urn:nbn:de:0070-ijcv-2007246 IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing Paul Gill, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland

Editorial (p. 91)

Focus: From Classical Terrorism to ‘Global’ Terrorism Michel Wieviorka (pp. 92 –104)

Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Robert Y. Shapiro (pp. 105–126)

Attributions of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Group Membership and Identification Bertjan Doosje, Sven Zebel, Marieke Scheermeijer, Pauline Mathyi (pp. 127– 141)

A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing Paul Gill (pp. 142–159)

Suicide Bombers in : Their Motivations, Characteristics, and Prior Activity in Terrorist Organizations Revital Sela-Shayovitz (pp. 160–168)

Open Section Living with Contradiction: Examining the Worldview of the Jewish Settlers in Hebron Hanne Eggen Røislien (pp. 169 –184)

Explaining the Long-Term Trend in Violent Crime: A Heuristic Scheme and Some Methodological Considerations Helmut Thome (pp. 185 –202)

All text of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence is subject to the terms of the Digital Peer Publishing Licence. http://www.ijcv.org /docs/licence/DPPL_v2_en_06-2004.pdf IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 143 A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing Paul Gill, School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, Ireland

Understanding suicide bombing entails studying the phenomenon on three different dimensions: the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization, and the com- munity from which suicide bombings emerge. Political and social psychology allow us to establish the reciprocal relationships that underpin the exchanges between the three dimensions. This method increases our theoretical understanding of suicide bombing by moving away from the unidimensional models that have previously dominated the terrorism literature.

1. Introduction bombers (Khalaf 2001). His neighbors hung pictures of Late on the night of Friday June 1, 2001, Saeed Hotary left the new martyr holding seven sticks of dynamite around the Palestinian city of Kalkilya by car. Two the neighborhood and arranged flowers in the shapes of colleagues, who also made the journey, dropped him off a heart and a bomb to display. His picture adorned an el- at the promenade in Tel Aviv. According to eyewitness ementary school entrance in his hometown (Kelley 2001). reports, Hotary joined a long queue of people awaiting Two weeks later, an opinion poll showed 68.6 percent sup- entry into the Dolphinarium nightclub. He mingled with port for suicide bombings amongst a sample of over one some of the teenagers in the queue and flirted with one thousand in the West Bank and Gaza (JMCC girl in particular. Without warning, Hotary detonated Poll no. 41). In a separate poll 82.3 percent of respondents an explosive device strapped to his body, which held a did not view this incident as an act of terrorism (PCPSR large number of metal objects including ball bearings Poll no. 3). and screws. Within an instant, both Hotary and the girl evaporated. In total, twenty-one people died and one Many questions arise from this story. Why would an hundred and twenty were injured, the vast majority of otherwise normal twenty-one-year-old electrician blow whom were teenagers gathering on Tel Aviv’s promenade himself up? Why do terrorist organizations use this to socialize at the weekend (O’Reilly 2001). tactic? Is the death of the perpetrator instrumental to the success of the act? What role do the bomber’s colleagues Condemnation from world leaders followed the next day. play in the facilitation of suicide bombing? Why do Despite that, Palestinian terrorist organizations competed terrorist organizations compete to claim such a violent for claims of responsibility. , Islamic Jihad, and the attack against innocents? How can a suicide bombing little known Palestinian claimed the bomber and actors involved receive such levels of support from as their own (MIPT Database). Dozens of Palestinians the wider community? in Ramallah reportedly celebrated the act. Hotary’s family and neighbors also celebrated. His father stated These questions have become more important over the he wished he had twenty more sons to become suicide last few years. The Iraqi insurgency has produced more IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 144

suicide bombings than the previous twenty-five years.1 Current research on terrorism in general, and suicide Between 1980 and 2004, suicide bombings accounted for bombing in particular typically focuses on one of three 48 percent of all deaths through terrorism despite its use in possible dimensions; the terrorist/suicide bomber, the only 3 percent of incidents (Pape 2005).2 Sustained suicide terrorist organization and to a lesser extent, the com- bombings occurred in various Lebanese groups’ campaigns munity from which suicide bombings emerge. Studies on to drive American, French, and Israeli forces out of Leba- individual terrorists and suicide bombers seek to ascer- non, attempts by various Palestinian groups to coerce Israel tain factors driving individuals to engage in terrorism. into leaving Gaza and the West Bank, the Tamil, Chechen, Various analyses have focused on pathological disposition Kashmiri, and Kurdish separatist movements, al Qaeda’s to violence (Gordon 2002; Post 1990), an authoritarian sustained efforts against the United States and its allies, personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), general and the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies. Suicide bombers socialization factors (Atran, 2003; Post 2005; Sageman have also emerged from Britain, Belgium, , , 2005; Silke 2003), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice Iran, , , Kazakhstan, , , Saudi (Gupta 2004), religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive Arabia , the , and . dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge for personal suffer- ing (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005).3

Figure 1: Number of suicide bombing by year

400

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0 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year

* Many thanks to Tobias Theiler, Indraneel Sircar, 1 See figure 1. Data is derived from my database 2 This figure excludes 9/11. Matteo Fumagalli, Karen Jacques, and the two of incidents of suicide bombing. This database anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments synthesizes information from online internet 3 For a general review of the psychological litera- on earlier drafts of this work. Research funded by databases such as MIPT and ICT with general ture on terrorism, see Horgan (2005) and Victoroff the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and chronologies (Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005) and (2005). Social Sciences. LexisNexis searches. IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 145

Studies on the organizational dimension of suicide bomb- Political and social psychology provide insights into ing generally offer rational-choice explanations. Examples behavior within groups, decision-making by individu- include cost-benefit analyses (Harrison 2001; Pape 2005), als, political socialization, conformism, group conflict, suicide bombing’s ability to balance power in an asymmet- and symbolic attachment. These insights underpin the ric war (Gupta and Mundra 2005; Luft 2002), domestic reciprocal relationships outlined in figure 2. They occur political competition and outbidding by different organi- unsystematically and can begin on any dimension. (A) zations for public support (Bloom 2005), and other strate- depicts the observation that terrorist organizations are gic motives such as the efficiency with which the terrorist ultimately dependent on the social, political, financial, can still activate the charge when captured (Ganor 2000).4 and moral patronage of the constituency they claim to represent. With this in mind, the terrorist organization Studies on the societal dimension of terrorism and must calibrate its tactics and the timing of its operations, suicide bombing focus on factors such as the degree of and its leaders must wield material and/or non-material re- political freedom and poverty in a given society (Abadie sources to maximize societal support. (B) + (C) start with 2004), frustration caused by social injustice (Bloom 2005; the proposition that when feelings of threat are salient, in- Khashan 2003; Merari 1990), and an attachment to politi- dividuals are more likely to be submissive toward certain cal Islam (Haddad 2004).5 Hafez (2006a) outlines that a types of leaders and symbolic narratives. Aggressive poli- sense of victimization and threat combined with sym- cies ostensibly aimed against those who cause the threat bolic narratives that venerate martyrdom and legitimate and anxiety become more readily acceptable. (D) + (E) leaders consenting to violence lead to societal support for focus on how societal support coupled with catalysts and suicide bombing. familial and friendship ties are behind the process of an individual joining a terrorist organization. (F) focuses on These studies have all contributed to our knowledge of how the would-be-bomber radicalizes further through suicide bombing but the literature lacks a framework that the internalization of relevant organizational norms. ties all three dimensions together to explain the interac- tion between them.6 Unidimensional explanations are Figure 2: Multi-dimensional model unconcerned with the wider process that enables suicide bombing. Without incorporating other dimensions, the Terrorist organization studies mentioned can often be misleading. Studies focus- ing on the individual suicide bomber cannot explain or- ganizational motivations and societal support. Organiza- (B (A ) Lends Support tional approaches concentrating on strategic and tactical ) Seeks Support advantages cannot explain how a culture of martyrdom is socially constructed. Societal approaches cannot take into (E) Volunteers F) Radicalisation Process account fully the complexity of individual and organiza- ( tional processes. The point of this article is not to present (D) Volunteers new empirical data, but instead to synthesize the wealth Individual Society of existing data into a broad conceptual framework. (C) Lends Support

4 For a general literature review of the organiza- 6. Hafez (2006b) and Moghadam (2006) have both and fails to propose an interpretive lens through tional dimension to terrorism, see Cronin put forward their own multi-causal frameworks which these interactions can be explained. (2003, 8–12). but have not focused upon the interactions be- tween dimensions. Pedahzur’s model (2004) does 5 For a general review on the societal literature, see account for some interactions but is too systematic Turk (2004). IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 146

With slight alterations most of the processes described its targeting strategies. Pape (2005) may be correct in above for this model also have the potential to explain asserting that suicide terrorism is a strategy to compel other (non-suicidal) acts of terrorism. However, in ex- foreign occupiers to withdraw but he fails to recognize plaining suicide bombing this model contains three major that this is just one part of the strategy. He fails to clarify differences from a model explaining ordinary terrorism. that, as Tilly (2005, 11) points out, terror is a strategy that Firstly, the social construction of a “culture of martyr- involves interactions among political actors at differ- dom” is not necessary to explain non-suicidal terrorism. ent levels, “and that to explain the adoption of such a Secondly, as will be outlined later, in the Palestinian case, strategy we have no choice but to analyze it as part of a support for orthodox acts of terrorism remained more or political process.” This section deals with how terrorist less constant over the period examined whereas support groups use their resources (both material and non-mate- for suicide bombing fluctuated. This fluctuation negatively rial) to promote suicide bombing by creating a culture of correlated with optimism for the future. Therefore, a sense martyrdom. In creating a culture of martyrdom, lead- of threat correlates with support for suicide bombing. ers of terrorist organizations seek to generate support Perhaps, the surrounding political conditions are enough from their constituency of supporters. In the Palestinian, for support for orthodox acts of terrorism. Threat salience Tamil, Iraqi, Afghan and Chechen cases, this constitu- leads individuals toward escalatory tendencies in conflict ency is large and surrounds the organization itself. For al and suicide bombing corresponds with this tendency for Qaeda and one-off cases such as 9/11, the Bali bombings, both normative and strategic reasons. Normatively, sui- and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, the constitu- cide bombing violates almost every predominant ethical ency mainly entails a “virtual constituency” consisting norm in societies in which it takes place (i.e. not to kill in- of global supporters on the internet and a small minority nocents and not to commit suicide). Strategically, suicide from within their own country holding similar sentiments. bombing causes more casualties. Thirdly, the radicaliza- Resources utilized by terrorist organizations include; the tion process for a suicide bomber within the group setting use of propaganda, charismatic leaders, epistemic authori- is a longer and more intense one. Preparation to kill and ties, agency-laden institutions, framing justifications, and be killed simultaneously requires a more nuanced psycho- using euphemistic language. I will now approach each of logical conditioning. these resources in turn. The aim is to show that in spite of the heterogeneous political or religious motivations 2. The Interactions Between Dimensions espoused by organizations using suicide bombing, the 2.1 The Terrorist Organization Seeks Societal Support by Creating a tactics used to garner support are very similar. Culture of Martyrdom (A) Prominent in terrorism studies is the argument that all 2.1.1 Propaganda terrorist acts are a rational strategic move vis-à-vis a more Propaganda is one obvious method by which the terrorist powerful opponent (Pape 2005, Crenshaw 1990). This is organization seeks support. This includes; communiqués, only partly correct. Terrorist acts are not only an attempt media coverage depicting suicide bombers as martyrs, to communicate to the political elites and public opinion websites, public discourses, street posters, pamphlets, and of the targeted state. Terrorist organizations also aim to attendance by respected public officials at the funerals communicate to the community they claim to represent or memorial ceremonies for suicide bombers. A full state (Hoffman and McCormick 2004). Taking this into con- funeral was held for a suicide bomber in Palestine in 2000. sideration, Weinburg and Pedahzur (2003) likened ter- Tamil Tiger suicide bombers have orphanages named after rorist organizations to political parties because they are them. A Palestinian suicide bomber had a youth football both ultimately dependent upon the moral and economic tournament held in his honor. Hamas calendars herald the patronage of their supporters. For example, Richardson “martyr of the month” (Hassan 2001). The Tamil Tigers, (2006, 84) argues that the IRA was always mindful not to PKK, and Hezbollah commemorate the anniversary of disaffect the Catholic population of Northern Ireland for their first suicide bombers each year. Chechens commem- fear of losing support. These concerns were reflected in orate the first Chechen suicide bomber in a popular song. IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 147

Together, these acts produce an informal communication Some terrorist groups dominate such institutions and ex- network that venerates suicide bombing. They supply the ert an informational influence to aid in political socializa- public with moral justifications for suicide attacks and tion. This is important in shaping behavioral compliance. help create a culture of martyrdom. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers capitalized on the lack of state structures to set up their own quasi-state 2.1.2 Leaders and Epistemic Authority Figures systems. For example, Hamas founded hospitals and paid Most terrorist organizations using suicide bombing pos- for funerals, medical care, dentistry, scholarships, pre- sess either leaders revered by their followers or epistemic natal care, and other social services. Hamas spokesman authority figures. Godlike leaders include Osama bin Ismail Abu Shanab explains the logic of this well: “The Laden of al Qaeda, Vellupillai Prabakharen of the Sri political level is the face of Hamas, but without the other Lankan Tamil Tigers, Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK in divisions Hamas would not be as strong as it is now… . , and al-Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency. Other If nobody supports these needy families, maybe nobody groups rely on epistemic authorities in the construction would think of martyrdom and the resistance of the of societal knowledge. Religious leaders are one example occupation” (cited in Bloom 2005, 27–8). Hamas leader (Bar-Tal 2000, 65). For example, Hamas, Hezbollah, al Ibrahim al-Yazuri considered Hamas’s intention as “the Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Iraqi and insurgents, liberation of all Palestine from the tyrannical Israeli oc- and other suicide bombers such as those involved in 9/11 cupation… . This is the main part of its concern … social and 7/7 rely on the religious rulings of Sheikh Ahmad work is carried out in support of this aim” (cited in Hu- Yassin, Sayid Muhammad Hasayn Fadlalla, Shaikh Yusuf man Rights Watch 2002, 103–4). Other material resources Qardawi, and others to provide a legitimating ideology include subsidies and apartments given to the families of for suicide bombing. suicide bombers (Human Rights Watch 2002, 16 and 100).

2.1.3 Agency-Laden Institutions 2.1.4 Public Discourse and Framing Justifications Utilizing agency-laden institutions, defined as “cultural or Edelman (1971) argues that public discourse is central to organizational resources that can be mobilized to launch evoking cognitive arousal and radicalization within the collective action” (Morris 2000, 450), is critical for a mass public. He explains behavior by focusing on what people movement to be successful. Coupled with charismatic lead- expect of the future. Readily available evidence does not ership, these institutions provide fertile ground for the mo- shape expectations. Instead, expectations based upon bilization of a mass movement. Leaders frame the necessity cues from legitimately perceived groups are absorbed for, and means of, mobilization within these institutions. more easily. This effect strengthens when cues include These institutions are often long-standing resources: emotionally persuasive information and when they connect current events to a historical narrative (McDer- Such institutions are configurations of cultural beliefs mott 2004, 64–5; Della Porta and Diani 1999, 184). This and practices that permeate and shape their social net- is especially true in ambiguous situations. Actions by works. Their cultural materials are constitutive in that groups perceived as legitimate help to shape and create they produce and solidify the trust, contacts, solidar- beliefs and norms, help create perceptions of what is true, ity, rituals, meaning systems, and options of members and help shape expectations of the future. For example, embedded in their social networks. Endemic to some Prabakharen, the leader of the Tamil Tigers, instrumen- agency-laden institutions is a transcendent and coher- tally justified suicide bombing because “with persever- ent belief system that shape its actors’ moral and politi- ance and sacrifice, Tamil Eelam can be achieved in a cal views about the kinds of relationships that ought to hundred years. But if we conduct Black Tiger (suicide) exist between individuals and social groups. These po- operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and litically relevant beliefs inspire … actions geared toward achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time” (cited the realization of group interests. (Morris 2000, 447) in Richardson 2006, 157). Without competing narratives from other sources, the cue effects strengthen further. In IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 148

these circumstances, they are a persuasive influence upon helicopters and missiles… . They are attacking us with behaviour (Edelman 1971, 7). weapons against which we can’t defend ourselves. And now we have a weapon they can’t defend themselves against… . Language is a key element in the construction of a legiti- We believe this weapon creates a kind of balance, because mating ideology or myth. “Language is capable not only this weapon is like an F-16” (Human Rights Watch 2002, of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted from 56–7). Similarly, al-Zarqawi, leader of the Iraqi insurgency everyday experience, but also of ‘bringing back’ these until his death, stated that his men “faced the strongest symbols and appresenting them as objectively real ele- and most advanced army in modern times… . When the ments in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and holy warriors noticed this huge disparity in numbers and symbolic language become essential constituents of the armaments between them and the enemy, they looked for reality of everyday life and of the commonsense appre- alternatives to amend this deficiency” (cited in Hafez 2007, hension of this reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 55). 98). Suicide bombing reduced the deficit. Thirdly, suicide Terrorist groups consistently use euphemistic language bombing is framed as an act of national struggle. ‘Abd when referring to suicide bombing. This portrays suicide al-Rahman described suicide bombings to al-Jazeera as bombing as heroic and deflects attention from the human “the highest form of national struggle. There is no argu- suffering on both sides of the conflict. Prior to the attack, ment about that” (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 37). the would-be-bomber is a “living martyr” (al Shahid al Fourthly, death under occupation is framed as inevitable hai). Afterwards, the funeral of the “martyr” is referred anyway. Al-Rantisi also claimed that “to die in this way to as a “wedding.” In Palestinian Arabic, the phrase for is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation” a suicide bombing attack is an amaliyya istishadiyya, a (cited in Soibelman 2004, 180). “martyrdom operation,” or an amaliyya fida’iyya, a “sac- rificial operation” (Human Rights Watch 2002, 36). The The examples provided show a remarkable similarity Tamil phrase for suicide bombing is thatkodai, meaning between organizations using suicide bombing in terms “to give yourself” (Richardson 2006; 140, Hopgood 2005, of leadership, how leaders frame justifications for sui- 74). Those who have given themselves to the cause are cide bombing, and the use of propaganda, euphemistic mahaveera, meaning “brave one,” and their mother is language, and agency-laden institutions. Organizational veeravati or “brave mother” (Richardson 2006, 141). leaders harness these non-material resources effectively in creating a culture of martyrdom. Leaders of terrorist organizations and prominent politi- cians frame justifications for suicide bombings in a number 2.2 Societal Support for Bombers and Terrorist Organizations (B + C) of ways. All attempt to cast the blame onto the other side The previous section introduced means by which leaders or accentuate the success of the suicide bombing. Firstly, of terrorist organizations seek societal support for suicide leaders frame suicide bombing as a response to state provo- bombing. This section depicts the process whereby audi- cation. Hamas labeled one set of bombings “the natural ences become susceptible to symbolic anxiety-reducing retaliation by a people slaughtered day and night, whose narratives and to the influence of leaders who promote dignity is humiliated by the Zionist enemy’s war ma- the use of suicide bombing. I propose that key to account- chine” (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 27–8). Hafez’s ing for this is the theory of terror management. analysis of propaganda emanating from Iraqi insurgents (2007) details how they often present a problem (the Greenberg et al. (1986, cited in Hogg and Vaughan 2005, United States), a cause of the problem (the subordination 138, and in Gordan and Arian 2001, 208) developed ter- of existing Muslim regimes to the United States), and a ror management theory. They argue that knowledge of solution (pious faith and martyrdom). Secondly, suicide the inevitability of death is the most fundamental threat bombing is framed as a tactic that balances power in what that people face. Therefore, it is the most powerful mo- is an otherwise asymmetric war. Hamas spokesman ‘Abd tivating factor in human existence. Experimental stud- al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi stated: “We don’t have F-16s, Apache ies strengthened the concept. When a sense of threat is IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 149

salient, positive feelings toward one’s belief system and tion as a victim, increase internal pressure for confor- those holding similar beliefs increase while negative feel- mity and a readiness to impose sanctions on dissenting ings toward those perceived to be a threat also increase. members of society. The strategy adopted to combat the threat is likely to be inflammatory (Castano et al. 2003, Voci 2006, Gordon The above points indicate that experiences of sustained and Arian 2001). Under conditions of threat decisions conflict lead societies toward authoritarian mindsets. are based on emotion, but when feelings of threat are low decisions made are based on both logic and emotion. Terror management theorists posit that individuals search Therefore, when one is in a conflict situation, the course of for self-esteem through their social identity to counteract action chosen is more likely to escalate and continue the feelings of threat. Any act can increase positive ingroup conflict. Threat salience increases the likelihood of a reli- status if members of the ingroup attach a positive role ance on stereotypes to characterize the threatening out- to the act itself (Rubin 2004, 825). Jerusalem Media and group (Schimel et al. 1999, Arndt et al. 2002). Importantly, Communication Center (JMCC) and Palestinian Center Greenberg et al. (1990) and Lavine et al. (2002) found for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) survey data show a positive correlation between threat salience and the that many forms of violent action toward Israel have a likelihood of resorting to authoritarian modes of think- positive value attached to them in Palestinian areas. ing. This may result in a search for an outgroup, thinking They show strong support for military actions against the in black-and-white terms, and the need for strong leaders Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli civilians, and settlers in to lessen the anxiety produced by the situation (Montuori the West Bank and Gaza. Over the course of 16 surveys, 2005, 22–24). In other words, under conditions of threat, undertaken between May 1997 and February 2006, JMCC people are more likely to follow certain types of leaders survey data average 60.9 percent support for military espousing authoritarian values and symbolic narratives operations against Israeli targets. The PCPSR findings perceived to be legitimate and aggressive toward those average 88.1 percent support for any military operation who cause the threat and anxiety. against Israeli military targets over 13 surveys between August 1995 and March 2005. Support for armed attacks Sustained conflict brings a sense of threat to the fore. This against Israeli civilians average 51.7 percent over nineteen impacts strongly upon the behavior of both individuals surveys between August 1995 and June 2006 (PCPSR). and collectives. Bar-Tal (2004) argues that in a conflict Support for armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the situation, individuals and collectives behave in particular West Bank and Gaza average 86.6 percent over twelve sur- ways. From an Israeli perspective, Bar-Tal (2004, 684–90) veys between August 1995 and December 2004 (PCPSR). found that: Support for these acts was consistently higher amongst those who were educated, young, female, living in refugee • Individuals perceive information supplied by the camps, earning a higher income, and Hamas supporters. ingroup’s epistemic authorities about the threatening outgroup as valid. As stated earlier, for al Qaeda, and one-off cases such as • Violence increases threat perception and feelings of 9/11, the Bali bombings, and 7/7, the constituency mainly fear and mistrust. entails a “virtual constituency” consisting of global sup- • Violence and threat perceptions cause delegitimization porters on the internet and a small minority from within of the rival group. their own country holding similar sentiments. The work • Violence, threat perception, and fear increase support of Sageman (2005) and Hafez (2007) reveal the ubiquitous of violent means to cope with the rival. extent of propaganda for suicide bombing on the inter- • During times of violence and perceived threat, people net. Opinion polls in many states reveal evidence of small support a leader who projects forcefulness. minorities justifying suicide bombings. For example, ICM • Violence, threat perception, and fear lead to group opinion polls undertaken for the British Guardian news- mobilization, patriotism, and unity, cause self-percep- paper reveal that in March 2004, 13 percent of Muslims IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 150

polled in Britain were willing to justify future al Qaeda asked “Can suicide bombing of civilian targets to defend attacks on the United States while in July 2005, 5 percent Islam be justified?” Muslim respondents from states in of Muslims polled were willing to justify future attacks which suicide bombers have emerged showed a small, by British suicide bombers in the UK. Populus opinion but significant in its implications, minority who justify polls undertaken for the British Times newspaper reveal suicide bombing. Examples include Jordan (29 percent), that of the British Muslims polled in December 2005, 7 Egypt (28 percent), Turkey (17 percent), Great Britain (15 percent were willing to justify suicide bombings in the percent), Pakistan (14 percent), and (10 percent). UK, 16 percent in Israel, 13 percent in Chechnya, and 15 percent in Iraq. A separate Populus opinion poll in June Support for suicide bombings in the Palestinian regions is 2006 showed 13 percent of polled British Muslims con- even higher. Over the course of nineteen surveys under- sidered the 7/7 perpetrators to be martyrs. In the same taken between June 1995 and February 2006, JMCC sur- poll 16 percent were willing to justify suicide bombings in vey data averaged 52 percent support for suicide bomb- the United Kingdom against military targets, 11 percent ings against any Israeli target. Support for specific suicide against government buildings/workers, 10 percent against bombings in PCPSR surveys garnered even higher levels. the police, and 7 percent against civilians. A major Pew The Maxim Restaurant bombing in 2003, which killed Research Center poll of sixty thousand Muslims living twenty Israeli civilians, received 74 percent support. The in the United States found that 5 percent justified suicide Beer Shiva suicide bombing in 2004 received 77 percent bombings. Of those aged under thirty, 15 percent saw jus- support, while 69 percent supported the suicide bombing tification. Pew’s “Global Attitudes Project” in May 2006 in Tel Aviv in April 2006 that killed eleven civilians.

Figure 3: Levels of support for suicide bombings versus optimism levels 90

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0 05/95 05/97 08/97 03/99 12/00 04/01 06/01 12/01 03/02 05/02 09/02 12/02 04/03 10/03 06/04 01/06 06/06

Date of survey Support for suicide bombing Levels of optimism

Source: Collated JMCC survey data IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 151

Support for orthodox (para)military operations against by Abdallah Badran was not celebrated. The surrounding Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli settlers, and Israeli civilians community did not print posters of the new martyr. No remained more or less constant over the period examined. social event was planned for his funeral. One local stated; Support for suicide bombing, on the other hand, fluctu- “Things were getting better and then no sooner do we have ated. JMCC survey data reveals a negative correlation be- money coming in again then it is stopped by this suicide tween support for suicide bombing and optimism about bombing” (cited in Urquhart 2005). No suicide bombings the future (see figure 3). This finding corresponds with emerged from Palestine in the following sixteen months. the terror management hypothesis that anxiety about the In other words, surrounding political conditions, coupled future turns individuals toward authoritarian and escala- with a shared sense of threat (or lack thereof) can con- tory tendencies. Suicide bombings correspond with this tribute toward either increasing or decreasing support for escalatory tendency for both normative and strategic rea- suicide bombing. sons. Normatively, suicide bombing violates almost every predominant ethical norm in societies in which it takes 2.3 The Individual Volunteers (D + E) place (i.e. not to kill innocents and not to commit suicide). Studies focusing on motivations for joining terrorist Strategically, suicide bombing causes more casualties. organizations have evolved over the past three decades. Since the first Palestinian suicide bombing in April 1993, Early research in the 1970s and 1980s searched for a “ter- suicide bombing has accounted for 78 percent of Israeli rorist personality.” This entailed the search for a deviant deaths through terrorism despite its use in only 12 percent personality characteristic within some individuals using of incidents.7 Seventeen JMCC surveys included both of psychoanalytic theories. Essentially, the argument was the following questions: “Are you optimistic or pessimis- that terrorist group members are born and not made by tic about the future?” and “Do you support suicide bomb- the surrounding social and political conditions and group ings?” When optimists outnumbered pessimists, support processes. Studies of this nature usually contained no for suicide bombing averaged 40 percent. When optimists empirical data, neither primary nor secondary, and were were in the minority, support averaged 65.6 percent. often condemnatory in nature.

To sum up, the variables listed in section (A) detailed how Academic work on terrorism improved in the 1990s. Em- terrorist organizations seek to alter public opinion to elic- pirical work increased and there was a shift away from it support. This section, on the other hand, proposed one focusing on the terrorist as being deviant in nature. major variable that stipulates the conditions under which Group processes, the role of leaders, surrounding politi- audiences may become susceptible to these tactics. This cal conditions and organizational motivations became is not to suggest however, that one psychological variable incorporated into the literature. Despite this improve- (sense of threat) by itself determines support. Instead, ment, research on individual motivations has been overly surrounding political conditions such as harsh anti-ter- simplistic and deterministic. Typically, this work focuses rorism policies, poverty, a sense of relative deprivation upon a very small number of group members (if any at all) and/or the initiation of peace processes may also contrib- and extrapolates these findings onto the wider terrorist ute toward individuals increasing or decreasing support community. Various analyses have focused on pathologi- for terrorist organizations or, at the very least, agreeing cal disposition to violence (Gordon 2002, Post 1990), an or disagreeing with their justifications. An example of authoritarian personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), surrounding political conditions lessening societal sup- general socialization factors (Atran, 2003, Post 2005, port for suicide bombing occurred in Palestine in Febru- Sageman 2005), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice ary 2005. Journalists reported that the suicide bombing (Gupta 2004), religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive

7 Mipt database of terrorism incidents (www.mipt.org). IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 152

dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge for personal suffer- reveres martyrdom was a supportive factor in each ideal ing (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005). Although type. It was the only common factor included in all four the above-mentioned studies have all contributed some- ideal types. By acknowledging the important role a “cul- what to our understanding of individual motivations, ture of martyrdom” plays, they strengthen the argument their generalizations are problematic. The diversity of that it is the surrounding social environment rather than demographic backgrounds of suicide bombers alone is a personality flaw that compels people to join terrorist striking. Bombers are between fifteen and seventy years organizations. old, overly educated and uneducated, male and female, from all socio-economic classes, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, The influences mentioned in connection with interac- and Muslim, religious and secular, single and married. tions A, B, and C also affect the would-be-bomber. The These studies also only focus on the “supply side” and fail role of propaganda, proclamations supporting suicide to account for the “demand side” of joining a terrorist bombing from leaders perceived to be legitimate, and a organization. In other words, by focusing on the underly- sense of threat because of the ongoing conflict may cre- ing conditions that may create a large pool of potential ate a pool of willing recruits for terrorist organizations. recruits, they ignore the impediments to membership. Propaganda that makes a celebrity of the suicide bomber Organizational leaders carefully choose who can join. may play a large role in helping others to make the same This is essential due to the secretive nature of their work. decision. Range et al (1997) provide persuasive sociologi- The risk of any new recruit becoming a state informant cal evidence that “suicidal contagion” exists following an or reneging on their task is too large. As will be outlined extensively publicised celebrity suicide. Other factors may later, the role of familial and friendship ties is key to un- also play a role and are outlined below. derstanding how a person becomes a member. Motivation to become a suicide bomber should be viewed as a process Through interviews with terrorists, Silke (2003) describes (depicted in figure 4). The socialized individual is aware the process of becoming a terrorist as primarily an issue of potential increases in social status from membership of of socialization. Fields (1978) came to a similar conclu- the organization. Although this awareness is usually long- sion. Her eight-year longitudinal study found exposure to standing, it is only after the experience of a catalyst when terrorism as a child produces a tendency toward terrorism compulsion to join becomes salient. Pre-existing familial as an adult. Bloom (2005, 1) points out that suicide bomb- and friendship ties mediate the recruitment process. ing campaigns usually occur in the second iteration of violence, citing examples such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Despite the heterogeneity in the demographic back- Chechnya, and . When socialized into a society grounds of suicide bombers, all suicide bombers do share where violence is a regular, highly publicized, and visible two common characteristics. One is membership in a experience, one may start to think of violence as a normal terrorist organization. Never has a lone suicide bomber part of everyday life. Post et al’s interviews with captured carried out an operation in a bout of heavenly revelation terrorists (2005) reveal awareness of the potential of or vengeance. Instead, all suicide attacks are coordinated, increased social status as a prime motivator in joining a designed, premeditated and organized by a terrorist or- terrorist organization. ganization. Kimhi and Even’s typology of suicide bomb- ers (2004) illustrates the second common characteristic. Silke (2003) also outlines that catalysts usually precipi- They operationalized sixty Palestinian bombers into four tate the compulsion to join a terrorist group. This is very categories: religious, exploited, retribution for suffering, true for would-be suicide bombers. The catalyst could be and social/nationalist. Support of the community that a response to personal suffering,8 revenge for imprison-

8 Wafaa Nour E’Din (23), female. Carried out Her husband had been killed in conflict by the IDF bombing for Hezbollah on May 9, 1985. earlier that year. IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 153

ment,9 a recent conversion to Islam,10 an act of violence by double suicide bombings include Palestine in December opposition forces,11 a response to restrictions on move- 2001, January 2003, September 2003, March 2004, and ment12, a response to personal desperation,13 or frustra- Chechnya in August 2004. Seven members of the same tion of personal goals.14 The list of catalysts and examples Palestinian football club carried out a wave of suicide at- of bombers are endless. tacks in late 2002, early 2003 (Hammer and Zidan 2003).

Empirical studies of recruitment processes in terrorist Figure 4: The path to becoming a suicide bomber organizations highlight the important role of pre-existing familial or friendship ties. Familial ties aid recruitment Socialization processes, in the IRA (Toolis 1995), and the recruitment of female community support, ETA members (Reinares 2004). Friendship ties are impor- other environmental factors tant for enrolling Italian and German left-wing militants (Della Porta 1992). Mixtures of both are important to the recruitment process of Palestinian groups (Post et al. 2005), global jihadists (Sageman 2005), and Colombian groups (Florez-Morris 2007). Plenty of evidence exists to show Catalyst the importance of pre-existing familial and friendship ties in recruiting would-be-suicide bombers Examples include husband and wife teams of bombers in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, and Jordan, a father and daughter team in Chechnya in November 2002, two Chechen sisters in Pre-existing ties August 2004, a sister of a top aide to al-Zarqawi in Jordan to aid recruitment in November 2005, a sister of a deceased Islamic Jihad militant in October 2003, a sister of an imprisoned Fatah operative in May 2003, a nephew of a prominent leader of Hamas in March 2001, and a nephew of a prominent Fatah leader in May 2005. Of the twenty-one Chechen suicide Suicide bomber bombers I have identified, fourteen had direct family members taking part in the conflict. Of the 220 Palestinian suicide bombers I have identified, there is clear evidence of pre-existing familial and friendship ties within the organization in 56 of the cases. Among the 9/11 hijackers 2.4 The Individual Radicalizes Within a Group Setting (F) there were many pre-existing friendship ties, two sets of Munir al-Makdah, a trainer of suicide bombers, out- brothers, and three hijackers who shared tribal affiliations. lines, “much of the work is already done by the suffering One would-be-bomber in the Iraqi insurgency claimed he these people have been subject to… . Only 10 percent had fifteen friends who had become suicide bombers them- comes from me. The suffering and living away from their selves (Ghosh 2005). Examples of best friends carrying out land has given the person 90 percent of what he needs to

9 Yusef Ali Mohammed Zughayer (22) and Sulei- 11 Taysir Ahmed Ajrami (22) carried out a suicide 13 Ala Araeshi (17) was a victim of AIDS. He tar- man Musa Dahayneh (24) both served time in bombing on the November 26, 2001.The bomber‘s geted Israeli police using a belt bomb. Israeli prisons. They conducted a double suicide suicide note said the attack was in response to the bombing on November 6, 1998, in Jerusalem. killing of five Palestinian children the previous 14 Three bombers carried out three separate acts week by an Israeli mine. over the course of one weekend in Israel. All three 10 Sergey Dimitriyev, former Russian soldier, had attended Hebron Polytechnic University, who converted to Islam and conducted a suicide 12 Abdel-Basset Odeh (25), carried out bombing which had been closed by IDF forces months truck bombing on June 11, 2000, for the Chechen on March 27, 2002. Restrictions on movement pre- beforehand. separatist movement. vented him from seeing his fiancée in Baghdad. IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 154

become a martyr. All we do is provide guidance and help strengthen if this “sub-universe” of thought and knowl- strengthen his faith and help set the objectives for him” edge contains influential leaders. One obvious example is (cited in Davis 2003, 154). This section deals with the extra the influence of religious figures. These leaders may replace 10 percent that al-Makdah refers to. Upon joining the significant others who played a role in the individual’s pri- group, what behavioral and psychological characteristics mary socialization. In other words, “the socializing person- of the individual alter? nel take on the character of significant other vis-à-vis the individual being socialized” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, Social identity theory (SIT) explains how individuals 165). Significant others and group norm acquisition ulti- define themselves by their social group memberships. SIT mately facilitate the suicide bomber throughout his train- accounts for two dual processes: social comparison and ing, the final process of which is acquiring the willingness categorization. Both processes have their own underlying to sacrifice oneself for the beliefs and norms internalized. motivations – to feel positive about oneself and to reduce the complexity of the surrounding world (Hogg and Grieve Group norms include coping strategies for the terrorist to 1999, 81). Self-perception of group membership creates psy- insulate himself from the human suffering of his actions. chologically distinguishing effects. From a SIT perspective, Bandura (1990) outlines four commonly used strategies. groups vie to be different from one another in positive Firstly, they may imagine themselves as saviors. “The Israe- ways because this provides individual group members lis, the enemy itself, they are the ones who caused me to do with positive social identities (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, what I did” argues a failed suicide bomber in an interview. 410). The improvement of self-esteem in the group setting (Schechter 2004). Secondly, they displace responsibility strengthens the individual’s group identification. onto the leader or other members. Thirdly, they minimize or ignore actual suffering. “I do not accept responsibi­ Stereotyping within the group creates a group prototype lity for their deaths. I feel pain, of course. They are little that specifies the mindsets, sentiments, perceptions, children. But the government of Israel is solely responsible” norms, and codes of conduct that characterize the group. a captured bomb-maker stated (Schechter 2004). Finally, The stereotype aids in the social categorization process they dehumanize their victims. Palestinian propaganda is whereby the individual assimilates others into relevant full of imagery of Israelis depicted as pigs, dogs, monkeys, in- and outgroups. This depersonalizes the self, fellow and donkeys (Oliver and Steinberg 2005, 101–2). ingroup members, and outgroup members because they are all viewed no longer as idiosyncratic individuals but Group identity overrides individual identity upon the ac- as members of groups. The individual stereotypes the quisition of group norms. This leads to a tendency toward ingroup as homogenous and coherent. This accentuates group polarization, defined as a propensity for groups “to the similarities of ingroup members while simultaneously make decisions that are more extreme than the mean of accentuating the differences between ingroup and out- individual members’ initial positions, in the direction al- group members. This also increases subjective certainty ready favored by that mean. So, for example, group discus- and “renders existence meaningful and thus gives one sion among a collection of people who already favor capital confidence in how to behave, and what to expect from the punishment is likely to produce a group decision that physical and social environment within which one finds strongly favors capital punishment” (Hogg and Vaughan oneself” (Hogg and Grieve 1999, 81). Trust, mutual aid 2005, 342). With group identity overriding individual iden- and compassion extend to fellow ingroup members but tity, the group, if highly cohesive, will tend toward a state not to those in the outgroup. of mind known as groupthink. Hogg and Vaughan (2005, 340) list the antecedents of groupthink as being: Group norms deepen group bonds by increasing group solidarity and aiding the internalization of a group identity. • Excessive group cohesiveness When this occurs, the individual views the newly acquired • Insulation of group from external information and norms as normal and therefore legitimate. The effects influence IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 155

• Lack of impartial leadership and of norms encouraging same time to build more pressure to conform. Al Qaeda, proper procedures the Tamil Tigers, and the Chechen and Iraqi insurgents • High stress from external threat and task complexity regularly use more than one bomber. Iraqi and Palestin- They also list the symptoms of these antecedents as; ian suicide bombers are constantly subjected to videos of • Feelings of invulnerability and unanimity past suicide bombings in the days before their operation • Unquestioning belief that the group must be right (Hassan 2001, Ghosh 2005). Would-be bombers write and • Tendency to ignore or discredit information contrary record their last wills and testaments, the effect of which to the group’s position may create a point of no return. The charismatic leader • Direct pressure exerted on dissidents to bring them of the Tamil Tigers, Pirabhakaran, has a final meal with into line would-be bombers the night before their operation. On • Stereotyping of outgroup members one occasion, Anita Pratap, an Indian journalist was pres- ent. She described the would-be bombers as “utterly emo- The antecedents and their symptoms (which have all been tionless … they could have been lobotomized for all I knew discussed in this paper) show how a commonly held group … the only time they showed some emotion was when they identity can radicalize the individual group members to- talked about Pirabhakaran” (Pratap 2001, 102–104). ward a state of mind that they may not reach independent of a group setting. In terms of suicide bombing, terrorist Some Palestinian areas frequently produce bombers in cells “canalize disparate religious or political sentiments intermittent phases. This may be because the bombers are of individuals into an emotionally bonded group of fictive trained and socialized into the group together, and are set kin who willfully commit to die spectacularly for one down a path dependent process whereby the first bomb- another” (Atran 2003, 1534). Suicide bombing, in this light, ing produces a pressure on the next in line to become a is a form of Durkheim’s (1953) concept of altruistic suicide bomber. There are many examples of this. Three university whereby, due to the deep integration of the individual in students from Hebron all carried out separate attacks in the group, the suicide is carried out for the group rather Israel over the course of three days in May 2003. A fourth than for the individual himself. Hebron resident followed four weeks later. Twelve suicide bombers came from Nablus between December 2, 2001, Social psychologists argue that conformity is a big factor and March 30, 2002. No Nablus residents carried out a in explaining behavior in a group setting. Conformity to suicide bombing in the following five weeks. Ten suicide group norms is a less direct manner of social influence bombers broke this phase between May 7 and August than Milgram’s famous experiments (1974). Conformity to 6. Again, no bombers emerged from Nablus for another an authoritative figure does not explain the behaviour but two months before four more carried out their operations “the subjective validity of social norms; that is, a feeling between October 27, 2002, and January 5, 2003. What is of confidence and certainty that the beliefs and actions striking is that when no bombers emerged from Nablus, described by the norm are correct, appropriate, valid and plenty came from Jenin. For example, between 25 May, socially desirable” (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 245). Leaders 2001, and 12 August, 2001, there were seven Jenin suicide of terrorist organizations ensure norm conformity until bombers. No Jenin bombers materialized for almost two moments before the suicide bombing. Fellow terrorist months. Between October 7, 2001, and December 9, 2001, group members closely guard the bomber. This facilitates three Jenin residents blew themselves up. No Jenin bomb- suicide bombing by guarding against the bomber reneging. ers emerged until March 5, 2002, and there was a further In Palestine, if the would-be-bomber does show signs of five before June 5. Again, there was a two-month spell with weakness, a senior trainer will be called for to reinforce his no Jenin suicide bombers but four bombers followed in the determination (Hassan 2001). Eyewitness reports of suicide space of two months between August 4 and October 21. bombings in Israel consistently include the description of Of the eighteen months covered here, there is only eight three or four men dropping the bomber off at his destina- weeks of overlap between the two towns producing suicide tion. Other organizations use multiple bombers at the bombers. This pattern of intermittent phases also occurs in IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 156

Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkarem and Kalkilya. The same may charismatic leaders, epistemic authority figures, agency- also be true of bombers within the Iraqi and Afghanistan laden institutions, framing justifications, euphemistic insurgencies but data is too sparse at this moment in time. language, and monetary rewards. Under conditions of threat, societies accept the proclamations of authoritarian Table 1: Bombers from Nablus and Jenin, May 25, 2001 — January 5, 2003 charismatic leaders as authentic and resort to authoritar- Dates Town No. of bombers ian mindsets. Threat salience coupled with, and caused May 25 — July 22, 2001 Jenin 5 by, surrounding political conditions facilitate support for August 2 — 8, 2001 Nablus 2 suicide bombing. The individual, in search of a positive identity, joins the terrorist organization with the support August 9 — 12, 2001 Jenin 2 of a surrounding community. Experiencing catalysts and October 7 — December 9, 2001 Jenin 3 recruitment through pre-existing familial and friendship December 2, 2001 — March 30, 2002 Nablus 12 ties drive the process of becoming a suicide bomber for- March 5 — June 5, 2002 Jenin 6 ward. Within the group, the new recruit radicalizes further. May 7 — August 8, 2002 Nablus 10 Relevant norm internalization, group polarization, group August 4 — October 21, 2002 Jenin 4 conformity, group identity overriding individual identity, the use of multiple bombers and other techniques are used October 27, 2002 — January 5, 2003 Nablus 4 by group leaders to facilitate the individual becoming a suicide bomber. This pattern of intermittent phases may be reinforced by domestic competition factors between Palestinian factions. This model is stronger than others in the current field of Palestinian terrorist organizations are not as hierarchi- research for many reasons. By focusing on organizational cally structured as, for example, the IRA, or ETA. Because and individual motivations as two distinct processes, the of the restrictions on movement and communication, and models proposed by Moghadam (2006) and Hafez (2006) the targeted assassination of their leaders, these organiza- ignore why and how leaders of terrorist organizations so- tions rely on a high degree of autonomy of local leaders and cially construct a “culture of martyrdom” and under what activists (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006). A Hamas suicide conditions audiences become susceptible to such narratives. bombing by their Nablus cell, for example, would create The radicalization process of the would-be-bomber within a pressure on the rival Nablus cells of Fatah, Palestinian the group setting is also largely ignored. Insights from so- Islamic Jihad and the PFLP to carry out a similar operation cial and political psychology provide an effective interpre- for fear of losing local support. This finding coupled with tive lens to understand these symbiotic processes. By his Pedahzur and Perliger’s social network analysis of Palestin- own admission, Pedahzur’s model (2004) is too systematic. ian terrorist organizations (2006) supports Bloom’s thesis Various interactions have shown dissimilar causal weights (2005) of domestic political competition factors driving sui- in each case of a terrorist organization resorting to suicide cide bombings except at a local rather than national level. bombing. Elites within Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad resorted to suicide bombing after carefully 3. Conclusion crafting a “culture of martyrdom.” The Tamil Tigers spent This paper has proposed a theoretical prism to view sui- three years radicalizing and training cadres to become sui- cide bombing by incorporating the interactions between cide bombers. This followed the apparent accidental suicide the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization and the sur- bombing of Captain Miller in 1987, which LTTE supporters rounding society from which suicide bombing emerges. By celebrated as the highest form of martyrdom. In this case, synthesizing empirically rich unidimensional approaches, grass roots support for suicide bombing preceded the social this multi-dimensional model provides us with a broader construction of a “culture of martyrdom” and the train- understanding of suicide bombing. Leaders of terrorist ing of members. When these conditions converged from organizations use material and nonmaterial resources to 1990 onwards, the LTTE became the most prolific users of venerate suicide bombing. Resources include the use of suicide bombing until the Iraqi insurgency began. Fatah’s IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 157

declining support in the Palestinian regions led them to Further research will be required to refine the model. Is undertake suicide bombing campaigns to boost support. there a relationship between acts of suicide bombing and Lower-level members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) counter-terrorism techniques such as targeted assassina- resorted to suicide bombing following the imprisonment tions and incursions? Is there an association between so- of their leader in Turkey. Self-starter suicide bombers such cietal support for suicide bombing and counter-terrorism as the London bombers make their own decisions but techniques? In what way do some counter-terrorism tech- are heavily motivated by pre-existing calls to arms by al niques influence the target society? Interviews with failed Qaeda leaders, “virtual” supporters, and ultimately group suicide bombers may further our knowledge of the group radicalization. radicalization process while more detailed case studies of individual terrorist organizations and campaigns would Focusing on organizations that have not resorted to allow for a comparative approach to this model. suicide bombing also confirms this model. Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca (2005, 211) provide details of Colombian terrorist organization FARC’s attempt to recruit suicide bombers. Despite offering a $2 million reward to the families of potential bombers, FARC was unsuccessful. The model outlined in this paper provides two reasons for this failure. Firstly, FARC does not possess charismatic leaders or epistemic authority figures, nor does it control social institutions. This makes it impossible to success- fully create a “culture of martyrdom” to garner support for suicide bombing from the wider community. Secondly, offering substantial amounts of money does not overcome the unwillingness of potential recruits to become suicide bombers. Without a “culture of martyrdom” and support for suicide bombing amongst their constituency of sup- porters, FARC found it impossible to radicalize recruits to the point of becoming a suicide bomber. ETA never re- sorted to suicide bombing, also for these reasons. A further reason may explain the IRA’s unwillingness to use suicide bombing despite possessing a historical narrative of mar- tyrdom to rely upon. Kalyvas and Sánchez Cuenca (2005) provide examples of how the IRA marginalized them- selves within their community after indiscriminate acts of violence. Suicide bombing causes more deaths than any other terrorist method. Possessing this knowledge through social learning, the IRA knew it could not afford the costs of losing more support. The examples, provided by Kaly- vas and Sánchez Cuenca, also suggest that ETA’s and the IRA’s supporters were considerably more moderate than the members of the organizations themselves. The IRA perhaps were also mindful not to disaffect their American support base. Utilizing a tactic originally developed to kill American forces in might have isolated the IRA from their lucrative fundraising contacts in America. IJCV : Vol. 1 (2) 2007, pp. 142–159 Paul Gill: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing 158

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