The Ukrainian Review” 200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 ILF
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T he U krainian Review A quarterly journal devoted to the study of Ukraine Spring, 1994 Vol. XLI, No. 1 The U krainian Review A quarterly journal devoted to the study of Ukraine Spring 1994 Vol. XLI, No. 1 EDITORIAL BOARD SLAVA STETSKO Senior Editor STEPHEN OLESKIW Executive Editor VERA RICH Research Editor NICHOLAS L. FR.-CHIROVSKY, LEV SHANKOVSKY, OLEH S. ROMANYSHYN Editorial Consultants Price: £5-00 or $10.00 a single copy Annual Subscription: £20.00 or $40.00 Published by The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain, Ltd. Organization for the Defense of Four Freedoms for Ukraine, Inc. (USA) Ucrainica Research Institute (Canada) ISSN 0041-6029 Editorial inquiries: The Executive Editor, “The Ukrainian Review” 200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 ILF Subscriptions: “The Ukrainian Review” (Administration), 49 Linden Gardens, London, W2 4HG Printed in Great Britain by the Ukrainian Publishers Limited 200 Liverpool Road, London, N1 ILF Tel.: 071 6076266/7 • Fax: 071 607 6737 CONTENTS CONTRIBUTORS 4 Current Affairs INTERNATIONAL FACTORS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT OF UKRAINE Serhiy Tolstov 5 UKRAINE: FORMATION OF A MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A HYPERINFLATIONARY ENVIRONMENT Valentyn Yegorov 21 History UKRAINIAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON MUSCOVY IN THE 17th AND 18th CENTURIES Petro Cymbalisty 33 Literature FIVE POLITICAL POEMS Taras Shevchenko 54 My Friendly Epistle 55 Unfree I count the days and nights 61 Paraphrase of the Eleventh Psalm 64 I am not ill... 65 Day comes and goes 65 FOREST SONG Lesya Ukrayinka 66 News From Ukraine 74 Art “ART OF THE UKRAINE”; NEW UKRAINIAN PAINTINGS; UKRAINIAN VISUAL POETRY Vera Rich 84 Books & Periodicals 88 Contributors SERHIY TOLSTOV is a Senior Research Fellow at the Department of International Organisations, Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Kyiv. He specialises in nuclear security issues. VALENTYN YEGOROV is an associate professor at the Department of Economics of Kyiv Shevchenko University. He is the author of more than 40 publications. Presently he is concluding his post-doctoral research on monetary policy in a transitional economy at The School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. PETRO CYMBALISTY is a professor of Slavonic Philology at the University of London, a professor of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, Germany, and the Director of the London College of the Ukrainian Catholic University. He is the author of Ukrainian Linguistic Elements in the Russian Language, 1680-1760 (1991), as well as numerous articles. 5 Current Affairs INTERNATIONAL FACTORS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT OF UKRAINE Serhiy Tolstov The issue of the status, subordination and decision of the ultimate fate of nuclear arms installed on Ukrainian territory in the times of the former Soviet Union has acquired an exceptional significance in the shaping of the foreign policy of Ukraine following independence. Nuclear arms have become, beyond any doubt, the most complicated problem of the foreign policy and security of the state. Ukraine acquired its nuclear weapons in a unique manner. For the first time in history a new legal subject with a claim to wield nuclear weapons appeared as the result of the disintegration and disappearance from the international political map of an active participant of international affairs, the Soviet Union, which was one of the founders and nuclear parties of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to experts’ estimates, based on the data in the protocols to the START-1 Treaty, at the end of 1991 the nuclear potential of the former USSR amounted to 32,000 nuclear warheads, of which more than 10,000 were of strategic type and 17,000 were tactical, while nearly 5,000 consisted of decommissioned and dismantled time-expired devices.1 After the destruction of medium- and short-range missiles in accordance with the Soviet-American Treaty of 1987, roughly half of the tactical weapons of the former USSR were in the hands of the armed forces stationed in Ukraine: 1,240 warheads in silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 4l6 warheads in gravity bombs and long-range cruise missiles in the arsenal of the strategic air force, concentrated around the towns of Uzyn (Kyiv region), Pryluky (Chernihiv region), and Stryi (Lviv region). Two types of ICBM were stationed on the territory of Ukraine: 130 SS-19s (Russian designation RS-22) and 46 SS-24 missiles (Russian designation RS- 18). Silo-based SS-19 multiple warhead missiles of the 1979 type, with a range of up to 10,000 km, were each armed with 6 550-kilotonne warheads 1 William Walker, “Break up of the Soviet nuclear arsenal”, International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2, April 1992, p. 259. 6 THE UKRAINIAN REVIEW (a total of 780 warheads). The other 46 missiles, dating from 1987, with a range of up to 10,000 km are of the latest type. They are each armed with 10 550-kilotonne warheads (a total of 460 warheads). The solid fuel SS-24 mis siles, of which only 86 were built in Ukraine by “Pivdenmash” (Southern Machine-Building Plant), could be refitted as mobile-launcher types with computer-controlled variable range. The total number of ICBMs and strategic bombers in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan came to 431- These strategic deterrent weapons were equipped with 3,147 nuclear warheads, of which 1,656 were deployed in Ukraine.2 In relation to the number of warheads, the strategic nuclear weapons were divided between the four new independent states as follows: 69.45% in Russia, 16.08% in Ukraine, 13-69% in Kazakhstan, and 0.79% in Belarus. During the course of 1993, a gradual increase in the role played by the nuclear arms problem in the civic-political life of Ukraine could be observed. Although the idea of the unilateral nuclear disarmament of the state had been proclaimed long before the declaration of independence, the political aspects of this strategic intention were not properly grounded and thought through, in particular, as regards the cost of disarmament and conversion. The politicians and legislators who introduced and approved the first documents of the Supreme Council on the renunciation of the future use of nuclear weapons were inspired by ideological motives. They could not even imagine most of the legal, financial and technical nuances of the process of disarmament, conver sion and inspection. The conceptual principles of the future non-nuclear status of the state were set out and formulated in circumstances of severe external pressure, against the background of the dynamic state-building events of 1991- 93, and in the course of complex interactions between the Ukrainian govern ment and other nuclear states, first and foremost Russia and the USA. The paradox lay in that the parliament and government of Ukraine, which had proclaimed their intention of achieving a non-nuclear status, ended up unable to realise this goal by their own efforts due to a lack of the funds required to finance the disarmament process. In addition, failures in foreign policy led to the emergence of opposition within Ukraine to the non-nuclear policy. Influential circles of the political élite, including members of parlia ment and some representatives of the military, began to envisage the nuclear weapons as perhaps the most effective guarantee of independence and terri torial integrity of Ukraine. Decision-making on the future of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons was slowed down by various complications arising out of internal and foreign policy issues, the main ones being property rights in the fissile materials of the missile war heads, financing the conversion and ensuring effective military and political guar antees of Ukraine’s national security after the removal of the nuclear weapons. 2 “Cooperative Denuclearization. From Pledges to Deeds”, Ed. by G. Allison, A.B. Carter, S.E. Miller and P. Zelikow. CSIA Studies in International Security no. 2, Cambridge, Mass., Center for Science and International Affairs, 1993, p. 31; Aleksandr Sychev, “Kyiv and Minsk: a personal point of view”, Izvestia, 5 January, 1993, p. 1. CURRENT AFFAIRS 7 The delay in deciding the future of the nuclear inheritance of the former USSR led to complications in relations between Ukraine on the one hand and the USA and the countries of Western Europe on the other, and to the creation of a negative image of Ukraine in the eyes of public opinion abroad. At the same time, talks on political concessions, including Ukraine’s possible renunci ation of control over these nuclear devices or the handing-over of warheads to Russia without the proper resolution of issues related to the value of the nuclear materials, the financial arrangements for the destruction of the missiles, silos and launch sites, and so on, led to the consolidation of pro-nuclear senti ments among the majority of the factions in the Ukrainian Parliament and a part of the military leadership. This came out strongly during the negotiations and ratification of the START-1 Treaty in the Supreme Council on 18 November 1993- The Ukrainian Parliament ratified START-1 on the scale of reduction of strategic offensive weapons which had formerly been envisaged for the entire former USSR (42% of the warheads and 36% of the missiles). When we look at the history of Ukraine’s proclamation of its goal of nuclear disarmament, we should recall the events of 1968, concerning the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This document, which laid the foundations of legal relations between states of the international community as regards the use of nuclear weapons, was drawn up by the Committee on Disarmament and ratified by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 June 1968. The governments of Ukraine (then the Ukrainian SSR) and Belarus (then the Byelorussian SSR) did not participate in the signing of the treaty although these states were formally members of the UN.