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Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform

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Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform ARMED FORCES (DCAF) FORCES ARMED DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF CONTROL DEMOCRATIC GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE FOR CENTRE GENEVA 978-92-9222-062-4 ISBN املدخلإلىإصﻻحالقطاعاﻷمنيفي فلسطني Reform بناء الدولة ونشر الدميوقراطية في الشرق اﻷوسط بصورة عامة. Security Sector Security مجاﻻت احلكم واﻹصﻻح في فلسطني. كما يعتبر هذا الكتاب مهماللمعنيني بدراسة عمليات ً هذاالكتاب مهم لصانعي السياسات، واﻷكادمييني، واخلبراء والطﻻب املتخصصني في to Palestinian to الذي يرغب الفلسطينيون برؤية قطاعهم اﻷمني يسير فيه بصورة أفضل. يبديها مؤلفو فصول الكتاب مساهمة متكن القارئ من فهم اﻻحتياجات الفلسطينية واﻻجتاه ً املداخل الضرورية ﻹصﻻح القطاع اﻷمني تشكل هذه املجموعة من وجهات النظر التي وإخضاعها للمساءلة، وإدارة اجلماعات املسلحة. من خﻻل تسليط الضوء على العديد من Entry-Points قطاع اﻷمن الفلسطيني، وهيكلية القوات اﻷمنية، واﻵليات الﻻزمة ملمارسة الرقابة عليها كتابة فصول هذا الكتاب، إجراء تغييرات مادية ملموسة على اﻹطار القانوني الذي ينظم اﻹصﻻح؛ حيث يقترح اخلبراء والعاملون الفلسطينيون في املجال اﻷمني، الذين أسهموا في الرئيسيون- من إصﻻح قطاعهم اﻷمني، ﻹبداء آرائهم والتعبير عن أفكارهم حول هذا يتيحهذا الكتاب الذي نضعه بني يدي القارئ الفرصة للفلسطينيني -وهم املستفيدون روﻻندفريدريكوأرنولد ليتهولد Arnold Luethold (Eds.) Luethold Arnold يرون أنهم بحاجة إليها، إﻻ أننا غالبا ﻻ نعرف الكثير عن تلك اﻹصﻻحات املطلوبة. Roland Friedrich Roland ً الوطنية الفلسطينية. ومع أن الفلسطينيني ميتلكون أفكارهم اخلاصة حول اﻹصﻻحات التي ُ عمليات اﻹصﻻح التي ي جريها الفلسطينيون بطريقة تخدم مصاحلهم وﻻ تلقي باﻻ للمصالح ً الصعيد بطيئا وصعبا ، وفي بعض اﻷحيان، تسعى الدول واجلهات املانحة إلى التأثير على ً ً والتنظيمية واﻻجتماعية واﻻقتصادية جتعل من التغيير الذين يتطلع له الفلسطينيون على هذا إحراز التقدم في مسيرتهم نحو بناء دولتهم املستقلة. ولكن العديد من التحديات السياسية اﻷمنية. بالنسبة للفلسطينيني، يعتبر إصﻻح قطاع اﻷمن ضرورة ﻻ غنى عنها من أجل ً ففي الواقع، يتطلع الفلسطينيون إلى إنشاء قوات أمنية فعالة ومسؤولة تلبي احتياجاتهم يحتل إصﻻح قطاع اﻷمن في فلسطني رأس سلم اﻷلويات على أجندة اﻹصﻻح الفلسطينية. مركز جنيف للرقابة الدميوقراطية على القوات املسلحة، سويسرا روﻻند فريدريك وأرنولد ليتهولد املدخل إلى إصﻻح القطاع اﻷمني في فلسطني Roland Friedrich, Arnold Luethold (Eds.) Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Roland Friedrich, Arnold Luethold (Eds.) Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform Editors Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold Editorial Assistance Jonas Loetscher Cover Design and Layout Wael Dwaik Copyrights All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. This publication is circulated subject to the condition that it shall not by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent publisher. Disclaimer The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) publishes studies, reports, and books on security sector governance worthy of public consideration. The views and opinions expressed (unless otherwise declared) are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of DCAF, its sponsors, or its editors. ISBN 978-92-9222-061-7 Publisher Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva. Original Versions English and Arabic, Geneva and Ramallah, 2007. Cover Picture © Keystone, 2007. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) promotes good governance and reform of the security sector. The Centre conducts research on good practices, encourages the development of appropriate norms at the national and international levels, makes policy recommendations and provides in-country advice and assistance programmes. DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society programmes and international organisations. Visit us at: www.dcaf.ch Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF): rue de Chantepoulet 11, PO Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 741 77 00; Fax: +41 22 741 77 05; e-mail: [email protected] Contents Introduction 13 Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold The Legal Framework for Palestinian Security Sector Governance 31 Asem Khalil Reconstructing the PNA Security Organisations 45 Ahmad Hussein Civil-Democratic Oversight of the PNA Security Sector 71 Majed Arouri and Mamoun Attili Security Sector Reform and Judicial Reform: The Missing Link 87 Maen Id’ais Non-Statutory Armed Groups and Security Sector Governance 103 Mohammad Najib and Roland Friedrich The Challenge for Hamas: Establishing Transparency and Accountability 131 Ghazi Ahmad Hamad Entry-Points to Palestinian Security Sector Reform 145 Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold Appendices 157 Appendix A – PNA Security Organisations 159 Appendix B – PLC Report on the Security Situation in the Palestinian Territories and the Role of the Authorities in charge of Internal Security (May 2005) 165 Appendix C – PLC Report on the Unstable Security Situation in the Palestinian Authority-Controlled Territory (June 2006) 177 Acronyms DCAF Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCO District Coordination Office DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine DIA Defence Intelligence Agency DGIS Director-General of Internal Security DGPS Director-General of Preventive Security EU European Union EUCOPPS European Union Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support GI General Intelligence HCNS Higher Council of National Security IDF Israel Defence Forces IED Improvised Explosive Device ISF Internal Security Forces ITAG International Transition Assistance Group IUED Institut Universitaire d’Etudes du Développement / Graduate Institute for Development Studies (Geneva) JD Jordanian Dinar JSC Joint Security Committee NAD Negotiation Affairs Department (PLO) NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NSC National Security Council NSF National Security Forces OG Official Gazette PCPSR Palestinian Center for Policy Survey and Research PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PICCR Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLA Palestine Liberation Army PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation 11 PNA Palestinian National Authority PRCs Popular Resistance Committees RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade RSC Regional Security Committee SAI Strategic Assessments Initiative SSR Security Sector Reform TRCT Treatment and Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture TSPT Transitional Security Planning Team UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States USD US Dollar USSC United States Security Coordinator 12 Introduction Roland Friedrich and Arnold Luethold he first Oslo Agreement of 1994 established the Palestinian National TAuthority (PNA) and provided for a system of limited self-governance in the Palestinian Territories. Ever since, security has been at the centre of Palestinian-Israeli relations: Security was a key issue in all Israeli-Palestinian agreements concluded during the interim period up to 1999; then, during the second Intifada, security became a cornerstone of all internationally-sponsored diplomatic initiatives and peace plans and, subsequently, of public discourse. Palestinian security sector reform (SSR) has only very recently begun. The very fault lines, perceptions and interests, which have characterised the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, also shape the debate on security sector reform. Thus, ‘security sector reform’ carries different meanings for different actors: For a majority of Palestinians, SSR is about the development of a fully-fledged functional security sector, which protects them against Israeli incursions and provides the basis for statehood and sovereignty. Israel, in turn, looks at Palestinian SSR as a means for enhancing her own security; accordingly, Israel expects SSR to produce a system of Palestinian policing, too weak to constitute a danger and strong enough to confront the “infrastructure of terror”. The US, several European and some Arab states, very much in line with Israel, see SSR essentially as a process to revive the system of policing laid out in the Oslo Agreements. Finally, some other countries emphasise the importance of good governance: for them, only a well-governed security sector can be effective; the challenge of SSR, according to this view, lies in building security organisations, which function in a transparent manner and are fully accountable to the elected executive and legislative authorities. Depending on their interests, various countries have sought to influence Palestinian SSR, both conceptually and practically, in different directions and a variable degree of transparency. Some dispatched assistance missions to the Palestinian Territories, and an increasing group of international experts are delivering technical aid to selected Palestinian security personnel. What has been missing most so far is a genuinely Palestinian perspective on the current SSR process and its direction, achievements and challenges. The present volume aims to address this shortfall. It combines a number of chapters by Palestinian security experts, researchers and practitioners, which address various aspects of security sector
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