rF

Given By t 3^

THE UNITED STATES SURVEY

Kawanishi Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabusbiki Kaisha)

CORPORATION REPORT No. Ill (Air frames)

AIRCRAFT DIVISION

April 1947

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha)

CORPORATION REPORT No. Ill (Air frames)

AIRCRAFT DIVISION Dates of Survey: 17 October-25 November 1945

Date of Publication: April 1947 :AL3

JUL 25 1947

This report was written priinaiily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more compreliensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be consid- ered as limited to the specific mateiial covered and as subject to fin-thei' inter- pretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.

"V

11 FOREWORD

Tlic United SLatcs Strategic Bombing Survey military segment of the oi-ganization was drawn was estahlished by the Secretary of War on 3 from tiie Ai-my to the extent of GO percent and November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the from the Navy to the extent of 40 peieenl. Both late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possi- conduct an impartial and expert study of the- bles assistance in furnishing men, supplies, ti-ans- effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be port, and information. The Survey operated used in connection with air attacks on Japan and from headquarters established in Tokyo early in to establish a basis for evaluating the importance September 1945, with subheadtjuarters in Nagoya, and potentialities of air power as an instrument of Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile military strategy for planning th^ future develop- teams operating in other parts of Japan, the ment of the United States armed forces and for islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. determining future economic policies with respect It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime to the national defense. A summary report and Japanese military planning and execution, engage- reports some 200 supporting containing the fiml- ment l)y engagement, and campaign by campaign, ings of the Survey in Germany have been published. and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested Japan's economy and war production, plant by that the Survey conduct a similar study of the plant, and industry liy industry. In addition, effects of all types of air attack in the war against studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra- Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the tegic plans and the l)ackground of her entry into Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the the war, the internal discussions anil negotiations Navy. The officers of the Survey during its Japanese phase were: leading to her acceptance of unconditional sur- render, the course of health and morale among Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. the civilian population, the effectiveness of the Paid H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice Japanese civilian defense organization, and tiie Chairmen. effects of atomic bombs. Harry L. Bowman, the Separate reports J. Kenneth Galbraith, will be issued covering each phase of the study. Rensis Likert, The Sui'vey interrogated more than 700 Jap- Frank A. McNamee, Jr., anese military, Goverimaent, and industrial of- Fred Searls, Jr., ficials. It also recovered and translated many Monroe' E. Spaght, documents which not only have been useful to Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, the Survey but also will furnish data valuable for Theodore P. Wright, Directors. other studies. Arrangements have been made to Walter Wilds, Secretary. turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelli- The Survey's complement provided for 300 gence Group, through which they will be available civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The for further examination and distribution.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Corporation and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry. 1 Air Attacks 4 Production Statistics 5 Evaluation of Pre-attack Intelligence G Appendix A—Chart of employment 9 Appendix B—Dispersal Map 10 B-1—Dispersal of aircraft manufacture 11 Appendix C—Production of combat-type aircraft 12 Appendix D—Aircraft production by type and years 13 Appendix E—Actual airplane protluction 13 Appendix F—MIS estimate of production, 1941-45 15 Naruo Plant (Plant report No. III-l) 17 KoxAN Plant (Plant report No. III-2) 45 HiMEji Plant (Plant report No. III-3) 63 Takarazuka Plant (Plant report No. III-4) 75

THE CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Till' Kawauislii Aircraft Co. (Ivawaiiishi Kokiiki In Decend)er 1939 the Kawazoe Iron Works in Knbushiki Kaisha) was the tenth hirgest producer the city of Fuse was purchased. This company of all typos of aircraft in the Japanese aircraft produced machine tools and was later a branch of industry. During the period 1941-45 it ac- the Takarazuka plant. At the request of the counted for 3 percent of all the aircraft produced -Japanese Naval Ministry, the aircraft-engine by the industry, increasing from 1.1 percent in department was dissolved in November 1940 and 1942 to 4 percent in 1944 and 5 percent in 1945. the engine-accessories department and machine- The company protluced' 5 percent of all fighters gun parts department were established. built by the Japanese aircraft industry. The capital was increased by 15,000,000 yen in Kawanishi produced air frames only and its October 1941. Thus the total authorized capital entire output went to the Japanese Navy. The became 30,000,000 yen, which was paid up in full principal products were used for George (NlKl-J in April 1943. At the request of the Japanese and N1K2-J), a single-engine fighter, and Frances Navy, the Takarazuka plant was established in (P1Y2-S), a twin-engine fighter. Other import- December 1941 and started production of ma- ant types of air frames were for Mavis and Emily, chined parts for aircraft, engme accessories, and four-engine flying boats, and various types of power-driven, machine-gun turrets. In February naval observation planes and trainers (USSBS, 1942 the Konan plant was established to produce Aircraft Division reports Nos. III-l and III-2). large flying boats, and in July of the same year In November 1928 the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. the Himeji plant was established to produce was established with a capital of 5,000,000 yen, fighter planes. assumed the assets and operations of the Kawani- In September 1943 the capital was increased by shi Engineering Works at Kobe and continued 30,000,000 yen, making the total authorized producing airplanes. Kawanishi Engineering- capital 60,000,000 yen. The Government-owned Works started producing seaplanes in 1921 for Naruo airport was first utilized by the company in the Nippon Airplane Co. (Nippon Hikoki K K), October 1943. In January 1944 the firm was an air transportation firm. designated a munitions company by the Munitions Upon the founding of the Nipi)on Aircraft Company Act. Production of large flying boats Transportation Co. (Nippon Koku Yuso K K), the was stopped in March 1945 by order of the Naval Nippon Airplane Co., which monopolized all civil- Ministry. In April 1945 the company started ian air transportation throughout Japan, had to to establish new facilities at Fukuchiyama, in be dissolved. In December 1928, since Kawanishi Kyoto prefecture, Honshu, and in Oe County, in Aircraft Co. had no market for its products, it Tokushima prefecture, Shikoku, as dispersal units started to manufacture observation seaplanes and of the Naruo plant. trainers for the Navy, as a naval-designated plant. By an order of the Minister of Munitions in In December 1930 the company moved to Naruo July 1945, the entire firm became the Second village and established a new plant. Munitions Arsenal. The company remained as a In cooperation with Short Bros. Co. of England, mei'e holding company. At the end of the war, in the Kawanishi Co., in January, started to build August 1945, all production stopped and the all-metal, trimotor flying boats. During August Minister of Munitions ordered the munitions 1934 an aircraft-engine department was established arsenals to be dissolved and all assets and personnel which experimented with liut produced only two returned to the original companies. engines and then dropped the experiment. The Sis members of the Kawanishi family owned capitalization was increased by 10,000,000 yen in 731,780 shares, or 61 percent, of the total 1,200,000 September 1938, and, fully paid, to 15,000,000 yen shares of capital stock of the Kawanishi Aircraft by November 1939. Co. There were four principal plants cif the Kaw anish Himeji plant produced only George (NlKl-J) Aircraft Co., all in the Osaka-Kobe area and and N1K2-J, a shigle-engine fighter (USSBS, •within a 40-niiIe area of each other. Three of Aircraft Division Reports Nos. III-2 and III-3). them, the Nanio, Konan, and Himeji plants, were From December 1928 through the end of the aircraft-assembly units, antl the remaining one, war, the Kawanishi Aircraft Co.'s entire produc- the Takarazuka plant, produced air frame ma- tion went to the Japanese Na\^. chined parts, gun turrets, and aircraft accessories Government financial aid to the company came, (fig. 1). under three categories. The first covered direct, ^ The Naruo plant produced George (NlKl-J) loans of U)0, 000,000 yen from August 1941 to and its modification, N1K2-J, a smgle-engine, July 1943; 40,000,000 yen from August 1943 to land-i)ased Navy fighter, Emily (H8K 1-2-3), a December 1944, and 71,000,000 yen from May four-engine flying boat, ami various trainers and 1944 to May 1945. The second was a loan of seaplanes (USSBS. Aircraft Division Report No. 3,621 machine tools and equipment, valued at iri-i). 24,0(i9,()00 y(.n. Th(> third consisted of Govern- Konan ])lant produced Fj-ances (P1Y2-S), a ment-furnished buildings and establishments twLn-engine, land-based fighter, and P]mily valued at 81,000,000 yen, including an airport and (H8K2). a four-engine flving boat, while the maintenance shops valued at 25,300,000 yen. In

MAP OF PRINCIPAL PLANT LOCATIONS

HONSHU

• HIMEJI PLANT • TAKARAZUKA PLANT KOBE KONAN PLANT NARUO PLANT

US-STRATEGIC BOMBING SUWFi KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT CO AIRFRAME PLANTS

FIGURE I —

.luly 1945, l)y oi'tlci- of Uic Minister oT Munitions, anil seven otiiers in wliii'h it owned I'lDni 1 percent tlic entire firm unci nil employees eanie luulei to 21 percent ol the slocU (tal)le 1). direct' su|)ervisi()n of the Goveniniciit iuul was Tahle 1. Subsidiary mid affiliated companies of the called the Second Mnnitions Arsenal. Kawanishi Aircraft Co. Organization and Operation

Th(! kc}' oflicers oi' the corporation were as Name follows:

Prcsidciil --- Ryuzo Kawanislii. Vice president Ivenji Macl)ai'a. Maiiagiiifi: director Sliiro Takaliashi. Chief onf^ineer Yosliio Hasliiuelii. Manager of Nariio plant Masakiyo Nakainura. Manager of Talvaraznlca plant Meishin Sailo. Manager of Konan plant Sakae Haniada. Manager of Hinieji plant Mitsuo Snehisa. The four plants were directly under the admin- istrative section of the company.

Figure 2 Organizational Chart- of Kawanishi Corporation

President Ryuzo Kawanishi.

Vice i)resident - Kenji Maehara. Managing director Shiro Takahashi. Chief engineer Yoshio Hashignchi.

Administrative sect ion

Administrative department. Personnel department. De.signing department. Finance department. Material and supply Medical department, department. Nanio plant

Administrative department. Machining, forging, and Production department. casting department. Inspection department. Dispersed plants. Personnel department.

Takarazuka plant

Administrative department. Gun turrets department. A/C machined parts department. Personnel depart ment. Aircraft accessories department. Machine tool department.

Konan plant

Administrative department. Personnel department. Production department. Material section. Inspection department.

Himcji plant

Administrative department. Personnel department. Production department. Dispersed plants (Uzu- Inspection department. rano plant).

Each of the three aircraft assembly plants of the company made wing, tail, and fuselage sul)- asseml)lies in addition to complete aircraft assem- blies (USSBS, Aircraft Division Report No. III-l). The Kawanishi Aircraft Co. had five subsidiary companies which it owned outright, three com- panies in which it held over a quarter interest, —

(USSBS. Aircraft Division Report No. III-2), the plans. Every type of plant was dispersing its Himeji plant (USSBS, Aircraft Division Report activity at the same time, overloading the trans- No. III-3). and the Takarazuiva plant (USSBS, portation system and hindering each other's pro- Aircraft Division Report No. III-4) —was inves- duction. For example, when component parts tigated. could not be provided by the plant's own shop, due to the fact that the shop was moving to Dispersal another location, such accessories could not, in Dispersal of aircraft production began in Oc- many cases, be provided by a subcontractor, as tober 1944 in the Naruo plant and in the early the latter also was dispersing at the same time. part of 194.5 for the other plants of the Kawanishi AIR ATTACKS Aircraft Co. The corporation policy was to dis- Naruo plant sustained direct perse production of each plant inider the various The one and two indirect attacks. direct attack occurred departments in the plant. The Naval Construc- The 9 •Tune 1945, durmg which high-explosive tion Corps assisted in building up dispersed plant 328 bombs struck, causing heavy damage. The first sites and in many cases supplied all the labor and indirect attack occurred on 19 July 1945, material necessary in digging underground plants when 110 high-explosive bombs, part of those and constructing buildings. Every type of con- aimed at the nearby Nippon oil refinery, struck the plant struction was utilized—tunnels, semiundergrounil and caused moderately heavy damage. buildings, schools, basements of department stores, On 6 August 1945, 385 incendiary bombs dropped in space under elevated railroads, converted woolen the Nishinomiya urlian area attack struck the mills, tile shops, and space in various factories. experimental section of the final assembly and The principal bottleneck in dispersion was lack caused medium damage to the plant. of sufficient transportation facilities. Railroads In addition to these two indirect attacks, two were overburdened because all types of plants other area attacks afl:"ected the plant. During were dispersmg at the same time and there were one, a few bombs fell on the nearby dormitories, not sufficient facilities to handle the tremendous and during the other, a few fell on the Naruo load. Due to the magnitude of the undertaking, airfield, near the plant. The plant itself was not there were not enough automotive trucks to struck. compensate for the deficiency in rail transpoi'ta- The Konan plant suft'ered one direct attack, tion. Provision of living quarters, iu isolated 11 May 1945, when 146 high-explosive bonds hit areas, for the workei-s and their families, was a and caused the greatest amount of damage to the probh'm which in some cases retarded production. plant. There were two area attacks the Kobe At the end of the war, Kawanishi had dispersed, — url>an area attack of 5 June and the Nishinomiya or planned to disperse, the facilities of its 4 major attack of fi August, a few incendiary bombs drop- plants to 32 main sites. jjing on the plant and dormitories. Damage was Tlie Naruo plant had eight dispersal areas, all negligible in each of these cases. but one of which were located on Honshu Island The one direct attack, on 22 June, leveled most six in the Osaka-Kobe area and one at Fukuchi- yama, in Kyoto prefecture. The eighth, the of the Himeji plant. During this attack, 229 Shikoku final-assembly plant, was in Oe County, high-explosive bombs struck the plant area. Two a few miles west of Tokushima, on Shikoku fighter swee])s, on 24 and 30 July, caused some Island. damage by strafing and fragmentation bombs. There were 5 Konan plant dispersals, all in the During the 23 July du'ect attack on the Takara-

(i plant dispersals, Osaka-Kobe area, and Himeji zuka ])lant, the 458 high-explosive bombs which total of most of which while Takarazuka had a 13, struck destroyed 80 percent of the plant. An inland from Kobe and Himeji (appendix B). were area attack on 15 June 1945 burned 30 percent It wa6 estimated l)y company officials that dis- of tlie dormitories by incendiary action. persals accounted for an over-all loss of 20 ])ercent Of a total of 13,221,747 square feet of floor in production, although the f)rogram was only space divided among the four plants, 4,765,476 about 50 percent completed. square feet were severely damaged or destroyed The dispersal of all types of Japanese industiy at the same time, contributed greatly to the and 8,456,271 square feet received superficial failure of the aircraft builders to meet production damage as a result of all air attacks (table 2). —

"ahIjK 2. Air nlUick lUuiiagc EVALUATION OF PREATTACK duction from 1941 to 1945, Intelligence exceeded INTELLIGENCE the actual output by 18 percent. Intelligence infornmtion was correct concerning the type of War Dcpartiiu'iit Military Intelligcncp (G-2) | aircraft produced by the company and the location cstiiiiatcs of f()inbat-tyi)o aircraft production for at the four largest plants 1944 aiul 1945 were 27 percent over the actual of and type of operation (appendix F). In estimating total aircraft pro- of the Kawanishi Aircraft Co.

PRODUCTION OF COMBAT TYPE AIRCRAFT

iij

0-

O

u CD z

ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA 1942 1943 1944 1945

U.SSTRATEGICBOMBSURVEY

KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT CO. FIGURE 3 1000

1 o

•( 3 10 . . . .

Appendix B-1. — Kawanishi Aircraft Co,—Dispersal of aircraft manufacture

Distance Date disiJersal l'erc<'nt of rrom plant Types of iiroduclion [jlaruicd .\rea (square feet) Location began eorn[(letion (in miles)

Nai'iioplHiil: 247,712 Kukucliiyama-- - October 1944... Final assembly

sliikoku (Oi' roiinly) -- do do ' 59,71(i Scliodls and l)uil(iint;s in Osaka- December 1944 On'tce. engineering ;ind wan-houses Kobe area. 1 il.7:i3 Sakasonawa Not started. . .. Machine parts.

Mukiipiwa • ....do Fuselage assembly- 2,637 KoyiH-n — ...do Sheet metal iiarts 27,341 70. KKI. Oshima-Shokukin .January 194.'j- - Machine shop

Kansaifiakuin -. Oecember 1944. ...do 22,7Rr) 1.^1. IConaii plant: \'acinns locations near Kohc November 1944 Raw material and maebini' tools UKI. ll.i>2.^i 100. Tatotsii Airport (Osaka) April 1945 Final assembly . . ..

Ifnioda braiicli. department store, May 1945 .Machine parts I 15.070 100. Osaka.

2.5. Yania Ashiya April 1945. Sheet metal parts I 31,211i.

! 25. Kiu'ak uen ( iinderKround) do .... Fitting shop - - - 223.892 Himeji plant:

Dangc .. March 194.5. Final assembly ..- -. m.^lti ion of building.

. -- 1 .1 SOofrunway. Uzurano - - April 1945- - - Engine run and flight hangai

Kasamatsu - June 1945---- Wing assembly 16.275, .1 50.

-' K ishiro -- - - do Fuselage assembly 2S,74n 40. IIojo (Taka village)-. March 1945. Machine shop Iii7.ii40 .! 30. Fuknzaki Unit: l^eno 11 Sheet-metal shoP-

Funazu ..- - --. 14 -do. Planned construction Tawai'a village.- 17 do- not started.

Tatsumo__ . 25 -do- -Takarazuka plant: Kobayashi -.. February 1945. 1 Gun-turret parts 100. Namaze .__. March 1945 3 Gun-turret hydraulic parts 100. Sanda- __ -_— .....do 11 Gun-turret parts 100. io6. Kashiea ; February 1945.. 3 Jig and cutting tools Kasbio June 1945 Sheet-metal parts and fuel-injection 80. pump. Sasayama February 1945.. 22 Parts for fuel pumps 100.

Sakasegawa June 1945 I Pumps assembly 100.

Nakatakamatsu :. April 1945 1 Jigs and tools 99. Nikawa- _. June 1945 Machine shop 100. Umeda branch department store, ----do Air-frame part? 100. Osaka. Okadayama (school) April 1945- 2 -do. 100.

Okadayama (underground) June 1945. - 2 -do. 50. Hojo (underground) 31 -do- 50.

7190.33—47- 11 Appendix C.—Kawanishi Aircraft Co.—Production of cotnbat-type aircraft

XI Kl NlKl-J N1K2-J P1Y2-S Total Year Capac- Capac- Capac- Capac- Ordered Actual C?Py^<^-|ordered Actual Ordered Actual Ordered Actual Ordered ity ity ity ity

January February... March .\pril May

June •-. July.- August September. October November. December..

Total-

1943: January 15 February... March April May.. June July. .August September. October Xovember.,

December -

Total- 84

1944: January 65 29 17 90 February... 85 48 40 110 March 120 63 05 145 .^pril 135 93 93 140 May.- 145 115 17 150 June 155 135 71 166 .luly 165 140 90 178 .August !7S 145 92 188 September. 175 100 106 200 October 165 120 100 205 November. 155 120 82 205 December. 145 120 51 215

Total 29 1,685 190

.January. . 130 120 65 60 215 February. 65 120 140 90 217 March 45 100 150 120 217 April 40 40 155 97 217 May 40 40 155 120 220

JUII'- - 70 150 85 July 70 160 86 .August 70 210 85

Total

Qranfl total. 330 128 97 590

Appendix E. — Kniraiiinhi Appendix F.—Kawanishi Aircraft Co. —MIS estimate of production, 1941~46

Plant

NARUO PLANT REPORT NO. III-l

(Air Frames)

Dates of Survey: 19 October 1945-3 November 1945 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Plant and its Function in the Aircraft Industry 17

Attack Data 1 21 Effects of Bombing '. 21 Intelligence Check 29 Vulnerability 29 Data Relevant to Other Division Studies 29 General Impression of Plant Inspection and Interrogation, 29 Reference Item_. 29 Appendix A—Naruo plant layout Facing page 30 Appendix B—Planned and actual expansion program 31 Appendix C—Schematic flow chart Facing page 32 (1)

Appendix D—Employment chart l. Facing page 32 (2) Appendix E—Number of man-hours worked Facing page 32 (3) Appendix F—Airplane production by types before 1939 33 Appendix G—Planned and actual production Facing page 34 (1) Appendix H—Monthly production and acceptances of propel- lers Facing page 34 (2) Appendix I—Aircraft repairs 35 Appendix J—Bomb plots .__ Facing page 36 (1) Appendix K-1—Damage plots—raid 9 June 1945 Facing page 3G (2) Appendix K-2—^Damage plots —raid 19 July 1945 Facing page 36 (3) Appendix L—Number of man-hours lost because of air raid alerts^ 37 Appendix M—Number of man-hours required to repair air-raid damage ^ 38 Appendix N—Number of man-hours lost because of air raids—^all causes 39 Appendix O—-Monthly consumption of electric power 40 Appendix P—Dispersion plan 41

KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY—NARUO PLANT

THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Ka- AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY bushiki Kaisha). Subassembly and final assem- Imroduction blies of air frames were conducted in 90 buildings square • comprising a total floor area of -,, TV- 1 /XT o 1 . s , 6,350,760 The ^aruo plant (^aruo Seisakusho) was lo- ^^^^ ^ combination of steel, concrete, brick, and cated in the village of Naruo (Daito, Naruo-mura, ^qq,, buildings were constructed, over a continu- Mukogun, Hyogo-ken), miles 8 west of Osaka. qus period of time, to meet the firm's expanding These properties were constructed in 1930 and operations (appendix A). Extensive facilities represented the largest of four major plants of the were available to conduct the complete assembly

17 : .

processes among the plant propoities. Projected Volunteers, including students, were pressed expansion programs were generally fulfilled up to into service to assist in the manufacturing opera- the 1944 year end (appendix B). tions. The program started in late 1942 and

The Kawanishi Aircraft Co. was an outgrow tii reached its peak at the 1943 year end. Tliis of the Kawanishi Engineering Works, formed in group of employees was very small in relation to 1921 for the production of commercial aircraft. the plant's total number of workers and evidently The company commenced prothicing airplanes for liad no appreciable eft'ect on production. the Na\-y in 1930 at the Naruo plant. In 1933 Under the Naruo plant's schedule of ])laniicd and 1934, experiments with 500-horsepower water- (>mployment, a total of 36,000 workers were pro- cooled engines were attempted. Only two engines jected by March 1944. This goal was almost were completed and a few others repaired. Mass reached in May 1944 wlien 35,100 people were on production was never inaugurated. The company the |5ay roll. The foiu'th employment plan con- confined its activities to the production of uii' templated a total force of 37,000 by March 1945,' frames. but was never attained. In fact, employment Government aid to the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. declined steadily from May 1944 until rapid de- trom August 1941 to May 1944 amounted to terioration set in toward the close of the war. 211,000,000 yen for eciuipment and airport facili- Man-hours reached a peak in May 1944. In- ties. funds received by the Naruo plant The auguration of the dispersal program, shortly there- were allocated as follows: after, was i-esponsiljle for the gradual decline that Facility >'"« set in (appendbc E). Xariio Airport 24, 000. 000 Excepting for the months of July and August Maintenance -shop at airports- 1, 300, 000 1944, during which period two shifts were con- Machine tools at Xarno plant __ 400, 000 ducted, operations were conducted on a one-shift

Total - 2.j, 700, 000 basis. During the one-shift operation, employees Plant Organization and Operation worked (excluding overtime) the following sched- The plant was managed by the following key ules: persoimel: Direct labor (male) 0730 to 1S()( .Masakiyo XaUarnura General manager. Direct labor (female) 0730 to ISOi Stndents 0800 to 1701 Hiro.shi Kono . Chief, planning departnienl. to IMii Masokiyo Nakainnra., C'liief, i)rodnction depart- Staff 0730 ment. Office personnel 0800 to ISdi Masauori Konishi Chief, inspection. and sttidents did not work overtime Shigeru Furukawa Chief, Labor Depari uien( Women The two shifts, during 1944, were ordered l)y tlic Manufacturmg processes were conducted on a Government and later discontinued. Men on!} functional basis through various departments worked the night shift, and tluy were very few (appendLx C). in number: only 2 percent of the total direct-laboi Production-line techniques were used exclu- workers, or 400 men. Compulsory service in the sively until the first attack iti June 1945, after war industrv started August 11, 1941. which job-shop jiractices were adopted. Material An involved system of compensation was in was processed through the plant on an established elTect and carried with it many variations. Tiic schematic production-flow basis. Manufacturing employees of the plant were paid on an average space appears to Inivc liceii utilized with liltlc of 180 to 200 yen per month, working almost 300 waste. hours per month. The base pay after the begin- Total employment in tiic Naruo plant increased ning of the war was 2 yen 80 sen for a 10-hour from 7,850 in December 1939 to 35,100 employees day. For the 2-hour compulsory overtime period, at the peak in May 1944. From June 1944, as an ;i Id-percent increase for each hour was allowed. increasing number of workers were called into tiie For the next 3 to 6 hours, 15 percent of base pay, military service, and es])(>cially after February and after 6 hours, 20 percent of base pay per hoiii 1945, when the dispersal i)rogram got under way, was given. In addition to base and overtime pay, employment at Naruo dropped rapidly iititii tlicic were only 17,900 employees in August 1945 each employee was allotted an additiomil bonus, (appendix D). based tipon age, as follows:

18 Percevl rudders, elevators and wing tips, but had not 20 years of age. 10 icceived e.\tensi\'e utilization. 21 to 25 years... 1 20

2f) (o 30 years - 30 Production Statistics 31 aiul over - 40 The Naruo plant constructed a total of 903 Siipplomcnliiiij; llic nixivc, ^(Mirral lioiiuscs of interceptor fighters, George (NlKl-.I an began in April 1944. production of successive types of aircraft. Six types of wooden propellers were made at the N1K3-J Naruo plant in addition to engine test clubs from In order to overcome the backward tendency of January 1939 to April 1945. A few were used l)y the center of gravity in the N 1 K 2-J, it was Kawanishi Aircraft Co., but most were sold to the planned to move the engine and pi'opeller forward Government. From 1939 to the end of 1944, approximately 150 millimi^ters. This type was when propeller production ended, 3,133 wooden called N 1 K 3-J but was never constructed. propellers for small trainers and observation N1K4-J planes were produced (appendix H). This was a modification of 1 2-J. Actual production exceetled planned output as N K The main differences follow: set l)y the Government. Type of engine elianged: (Installed injection pumps instead of carburetors.) Rebuilding and Repair of Airplanes 13-millimeter machine guns added in tlie fuselage. From January to October 1944 a total of 393 .\rrangcment of armament in wings modified. aircraft were repaired at the Naruo plant. In The first to third experimental planes were com- 1939, 21 aircraft were repaired, increasing to 95 ])lctcd in 1944. Numerous modifications were in 1940, 98 in 1941, chopping to but 17 in 1942, made after test flights and applied to later plaiK^s and reaching a peak of 137 in 1943. This work as well as to the above three experim(>ntal planes. tapered ofl" in 1944, during which year only 25 The fourth plane was 95 percent completed at the we're repaired, and came to a stop by the end of end of the war. that year. No airplanes were repaired in 1 945. N1K4-A Repairs of diverse character were made for This was a modification of N1K4-J, for use on various contractors, including the Government and aircraft carriers. Two planes of the N1K2-J private builders (appendix I). model were reconstructed in 1944 for the purpose Experimental Aircraft of this experiment. The first experimental plane was completed on 20 September 1944, and the Early in 1939, only one experimental three- second plane about half a month later. seatcr observation seaplane, Jake, was produced. In 1940, one large experimental flying boat was N1K5-J produced which never got into production. Also This was also a modification of N1K2-J for per- in 1940, 12 primary training seaplanes were pro- formance improvement. The type of engine was duced and from October 1942 to February 1944, elianged from the Homare to the Kasei and the only 15 observation seaplanes, Noi-m 11, were airframe strengthened. subject to experiment. Plans were started at the beginning of 1945, ami The following experimental airplanes were pro- design drawings were nearly completed. Just duced in 1944 and 1945, chiefly in the design de- before the construction work was started in the partment and final-assembly shop of the Naruo Himeji plant, everything was destroyed by the plant: air attack on the Naruo plant. 20 J6K1 Number in plant area, 385. 6 August 1945. Number of liuildiug hits, final assembly. This was a new type liigh-altiliidc inlcrccptoi-. I .Number of i:XH, Uuildiiig No. 101. The first ex|)('riinciital plane was planned for completion at tlie end of 1944. When the desi<;n EFFECTS OF BOMBING drawings were nearly completed, all the plans Direct Air Attacks had to he ahandoned at the retpiest of the (iov- There were three attacks on the Xaruo i)lant: ernment. 1. 9 June 1945 0832 to 0905. HllKl 2. 19 July 1945 1120 to 1200.

This represented a new type of transport flying 3. (I August 1945 0050 to 0202. boat, with wooden construction members. This In addition to the above three attacks, tlierc aircraft was planned in conjunction with J()Kl, were two area attacks which affected the Naruo and was stopped at the same time. Design plant. On 15 June 1945, from 0850 to 1050, the drawings were nearly completed and preparation plant area was not struck, but dormitories some for production was started. Approximately ''0 distance away were damaged. On 10 July 1945, percent of a half-size model plane, for structuial from 1030 to 1040, 31 bombs struck the Naruo tests, was completed at the end of the war. airfield, 29 hitting the runway. Bomb plots (ap- SUICIDE PLANE I)endix J) show the three attacks on the plant. Damage caused by the first 2 attacks are revealed A modification of NlKl-J George 11, to carry in appendi.xes K-1 and K-2. During the attack a larger bomb load. From the end of 1944 to of 6 August 1945, only incendiaries were dropped. January 1945, four George ll's were reconstructed, All fell on one part of the final assembly buUding, employing 200 employees, including the designing building number 101, causing very little structural department. These employees, worked exclu- damage and burning seven assembled airplanes. sively on the modification of George 11. A number of the least essential buildmgs were Experiments in wind tunnel and experimental dismantled before the attacks, as precaution tanks, flight tests, structural tests and experi- against fire. During the first attack, the sub- ments in production methods were carried out at assembly shops for wings and tail units were the same time. severely damaged, therefore, the subassembly of Experimental planes were assembled in the final these parts were subcontracted. Final assembly assembly shop, utilizing from 250 to 300 em- was consolidated from three different buildings to ployees. Upon completion of the final assembh' two buildings. of the plane, officers in charge of the First Aviation The total floor area before air attacks amounted Arsenal inspected, the aircraft. Test flights were to 6,350,760 square feet. Superficial damage to carried out in cooperation with officers in charge 5,000,000 square feet w'as sustained and 600,000 of the test-flight section. First Aviation Arsenal, square feet of floor space was entirely destroyed m and the company's test pilots. all air attacks. No attempt was made to repair ATTACK DATA the damage; everything was left m its damaged The attack data may be summarized as follows: state to give the appearance of inactivity and

Intelligence (lain: severe damage. Temporary wooden roofs mider Date and hour of attack, 9 June 194.5, 19 .July 194.5, the damaged original roof were erected over sec- August 1945. tions of the wing and tail assembly line to protect Duration, 0832 to 0905, 1120 to 1200. 0050 to 0202. the material and workers from the weather and to Attacking unit. Twentieth Air Force. Altitude, 20.500. camouflage their activity. Number of aircraft over target, 44. The air attacks caused extensive physical dam-

HE— Number, weight, and type, 263.5 tons M65GP's. age. (See photographs 1 to 10.) Jiluch of the Fuzing, 1/1000 nose, N. D. tail. HE— debris shown in the photographs was caused by On-lhe-ground findings: the tidal wave of 17 September 1945. A copy of M [Number in plant area, 328, 9 June 1945; 110, 6 a report of the damage attributed to the air attack August 1945. P' of 9 Jime 1945, as made to the Japanese Govern- HE— ( Number of building hits, 213, 9 June 1945; 23, is in 6 August 1945. ment by Naruo plant officials, incorporated

Number of UXB, 1, 9 June 1945. the reference material.

21 Photo No. 1.—Building No. 602, lay-out shop. View west, showing damage of a direct hit.

Photo No. 2.—Building No. 601, sheet metal works. View northeast. Be- cause of marshy ground, the floor was concrete reinforced with steel. Bombs exploded on strong floor and did not cause too much struc- tural damage.

22 si- H

Photo No. 3. — Buildings 701,704,716, machine shops and sheet metal works. View northeast, showing i * » slight damage to concrete buildings. I 'I »t wm IP y~ ^BSTviT?:^ ' ^

Photo No. 4.—Buildings 701, 704, 7X6, machine shops and sheet metal works. View north, showing bomb damage of direct hits and near-misses to a steel- reinforced concrete building.

23 Photo No. 5. —Building 401, final assembly. View west—roof damage over assembly line.

Photo No. 6.—Building 201, final assembly. View east, showing four bomb hits on the roof.

24 Photo No. 7.— Building 101, final assembly. View east — slight superficial damage. I

I

Photo No. 8.—Buildings 201 and 202, wing assembly. View northeast—superficial damage.

25 —

Photo No. 9.—Building 201, wing assembly. View north— super- ficial damage. Note temporary roof over wing assembly line.

Photo No. 1 0.—Build- ing 703, assembly of wings and spars. View northwest -^- structural damage.

26 — —

T.\BLE 3. Casualties for each raid Icr tlic first attiu'k, most of tlic inacliiiic tools removed from tlie plants and dispersed to us locations. Only the heaviest maeliinery

1 few machine tools essential to the assembly icfaft renniined in the plant. Before the air ks, there were a total of 4 Hi machine tools. his amount, 69 machine tools were superfi-

• damaf^ed but repairable and 65 were dam- beyond repair. le accom])anying tables 1 and 2 list the e.xtent amag'e suffered by tlio machine-tool and jment facilities. ible 3 reveals the casualties for each raid. It be seen that the 9 June 1945 attack was the

. one with major effect.

|,E 1. List nf —

Acting head. Fire defense part v. Assistant. Relief party. Antigas party. Engineering party. Transport party. Office defense party. Shop defense party.

Au average of 2 or 3 hours were lost duiiug each raid. The employees would run to their shelters outside the plant, hut were very slow in returning to their work.

Interruptions to Production

Direct air attacks cm the plant caused a great (ho]) in the ])roduetion of George, the only type uf aircraft heing produced in 1945. The accom- panying tahle 4 presents actual production and Government-plamied production for 1945.

Table 4. Production of George 21-Nl K^-J

Month (1945) DIVISION was the principal hottleiicck, DATA RELEVANT TO OTHER Trans])ortiitioii STUDIES took s the ilispersioii of all types of iiuiustry in )lac(> simultaneously. Railway transportation didiculties started Kai)i(l dispersion of ein|)loyees was delayed by June 1944, and continually becanu' worse. The of l)illets, food, etc., anil especially Naruo plant hud diniculty getting raw materials I shortage )ecause of the difficulties involved in transferring and component parts to its works, ;iiul in sending aniilies and household goods of (he employees to material to subcontractors and receiving linisiied he disj)ersed locations. parts in return. The greatest difficulty was ex- The Naruo plant estimated that from 30 to 40 perienced with the Hokuiiku Railroad Line. :lj)ercent of production was lost during May 1945 Starting in the latter part of 1944, deliveiT of «lue solely to dispersion. airplanes was held up due to a shortage of hydrau- At the Naruo plant proper, production droppetl lic parts. Instruments, and electrical equipmejit om a planned total of 190 to 120. which were for the main part manufactured in Tokyo and were not arriving at the aircraft com- INTELLIGENCE CHECK panies because of ti-ansportation difficulties The In the type and quantity of certain planes pro- various aircraft companies used special couriers to luced, intelligence information was accurate, carry the vital parts from Tokyo to the aircraft ^he intelligence information on the production companies on regular passenger trains-. Durmg f the most important plane, George, was in- September and October of 1944, the Japanese ccurate in that it was estimated that 1,280 Government ordered the railroad companies to Ijxeorges were produced while only 903 planes provide special coaches for aircraft company ere actually produced over the same period, couriers between Tokyo and Kobe, to eliminate 'his was 377 planes or 30 percent less than had the shortage of necessary parts and assist in the een estimated. In the production of Mavis, delivery of completed aircraft. he estimated production was 156 planes while ctual production amounted to 186 planes from GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF PLANT INSPEC- 940 to 1943. This amounted to an underesti- TION AND INTERROGATION late of 30 large 4-engine patrol or 16 The Naruo plant was well constructed and the ercent less than were produced at this plant. buildings were all of modern design. The plant VULNERABILITY lay-out was suitable for mass production and with could The Xaruo plant was vulnerable to air attack full utilization of its productive capacity have produced more aircraft than it actually did. 1 that all the activities of the plant were centered water basin, a 1 a small area. Subasseml)ly of component parts With its two wind tunnels and one nd final assembly of air frames were caiTied on greater e.xperimental program could have been plant site was not too well 1 buildings bordering each other in much the undertaken. The ame way as they are in the United States. The chosen ui that tidal waves flooded the entire measures let that the plant was situated on the shore at plant each year, and no precautionaiy he mouth of a river, which coukl be used as a (i. e., flood walls) were undertaken to remedy mdmark, increased its vulnerability. N^o at- this condition. empt was made to camouflage the plant. All REFERENCE ITEM he buildings were concentrated in a small area.

i.fter the first 6 months of the war, the labor The following reference item is filed with the orce was not very enthusiastic about war pro- records of the Aircraft Division, United States luction. During the last few years of the war, Strategic Bombing Survey, in the office of The bsenteeism always increased during the spring Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, ,nd summer months, because many of the em- D. C. iloyees worked in their gardens and on their Reference Item 1. Sample of Report to Gorern- arms. From the beginning of 1945, ever in- ment. Teasing numbers of employees stayed away from Report on Damages due to heir work to evacuate their families and homes Air Jiaid of Naruo PlaiH. rom, the cities, in order to safeguard their lives (The 1st report) ,nd possessions from air attacks. June 9th 1945.

29

MO fUHCTlON rtPL COMSritUCTlOW NO FUNCTION TTfE COH«TRUCTIOM

I WAREHOUSES I STDRV WOOD BOILERS STORT STEEL I ftRCHITECTS OFFICE I STOAT WOOD i

3 UNKNOWN I STORT WOOD ! C0MPRES5CRS

4 APPRENTICE SCHOOL Z BTORT MOOD I WATER PLANT I STONY W/aASE WOOO

STORkOE I STORY WOOD 4 I STORT WOOO

a UNKNOWN I sTonv wood 1 PNESS ft MEAT TREAT. I STORT STEEL T WMEHOUSCS ISTOHYW/MEIZ PLOOH WOOD KITCHEN EXPERIMENT SHOP Z STORT WOOO • riMEKCCPCR I STORV WOOD OFFICE Z STORT WOOO

9 CASTINO a FORfllNS STORASC I STOtTY WOOO I SHEET METAL SHOP I STORT W/BaSC STECL

I 10 eiUNASIUM STORT WOOO » LAYOUT SHOf I STORY W/MEI2 « BASE STEEL

I II OARAOE STORT WOOCi 3 QARASE I STORT WOOO IE OATEHOUSE Z STORV WOOO OSS i STORY WOOO

13 Jie STORES I STORT WOOD I UNKNOWN WOOO

14 APPRENTICE SHOPS I STOUT WOOO S DORMITORY Z STORY WOOD

I IB PLTWOOO STORES I 9T0«T WOOD « UNKNOWN STORT WOOO

I STORY BRICK l« BASOLrHE a OIL STORES I STORT BRICK

', I T TEMP. MACH SHOP TRANSPORT OFFICE lOWN t STORY STEEL

I SHOP 1 STom CONCRETE I STORT WOOD |T« UNKNOWN Z STORT WOOD kR ASSEMBLY I STOR' W/MEZ7 STEEL

la PLASTIC SHAPIHS 2 STORT WOOD ) WATER PLANT I STORY WOOD • WOOO STORASE t STORY WOOO LOCKER ' STORY STEEL

to GARDioE sTORaec I STorr irick I STORASE OOV'T FURNISHED PART8 I STORV STEEL • SHOPS STORY WOOD ei UNKNOWN I STORY WOOD MODEL Z

EZ STORE I STORY WOOO ) SMALL WIND TUNNEL 1 STORY '

3 3 CARPENDER SHOP I STORY WOOO 1 WATER TEST BASIN I STORY STEEL (4 aiCTCLE/^ACKS INO TUNNEL e STORY CONCRETE

I STRUCTURE LAB. I STORY STEEL ' WIND TUNNEL Z STORY CONCRETE

t PRODUCTION OFFICE Z STORY WOOO

:N0WN I STORT WOOD WAIN OFFICE 3 STORT CONCRETE

FINAL ASSEMBLY I STORY STEEL EXPERIMENTAL SHOP

UNKNOWN I STORY BRICK PRODUCTION OFFICE Z STORT CONCRETE

FOUNORT I STORT STEEL STORT CONCRETE OIL sroRAQE a STOUT concrete ENGINE TEST CELL Z STORY STEEL

FOHOINa ft STEEL HEAT TREAT I STORf STEEL

MATERIAL TCSTINS SHOP I STORT WOOO

TAIL UNIT ASSEWBLT I STON/ STEEL

CRATINQ ft PACKINa I STORT STEEL

UNKNOWN I STORT CONCRETE

SHOP > STONV STEEL

PAINT SHOP I STORT STEEL PROPELLER SHOP Z STORT STEEL

FINAL ASSEUBLY I STORY STEEL

WIND ASSEMBLY I STORT STEEL UNKNOWN 2 STORT STEEL

ANODIC TREATMENT SHOP I STORY STEEL

FUSELAGE ASSEHBLT I STORY STEEL EXPERMENTAL SHOP

UNKNOWN I STORY BRICK

THREE WOOOEN BUILDINGS INTENDED FOR SHEET METAL SHOPS Dismantled in april-

HAT 1943 . operations mostly within TNIE

PLANT , balance to dispersed plants

NARUO PLANT LAYOUT AS OF MAY 1945

SCALE in feet us STRATEGIC BOMB SURVEY

KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY NARUO PLANT APPENDIX A

719033 0-47 (Face p. 30)

1

SCHEMATIC FLOW CHART MAY 1945

RAILWAY SIDING FROM NISH INONUYA STA.

TRU CKS FROM OUT SIDE

WARE HOUSE

L. WARE HOUSE

WARE HOUSE _J SHEET METAL SHOP

MACHINE SHOP

-JIG 8 Fl TTING SPAR ASSEMBLY

T

I

*

FINAL ASSEMBLY

TAIL UNIT ASSEMBLY -rr

TO AIRPORT — 1

NUMBER OF MANHOURS WORKED

FROM APRIL 1939 TO AUGUST 1949

o o o o*

K o X z < z

MAMJJASOND (949

U.S.STWATE8ICB0UBW6 SURVEY KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT CO. NARUO PLANT

APPENDIX E

71B033 O- 47 (Face p. 33} No. 3

1

Appendix F. —Airplane production by types before 1939, Kawanishi

PLANNED AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION NIKIJ AND NIK2J

- NIKI SHIDEN II TYPE INTERCEPTER FIGHTER J-GEOREM

A. OCT. -DEC- 194 3 DROP IN PROOUCTION DUE TO DEL AYS IN PREPARING PRODUCTION FIGS (ESPICALLY ASSEMBLING FIGS)

B. MAY-AUG.I944 DROP IN PRODUCTION DUE TO UODIFICATIONB BY WAR EXPERIENCES ETC

C. SEP 1944- DECREASE OF PLANNED PRODUCTION BY CHANBE IN TYPE OF PRODUCTS FROM NIKIJ TO NIKE J

GOVERNMENT PLANNED PROOUCTION LINE

V z

t s -. *-« «» kio

a o

z o >- IT < g £ Z <

o s a

'X ... ,

— Ai'r'KNUix I. — Aircnifl it/xiir.i, Kdiriniishi Airniifl Co. Niinio /ihint

Total num- Number ber of air- of air- T>l«' Defective parts Sourcc [ilnnos to 1)1 planes repaired repaired

J)uiu;ir\

Fi't>ru;ir.v KllKl Naval Air Arsenal. March HBKl Hull... Do. April KlIKl ...do. Do. .May

.Itltlc H6KI Hull and fuel system Do. July H6K1 . Hull . . Auf:iisl KllKl Changing type of engine fmotorZirapu r> type) Do. Seiiloinhcr Do.

October H6K1.. Hull and equipment - Do. November H6K1.. ...do... Do. E13K1. Modification Do. Do. neceniher .

10: January February H6K1 Modification to transporting flying boat. Naval .\ir Ar.senal. H6K1 Wing Do. H6K1. Hull... Do. H6K1. Repainting of bottom of hull. Do. H6K1. Hull Do. .March H6K2 do Do. H6K2 .. -do. Naval Aviation Bureau.

April ... - of bottom of hull. Naval .\ir .\rsenal. May. - - -- H6K2 Repainting June H6K2. Tail-plane and elevator Do.

E7K2. Wing - Do. July AUL'USI H6K2. Modification of hull and equipment- Nippon Air-Ways Co. H5Y1. do... Hiro Naval Arsenal. September H6K2. Hull Naval Air .\rsenal.

October . H6K2. Wing . - Do. November H6K2. Hull Do. H6K2. ...do Nippon .\ir-Ways Co. December. H6KI Modification. Naval .\viation Bureau. H6K2. Overhaul Naval .^ir .\rsenal. H6K2 ...do Do. H6K2. do Nippon .\ir-Ways Co.

January. H6K2 Hull. Naval .\ir .\rsenal. February

March . April.. H6K2. Modification of hull Naval .\viation Bureau. May H6K2- Modification... Do. H6K2. Hull Naval Air Arsenal. June H6K2. Modification of hull and repairing. Naval .Aviation Bureau. July Tia. August . - - H6K2. Modification of hull and repairing.. September H6K2. do Do. October.,. H6K2. do Do. November. H6K2.. Repairing of bottom of hull Naval Air ,\rsenal. December.

12: Januar>'

Fettruary H6K2. Modification of hull. Naval Aviation Bureau. Arsenal. H8K1. ....do... - Naval Air March H8K1. Repairing of hull Do. April May June Jnly H8K1. Repairing of huU. Do.

Augu.st . . September

October . . Kovember. H8K1. Repairing of hull. Do. Doeember.

35 —

Appendix I. Aircraft re-pairs, Kawanishi Aircraft Co.—Naruo plant— Continued

Year TKBEt WOODCN •UILCNOSINTINOEI

^H[(r HETAL SHlD«S (HSMINTLEO I

M»T 1949 . OPER*tiON8 MOSnt

PlIKT , B«i.*NCE TO Oi&PtKlEO

eOMe LEGEND

1

UKCTI OH TtPC COWITHUcnOM HO FUNCTION TYPE COWBTRUCTIOH

. SHED I MtREHOUIES • STORT WOOD •OILERS t STORT E tnCMIIECTS OFFICf > STORT MOOD • CONPRESSCRS 3 gNKNOwra i stodi wood

4 «PPBENrice SCHOJL 2 STORY WOOO I WATER PLANT I STORT W/BA9E

STORAGE I STORT WOOD t KITCHEN I STORT WOOO

) PRESS 5 UNKNOWN I STORT WOOD S HEAT TREAT. I STORY STEEL T WARENOUStS 'STORY W/MCZZ FLOOH WOOD I KITCHEN ' EX.'ERIMENT SHOP 2 STORY WOOO T OFFICE Z STORY WOOD • TIMCKEEPER I STORY WOOD SHEET METAL SHOP I STORT W/BASE STEEL 9 CASTING • FOR8IN0 5T0UW I STORY WOOO I

I STEEL 10 SVMNASIUM I STORT WOOO 9 LAYOUT SHOT STORY W/MEIZ S BASE

M GADAQE I STORY WOOt a GARAGE I STORT WOOD li GATEHOUSE Z STORY WOOD I RED CROSS 2 STORT WOOO

13 JIG STORES I STORY WOOO WOOD STORY 14 APPRENTICE SHOPS I STORT WOOD Z WOOD t > STORT 15 PLYWOOD STORES 1 STOP! WOOO UNKNOWH WOOO

.NOWN I STORY BRICK l« QASOLtHE A OIL STORM I STORY aRICN I UNKNOWN 2 STORY STEEL IT TEMP UACH SHOP , TRANSPORT OPFICC > JIO SHOP 3 STORY CONCRETE 1 STORY I ITA UNNNOWM Z STORY WOOD I SPAR ASSEMBLY I STORY WfMEZZ la PLASTIC SHAPING 1 STORY WOOO > WATER PLANT I 9T0RY WOOO 19 WOOO STORASE t STORY WOOD J PAINT LOCKER I STORY STEEL

I STORAOE FURNISHED PARTS Ii STORY STEti CO CARIIOE STORASe I STORY BRICK GOV'T ! MODEL SHOPS Z STORT WOOD Zl UNKNOWN I STORT WOOD ZZ STORE t STORY WOOO ) SVALL WIND TUNNEL I STORY WOOD Zi CARPEHOER SHOP 1 STORY WOOO • WATER TEST BASIN I STORY STEEL

(4 aiCYCLE RACKS I STORI WOOD J WIND TUNNEL t STORY CONCRETE

S I Zfi STORE 2 STORY WOOO STRUCTURE LAB STORY STEEL 26 UNKNOWN 2 STORY WOOD T WIND TUNNEL t STORT CONCRETE lUCTION OFFICE STORY Z7 UNKNOWN I STORY WOOO 2 WOOO tt »NERAL WAREHOUSE S STORY CONCRETE IKNOWN I STORY WOOD E SHOP 3 STORY CONCRETE OFFICE J STORY CONCRETE

L ASSEUBLT I STORT STEEL RIMEHTAL SHOP

lOWN I STORY BRICK 4 PRODUCTION OFFICE 1 STORY CONCRETE

5 FOUNDRY I STORY STEEL e WAREHOUSES 2 STORT CONCRETE STORY CONCRETE 2 STORT STEEL

> FOROINO B STEEL HUT TREAT I STORT STEEL

9 MATERIAL TESTING SHOP I STORY WOOD

I TAIL UNIT ASSEMBLY > STORT STEEL

t CRATING B PACKINB I STORY STEIL

3 UNKNOWN I STORY CONCRETE

D BLASTiNO SHOP I STORY STEEL

I PAINT SHOP I STORT STEEL

I PROPELLER SHOP 1 STORT BTEEL

' FIHAL ASSEMBLY I STORT STEEL

I WING ASSEMBLY I STORY STEEL Z STORY STEEL

TREATMENT SHOP 1 STORT STEEL

I FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY I STORT STEEL Z EXPERMENTAL SHOP

• 3 UNKNOWN I STORT BRICK

719033 O - 47 (Face p. 36} No. 2 i UNCTIOW TYRE COWBTBUCriOW HO FUNC Tl OM TYgj COWSTBUCtlOW

) COAL SHED I WAREHOUSES I STORV MOOO iOILERS 1 STORY STCCL t «»CMIICCTS OfFICE I STOUT MOOD COMPRESS CRS 3 UNKNOWN STOR'r WOOD t a APPRENTICE SCHOOL Z 9T0RT WOOO I WATER PLANT I STORY W/IASE WOOD ( I s (CHAP SToRAoe < storv wooo KITCHEN STORY WOOD ) e UNaNOMN I STORV wOOO PRESS • HEAT TREAT. I STORY STCCL

KITCHEN < EXPERIMENT SHOP STORY WOOD T WiREMOUSES I STWn W/MEZZ FLOOR WOOD I I t OFFICE I STORY « TINeHEEPCR I STORY WOOD SHOP I STOUT W/UlSE STEEL 3 CASTina • FOReiRtt STORAU I STORY WOOO i SHEET MCTAL lO 0VWfUSIUM I STORY WOOD » LAYOUT SMOr I STORY W/MCtZ • tASI STEEL n OANACE I STORY WOOl. OARAGE I STORY WOOO le MTCMOUSE ( STORV MOOD 1 RED CROSS Z STORY WOOO

IS JI8 STORES I STORY WOOD t UNKNOWN WOOO

14 ARMEMTICE SHOPS > STORY WOOD 3 DORMITORY i STORY WOOO

t I STORY l» PLYWOOD STORES I STORY WOOD UNKNOWN WOOO ;N0«N I STORY RRICK 15 OASOLIME K OIL STORES I STORY SRICK INOWN t STORY STEEL IT TEMP. lUCH SHOF , TRANSPORT OFFICC ' JIO SHOP 3 STORY CONCRETE I STORY WOOD

I STORY WfMEZZ STEEL IM UHKHOWH E STORY WOOD I SPAR ASSCMRLY II PLASTIC SKAPINt 2 STORY WOOD I WATER PLANT I STORY WOOO la WOOD 9T0RACC t STORY WOOD 3 PAINT LOCKER ' STORY STEEL

I tTORAM aOV'T FURNISHED i STORY STCCL to CARIIDE CTORAeC I STORY BRICK MRTt t MODEL SHOPS I STORY WOOD tt UHKNOMM > STORY

tt STORE I STORY WOOD ) SMALL WIND TUNNEL I STORY WOOD t) CARPENOER SNO<' i STORY WOOD • WATER TEST BASIN i STORY STEEL STORY f4 tlCYCLE RACKS I STORY WOOD S WIND TUNNEL t COHCRCTE

I STORY Ifl STORE Z STORY WOOD S STRUCTURE LAB STEEL J» UNKNOWN I STORY WOOD T WIND TUNNEL t STORY CONCRETE PRODUCTION STORY 27 UHRNOWN I STORY WOOD I OFFICE t WOOO tt SCHERAL WAREHOUSE SSTORY CONCIICTC 1 STORY WOOD STORY CONCRETE iS MACHINE SHOP ) STORY CONCRETE MAIN OFFICE 1

1 FINAL ASSEMBLY 1 STORY STEEL 2 CIPERiMENTf

S UNKNOWN I STORY BRICK 4 PRODUCTION OFFICE Z STORY CONCRCTI

9 FOUNDRY I STORY STtCL REHOUSES t STORY CONCRETE iRAQE 2 STORY CONCRETC B EN6INC TEST CELL Z STORY STtEL

) FORBINQ B STEEL NEAT TREAT- I STORY STE MATERIAL TESTING SHOP 1 STORY I

1 TAIL UNIT ASSEMBLY I STORY STEEL

1 CRATINS B PACKINB I STORY STCCL INOWN > STORY CONCRETE

k SAND BLASTING SHOP i STORY STEEL STElL

S PROPELLER SHOP E STORY STEEL

r FINAL ASSEMBLY I STORY STEEL

) WING ASSEMBLY I STORY STEEL ) UNKNOWN 2 STORY STEEL

a ANODIC TRCATMCNT SHOP I STORY STEEL

I FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY I STORY STCCL

i CXPERWENTAL SHOP

} UNKNOWN I STORY BRICK

us STRATEGIC BOMB SURVEY

KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY NARUO PLANT

UJ < < a:

UJ o en f E S CO JC ^§ If) l_ in O ».

Z < o

IT mUJ 2 z

37 2 LU

UJ(5 £3 3 I

(n cr Xo <

APPENDIX P

Dispersion Plan, Kawanishi Aircraft Co. —Naruo Plant

Dispersion of Naruo ])laiit was startod in 1. Heinoval of small wooden l)iiil(liiif;s aud fixtures. 2. Thiiiiiiiiff out wooden Ijuildint^s. October 1944 in the following order, but had to b(^ 3. Dispersion of machines, tools and shop equipment. iiltered often, due to air raids. The program A. Dispersion of main components for (jeortje 21 started with precautionary measures against fire (MK2J). bombs, then against small bombs, and finally 5. Dispersion of assembling; shops for (Jeorne 21 complete dispersion of production to other lo- (N1K2J). cations. 6. Complete removal of wooden l)iiililinf;s.

1-A. -Design Department, Kansai-Gakuin, grounds and buildings (planned)

Niinie of shop Ground and Buildings (planned)

N'ame of shops Employees (planned) Principal machines (planned)

StalT

KONAN PLANT REPORT NO. III-2

(Air Frames)

Dates of Survey, 22-24 October 1945

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

The Plant and Its Function in the Aircraft Industry 4.5 Attack Data 47 Effects of Bombing 47 Intelligence Check 51 Appendix A—Organization chart 52 Appendix B—Plant layout Facing page 52 Appendix C—Number of employees 53

Appendix D—Number of man-hours worked _ _ , 54

Appendix E—Planned and actual production . 55

Appendix F—Bomb plot, 11 May 1945 Facing page 56 (1)

Appendix G—Bomb damage, 11 May 1945 Facing page 56 (2) Appendix H—Bomb damage, 5 June and 6 August 1945. Facing page 56 (3) Appendix I—Man-hours lost because of damage caused by air attack 57

Appendix J—Man-hours lost from air raid alerts i . 58 Appendix K—^Number of man-hours lost by air raids 59 Appendix L— Electric power production 60 Appendix M—Dispersion of factories and warehouses 61 Appendix N—Dispersal of production 62

THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY troduction machined air-frame parts, was acquired in Decem- The Konan or Fukae plant (Konan Seisaku- l>er 1943. a), one of the four largest plants of the Kawani- This plant was one of three, belonging to the i Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Kal)ushiki Kawanishi Aircraft Co., which assembled planes. lisha), was located at Honjo village, 15 miles The Kawanishi Au'craft Co. was founded in 1928 st of Osaka. The plant consisted of 40 build- as a producer of seaplanes. The company grew ;s and over 30 dormitories. Total l)uilding and moved to Naruo village in 1930 to build air 'a of the Konan plant was 1,994,785 square frames for various types of seaplanes, including t, of which 1,070,000 square feet was devoted large, four-engine transport planes. (For de- direct production and 924,785 square feet was tailed history, see Aircraft Division Corporation Jized for indirect labor. The plant, con- Report No. Ill of the Kawanishi Ah-craft Co.) ucted in February 1942, comprised main In February 1942, at the request of the Japanese ildings of modern structural steel design. The Navy, the Konan plant was established to build lido Seiki Industrial Co. in Kol)e, which large seaplanes. In June 1944 the Konan plant 45 .

started prod Uft ion of Frances, a two-onglnp 2,050,000 for March 1945. This was never a medium homl)er. tained as actual man-hours worked totaled oa Government aiti to the Kenan plant took the 1,425,000 for that month. Planned scheduli

following foi-m: were never approached from August 1942 c

Facility: i'«" (appendix D). Biiildings 22,400,000 231 presses, furnaces, transformers, sheet- Production Statistics

metal machine, etc 1, fiO(), 000 All production was for the Navy. Productii .^2 machine tools 229, 000 of H8K2, Emily 12, a four-engine flying bo

Total 24, 235, 000 started in February 1943 when 03 air fram were produced. Durhig 1944, 77 air frames we Plant Organization and Operation. built, and in 1945, when production of this ty The Kawanishi Aircraft Co. was managed by ceased, only 10 air frames were manufactured. the following officers: Production of H8K2-L, Emily 32, a four-engi

Ryuzo Kawanishi President. flymg boat which was a modification of Emily ] Kenji Maeliara ^ice president. started in November 1943 diu'ing which year fi Shiro Takahashi Managing director. air frames were manufactured. During 1944 Chief engineer. Yoshio Hashiguchi were produced. Smce production of this type Pakae Hamada Plant manager of Konan aircraft was discontinued, only five airfran plant. were built during 1945.

Plant responsibilities weie delegated to other Manufactm'e of both the above types of a key persotmel (appendix A). craft was discontimied in favor of P1Y2S, Fran^ plant, designed for production of The Konan 11, a twin-cngme , which started into p large four-engine seaplanes, was located at the duction in June 1944. The Government plan edge of a bay, and had two large slipways, but no production for 1944 was 162 aircraft, but the ph airfield nearliy. All lantl-basetl planes were ferried protluced only 28 because of the difficidty by bargi' 3 miles across the bay to the airfield at changing over from one- type to another. 1 Aircraft Co. the Naruo plant of the Kawanishi Ciovernment plan for 1944 to the end of the \

The Konan plant was ideally orgaiuzed for mass called for 605; the total aircraft produced v (appendix B). The general arrange- production only 94. During 1945, only 66 aircraft were p ment of the plant made for efficient use of floor duced while the Government plan was 4 space. Production was gradually increasing until the Total employment showed a consistent rising attack of 11 May 1945, which arrested manuf trend. At the end of 1942 it was 2,000, growing luring. It continued to drop after the 5 Ji to 5,050 at the 1943 year end. At the peak, in 1945 attack imtil onl}' one aircraft was produi November 1944, employment totaled 7,900, de- during August. (appendix «1 creasing to 7,500 as the war ended C). The following is a list of planes produced si The total number of men engaged in direct labor 1942: accounted for the bulk of the employees. Men at the 1942 year end, workers aggregated 2,000 To Allied code increasing to 4,000 a year later, and remainmg .lapiinese code No. name Type of aircraft nuir prod level until the end. . above the 4,500 first began working at the Konan Students H8K3.-. Emily 22. 4-engine flying boat. . . . plant in May 1944, when 232 were employed. H8K2.-. Emily 12.. do - -- H8K2L.. Emily 32.. do Girl volunteer workers first were employed in P1V2.,.. Frances... 2-engine . February 1944, when 354 were hired. Very few Total air-rrame militaiy i)ersomiel were employed at Konan, the production. first few bemg employed in June 1945. i One 10-hour shift worked until February 1944, when a second 8-hour shift was added. In De- Go\(innicnt-planned production was net cember 1944 the plant went back to one lO-hoia- reached for the PlY2 or Frances 11. A totaH shift. 77 ])lanes was projected for March 1945 but of Total maximum man-hours were projected at 11 were produced (appendix E). " 46 AIR DATA Photo No -Building 4, wing assembly shop. View interior, looking west in subassembly building. Slight roof damage.

Photo No. 2.—Building 3, fuselage and wing assembly building, View southeast, showing slight superficial damage.

48 .•."•**SiJi.

iSilBSi.ii

S t'f •«!• » WJ li'!

^^SfSS^SPP^

Photo No. 3.—Building 3, wing and fuselage assembly building. View north end looking west, showing slight superficial damage.

Photo No. 4.—Building 1, final assembly building. View north, showing super- ficial damage.

49 Photo No. 5.—Building 1, final aibciubl) building. \'it\v interior, looking northwebt, showing assembly linfi and slight roof and glass damage. in the plant, the Osaka naval garrison, police Electric-power consumption was close to capa^ station, military police, fire station, public-address ity from August 1943, when 1,040 Idlowatts we: sj^stem, and radio room was constantly manned. used, with a capacity of 1,300 kilowatts, to Ma A total of 266 eniplo.yees was used in the air attack 1944. After May 1944, kilowatt consumptic precaution and defense system. dropped (appendi.x L).

Interruption Due to Alerts Interruptions Due to Suppliers A total of 370,902 man-hours was lost because In the production of Emily, a shortage of rubbi of air-raid alerts from Xoveniber 1944 to the end I sheeting for bulletproof fuel tanks, supplied t' of the war (appendi.x J). Fujimura Inilustries (Fujinnna Kogj^o), was e: Interruptions Due to Direct Attack and Area pcrienced in the middle of 1943. During 194

Attacks there was a shortage of waterproof paint from tl

There were .'i, 10.3, 300 man-lmuis lost because of Toa refinery (Toa Seiren). air raids from November 1944 to August 1945 During 1944 a shortage existed in springs su]

(appendix K). The greatest loss was in May plietl by Taisei Spring Co. (Taisei Hatsujyo), : 1945 as a result of the direct attack on the Konan ruhlicr parts from Nichirin Rubber Co. (Nichir:

[)lant. Ciomu), and in small aircraft parts supplied 1: 50 —

ihir plants of the Kinvjinislii Aircraft Co. final assend)ly was delayed in ordr'r to find suitable

'hrsc |)arts Were used in rnaniifact iiriiiji' Frances. locations.

I)in'in

I'lki Ail- Industries Co. (Seiki Koivii), cnijine chine tools, and ji<;s to various schools and shojjs; lleds fi-oin Takata Aiiuniniini Co., o.xy^'en suj)- final assembly to buildinii-s of the Matsushita ied by the. Ini])eriai ().\yi;('n Co. (Teikokn Aircraft Co. near the Tatetsu Airport; machine anso), and many small uir-franie parts sui>plied sh(»p to part of the second floor and basement of y many ]>ro(hi('ers. the Haiikyu Building, Osaka; sheet-metal shop to Yama Ashiya; fittin

ihools and other l)iiildin<;s near the Konaii plant, Table 1 presents the productiou-dispeisal program he dispersion of component parts assembly and of the Koiian ])lanl.

T.\BLE 1. Dinfirrsnl of airnnft iiKiiiiifactiirr

Typo nf work o o o to z 5 uj

o

Q: o o

N o 8 PLANT LAYOUT ^

KEY TO BUILDINGS NAME O F B UILDING HS>. NAME OF BUILDING FINAL ASSEMBLY SHOP APPRENTICE SHOP HANGAR APPRENTICE SHOP FUSELAGE ASSEMBLY SHOP APPRENTICE SCHOOL WING ASSEMBLY SHOP AIR COMPRESSOR ROOM PAINT SHOP AIR COMPRESSOR ROOM STORE(GOVERNMENT FURNISHED JETTY PARTS) JETTY STOREIGOVERNMENT FURNiSHEff GARAGE FOR TRUCK PARTS) GARAGE FOR FIRE ENGINE TOOL SHOP HEAT TREATMENT SHOP WAREHOUSE INFIRMARY WAREHOUSE TELEPHONE EXCHANGE ROOM WAREHOUSE TIME KEEPER WAREHOUSE CARPENTER SHOP WAREHOUSE SCRAP STORAGE WAREHOUSE REPAIR SHOP WEIGHING ROOM PROVISION STORE PAINT a MEDICINE STORE PROVISION STORE GARAGE FOR TRACTOR KITCHEN a BOILER ROOM OIL HEATING ROOM MESS ROOM AIRPORT CONTROLLING ROOM KITCHEN PILOTS OFFICE BOILER ROOM WINCH HOUSE MESS ROOM SLIP WAY MESS ROOM SLIP WAY FIRST DORMITORY TEMPORARY BOILER ROOM SECOND DORMITORY sue STATION THIRD DORMITORY WATER PLANT FOURTH DORMITORY MESS ROOM FIFTH DORMITORY MESS ROOM SIXTH DOlMITORY MESS ROOM SEVENTH DORMITORY MAIN OFFICE EIGHTH DORMITORY ELECTRIC SHOP NINTH DORMITORY PROPELLER ASSEMBLY SHOP TENTH DORMITORY GARAGE ELEVENTH DORMITORY GUARD OFFICE KITCHEN STORE GATE HOUSE GATE HOUSE APPRENTICE SHOP

PULLED DOWN FOR DISPERSION

U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT CO. KONAN PLANT SCALE IN FEET APPENDIX-

719033 O-*"! (Fice p. 53)

53 NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS WORKED 2.2 .0

2.000, 00

1.600, 000

1.000, 000

600, 000

MAN HOURS 55

719033 0-47 {Face p. 56) No. 1 a

o 71S033 O- 47 (Face p. 56) No. 3 (0

o C

.. Pf o C 2 ° < < 5-5 S a. o. o " -o o X g , i?5 5 I. ih < < si (?tf;

: :• i* *8 *i i' 0> €i S.i <° P JS 8.

>. O Ik 1 3 X t- •; ! i « a « z z IH ii if Ml li ;i 1= ® ~3 ni i ® •o

o § e> V) ::> Q 'I

Q: (0

o CO It

CD ^

% ^ Mi

IP' e

O

op. 57 NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS LOST KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT 00 KONAN PLANT FROM AIR RAID ALERTS TOTAL- 370,902 MAN HOURS "1»033 -47 5 59 KWH ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION 350,000 -

soc^ooo - LEGEND

f~l ELECTRICITY CONSUMED IN KWH

n MAXIMUM ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMED IN KW

PEAK LOAD BY CONTRACT isopoo-

1300 KW ILIMITED ELECTRIC POWER ~J]Z

mj s 3(^000- J Li-

3 lis ST»>TE6IC BONSrwG SUR- KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT C , KONAN PLANT 9 *PPtNOIK-L JFM&MJJASOND JFMAMJ JASONDjJFMAMJJASOND1 JFMAMJ JASOND JFMAMJJA50N0A.

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

60 i I i s

5

1^

§

CO Q

61 APPENDIX N DISPERSAL OF PRODUCTION

DispiM'sion staitcil in DccenilHT 1944 Vjy moving raw niatciiiils and i)urclias('d parts to scliools and other buildmgs near the Konan ])hint, whicli dispersal was finished by May 1945. Dis])ersi()n of assembly and of component shops was dela_vi'd in order to find suitable locations, but by May 1945 dispersion was carried out as shown below.

OrieiDal location HIMEJT PLANT REPORT NO III-3

(Air Frames)

Dates of survey, 27-29 October 1945

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

The Plant and Its Function ix the Aircraft Ixdcstrv _ 63 Attack Data.. 65

Effects of Bombing 1 65 Intelligence Check 66 Appendix A—Chart of new ciniiloymcMit first of each month 67

Appendix B—Chart of cmplovinciit _ , 68 Appendix C—Number of man-liouis worked 69 Appendix D—Production charts 70 Appendix E—Boml) and

THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

reduction The bi-ick and wood buiklings, which comprised The Hinieji plant (Himeji Seisakusho) of the the nucleus of th." plant, were originally a woolen wanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabu- mill, purchased in July 1942. The three new- ki Kaisha) was located about 45 miles west of buildings of modern construction, built shortly 'be and about 15 miles from the Inland Sea. thereafter, w-ere used as a final-assembly shop, a e plant itself was in the city of Himeji, a sheet-metal shop, and the third for storage of dium-sized, semi-industrial city. The building spares. They totaled 168.000 square feet in area.

'&. of the factory was 1,431,722 square feet, A branch plant of this organization was established ich consisted of 572,690 square feet of produc- in April 1945 at Uzurano. It was adjacent to the e floor area, and 859,032 s((uai'e feet of wai-e- airport, 10 miles northeast of the main plant site. uses, service facilities, and office space. There This i)ranch plant consisted of 104,680 square feet re 32 buildings, 29 of brick and wood construc- and was originally intended as a flight-preparation n, and 3 modein steel-frame structures. shop. The Hinieji plant was one of three final-assembly Himeji produced only George fighters (NlKl-J iits of the Kawanishi Aircraft Co., and func- and N1K2-J), with the Homare model 20 and ned in that category until 9 July 1945, when model 21 engine, rated at 1,970 horsepower take-

Kawanishi properties were taken over by the oft'. All work at the plant w-as done on this Navy Janese Navy. At that time it became the plane. irth plant of the Second Munitions Arsenal. Organization and Operation -U'ing the naval regime no change was made in

• plant's management. At the end of the war General manager of this organization was

I properties were returned to the company. Mitsuo Suehisa. reporting directly to the presi-

63 — 1 dout of the company, who was located at Nanio. the indirect-labor workers were 1,400 girl volu The almost complete destniction of the plant teers and students. The students divided a 9-h4 made it impossilile to judge its production day about e(|ually between academic stud' methods. However, with converted facilities and and apprentice work in the plant. Although tl only 9,000 workers, it was able to attain an avei- plant felt seasonal surges of absenteeism throu age production of 25 air frames per month. its 3-year history, the worst occiu'red in May 19 Conventional organization methods prevailed in when there was an almost wholesale desertion

the production of aircraft (fig. 1). the retinii to tlie farms. Throughout the war i plant worked one 10-hour shift (appendix B). 1. — chart, July 19J,5 Figure Himeji Plant Organization All told, there were 32,050,000 man-hoi

Himeji plant, iissemhly of aircraft; plant manager Mitsuo worked at the Himeji • plant. This was rep

Suehi.sa. sented by 930,000 during 1942, when the plant fi General affairs started operations; 5,820,000 in 1943; 17,530,(

Management, Masumi. Component part.'i a.ssenibly in 1944; and only 7,770,000 in 1945 up to the ti Material supply, Utsumi. Sugihara. of the bombing attack (appendix C). Inspection, Sasaki. Rigging shop, Kakiuchi. Scrap utilizini;, Utsumi. Final-assembly shop, Tak a- Materia! and Components Labor, Aoyama. hashi. Shortages of ahuninuin extrusions and sh Financial, Umetani. Jig shop, Matsumoto. stoclv, as well as shortages of forgings and ca Medical, Ota. Carpenter shop, Katsumura. ings, were experienced throughout 1944 and 19 Private school, Saito. Heat-treatment shop, Naka- Hospital, Ota. jima. Steel forgings were also in short supply. Uzurano plant, Hirata. Paint and sewing shop, Na- During May 1944 a shortage of Momare engi in Component shop, Kubo. kajima. from the Eleventh Naval Arsenal at Hiro cause Machine shop, Matsumoto. Apprentice school, Nakata. temporary sag in deliveries for the month. She of magnetos, fuel pumps, and piston hei Employment ages He. w(M'e, in turn, responsible for the engine shorta The Himeji plant, although located in a me- During the early months of 1945, the Kayi dium-sized, semi-.industrial city, was largely de- Co. of Tokyo failed in making deliveries of la ])endent for its labor on the rural population. ing-gear assemblies, accentuating the product Absenteeism reached 30 percent during the spring drop during this period. and fall months of 1944. Discharges and sickness ffl There is no record of the use of substitute mm during 1944, when the plant was reaching its rials at this plant. In August 1945, however production peak, averaged about 10 percent. a dispersion measure, the Himeji organizat Plant officials said that their organization was in the process of acquiring a large piywi started with only 5 percent trained labor, taken company. from the Naruo plant. They stated that it took

1 year to recruit a minimum labor force, and train Production Statistics them into even a semblance of a production or- During the war the plant produced 510 fighi

ganization. The first large group of new employ- planes, Georges NlKl-J and N1K2-J. "J ees was engaged in May 1943 when 1,000 were Government-planned production from the beg

hired. In January 1944, 1,090 additional persons ning of operations at the Himeji plant to the <

were employed in expectation of a mass produc- of the war was projected at 683 planes. This \

tion of George XlKl-J. The peak of new em- 173 planes, or 25 percent, more than actual p ployment was reached in April 1944, when 1,290 (hiction (appenchx D). k

new apprentices were engaged. The last large The company's first production peak ^ group of new employees entered the Himeji plant reached in April 1944 with the delivery of

in January 1945, when 1,180 persons were cm- Georges, NiKl-J. This was followed by a d: ployed in anticipation of mass production of the in May, due to modification of the plane. Tl improved George X1K2-J (appendix A). Women production started to climb again, and by Aug constituted one-third of the plant's total employ- of the same year protluction iiad been boosted ment, a slight majority being used in direct-labor 51 planes per month. Production continued activities. this rate, after a temporary drop in Septemt Tlie plant's employment broke down to al)out until the entl of that year. In January' 1945 p

2 to 1 , (Hrect laljor workers over indirect. Among chiction dropped to 24 aircraft, recovered sligh

64 .'^0 iiiicnift for Fp})rii!irv Jind Miircli, iind, duo Himeji plant itself, which was almost entirely

ii cliiiniicovcr lo nil iiupi'oxod model NlKl-.l, ie\cli'd. Recuperation of pi-oduction at fiis- )pppd stcjidily until .Iuih> 1945 wlicn pioductinti persed sites to 65 percent of liie [)eak might liavo this iiiodci slopj)cd. been p()ssil)li' within 6 to 9 months. n Januni'v li)4r) tlie Navy ordered extensive Casualties included 72 persons killed and 150 idifieation ol' the Georii-e fifihter. incorporatiiii;- wounded by the 22 June 1945

! foriiier undeishnii;- eaiinou into tiie wing llinicji. Two persons were killed and one uctures. This recjuired retoohn<;, which re- wounded by the 30 July 1945 raid on the Uzurano [ed production to 24 planes for the month, l)rancli plant. e new model got into production in FVbruary Counter-Measures March and reached its ])eak in May when 20 No buildings had been placed undei'ground noi- craft were produced. In June, however, the had any attempt lieen made to camouflage exist- nt went into its final i)roduction tailspin, due, ing structures. The air-raid warning system con- previously mentioned, to labor difliculties. sisted of a control station eciuipped with radio and ATTACK DATA telephone communication .systems, located in a bombproof dugout near the main office. The tligcncf (laid: control station was notified by radio or telephone e and liour of attack 22 June 1945. of approaching aircraft and the entire plant was ration 0930 to 1030. acking unit Twentieth Air Force. alerted by siren, loud speaker system, telephone,

tude 15,200 feet. • and flags. One observation post was situated on mber of aircraft over target- - 52. the roof of the plant. The plant manager, acting (number, weight and 1403, 500-pound GP. type). as head of the air-defense system, ordered the the-gronnil findings: evacuation of the plant when an air attack was mber in plant area 229. threatened. The order in which the employees mber of Ijuilding hits 183. left the plant was students first, women ne.xt, (number of UXB) 3. and men emj)loyees who were not members of the EFFECTS OF BOMBING air-defense system last. The fire-defense system consisted of 60 regular

:ect Attacks firemen assisted by a group of auxiliary firemen and 3 fire engines. In addition to fire hydrants, The 22 June 1945 precision bombing attack on water casks and static water tanks were situated s plant carried out during daylight, and lasting at various locations throughout the plant. lour, leveled the 29 brick and wood buildings There were air-raid shelters (dugouts) for 1,800 the plant and seriously damaged the 3 steel employees within the plant shelters for 8,000 dern-type structures. Bombs were of the 500- and employees outside the plant. ind HE type. There were 229 bombs dropped .bin the plant enclosure, only 3 of which were Interruptions Due to Alerts LB's (appcndi.x E). The first man-hour loss due to air-raid alerts The 22 June 1945 raid on the Himeji plant occurred in the latter part of November 1944 when maged 100 percent of the machine tools—74 5,000 man-hours were lost. For all of 1944, only •cent superficially damaged and 26 percent 10,300 man-hours were lost because of air-raid maged beyond repair. alerts. The loss increased very greatly in 1945, 3il 28 March 1945 raids, which consisted of with 32.200 man-hours lost in January and 35,100 afing and rocket attacks, started against the in February. At the height of air alerts, June urano Airport plant, an aircraft final-assembly 1945, 62,100 man-hours were lost. The total for it of the Himeji plant. Subsequently, this 1945 amounted to 164,000, making a total in both lilt was harrassecl by strafing raids which did years of 174,700 man-hoin-s lost because of air-raid tie damage, but discouraged procUiction. On 30 alerts (appendix F). ly, however, considerable damage was done to Interruptions I>ue to Area Attacks B facilities and completed aircraft by a strafing d fragmentation bomb raid. The area air attacks did not aft'ect electric-power Plant officials planned no recuperation at the production in this district and there was no inter-

65 . :

ruption of the plant's electric ])o\ver supply. In Dispersal 1943, when the plant started production of air The Himeji ])lant |)lanned six dispersed unit frames, the electric-power consumption increased l)ut none of them had l)een in pi'oduction. Tl steadily. The rate of increase continued until the construction of the plants in the dispersal progr plant reached its peak of power consumption in was under the direction of the Naval ConstructI December 1944, when 310,000 kilowatt hours were Corps, which furnished labor and material. B consumed. Then, in the early part of 1945, due fore the air attack on the Himeji plant, 2i to the dispersal program, the rate of power con- machine tools had been dispersed to the Ho sumption decreased shai-ply and stopped com- unit (a|)pen(lix I). pletely at the time of the air attack on the plant The dispersion program assumed the foUowi: in June 1945 (appendix G). pattern ^

Distance Date Area (square feet) or number from Type of production planned Percent of completl Location buildings started Himeji of

Miles Dange Mar. 1015 16 Final assembly 90,570.. 100, of building; 8C runw ay.

ITzurano .\pr. I'JtS 17 Engine run and flight. 1 hangar 0. Kasamatsu June 1945 14 Wing assembly 16,275... 50,

Kishiro ...-do Ifi Fuselage assembly . . 28,740... 40

Hojn (Taka village). Mar. 1946 18 Machine shoi* 107,fi40- - 30, Fukuzaki unit:

Uciio--- -. 11 ,^heet -metal shop. Funazu-- 14 do Converted tile shops: opera-

Tawara village. . 17 do ti(Hi not started. Tatsumo 25 do...

There was no ])roduction loss because of dis- However, the estimated production for 1944 v

persion, tjccause all work on dis])ersed locations 229 Georges, while actual production for t was performed \>y the \avid Construction Cor])s period was 354 aircraft, or 35 i)ereent over ei and the Himeji i)laiit did i\n[ fui'iiish any men or mated production. In 1945 the estimated p material. duction was 300 aircraft, while only 156 W" actually produced. Thus, for 1945 it was es INTELLIGENCE CHECK mated that 48 pcrc(>nt more aircraft were pi duced than were actually made. The estimal The War Department, Military Intelligence total production for both years was 529 aircra Service (Ci-2), estimate of total aircraft produc- while 510 were actually produced, or a 4-perc( tion at the Himeji plant was essentially correct. overestimate.

66 M

* 3 saaAOidNj io dsannN

68 2.600,000

2,400,000

2,200,000

2,000,000

1.800.000

1,600.000

1 1,400,000 X i 1,200,000

1,000.000

800,000

600,000

400.000

200,000 PRODUCTION CHARTS

80 GEOF

70

60

50

40

30

20

10 71 o o

TAKARAZUKA PLANT REPORT NO. 111-4

(Components)

Dates of Survey, 23-25 October 1945 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page The Plant and Its Function in the Aiucraft Industry^. 75 Attack Data 78 Effects of BbMBiNG 79 Intelligence Check 83 Vulnerability 83 Appendix A—General arrangement of plant Facing page 84 Appendix B.—Organization chart 85 Appendix C—Number of man-hours worked ' 86 Appendix D—Employment chart 87 Appendix E—Critical shortages 88 Appendix F—Bomb plots Facing page 88 (1) Appendix G—Bomb damage plan Facing page 88 (2) Appendix H—Man-hours expended in repair of air-raid damage. 89 Appendix I—Production man-hours lost as a result of air attack 89 Appendix J—Man-hours lost because of air-raid alerts 90 Appendix K—Man-hours lost due to air-raid attack 91 Appendix L—Chart of electric-power consumption 92 Appendix M—Dispersal map 93

THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY oduction There were foiu- production departments in the he Takarazuka plant (Takarazuka Seisakusho) Takarazuka jjlant. The first one, the aircraft- le Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (Kawanishi Kokuki machine-parts department, was constructed in ushiki Kaishi) was located 20 miles northwest June 1942. The material-treating department saka, near the village of Takarazuka. It was (casting, forging, heat treating, and galvanizing) blished in the fall of 1942 to machine aircraft was constructed in August 1942; the aero-engine- s for the various Kawanishi assembly plants, accessories department in September 1942; and r to this it was a machine shop producing gun the machine-gun-mounting department in Febru- ets and various types of pumps; it also did ary 1943. e machining of aircraft parts. The total floor On 1 November 1943, the Takarazuka plant before air attack, was 3,392,000 scpiare feet, acquired the Teikoku Electric Co. as its only sub- hich 1,802,000 square feet was productive sidiary. This unit built electric parts, mainly for area. The general arrangement plan of the the gun-mounting department.

|t (Appendix A) gives the area of each building, The Japanese Government loaned the Kawanishi type of work performed, date and type of Aircraft Co. a total of 211,000.000 yen for equip- ruction. ment and facilities. The Takarazuka plant

TlflO.'iS—17- 75 :

received about one-fourth of this amount, as in March 1944, when two 10-hour shifts wen follows started. Man-hours lost, due to absentecisn in 1942 Faeilitv: were quite low —4,000 per month—but in Yen creased very sharply, reaching 45,500 in Maicl 2,896 machine tools 21,053,000 1945 and finally 125,000 in August 1945. 422 presses, furnaces, transformers, sheet- The increased absenteeism was caused by ai metal machines 1, 181, 000 Buildings 33,300,000 attacks on the cities and towns. After suci attacks many employees did not work reguhulj Total 55, 534, 000 evacuating their families and personal belonging

Organization and Operation to safer places. Allien Takarazuka started in 1942 as an ai The names and functions of key persomiel fol- craft plant, a munber of employees were tran low: ferred from the Naruo plant of the Kawanis Hyuzo Kawanishi, President. Kenji Maebara, Vice president. Aircraft Co. Another large group of employe Shiro Takahashi, Managing director. was transferred from Naruo in November 194 Yoshio Hashiguchi, Chief engineer. and yet another in April 1944. Saito, .Manager of Takarazuka plant. Meishin The number of. employees reached a peak Organization of the Takarazuka plant followed 16,600 in August 1944, declining steadily thci the general pattern for the industry (appendix B). after. It shoidd be noted that there was a vc Plant officials furnished an outline of the plant small number of women workers in the plant by departments, date the sections began opera- 1,100 at the peak. Veiy few military person) tion, the type of aircraft for which the parts were were employed at the plant —only 150 duri made, where the products were shipped, and the 1945 (appendix D). percent of production sent to the various com- Material and Components panies (fig. 1). It should be noted that pumps The Takarazuka plant fabricated gun tiu-re and gun turrets originally were made at the Naruo macliine guns, various types of pumps, macliin. plant of the Kawanishi Aircraft Co. (USSBS Air- steel parts for aircraft, castings, and forgiii craft Division Plant Report No. III-l), but pro- Of the above products, 80 percent of the duction was transferred to the Takarazuka plant § turrets were produced for other plants and on m 1943 to facilitate more efficient utilization of 20 percent were used by the Kawanishi Airci the separate plant properties. Co.; 90 percent of the pumps were produced Employment outside plants; and all of the machined airci 1944 to the termination of the war, From March jjarts, castings, and forgings were produced shifts, working 10 hours each the plant had two the various aircraft-assembly plants of the Ka day. Approximately two-thirds of the employees nishi Aircraft Co. (fig. 1). Girl students vol- worked the day shift. and Due to the difficulties in assembling mach shifts. unteers worked 9-hour guns until December 1943, there were no sh« The number of employees increased gradually ages of raw materials for this activity. dining the war, reaching its maxinuim in August The most important critical shortages of } 1944 when a total of 16,600 workers were em- tcrial that existed in 1944 and 1945 were oxy) situation changed, students ployed. As the war for welding, small electric motors, and ammo or (boys and girls), whether they had graduated used in metal plating (appendix E). not, entered the plant as a patriotic-service corps, organized by labor-mobilization ortlers of the Production Statistics

Goverinnent. Boy students worked 10-hour shifts The Takarazuka ])lant first started protluci and younger school boys worked 8-hour shifts. in March 1941 witii the manufacture of j The greatest number of man-hours worked was tiu'rets. In April 1941 the nuimifacture in October 1944, when 183,000 man-liours were pumps started and by April 1942 the manufact recorded (appendix C). The great increase began of air frames macliined parts began.

76

Department .

EFFECTS OF BOMBING production. Tlu' day following the attack, only

about 40 percent of I he usuid niiin-liours were Tlio Takaraziika plant was struck twice. The woi-kent of the lusively to the destruction of about 30 percent iittack 24 About 58 total man-hours alri-ady were divc^rted towards dis- the iiouses in the workinen's Hviiifj; area (ap- dixes F and G). l)crsal and this attack stopped production; oidy he second attack, which was directed at the 7,300 man-hours out of the normal 29,000 man- houi-s the aftei' the attack. nt, occurred at 0930 hours on 24 July 1945. was worked day

I this, 458 tons of 1- and 2- thousand pound Counter-Measures hundred two tons imbs were dropped. Two Prior to the air attacks, 95 percent of the the plant area, 88 tons striking buildings. 3 uck machine tools were either dispersed or lented to ^lne the buildings repaired. few of was The subcontractors. The least essential wooden build- iuctural steel buildings also sustained heavy ings were dismantled as a precaution against fire. dtnage (photos 1-5). The air-raid-precaution system at the plant During the first attack, 181,094 square feet, or consisted of 600 people, organized in various

I [icrcent, of the dormitories and kitchens wer(! groups. The chief of the organization sounded lined addition to the destruction of in ])ower the alarm by loudspeaker system throughout the

I s, causing a 50-percent loss of productive plant. Alarm in the plant was given by loud-

1 u-hours. speaker system or siren. When this system did during tlie second attack, 100 percent of the not function, messengers stationed at each princi-

; i-turret department, 99 percent of the aircraft- ]3al shop gave the alarm by flag or siren diu'ing

I (ssories department, 78 percent of machined- the daytime, and by siren or light signal at night.

> Is department, 30 percent of the heat-treating, The heads of the various departments ordered "ling, and forging department, boiler and air- the workers to go to the air-raid shelters in the 111 pressor room, 67 percent of the office, and following order: students of the primary schools,

II percent of the dormitory and mess room were other students, apprentices and regular workmen, Utroyed. The damaged shops were not repaired. and finally members of the air-raid-precaution

- ring the second air attack, 108 employees were gi'oup. :ed and 51 wounded. Interruption Due to Alerts it the outset of 1945, before the attacks, 95 A total of 795,581 man-liours was lost because I cent of all machines were dispersed to various of air-raid alerts. The alerts started in Novem- i-Ditions within a few miles of the Takarazuka l)er 1944 and during the remainder of the year

[,j^, nt. Some were loaned to subcontractors and 36,800 man-hours were lost. In 1945, 758,781 ff' ers were installed in dispersed plants. After man-hours were lost, with June 1945, the month ii,-l> dispersal, there were 47 machine tools at the of the area attack on the plant, having the greatest •ciin plant. Durmg the attack of 24 July 1945, number of lost man-hours (181,200) due to air- iiachine tools were damaged superficially but I'aid alerts (appendix J) tairable and 39 were destroyed beyond repair.

J machine tools were replaced at the plant. Interruption Due to Area Attacks h'ing various area attacks, many of the dis- A total of 585,500 man-hours was lost because (3ed machine tools were damaged and destroyed. of area attacks. The loss started in February

ifter the first air attack of 15 June, 14,200 1945, the greatest occurring in June 1945, when n-hours were e.xpended to repair damage (ap- 182,000 man-hours were lost due to air attacks in ^dix H). A total of 126,140 productive man- the area (appendix Iv), in addition to the loss rs were lost as a direct result, rerpiiring approx- resulting from alerts.

tely 1 week to recuperate to normalcy (appen- The peak loatl of electric i)ower under contract I). During this same period, about 27,000 was 2,500 kilowatts. Throughout the productive n-hours per day, or a total of 189,000 man- period at the plant, from 1942 to 1945, the maxi-

( rs, were lost due to dispersal factors, indicating mum consumption was from February 1944 to it dispersal was a great factor in keeping down May 1945, when 2,170 kilowatts were consumed.

79 southwest, showing structural damage. Photo 1.— Building 1, machine shop. View

S^^as^l^^ . -.-.,.^-

shop. View, southwest, showing structural damage. Photo 2.-Building 1 59, sheet-metal

80

I photo 3. —Building 159, sheet-metal shop view—interior looking west. Heavy bomb damage.

Photo 4. —Building 159, sheet-metal shop. View interior, southwest, showing bomb crater at base of column. 81 PhoK liuildmg I 38, machine shop. View northwest.

Power coiisiunptioii fell oil' at the l)oginiuag of Dispersal

- 1945, (iue to dispersion, until, by June 1945, it Each division of the Takarazuka plant i liad cirop])(Hl to 1,4.30 kilowatts. After the persed its own production. The macliine-g - attacks it (h-opped to zero in August 1945 (ap- mounting department dispersi'd to the follow ; pendix L). locations:

Planned Percent dispers

Location Type of work DispiTSEil began Number of machine Number of Machine Emplc employees tools tools

Kobayashi. Structural parts February 1945. 124 300 100

Namaze... Hydraulic parts March 1945.. _ 206 470 100 Sanda Parts .March 1945... 52 400 100 Koshicn... Jig and cutting tools Fi'hruary 1945 :07 220 100 m Kashio Sheet-metal parts and assembly June 1945 237 750 80

The chief bottleneck in tiie disperal program of per montli. Capacity after disperal was 150 ijr the machine-gun-mounting department was trans- month, a 17 pei'cent loss. j portation. The cni)acity of llie plant to piwluce The aero-engine-accessories department iiiacliiiii'-gun indiiiit iiigs, tiefore dispersal, was ISO persed to the following locations:

82 I

Planned Percent disperscil

Loc'utii)li Typ. J)ispiTsal h('j:ari Number of machine Number of Machine Emplny- employees tools tools ees

:a.vainn . Parts, fiu'l piiini) Ffiiruary 1945, 304 1. ion 1(» idsoBawii Assoinhly 1945_ pumps June 357 I, 50() I (XI 70

shin Fiu'I-inJection punij) Tune 1945 185 1, 21 Kl ion 70 kaiakamatsu-. Jigs and tools.- April 1945 ir,n 350 99 99

. ;awa.-- Machine shop June 1945 123 150 100 M

Transportation was the chief bottleneck, but a Fukuchiyama district (underground and in ortage of labor and electrical parts hindered the earth-covered buildings): This unit of 154 ma- iistruction and installation of mnchinory at (he chines and 500 workmen was under the direction ispersal locations. of the Naruo plant, and was planned (o produce The engine-accessories department loss of pro- machined parts for George. Transportation of idction caj^acity and potential due to dispersal machines was finished on 10 July 1945 but opera-

I' IS estimated as follows: tion did not begin because of lack of power. Hojo district (underground unit): This unit Maximum Maximum possible jKissiblc planned to produce machined ptiits for Frances

I >i'Sfripl i()?i i)i proilucts I)rodut'tioii profluflioii before after and George, with 309 machines, and 1,200 dispersion dispersion workers. However, to the termination of the war, only 261 machines were transported to this l-injection pump (complete set)- - - 750 5,50 h-pressure oil pump 1,200 1,000 unit, which was never in operation. motor for variable-piteh propeller- 400 300 Dispersal stopped operation of the aircraft- iium pump -_ 700 000

)IT valve for flap 400 31 U machine-parts department and all of the machined

nozzle - _ 12, 000 III. IIOII parts for CJeorge and Frances had to be supi)lied Ihanol-injeetion pump 900 Klin )rieant-oil pump for starting 350 300 by subcontractors. The casting, forging, heat-treating, aiu! gal- It was planned that the aircraft-parts machining vanizing department of the Takarazuka plant was partment be dispersed in four districts under the to be dispersed near the plant in (lie hills of the |ntrol of each plant in each district. Only two Koyoen Park, but this was never done (a])])eiidi.\ •nits, Osaka and Okadayama, were already dis- M)". ]Tsed and in operation at the end of the war. In INTELLIGENCE CHECK her dispersed units, machines were all on hand The prc-attack-intelligcnce information as to the lit were not in operation. type of manufacture engaged in at the Takara- Plant dispersal assumed the following pattern: zuka plant and the photo interpretation after the Osaka district (Hankyu department store in air attack reporting the damage sustained were

meda—bombproof building) : This unit belonged essentially correct. the Konan plant and produced machined parts Ir Frances with 139 machine tools and 350 work- VULNERABILITY en. It began to operate on the 15th of June The Takarazuka plant was particularly vulner- 45. able to air attacks in that all the buildings were

Koyoen district : Okadayama unit (in the Kobe completely of wooden construction, except four id's college) lielonged to the Xaruo plant and large shops, which were of structural steel and loduced machined parts for George with 54 ma- wooden roof and walls. This light construction

( ine tools and 1 70 school-girl workers. This unit was particularly vulnerable to incendiaries. No gan production on 10 April 1945. attempt was made to camouflage the plant. Koyoen unit (underground and in earth-covered The morale of the employees was none too high, lildings) : Planned to produce parts for George starting with the end of 1944 and continuing

' th 123 machine tools and 500 workers. All the through 1945, during whicli time air attacks on

I ichine tools were transported to this unit by 30 nearby cities, as well as on the plant itself, made ne 1945, but were not in operation, due to lack many of them homeless and caused others to

1 power and homes for employees. evacuate tlieii' personal belongings and families.

83

BL66. NO

ORGANIZATION

EMPLOYMENT CHART APPENDIX E

LIST OF SHORTAGES OF RAW MATERIALS AND PARTS FOR THE ENGINE-ACCESSORIES DEPARTMENT

19U . leLfiA.; NO, eUlLONG NAME

) I MACHINE SHOP

3 4 5 6 7 BOMB PLOTS 8 9 JULY 24 Ih. ATTACK 10 ROUGH MACHINE SHOP

II I I 1 IS WORKSHOP 13 14 IS 16 SHEET METAL SHOP 17 JIG SHOP 18 CARPENTER SHOP 19 GALVANIZING SHOP 20 ' HEAT TREATMENT SHOP 21 CASTING SHOP ;

22 ! FORGING SHOP 23! 24 26 SCRAP PRESSING SHOP

I 26 AIR COMPRESSOR

27 ! 281 TESTING

29 I TRANSFORMER

30 I 31 BOILER 32 PAINT STORE 3 3 OIL STORE

34 I I 35 SWITCHBOARD 36 HOSPITAL 37 CENTRAL OFFICE 38 OFFICE 39 DINING HALL 40 SCHOOL 41 PATTERN SHOP 42 KITCHEN 43 STORE 4^4 GARAGE ___ _^ 45 J*6 47 48

SCALE IN FEET

US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY TAKARA2UKA PLANT

<^fpewpix f

1$ 719033 O- 47

I3_-

'fi^'i*> • KEY 1 '"MAO R^'"^--'

>S YJOL 88

gs 5 •!*' .v)XT '4- u] in 1 "1 1 Z 2 oen se to o DccS— O o

< °

Z 0) O >- O D a Q O q: to I- cc

Q S

MAN-HOURS LOST DUE TO AIR RAID ATTACKS

PLANT RAIoeO a WORKMEN HOMES IN OSAKA BURNED 94,000

\

PART OF THE PLANT RAIDED

a AMAGASAKI DISTRICT t. 76,000-

APR. MAY 1945

US. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT CO. TAKARAZUKA PLANT

APPENDIX K

719033—47- 91 3 FUKUCHIYAMA

DISPERSAL MAP

M G. MOUNTINGS DEPT. AIRCRAFT MACHINE PARTS DEPT ® KOBAYASHI UNIT ® OKADAYAMA UNIT © NAMAZE UNIT (g) KOYOEN UNIT SANDA UNIT © FUKUCHIYAMA UNIT (g) KOSHIEN UNIT (3) HOJO UNIT (E) KASHO UNIT (D UMEDA UNIT

AERO ENGINE ACCESSORIES DEPT. ® SASAYAMA UNIT SAKASEGAWA UNIT KASHO UNIT NAKATAKAMATSU UNIT NIGAWA UNIT

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY KAWANISHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY TAKARAZUKA PLANT

APPENDIX - M

93 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS

Mctallwerke, Hildesheim, G( The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from 21 Vereinigte Deutsche the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. many Those reports marked with an asterislc (*) may be pur- 22 Metallgussgesell.schaft G m b H, Leipzig, Germai the 23 Aluminiumwerk G m b H, Plant No. 2, Bitterfe chased from I lie Superintendent of Documents at Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. Germany 24 Gebrueder Giulini G m b H, Ludwigshafen. Germa 25 Luftschiffbau, Zepellin G m b H, Friedrichshaf European War on Bodensee, Germany 26 Wieland Werke A G, I'lm, Germany 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmctallgiessercien, Sol OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN gen, Germany 28 Lippewerke Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke A G, Lvuv *1 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum- Germany niarv Report (European War) 29 Vereinigte" Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernhei *2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over- Germany all Report (European War) 30 Duerener Kletallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Bei *3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German & Waren, Germany War Economy AREA STUDIES DIVISION AIRCRAFT DIVISION *31 Area Studies Division Report Branch) (By Division and 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomb on Hamburg *4 Aircraft Division Industry Report 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomb Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Rejjort) 5 on Wuppertal 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomk Airframes Branch on Dusseldorf 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area BomI Junkers Aircraft and Aero Elngine Works, Dessau, on Solingen German V 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area BomI 7 Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Heiterblick, German on Remscheid 8 A T G Maschinenbau, G m b H, Leipzig (Mockau), 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Boml Germany on Darmstadt 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomt 10 Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany on Lubeck Over-all Rejjort 39 A Brief Stiidy of the Effects of Area Bombing,] I Part A Bochum. Leipzig, Hagen, D I G, Augsburg, 1 Mcsserschmitt A Berlin. J Augsburg, Germany Part B mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt. and Bremen | (Appendices I, II, 111 Friedrichshafen & Munich, (lerniany 12 Dornier Works, CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke GmbH, Kassel, Germany Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Xcu- 14 *40 Civilian Defense Division— Final Report stadt, Austria 41 Cologne Field Report 42 Bonn Field Re|)ort Aero Engines Branch 43 Hanover Field Report 44 Hamburg Field Report—Vol. I, Text; Vol. II, Exhi s 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke G ni h il, I(r\uis- 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report wick, Germany Augsburg Field Report 46 , fl 1) H, Taucha, in Bavaria, Germany 10 Mittel-Deutsche" .Motorcnwerke m 47 Reception Areas , Germany 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc., Eisenach .t Durrerhof, EQUIPMENT DIVISION Germany .Municli. 18 Bayerische Motoreiiwerke A G (BMW) Electrical Branch Germany Kassel, Germany I^quipment Industry Report 19 Hcnscliel Flugmoloren werke, *48 German Electrical j 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, GerniiJ Light Metal Branch Optical and Precision Instrument Branch ' 20 Light Metals Industry (Part I, .Muminum Precision Instrument Industry Rejri of Germany tl'art II, Magnesium *50 Optical and

94 —

Abrasives liranch Submarine liranch

The ( KTinaii Abrasive Indus! ry 02 German Sidiujarine Industry Report Mayer aiui Sehiniflt, Offeiibacli ' ^r; liii, (lerinanv 'Xi Maschinenfal)rik Augsburg-Xurnberg A G, Augs- burg, < ieririany Anti-Friction Brancli !)4 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 95 .:; 'I'lic (ieriuaii Aiifi-Friiiion Bearings Iriciiistry Deutschewerke A. G. 'Kiel, Germany 9G Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau', Bremen Ger- ' Macliine Tools Branch many i)7 Friedrich Krupp Gcrnumiawcrft, Kiel, Germany I Machine Tools & Maeliiuery as Capital I';c|uii)iiieiil 98 Hiiwaldtswerke \. G, Hamburg, Germany "i Maeliiiie Tool Industry in Germany 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, (iermany (i Herman Kolb Co., Colof^ne, Oermany UJO Bremer ^'\lIkan, Vegesack, Germany 7 ( ollet and Kngelliard, OfTeidjach, (ierniany s Xaxos Union, Frankfort on Main, (Germany Ordnance Branch MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION *101 Ordnance Industry Report '.I The Defeat of the lierman Air P'orce 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G, Magdeburg (I \'-\\'eapons (Crossbow) Campaign Germany

1 Air Force of 103 Rate Operation Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A (', ' 2 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera- Bochum, Germany tions in the European Theatre 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, German\- 'i Ikmibiiif!; Accviracv, USAAF Heavv anrl Medium 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseidorf, (iermany Bombers in the ETO 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunscliweig, Hallen- Iji Description of RAF Bombing dorf, (iermany ta The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German lo- 107 Hannoyerische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany gistics 108 Ciusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany MORALE DIVISION OIL DIVISION lb The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Vol. I and Vol. ID *109 Oil Division, Final Report *110 Oil Division, Final Medical Brancli Report, Appendix *111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- The effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care pellants. War Gases and Smoke .Acid (Ministerial in Germany Report $1) 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in (ireater Ger- MUNITIONS DIVISION many 1 13 The German Oil Heavy Industry Branch Industry, Ministerial Report Team 78 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A,"B, C, & D Gutehoffiningshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, CJermany Oil Branch Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger- many ll.T Amrnoniakwerke Merseburg G m b H, Leuna, Ger- Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf many— 2 Appendices Germany 116 Braimkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany August Thyssen Huette .-V G, Hamborn, Germany Wintershall A G, Leutzkendorf, Germany Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, E.ssen, Ger- 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindustrie many A (1, Ludwigshafen, Germany Dortmund Hoerder Iluettenverein, A (!, Dortmund, 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenaf ion Plant," Bottrop-Boy, Ger- Germany many, Vol. I, \'ol. II Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany 119 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstah'lfabrikation A C!, Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Bochum, Germany 120 Rlienania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch 121 Rhenania Ossag M ineraloelwerke AG, Wilhelmsburg Refinery, Hamburg, (iermany German Motor \'ehicies Industry Report 122 Gewerkschaft Tank Industry Report Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Vol. I & Vol. II Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, A G, Ham- Paris burg, Adam Opel, Russelheim, (iermany Germany 124 Daimler Benz-Gaggenan Works, Ebano Asphalt Werke .A G, Harljurg Refinery. Gaggenau, Germany Hamburg, Germany Maschinenfabrik .\ugsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreu.s.sen Synthetic Oil Plant Vol. I & Vol. IT Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kas.sel, Germany Maybach Motor Works, Friedriclishafen, Germany Rubber Branch Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plaiien, Germany Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main, Bussing XA(j, Brunswick, Germany Germany Muehlenbau Industrie A G (.Miag)" Brunswick, Ger- 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany many 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry

95 Howaldtswerkc, Hamburg, Germany Propellants Branch 182 Ship Yards 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Mannheim, Ciermany 130 Elektrochoiuisehewerkc, Munich, Germany 184 Daimler-Benz A G, Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Cierman 131 SchoenebecR Germany Werke G m b H, Bad Salzemen, Germany 186 Ciewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Deutz, Ulm, Ciermany 132 Plants of Dvnamit A G, Vormal. Alfred Xobel & Co., 187 Klockner Humboldt Bottrop-Boy, Ge Troisdorf, Clausthal. Drummel and Duneberg, 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, manv Germany ,, t- , r. Ger- Eisenwerke A Ci, Xeukirchen, German 133 Deutsche Sprengchemie (! m 1) H, Kraiburg. 189 Xeukirchen many 190 Railwav Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany 191 RailwaV Viaduct at Arnsburg, Ciermany OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 192 Deurag-Xerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 193 Fire Raids on German Cities Over-all Economic Effects Division Report Germany, V' 134 194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Gross National Product [Special papers together I & Vol. II Kriegseilberichte J which 19.^) Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Llm, German Goering Works comprise the Hermann ) Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany above report 196 I Ci Food and Agriculture I Chemische-Werke. Huels, Ciermany Output and Productivity 197 134a Industrial Sales 198 Ciremberg Marshalling Yard, Ciremberg, Germai at Hamm, Germai PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION 199 Locomotive shops and Bridges TRANSPORTATION DIVISION 134b Phvsical Damage Division Report (ETO) Airdrome, Paris, France 135 Villacoublav *200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Cierman Trai Malines, Belgium 13fj Railroad Repair Yards, portation Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 137 Railroad 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass 138 Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium Bombing on Railroad Installations Belgium 202 Effects of 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Xamur, Regensburg, Xurnberg and Munich Divisions Brest, France 140 Submarine Pens, 203 Cierman Locomotive Industry During the War Angouleme, France 141 Powder Plant, 204 Cierman Military Railroad Traffic 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium UTILITIES DIVISION 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France Electric Utilities Industry Report 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France *205 Cierman France I "Utilities Division Plant Repor 146 Michelin Tire Factorv, Clermont-Ferrand, 206 I to 10 in Vol. "Utilities Division Plant Repor 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, 207 I I to 20 in Vol. II France 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk .^ , , ,-, 148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger- manv Pacific War 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France France 150 S N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulou.se, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN France 151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, 152 V Weapons in London *1 Suminarv Report (Pacific War) 153 Citv Area of Krefeld *2 .Japan's Struggle To End The War Hiroshima 154 Public .\ir Raid Shelters in Germany *3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on 150 Goklenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap- Xagasaki sack, Germany . STUDIES 15G Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau- CIVILIAN weiler, Germany Civilian Defense Division 157 Storage Depot, Xahbollenbach, Germany Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany 158 Railway and Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Bridge, EUer, Germany 159 RaihvaV Allied Subjects, Tokyo, Japan Weimar, Weimar, Germany 160 Gust loff- Werke Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Sohn G b H, Kassel, Germany 161 Henschell & m Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Pirmasens, Germany 162 Area Survey at *6 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Hanover, Germany 163 Hanomag, Allied Subjects. Kyoto, Japan Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 164 M A X Werke Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection G, Essen, Ciermany 165 Friedrich Krupp A Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Maschinenwerke G m b H, Heiterblick, Ger- i 166 lOrla Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection man v Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan G'Maschincnbau G m 1) H, Mockau, Germany i 167 A T Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection G m b H, Mockau, Ciermany 168 Erla Maschinenwerke \llied Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan— Xo. 1 Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany 169 Baverische *10 Suminarv Report Covering Air Raid Protection Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha. 170 .Miiicl-Deutsche Allied "Subjects in Japan Germany Air Raid Protection ,x , r. *11 Final Rejjort Covering Deutsche- Werft, Hamburg, Ger- 171 Submarine Pens .Mlied Subjects in Japan many i 172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Medical Division 173 C'ontinental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany on Health and .Me al 174 Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany *12 The Effects of Bombing 175 Ammoniawerke, Mcrseburg-Leuna, Germany Services in Japan on Health and A li Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Ger- *13 The F^tfects of Atomic Bombs 176 Xagasaki inanv cal Services in Hiroshima and Opel G, Russelsheim, Germany 177 Adam A Morale Division 178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany .Tapi'is 179 Valentin *14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Fallersleben, Germany 180 Volkswaggonwerke, Morale 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany

96 ECONOMIC STUDIES *33 Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report No. Aircraft Division Will (Nissan Jidoslia KK) 'I'ho Japanese AircrafI Itidustry (Engines) *34 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Army Air Arsenal

97 Survey Party (En- MILITARY STUDIES 87 Report of Ships Bombardment closure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness of Ammunition Division Military Analysis 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of United States in the War 61 Air Forces Allied with the Firing Against Japan 89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 62 Japanese Air Power closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics Japanese War Potential 64 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics ^ PacihcTi -c Physical Damage Division 65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Command on Japan 90 Effect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks {i 66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- (Twentieth Report on Eight Cities) bardment in the War Against Japan Bomli 91 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound oi \ir Force) World War Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents) 67 Air Operations in China, Burma, India— 92 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima. Japan Japan Against 93 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, 68 The Air Transport Command in the War 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa Japan ,,r . • Incidents) , i I nese Targets (a Report on Five Force the \\ ar Agamst Japan 69 The Thirteenth Air m Thousand, One Thousand, and Fiv Air Forces in the War 95 Effects of Two 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Target.s Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese ( Against Japan Japan Report on Eight Incidents) 71 The "Fifth Air Force in the War Against 96 A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Sumniar Report)

Naval Analysis Division G-2 Division

Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence of Japanese Officials (Vols, 97 *72 The Interrogations tl 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in and II) Japanese Homeland, Part I, Coniprehenswc R *73 Campaigns of the Pacific War port of Wake Island . *74 The Reduction Photographic Intelligence in t Campaign Against Rabaul 99 Evaluation of *75 The Allied Japanese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Against \\ otje, Maloelaj 76 The American Campaign in t 100 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence and Jaluit (Vols. I, II, and III) Mille, Japanese Homeland, Fart III, Computed Bo\ *77 Reduction of Trulv The Plotting Laying Campaign Against . ^ 78 The Offensive Mine t 101 Evaluation of Photographic IiUelhgeiice m Japan Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Ai Report of Ships Bombardment Sur ty— 79 Analiisis Foreword, Introduction, Conclu.sio- 'en- 102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in t eral Summary Camouflage Japanese Homeland, Part V , of Ships Bombardment Sui en- 80 Report Photographic Intelligence„--- in I Kamaishi Area 103 Evaluation of closure A), Japanese Homeland, Part IV, Shipping Sui >ey I arty (fc>n- 81 Report of Ships Bombardment in 104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence B). Hamamatsu Area closure Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronirs ,_„i. ,ey 1 arty ( I'-u- 82 Report of Ships Bombardment in 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence closure C), Hitachi Area Beach Inti (En- Japanese Homeland, Part VIII, Report of Ships Bombardment S'.rvey 1 arty 83 gence closure D), Hakodate Area *106 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence ni Ships Bombardment ey Party (En- 84 Report of Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery closure E). Muroran Area m (En- *107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelhgence Report of Ships Bomlmrdment Survey Party 85 .fapanese Homeland, Part X, Roads and R closure F). Shimiz.u Area (En- roads Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party 86 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima- 108 closures G Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Anal Saki Areas

19

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