r&"
I
Given By
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc.
(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)
CORPORATION REPORV NO. IV
(Air Frames aod Eagines)
Aircraft Division
May 1947
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc.
(Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha)
CORPORATION REPORT NO. IV
(Air Frames and Engines)
Aircraft Division
Dates of Survey:
10 October-29 November 1945
Date of Publication: May 1947 ,U63
it. a. SUPERfNTENDtM Of OOCUMENTS
This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be con- sidered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further intei'pretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey. FOREWORD
"lie Uiiili'il Stiitos St.i-alcgic IJoinliinsj,- Sui-voy miiitaiy segment of the organiziition was drawn
:! ,• estnl)lislK'(l by the Secretiirv of War on from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and ;i('inl)or 1044, pursuant to a directive from tlie fiom the Navy to the e tent of 40 percent. Both Presideiit Roosevelt. Its mission was to eon- 1 the Army aiul the Navy gave the Survey all it impartial and expert study of the effects an possii)le assistance in furnishing men, supplies, hur aerial attack on Germany, to he used in transport, and information. The Survey operated iiiection with air attacks on Japan and to from head(iuartei-s established hi Tokyo early in Slibiish a basis fur evahiating the importance September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, air instrument 1 ])otentialities of power as an Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with mobile Inilitary strategy, for planning the future de- teams operating in other parts of Opment of the United States armed forces, and Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. J determining future economic policies with re-
[ct to the national defense. A summary report It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime
1. some 200 supporting I'eports containing the Japanese military planning and execution, engage-
;liiigs o( the Survey in Germany have been ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign, ilished. and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on )n 15 August 194.5, President Truman re- Japan's economy and war-production, plant by sted that the Survey conduct a similar study ])lant, a id industry by influstry. In addition,
J he eflects of all types of air attack in the war studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra- jinst Japa)i, submitting reports in dupHcate to tegic plans and the background of her entry into I Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the the war, the internal discussions and negotiations \vy. The officers of the Surve}' during the Jap- leading to her acceptance of uiiconditional sur- .'se phase were: render, the coiu-se of health and morale among Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. the civilian population, the effectiveness of the Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Ale.vander, Vice Japanese civilian defense organization, and the Chairmen. effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports Harry L. Bowman,
\\ ill covering of the study. J. Kenneth Galbraith, be issued each phase Uensis Likert, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa- officials. li Frank A. McNamee, Jr., nese military, government, and industrial Fred Searls, Jr., It also HH'overed and translated many documents Monroe F.. Spaght, which not only have been useful to the Survey, but Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, also will fui-nish data valuable for other stucUes. Theodore P. Wright, Directors. Arrangements have been made to turn over the Walter Wilds, Secretary. Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group,
|rhe Survey's complement jH-ovided for 300 through which they will be available for further Jilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The examination and distribution.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
KAWASAKI CORPORATION (Corporation Report No. IV) p^ ^
The corporation and its importance in the aircraft industry. _ , .1 Tlie air attacks 4 Production statistics 5 Intelhgence evahiation 9 Reference item 9 Appendix A—Air-frame and engine production 1 930-39 14
Appendix B— Organization chart .. 14 Appendix C—FaciUty locations ' 15 Appendix D—Employment statistics IG Appendix E—Air-frame production statistics facing page 16 KAWASAKI KAGAMIGAHARA (Plant Report No. IV-1)
The plant and its function in the aircraft industry 17 Effects of bombing 21 Intelligence check 23 Vulnerability 23 General impressions of plant inspection and interrogation 23 Reference item 25
Appendix A—Plant expansions ^_ _, 34 Appendix B—Organization chart 35 Appendix C—Production flow chart facing page 36 Appendix D—Critical shortages in accessories 37 Appendix E—Bomb plot facing page 38 KAWASAKI AKASHI (Plant Report No. IV-2)
The plant and its function in the aircraft industry 39 Effects of bombing '.» 46 Intelligence check 53 Vulnerability ._ 53 General impressions of plant inspection and interrogation 53 Reference item 53 Appendix A—Plant lay-out before raid of 19 January 1945 facing page 56 Appendix B—Organization chart 57
Appendix C—Engine production No. 1 facing page 58 Appendix D—Air-frame production . No. 2 facing page 58 1-2-3-4 facing page Appendix E— —Bomb plots . Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 58
V
,
KAWASAKI CORPORATION
(Corporation Report No. IV)
PHE CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
TRODUCTION early 1939, engines mainifacluring also was se])a- rated from the Kawasaki H(>avy Luhistry facilities 'his ooiHiJUiiy occiii)i(Ml the Tuunbor thi'eo place and a plant was started at Akashi just west of lapaii's aircraft iiiclustvy. In over-all produc- Kobe on the Inland Sea. A subsidiary unit of the 1 it accounted for 17 percent of the combat air frame division, operated under th<^ Kagami- frames and 12 percent of cotnbat engines gahara management, was set up at Akashi in the luifactured in 1944, the industry's peak year, same plant area as the engine facilities. operated 3,217,814 squaie feet of productive The main office of the corporation, which frame floor area and 2,155,680 square feet of e.xeicised supervision over all air frame and iue floor aiea before the air raids. By the end engine activities, was at Akashi. Kawasaki, be- he war, aii' frame floor area in pi'oduction was cause of its relatively (compact organization, need to 100,000 square feet and enguie floor managed to retain financial and nninagement a to 1,202,300 square feet, control of its plants. With production centralized dl production went to the Aimy. Kawasaki's in two large permanent plants, and later dispersion cipal airplanes were Tony (Ki-61 antl Ki-100), chiefly into defunct spimiing mill facilities, the mall fighter in liquid-cooled and radial-engine company's relative wai'time expansion Was small lels resembling the Me-109; Lily (Ki-48), a compared to Nakajima and Mitsubishi^. t bomber with two radial engines; and Nick, There was considerable evidence of foreign in- -place, twin-engine fighter (Ki-45) in conven- fluence on design of products throughout the lal and night-fighter vei'sions. Randy (Ki-102) history of the company. In 1919 the company production toward the end of the war, was a ])urchased the license to manufacture the French le-place, improved Nick. Salmson airplane and engine. In 1926 Kawasaki The company's own engine in various models purchased the license from Germany to mami- a liquid-cooled Daimler-Benz design, manu- facture BMW engines, and in 1927 designed and tured under German license (Ha-60, Model 22 built the type 87 heavy bomber around two of Ha-60, Model 33). At Army request late in these engines. There were 25 of these built in the war, the company manufactured Ha-35, Kobe facilities. del 21, a Mitsubishi radial developing 1970 However, outside of licensing agreements entered sepower at take-off. Both radials were shipped into prior to the war, there was no evidence the Nakajima's I\oizum.i plants for use in Oscar company had direct liaison with German business I Frank fighters, respectively. The Ha-115 contacts after hostilities started. Foreign equip- i later destined foi Ki-115, the Nakajuna ment at Kawasaki plants for stiuiy was received cial attack plane. from the Army. ^he corporation was a completely owned In plant investigations, the Akashi plant site 'sidiary of Kawasaki Heavy Industries Com- was studied as an entity. From an operational ly, Ltd. The aircraft division of the parent standpoint, however, the Akashi facilities were ipany was organized in 1918, and for the first sharply divided, with one geographically grouped years of its existence conducted its manufactiu'- section of buildings within the plant enclosure activities in the facilities of Kawasaki Heavy devoted to air-frame manufacture and reporting lustries Co., I^td., at Kobe, to the nmnagement of the air-frame division at n 1937 au- fra.me manufacturing activities were Kagamigahara. In addition to the main plants loved fi-om the parent corijoration and a plant at Akashi and Kagamigahara, the company had :ted at Kagamigahara, north of Nagoya. In smaller air frame assembly plants at Miyakonojo
1 '
in southeast Kvuslui iind ;it Icliiiioiniy!) hot ween was largely concentrated in large, self-suflic
Nagoya aiul Ciifu. units, rather than being a series of "feeder" shi In addition to Aivasbi, other ])hmts producing- Akashi, Futami and Takatsuki all prodvl ronii)lete engines were at Takatsiiki, halfway be- complete engines. Their only feeder units \| tween Osaka and Kyoto, and at Futami about 2f) the Hokuben gear plant antl the Kobe and S; niiU^s west of Kobe. The Kobe casting and casting and forging plants. forging and the Sakai casting and forging sub- Complete air frames were produced at Kag; sidiaries also operated under the engine division. gahara, Akashi, Ichinomiya, and Miyakor
Through the late 20's and early ,'50's the com- Only Miyakonojo depended on other plants pany received sizeable Army orders, ]iromi)ted by parts (Appendix C). the impending Chinese war, which built up to a The comjjany hoped to go on a mass-prodiK 1,000-unit order for type 98 light bombers in 1935. basis with Ki-61 Tony, but about the time Kawasaki was apparently strong in Army favor, were tooling up toward 500 per month produi even in those days (Appendix A), However, the "bugs" in their liquid-cooled engine fd there was a tendency, almost a well-defined policy suspension of the contract. In the en( on the part of the company, to keep the govern- division orders were not of a quantity to die ment's influence as small as po.ssible. In fact mass production on their liquid-cooled en Kawasaki at first was in a position to refuse cer- Toward the end of the war, when the com tain types of work from the government, as in was switching to Nakajima and Mitsubishi ia( 1943 when the company turned down an Army they might have developed semimass produ invitation to undertake experiments on jet and techniques. rocket planes. Toward the end of the war, how- The Kawasaki aircraft industries reachc' ui ever, because of failure of its own liquid-cooled employment peak of 87,121 persons in July ^j| engine, Kawasaki was being forced by the Army (Fig. 1). Of these, 64,494 were employed ii to manufacture successful Nakajima and Mitsu- air frame plants and 22,627 in the engine facii c-^ bishi designs, At this time apjjroximately 19 percent o) ill employees in the air-frame plant and 7 ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION pe in the engine plant were students. Twenty] Managing director of the company was Masa- percent of the labor force in air frames and T yuki Nemoto, a forceful executive who, in addition cent in engines were women. Just as the com p to his management duties, directly supervisetl the reached this employment peak a heavy t( company's engine-manufacturing activities. His Army inductions caused a dro]) in employ ei immediate subordinate was Hisashi Tojo, brother hat resulted in a serious ])roduction probler Ij of Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime i)remier. Tojo During the latter half of 194^ and during :i was manager of the company's air frame manu- 1945, 50 percent of the air-frame emjjlovcis d facturing plants. nonproductive. Throughout the middle nm Tokyo representative of the company and years of the war 50 percent of the labor lui government liaison man was Sei Yamasaki. lioth engine and air-frame facilities wcic >
This man spent 5 years in Germany during which scripted from other occupations under the ( l
Kawasaki on the Daimler-Benz engine. These could fill the draft quotas \\ith its least s Ii three men were the dominating factors in the workers, the draft seriously drained botl tli company's operations (Appendix B), All were engine and air-frame plants of skilled ])('is( i!'' cooperative in furnishing requested information. Turn-over in both divisions of the com]):iii'
Examination of the heavily damaged plants about 1 percent per month. Absenteeism d'iia revealed very little of mass-production technique late 1944 and 1945 ran as high as S to 10 pc i in either engine or air-frame mamifactuie. Kawa- illustrating the basic weakness of the cons( i saki methods in air-frame manufacture appeared program. Thus a combination of factors ii to be those of the prewar, small order, aircraft ing the Army ilraft, unskilled conscripted w i> ' industry of the I'nited States. absenteeism and a serious typhoid fever cim As previously indicated, Kawasaki's picxhiction in early 1944, dropped the company's prsjui
'
tivity far below what its total employment dispersion order which specified a general m| figures should mdicatc (appeudLx D). ment underground if possible. Until May 1943 the company was on a single, As a result, the divisions of the comjl 8-hour shift basis. In the second half of 1943 the planned a second dispersal program. The enl company put on a determined drive to get all division's liquid-cooled facilities in the Takall departments on two 10-hour shifts. By the spiimLng mill were to move back into a ne; middle of 1944 they had succeeded m doing this for series of mountain tunnels partially complete about 66 percent of the engme facilities and 45 the war's end. The Futami radial engine faci percent of the total air-frame plants. were to disperse to a group of 25 small spimj mills reverted buildings forest BRIEF DISCUSSION OF APPENDED PLANT and m the iti REPORTS Ishiliara (Fig. 5, USSBS Aircraft Division Ror! IV-2). Akashi facilities Detailed plant reports have been written on The au'-frame we move mto a like installation at Miki. 1 Kagamigahara (USSBS Aircraft Division Keport Kagamigaliai'a air-frame facilities IV-1) au--frame works and the Akashi (USSBS were to b up in a series of three assembly lines stretij Aircraft Division Keport IV-2) engine and air- through the mountains forests with frame works. These reports are appended. (For and underground installations at Mhio, Watchi, jJ notes on the Miyakonojo works see reference ! Misunami (Fig. 3, USSBS Aircraft Division R item No. 1.) IV-1). production loss to dispersal h: Kagamigahara and Akashi were inspected by The second program would have occurred th( Field Team No. 3 of the Aircraft Division, m summer and early fall of 1945 when movei United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and into forest and underground locations would comprehensive mterrogations of plant executives been at their peak. down through the level of department heads were Transportation was, of course, a terrific h held. cap to dispersion. Railroads were overtaxed Supplemental to the information m this report, loads which normally woidd have been carri the plant reports contain plant lay-outs, bomb sea, and unprovised transportation such as t plots, dispersal charts, plant flow sheets, and had to be used over narrow and bad roa photographs of air raid damage. remote sites. As dispersion got under way to THE DISPERSAL PROGRAM underground installations, an effort was The company had recognized by the middle of made to miprove the roads with hard surfac 1944, to some extent the need for dispersal, and move which might have revealed such sit tooling had been increased at large parts plants aerial reconnaissance. so that they might produce complete air frames Food was scarce at dispersal sites and n and engmes. This was their first dispersal of the workers, who were installed in bai program. The engine division's plants at Fu- without their families, was bad. tami and Takatsuki, both converted spinning mills, were in this category and the air-frame THE AIR ATTACKS division's facilities at Miyakonojo and Ichino- niiya were of this type. Early in 1945 these four AIR ATTACKS ON PLANTS plants were able to produce complete units Air attacks against the company's two in limited quantity. These plants, except Miya- sites at Akashi and Kagamigahara were a konojo, were self-sufficient. Another dispersal models of success considering their effeo unit consisted of a series of workshops in the Gifu production. The first strilces crippled boi area feeding components to Kagamigahara. This badly that they never played an important pi first dispersal program was carried out almost war production agahi. Due to economic par without production loss as it really consisted of and a deteriorating materials situation, it a increased emphasis on existing facilities. have been a long uphill struggle for them As a result of the November and December so, evea if the war had continued. B-29 bombings as well as those that followed, the On 19 January 1945, the Akashi engiac government, on 4 April 1945, promulgated its air-frame works of the company were bombedWw started! the second I |ii>iiii(l liigh-fxplosive bombs and cvory impor- gram. The division dispersion
;ii building was blanketed vvitb explosives jirogram ])reviously mentione^d, but transj)ortatioti |^S|{.S Aircraft Division Report iy-2, Apj)endix and food difficulties made it an ahnost inevitable
) Production was cut to a driblet in bolli failure. Previously the 16 March area raid against branches. Machines, liow- the city of Kobe burned out 80 percent of the K{)f)e ) lianio and engine; vr, were only slightly damaged and if their and Sakai casting and forging companies, which successful they would supplied both engine and air-frame branches. I Ml sal i)rogram had been h.ive been "in the war." This plant was hit jn on 22 and 26 June with 4,000-pound bombs, PRODUCTION STATISTICS
r i(s dispersed, but some I machines had been
1 irUiral damage was inflicted. From January 1941 through August 1945,
lie Kagamigahara air-frame facilities also were Kawasaki produced a grand total of 8,269 air
:ili(l on 22 and 26 June. Hits were scored on frames under plans calling for 11,662. Over the hiiiportant buildings (USSBS Aircraft Division same period the corporation j)roduced a total of
; Kii t IV-1, Appendix F) including several whose 10,274 engines compared with a planned produc-
I ipment, such as the heat-treating facilities, the tion of 15,402.
Ill-Ion gas company's high in , hydraulic press, and the acetylene The month engine production y iiii, could not be replaced. About 17 percent was November 1944, with a total of 496 engines filir machine tools were seriously damaged. (Appendix E). By this time the company had
I iiist all of the buildings were burned out, but shifted the major part of its engine production
, luut serious structural damage. from liquid-cooled to air-cooled and 257 of this he Miyakonojo plant of Kawasaki in Kyushu total were Nakajima-designed Ha-115 (Fig. 2).
, 1 1 it three times by planes raiding the three The 19 January 1945 raid smashed the Akashi
( I l>y airfields. Task Force 58 fighters did a small engine plant when it was in high gear (USSBS,
I Hint of damage on 18 July 1945. On 6 August Aircraft Division Report IV-2, Fig. 3). The
(."., Army fighters devoted more effort to build- Futami facilities, producing air-cooled engines, i; and burned 95 percent of them. Major were well into production by 19 January 1945,
1 liinery was destroyed by this raid. On 12 and by May were producing 285 units—the engine Liust, Army fighters burned out the coastal division's entire production for the month.
I a/.aki components branch 50 miles to the east. The peak month of air-frame production was July 1944, in which 407 air frames were produced, i L ATTACKS ON URBAN AREAS 330 of which were Tonys, liquid-cooled engine rea attacks came too late in the Akaslii area fighters (AppendLx E). oiave any effect on that plant. The plant had After July, air frame production began to slump lui completely smashed as a productive unit and continued downward throughout the remain-
I 'ic the heaviest Kobe area raids of July were der of 1944 and 1945 (Figs. 3a and 3b). This
;ri((l out. Also, the company had carried out its was caused chiefly by a shortage of liquid-cooled
;ii;il dispersion program for the engine section of engines from Akashi, and design modifications li Akashi plant prior to these raids. The area dictated by combat failures in Tony. A secondary
.1 s may have retarded the secondary dispersion factor was the sharp inroads into the skilled labor lUiain for engines and the primary dispersion of supply by the Armj' draft. Damages caused by ii Akashi air-frame branch to Miki. the 19 January 1945 attack on the Akashi facilities
1 -Tuly, prior to the 22 and 26 June raids wliich accentuated this air frame production slump.
I pled the Kagamigahara air-frame plant of the Growth of tlu? company's production capacity iiipany, the Ichinomiya factory had been con- in both air fI'ames and engines was a steady develop-
I ed to construction of complete airplanes and ment fed by military orders since 1927 when
1) I iiiiipany had built a series of Gifu workshops the company designed the type 87 heavy bomber.
-I dispersion measure. These were expanded Even before the war the company was executing
I I the raids. The area raids on the cities of 1,000-plane orders and in 1941 had a monthly pro-
I nuniiya and Gifu burned out these facilities, duction rate of about 80 airplanes and enguies. ."upietely nullifying the division's dispersion pro- In 1942 this had been upjjed to approximately
I
( ,iir frames per month and 125 engines. Dur- In November 1944 Lily was taken out of pro- nir friiiiics per I 1043 production averaged 225 (hiction but intelHgence estimatt^s slioweil con- Mill and 325 engines, tinuation of production on phines at the rate of lovernment orders ran about 10 percent below 00 per month until the end of the war. tool capacity the plant. I maximum machine of Estimates on engine production were excellent
Ii\('ver, with a severe shortage of skilled hihor (Figs. 6a and (jh).
I varying shortages of both engine components No intelligence seems to be available that
li air frame accessories tliis maxinnnn production Peggys (Ivi-67) were being assembled at the uential is a very theoretical figure. This is Kagamigahara plant beginning in December iiuiilit out by the fact that the percentage of 1944 or that the existence here of the radio-
I iplction on Government aii* frame contracts controlled Baka "I-GO-B" was known. Pro-
,• S4 percent in 1939, 45 percent in 1943, 66 duction averaged about 15 to 20 per month. h( (lit in 1944, and about 25 percent in 1945. Another intelligence oversight was in evaluating 'he company's record was no better on engines. the Miyakomojo factory of the company as an
J ling the first half of 1944 the company com- engine parts plant. This was entirely devoted to iteil production schedules for liquid-cooled Tony manufactiu-e, the fu'st one coming off the
: iiu's; but during the latter half of the year they assembly line in May 1945.
I \ met 50 percent of schedules. By January The evaluation of a plant's productive capacity
J there were 364 Tonys complete except for was made only on a basis of roof damage sus- i lid-cooled engines. The Tonys eventually tained. For tliis reason, the Akashi plant was MO converted to air-cooled radial installations. bombed, although almost all of its machinery had ling the spring of 1945 the Futami facilities been removed to dispersal sites. Ml' able to meet 75 percent of the Government Kawasaki's experimental planes were of inci-
. iihile for air-cooled engines. dental intelhgence interest. Bob (Ki-64), the ^oth direct attacks against the Kawasaki air- tandem-in-line engine fighter, was test-flown in
ft facilities and area raids knocked out 66 per- early 1944. It did not go into production because it of the engine production, or an estimated the type of engines around which it was built were
li:; engines lost to combat use, and 53 percent found to be unsatisfactory. The mockup had )tbe air frame production, or an estimated 2,040 been built for a four-engine bomber (Ki-91) •iibat air frames lost, during the first 7 months which had a 5,000-mile range with a 4-ton load.
) 1945. The effects of the 22 and 26 June air The Ki-108 was a single-place fighter with pres- ds on the large Kagamigahara air frame plant surized cabin unit. High performance was claimed ,'iich came close at the end of the war would have for this plane. About to go into jDroduction was igmented this loss had the war continued. the Baka I-GO-B, which carried a 660-poiuid war head. Frances was to be the mother plane INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION for this projectile. All experimental air-frame work was done at Kagamigahara. War Department Military Intelligence Service -2 production estimates for fighters at the Kawa- d facilities were very accmate (Fig. 4). Esti- REFERENCE ITEM ites of production trends lagged only about a r'mth behind the actual trends. Estimates on Reference Item 1. Miyakomojo plant report, Imber (Lily) production were not, however, as Kawasaki Corporation. use. Intelligence estimates were 46 percent low Reference item is filed with the USSES records, f 1942 production, a miscalcidation of 200 planes. Aircraft Division, Adjutant General's Office, War
] 104:j bombei- estimates wei'c very good (Fig. 5). Department, Washington, D. C.
1 12
APPENDIX A
1930-39 Air-Frame and Engine Production
1928- 1930- 1932, 1933- 1935- 1937, 1929 1931 1934 1936 1!
Type 88 Recco (BMW engines) 300 Type 92 fighter (BMW engines) 300 Type 93 light bomber (BMW engines). 250 Type 95 fighter (HA-9 engines) 800 Type 98 Ught bomber (HA-9 engines).
APPENDIX B ORGANIZATION CHART Kawasaki Aikcraft Industries Company, Ltd.
(Masayoki Nemoto, Afanaging Director)
Head office —Chiof, Masayoki Nemoto. Engine division—Masayoki Nemoto. Akashi plant— (Masayoki Nemoto, Stipt. Hokuban plant. Takatsuki plart^(T. Tominaga, ChieJ) Kobe, casting and forging plant. Futami plant. Sakai casting and lead-bronze plant. Air-frame dvmsio7i—Hisashi Tojo. Akashi airplane plant —Toshikiiiii Tateyama, Manager. Gifii plant (Kagamigahara)— Hisaslii Tojo, Manager. Miyakonojo plant —Tosliikuni Tateyama, Manager. Mr. Isliii, Axst. Manager. Ichinomiya plant—Kinzo Tanaka, Manager. Tokyo agency—Sei Yamasake, Chief.
14 ' < -15 O a ft.- "S
Z o o< o
t-
<
m
15 APPENDIX D EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS AIRCRAFT DIVISION-
Employment Manufacturer, Kawasaki; Plant, Corporation
Year -
APPENDIX E KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES CO., LTD.—TOTAL AIR FRAME PRODUCTION
S 10 11 13 ToUl 10 11 12 Total 10 11 13 ToUl 10 It 13 Total 10 U 12 Total 10 11 13 Total 10 11 12 Total
TottliMntlprodurtioD . Tatil planned production
Actual . PIsnneJ RO-Typc: Actus! Flannel Zi-K:
Actual . Planned Ki-U:
Actual . Flannel
Actual .
PlaaneJ . . . Xl-I^and Ki-tSS: Actual .... Ptanne]
Actual Planned. K!-UU:
Actual -. Planned. 2l-fl1I: Actual _ PlamiBl. XMtlll:
Adml . Planoed _ 40 Kf-«7: »
Actual . Plaaacd. 70 KI-100: Actual Planned.. . 366' St-IOUD, KMDIB, iao HQA: Actual Planned 140 100 130 UK) flO .
Tot total CofponUon e&flM production, m Alronlt DlvUlop Report IV-3 KAWASAKI KAGAMIGAHARA (Plant Report No. IV-1) THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY PRODUCTION a brother of Hideki Tojo, prime minister in the "Pearl Harbor cabinet". 'he Kagamigahara works (Kagamigahara Seis- The Army Ki-61 Tony single-engine fighter was ho), sometimes referred to as the Gifu works, organization's chief product. Through 194.3 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Co., Ltd., was the and 1944 this plane was powered with a liquid- cent to and slightly north of the Kagamiga- cooled engine. In 194.5 it was converted to a radial a militaiy akport and about five miles east of installation and its designation changed to Ki-100. town of Gifu. This area is 18 mUcs north of In its liquid-cooled version this plane was an (oya. The works consisted of 24 large, exact duplicate of the German Me 109. rably-type buUdings and hangars with numer- almost Its engine was of a Daimler-Benz design. smaller office and service-function structures, Six months before the end of the war the al floor area was 2,152,09 square feet (Appen- works' production was shifted to Mitsubishi's A). twin-engine bomber Peggy, Ki-67. By the end ^he Kagamigahara works was the largest plant had completed air-frame division. The of the war, however, the company I headquarters for the only a few of these planes. ks was also the center for a dispersal network the middle war years Kagamigahara slants and workshops scattered throughout the During twin-engine bomber LUy Ki-48, and o;amigahara fOifu) area. A few elements of produced the fighter Nick Ki-45. network were located over 100 miles distant the twin-engine to the war and during early 1942 the or- the northeast coast of Honshu. As head- Prior ganization had been producing trainers and iters for the air-frame division, Kagamigahara including Ki-56 Thalia, a version of pcted units at Akashi, Miyakonojo on Kyushu, transports the Lockheed IS; the Ro transport, also a twin- 1 Ichinonnya which produced complete au'craft. the Ki-36 Ida; the Ki-55 recon- The Kagamigahara management, in turn, re- engine transport; plane; and Ki-32 Mary, light bomber. ted to the general manager or managing naissance lattei two were shigle-engine aircraft. ctor for all the corporation's aviation activities The was headquartered at Akashi. This man was PLANT ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION ponsible to topside management of Kawasaki avy Industries Co., Ltd., holding company for As previously mentioned, managing director of th aviation and shipbuilding interests, located this works and of the air-frame division was Kobe. Hisashi Tojo. H^s assistant was Masayoshi Yako Lentil 1937 the aviation activities of Kawasaki and the factory manager was Kanabei Tanaka. re housed with its shipbuilding activities at To this top level of authority nine major depart- be. At this time the airframes organization ment heads reported. Managers at 13 branch )ved to Kagamigahara and started construction plants and workshops, which formed the ex- ich was to be augmented many times over the panded and dispersed Kagamigahara organization, xt eight years. also reported to these tliree men. During plant The works was entu'ely financed with corpora- visits and inten-ogations they furnished the major m money derived from private capital, part of the information on the organization. iroughout its history Kagamigahara was an The departmental organization of the works my contractor. Relationships between manage- was extremely detailed with many fine shadings nt and government agencies were harmonious, of authority which at times may have produced isashi Tojo, superintendent of the air-frame some friction. However, a well-integrated top vision and head of the Kagamigahara plant, was management may have been able to keep the 17 18 sjx'cializu- ['S of Mut.luirily from snarling'. 'IMic Kagaiiiigahnra. Women consitnted 22 |)ercent .-it n of (lc])iir(incnis as illuslralcd 1)V tlic works ol iahoi' force pc;d< cni|)loym('n( . chart (Ai)j)<'n(li.\ B) is almost an ;!iiii/.!ilion MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS 1(1 (liii)licati' of llic avcra^o large American nt cliarl. Direct allocation of materials to the works was Vs sliown in llic list of l)uil(ling additions over made by the Army section of the ministry of )crio(l of ciiilit years (Appendix A), Kagamiti'a- inimitions. This was an amuial piograni. How- iiicii ii was llie victim of a mushroom growtli w ever, there were quarterly meetings foiadjust- aled any a1teni])ts at mass-production lay-out nuMits. The materials committee of the Aiiriaft i)Ug the liuildings. 'I'his pi'ohlem was ac- Manufactures Control Association functioned dur- itualcd l)y two railroad systems, one a main ing 1944 but its efforts were highly iiu'lfcctual and the other a heavily traveled road which and it was abolished after 1 year. ected the plant area, Materials for the plant came from the following udivichiaily Ihe buildings were of modern steel nuijor sources: with spacious assembly Al alloy: Sumitomo Kinzoku K, Osaka I glass construction K and ,-s which were ailaptable to some degree of pro- Nagoya; Furnkawa Denki K K, Nikko and tion line arrangement. Frequent Army-dic- Osaka; Tokushu Keigokin K K, Shimonoseki, ed nioditications and perpetual anxiety over Nagoya and Kobe. atoned cancellation of Tony contracts because Special steel: Kawasaki Seihan plant, Nagoya; ngine shortages, prevented the organization Daitlo vSeiko K K, Nagoya and Yasuki; Nihon m making ])rogress toward assembly-line tech- Kokan K K, Kawasaki; Sumitomo Pipe plant, |ue (Apj)cndix C). Anmgasaki; Nihon Seitatau K K, Yawata. Peak of employment was reached in July 1944 Copper Alloy: Fm'ukawa Denki KK, Kobe; approximately 40,000 workers (Fig. 1). Kobe Seiko KK, Moji. wever, only one-half of this group was eii- As illustrated from the experience of this works, jed in, productive work. Until June 1944 the JajDanese were forced to make many s\ib- gamigahara was on a single ten-hour shift. In stitutions in metals. A threatened shortage of le employment had increased to the point light metals caused the company to begin experi- ere about 50 percent of the organization was mentation in wood fabrication in the fall of 1943. to go on two shifts. This work schedule The metals shortage did not develop so seriously s contimied until the bombing of 22 and 2G as predicted because of bombed-out plants le 1945. Labor shortage defeated attempts to throughout the industry. However, the com- a higher percentage of the workers into two pany was successful ui fabi'icating a complete fts. empennage structure from plywood which earned riie employment of student workers started in Army acceptance and would have put this into irch 19415 and by the end of the war they ])roduction in early 1945 if dispersion measiu'es ounted for 19 percent of the labor force. had not interfered. (Photos 1 and 2.) is group worked 6 days a week, 9 to 4, alter- Selection of the empennage as the structure for ing classroom technical and academic instruc- this exj)eiimentation may have been influenced II with aiJju'entice work in the factory. by th(> Gi'rman success in adapting Tony's coun- Ivagamigahara was highly dependent on the ti'r])!ut, the Me 109, to a plywood tail assembly. vernment's conscription program. It had 10 Plywood storage battery racks and ammunition •cent conscripted labor in 1942, 40 percent in boxes also passed Government tests. However, a 13, and 50 percent in 1944 and 1945. The model of the company's pilot seat failed. Plant my draft caused some trouble all tlu-ough the inspection showed that a large part of Kagamiga- r but in late 1944 its inroads into the labor hara's sizeable research facilities were devoted to pply, especially of skilled workers, brought plywood experimentation. (Appendix D.) out a critical situation. PRODUCTION STATISTICS Soldiers did not come into the plant until the ly late days of the wai'. By August 1945 Peak production month at Ivagamigahara was pre were only 1,100 of them employed at July 1944 when 29G planes, mostly Tony fighters, 19 'lUMl—47 i 20 iCMiiaiiuliu'lurecl (Fig;. 2). Pioduction had avci- Model 22 engines, i-ated at 1,020 liorsej)ower for il aboiil 230 planes per montli throughout 1944 tnke-olF. The engines were in tandem, one il the \nii (h'op in Nov('in})er stalled the down- mounted foi'e and one aft of the pilot. Tiie plane 1 curve. This was caused by Ariuy-dictated was test down in early 1944 but troubles with I lie lificalioiis iu Tony. (Photos 3 and 4.) li(|uid cooled engines caused a delay in putting the rem .5,SS ])lanes in 19.19, and 320 in 1940, ])lane into i)ro(luction. i;aniigaiuira's prcnhiction huilL up to 718 ])hxnes The Ki 91, a four-engine bondxT about the size 941, 757 in 1942, 1,518 in 1943, 2,68S in 1944 of the B-29 but of much less load-carrying ability 037 durini>: the last eight inonths of the war, was in th(> mockup stage of development. tal of 7,232 aircraft. Amount of completion Kagamigahara hail developetl anil put into lovernment contracts was 84 percent in 1939, quantity production a radio-controlled "Baka" i)crcent in 1940, 77 percent in 1941, 52 percent carrying a 060-lb. war head. This was known as 942, 74 percent in 1943, (SO i)ercent in 1944, "l-(i()-B". Frances or Peggy was intended as about 25 ])ercent during tlie months of 1945 the mother plane. jiondix E). The Ki-108 was an experimental twin-engine LU'ing the latter part of 1944 (h'liveries of fighter with pressurized cabin, a development of id-cooled engines from Akashi fell ln'iow sclied- Randy—production twin-engine fighter in the because of mechanical troubles, and m Janu- Akashi works. They were also experimenting on 1945 there were 364 Tony air frames awaiting Randy with an exhaust turbine. nes at Kagamigahara. Of these 265 were A large amount of German and American equip- .'erted to radial-engin(> installation. Liquid- ment in their shops for study indicated that od engines finally ariived for the remainder. Kagamigahara received good cooperation from Anny research agencies (Photo JUILDING AND REPAIR OF AIRPLANES 5). rebuilding or repair was done in the Kaga- EFFECTS OF BOMBING aliai'a works proper; however, skilled work- DIRECT ATTACKS 1 were dispatched next door to the Kagamiga- i military air depot where extensive work was The Kagamigahara works were fii-st hit on e. Most of this work was done by Army 22 Jime 1945 in a daylight precision raid from hanics, although company technicians were 0926 to 0945. Visibility was good and a mLxed >d in for extensive and specialized jobs. load of 4,000-lb and 2,000-lb l)ombs wei-e used with instantaneous fusmg. The Peggy final assembly VERSION TO EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT shop, subassembly building, parts-assembly shops, here was a well-developed experimental de- anil the administration liuilding were hit. iment at Kagamigahara and 12 percent of the The raid of 26 Jmie 1945, from 0910 to 1049, ding facilities were devoted to this work. In using 500-pound high-explosive bombs hit the ition to one new and very large building used Tony final-assembly shop, the experimental build- an experimental shop, there was a modern ing, the engineering offices, subassembly shops, irl tunnel devoted to flutter research. workers' dormitories, the school building, and the he research division reporting directly to the press shops. This later group of buililmgs suf- laging director, included the wind timnel de- fered by far the most irreparable ilamage. This i:ment, the flutter research and the material second raid was by far th(> more damaging arch departments. The design and experi- (Photos 6 and 7). ital division, which also reported to the All public utUitdes were knocked out by the laging director, included the customary group raiils and company officials reported repair parties engineering departments and in addition a were greatly disorganized. ingth and construction department (static The two raids knocked out every important '•ing) and the experimental mainifacturing building in the works. Manufacturing activities Sirtmeiit. were permanently halted (Appendix F). mong the important projects was Rob (Ki-64), Most of the buildings were blasted and burnt 'u-gc fighter with two liquid-cooled, Ha-60, out, but structural damage was small. 21 Stocks of raw materials were lost, but many planned as a result of damage to acetylem half-finished planes could have been completed generators. throuoh cannibalization. In the 22 June 1945 raid 61 people were k^ By the time of the raids, a hi Kagamigahara's machine tools had been dispersed ill the 26 June 1945 raid. to small workshops and branch plants, most of which were in the nearby area. Only 112 of Kaga- INTERRUPTIONS DUE TO AREA ATTACjS migahara's 1 ,508 machine tools were in the works On 28 July 1945 an incendiary attack ags at the time of the raid. Of this 1 12 oidy 4 percent the city of Ichinomiya completi-ly destroyet were badly damaged. Subsequent area raids 470,000-square-foot Ichuiomiya Branch fac badly damaged 15 percent of the 1,508 machine which was prodiicmg Tonys at the rate of 2^ tools. month on a rising production cm-ve. The If undamaged by aii' jaids, Kagamigahara pro- 1945 incendiary raid on the city of Gifu ilestr duction Would have probably leveled off at about the workshops in that city which had been acqi 200 air frames per month through late 1945 and as k(\v uii,its in the Kagamigahara dispe early 1946. Pioduction would have been about plans. These were the last remaining functic equally divided between Tony and Peggy. units of the once large Kagamigahara networ The war ended before the company could do Prior to the actual bui'uing out of Ichino more than I'cpaii' a few of the damaged public and Ciifu in July 1945 the population of this utilities and clean out the buildings. However, had suft'ered very little inconvenience fron (he following prioiities for repair had been set up: raids. Because the Kagamigahara works ilight engineering, asseml)ly buildings, heat-treat- been bombed out by the ti.me these raids occi ing facilities, press buildings and experimental tlieir eft'ects on production were not measui sho])s. The nninagement ])lanned to resunic |:>rodurtion INTERRUPTIONS DUE TO SUPPLIES at Kagamigahara by utilizing many of Ihe jigs Air attacks had not as yet affected recei tools wei'c as well as and which not damaged, materials and supplies. Fi-o.m 1942 on, j rejjairing the main asseml)ly l)uildings and con- types of electrical and hydraulic equipment veiling them to a variety of processes. behind delivery schedule because the- man The (omijlete ])lant would not have been re- turers of this intricate and specialized e(|uip paired. Even after repairs, total production could not expand at the same rate as the air-i n would have been small because of the disjointed plants. The Tokaido district earthquake in effoils wiiicli Kagamigahai-a's dispersion bad also retarded deliveries of these parts iuxd I caused. ponents (Appendi.x D). The effects weie Probably llic most destructive blows at Kaga- about to be felt when the war ended. migahara's protluction were hits on the heat- DISPERSAL Ireating facilities and near misses which jarred I the 2,000-ton hydraulic i)ress sufficiently to cause Fear of air raids had started dispersion oil irre])ai'able damage to the installation. Kagamigahara works in Novcunber and Dece'J They also had no hope of re-establishing 1944 to the Ichinonuya plant. On 4 April (( iiilciior rdiiiniunical ions and bad 1o depend on the Government ordered the company to begJi messenger service. official dispersion jjiogram. This piogram P After the bond)ing, despite a previous Army schetluled for completion in August 1945JI ])riority on Peggy, the emphasis was shifted to Kagamigahara officials estimated it would )( 'i'ony on which there was a better chance of have been ready for production before Dece ui re Witli tlie 2,000-ton hydraulic press ilamaged, The first phase of this plan was the acquis jo an atteji:|'l uas made to use hand molding. Pipe of a group of schools and small mills in the it bending was attempted o\('r hand gas buiners as of Ciifu for conversion to workshops and hoiu a result of cut ling off the supply of gas from units for 500 to 1,000 employees each. Shi'i! llie main source. Klectric welding was also neighborhood yards, and parks in the fori* 22 •I itiinind llic KiitiamijjaliiU'ii wdiks were niiidc Service (G-2) was very good. I'idduclion esti- ' l\ lo store |)iirts and asscinhlics. m;ites were about right. The only omission in he second pluiso of this first disfx'rsid pl.-in \\,-is tills regard was failure to assess any Peggy (jro- teri-.iin ; /.ilion of tiie forests and rou^li of duction at this plant. Proximity of the target 1 itiv for lar^io assombiy sliops and iindci'tiioiind to the Kagamigahnra military air depot at which .ill.itions. Uiidprground facilities in tiiis net- all tyi)es of planes were serviced and tested may ik were located at Mizunami, Nakatsugawa, have served to confuse photographic interpreta- ; INI and Waclii. P"'orest installations were at tion on this point. n Katabira, and Akutanii. All these loca- A])|)arently movement by night of a major - w ith the exception of the small shops on the proportion of the works' machine tools to dispersed I hi'.ist coast of Honshu previously mentioned, locations nlso went undetected by photogi'.-ipliir \\ ithin a 2o-mile ratlius of the main Kaga- intelligence. war did not last to j)i'ove or i di.-ira works. The long enough 1 I lie first disj)ei'sion program 1,900,000 square disprove the diagnosis that Kagamigahara 's pi'o- of facilities had been ordered b_v the Govern- (lucti\ity had l)een destroyed l\y the raids of 22 j, t. At the end of the war 1,200,000 square and 26 June. There is some evidence that after a had been completed and machinery had been two- or three-month period of recujiei-ation the sferred or was in transit. works could have resumetl about 2.5 percent of its f the 1,200,000 square feet of completed dis- former ;issenil)]y functions. al aren appro.ximately 2.^ percent was in under- nd instidlations which represented half the VULNERABILITY emplated area. The largest underground illation was at Mizunami with 2.50,000 squnre Kagamigahara 's most vulnerable facilities as excavated but largely without lighting or listed by company officials in ortler of priority hinery installations. Tunnels were from 12 were: (1) heat-treating facilities, (2) the 2,000- feet in width and from 1.5 to 21 feet high. ton and 1,000-ton hydraulic presses, and (3) its he area raids on the cities of Ichinomiya and acetylene gas supply. All three were hit in the 22 I, which burned out the company's buildings and 26 June raids. e, necessitated a second dispersion program. Most vulnerable factor in the dispei'sed and ; was an expansion of the first plant through branch factory facilities proved to be their in- iddition of many more forest workshops which flammability in the area raids on the cities of formed into three production lines anchored Gifu and Ichinomiya. lino, Kagamigahara and Mizunami (Fig. 3). Apparently, fro.m the comnients of Kagamiga- ransportation difficulties were a tremendous hara officials, the thi-eat of air raids had a dis- licap, des])ite relatively short hauls, in Kaga- astrous eft'ect on workers' morale. This was a ihara's dispersion program. The nearby rail- decisive factor in the extensiveness of the dis- s could not be used and roads were narrow persal plans. overcrowded. ver a six months' period from Alarch through GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF PLANT IN. ust 194.5, company officials estimated tJiat SPECTION AND INTERROGATION ersal activities were directly responsible for a fuction loss of 54 Tony aircraft. Considering This was a well-organized plant IjuI the pro- ow point to which production had fallen due duction was disappointing. This was due to the ther causes, this represented a large part of persistence in using the inferior Ha-60, Model 22, works' total possible production during this liquid-cooled engine supplied by their sister )d. (Photos 8-10.) Kawasaki organization at Akashi. This cranky ]iroduct was never available in sufficient quanti- INTELLIGENCE CHECK ties. Even the engines supplied were high in failures. The resultmg design changes ordered a whole, intelligence information on this by the Ar.my because of this, caused innumerable 'i, mostly complied by Military Intelligence production stoppages. The sense of frustration 23 us STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT IN KAWASAKI (GIFU) FIGURE 24 I . resent JiKMit (owiird tlieir Kau'nsaki sister a switch to radial installation in Tony, it was too nt wliicl) this ciiiised nnionjj the KngJiniijiJihiini late in tlie war to have any effect. odieials was apparent. They wei-e nagemeiit. REFERENCE ITEM verlcss to secure early redress, however, be- ise tlieii- ii)aiia 25 y III i : • .. '^V ««"»»;<»!rti|j * s^//«5- Xo. 1. Photo — Outer wing panel assembly jigs, Kagamigahara plant. As can be seen, jigs were light in constnic but adequate. \ Photo No. 2. — Wood niockups in cxperinieiital huilding at Kaganiigahara. Many types of .\nicrican, (lei-iiian Urilisli rriiiipnienl was found in llii< buiidiiiK, Interesting was uiockup of Japanese power driven turret carr.'l four eannon. 26 ' )To No. 3. — Tony, in new radial engine version sliown in final assembly building at Kagamigahara. Large arclied-roof hangar-type buildings constituted about one-half of the plant's structures. 27 716941—47 5 I I'liciiii X 29 Photo No. 6. —Saw-tooth roof-type buildings at Kagamigahara showing light structural damage. The 500-i)oinid explosives of second raid (2(i June 1945) did majority of damage on works, including these buildings. 30 HuTO No. 7. — Raiidy (Ki-102) fighter in experimental building at Kagamigahara. This plane was manufactured at Akashi and was brought to the experimental center at Kagamigahara. This picture shows in detail typical building damage. 31 Photo No. 8. —Tuny figlUer assemblies hidcieii iiiidor the trees about one halt" mile from Kagaiuis^ahaia works. 1 was part of dispersion i)laii whicli intended to use main works onl_v as assembly sliop for part of output after J raids. 32 1'hoto No. 9. — Assemblies in yard of shrine one-lialf mile fnmi Kagamiftahara plaiil. iTO No. 10.— As.somblies have crowded objects of worship out from under the roof of this shrine at Kagamigahara. 33 KAWASAKI (GIFU), APPENDIX A PLANT EXPANSIONS KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, KAGAMIGAHARA WORKS June 1937-March 1945 Name of component Building arc Date of expansion Building or shop plant (square feel Main factory at June 1937. Construction of first building. 45, 8e Kaganiigahara. Do September 1937- March 1938... Office building, final assembly shop, boiler room, 101.8; forging shop, heat-treatment shop, etc. Do. April 1938- March 1939.. Drafting room, fuselage wing components sho]), foundry 140,0; and press work shop, etc. 1939- Do_ April March 1940. Xorthern press work shop, etc . 154. 6) Do. April 1940- Marcli 1941. First ground engineering shop, higli pressure oil units 172. work shop, etc. Do. April 194N March 1942. Covering shoji, second ground engineering shop 182, 4!' Do. April 1942- March 1943. Third ground engineering shop, cover units work shop, 264, 1! second final assemlily shop, etc. Do. April 1943--March 1944. Fourth and fifth ground engineering shops, etc.. 419,9" Do. April 1944- March 1945. Third final assembly sho]), experimental workshop, 670, 2' etc. Total. 2, 152, 0" 34 : APPENDIX B ORGANIZATION CHART ii.iiiii' DiviVidii, Ilisnshi Tciji), inlendc?!!. Stipn /I'c.s'ca/c/i divisiiiii Wind-t iinnil, IIiiIIit research, njaterial research. 'iirjihiiK pUiiil — Tci^liiUiiiii 'l';il('v;uii;i, Siipi riiiliiiil- Designing and cxpi rinii-ntdl division: ii |i.ir'(iueiit of general alfiiirs, |)ei'soiiiiel clejiartiiienl, PlanniuK anfl design, fuselage, wing unit, poucr plajjt, |iri)diictioii deiiartnient, factoi'v iiiaiiatjer, tcclmi- arnuiiuent, drawing, strength and construction, r:\\ Department. experimental manufacturing. n, 'I'cijci, Sii til; I'lnniiing division: I ijahara (Gifii) plant — Hisaslii pcrinUiidi )i~:i \ iislii Yakci, Aifnisldiil; Kanhi'i 'I'a'naka, I'ocluni Planning, industrial alTairs, factory power, technical :' 't,in-. assembling, parts engineering, process management. I'linrd (lirisi(i)i: Production division: " Mcral affairs, estate, docvuuent, finance, vigilanee, Construction, Misato plant, Sakahogi plant, Xakat- iiininiodities, hcaltli and sanitation, medical treat- siigawa plant, Kiyosu plant. ment. Inspection division: (Jii'isio/i: Materials insjiection, function inspection, production Office laljor, faetdry lalxir, stiuient laliur, durniituries, inspection, experimental ins|)ection, flight adjust- welfare, health insurance. ments, and jjreparations. iah division: City of Gifu workshops, Kisogawa Ijranch factory, Saka- Material.? preiJaration, parts preparaticm. materials hogi branch factory, Nakatsugawa branch factory, management, paynient in.spection, transportation. Sabaye branch factory (XW Honshu), Fukui branch dishmcnt division: factory (NW Honshu), Kawasaki hospital. Young Materials, machinery, construction, utilization. men's .school, Ichinomiya factory. 35 DORMITORIES en. J KAWASAKI (GIFU), APPENDIX D CRITICAL SHORTAGES IN ACCESSORIES (Actual statistics lost in bombing, information supplied from memory of plant officials) U S STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT DORMITORIES INDUSTRIES CO. LTD. K A WASAK I (Gl FU ) LXXXV_ ; APPENDIX E BOMB PLOT KAGAMIGAHARA WORKS LEGEND JUN22 JUN26 RAID RAID O D INDICATES BOMB HIT COMPLETELY BURNT DOWN OR COMPLETELY DAMAGED HALF BURNT DOWN OR HALF I II I DAMAGED KAWASAKI AKASHI (Plant Report No. lV-2) THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY fTRODUCTION casting and forging plant, and the Uokuban |)lant w liich produced gears. 'Flic Akaslii works (Akaslii Scisukusliu) of Akashi facilities were a wholly-owned unit xwasiiki Aiicral't Iiulustries Co. Ltd., was located The of Aircraft Industries Co. Ltd., which out two miles northwest of the town of Akashi. Kawasaki subsidiary of Kawasaki Heavy In- was on the shores of Akashi Strait of the Inland in turn was a dustries Co. Ltd. The aviation branch had I)eeu a and 12 miles to the west of Kobe. organized in 1918 and the company had been able The facilities, which combined an air-frame and financial control of all its facili- craft engine works, contained a floor area of to retain complete ties. Construction of the Akashi works was ghtly over 3,300,000 square feet. This in- 1937 the aircraft activities left uled S assemhly buiidings, 4 machine shops ami started in when entirely an Army contractor. buildings tlevoted to fabrication. Ten addi- Kobe. Akashi was history of Kawasaki's production was one Mial buildings were used for inspection and The fed military orders from the search and the remaining structures were usetl of steady growth, by warehouses, welfare and service buildings, end of World War I into World War II. building the French Salm- est buildings were of modern light-steel frame The company began airplane engine under license in 1919. ul glass construction (Appendix A). son and the license to manufacture The I'ugine facilities of Akashi constituted In 1926 it purchased works (Bayerische Motern- 287,700 square feet of productive floor area and the Bavarian motor werkc) engine, and in 1927 designed the Type 87 le air-fiame organization occupied 1,047.700 powered with two uare feet of productive floor area. heavy bomber which was the company received an order The Akashi works, general headquarters for all BMWs. In 1928 for 300 88 reconnaissance planes, also le Kawasaki aviation activities, constituted one Type ' the two large units of Kawasaki Aircraft Indus- powered with Kawasaki manufactured BMWs. 92 fighters was given the ics Co. Ltd. The other was located at Kaga- An order for 300 Type plant was an im- igahara (USSBS Aircraft Division Airframes company in 1930. The power company exe- lant Report IV-1). Akashi was the corpora- proved BMW. During 1933 the 93 light bombers on's largest works and headquarters for the cuted an order for 250 Type In 1935 it igine division. powered by the BMW, IVIodel 9. fighter of the An air-frame works had i)een added to the large started manufacturing the Type 95 order for 800. This igine facilities at Akashi early in 1941 to produce China campaigns on an a hquid-cooled )niplete aircraft. This works was under the fighter was powered by the Ha-9, the company. In 1938 •ganizational structure of the Kagamigahara air- engine manufactured by 98 fight bombers powered- ame management. However, in such matters an order for 1,000 Type model was received. 1 employment, air-raid defense, etc. it operated with Ha-9 luler the over-all Akashi organization. Most important products of Akashi's engine The plants at Futami and Takatsuki, conceived facilities were its line of liquid-cooled engines. at 5 parts plants for Akashi, but later converted into These were Ha-60 Model 22, rated 1,150 idependent units producing complete engines by horsepower for takeoff, and Ha-60 Model 33, 10 dispersal program, operated under the Akashi rated at 1,350 horsepower for take-ofl", both out- igiue-division management. growths of the Daimler-Benz design purchased Other ofl'shoots of the Akashi engine division from Germany in 1937. They were used in ere the .Sakai casting and forging plant, the Kobe Tony fighters. 39 The Akashi facilities also produced the na-35 Only after pi-oduetion had halted in If Model 22, and the Ha-35 Model 32^Nakajima- were soldiers brought into the plant. Tli dcsigned radials, rated at 1,100 horsepower and total was 717 at the high point. 1,150 horsepower for take-off, respectively. They The engine-plant employment increased stead were used iii Oscar fighters and Ki-115, the through many difficulties, such as the An Nakajima suicide plane. A late product was the draft, uutU bombing knocked out the plant Ha-4.5 Model 21, Nakajima 1,970 horsepower January 1945 (Fig. 1). Average monthly wi radial, used primarily in Frank fighters. at Akashi was 150 yen. Primary products of the air-frame facilities were In June 1943 the engine pl;int went on two Nick, Ki-4.5, a twin-engine fighter in conventional hoin- shifts. Through 1944 and 1945 about and night-fighter versions and Randy, Ki-102, percent of the plant's departments were on also a twin-engine fighter but of single-place double shift. A shortage of skilled work performance. design and higher prevented the entire persomiel from going on t basis. Labor timi-over svas from 1 to 2 perc^ ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION . per month. figure in the Akashi works was Masayoki A key Air-frame employment at Akashi reached Nemoto who was managing director of all (1) peak in August 1944 with 23,798 workers (Fig. Kawasaki aviation activities, (2) managiiig direc- Students constituted 25 percent of this grc tor of the Kawasaki engine division and (3) and women about 5 percent. It succeeded director of the Akashi works itself. managing putting only about 30 percent of the organizat Toshikuni Tateyama was superintendent of the on tliis basis bj' mid- 1944. There were no soldi air-frames division reporting to the au'-frame in the air-frame departments. management of Ivagamigahara and, through The engine and air-frame branches functioi them, to Nemoto (Appendix B). under a common personnel department and All department heads of both engine and air- is possible, because of the labor shortage, t frame facilities attended interrogations at the most skilled workers were of necessity channe Akashi works. The Sakai and Kobe casting and into the engine organization. This left the forging plants were also represented at these frame organization extremely short. meetings. Nemoto's presence also assured com- plete cooperation in securing information for this MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS. report. Allocation of materials for engine nianul The plant was organized on fairly well-estab- turers was made by the Army section of hshed flow-line principles (Appendix A): but, with ministry of munitions on the customary ann destruction of the buildings almost complete, and basis with readjustments made quarterly. Ci all machinery icmoved, it was impossible to material sources were as follows: reconstruct the details of fabrication and assem- Materials Sapptitrs Locntiov bly. Frequent design changes and production Al and Mg Kobe Kiiizokii phiiit of Ivobc. stoppages, however, probably discouraged any castings. Kawasaki. attempt at real mass ])ro Kobe Seiko K_ . Kobe. time was the employment of women above a K Kawasaki Seihan plant,. Nishinomiy level of 5 percent. Students constitut(>d about 7 percent of the labor force in November 1944. The material department for air frames Conscripted in reality branch of the ceni labor never was more than , 10 Akashi was a percent of the workers. material de[)artrnent for the entire air-frame 40 42 izatioii wliicli \\;is ;i( KtifiJiiiiijinliiiin (I'SSBS During the spring of Kill the pl.-inl iiad been jraft Division AiriVnincs I'lanl licporl delayed in I'eaching its production |)eak 1). Ak'iislii's iiiiitorisil sources iiiul slioitiiiics I \|)lioid-l'('\ cr epidemic. e itienticiil to those ciiunierated in the iva^ii- ahani |)lant report. REBUILDING AND REPAIR According to company officials, inferior materials ODUCTION STATISTICS accounted for 5.3 percent of all engines returned to Akashi for factory rework and overhaul dui-ing .kaslii's engine division ijrodiiced .i IoImI of and 1945. 559 units against 15,772 ordered and i;i,S4() 1944 sent from Kaganiigidiaia, Tachi- aeity during tlie period April ]9IJ9-Angnst 1945 Engines were inv de()ots. pendix ('). kawa, Osaka and Tachiarai Army furnished far the largest number 'lanned ])roductioii lor tiie air-1'ranie division Kagamigahara by 8fi7 engines died 2,714 units from Sej)tendHM' 1941 tliiough of these overhaul jobs. Of the re- teniber 1945, while actual production, which |)aired and overhauled, 457 contained poor quality through rough ed in August 1945, was 1,945 completed air materials, 229 were damaged nes (Appendix D). service treatment, 145 were routine service over- suffered battle and seven were lighest monthly engine production foi- Akaslii hauls, 29 damage training engines. 1 450 imits during November 1944. Average itlily production during 1944 was 350 units After the crippling raid of 19 January 1945, the month (Fig. '.]). This was about ecpially engine division was able to produce 292 engines ided between liquid-cooled and radial engines. in May 1945. Two hundred of these came from )uring the first half of 1944 the coni]3any was the undamaged Futami ])lant an I mechanical fi'oubles they met only 57 percent At Akashi there had been no conversion to sub- heir (piota during the latter half of the year, stitute wooden assemblies and parts which had nufacture of licjuid-cooled engines was ham- been developed at Kagamigahara. ed by main bearing, supercharger, oil and ling-system failures. DIVERSION TO EXPERIMENTAL ENGINES hortagos of materials and mechanical failures Very little of Akashi's engine facilities was jughout the war thus prevented the type of devoted to experimental work beyond some ic production scheduling which means mass exhaust thrust utilization on the engines used in duction anil an efficient shop. Splitting the the fighter Randy. The company preferred to at between the manufacture of licpiid-cooled buy foreign designs or produce other Japanese I radial engines was probably another factor models. Two engines of Ha-240 designation, venting mass production. licpiid-cooled and rated at 1,800 horse])ower take- 'roduction of Nick fighters in the Akashi aii- off, had been built but failed in tests. ne division reached its ])eak in August 1944 At the end of the war the primary experimental li 119 units ])roduced (Fig. 4). At this .time effort of the company was devoted to super- version was begun to the Randy fighter and charging the Ha-60, Model 33 hquid-cooled engine duction slum])ed. The shortage of electric-d of 1,350 horsepower at take-oft'. No jet or rocket ipment, pet cocks and plungers resulting from work was done by the company. The Army Tokaido district earthquake was another recjuested the company to undertake .some of this tor in the slump which occurred during this work in 1943 but the company was permitted to iod. It was primarily a disruption of the refuse the undertaking. asportation system resulting from the earth- delivercil to the ke rather than damage to the equipment plants All planes from this works were was no rebuild- ich produced the shortages. During 1944 the Osaka military air depot. There Akashi. nt met 80 percent of its government schedules. ing or repair of aircraft at 43 Attack data Intelligence data January 1945 raid. Li.uitod structural Ph.itu Xo. 1.—Engine plant niachine shops damaged by ligiu i.MKI-il..,) HEs of 19 damage was caused by 22 and 26 June 1945 raids. 47 Photo No. 2. — Detail of engine machj sliops damaged by 500-lb. HEs in- January 1945 attack. Only 7 percent machinery was damaged. Machinery w removed lo disposal sites following tl attack. k ft Photo Xo. 3. — Looking south toward engine- parts assembly shops. .Most damage occurred in 19,January 1945 attack by 500-lb. HEs. 48 I - i|); spcontl i^roiip- aiiicliiiH' sliop, Irinl shop, ever, area raids iclarded ircovery and dispersion. iii>spit;ii, homes, lack of sleep, Iransporlalion 1 oflicc, shoj), Destroyed 1 s-assombly shipping 1 I'ooni; third groii]) production oliicc nnd disrujjtion, etc., hi'ought about an absentee rate I ling U'ehouses. (d' S to 10 percent dui'ing this j)eriod. The disruj)- In the air-fi'anii' inancii the first priority was tion to trans])()iialion also slowed the dispersal /en the Hight-cnginci'iing sliop. Jlcrc phuies of tools to new |)lant sites. re caunihalizcd and about a dozen were ilerances were lowered iii the machining of parts. duced 13 engines up to the end of the war and Futami about 1,200 engines. ^TERRUTPIONS DUE TO ALERTS AND In the spring of 1945 the Government felt that AREA ATTACKS. even more complete dispersion was necessary. Since the 19 January attack which stopped As a result, the liquid-cooled engine facilities were reduction at Akashi was also the first raid in the in the process of dispersion to a system of tiuinels rea, no measureable production loss due to air in two forested hills north of Takatsuki (Photos lerts was experienced. After 19 January, how- 10-12), and the Futami facilities were moved to a 49 ^/^ "., '^ . ^ .••^l ^^s O'.' ^i:. Photos 4-9.--\"it\\s of Akashi jjlant Imililin^,- dau]at;ud and destroyed by June 1945 attacks in which 4,000-lb. fused instantaneous! V were used. ~^.^" :UJI*^7-|. Photo No. 5. 51 \wm^ immmm tW^ftM twork of small spiiininjj: mills mid forest liuts ery might eventually have negated the effect of ound Jshihara, far back in the hills iioilli of the 19 January raid which put Akashi out of tami. The Takatsuki hraiifh was scheduled business. Th<' 4,000-poun(l bombs in quantity, a production of 200 entwines jier month and tin; fused for a slight delay, would have been necessary itanii i)i'anch for 250. Both were scheduled to lo do this job. ,ch full i)iotluclion under their second dispersion It was mentioned by ofllcials at this j)lant that ograni late in 1945 (Fip. 5). the destruction of their heal-treating jirocess and The air-frame division was scheduled to move acetylene gas facilities was one of the most effec- a dispersed location at Miki hut never was tive results of the raids. e to carry out the program. Morale of th(> workers, who were living in GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF PLANT IN- racks at the dispersed sites without their SPECTION AND INTERROGATION nilies, was low. Transportation for material machinery was very difficult. P^ood was Akashi personnel, following the orders of Tce at dispersed locations and communications managing director Nemo to, were very cooperative iween plants were frequently cut. and provided all the requested information as well as certain voluntary material which was not INTELLIGENCE CHECK necessary for this report. The interrogations the impression of a War Department Military Intelligence Service gave well-organized but rather inflexible organization -2) monthly production estimates were phenom- dominated by the above-mentioned lUy close throughout 1944; however, estimates Nemoto. inferior quality of its radial-engine production during 1944 were 80 The liquid-cooled engine was the chief factor in the company's failure cent low. Kawasaki had been in production to account for a larger percentage of the country's radials throughout 1943 without any estimate total engine and aircraft production. MIS during this period. With a power-plant design staff, VIonthly estimates on Nick twin-engine fighters good and the product M'hich might have resulted therefrom, the re excellent and were within a few percent of com- ual production. pany might have accounted for about 25 to 30 percent of the country's engine production rather ^holographic intelligence was faiily accurate, than 15 percent. There Avould have been a wever, the movement of almost all machine similar increase in air frame production if Tony s from the works after the 19 January 1945 had been equipped originally with an air-cooeds d escaped notice. The result was an over- engine. This was the result of the companly' iinate of the amount of productivity still policy of depending on engines of foreign design. laining in the works, and the raids of 22 and June with 4,000-pound high-explosives were REFERENCE ITEM lost wasted. VULNERABILITY Reference item for this report is filed with the records of the United States Strategic Bombing tlost vulnerable feature of the engine plant Survey, War Department, Washington, D. C, loubtcdly was its precision machinery hi the care of the Adjutant General. chine-shop buildings. Failure to damage seri- Reference Item 1.—Machine tool damage ly any appreciable percentage of this niachui- tables. 53 Photo No. 10. —Tunnel months at Takat.suki vuidergronnd engiue-di.spersal plant. Xote netting over entrances crude hoists for handling machinerj-. Only rough .'^teep trails led to this remote location. '^"Wm Photo No. 11. — ('lo.se-u]) showing crude ci instruct ion of Takatsuki tunnels. Most of tunnels were not faced and had b constructed early in war by Korean slave labor as an ammunition dump. 54 Photo 12. —Trellis at Takatsuki for liauling machinen- to tunnels. 55 us STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT IND. AKASHI PLANT FIGURE 5 56 TlflMl O 17 (Pice p. SB) APPENDIX B ORGANIZATION CHART AKASHI PL/AN T Ilcad office engine division: Akaslii—Planning, equipment, production, technical, Masavoki Nemoto Manager inspection, Takatsuki plant, Futann' plant, Hokuban plant, Kobe casting and furging i)lant,Saka casting orporalion head office— Maaayoki Nemoto Chief. ancl lead-bronze plant. Deputy of general atfairs, finance, headquarters of Note: For organization chart of Akashi division see technical director. Kagamigahara plant report. 57 U APPENDIX C ENGINE PRODUCTION—PLANNED, CAPACITY, AND ACTUAL—APRIL ie40-AUGUST 1945 Ju. P«b. Mv. A|>t. Mfty Jura- July Aut. a«pi. | Nor. t>«-. [Total Nov. Total , Mtr. Ape. May June July On. ; Mayjlunt JulrUiif. I . Juiu July Aug. S«pl. OH. Dm. I 9tpi. { May Oct. Nov, D«c Total Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June I July Aug. Bepl. Oct. Nov. Dec, Total Ian. Feb. Mar. Apr. May JuiM July Auk. ^I>t. Ool. Nav. Dee. Total { j PlinnKl... eOl Wl IID JO ID 30 A dull I I I I ::l::::;:l;:::::l;:::::l I I wl IS Ml sol &9I 50 :i !SI SI S|--d-,,i::::::l;;::±;:::l SSI:: B»-U ... 100 1 I I 1 110 110 » 120 I 130 IMOU HO !» 120 01 50 1 40 10 1 30 1 MO 1.. I I I I 1 I I 4 I los los seo 110 I 11; lU SB IB ! I I I I I 73 70 I 17 Il.lia I.. I I I I 4,343 Ill llM 1.800 S,174 rUnnH 2.T3S Jl21» ArtUKl ] 2.7BI ) a.ivn I 3.107 ..6.07a . .. fl.3ia . Anu«J . . 4. lU . I'lknnrl . 1 s.STa 1^773 13.840 Anutl .. laua K) 131 1,373 ;iaMI No J Fadui Pap- APPENDIX D KAWASAKI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES CO.. LTD.—AKASHI AIRPLANE PLANT—AIRFRAME PRODUCTION—PLANNED AND ACTUAI^SEPTEMBER 1941-SEPTEMBER 1945 I i^m TRMWM 9CM00L aOAfe PLOT 19 JAN. 1945 ATTACK 500 LB. BOMBS 245 HE 30 UXB AK4SHI PLANT OP KAWASAKI AIRCRAF INDUSTRIES APPENDIX TISMI O ' 47 |ru« p. SB) No. 1 C' 1 DD l_l DD 1 \ DD SWOfl SHEET-liETM. a'Hpi] n -'SHEET-METAL g UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY LIST OF REPORTS The folliiwins is a l>il>liograi)liy of rt'|)orts resulting from 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, llildesheim, (;er- le Survey's stuflies of tlie iMiropean and Pacific wars, many hose reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be pur- 22 Metallgussgcsellschaft G m 1) H, Leipzig, Germany ased from tlie Superintendent of Documents at the 23 Aluminiumwerk G m b H, Plant No. 2, Bittcrfeld, overnnicnt Printing Office, Washington, D. C. Germany 24 Gebrueder Ciiuliiii G m b H, Ludwigshafen, Germany 25 LuftschifTbau, Zeppelin G m 1) H, Friedrichshafen European War on Bodensee, Germany 26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 27 Rudolph Rautenl)ach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin- gen, Germany The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum- 28 Lippewerke Vereinigte .Muininiumwerke .\ G, Lunen, mary Report (European War) Germany The United States Strategic Bomljing Survey: Over- 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hcfidernheim, all Report (European War) Germany The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German 30 Duerener JMetallwerkc A G, Duren \\'ittenau-Berlin War Economy & Waren. Germany AIRCRAFT DIVISION AREA STUDIES DIVISION (By Division and Branch) *31 Area Studies Division Report 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Aircraft Division Industry Report on Hamburg 5 Inspection Visits to Vario\is Targets (Special Rejjort) 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomlnng on Wuppertal 34 .\ Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Airframes Branch Bombing on Dusseldorf 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, Germany on Solingen 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of .\rea Bombing 7 Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Heiterblick, German on Remscheid 8 A T G Maschinenbau, GmbH, Leipzig (Mockau), Germany 37 .\ Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bonil)ing on Darmstadt 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomliing Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany on Liibeck (Over-all Report 39 \ Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on 1 Messerschniitt A G, | Part A Berlin, .-Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort- Augsburg, Germany Part B ] mund, 01)erhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen I Appendices I, II, III I Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany i Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, Germany CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 1 Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu- stadt, Austria ^ *40 Civilian Defense Division— Final Report 41 Cologne Field Report 42 Bonn Field Report Aero Engines Branch 43 Hanover Field Report 44 Hamburg P'ield Report — Vol I, Text; \'ol II, Flxhibits ') Bussing Flugmotorcnwerke ni NAG G b H, Bruns- 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report wick, Germany 46 Augsburg Held Report Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, 47 Germany Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, Germany EQUIPMENT DIVISION ! Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW), -Munich, Germany Electrical Branch • Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany *48 German Electrical Equipment Indu.str\' Report 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany Light Metal Branch Optical and Precision Instrument Branch Light ]Metals Industry (Part I, Aluminum of Germany (.Part II, Magnesium *50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report 59 Abrasives Branch Submarine Branch The German Abrasive Industry 92 German Submarine Industry Report 52 Maver and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main ficinuiny 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-X'^urnberg A G, Au burg. Germany Anti-Friction Branch 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hanrburg, Germany *53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry 95 Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, G many Machine Tools Branch 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany *.5-t Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equi])nicnt 98 Ho\yaldts\verke A G, Hamburg, Germany *55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge. Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany 100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany 57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany 58 Xaxos Union, Frankfort on !Main, Germany Ordnance Branch MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION *101 Ordnance Industry Report 59 The Defeat of the Geiman Air Force 102 F>iedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G, Magdeb 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Camjjaign Germany Gl Air Force Rate of Operation 103 Bochumer Verein fvier Gusstahlfabrikation A 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera- Bochiun, Germany tions in the European Theatre 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heav\ and Medium 105 Rheimnetall-Borsig, Dusscldorf, Germany Bombers in the ETO 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braim.schweig, Hallenc 64 Description of RAF Bombing Germany 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo- 107 Haunoyerische IVIaschinenbavi, Hanover, Germaii gistics Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Essen, German MORALE DIVISION lOS Krupp, *64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale OIL DIVISION (Vol. I and II) *109 Oil Division, F'inal Report Medical Branch *110 Oil Division, F'inal Report, Appendi.x *111 Powder. Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet *65 Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care The pellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Minist in Germany Rei)ort #1) 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater MUNITIONS DIVISION many Heavy Industry Branch 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report 1 78 *66 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 111 Ministerial Report on Chemicals 67 Coking Plant Report Xo. 1, Sections A,'B, C, & D 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Oil Branch 09 Friediich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany 70 Ncunkirchen EiseuNverke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger- many 115 Anuiioniakwerke Mcrseburg G m b H, Lcuna, many—2 Appendices 71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf, Germany 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Genr 72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany Wintershall A G. Luelzkendorf, Germany 73 Friedrich Krup]) A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Gei- 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindt niany A G, Ludwigsliafen. Germany h 74 Dortnuuid Hoerder Huettenverein A G, Dortmund, IIS Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant. Bottrop-Boy Germany many. \'ol. I, Vol. II 75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany I 19 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Hai 76 Bochumer \'erein fuer Gusstahlfabrikalion A (!, Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Bochum, Germany 120 Hhcnania O.ssag Mineraloelwerke A G, GrasI: )l Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch 121 Rhenania Ossag ^lineraloelwerke \ G, Wilhelmi Refinery, Hamburg, Germany *77 German Motor Vehicles Indiistrv Report Castrop-Rauxel, Gcrnuwv *78 Tank Industry Report 122 Gewerkschaft, Victor, 79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany I & Vol. II 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris 123 F'uropaeische Tanklager und Transjjort A G. 1 81 Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany burg. Germany 82 Daimler Benz-(iaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany 124 l';bano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, 1 83 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Xuriiberg, Xurnberg, burg, Germany German\- 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant- 84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Z\yickau, (iermaiiy A Vol. II 85 Henschi'l & Sohn, Kassel, Geimany Rubber Branch 86 Maybach Motor ^\orks, Friedrichshafeii, Germany 87 Voigtianfier, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany 126 Deutsche Dnnliij) Gununi Co., Hanau on '. 88 Volkswagenxyerke, Fallersleben, Germany Germany 89 Bussing XAG, Brunswick, Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany 90 Muehlenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Biunswick, Ger- many 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 91 I'liedrich Knijip (jrusonwcrke, Magdeburg, Germany 129 Ministerial Report, on German Rubber Indu.str 60 Propcllanls Hranch 182 Shij) ^'ards Howaldtswerkc, Hamburg, Gcjrmany 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany lok'kti-Dfheniisclu'W I'lkf, M uiiicli, ( Icriiuiiiy 1S4 Dainilcr-Bcnz A (i, Mannheim, Germany Scliociiobock Ivxplosivp Plant, I,ignoso Sl)^(•llf^^to(^ bS.') Syiilhrlic Oil Plant, Mecrbeek-Hamburg, Germany Wcrke G in li H, Bad Salzoinon, Gcriiiaii\' IS(i (iewcrkscliaft Viclor, Caslrop-Rauxel, (Jerniany Plants of TJynaniit A G, Vorinal, Alfred Noix-l & Co, 1S7 Klockner Humlxildl Deuiz, t'lm, Gerinany Troisdorf, C'lansllial, Dnininiel anrl Dunoborf!;, 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrojj-Hoy, (ier- Germany many Deutsche Sprengcheniie G ni b H, Krailiiiry, Ger- many IS!) Ncukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, Germany 190 Railway Viaduct at Allenbecken, Germany 191 Railway V'iaduct OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION at Arnsburg, Germany 192 Deurag-Xerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Over-all Kcononiic Effects Division Report 193 Fire Raids on Cierman Cities 194 I Farbenindustric, Gross National Product '|Si)ecial pa])ers G Ludwigshafen, Germanv, Vol I Kriegseilliericlite which together & Vol II I 19o Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany Herman Goerinf? Works [ comprise the 190 I G Farbendustrie, Leverkii.sen, Germany Food and Agriculture ) above report 4a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity 197 Cheniische- Werke, Huels, Germany 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION 199 Locomotive Sho])s and Bridges at Hanim, Germany 4 b Physical Damage Division lieport (ETO) TRANSPORTATION DIVISION Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France Railroad Rejjair Yards, Malines, Belgium *200 The pjflfectsof Strategic Bombing on German Trans- Railroad Repair Yards, Lou vain, Belgium portation Railroad liepair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Railroad Re])air Yards, Namur, Belgium 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Submarine Pens, Brest, France Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions. Powder "Plant, Angouleme, France 203 German Locomotive Industrv During the War Powder Plant, 4-iergerac, France 204 German Military Railroad Traffic Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium Fort St. Blaise \'erdun Group. Metz. France UTILITIES DIVISION Gnome et l^hone, Limoges. France *205 German Electric Utilities Industrv Report Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 206 1 to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Rejiorls" Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France 207 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A ivugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger- G many Louis i5rcguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France Pacific War S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France .\. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN V Weapons in London City Area of Krefeld *1 Summary Report (Pacific War) *2 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany Japan's Struggle to I<]nd The War Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap- *3 The Effects of Atonn'c Bombs on Hiroshima and sack, Germany Nagasaki Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau- CIVILIAN STUDIES weiler, CJermany Storage Depot, XahboUenbach, Germany Civilian Defense Division Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany 4 Field Report Covering Air Railway Bridge. EUer, Germany Raid Protection and Allied GustlofT-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany Subjects, Tokyo, Japan 5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Henschell & Sohn G m b H. Kassel, Germany Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany *6 Field R-ejiort Covering Air Protection Hanomag. Hanover. Cierniany Raid and Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Ja])an M .\ N Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany Subjects, Kobe, Japan Erla Maschinenwerke, G m b^H, Hcitcrblick, Cier- many 8 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan A T G Maschinenbau G m b H, Mockau, Germany 9 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Mockau, Germany Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan No. 1 Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany — *I0 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke GmbH, Taucha, and Germany Allied Subjects in Japan *11 Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Submarine Pens Deutsche- Werft, Hamburg, Ger- many Allied Subjects in Japan Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Medical Division Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Eassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany *12 The Effects of Boniliing on Health and Medical Ammoniawerke, Serv- Merseburg-Leuna, CJermany ices in Japan Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam *13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Daimler-Berjz \ G, I'nterturkheim, Germany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Morale Division Volkswaggonwerke. Fallersleben, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany *14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale 61 ECONOMIC STUDIES *33 Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Re pott No. X\'III Aircraft Division (Nissan Jidosha KK) (Engines) *15 The Japaiiesp Aircraft Industry *34 Army Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots *16 >Iifsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIX Corporatio>i Report No. I (Airframes and Engines) (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) *35 Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft (Airframes & Engines) Report No. XX 17 Kakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. Corporation Report A'o. // (Nakajima Hikoki KK) Basic Materials Division (Airframes & Engines) *18 Kawanishi Aircraft Company *36 Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy Corporation Report A'o. /// (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabusliiki Kaisha) Capital Goods, Equipment, and Construction Divisio (Airframes') *10 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. *37 The Japanese Construction Industry Corporation Re /tort A'o. IV Et|ulpment (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabusliiki *38 Jajianese Electrical *39 The Japanese INIachine Building Industry Kaisha) (Airframes & Engines) *20 Aiohi Aircraft Company Electric Power Division Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) *40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan Engines) (Airframes & *41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant 1 Division *21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller ports) Corporation Report No. VI (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera Division Seizosho) Manpower, Food, and Civilian Supplies (Propellers) of Living and I't Hitachi Aircraft Company *42 The Jai)anese Wartime Standard Corporation Report No. VII zation of Manpower (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Military Supplies Division *23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. VIII *43 Japanese War Production Industries (Nipi5on Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) *44 Japanese Naval Ordnance (Airframes) 4.5 Japanese Army Ordnance *24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company *46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding Corporation Report No. IX *47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) *48 Jajjanesc Merchant Shipbuilding (Propellers) *25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company Oil and Chemical Division Corporation Report A'o. A (Tachikawa Hikoki KK) 49 Chemicals in Japan's War (Airframes) 50 Chemicals in Japan's War— .\i)peiidix *2G Fuji Airplane Company 51 Oil in Jaiian's War Corporation Report No. XI 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix (Fuji Hikoki KK) (Airframes) *27 Showa Airplane Company Over-all Economic Effects Division Corporation Report No. .\II (Showa hikoki Kogyo KK) ^53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's \ (.\irframes) Economv (Including Appendix A: U. S. Econoi *28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Indu.stries Company, Ltd. Intelligence on Japan—Analysis and Comparls Corporation Report No. XIII .\ppendlx B: Gro.ss National Product on Jai (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabusliiki and Its Components; Appendix C: Statist Kaisha) Sources) (Engines) *2'.t Nippon .\iri)lane Company Transportation Division Corporation Report No. \IV (Nippon Hikoki KK) *54 The War Against Jajianesc Transportation, 19 (Airframes) 1945 *30 Kyushu Airplane Company Corporation Report No. .XV Division (Kyushu Hikoki KK) Urban Areas (Airframes) Air Attack on Jai)ane,se Urban Econo »31 Slioda Engineering Company *.55 Effects of ( Report) Corporation Report No. XVI Summarv *.")(•) Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tok (Shoda Seisakujo) Yokohama (Coni])oiien1s) Kawasaki- *57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya *32 Mitaka .\ircraft Industries Air Attack on Osaka-Kolje-Kyoto Corporation Report No. XVII *58 Effects of Attack on the City of Nagasaki (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kal)usliiki Kaisha) 5!) Effects of Air City of Hiroshima (Components) ICffects of Air Attack on the 62 MILITARY STUDIES 87 Rcjxirt of Ships Bonibardrneiit Survey Party (En- closure I), Comments and Data on Effectivene.ss Military Analysis Division of Ammvinition 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party fEn- Air Forces Allied willi Ihc I'liilrcl States in the War closurc J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of Against Japan Firing .Ia])auese Air Power 8!) [{ejjorts of Ships Bombardment Survey Part}' (Imi- Japanese Air Weapons and Taelies closurc K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on The EfTeet of Air Act ion on Jai)iinese (.round Army Japanese War Potential Logistics Kmi)loyniont of Forces Under tlie Southwest Pacific Command Physical Damage Division The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- bardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth 90 EfTect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on .lapan (a Air Force) Report on Eight Cities') Air Operations in C'liina, Burma, India—World War ill The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on II Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Licidents) The Air Transport Command in tlie War Against 92 Flfifects of the Atomic Bomli on Hiroshima, Japan Ja))an 93 Effects of the Atomic BomI) on Nagasaki, Japan The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa- The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents; Against Japan 9.5 Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five The Fifth Air Force in the War Against Japan Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a Report on Eight Incidents) Naval Analysis Division 96 ~ A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary Report) The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols. I and II) Canniaigns of the Pacific W^ar G 2 Division The Reduction of Wake Island The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul 97 Japanese Military and Xaval Intelligence The American Campaign Against W'otie, Maloelap, 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Mille, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II, and III) nese Homeland, Part I. Comprehensive Report The Reduction of Truk 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Jajja- The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party— Fore- too Evaluation of Photograjihic Intelligence in the Japa- word, Introduction, Conclusions, and General nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting Summary 101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part IV, f rban Area Analysis closure A), Kamaishi Area 102 i; valuation of Photograjjliic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part V, Camouflage closure B), Hamamatsu Area 103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping closure C), Hitachi Area 104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party- (En- nese Homeland, Part \"II, Electronics closure D), Hakodate Area 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part \'III, Beach Intelligence closure E), !^Iuroran Area *106 EA-aluation of Photographic Intelligence in the .lapa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery closure F), Shimizu Area *107 Evaluation of Photograjjhic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Fln- nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads elosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojima- 108 lOvaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Saki Aieas nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis 63 U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1947 (7 3 9999 06313 352 2