribution of power determines the decisions of city government. Pluralists have argued that power is the ability to have one's preferences be decisive in policy decisions, but elite theorists have claimed that this is only one face of power. Elite theorists claim that power is a more subtle and complex concept. The ability to suppress issues so that they never reach the resolution stage of the policy making process constitutes an important face of power. According to this view, the wealthy have an easier time gaining access to officials, in part because local government relies on a middle class constituency. According to a number of scholars, the result is a middle class bias in the city government (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983). The implication is that political incentives are allocated to associations that are connected to the institutional structure of the city. Voluntary associations act as interest groups. They lobby local officials and City Council members and may influence the decisions on the allocation of political incentives. The result may be that political incentives are allocated to relatively wealthy neighborhoods that do not face major environmental threats and do not have a need for action. Thus, I expect a positive relationship between socioeconomic status and political incentives.
Hg: The higher the socioeconomic status of neighborhood
residents, the greater the political incentives for
organization. CHAPTER IV
THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH
The Citv of Columbus
This research was conducted in the City of Columbus and surrounding suburbs. Columbus is the state capital. It is located in Franklin County, in the central part of the State of Ohio. The central city covers an area that has a population of 700,000 in a metropolitan area comprised of approximately 1.1 million. Columbus is different in many respects from other northeastern metropolitan areas in that the level of suburbanization is relatively low. As a result of an intensive policy of land annexation after World War II the city expanded from 40 square miles in 1950 to 190 in
1990. The result is that only 30 percent of the metropolitan population lives in the suburbs and surrounding counties
(Jonas, A., 1991).
Unlike other older cities, the metropolitan area is growing very fast. Table 1 reports population, housing and labor force characteristics for the Columbus and Cleveland metropolitan areas in the census years 1970 and 1980. In that decade Columbus experienced an increase in population while the population of Cleveland decreased.
61 62
Table 1. Population. Housing and Labor Force Characteristics
of Columbus and Cleveland SMSA's(1970-1980)
Columbus Cleveland
1970 1980 1970 1980
Population 916,228 1,093,316 2,064,192 1,898,825
Total housing
Units 296,427 426,429 677,039 734,110
Percent H.S.
Graduates 63.0 72.0 63.0 68.0
Unemployment rate 11.0 5.7 14.6 6.8
Percent in occupations:
Managerial and
Professional 25.0 25.0 21.0 23.0
Technical and
Sales 34.0 34.0 36.0 32.0
Services 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.0
Operators and
Laborers 19.0 16.0 26.0 19.0 The economic base of Columbus is diverse and shaped by its position as state capital. Local employment is concentrated in the service sector, particularly in state and local government, health and education, finance and insurance and retail trade. The economic base is stable.
Despite the increase of the population during the 1970's, the occupational distribution of the labor force remained stable and the unemployment rate decreased. During the same period Cleveland lost both population and jobs in the technical, sales and blue collar occupations. The unemployment rate, despite the decrease in total population, remained higher than that of Columbus.
Like many other cities that are in the process of development and expansion, Columbus has experienced tension between development forces and neighborhood residents. As new areas develop and old areas change, conflicts emerge between developers interested in intensifying land use, politician's interest in expanding available jobs and the tax base and residents' interest in conserving and improving their neighborhoods. Commercial and industrial developments in both new areas and older residential neighborhoods create conflicts. Often neighborhood groups all over the city take positions on the issues in question (Mesch and Schwirian,
1993) .
During the course of this study a number of citywide conflicts arose. Among them was a proposed 64 development of an amphitheater on the fringe of the German
Village. The Mayor and City Council supported a proposal for an Amphitheater with 18,000 seats. The external developer enjoyed the initial support of Downtown Columbus Inc., a coalition of public officials and representatives of private interests having a stake in the redevelopment of downtown.
The goal of the organization was to generate and implement development plans for the city's core.
The initial opposition came from the German Village
Society, the association of the gentrified neighborhood adjacent to the site of the proposed amphitheater. Downtown neighborhoods joined the opposition. Their concern was that the amphitheater would increase existing problems: more bars, crime and congestion.
Neighborhood groups from the north and south sides of the city supported the project. They saw it as boosting the city's economy and increasing the aggregate tax base, thereby helping to shift the tax burden from residents to business (Mesch and Schwirian, 1993).
The pressure of active and vocal neighborhood groups was successful. Private and public sector representatives in
Downtown Columbus Inc. asked the developer to put a hold on the project. Downtown Columbus Inc. decided to cease to exist, in part due to its inability to go ahead with the amphitheater. Columbus, then, is an appropriate setting for this study. First, it is a growing city experiencing conflicts over land use in which private interests, the government and neighborhood groups are involved. The relatively solid and stable economic base of the city allows to residents to suspect any promises of more jobs and tax revenues for the city. Second, inner city neighborhoods are confronted with serious housing and crime problems. Both, the relatively low suburbanization and the solid economic base of the city, provide hope that those problems can be solved. Third, together with population growth, the number of neighborhood associations increased. About 60 associations were created in the last 10 years and become very active in protecting and improving their neighborhoods. Part of the increase in the number of associations can be attributed to the actions of the government. The city recognized and help organize 15 area commissions. The result is a city where neighborhood conflicts are common and neighborhood groups are active.
The Organizational Structure of Columbus
This research identified three types of organizations that coexist in the city: Neighborhood Associations, Area
Commissions and Area Coalitions. Each is a unique form of organization with a unique place in the city's political economy. 66
Neighborhood Associations
The neighborhood association is the most common type of organization in the city. Its main goals are to maintain and improve the neighborhood quality of life and to protect common economic and social interests. By definition, neighborhood associations are place specific. They represent a relative small and well defined geographical area. The size of the area ranges between 50 to 500 households. Such associations restrict membership to residents whether homeowners or renters. Neighborhood groups with few exceptions are voluntary associations. Members contribute monetary resources, time and energy . The one exception is the German Village Society. This neighborhood association actively solicits private funds for the historical preservation and restoration of the neighborhood.
The goals of neighborhood associations are multipurpose. Issues and problems are brought before the residents and to the association by them for group consideration. As the president of one association said:
" One of the difficulties that our association faces is the variety of issues that residents bring to us. Sometimes we are like an internal government. We must educate our residents to take care of the yard, to keep public spaces clean, and we are expected to mediate in conflicts between neighbors. Others require persistent contacts and negotiation with the government on issues of snow removal, 67 street lights, traffic congestion. Finally, we need to express our concerns on land use changes. Goals change according to what residents feel is important. The criteria of what is important is everything that may affect the property."
The strength of the neighborhood associations lies in the direct participation of its members. The organized participation of residents communicates to residents and outsiders a sense of community, of a population living in a geographically bounded part of the city with a particular identity, of common problems that may affect the quality of the residents' lives.
The weakness of neighborhood associations is a function of the diversity of the city. Problems vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. High crime rates, disorganization and housing deterioration are the major problems in the inner city. A leader on the near east side defined his most important concern as the safety of children and residents. He described the association's main concern as the improvement of neighborhood safety. When asked for an example, he said: "Children now feel very safe. We were able to reach an agreement with the police. They escort the children to and from school."
Unwanted businesses such as bars and adult bookstores seem to represent a serious concern for a relatively large number of neighborhoods. For example, in the far east area, 68 the neighborhood association organized a successful boycott of a gas station that sold alcoholic beverages. After two months, the gas station, a member of a national chain, decided to stop selling alcoholic beverages. But success is not easy to achieve. For example, in one inner city neighborhood conflict continues over a state liquor store that is close to the elementary school.
In the northwest, northeast and far north sections, problems are different. The central issue in these areas is the attempt of developers to intensify land use. These neighborhood groups have to contend with new malls, apartment complexes and increasing traffic. The diversity of the city works as a divisive force. Despite the large number of active neighborhood associations, only half maintain regular formal contacts with others. The remainder are unaffiliated.
In addition, leaders of neighborhood associations recognize their weakness in dealing with city government and developers. They feel that in the overall structure of city government, neighborhood associations are peripheral and powerless. As one of the leaders said: "We lack the accessibility to the city bureaucracy that the Area
Commissions enjoy." This feeling is sometimes expressed in ambivalent terms. From one side, neighborhood associations feel free to voice their concerns and use any strategy to further their interests. From the other side, they feel that 69 lacking an officially defined role, their effectiveness is decreased.
In sum, neighborhood groups are the most common neighborhood organizations in the city. They represent relatively small areas, are voluntary, based on direct participation of members and define their goals as problem solving. The diversity of the city creates different problems for different areas. In the face of this diversity, almost half of these groups remain isolated from others, and consequently deal with the city on a bilateral basis.
Area Commissions
Since the 1960s the City of Columbus has worked to create a body of advisory neighborhood representatives. The process started with the definition of three inner city historical districts that were targeted for restoration:
German Village, Italian Village and Victorian Village.
Subsequent to the identification of these historical districts, an official advisory organization from each district was formed. This advisory group focused on the process of architectural review and proposed changes in physical structure of the area.
During the 1970s and 1980s area commissions were created in other areas of the city and the city code was changed. Currently there are 15 officially recognized area commissions. According to the modification of the Columbus City Code in 1981, "Area Commissions are established to afford additional voluntary citizen participation in decision making in an advisory capacity and to facilitate communication, understanding and cooperation between neighborhood groups, city officials and developers."
In this sense, Area Commissions were created to function as social influence associations, voluntary organizations that are invited to shape the adoption and implementation of public policies. In addition, Area commissions were also created to represent the various interests in the neighborhoods. This is different from neighborhood associations that restrict their membership to residents.
According to the ordinance:
"persons residing, working or owning property in an area of the City who desire to participate in decision-making on a representative advisory Area
Commission, may petition council for the establishment of the area commission. No less than 500 signatures of residents of the proposed commission area are required."
While the number and selection of nominated members is left to the by-laws of each commission, the City Council controls the activities of the commission. According to the operative ordinance, the Area Commission nominates individuals to be members, but "All members should be appointed by the Mayor with the concurrence of City 71
Council"(1981).
The city, in fact, has exercised this control.
Informants from both the Italian Village Commission and the
Victorian Village Commission told me that in the past, the city government refused to appoint members who were nominated and/or elected by the residents. Known militants and vocal neighborhood activists were not appointed.
The city ordinances define the official functions of the area commission to:
1. Identify local planning needs and bring them to the knowledge of the government.
2. Promote communication between the Area Commission and the rest of the city.
3. Initiate, review and recommend criteria for the preservation and development of the area including parks, recreational areas, streets and traffic.
4. Recommend priorities for government services to the area.
5. Review applications for land use change.
In reviewing applications for land use change the power of the Area Commission is more than limited. The area commission must meet with any applicant for rezoning, special permits, demolition permits or variances regarding property in the area. Suggestions and comments of the area commission are only advisory and failure of the applicant to comply with the requests of the area commission may not be, in itself, grounds for the denial of the application. 72
While the tasks of the area commissions are broadly- defined, I found that most area commissions limit themselves strictly to architectural review in the case of the historical preservation districts, and to land use change and applications for zoning changes in the other areas.
These limitation seems to be a result of the wishes of city government rather than of the citizens.
In the last 10 years, city government has been interested in the consolidation of zoning plans for the inner city. To achieve this goal, interns from the
Department of City Planning at The Ohio State University were assigned to each area commission. In addition, the city refers zoning change applications to the commission. The result is that the organizations are overloaded with zoning applications and zoning plans.
This overspecialization of area commissions in the physical landscape of the neighborhood has been criticized by the Urban Land Institute. In the final report of an extensive study of inner city neighborhoods, The Urban Land
Institute argued that excessive concern of area commissions with the physical landscape works against resident interests and neighborhood revitalization. The Institute claimed that important issues such as economic development and population needs are not being addressed.
The creation of area commissions had an impact on the pattern of community organization. With the exception of the renovating neighborhoods, area commissions replaced existing neighborhood associations. The understanding of residents is that area commissions are a more effective instrument for influencing the city than the traditional neighborhood associations. Once the Commission is created there is little need for other organizations representing smaller areas. The
President of the South Linden Area Commission told us that
"Before the creation of the area commission we had active organizations almost in every neighborhood. The organizations brought problems such as inadequate garbage collection and crime and code enforcement to the city for solutions. Since the creation of the Area Commissions, the organizations started disappearing. Some of the leaders became members of the commission and others became inactive because they believe that the Commission is part of government and should take care of all the problems. Now we are encouraging residents and businesses to organize again.
But we are not very successful in that."
The three restoration neighborhoods and the university area represent an exemption to this pattern. In these areas, the creation of the Area Commissions was part of a process of differentiation and specialization of community organizations. The new Area Commissions took on only issues that are related to architectural review and land use change. The traditional neighborhood improvement associations deal with all other issues. 74
In sum, area commissions represent an attempt of the city government to externally induce citizen participation.
While the intention was to increase resident participation in all the aspects of neighborhood quality of life, the city agenda dictated specialization in physical landscape matters.
Paradoxically, instead of increasing local groups, the creation of area commissions reduced the number of neighborhood organizations. With the exception of the restoration neighborhoods and the university area, the area commissions replaced existing traditional neighborhood associations. Where area commissions were not created, neighborhood coalitions emerged.
Area Coalitions
The formation of the area commissions was designed to solve the problem of representation and accessibility to the political center. Other organized areas tried to influence the decision making process while avoiding being officially tied to the city government. In the mid 1980s some groups started organizing area coalitions. Currently six area coalitions exist in the city and each claims to represent an average of ten neighborhood associations. They have regular monthly meetings.
Coalition leaders give a number of reasons for their existence. First, there is the realization that neighborhood problems are also of concern to broader areas. A new 75 commercial development, like the Tuttle Cross Mall which the
Northwest Columbus Coalition strongly opposed, affect not only the adjacent neighborhood but the quality of life in a large segment of the northwest area.
Second, the existence of officially recognized area commissions is an advantage in their access to decision makers and may be decisive in the allocation of city resources.
Third, joining forces to access and share information on potential changes makes opposition to them more effective. Being detached from local government, coalitions have the freedom to use any effective type of action including petitions to and protests in city hall meetings.
Candidates for city council are invited to coalition meetings to express their ideas. While the coalitions officially do not support any candidate, they make clear to the different candidates their expectations regarding issues that concern the area.
Fourth, in new residential areas, coalitions are important sources of information. They provide the newcomers with information on residents' rights, how to deal with developers and how to influence the city distribution of services to the area.
Most of the leaders believe that coalitions were created as a response to the area commissions. Coalition impact on the small neighborhood associations has been one 76 of encouraging organization. The coalitions build on the neighborhood associations and do not attempt to replace them. In fact, coalitions encourage the development of neighborhood associations. Once the coalition was in place, some neighborhoods created associations to represent local interests. Furthermore, coalition meetings are a forum where leaders of neighborhood associations exchange experiences and knowledge, enhancing their leadership skills.
Coalitions are partially recognized by the city. The
Department of Human Services includes them in the official list of Major Civic Associations. They are invited to quarterly meetings with the Mayor or his special representative. The purpose of these meetings is to establish a permanent channel of information exchange from the City to the neighborhoods and from the neighborhoods to the city.
In sum, area coalitions are umbrella organizations that represent a group of small neighborhoods. They address a broad range of issues, from zoning to services, in a geographically broad area. Their creation was a reaction to the government initiative of recognizing area commissions.
The goal was to make sure that the concerns of areas not represented in the officially recognized advisory boards are heard. In contrast with the area commissions , the overall effect of the coalitions is to increase community organization at the neighborhood level. CHAPTER V
METHODOLOGY
Sample
The data for this study were collected from a survey of neighborhood associations in the city of Columbus (Ohio) and its suburbs (Gahanna, Dublin, Upper Arlington and Hilliard).
The universe of existing organizations was defined with the assistance of The Department of Human Services of the City of Columbus and the Departments of Community Relations of the cities of Gahanna, Dublin, Upper Arlington and Hilliard.
These agencies were asked to provide lists of civic associations that define their goals as maintaining or improving the quality of life in a geographically delimited residential area and were known to be active in the last three years.
The lists that the governmental agencies provided included 194 organizations and the names and addresses of their current presidents. Ten organizations were deleted from this list. Seven were found to be doubles, appearing both in the list of the City of Columbus and of one of the suburban areas. Three others were deleted because they did not meet the definition of neighborhood associations. They are formal organizations that provide services to the 78 elderly and handicapped.
The final list included a total of 184 neighborhood associations. The list consists of 131 neighborhood associations from the City of Columbus and 53 from the suburbs. In addition, in the process of data collection, a snowball technique was used. Informants were asked for names of other neighborhood associations in the area. Because this last method generated no new names, there is reason to believe that the formal list is comprehensive.
Neighborhood associations are often ephemeral. They arise when an important issue concerns the neighborhood and may become inactive until the next issue arises. Given that our goal is to study the determinants of collective action, an effort was made to contact only active organizations.
Respondents were asked to participate in the survey only if the association had been active in the last year. Overall,
41 neighborhood associations reported being inactive or defunct, resulting in 143 currently active neighborhood associations.
The existence of such a large number of neighborhood associations was surprising. Past studies using neighborhood associations as the unit of analysis report about 60 to 70 associations in various metropolitan areas (Haberle, 1989;
Thomas, 1986; Austin, 1990) . This disparity is a consequence of sample restrictions. These studies imposed two restrictions on their sampling. First, they restricted associations to those officially recognized by governmental bodies. This restriction is questionable. Government agencies may have an interest in recognizing cooperative associations and excluding vocal ones. Second, past studies restricted themselves to the inner city, deliberately ignoring suburban neighborhood associations. This is a serious limitation. Suburbs and the inner city should be recognized as a single metropolitan area that is integrated and interrelated. In the metropolitan area the activities necessary for the provision of services and goods to the population takes place. Where once the inner city and suburbs where relatively self sufficient, they now perform specialized functions for the metropolitan area. The metropolitan area comprises a single commuting field, a single retail distribution market and a single communication field. There is a territorial specialization of the areas in which particular activities and land uses are concentrated.
These include specialized areas such as Central Business
District, manufacturing zones, large retailing areas and residential areas. It is in the metropolitan area where economic institutions and residents compete for strategic location. Decisions on land use changes that threat neighborhoods are made by powerful actors at the metropolitan level. In sum, suburbs are a part of the metropolitan area. Land use pressures represent an environmental threat to their neighborhoods. Some of the suburbs are aging and face similar environmental threats as the inner city neighborhoods. In the preliminary analysis, a dummy variable representing suburban location was introduced in all the regression models. The effect of the variable was not significant. This finding is consistent with a recent study of 99 associations in the Albany, NY metropolitan area
(Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990). City and suburban neighborhood associations were not found to be different in their internal structure and resources. They did differ in some of the issues that they dealt with. These findings provide additional support for my decision to include all the known associations in the city and suburbs.
Data Collection
The data for this study were collected during the first quarter of 1993. The primary source of data was a questionnaire (see Appendix) that requested information concerning the organizational structure and resources of the association, problems affecting the area, actions taken to solve these problems, relationships with other neighborhood organizations and perceptions of the relationship with city government.
Questions on the social characteristics of the neighborhood such as income, racial composition and homeownership were included in the survey. However, past studies suggest that some of the social characteristics of neighborhood residents are not known to the association 81 leadership (Haberle, 1989; Perkins, et . a l .; 1990). To avoid this possibility, presidents of the associations were asked to define the geographical area represented by the association. In the preliminary analysis I found a large number of missing values. Many presidents, 25%, responded to the question of racial composition as "do not know."
To avoid losing a fourth of the data, the geographical boundaries were used to match the associations with the appropriate census tracts. In this procedure we followed the technique used by Austin (1990). First, neighborhood boundaries were identified in the street map of Franklin
County. Second, the census tracks that the neighborhood cover were identified using the Census Track Street
Directory. Social neighborhood characteristics - socioeconomic status, family status and housing stock- were obtained from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing,
1990. When the neighborhood included more than one census track the average value on residents social characteristics was taken. The Census data were merged with the survey data by census tracts. Although census tracks are known to be more heterogeneous than neighborhoods, it is accepted as a proxy of neighborhood characteristics and widely used in neighborhood change research (Barret and Wood, 1990) .
Previous neighborhood studies report a medium to low level of response to surveys ( Perkins, et . al., 1990;
Crenshaw and St. John, 1989; Guest and Lee, 1983) . Non- response is an important source of sample bias. This is, that the sample of organizations is not random and therefore not representative of the population of neighborhood associations. The main implication of sample bias is that the results cannot be generalized and may represent a particular group of associations. In particular, the concern was that non-response in a mail survey is not random. Social groups in the population that participate in city politics may be overrepresented in the sample. Neighborhood associations located in middle class and white areas are more likely to participate. On the other hand, social groups known to participate less in city politics may be underrepresented. Given the substantive interest of this study with whether the incentives for action increase the action of social groups that traditionally do not act, sample bias may affect the results and conclusions.
In order to avoid sample bias and increase the reliability of the results, a two step strategy was used.
Our final list of 143 active organizations was divided into two sub-samples. A random sample of 50 organizations was selected using random numbers. Data from these associations were collected by face-to-face interviews in which the questionnaire was administered as an interview schedule.
Data from the remaining 93 organizations was collected using a mailed survey. 83
Interviewing presidents was a strategic choice, given their high levels of involvement and information. The leaders of the random sample of associations were contacted by phone and asked to participate in the study. Appointments were made and face-to-face interviews were conducted. A total of 41 interviews were completed and only nine associations refused to participate.
The leaders of the remaining 93 organizations were contacted by mail, asked to participate in the study and to fill out the questionnaire. The first mailing resulted in 40 completed questionnaires and the second mailing in 26, 66 in all. During the data coding, two of the organizations did not fit the criteria of neighborhood associations. The first is a condominium association and membership and dues are not voluntary. The second evolved in the last ten years from a neighborhood association to a formal social agency.
This two step strategy of data collection yielded 105 questionnaires, 41 from face-to-face interviews and 64 from the mailed survey. The statistical analysis was conducted on the total sample and the random sample as a control group.
To the extent that the results do not differ, I am confident that sample bias is not a problem, the sample is representative and the findings may be generalized.
Compared with recent neighborhood research, the response rate of this study can be considered high. Crenshaw and St. John (1989) in their Oklahoma City study report the 84 lowest (38%), Perkins et. al (1990) report 58% and Guest and Lee (1983) in their study of Seattle (Washington) report the highest, 66.2%. While the current study differ from the above in the unit of analysis (individuals vs. organizations) the response rate of this study was 73%, the highest in recent neighborhood research projects.
Measures
The purpose of the survey was to study the determinants of organized collective action. To identify the issues that are likely to elicit action, I adopted the categories developed by Logan and Rabrenovic (1990) . The issues defined by them are commercial development, land use change, keeping unwanted business from establishing in the area, crime and safety, housing decline, lack of adequate services, educational and recreational issues and social activities.
For each of the issues respondents were given nine possible actions, including participation in public hearings, contacting the government, forming coalitions with other local groups, organizing petitions, writing to the newspaper and creating neighborhood programs,(e.g. beautification or crime watch). Respondents were asked whether they took that particular action or not. At the end of each question they were asked if they took any action that were not mentioned. The number of collective actions 85 were summed across the categories. This yielded the measure of collective action (See questionnaire in Appendix).
The ecological perspective assumes that neighborhood action is a function of environmental threats, population social composition and interests in neighborhood.
Environmental threats were measured using subjective indicators. Past studies have shown that the perception that an issue may negatively affect the neighborhood motivates participation in neighborhood and crime prevention associations (Crenshaw and St. John, 1989) . Research that used more objective indicators such as percent renters and crime rates, generally found that the expected effects are present only to the extent that are known to the residents
(Thomas, 1986). Given these considerations, presidents of the associations were asked six questions about the importance of issues related to the categories defined previously. The importance of the threat was measured on a five item scale from not important to very important.
Issues that are perceived to negatively affect the neighborhood may motivate different levels of actions (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Land use changes and commercial developments involve a number of powerful and antagonistic interests. Residents confront the desire of developers to intensify land use and the interest of the government to increase the tax base. Residents of other areas may enter the conflict to support the increment in revenues and 86 decrease the tax burden on them. Neighborhood associations that want to protect their environment from developments need to deal with more actors and to take a large number of actions to success (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990) .
Other issues that threaten the neighborhood may be solved by less neighborhood action. While the provision of services to communities such as parks and police protection may be economically costly, it is considered an obligation of the city. The request for that services may generate less opposition and require less actions.
Given these considerations, the issues were subjected to principal component factor analysis. Because the theoretical assumption is that unwanted land use changes will generate a different level of action than lack of services and crime, an orthogonal transformation that maximizes the independence of the concepts was used. Table 2 reports the results of the factor analysis. Two factors resulted from the analysis. The first includes environmental threats that are the result of the life cycle of the neighborhood such as housing decline, crime and services.
The second includes environmental threats that are the result of growth and development such as new commercial developments, land use changes and unwanted businesses. The results of the factor analysis are consistent with the categories found in previous studies (Logan and Rabrenovic,
1990; Guest and Oropesa, 1984). 87
Table 2. Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Environmental
Threats (Orthogonal Rotation)
Variable Factor Neighborhood Factor Land Use
Life Cycle Changes
Crime .701 -.033
Lack of Services .677 .149
Housing
Deterioration .614 .126
New Developments .251 .589
Land Use Change -.307 .76 9
Unwanted Business .381 .590
Eigenvalues 1.936 1.437 A number of measures of socioeconomic status were identified in the literature review as affecting the number of actions of neighborhood associations. Income has been consistently shown to correlate positively with civic participation
(Haberle, 198 9; Thomas, 1986). Income is known to have a non-normal, skewed distribution. A few extreme cases may dramatically affect the average and subsequently all the measures of relationship between variables. To avoid these problems, past studies used median household income
(Crenshaw and St. John, 1989; Haberle, 1989; Austin, 1991).
Median household income has been shown to have a distribution closer to normal.
Education is a second measure of socioeconomic status that was identified as affecting participation in political activities. Residents with high school diploma or less are less active than those with some or complete college education. It is reasonable to assume that a higher proportion of residents with College education may serve as a pool for the recruitment of experts to the organization, a variable that has been shown in past studies to affect action. Given this consideration in this study education is defined as the proportion of residents who have some college or completed college education. Finally, past studies have shown that residents with more expensive homes are characterized by greater political involvement in local issues (Guest and Lee, 1983). Using the same methodological 89 considerations as with income, median home value was preferred as a measure to the average home value.
The three measures of socioeconomic status were found to be highly correlated. Table 4 reports the zero order correlations. The zero order correlation among the three variables is significant and higher than .81. The high correlations may create multicollinearity between the variables resulting in a bias of the estimates. To avoid this problem, the measures were used as an index created by using factor analysis. The factor loadings and eigenvalues are reported in Table 3.
Investment in the neighborhood, according to the
Community of Limited Liability model, is an important variable influencing neighborhood collective action. Three variables were identified in past studies to affect participation in neighborhood issues. The proportion of residents who are homeowners reflects the existence of a group with a clear interest in protecting the property that is often their principal asset. The percent of residents with children under the age of 18, reflects the existence of a group of residents that are likely to be involved in local issues as a result of their stage in the life cycle. The proportion of residents in the same home since 1985 is used as a proxy for residential stability. Certainly length of residence is a dependable measure of the residential 90
Table 3. Factor Loadings and Eigenvalues for Socioeconomic
Status and Investments in the Neighborhood(Orthogonal
Rotation)
Variable Factor Factor
Socioeconomic Investments in
Status Neighborhood
Percent Families with children under age 18 -.550 . 728
Percentage of Persons with 4 or more years of college .760 - . 552
Median Value of owner occupied housing .883 - .292
Percentage of housing units owner occupied .656 . 689
Median Household
Income .963 - . 143
Proportion of residents that lived in the same house in 1985 -.195 . 922
Eigenvalues 3.815 2 . 272 91 stability. However, Census Data includes data only of residence in the last five years. Past studies have shown that the proportion of residents that live in the same house since 1985 is a good proxy and can be used to measure residential stability (Guest and Lee, 1983; Austin, 1991).
An index of investment in the neighborhood was created using the scores obtained in factor analysis. The three highest loads in each factor were taken to construct each index. Table 3. report the results. Median income, proportion with college education and median household value load on the first factor that was defined as socioeconomic status (FSES). Proportion of families with children under age 18, proportion of homeowners and proportion of residents living in the same house since 1985 load in the second factor that is the defined as Investments in the neighborhood (FINT).
Neighborhood racial composition, according to the defended neighborhood model, influences collective action.
Racially homogeneous neighborhoods are able to better define their goals and to collectively organize to achieve them.
The variable was defined in past studies using a proxy of percent black. I believe that this is not a measure of racial heterogeneity. Neighborhoods with a high or low proportion of black residents are homogeneous and only those in the middle are heterogeneous. The use of proportion of residents that are black is only justified in the middle 92 values of percent blacks.
In this study, racial heterogeneity is measured using a series of three dummy variables: white homogeneous, black homogeneous and racially heterogeneous. The omitted category for reference is white homogeneous. The cutting points were defined after inspection of the data. Neighborhoods defined as white homogeneous have between 0 to 15% blacks. The literature on neighborhood change suggest that the "tipping point," where the increment in newcomers will create white flight, is between 15 to 30%. Between 30 to 60% the neighborhood is considered to be in transition from one population to the other and after 60% will eventually become all black (Lee and Wood, 1991) . In this study, white homogeneous neighborhoods contained 75% of neighborhood associations. No neighborhoods were found that have between
15 to 40% blacks. Racially heterogeneous areas were defined as those neighborhoods where the proportion of blacks is between .40 to .60. A total of 12% of the neighborhood associations are located in these heterogeneous neighborhoods. Black homogeneous was defined as those neighborhoods where more than 60% of the residents are blacks. A total of 13% of the neighborhood associations are located in these black neighborhoods.
The resource dependence perspective argues that organizational characteristics determine the content and extent of neighborhood action. The expectation is that the 93 more organizationally complex the association and the more the links with other local organizations the greater the action. Organizational Complexity is conceptualized as the number of objectives of an organization. In voluntary associations, internal committees and tasks are considered to be indicators of structural complexity (Knoke, 1991) .
The existence of internal committees allows the association to deal with an unstable resource base by formally delegating responsibility to others (Austin, 1991). The ability to perform certain tasks, such as publication of a newsletter, is another measure of complexity that requires a high level of coordination of technical tasks on a regular basis. Given that neighborhood associations are small voluntary groups, it was expected that there would be important differences between organizations without and those with committees and regular newsletter. Past research provides support for this assumption. Committees and newsletter are measured as dummy variables.
Experts on the board was identified in the literature review as a variable that may affect neighborhood action.
The variable was measured as a dummy variable. Resource exchange among neighborhood based organizations was measured by a question (see Appendix) that asked the presidents which of the following neighborhood-based organizations provide support, technical advice and material help to the neighborhood association. For each organization the answers were coded "one" if yes and "zero" if no. A problem with this measure is that it does not indicate the amount of resources that were provided to the association. However, previous studies have shown that those resources are not monetary but in the experience of members, skilled leaders and political legitimacy (Hunter and Wiewel, 1987). As such these resources become more accessible the greater the density of the networks that the association established with neighborhood-based organizations. The measure used in this study taps the density of local interorganizational networks.
Incentives for collective action was measured combining the responses to five items. Two items refer to material incentives. Presidents were asked whether governmental programs are currently being conducted in the neighborhood and whether the government provides technical and material assistance to the neighborhood association. The political incentives variable was measured with three items.
Respondents were asked whether the neighborhood association is officially recognized, the city government regularly contacts the association on issues concerning the area, and how responsive the city government is to the concerns of the civic association. Each "yes" response to a statement was assigned a value of "1" and each "no" was given a value of
"0" with scores ranging from 0 to 5. The measures were adapted from previous studies on voluntary associations 95
(Knoke, 1990). In these studies it was found that recognition, regular contact and material support provided the association legitimacy in its claims and goals (Hunter and Staggenborg, 1987). Legitimacy reduces the costs involved in participation and motivates further action
(Hunter and Staggenborg, 1988).
The analysis of the data was conducted using O.L.S. multiple regression. Given the fact that the sample is relatively small and may be affected by extreme values, special attention was paid to outliers, the distribution of the variables and residuals. All the equations were subjected to outlier analysis and tests for both multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. In this study, influential outliers have been identified using partial regression plots, studentized residuals and hat matrix
(Bollen and Jackman, 1985). In each regression model between four to six outliers were identified. A second regression analysis was conducted without the outliers. The significance, magnitude and direction of the effects were the same in the models with outliers included and the models with outliers excluded. Since no differences were found, all the tables report regression models with outliers included.
Multicollinearity was tested using variance of inflation factors (Johnson, Johnson and Buse, 1987). No variable was found with a studentized coefficient higher than two or lower than minus two. Total residuals were examined. Only five large standard residuals were identified. No differences were found between models that included and models that excluded large standard residuals. Standardized residuals were examined using the Breusch-Pagan global test for the possibility of high correlation between the standardized residuals and the predictor variables. No heteroscedasticity was encountered. CHAPTER VI
FINDINGS
The study is concerned with organized collective actions taken by neighborhood associations to improve their areas. Presidents and vice presidents of 105 neighborhood associations in the city of Columbus (OH) and its suburbs were contacted in the first quarter of 1993. They provided information on the problems that the neighborhoods face, the actions taken to solve them and the organizational characteristics of the associations.
Sample Description
Descriptive results are presented in Table 6.
Neighborhood associations are relatively small in participation and poor in financial resources. An average of
42 members participate in general membership meetings.
Financial resources are limited. The median annual budget is
$1000 a year. This limited budget is the result of the modest annual dues that are collected from members. Half of the associations collect six dollars a year per member and
27% of the associations do not collect any dues at all.
97 98
TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of
Neighborhood Associations
Variable Mean S.D. Median
Member Participation 42.08 51.1 30 . 0
Annual Budget 5925.48 29711.97 1000 . 0
Dues 12.31 22.34 6 . 0
Association Age 15.37 11. 54 13 . 0
Internal Committees(%) . 77
Newsletter (%) . 67
Experts on the
Board (%) .41
Number of links with neighborhood based organizations 1.96 1.54 2 . 0
Percent homeowners .57 .19 . 57
Percent residents lived in the same house in
1985 .43 .15 .39
Actions 21.66 5.13 20 . 0 99
Neighborhood organization is a relatively new process in the city of Columbus and its suburbs. The average age of the neighborhood associations is 15 years. It is interesting to note that half of the neighborhood associations were created in the last 13 years. The growth of the population and the official recognition of some of the associations as advisory boards contributed to the increase in the number of neighborhood associations.
The associations have developed a relatively complex structure given their limited human and financial resources.
A majority of the associations, 77%, have internal committees that deal with specific issues. Two thirds
(67.6%) publish a regular newsletter that provides information to the residents. Some associations (41%) recognize the importance of expertise in dealing with urban issues and have experts on the board.
Neighborhood associations are linked more to other neighborhood based organizations than to coalitions that represent broader areas. A majority of the associations
(78%) reported that they had received material, technical or other support from other neighborhood based organizations.
They exchange resources with an average of 1.96 neighborhood based organizations that expand their limited resources. In contrast, the links with similar associations in other areas of the city are limited . Only 47.6% of the neighborhood associations reported that they are members of area 100 coalitions.
In terms of location, neighborhood associations are located in areas that are residentially stable with a high percentage of homeowners. Associations are located in areas where, on the average, 43% of the residents had lived 5 years or more and an average of 57% of the residents are homeowners.
Neighborhood leaders reported a relatively high number of actions to improve the area. On the average they, had taken 21.66 actions in the last year to solve problems that directly affect their environments.
Zero-Order Findings
The means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 14 (see Appendix).
Zero order correlations ranged from .547 to -.003. For this sample of 105 neighborhood associations, a correlation coefficient greater than .12 is significantly different from zero at the .05 level and a correlation greater than .22 is significant at the .01 level.
A significant correlation was found between environmental threats and number of actions taken by the neighborhood association. The measure of environmental threats related to land use change is positively correlated to action (r=.547 pc.Ol) as well as the measure of neighborhood life cycle environmental threats (r=.497 pc.Ol). The findings suggest that the greater the number of 101 problems faced by the neighborhood, the greater the number of actions taken to solve them.
Another significant correlation was found between the measure of socioeconomic status and neighborhood life cycle issues. This correlation is negative (r=-.437 pc.Ol) and suggests that the higher the socioeconomic status of the residents, the lower are problems such as crime, housing decline and lack of services in the neighborhood. This finding may be explained in terms of social selection. The higher the income of the individual the more choice one has to live in a neighborhood that is not affected by those problems.
A number of significant correlations were found between percent African-American in the neighborhood and the degree of complexity of the neighborhood association. Associations located in neighborhoods with a majority of black residents are less likely to have experts on the board (r=-.224 p<0.05) and less likely to publish a newsletter (r=-.279 pc.Ol). A positive relationship was found between percent of
African-American residents and actions (r=.210 pc.001).
Associations in predominantly black neighborhoods are more active than those in predominantly white neighborhoods.
Hypothesis 1: Neighborhood associations where residents face potential land use changes are likely to take a greater number of actions than neighborhood associations where residents face neighborhood life cycle problems. Neighborhood action is positively correlated with the two measures of environmental threats. The greater the potential for land use change and unwanted new commercial developments the greater the number of actions taken by the neighborhood associations (r=.547 pc.001). The more important the changes in the environment related to the life cycle of the neighborhood such as crime, housing deterioration and lack of services, the greater the actions taken by the associations to protect the neighborhood
(r=.497 pc.Ol). In terms of their differential influence on action, the highest correlation is that of potential land use changes, supporting the argument of Logan and Molotch
(1987) that the most important issue facing neighborhoods today is land use change. The hypothesis is supported.
Hypothesis 2: Neighborhood associations located in neighborhoods with a high proportion of residents from low or high socioeconomic status will take less collective actions than neighborhood associations located in neighborhoods with a high proportion of middle class residents.
Socioeconomic status is negatively correlated to collective action (r=-.318 pc.Ol). Neighborhoods with a high proportion of residents from high socioeconomic status take less actions to protect and improve the neighborhood environment. This result is unexpected. To the extent that a linear relationship exists, is expected to be positive. 103
Neighborhoods with a high proportion of wealthy residents are expected to be able to afford the costs of action in terms of money and energy. Members participate more and the associations are more active. Also it is possible that the negative correlation reflects a curvilinear relationship.
This possibility is investigated in the multiple regression analysis.
Hypothesis 3 : Neighborhood associations located in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods are likely to engage in more actions than neighborhood associations located in ethnically heterogeneous neighborhoods.
In this study, a series of three dummy variables were defined to investigate the influence of neighborhood ethnic composition on action. A neighborhood was defined as heterogeneous if between 15 to 60% of the residents are blacks. A neighborhood was defined as black homogeneous if more than 60% of the residents are blacks and white homogeneous if less than 15% of the residents are blacks.
The reference category is white homogeneous.
A positive relationship was found between black homogeneous neighborhoods and action (r=.21 pc.Ol). Black homogeneous neighborhoods are more likely to engage in collective action than white homogeneous neighborhoods. The correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and action is not significant. The hypothesis is partially supported.
Hypothesis 4: The greater the proportion of neighborhood 104 residents with interest in locale(e.g., families with children, homeowners and long time residents) the greater the number of actions taken by the neighborhood associations.
Interests in locale is measured with an index created by factor analysis that includes the following variables: proportion of families with children, percentage of homeowners and proportion of residents living at least five years in the same residence. The correlation between this
index and action is not significant and the hypothesis is not supported.
Hypothesis 5 : Complex neighborhood associations will take a greater number of actions that non complex neighborhood associations.
Complexity of neighborhood associations is measured by two dummy variables. The first is whether internal committees exist in the association and the second whether the association publishes a newsletter. A positive and
significant correlation was found between the existence of
internal committees and action (r=.189 p<.05). Associations
that have internal committees take more actions to protect
and improve the neighborhood than associations that lack
committees. The correlation between publishing a newsletter
and action is not significant. Neighborhood associations
that publish a newsletter are not more likely to engage in
action than neighborhood associations that do not publish a 105 newsletter. The hypothesis is partially supported.
Hypothesis 6: Neighborhood associations that have experts on their board of directors are more likely to engage in collective actions that those that lack experts.
Expertise on the board is measured as a dummy variable based on a question in the survey that asked whether there are board members that are not elected but serve on the board on the basis of some expertise, e.g., architects, attorneys or real state agents. The correlation between experts on the board and action is not significant.
Neighborhood associations that have experts on the board do not take more actions than those without experts.
Hypothesis 7: The greater the number of local organizations that provide technical and material support, the greater the number of collective actions taken by the neighborhood association.
According to this hypothesis, the strength of local interorganizational networks is expected to be positively- related to collective action. The zero order correlation between the number of neighborhood based organizations that provide resources and the number of actions taken by the neighborhood association is significant (r=.485 pc.Ol). The more the number of neighborhood based organizations that provide resources the greater the number of actions taken by the association to improve and protect the neighborhood from unwanted changes. The hypothesis is supported. 106
Hypothesis 8: The greater the political incentives the greater the number of actions taken by neighborhood associations.
Political incentives are measured as a scale that combines positive responses to questions such as whether the association is officially recognized, regularly contacted by the city government and has access to governmental technical and material support to carry out its activities. The zero order correlation is negative and significant (r=-.23 pc.Ol) . The greater the political incentives allocated by the government to the association the fewer the actions taken to improve and protect the neighborhood.
Hypothesis 9: The higher the socioeconomic status of the residents, the greater the political incentives for organization.
The elitist approach to community power argues that political processes are related to the structure of community power. The expectation is that middle and upper middle class residents have an easier time gaining access to officials. The implication is that political incentives are allocated to the wealthy and not according to needs.
Consistent with this argument, a positive correlation is found between political incentives and socioeconomic status
(r=.303 pc.Ol). On the other side the correlation between environmental threats, as a measure that reflects neighborhood needs, is not significant. The hypothesis is 107 supported.
Multivariate Analysis:
A multivariate analysis was required for a number of reasons. First, the bivariate correlations do not control for the effects of the other relevant variables. The relationships found may be indirect effects. Multiple regression controls the effects of the other relevant variables. Regression coefficients are direct effects on the dependent variable. Second, this research was designed to identify the best predictors of neighborhood action. The standard coefficients of multiple regression are magnitudes that can be compared to determine which variables are the best predictors. Third, another purpose of this research is to evaluate the differential contributions of the ecological, resource dependence and political economy models to the explanation of neighborhood actions. The evaluation is made by comparing the percent of variance in neighborhood actions explained by each model.
In order to test the curvilinear relationship between socioeconomic status and collective action, a new variable is introduced in the analysis. This variable is defined as the squared values of the socioeconomic status index
(Sqses). The variable was introduced in a regression model, together with the non-squared socioeconomic status index .
The hypothesis can be supported if the regression coefficient of the quadratic term is significant. The Table 5 . Regression of Neighborhood Action on Socioeconomic
Status with Quadratic Term
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard
(Standard Error) Estimate
SES - . 003 - .329
(.003)
SqSES 1.223 . 008
( .001)
Interest -4.781 - . 070
(6 .418)
Intercept 32 .382* 109 results of this regression are reported in Table 5. The regression coefficient of the quadratic term is not significant and the hypothesis is not supported.
The ecological perspective assumes that organization and collective action are the result of a population interacting with an environment. In this perspective the environment is important because it defines the problems that a population needs to solve. Environmental threats, according to this perspective, should affect collective action.
The social organization of a neighborhood, as a unique social system with an identity and a pattern of action, is dependent on the characteristics of the population. Two models of social organization are suggested. The defended neighborhood model argues that neighborhood collective action is more likely in racially-homogeneous neighborhoods.
Homogeneous neighborhoods are more likely than racially heterogeneous neighborhoods to be able to define common goals and for this reason to be more active. The community of limited liability model argues that neighborhoods with a high proportion of residents that have interests in the residential area are more likely to engage in action. The higher the proportion of homeowners, families with children and residents that live more than five years in the neighborhood, the greater the actions taken by the neighborhood association to protect and improve the 110 neighborhood.
Results of the multiple regression entering only measures derived from the ecological perspective are reported in Table 6. The measures of environmental threats are the only significant variables. The more important are land use changes and neighborhood decline problems, the greatest the number of actions taken by the neighborhood associations. The magnitude of the standard coefficient of land use change is greater than that of neighborhood decline. This finding is consistent with the argument of the growth machine model that land use changes are the most important issue that neighborhoods face and the most important driving force of action.
The non-significant effect of socioeconomic status needs to be explained. In the bivariate analysis there was a negative and significant correlation between socioeconomic status and neighborhood action. When the neighborhood environment is controlled, the effect disappears. The meaning of this result is that the socioeconomic status does not affect collective action directly. There is an indirect effect which means that the higher the socioeconomic status of the individual the more he/she is likely to live in a neighborhood with fewer environmental threats. Regarding action, low environmental threats do not elicit action regardless of socioeconomic status. Ill
Table 6.Multiple Regression of Neighborhood Action on
Ecological Variables For All the Sample (n=105)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard
(Standard Error) Coefficient
Land Use Threats 2 .416 458*
( .405)
Decline Threats 2 . 079 347*
( .505)
SES . 004 . 0189
( . 008)
SqSES -4.051 - .270
(.003)
Interest -1.303 - . 019
(5.243)
Heterogeneous 1. 968 055
(3.281)
Black 1.072 .043
(2.619)
Intercept 1. 088
R2: .464
*p<.01 112
It is also possible that there is an interaction between socioeconomic status and environmental threats. In other words that when neighborhoods of high socioeconomic status face environmental threats because they are well connected to the city, less action is needed. To study this possibility a term representing the interaction between socioeconomic status and environmental threats was introduced in the equation (analysis not shown). The term representing the interaction between neighborhood decline and socioeconomic status has a negative and significant effect on collective action. Neighborhoods of high socioeconomic status that face problems of neighborhood decline take less actions to solve their problems.
The use of fewer actions may be explained as a result of either low levels of participation and interest of the residents or high responsiveness of the government. However, upper middle class neighborhoods are known to be the most organized and to have the highest level of resident participation in neighborhood associations. For this reason, it is more likely that the government is more responsive to upper middle class neighborhood problems. When this neighborhoods face problems such as crime and inadequate services fewer actions are needed to bring the government to solve the problem.
The measures of racial composition are not significant.
In the bivariate analysis a positive correlation was found 113
(r=.281, p<.05) between black homogeneous neighborhoods and the number of actions taken by the neighborhood association.
In the multiple regression, when the environmental threats are controlled, the effect is not significant. The explanation of this finding is again in terms of indirect and direct effects. There is a significant correlation between predominantly black neighborhoods and the importance of neighborhood decline problems (r=.210, p<.05). This correlation means that predominantly black neighborhoods are located in areas where crime, housing decline and lack of services are very important. Predominantly black neighborhoods are located in areas with high environmental threats and for this reason seem to be more active. In addition, the significant effect of race composition on collective action disappears when controls for socioeconomic status are introduced (analysis not shown). In other words, when socioeconomic status is controlled race does not have an independent effect on action. In sum, the results indicate that predominantly African-American neighborhoods are located in low income areas that face high environmental threats such as crime, housing decline and lack of services.
The greater the environmental threats the greater the action taken by the neighborhood association, regardless of race.
Sample bias, or the possibility that the sample is not representative of the population of neighborhood associations, is always a threat to mailed surveys. The high 114 response rate of this study (74%) minimizes this possibility. However, it is possible that the associations that did not respond represent a special group. In particular, it is possible that associations located in low income and predominantly African-American neighborhoods for different reasons decided not to respond. To minimize this possibility, a random sample of associations was taken and their presidents were interviewed face-to- face.
The results for the random sample of 41 associations are presented in table 7. The only significant variables that influence collective action are again environmental threats. Regardless of socioeconomic status, racial composition and high proportion of residents with interest in the neighborhood, the greater the environmental threats the greater the action. It is interesting to note that the only discrepancy is on the relative influence of each threat. In the random sample, threats of neighborhood decline such as crime, housing decline and lack of services are the greatest influence on collective action. In the model based on the total sample, threats related to land use changes are the greatest influence on collective action.
Given that the results are similar we are more confident that the significant effects of environmental threats are not a result of sample bias.
Thus, the ecological model receives partial empirical support. Environmental threats are the only predictors of 115
Table 7 .Multiple Regression of Neighborhood Action on
Ecological Variables For Random Sample Only (n=41)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard
(Standard Error) Coefficient
Land Use Threats 2.429 .527*
(.581)
Decline Threats 3.688 .695*
(1.034)
SES .002 .356
( .004)
SqSES -1.977 -.142
( .001)
Neigh.Interest 7.284 .119
(8.090)
Heterogenous -.056 -.021
(3.918)
Black 1.802 .102
(2.808)
Intercept 12.324
R2: .532
*p<.01 116 actions taken by neighborhood associations. The community of limited liability model, which argues that the greater the proportion of residents with vested interests in the neighborhood the greater the action, is not supported. The defended neighborhood model that suggest a positive influence of population social and racial composition on collective action is partially supported. Socioeconomic status and racial composition are exogenous variables.
Associations located in low income and predominantly African
American neighborhoods take more actions because they are located in neighborhoods with high environmental threats.
The greater the environmental threats, the greater the collective action. The effect of environmental threats is very important, explaining 46.4 % of the variance in the number of actions taken by neighborhood associations.
Resource mobilization theory argues that the ability of a population to engage in collective action depends on its ability to mobilize resources. According to this perspective, resources shape the content and the degree of collective action. The expectation is that the greater the resources the more complex the association and the greater the actions taken to protect and improve the neighborhood.
The political economy perspective argues that collective action is the result of the existence of incentives that reduce the costs of action. The actions of the city government that provide material and political 117 support to neighborhood associations are expected to increase the number of actions taken to protect and improve the neighborhood. Table 8 reports the results of the multiple regression when measures derived from the resource mobilization and political economy models are included without ecological controls. The expectation of a positive relationship between organizational complexity and collective action is partially supported. Associations that have committees take more actions to protect and improve their neighborhoods than those that lack internal committees. Associations that publish a newsletter and have experts on their board are not more active that associations that lack those organizational elements.
Resources exchange is the best predictor of collective action in this model. The greater the number of neighborhood based organizations that provide material and technical support to the neighborhood association, the greater the actions taken to protect and improve the neighborhood. This suggests that the strength of interorganizational networks in the community contributes to collective action.
Political incentives are the next best predictor. The effect is negative. The greater the political incentives, the less the number of actions taken by the neighborhood association to protect the environment. 118
Table 8. Multiple Regression on Collective Action for
Organizational Complexity and Political Incentives as
Predictors For All the Sample (n=105)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Committees 3.898 .174**
(1.919)
Newsletter -2.597 -.129
(1.734)
Experts .924 .048
1.588
Resources
Exchange 2.84 9 .4 65*
(.509)
Political
Incentives -.147 -.195*
(.639)
Intercept 19.924
(2 . 982)
R2: .323
*p<.01
*p<.05 119
Thus, organizational complexity and the links to local organizations and the city government influence the number of actions taken by the association to protect and improve neighborhood. The model explains 32.3% of the variance in collective action.
Results for the random sample of 41 associations are reported in table 9. The results are consistent in general with those reported for all the sample. Associations that developed a level of complexity reflected in the presence of internal committees are more likely to engage in neighborhood action than associations that do not have internal committees. The greater the number of links with other associations the greater the actions taken by neighborhood associations to improve and protect the neighborhood. Political incentives that reflect the links to city government negatively influence neighborhood action.
There are few small differences. The explained variance in the random sample equation is higher than the explained variance in the all sample equation. To the extent that there is sample bias, the equation based on the total sample is underestimating the explained variance by the independent variables. The larger sample provides a conservative test of the theoretical models. The main difference is in the magnitude of political incentives. The parameter estimate in the equation based on the larger sample is -.147 and in the equation based on the random sample is -2.872. These 120
Table 9. Multiple Regression on Collective Action for
Organizational Complexity and Political Incentives as
Predictors For Random Sample Only (n=41)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard
(Standard Error) Coefficient
Committees 5.094 . 282**
(2.184)
Newsletter -1.815 - . 116
(2.184)
Experts 3 . 447 .216
(1.970)
Resources
Exchange 2 . 277 .448*
( .596)
Political
Incentives -2.872 - .447*
( .774)
Intercept 23 .430
(3 .331)
R2: .541
*p<.01
*p<.05 121
differences mean that the equation based on all the sample is underestimating the negative influence of political incentives on action. In other words, sample bias is not a limitation of the findings. The effects found in the equation using the larger sample probably underestimate the negative effect of political incentives.
The ecological perspective emphasizes the context in which organization and action take place. According to this perspective the interaction between a population and environment determines the social system. Collective action is an attempt to resist change. The amount of resources that neighborhood residents mobilize is dependent on the characteristics of the social system and the threats that result from a changing environment. The implication of this argument is that resources and political incentives are intervening variables in the relationship between ecological measures and collective action. To test this argument ecological, organizational and political variables are introduced in the equation.
Table 10 reports the results of the multiple regression on neighborhood actions when measures derived from the ecological, resource mobilization and political economy models are included. The results provide support for the theoretical argument of this study. The integrative model explains 62.1% of the variance in neighborhood collective actions. 122
Table 10. Multiple Regression of Action on Ecological.
Organizational and Political Variables For All the Sample
(n=105)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Coefficient
(Standard Error) _ _
Decline Threats 1.421 .237*
(.459)
Land Use Threats 2.400 .455*
(.360)
SES .001 .027
( .002)
Neighlnterest - .384 -.056
(4.627)
Heterogeneous 1.827 .051
(2.909)
Black 2.446 .098
(2.291)
Committees 3.164 .141**
(1.508)
Newsletter -.023 - .001
(1.65)
Experts 2.522 .132
(1.305)
Resources
Exchange 2.054 .336*
(.429)
Political
Incentives -1.236 - .164*
(.516)
Intercept 2.042
(6.832)
R2: .621
*p<.01
**p<.05 The explained variance of this model is higher than that of the partial models. There is no change in the predictors that are significant. The effect of environmental threats remains significant even when resources and political incentives are controlled. The effect of environmental threats is direct and not mediated by resources. When the magnitude of the standard coefficients is compared, it is found that the best predictors of neighborhood collective actions are neighborhood problems of land use change and new commercial developments. The second best predictors are the number of neighborhood-based organizations that provide resources to the association. The effects of problems related to neighborhood decline and the existence of internal committees are also significant. The effect of political incentives on neighborhood collective action is negative and significant. The more the political incentives provided by city government, the fewer the actions taken by the associations to protect and improve the neighborhood.
Table 11 present the results predicting collective action for the random sample only. Environmental threats are the only ecological variables that influence collective action. While the direction of the effect is the same, the relative magnitudes are different from the larger sample. In the equation based on the random sample, neighborhood decline problems have a greater effect on action than land use change problems. 124
Table 11. Multiple Regression of Action on Ecological.
Organizational and Political Variables For Random Sample
Only (n=4l)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Decline Threats 2.702 .509*
(.756)
Land Use Threats 1.865 .405*
(.493)
SES .002 .302
(.0 01 )
Neigh.Interest -2.284 -.037
(6.215)
Heterogeneous -4.520 -.172
(2.615)
Black 2.557 .146
(1.891)
Committees 2.402 .133
(1.736)
Newsletter .334 .021
(1.618)
Experts 4.468 .281*
(1.536)
Resources
Exchange 2.485 .489*
(.478)
Political
Incentives -1.980 -.308*
(.655)
Intercept 4.064
(8.915)
R2: .734
*p<.01
**p<.05 125
Other ecological variables such as social and racial composition and vested interest in the neighborhood are not significant.
Resources that the association mobilizes to carry its goals influence the number of actions taken by the neighborhood association. As in the larger sample, the number of links with other neighborhood-based organizations is the resource that best predicts action. Unlike the larger sample, the presence of committees, do not affect action but experts on the board positively influence action. Political incentives are again found to negatively influence action.
In sum, the results of the equation based on the random sample are in general consistent with the findings of the larger sample. The consistency of the findings provides additional evidence that they are not a result of sample bias .
The negative effect of political incentives needs further explanation. Political incentives are a resource allocated to neighborhoods by the city government.
Political incentives may be allocated according to the needs of neighborhoods. In this case, it is reasonable to expect that the greater the environmental threats, the greater the political incentives.
Another possibility is that political incentives are not allocated according to needs, but to associations that are connected to the institutional structure of the city. 126
Table 12. Regression of Political Incentives on
Environmental Threats and Socioeconomic Status Controlling
for Organizational Characteristics For All the Sample
(n=105)
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Coefficient
(Standard Error)
Land Use Threats 1.130 .001
( .071)
Decline Threats 1.424 .012
( .091)
SES .004 .308*
(.001)
Experts -.055 -.021
( .256)
Committees .200 .067
( .300)
Newsletter .390 .145
( .299)
Intercept 2.037
( .912)
R2 .127 127
Voluntary associations act as interest groups. They lobby local officials and City Council members and may influence the decisions on the allocation of political incentives. The result may be that political incentives are allocated to relatively wealthy neighborhoods that do not face major environmental threats and do not have a need for action.
The assumptions of the arguments, whether political incentives are allocated according to needs or socioeconomic status of the residents, can be tested. Table 12 reports the results of a regression of political incentives of environmental threats and socioeconomic status controlling for organizational characteristics. The results show that political incentives are not allocated according to needs but to socioeconomic status. Both measures of environmental threats are not significant. A significant positive coefficient is found between socioeconomic status and political incentives. The higher the socioeconomic status the greater the political incentives allocated to the neighborhood association. This finding supports the argument that the negative effect of political incentives on action is the result of allocation of the resources to neighborhoods without major needs and that for this reason they are not very active. However, a note of caution is needed. First, in the equation based on the random sample none of the variables are significant (analysis not shown).
Second, the explained variance of the model is only .127. 128
This finding suggest that other variables besides socioeconomic status may affect the decision of city government to allocate official recognition and material support to neighborhood associations.
In sum, the findings provide empirical support for the theoretical model of this study. Organized neighborhood action is found to be a function of environmental threats, resources for collective action and political incentives available to the community. Population social and racial composition define the characteristics of the environment in which residents live. Neighborhoods with a high proportion of low income and predominantly African American residents face a declining neighborhood environment and for this reason neighborhood associations located in these areas are likely to be more active. Resources that are the result of links with other locally-based organizations are the most important contributors to the efforts of associations to improve and protect their neighborhoods. The actions and policies of the government are negative incentives for collective action, in part because such incentives are allocated to wealthy associations. The neighborhoods where they live do not face major threats. CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
The results of this study have a number of implications for the understanding of neighborhood action and the allocation of political incentives for neighborhood organization. Residents in cities and suburban neighborhoods are increasingly concerned with local issues such as land use change, new developments, housing decline and crime. To protect their environment they organize in neighborhood associations and act collectively.
Consistent with recent studies in other cities
(Haberle, 1989; Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990), neighborhood organization is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Half of the organizations in the Columbus metropolitan area were created in the last 13 years. A review of the conditions in the city in that period suggests a number of influences for the appearance of neighborhood organizations.
The major influence is probably the significant city growth in population and housing units. Residents in new residential areas learned that with growth comes intensification of land use. New commercial developments and apartment complexes are the first potential environmental
129 130 changes that new areas face. At the same time, population growth imposes a burden on the distribution of services.
More services are needed, and during the period of accommodation, residents of certain neighborhoods are allocated fewer services that they were used to previously.
This prompts residents to organize and act collectively to protect their community.
The political context is a second factor. During these years of rapid expansion, the city implemented a program of supporting neighborhood organizations. Under this program 15 new area commissions were created with advisory status on architectural matters and zoning. The main effect of the program is not in the numbers. Usually area commissions replaced existing organizations. However their effect was in the creation of a political field. The advantage of area commissions in their access to decision makers affected the other organizations. Small neighborhood associations and coalitions were created to compete in the political process of decision making.
The purpose of this research was to study the determinants of organized neighborhood action and to learn how this action has been influenced by the incentives made available by the local government. The empirical evidence shows that environmental threats, resource mobilization and political incentives influence neighborhood collective action. 131
Environment and Action
Consistent with previous studies on neighborhood organization (Thomas, 1986; Crenshaw and St. John, 1989), this study found that the fundamental goal of neighborhood organizing is to protect the residential environment.
Potential changes in the environment such as land use and neighborhood decline are the best predictors of neighborhood action. Residents will defend many dimensions of their neighborhood, such as the land use and buildings, access to daily necessities and personal safety. This finding provides support for the basic assumption of the ecological perspective that community organization and action is the result of the interaction of a population with its environment. The major threat that galvanizes resident is a perceived threat to the environment (Hawley, 1968) .
The findings of this study allow us to specify that land use change proposals and new commercial developments are a stronger motivation for neighborhood action than housing decline and crime. This finding is, in part, a result of the particular situation of Columbus as a growing city. At the same time, this finding provides support for the growth machine model (Logan and Molotch, 1987). The fundamental assumption of the growth machine model is that the central issue in local politics is the inevitable conflict between a progrowth coalition of entrepreneurs and city residents. In accord with previous studies that focus 132 on land use issues as the most central issue in neighborhood associations (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990), we also found that growth issues are the most important predictor of neighborhood action.
Population Social Composition
Our findings regarding the effects of social and racial composition and interests in the neighborhood appear to challenge the ecological models of neighborhood organization. The expectation that socioeconomic status would affect neighborhood action was based on past research that was concerned with neighborhood organization ( Thomas,
1986). The explanation is in terms of the existence of needs and the costs of action. The spatial distribution of different groups according to socioeconomic status and racial composition may result in differential exposure to environments which results in different degrees of action.
Middle income areas have the needs for action (land use change, housing decline and crime) and can afford the costs in terms of money and energy that action requires (Rich,
1980). Consistent with past studies, in this research it was found that neighborhood associations are located in areas with a high proportion of middle class residents. It is possible to conclude that all the areas in the study are relatively similar in the ability of the residents to afford the costs of action. Given this similarity, the only difference that may affect action is needs. The findings of this study support this explanation. At the bivariate level, a negative correlation (r=~.318 p<.01) is found between socioeconomic status and collective action. When controls for environmental threats are introduced in the multiple regression, this effect is not significant. The meaning is that the greater the environmental threats or the greater the neighborhood needs the greater the action. Furthermore the negative correlation (r=-.437 p<.001) between socioeconomic status and environmental threats suggests that the more wealthy the residents the fewer the environmental threats. In sum, wealthy neighborhoods are not less or more active than low income neighborhoods. Action is first of all the result of needs that are reflected in environmental threats. While socioeconomic status may affect which areas are organized, once neighborhoods are organized, what drives the action are perceived environmental threats.
Regarding racial composition, our findings do not support the defended neighborhood model that racially heterogeneous areas are less active than racially homogeneous areas (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974; Sampson,
1991). However, a note of caution is needed here. Only five percent of the neighborhoods in the sample are racially heterogeneous (defined as neighborhoods where the proportion of blacks is between 40 to 60%). On the contrary and consistent with the defended neighborhood model, it seems that heterogeneous areas are the less organized explaining 134 the low number of cases in the study. Consistent with previous studies (Thomas, 1986; Hunter and Staggenborg,
1988) we found at the bivariate level that black neighborhoods engage in more actions than white neighborhoods (r=.210 p<.05). However, when we introduce controls for the environment, the effect disappears. A positive correlation (r=.281 p<.01) is found between black neighborhoods and environmental threats. The interpretation of this positive correlation is that blacks live in areas that experience high environmental threats such as housing deterioration and crime.
The community of limited liability model of neighborhood organization assumes that areas with a higher proportion of residents with interests in the neighborhood are more likely to be organized and to act to protect and improve the neighborhood( Guest and Oropesa, 1983) .
Regarding organization, the model is supported. Neighborhood organizations are located in areas where a high proportion of residents are homeowners and had lived in the area five years or more. In terms of collective action the model is not supported. No significant effect was found between the measures of interest in the neighborhood stability and collective action.
An important contribution of our study is the need to specify the difference between neighborhood organization and action. Past studies assumed that the same factors that 135 affect organization also affect action. Consistent with past studies we found that neighborhoods that organize in associations are more likely to be those that are threatened by unwanted change and the residents can afford the costs of getting involved. Neighborhood associations are located in areas with a high proportion of residents with interests in locale, that are residentially stable and racially homogeneous. However, once neighborhoods are organized, these characteristics are more or less constant across neighborhoods. What best predicts their collective actions is the seriousness of environmental threats. Regardless of race and socioeconomic status and interests in locale, it is the prospects of unwanted change that motivates collective action.
Resource Mobilization
Consistent with the resource mobilization perspective, the resources that local associations are able to mobilize significantly influence collective action. We found that resources shape the extent of collective action. An important finding is that the most important resources are those that result from links with other neighborhood based organizations. The greater the links with other community organizations the greater the number of actions taken by the association to protect and improve the neighborhood.
Hunter and Wiewel (1985) suggest that other neighborhood based associations, such as the local business association 136 and local church, may provide essential material and human resources. Meeting places, office facilities and skilled leaders allow the association to regularize and extend the actions to a larger number of issues. Links with other organizations provide legitimacy to the association and its activities, both inside and outside the neighborhood. The data does not allow us to understand exactly how collective action is enhanced by links with other neighborhood based organizations. This issue requires further research.
The positive correlation between the number of links with other neighborhood based organizations and environmental threats of neighborhood decline (r=.324 pc.Ol) and the negative correlation with socioeconomic status (r=-
.243 pc.Ol) suggest that local interorganizational links are more common in low income and older areas. It is reasonable to assume that the residents of these neighborhoods are less able to provide human and financial resources. Neighborhood based organizations may replace the resources that cannot be internally generated.
The complexity of the association measured as the existence of internal committees is assumed in this study to reflect the resources that the association recruits from its constituency. Complex associations have a number of active and committed members that routinely contribute their time and energy to the goals of the association. Associations that have internal committees may be able to define more 137 tasks and more fields of intervention. As in past studies
(Austin, 1991), this study found that associations that can afford internal committees engage in greater number of actions than associations that do not have them. However, the effect is small compared to the greater importance of links with other neighborhood based organizations.
Political Incentives
The central question of this study was how political incentives influence neighborhood action. The new urban sociology assumes that urban structure is the result of the purposive actions of organized actors (developers and residents associations), agencies (bureaucracies) and the city government. Developers are interested in the intensification of land use to maximize their profits.
Neighborhood associations act to protect and improve their environment. Developers and residents are often in conflict.
The actions of developers are a threat to the neighborhood social system and residents use neighborhood associations to collectively respond to those threats. In this conflict the government is a central protagonist. Policies such as tax abatement and zoning may support the other actors. The city government is seen as having a semiautonomous role.
Electoral and fiscal considerations are assumed to drive government actions. The government is compelled to respond to voters providing services at a minimal level of taxation and avoiding zoning decisions which conflict with political 138 significant interests. In addition, it must assure that the fiscal requirements for its functioning as an administrative entity are met. The growth machine model assumes that electoral considerations are more important. Elkin (1985) argues that city governments are more supportive of residents' interests. Thus, the government responding to citizens concerns, create empowered associations. This empowerment is reflected in the allocation of formally recognized status in the power structure of the city. This inclusion in the political process should allow residents to express their opposition to unfavorable changes and increase their action.
The resource mobilization perspective argues that governmental sponsorship of neighborhood associations may create a resource dependence relationship. Neighborhood associations are poor in resources. They seek various resources that cannot generate internally such as technical information, financial assistance and public and elite acceptance of their claims as legitimate. When the government offers material and political resources a dependency relationship may be created. The ultimate result of resource dependency is in the displacement of goals as associations modify and moderate positions to ensure the flow of material and political incentives. The expectation is that the greater the political incentives the fewer the actions taken by neighborhood associations to protect their 139 environment.
The ecological perspective argues that neighborhoods are a result competition for land use between commercial and residential interests. Each type of land use achieves the location that best suit its needs and the needs of the community. The result is a pattern of urban organization that is functional to the community, or "natural areas." A natural area involves a geographic area with a population with unique social, demographic and ethnic composition that develops a social system with rules and patterns of social interaction and behaviors that distinguish the areas from others around it (Schwirian, 1983). The term natural represents a conception that they are the result of ecological process rather than planning or the conscious actions of organized actors such as developers and the government. The assumption is that the actions of these actor do not matter. When zoning regulations are established, they generally recognize the results of the ecological processes. The implication is that ultimately the actions of the government do not matter and neighborhood action is the result of changes in the environment that may alter the social system.
Consistent with the assumptions of the new urban sociology, the government is an important actor in city issues. In this study we found a relationship between local government recognition, material and technical support to 140 neighborhood groups and collective action. The argument inherent in the political economy perspective is not supported. The results are more consistent with the resource mobilization perspective. The institutional pattern of interaction with the government reduces the number and salience of issues that neighborhood associations can address.
In part, this finding may be explained by the institutional nature of the organizational field created.
When city government provide political incentives, a situation of resource dependence is created (Jenkins, 1983) .
The agendas of the associations are shaped by the agenda of the city restricting the issues that are open to action. The city government specifically narrowed the potential for action when it allocated a status of advisory boards and provided material and technical support mainly in the field of zoning to neighborhood associations. Every application for zoning change is referred to the associations. The large number of applications creates a burden on the association and shapes its agenda. The result is that political incentives are detrimental to collective action. Most of the scarce energy of the association is thus allocated to zoning and other problems facing the neighborhood are not addressed. The institutional pattern of interaction between the residents and city council restricts citizen participation almost exclusively to the issues of concern to 141 government.
Resource dependence is troublesome when the external sponsor is also the adversary or the target of collective action (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977). Past studies show that the city government is not always perceived as the enemy
(Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990). However, the city government makes the decisions on zoning and service distribution. As such it becomes the target of neighborhood association collective action. The outcome seems to be resource dependency that results in the displacement of goals as associations moderate positions and take fewer actions to ensure the flow of political incentives (Jenkins, 1983).
The allocation of political incentives is an important issue with social policy implications. A major goal of citizen participation programs is to increase the involvement of groups that are traditionally inactive
(Haberle, 1989; Thomas, 1986). Neighborhoods with a high proportion of low income and black residents are likely to need the most municipal services. The elitist approach to community power argues that the allocation of political incentives is not according to needs. In this view, the more wealthy the neighborhood residents the more their access to the government (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983). The results of this study seem to support the argument of the elitist perspective. Environmental threats, a measure of neighborhood needs, does not influence the allocation of political recognition, material and technical support. It was found that the higher the socioeconomic status of the residents the greater the political incentives allocated to the association. But this must be interpreted with caution.
The effect was not significant in the model based on the random sample only. It is possible that the positive effect of socioeconomic status on political incentives is a result of sample bias. In addition, the model based on the larger sample where the effect is significant, explains a small proportion of the variance. This finding suggest that other factors not included in the model may affect more the allocation of political incentives. In sum, despite the original goal of increasing the representation of traditionally non organized groups, there is evidence that government allocates more political incentives to the wealthier associations.
This finding may provide a supplementary explanation for the negative effect of political incentives on collective action. Political incentives are allocated to associations located in wealthy neighborhoods. Given that those neighborhoods do not suffer as acutely from major problems, they are the less active. In addition, socioeconomic status negatively interacts with environmental threats of decline in the effect on collective action. When wealthy neighborhoods face problems that are a threat to their environment, their associations take less actions to 143 bring the government to solve the problem. This finding may be explained again in terms of accessibility to the government. The greater residents income, the fewer the actions their associations need to take to influence the government.
In sum, we found that regardless of social class and race composition of the neighborhood, environmental threats such as land use change are the best predictors of collective action. Resources are an important antecedent of community action. Resources provided by other neighborhood based organizations are more important than those that are mobilized from its constituency. The political incentives for organization create a situation of resource dependency.
Neighborhood associations goals are tailored to fit the governmental agenda, resulting in a decrease in their actions. Political incentives are more likely to be distributed not according to needs, but to the socioeconomic status of the residents.
Directions For Future Research
This study focused on the effects of government sponsorship of neighborhood organization programs on collective action. In that sense, the findings of this study are limited to the understanding of the effects of external actors on the actions taken by neighborhoods to protect and improve their environment. It is our impression that governmental actions had an effect on the patterns of 144 neighborhood organization. For example, neighborhood activists argued that the officially recognized associations, drove out the grassroots organizations. Future research should address the effects of the creation of officially recognized local associations on neighborhood organization.
Another important finding is the role of local interoganizational links in the facilitation of collective action. This is very important because of the claim of neighborhood activists that officially recognized organizations have replaced existing local voluntary associations. A number of explanations have been suggested to explain the positive effect of int.erorganizational links on neighborhood action. This effect may be the result of exchange of material and human resources and provision of internal and external legitimacy to residents claims. Future research needs also to address this issue.
We found that government political incentives work to decrease the action of neighborhood associations to protect and improve the locale. Certainly, this seems to be a result of the allocation of official recognition to neighborhoods that confront few environmental problems. However it is also possible that these associations, because they are officially recognized, have easier access to city officials.
For that reason, their problems are better known and less action is needed to make them known. The considerations of 145 city government in providing recognition and political support are very important from a social policy perspective.
It is possible that residents and the government differ in the criteria used to evaluate neighborhood problems. Issues that are important for neighborhoods may not be important for the government. Urban research will benefit from studies that investigate what influence government decisions in the allocation of political incentives.
Finally, an important theoretical discrepancy exists on the effects and consequences of the actions of agencies, government and neighborhood associations. The new urban sociology argues that the organized actions of developers, city bureaucracy and government and residents shape urban organization. Human ecology underestimates these actions. In this approach the result of the competition between city actors with different goals and interests is a an efficient social system. The actions of the government, residents and developers ultimately recognize the results of ecological process. The new urban sociology produced large research that investigate the effect of the actions of real estate developers and growth coalitions. Future research need to address neighborhood associations as a distinctive form of organization in which the common interests of residents of a bounded community are expressed. The findings of this study show that neighborhood associations are an important player in urban issues. Residents organize in associations to 146 protect the residential environment. More research should be directed to identify the results of their actions. APPENDIX
147 Table 13. Correlation Matrix of Collective Action for Predicted Variable
ACTION FENDEV FENDEC PFAMCH EDUC HOUMEV POWNER REST MEFAIN POLINREEXEXP NEWSL COMMHETER BLACK
ACTION 1.0
FENDEV .547* 1.0
FENDEC .497* .217** 1.0
PFAMCH .253* .115 .313* 1.0
EDUC -.248* .087 -.288* -.767* 1.0
HOUMEVA -.339* -.123 -.425* -.065* .875* 1.0
POWNER -.206** -.148 -.264* . 089 .096 .361* 1.0
PREST . 047 -.040 .211 .740* -.608* -.408* .450* 1.0
MEFAINC - .260* -.094 -.430 -.587* .811* .896* .506* -.328* 1.0
POLIN -.231** -.068 -.177 -.151 .244** .300* .146 -.096 .288* 1.0
REEX .485* .103 .342* .227* -.225** -.277* .123 - . 055 .114 -.167 1.0
EXP . 066- .106 -.082 -.122 .081 .002 . 090 .017 .095 .017 . 071 1.0
NEWSL -.121 -.199** -.106 - .431* .410* .388* .110 -.295* .352* .238** . 049 .079 1.0
COMM .189** -.030 .176 .042 -.051 -.058 -.105 . 075 -.137 . 048 .089 -.007 .156 1.0
HETERO .114 -.016 .169 .225* -.319* -.355* .225** .102 -.308* -.016 .147 .125 -.184** -.100 1.0
BLACK .210** .135 .281** .656* -.493* -.454* -.110 .405 -.519* - .172 .044 - .224** -.279** .067 -.130 1.0
Means 21.76 5.094 3.552 .194 .350 81002 .577 .431 38771 3.695 1.961 .409 .676 .771 .076 .171
S.D. 9.439 1.791 1.579 .082 .192 30755 .199 .151 14575 1.256 1.543 .494 .470 .421 .266 .378
* significant at p<.01
“ significant at p<.05 Table 14. Zero-Order Correlations of Collective Action for Predicted Variable using Factors as Independent Variables
TACTION FENDEV FENDEC FSES FINT POLINREEXEXPNEWSLCOMM HETER BLA
ACTION 1.0
FENDEV .547* 1.0
FENDEC .497* .217** 1.0
FSES -.318* -.116 -.437* 1.0
FINT -.058 -.088 -.006 -.037 1.0
POLIN -.231* -.068 -.117 .303* .017 1.0
REEX .485* .103 .324* -.243* .058 -.030* 1.0
EXP .066 -.106 -.082 .036 .041 .017 .071 1.0
NEWSL -.121 -.199** -.106 .384* - .145 .238** .049 .079 1.0
COMM .189** -.003 .176 -.089 -.020 .048 .089 -.007 .156 1.0
Heterogeneous .114 -.016 .169 -.346* -.030 -.016 .147 .125 -.184** -.100 1.0
Black .210** .135 .281* -.489* .236*- .172 .044 -.224** -.279** .067 -.130 1.0
Mean 21.761 5.094 3.552 27901 .484 3.695 1.961 .409 .523 .676 .213 .171
S.D. 9.439 1.791 1.579 10307 .139 1.256 1.543 .494 .501 .470 .308 .378
•Significant pc.Ol
••Significant p<.05 150
Neighborhood Associations Survey
1. What is your official position in the Association
a .______(Your official Position). b. I do not have an official position.
2. In approximately what year was your neighborhood association first formed? ______
3. Approximately how many total households are there in the area that your neighborhood association represents? ______
4. What are the geographic limits of the area that your neighborhood association represents?______
5. What percentage of the neighborhood residents are homeowners?
6. What percentage of the neighborhood residents are blacks?
7. What would you say is the average home value in your neighborhood?
8. What would you say are the annual average taxes on homes in your Neighborhood? ______
9. What would you say is the average income of a family in your neighborhood? (Please, place a check) a. Less than $10,000 a year. b. Between $10,000 to $19,999 a year c . Between $20,000 to $29,999 a year d. Between $30,000 to $39,999 a year e . Between $40,000 to $49,999 a year f . Between $50,000 to $59,999 a year g- Between $60,000 to $69,999 a year h. More than $70,000 a year.
10. How many total members does your neighborhood association have? 151
11. Please, place a check by the officers or officials that your neighborhood association have and indicate if it is an elected position.
Position Elected Position 1.President yes No 2.Vice-President yes No 3.Secretary yes No 4.treasurer yes No 5.Newsletter Editor yes No 6.Other(Please describe) yes No 7.My neighborhood association does not have officers or officials.
12. Some neighborhood associations have expert members (attorney, architect, real state agents) appointed to the board of trustees. How many expert members does your organization have in the board?
13. What are their professions/expertise?
14. Some neighborhood associations have special committees that work on different issues and activities that affect the neighborhood. How many active committees does your association have? ______.
15. Can you name the activities and/or issues that each committee addresses. 1 .______2 . ______3 .______4 .______5 .______6. ______7 .______8 .______
16. Some neighborhood associations have paid staff members. Can you please tell us how many staff members of your organization are paid?
17. What are their duties/job?
18. How often does your neighborhood association hold general meetings to which all the members of the association are invited? (Please place a check). 1. At least once a month. 2. Once every two or three months. 3. About twice a year. 4. Once a Year. 5. Never
19. How many people usually attend a general meeting to which all the members of your association are invited? (Please place a check) 1. Number of people______2. My neighborhood association does not hold such meetings. 152
20. How often does your neighborhood association board of directors meet in addition to general meetings of all the members of the association? (Please place a check).
1. At least once a month. 2. Once every two or three months. 3. About twice a year. 4 . Once a year . 5. Never 6. My neighborhood association does not have a board of directors.
21. Who usually is involved when your association makes a decision regarding important association activities or projects? (Please, place a check) 1. The neighborhood association president or leader only. 2. All of the neighborhood association officers or leaders (for example the board of directors). 3. A vote is taken among all the members of the association who want to vote. 4. Other, specify ______
22. How many times per year does your neighborhood association publish a newsletter? (Please place a check)
1. ______times per year. 2. My neighborhood association does not publish a newsletter.
23. When your neighborhood association publishes a newsletter, how many copies are mailed or delivered? 1. ______copies. 2. My neighborhood association does not publish a newsletter.
24. How do people become official members of your neighborhood association? 1. They are automatically members if they are homeowners living in the neighborhood. 2. They are automatically members if they live in the neighborhood regardless of the fact that they ovm or rent a residence. 3. They become a member by paying membership dues regardless of residence. 4. They become a member by paying membership dues and actually living in the neighborhood. 5. Other, please describe ______
6. My neighborhood association does not have any official members.
25. How much does each member of your neighborhood association pay in dues per year? 1. ______dollars a year. 2. My neighborhood association does not collect dues.
26. Does your neighborhood association have any way to enforce the collection of dues? 1. No 2. Yes, please describe ______153
27. Place a check by each source listed below from which your neighborhood association received income in the last two years and indicate the amount received from each source you check.
Sources of Income Amount Received
Donations from non local business ______Fund Raising Activities(garage sales, bake sales,etc)______Donations from churches ______Government funded projects or programs ______Donations or Grants from Non Profit Organizations( Columbus Foundation, etc.) ______Advertising in the newsletter ______
28. What was your neighborhood association total operating budget in 1992? ______dollars.
Neighborhood associations differ on the issues that face. Regarding the years 1991-2 please rank each of them as being not important, slightly important, moderately important, important and very important. Please, circle the answer that best represents your opinion.
29. How important are problems related to new commercial/industrial development in your neighborhood?
a. Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c. Moderately Important. d. Important. e. Very Important.
30. In dealing with new Commercial/Industrial development what action did your association take? Yes No a. Negotiation with the developer. ______b. Participate/organized public hearings. ______c. Wrote letters to the newspaper. ______d. Formed coalition with other local groups. ______e. Contact local government officials by phone. ______f. Contacted local government officials by mail. ______g. Organized petitions of the residents. ______h. Initiate a law-suit. ______i. Designing a plan for zone regulations.______j . Encourage residents to write letters to city Council members.______k. Other, describe______
31. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on commercial/industrial developments?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful. 154
32. How important are problems related to land use change (from residential to commercial, from single house to multiple apartments,etc). in your neighborhood?
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c . Moderately Important. d . Important. e . Very Important.
33. In dealing with change in land use what action did your association take? Yes No a. Negotiation with the developer/landlord. ______b. Participate/organized public hearings. ______c. Wrote letters to the newspaper.______d. Formed coalition with other local groups.______e. Contact local government officials by phone.______f. Contacted local government officials by mail.______g. Organized petitions of the residents. ______h. Initiate a law-suit.______i. Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members.______j. Other, describe:______
34. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on changes in land use?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful.
35. How important is keeping unwanted business (bars, adult bookstores) from establishing in your neighborhood?
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c. Moderately Important. d. Important. e . Very Important.
36. In dealing with unwanted business from establishing in the neighborhood what action did your association take? Yes No a. Negotiation with the business owner.______b. Participate/organized public hearings.______c. Wrote letters to the newspaper.______d. Formed coalition with other local groups.______e. Contact local government officials by phone. ______f. Contacted local government officials by mail. ______g. Organized petitions of the residents.______h. Initiate a law-suit.______i. Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members.______j. Other, describe:______155
37. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on keeping unwanted business from establishing in the area?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful.
38. How important are problems of crime and safety (like drugs, vandalism, car thefts etc.) in your neighborhood?
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c . Moderately Important. d. Important. e . Very Important.
39. In dealing with crime and safety what action did your association take? Yes No a. Create a crime watch program. ___ __ b. Participate/organized public hearings. ___ __ c. Wrote letters to the newspaper. ___ __ d. Formed coalition with other local groups. ___ __ e. Contact local government officials by phone. ___ __ f. Contacted local government officials by mail.______g. Organized petitions of the residents ___ __ h. Organized anti crime marches ___ __ i . Apply for governmental grants______j . Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members. ___ __ k. Apply for a foundation grants ___ __ 1. Other, describe:______
40. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on crime and safety?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful.
41. How important is lack of adequate municipal services to the area (like inadequate refuse collection, inadequate snow removal, street drain not cleaned)?
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c . Moderately Important. d. Important. e . Very Important. 156
42. In dealing with lack of adequate municipal services to the area what action did your association take? Yes No a. Apply for grants from the government. ______b. Participate/organized public hearings. ______c. Wrote letters to the newspaper. ______d. Formed coalition with other local groups. ______e. Contact local government officials by phone. ______f. Contacted local government officials by mail. ______g. Organized petitions of the residents. ______h. Initiate a law-suit. ______i. Organized clean-ups. ______j . Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members. ______k. Other, describe:______
43. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on Services?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful.
44. How important are housing problems (like vacant buildings, deteriorating housing, difficulties in getting mortgages and insurance to houses in the area) in your neighborhood?.
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c. Moderately Important. d. Important. e . Very Important.
45. In dealing with deteriorating housing what action did your association take? Yes No a. Apply for grants from the government. ___ __
b. Participate/organized public hearings. ___ __ c. Wrote letters to the Newspaper. ___ __
d. Formed coalition with other local groups. ___ __ e. Contact local government officials by phone. ___ __ f. Contacted local government officials by mail.______g. Organized petitions of the residents. ___ __ h. Organized beautification programs. ___ __ i. Organized housing rehabilitation______projects. ___ __ j . Initiate a law-suit______k. Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members.______1. Other,describe:______
46. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on housing? a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful. 157
47. How important are educational issues (like poor education in public schools, lack of recreation facilities) in your neighborhood?.
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c . Moderately Important. d . Important. e . Very Important.
48. In dealing with educational issues what action did your association take? Yes No a. Apply for grants from the government ______b. Participate/organized public hearings. ______c. Wrote letters to the newspaper ______d. Formed coalition with other local groups. ______e. Contact local government officials by phone. ______f. Contacted local government officials by mail. ______g. Organized petitions of the residents. ______h. Initiate a law-suit ______k. Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members.______i. Other, describe:______
49. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on educational issues?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful.
50. How important is the need for neighborhood social activities ( like recruiting members, increasing the identification with the area) in your neighborhood?
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c . Moderately Important. d. Important. e . Very Important.
51. In dealing with neighborhood social activities what action did your association take? Yes No a. Organize block parties. ______b. Organize picnics/barbecues ______c. Organize sports activities______d. Organize local festivals/parades ______e. Other, describe:______
52. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on neighborhood social activities?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful. 158
53. Is there any other problem in the neighborhood?
54. How important is this problem?
a . Not Important. b. Slightly Important. c . Moderately Important. d. Important. e . Very Important.
55. In dealing with this issue what action did your association take? Yes No a. Apply for grants from the government. ___ __ b. Participate/organized public hearings. ___ __ c. Wrote letters to the newspaper. ___ __ d. Formed coalition with other local groups. ___ __ e. Contact local government officials by phone. ___ __ f. Contacted local government officials by mail.______g. Organized petitions of the residents. ___ __ h. Initiate a law-suit ___ __ k. Encourage residents to write letters to City Council members. ___ __ i. Other, describe: ______
56. Overall how successful was your association in achieving its goals on this issue?
a. Extremely successful. b. Moderately successful. c. Slightly successful. d. Not at all successful.
57. In dealing with local issues, neighborhood associations sometimes ask for technical advise, moral support, provision of meeting places or other material support from other community organizations. Which of the following organizations would you say that provide that kind of support to your association.
Yes No Local churches______Local business association______Community Development Corporations______Educational Organizations(Schools, Colleges)______Other community organizations(Kiwanis, Rotary, etc.) ______Library local branch______Other, describe:
58. Thinking about the relationship with the city government, is your organization officially recognized? a. Yes b. No
59. Does the city government regularly contact your organization on issues that affect the neighborhood ? a. Yes b. No 159
60. When you express your concerns to the city government do you find it responsive to the concerns of the Neighborhood Association?
a. Yes b. No
61. In your opinion, does the city government encourage neighborhood organization? a. Yes b. No
62. Based on your experience, does the city government provide technical and material assistance to your neighborhood association to carry out your goals? a. Yes b. No
Thinking about your neighborhood, I would like to know how much do you agree with the following statements:
63. As a result of the activities of the neighborhood association, the residents are more aware of neighborhood issues.
a. Strongly agree. b . Somewhat agree. c. Somewhat disagree. d. Strongly disagree.
64. The neighborhood association has solved major neighborhood problems.
a. Strongly agree b . Somewhat agree c . Somewhat disagree d. Strongly disagree
65. The neighborhood association has an influence in major decisions affecting the neighborhood.
a. Strongly agree b . Somewhat agree c. Somewhat disagree d. Strongly disagree
66. The residents of our area are well organized in the neighborhood.
a. Strongly agree b. Somewhat agree c . Somewhat disagree d. Strongly disagree
67. Does your association participate in any coalition, federation or any umbrella organization of neighborhood associations?
a. Yes (please go to question 68). b . No
68. If yes, can you please describe in a few sentences the activities of this coalition/federation? (Which organizations are members, how many times a year the organization holds meetings, what issues are discussed and what actions are taken). References
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