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Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs is Head of Research at the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) and affiliated Senior Researcher with the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden. Her research focus is on non-state actors in civil wars, rebel-to-party transformations, conflict resolution, peace processes, and post-war democratisation.

Jesper Bjarnesen is Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI). His main research area is qualitative migration studies, with a focus on the overlaps between voluntary and involuntary movements; the dynamics of mobility in relation to armed conflict; and the micro-politics of inclusion and exclusion in urban contexts in West Africa.

Violence in African Elections

Between Democracy and Big Man Politics

edited by Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Jesper Bjarnesen Violence in African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics was first published in association with the Nordic Africa Institute, PO Box 1703, SE-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden in 2018 by Zed Books Ltd, The Foundry, 17 Oval Way, London SE11 5RR, UK. www.zedbooks.net www.nai.uu.se

The rights of Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Jesper Bjarnesen to be identified as the editors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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ISBN 978‑1‑78699‑229‑1 hb ISBN 978‑1‑78699‑228‑4 pb ISBN 978‑1‑78699‑230‑7 pdf ISBN 978‑1‑78699‑231‑4 epub ISBN 978‑1‑78699‑232‑1 mobi Contents

Abbreviations | ix Acknowledgements | xiii

Introduction: The everyday politics of electoral violence in Africa . . . 1 mimmi söderberg kovacs

1 Ethnic politics and elite competition: the roots of electoral 27 violence in Kenya hanne fjelde and kristine höglund

2 Wielding the stick again: the rise and fall and rise of state ...... 47 violence during presidential elections in Uganda anders sjögren

3 Land conflict and electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire: ...... 67 a micro-level analysis matthew i. mitchell

4 The geography of violence in Burundi’s 2015 elections ...... 87 willy nindorera and jesper bjarnesen

5 Competition, uncertainty and violence in Sierra Leone’s 114 swing district ibrahim bangura and mimmi söderberg kovacs

6 Ex-militants and electoral violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 135 tarila marclint ebiede 7 The winner takes it all: post-war rebel networks, Big Man politics, 156 and the threat of violence in the 2011 Liberian elections mariam bjarnesen

8 Parasitic politics: violence, deception and change in Kenya’s . . . . 176 electoral politics jacob rasmussen

9 Eclectic ties and election touts: Chipangano’s cyclic ...... 197 governance agenda in Mbare, Zimbabwe tariro mutongwizo

10 Patronage politics and electoral violence in Lagos, Nigeria: . . . . . 215 understanding the micro-level dynamics daniel e. agbiboa

11 ‘Once they all pick their guns you can have your way’: ...... 233 campaigning and talking about violence in northern Ghana afra schmitz

Conclusion: Beyond democracy and Big Man politics ...... 250 jesper bjarnesen and mimmi söderberg kovacs

About the contributors | 263 Index | 264 Abbreviations

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone) ANACOWA All Nigerians Autobike Commercial Owners and Workers Association of Nigeria APC All People’s Congress (Sierra Leone) APC All Progressives Congress (Nigeria) CDC Congress of Democratic Change (Liberia) CENAP Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (Burundi) CHRA Combined Harare Residents’ Association (Zimbabwe) CNDD-FDD National Council for the Defence of Democracy and the Forces for the Defence of Democracy (Burundi) CNTB National Commission on Land and Other Assets (Burundi) CODEO Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (Ghana) CORD Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (Kenya) DCE District Chief Executive (Ghana) DDR disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration DDRR disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration DP Democratic Party (Kenya / Uganda) ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States FDC Forum for Democratic Change (Uganda) FNL National Forces of Liberation (Burundi) FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Kenya) FPI Ivorian Popular Front (Côte d’Ivoire) FRODEBU Front for Democracy in Burundi GEMA Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (Kenya) GPA global political agreement (Zimbabwe) HRT Harare Residents’ Trust (Zimbabwe) ICC International Criminal Court IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Kenya) INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia IOC international oil company (Nigeria) JIAM Jesus Is Alive Ministries (Kenya) KADU Kenyan National Democratic Union KAI Kick Against Indiscipline (Nigeria) KAMATUSA Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu Association (Kenya) KANU Kenyan African National Union ix KPM Kono Progressive Movement (Sierra Leone) KPU Kenya People’s Union LNP Liberian National Police LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy MAC-P Military Aid to Civil Power (Sierra Leone) MDC Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe) MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Nigeria) MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia MP member of parliament MSD Movement for Solidarity and Development (Burundi) NARC National Rainbow Coalition (Kenya) NDC National Democratic Congress (Ghana) NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission (Nigeria) NDPL National Democratic Party of Liberia NDPVF Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (Nigeria) NDV Niger Delta Vigilante (Nigeria) NEC National Electoral Commission (Sierra Leone) NIMASA Nigerian Maritime Safety Agency NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Company NPC National Peace Council (Ghana) NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPN National Party of Nigeria NPP New Patriotic Party (Ghana) NPP National Patriotic Party (Liberia) NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council (Sierra Leone) NRA National Resistance Army (Uganda) NRM National Resistance Movement (Uganda) NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia NUDP National Union for Democratic Progress (Liberia) NURTW National Union of Road Transport Workers (Nigeria) ONS Office of National Security (Sierra Leone) P4P Partners for Peace (Nigeria) PAP Presidential Amnesty Programme (Nigeria) PDP People’s Democratic Party (Nigeria) PMDC People’s Movement for Democratic Change (Sierra Leone) PNDC Provisional National Defence Council (Ghana) PNU Party of National Unity (Kenya) PPRC Political Party Registration Commission (Sierra Leone) RA Reform Agenda (Uganda) RFI Radio France Internationale RPA Radio Publique Africaine (Burundi) RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

x Abbreviations Patriotic Front Front Patriotic

xi West Africa Network for Peacebuilding for Africa Network West Union African National Zimbabwe Union African People’s Zimbabwe First People Zimbabwe Sierra Leone People’s Party People’s Leone Sierra Nations United Liberiain Mission Nations United (Liberia) Party Unity Congress People’s Uganda Forces Defence Peoples Uganda Nigeria of Party Unity (Burundi) Progress National for Union

ZANU-PF ZimPF ZAPU SLPP UN UNMIL UP UPC UPDF UPN UPRONA WANEP

Acknowledgements

The first steps towards the writing of this book were taken in October 2015 with the organisation of a two-day writers’ workshop at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) on this theme. During intense discussions, patterns and trends began to emerge across the different case studies of electoral violence in Africa that were presented, and many of the gaps that we try to address in this volume were identified. We owe a great deal to all those scholars who participated in the workshop but are not included in this book, notably Akin Iwilade, Ayokunle O. Omobowale, Azeez O. Olaniyan, Charly D. N. Tsafack, Felix Kumah-Abiwu, Johanna Riess, Michael N. Mbapndah, Olatokunbo O. Fayiga, Olusoji A. Odeyemi, Osita Odafi, Rodrick Henry and Surajudeen O. Mudasiro. We are also grateful to colleagues outside the author circle who provided insightful comments on some of the chapters, notably Anders Themnér, Angela Muvumba Sellström, Henrik Angerbrandt and Johan Brosché. The Swedish Research Council financially supported the writers’ workshop, as well as the production of this book, within the framework of a major research grant. Funding for the workshop was also generously provided by NAI, and we were able to benefit from much appreciated administrative assistance in the form of Annika Franklin’s expertise. We are truly indebted to both institutions, without whose support this book project could not have been completed. Several of the ideas expressed in this book also benefited from years of discussions and stimulating intellectual exchange with our research colleagues at NAI, not least in the dynamic research cluster on Conflict, Security and Democratic Transformation. Perhaps more than anyone, we would like to thank Mats Utas for first opening the door for us at NAI and successfully nurturing a space for productive interdisciplinary research on contemporary African studies. We would also like to extend our appreciation to former Director Carin Norberg for accepting to host the research grant at NAI in the first place, and to current Director Iina Soiri and Head of Research Victor Adetula for their continuous support. We are also grateful to NAI’s former Head of Communications Elnaz Alizadeh for supporting our initial idea of an edited volume on this theme. During the writing of this volume, we have also relied on meticulous assistance from Henrik Persson at NAI and Sophia Wrede at the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). We received insightful comments from Kristine Höglund at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University on the introductory chapter, and several other colleagues xiii and conference participants have provided useful input and advice on various parts of the book. We would also like to highlight the constructive and very useful comments provided by two anonymous reviewers. Their suggestions significantly helped us in strengthening our arguments and sharpening our contributions. We would also like to extend our appreciation to the team at Zed Books and especially to Ken Barlow, editor of the Africa Now series, for his enthusiasm and unwavering support. We have also benefited considerably from Judith Forshaw’s perceptive copyediting of this text, and Henrik Alfreds- son’s tireless work in designing the maps for chapter 4. Above all, we would like to say thank you to all the chapter authors, who took time out of busy schedules and demanding work piles to join us in this collaborative and interdisciplinary effort on violence in African elections.

Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs Jesper Bjarnesen Uppsala, December 2017

xiv Introduction: The everyday politics of electoral violence in Africa

Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs

‘Ampa ampoh,’ yell the young men sitting on the back of the pickup truck that hastily enters the back gate of the State House building in downtown Freetown in Sierra Leone. It means ‘It is over’ in Temne, one of the local languages. It is late in the afternoon of Friday 24 November 2012, and the National Election Commission (NEC) has just held a press conference to announce the results of the presidential elections, ending days of intense speculation after the closing of the polls. According to the announcement, the sitting president Ernest Bai Koroma of the All People’s Congress (APC) has secured a second term in power against Julius Maada Bio, the flag-bearer of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). Many hoped that this would be the end of a tense and occasionally violent election campaign. However, while APC supporters dressed in red (the party colour) danced in the streets of Freetown, cheering and singing amidst the ear-deafening sounds of car horns, whistle pipes and the banging of pots and pans, disgruntlement was mounting in the opposition camp. The following day, the SLPP accused the incumbent of electoral fraud, refusing to accept the results. The next few weeks saw several minor incidents of violence across the country, especially in traditional SLPP strongholds, as young party supporters took to the streets, clashed with the police and security personnel, and engaged in local fights against APC supporters. It was not until the SLPP leadership eventually conceded its electoral defeat a few weeks later that the violence finally subsided (Söderberg Kovacs 2012). The example above reflects a larger trend that we have witnessed in sub- Saharan Africa since the (re-)introduction of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. In a relatively short time period, democracy has formally been established as the dominant political system across the continent, and the holding of elections has emerged as the most important institutional mechanism for the distribution of political power. Other means and methods of political rule have grown increasingly difficult to motivate and sustain in the face of changing normative and institutional frameworks at both the global and the regional level. Yet, at the same time, we have witnessed a growing trend of electoral violence in many new democracies. According to Burchard (2015: 50), more than half of Africa’s states, 55 per cent, have experienced electoral

1 violence in the post-Cold War period. Importantly, beyond the relatively few cases of large-scale killings and widespread fear and insecurity that make it to the international headlines – such as in Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 – a more common scenario has been that of isolated violent events, harassment and coercive intimidation. Countries that have displayed such characteristics during election periods include, for example, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Uganda (Straus and Taylor 2012). In addition, and often forgotten both by the international media and by the scholarly community engaged in better understanding the phenomenon, a multitude of countries experience the kind of electoral violence that is low-scale but pervasive and typically occurs long before the elections, between electoral cycles, and in local elections far from the international limelight. MacGinty (2014) introduced the term ‘everyday peace’ to capture the routinised practices and norms deployed by individuals and groups to navigate their way through life in divided societies. This is a scholarly approach that emphasises bottom-up perspectives on a social phenomenon and takes seriously the notion of local agency (see also Autesserre 2010). We find this inspirational, and would like to evoke the expression of ‘everyday politics of electoral violence’ to characterise the overall perspective employed in this book. Most individuals and groups in Africa’s electoral democracies are likely to find concepts such as ‘competitive elections’ and ‘patronage politics’ to be of little use for describing their everyday experiences. However, their everyday realities can assist us in better understanding the specific and localised expressions of these theoretical concepts and contribute to a more deep-layered understanding of the phenomenon of electoral violence. Importantly, the ‘bottom-up’ perspective is not put in contrast or opposition to the ‘top-down’. Instead, the two views inform each other, and we have deliberately put together a collection of contributions that together and jointly highlight both perspectives. The example given above from the 2012 general elections in Sierra Leone is particularly interesting in this respect because it was generally considered a very successful election according to most traditional international criteria. For example, the national electoral institutions acknowledged only a handful of electoral irregularities. Very limited evidence of over-voting or ballot stuffing was discovered. The large number of international and domestic election observer teams all declared the elections free of systematic malpractice. Yet, at the same time, there is little doubt that the elections were conducted on an uneven playing field, where the incumbent was able to take significant advantage of his position in power, for example in terms of access to the media and to resources for campaigning. In addition, the heavy and visible presence of both the police and the military patrolling the streets during the

2 Introduction - - 3 The threats associated with electoral violence are many. imme the Beyond many. are electoral violence with associated The threats fast-growing and emerging an this development, of in the footsteps Following mation from wartime leader to political party representative running for office office running for wartime leader political party to representative from mation the witnessed have African post-war states of number A large unique. not is military political leaders former or democrats’: so-called of ‘warlord emergence (Themnér politics in electoral participate who subsequently groups armed of have elections that suggesting for goodreasons many thus are There 2017). 2014). (Bøås Utas and new battlegrounds’ ‘the become already on imposes violence societal such and that costs material human, diate also the undermining risks it states, war-torn sometimes and impoverished Research political system. the democratic and process thelegitimacy electoral of assessments individual to related significantly is violence electoral that shows democracy for and support satisfaction, democratic vote, willingness to about intimidation voter and Violence 2015). (Burchard institutions trust in governing 2008; (Bratton elections some in turnouts voter reduce to also been found have there that suggests research recent more 2008), although Collier Vicente and African in generally more turnout voter on of violence effects such no are also Electoral 2017). violence permeating risks (Bekoe Burchard elections and and between the local political parties (Höglund at level revenge cycles of takes all, the stakes the literally winner where countries 2009). In Piyarathne the are you Whether devastating. defeat of the costs high, and are elections of the behind scenes working or ex-militia an ex-soldier or of the party flag-bearer the polls means at a loss a political party, of the security partas of force task struggle survival of for years few another in the cold, out years few another exceptional some In 2016). Utas and (Christensen resources to access for and the developments as civil war, for be impetus even an cases, may elections when rare, are instances if such Even illustrated. amply in 2015 in Burundi large-scale through states they alsoneighbouring can they affect do happen the increasing crisis, and a humanitarian of the creation people, of displacement regions. volatile already in arms of circulation the causes, understand seeks better to that developed has agenda research several critical this debate, In violence. electoral of consequences and dynamics are countries some why for beenas explanations identified have factors generic election period did not always instil a sense of security among the population. the population. security a sense instil of among election period always did not the APC was a sign that and provocation of cause a was it some for Rather, to further if As 2012). Kovacs (Söderberg state party the the with conflating the language and discourse public both the dominant this point, underscore symbolism cloaked in frequently terminology the parties usedand were by ‘the as hailed was Bio Maada example, For warfare. and battle with associated leader militarya as past his junta to reference in supporters, his by Tormentor’ the the beginning of at APC regime the one-party overthrew that in the coup transfor Bio’s Maada 2017). Söderberg and (Bangura Kovacs in 1992 civil war more likely than others to experience such violence (e.g. Fjelde and Höglund 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2013; Norris, Frank and Martinez i Coma 2015; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015). While such studies are important in identifying those countries most at risk, and while they can help us understand what characteristics of the political system in place generate the incentives for violence in the first place, they often fall short of explaining – and empirically demonstrating – exactly how and why these factors lead to specific incidents of violence. Also, this is not their primary purpose. Other studies persuasively capture the rich complexities of individual country cases or specific elections in more depth (e.g. Boone and Kriger 2012; Sisk 2012; Smith 2009). From such work, we can learn a lot about the relative importance of various factors in different empirical contexts. However, with some important exceptions (e.g. de Smedt 2009; Höglund and Piyarathne 2009; Klaus and Mitchell 2015), few previous studies have explored these issues on a subnational level, attempting to elucidate the patterns, dynamics and trends of such violence within states and why some areas and regions in a country are more likely than others to experience instances of election-related violence. In addition, we do not yet know enough about the micro-level factors and dynamics at work and the more intricate causal processes that link macro-level factors at the national level with the occurrences of violent events at the local level. This book aims to address these identified gaps. The chapters all attempt to answer one or several of these pertinent questions at the front line of the research agenda: why are some regions, areas and towns within the same country more likely than others to see incidents of electoral violence? Why are some elections more violent than others within the same country? What is the relationship between the dynamics of national-level politics and incidents of electoral violence at the local level? Why are some actors more likely than others to engage in, or support, violent acts around election time? Why are some issues more likely than others to mobilise people for violence? The overall objective of this book is thus not only to explain when and why we see electoral violence in Africa’s emerging democracies, but to empirically trace the processes through which such events occur. By doing so, we hope that the findings from this book will be useful for policy makers and practitioners working in the field of election assistance and support, election observation, and the promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights, especially in new democracies in developing states. The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, the phenomenon of electoral violence is discussed and problematised, building on previous contributions in the field. Second, the rationale for the empirical focus on the subnational level of analysis is explained, on the basis of scholarly work emphasising the need for increased analysis beyond the macro-level. Third, previous research on the causes and dynamics of election-related violence is

4 Introduction - 5 What is electoral violence? There is not yet an established definition in the inthe definition an established yet not is There violence? electoral is What and timing motive criteria: usually highlight two definitions Existing The phenomenon of electoral violence violence ofThe phenomenon electoral considered, structuring the discussion around three main clusters: the structural the clusters: main three around discussion the structuring considered, patronage and states multi-ethnic Africa’s in elections holding of conditions competition electoral as such elections, multiparty of the characteristics systems; final The elections. of framework the institutional and races; close electoral and in this volume the chapters each of on note introductory an section provides the book. of theme the overall to they relate how on words a few with together academic literature and there is no strong consensus in previous research. research. in previous consensus strong no is there and academic literature defining began by we however, this book project, for departure of a point As of purpose the for out carried acts coercive or violent as violence electoral understanding conceptual . This election an of results or process the affecting in the developments – previous from also – yet partly diverges by inspired is a on while agreeing However, detailbelow. discussed is more This field. in also we chapters, individual our in to relate and depart from to platform joint to loyal remained authors necessary all not chapter was that it believed that in to concept the approach broad a encouraged have we and this definition, local contexts. different of a range the to theme of the relevance adapt to order build of to expand to theorythis is book and objectives of the one all, After too believe that we such, As the phenomenon. of understanding empirical our prevent and analysis the constrain unnecessarily might definition a narrow inductively. generated being from newknowledge Laakso that example, for find, we Beginning2009). motive, with (Höglund moti activity ‘an is definition by violence electoral that 227–8) argues (2007: manipulating by – either elections of the results affect the to attempt an by vated the legitimacy of contesting by or participation and procedures the electoral that sense argue makes to it level, aggregated an on words, other In the results’. 2009: 415). (Höglund process’ electoral the ‘influence to is objective the overall to differentiate us helps it in only that is criticalnot on intent emphasis This also because it but political violence, of forms other from violence electoral involved. motives the strategic and violence of highlights the instrumentality dynamics and causes the understanding aspect find for this essential We African that Bøås as 4) argue Dunn (2007: and Just violence. electoral of of the composition to responses rational best as understood ‘are insurgencies a rational is violence electoral believe that we their policies’, and African states African political systems. of thein context elections the logic of to response on this emphasis detail section. in the next However, discuss this in more We exclude doesnot process electoral the influencing at aimed motives strategic range a find we picture, this overarching beyond behindand thefact that, associated risks the potential of aware acutely are We motives. additional of with pursuing a framing of the problem that is too simplistic. As noted by Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2013), in the context of understanding the occurrence of sexual violence in war, the pursuit of a single narrative risks excluding and silencing additional and equally relevant motives, particularly at the micro-level of analysis. We therefore want to underline that the more precise motives of each actor involved in electoral violence may vary. Those motives may also shift over time. In addition, each actor might pursue a range of multiple motives when engaging in electoral violence. For example, several chapters in this book discuss the role that young people – mostly men – play as so-called ‘foot soldiers’ of electoral violence (Bob-Milliar 2014). These individuals are usually mobilised for violence by a range of different motives, such as access to short-term benefits, loyalty to a Big Man, and private score settling against rival groups. In some instances, they engage in violent activities without any prior contacts, encouragement or instructions from Big Men, hoping that their sacrifice will be noticed and rewarded (Christensen and Utas 2016). However, we argue that their violent behaviour cannot be understood outside the context of the instrumentality of electoral violence for the political elites. In doing so, we also take issue with attempts to draw a sharp differentiation between strategic and incidental electoral violence. Alston (2010: 5–6), for example, argues that some violence, particularly in connection with riots or protests, is not intended to influence or change electoral outcomes, but rather is motivated by ‘indignation, anger and disappointment’. Burchard (2015: 12–13) echoes this message when she argues that some election-related violence lacks explicit intent, such as ‘spontaneous’ protests and killings by ‘over-zealous security forces’. We believe that this interpretation ignores the overarching context in which these individual engagements in electoral violence take place. On this issue, we are inspired by Kalyvas, who argues that, in the context of civil wars, the decentralised and localised nature of conflict does not imply spontaneous and anarchical violence: such a perspective ‘overlooks the political conflict in which [civil wars] occur’ (Kalyvas 2003: 485). When it comes to timing, the other definitional feature commonly identified in the literature (e.g. Bekoe 2012; Burchard 2015; Höglund 2009), this book deliberately avoids a definition that limits our analysis to violence ‘directly tied to an impending electoral contest or an announced electoral result’ (Straus and Taylor 2012: 19). While we agree that electoral violence can take place at all stages of the electoral process – notably before, during and after an election – it is close to impossible to pin down the exact time period this includes (and excludes) in the context of new and emerging democracies in developing states (see also Bekoe 2012: 2). The strategic electoral game is an ongoing process and an integral part of party politics itself. In addition, we believe that electoral violence is a phenomenon that is not limited to general and national elections, although these tend to generate the greatest attention.

6 Introduction - - - 7 Another aspect in the identification and delimitation of electoral violence electoral violence of delimitation and aspect in the identification Another other In methods used.and means to the relates relevance aspectA final of tions, primaries and by-elections (see for example Höglund and Jarstad 2011). 2011). Jarstad and Höglund example (see for by-elections and primaries tions, of the 5 in context in Chapter Söderberg and discussedBangura Kovacs As by election- more generate sometimes in-between can elections such Sierra Leone, elections. general monitored better the often than violence related (2009: Höglund 416) suspects,usual The involved. actors the relevant concerns the although in opposition, and the political parties in government are argues, or post-war conflict in example, For the context. depends on exactline-up paramilitary groups and militias as well as actors societies, non-state armed Höglund, see also (ibid.; instigators as violent role significant a play may in studies subsequent 2009; Raleigh Söderberg Most and 2016). Kovacs Jarstad activities committed on focusprimarily and leadthis followed have thefield Straus by acknowledged As opposition. the political or the incumbent by spectrum actors a broad usually is of there 20), however, (2012: Taylor and empirical broad a They employ categories. who fall these under umbrella two explicit both with more actors activities by includes that operationalisation theties politicalparties to in ques clandestine even or implicit more and perspective on thisbroad with the purposes thisbook, agree of we For tion. the to contribute to attempt We violence. electoral of perpetrators potential detail, more in these actors of some examining by precisely debate scholarly Men Big linked to ex-combatants 8) and party (Chapter militias youth as such dynamics internal their characteristics, study We 7). and 6 (Chapters networks our largely Through violence. electoral in acts of engaging for incentives and additional of number a on also light we shed approach, empirical inductive on research in previous attention of been the centre rarely have that actors of understanding in our role instrumental an play that but violence electoral in Sierra Leone authorities traditional notably violence, local of trajectories a criminal business 10), and (Chapter in Nigeria unions 5), transport (Chapter patronage on emphasis the analytical Given 9). (Chapter Zimbabwe in network intricate the more focus on also explicitly several the contributions of networks, dependencies alliances, mutual how and actors, between various relationships formed. and shaped are elections around social and networks in the literature the classic In to? referring we are violence kind of what words, consid usually is physical violence direct research, of conflict and peace field conflict behaviour of forms other from separate a distinct phenomenon, ered in civil wars, violence the logic of on seminal his work In 1969). (Galtung violence define can one basic level, the most at that, suggests 19) (2006: Kalyvas other disciplinary fields, In on people. harm of infliction the deliberate as broadly more defined commonly is violence anthropology, cultural notably Electoral violence is something that also takes place in connection with other other with also connection in takesplace that something is Electoralviolence elec chiefdom elections, localgovernment example, for including, elections, and stretched beyond physical violence to cover the infliction of suffering in a broader sense (see for example Nordstrom 1997). For the purpose of defining and studying electoral violence, the scholarly literature has usually settled on something of a middle road. According to Straus and Taylor (2012: 17–18), electoral violence, including direct physical violence in the form of targeted high-level assassinations or generalised killing in immediate connection to an electoral contest, occurs relatively rarely on the African continent. Such violence is much more likely to come in the form of ‘harassment, intimidation, and disruption’ (ibid. 24). Hence, although Straus and Taylor limit their focus to physical aspects of violence, they also include threats of physical violence, captured by the notion of coercive intimidation. Importantly, Fischer (2002: 8) informs us that the targets of electoral violence are not necessarily only people, but also institutions, facilities, materials and symbols associated with elections. As noted by Bekoe (2012: 3), however, victims can also be perpetrators, and Höglund and Piyarathne (2009) convincingly show that just as conflict begets conflict, electoral violence tends to result in cycles of revenge between the main political parties. As the chapters in this book illustrate, the violent and coercive methods used to affect the process or results of an election are many and varied, being both direct and indirect, and both high-intensity and more subdued and subtle. Above all, the everyday kinds of electoral violence that take place behind the backs of international election observers are almost always intimately local in their expression. In Chapter 11 of this volume, Schmitz illustrates how violent language and verbal threats cloaked in coercive and derogatory references shape electoral outcomes in Ghana, one of the most prominent democratic success stories on the African continent. On a final note, in this book we will use the terms ‘electoral violence’, ‘election-related violence’ and ‘violence-induced elections’ interchangeably. While these terms might imply different causal relationships between elections and violence, we believe that a more detailed understanding of the exact nature and characteristics of these relationships is something to be explored inductively in each chapter.

Looking beyond the national: shifting the level of analysis In order to better understand the more specific patterns of variation across space and time, most chapters in this volume apply a subnational perspective that links macro-level events and processes at the level of national political leadership to dynamics at the local level: a sub-region, district, town or neighbourhood. Other contributions focus on particular aspects of these processes, primarily from the perspective of a specific actor: the incentives of the political elite in a country to mobilise votes along ethnic lines; a youth militia’s quest for political inclusion, influence and power; or the rationale of individual ex-combatants

8 Introduction - 9 at work in processes of election-related violence. violence. election-related of in processes work at In this, we are inspired by scholars in the field of civil war literature who who literature civil of war in thefield scholars by inspired are this, we In pose we questions the research and the purpose this study of for Importantly have stressed the importance of going beyond macro-level analyses to under to analyses macro-level beyond going of the importance stressed have expose mechanisms and the political causal violence of the dynamics stand Verwimp, 2003; 2014; Kalyvas Balcells (e.g. Justine Balcells 2017; and work at understand to in order that, argues (2003) Kalyvas 2009). Brück and Justino must attention the ground, on out play political violence of processes how processes complex are civil wars account, his local In be to paid dynamics. The identities. and motives of a mixture and actors of a range involve that on motives local private by and much be as can driven violence of dynamics unsettled the periphery local competition, rivalries and – individual power at collective incentives political and by – as revenge of issues and disputes, the on impact a substantial have to local likely grievances Such are the centre. study her 479). In (ibid. violence’ of intensity and direction ‘content, overall the relevance demonstrates Balcells similarly (2017) civil war, the Spanish of Observations account. into rivalry taking local of of revenge dynamics and suggest countries the local in various at level violence election-related of Höglund 2012; Guiterrez-Romero and Dercon (e.g. work at dynamics similar of violence reality multi-layered 2008). This 2009; Kandeh Piyarathne and outbreak forthe cause a single pinpoint to difficult usually is it why explains local Sometimes transformed grievances analysis. are all of levels at violence of times other while time, at over violence of processes larger into escalated and on the of interests in a specific divergence result political dynamics national converge and they coexist however, often, localities. Most in various ground to According elections. the time of at as such in time, moments various at civil endows that motives various of 475), the convergence is (2003: Kalyvas it are they character; together, puzzling their particular with often wars and 476). (ibid. political violence of production’ the ‘joint for responsible our advance approaches micro-level been that in this has book, suggested it account to their ability because of precisely processes violent of understanding and Justino (Verwimp, conflict country or one within variations important for miss may we the micro-level, only at looking by However, 2009: 307). Brück general important drawing of the possibility and picture the bigger on out (2014) local and cases. Justino Balcells studies and individual from lessons conflict between the linkages micro-level to attention greater callhence for and work, social at and processes the wider economic political, and dynamics conflict between local of the gap dynamics bridge to attempts that research for We arena. macro in place the taking outcomes and processes conflict and the study for equally relevant are that insights important these are believe that to engage or not engage in acts of electoral violence on behalf of a Big Man. Man. a Big behalf of on violence electoral in acts of engage not or engage to and theidentification is this in book together thecontributions binds What mechanisms causal of analysis of electoral violence. Following Balcells and Justino (ibid. 1345), we define the macro-level as the level of the state and national processes and the micro-level as the level of the individual, household or small group, such as an individual’s ex-combatant network. In between the two, Balcells and Justino conceive of the meso-level as ‘processes that take place at the community level or at the level of local social groups and organisations’. While these categories might be analytically distinct, they sometimes overlap empirically. For example, the national political elite in a country consists of a collection of individuals, and an in-depth analysis of their individual and collective behaviour simultaneously straddles both the macro- and the micro-level. In this book, we have approached this turn beyond traditional macro-level analyses of electoral violence in different ways. A few contributions explicitly attempt to link national political dynamics with violent processes at the local level. Several other contributions address linkages between dynamics at different levels of analysis and strengthen our knowledge about the complex networks, alliances and allegiances in place beyond the façade of the unitary state. However, even in cases where the analysis is deeply embedded in the local context, we believe that there are important general lessons to be learned. For example, in Chapter 10, Agbiboa discusses electoral violence associated with the urban transportation sector in two areas of Lagos. From his detailed description of the interdependency and precarity between patrons and clients, he conveys a micro-cosmos as part of a much larger phenomenon in Nigeria, with important implications for our understanding of the dynamics of electoral violence in the country at large. At the other end of the spectrum, both Fjelde and Höglund (Chapter 1) and Sjögren (Chapter 2) discuss the strategies of national political elites while highlighting individual leadership experiences and learning processes. As such, all the contributions shed light on the micro-foundations of electoral violence in new and emerging democracies in developing states.

Between democracy and Big Man politics At the beginning of this chapter, we highlighted a trend that at first glance might seem to be a paradox: while democratic elections are gaining ground on the African continent, we are simultaneously seeing a rise in election-related violence. In this book, we suggest that it is precisely because multiparty elections are gradually becoming more openly competitive and because the results of elections matter more that elections are also more contentious. In light of an increasingly narrow space for traditional means of electoral fraud and manipulation, contending political elites resort to coercive and intimidating tactics to influence the electoral process and outcome. The key problem is that, although the formal institutional mechanisms have changed, the underlying logics of politics have not. Power and resources are still largely concentrated

10 Introduction

- 11 It is acknowledged that politics in many parts of the developing the developing parts of in many politics that acknowledged is It In the terminology used by Bratton and van de Walle (1997), this resulted this resulted (1997), Walle de van and the terminology Bratton used In by ‘Stomach infrastructure’, high stakes, and the struggle for power for power and the struggle high stakes, ‘Stomach infrastructure’, centre the at at the centre, raising the stakes of electoral contests, and patronage politics is is politics patronage and contests, electoral of the stakes raising the centre, at sections, few the we next In political mobilisation. mode of still thedominant developments conceptual key discuss some further, this statement will explore that assumptions theoretical underlying the out and set in the academic field, violence electoral on knowledge scholarly body of accumulated our constitute democracies. electoral Africa’s in tions. These relations, they argue, are organised in a hierarchical network, all network, in a hierarchical organised are argue, they relations, These tions. formal is a toAlthoughthere the local office level. the executive from the way is the in practice distinction the public, and betweendistinction the private the overshadow generally practicesof power informal and the distorted, often have terms other Many their patrons. to be to loyal tend clients as formal, alsoincluding been used describe political systems, to these hybrid essentially 2003), (Ottaway states’ ‘semi-authoritarian 2003), (Joseph democracies’ ‘façade (Schedler 2006). autocracies’ ‘electoral (Zakaria‘illiberal and 1997) democracies’ outlook democratic the formal beyond indicate, these aptly terms of most As resemblance little with in nature, autocratic essentially are many these states, of by out pointed liberal democracies. As and consolidated of theworkings to served often has the disorder political this Daloz apparent (1999), Chabal and in the establishment of ‘neopatrimonial’ regimes; these combine the institutions the institutions these combine regimes; ‘neopatrimonial’ of thein establishment the with elections, competitive including state, the modern bureaucratic of rela patron–client of power personalised, unaccountable of reality informal world is characterised by the pervasiveness of patronage politics, or what Utas Utas what or politics, the patronage pervasiveness of by characterised is world Sahlins 1963). 1992; Médard (e.g. politics Man Big as to refer others and (2012) informal of forms alternative structures, state absent weak or of situations In Africa, In the occurrence 1998). of (Reno thrive usually structures governance of be to one known is relations patron–client of networks informal hierarchical, Ohlson by (Gyimah-Boadi noted politics As of 2007). features durable the most remarkably proved this aspect African has politics of (2002), Söderbergand Kovacs the in postcolonial radical reform political at survived has all and attempts resilient democracy Hence, 1990s. in the early multiparty to the turn period, including practitioners policy and makers scholars, many by shared the enthusiasm amid spread 1991) (Huntington democratisation of alike when the so-called wave third were voices some 1990s, in the early African states of number a large across in take place did not political change of this process that out point raised to (1997) de Walle van and Bratton and (1995) Nugent vacuum. power existing an the networks, patronage existing reforming or replacing of instead that, argued part integral an as incorporated become to likely was politics patronage logic of of the democratic political system in these states. thesein states. political system the democratic of elites in Africa well, and the incentives for governments to change this state of affairs are relatively low. For the purposes of this book, the most important implication is that, beyond formal democratic institutions and processes, politics is often rooted in the informal sphere of power. As will be evident from the chapters that follow, beyond this generalised picture, there is also great diversity and heterogeneity across and within states, particularly as we move to the local level. In order to understand and explain the workings of individual Big Man networks we have to recognise that these informal structures are built on fluid, flexible and ever changing ‘webs of power’ (Utas 2012: 14). In conflict and post-war societies in particular, these networks are thus likely to be less stable than usually depicted. Each Big Man’s network builds on temporary relationships that are constantly being revisited and renegotiated (ibid.). For example, Christensen and Utas (2008; 2016) have illuminated the many and complex ways in which ex-militia members engage with political Big Men around election time. Their studies reveal the fluidity of these social networks, characterised by mutual dependencies, shifting alliances, unfulfilled promises and unpaid debts. Critical for understanding the phenomena of electoral violence is the awareness that electoral competition has generally tended to strengthen and reinforce rather than eradicate this hybrid political order (Lindberg 2003). In this context, patronage capacity easily becomes the most important factor in determining electoral outcomes (Gyimah-Boadi 2007). Voters choose among candidates less on the basis of public policy positions and political party programmes than on the candidates’ assumed patronage capacity. In order to demonstrate their patronage potential, patrons thus need to distribute largesse to their followers. The clients are assured that their Big Men will attend to their needs – be it the provision of food, jobs, licences or contracts – in exchange for political loyalty transferred into votes at the time of the election (Diamond 2008: 145). Elections are thus costly affairs. Most often, the resources needed to win elections are extracted from the state, raising the stakes for political control over state resources (Lindberg 2003; Nugent 2001). The tendency of many African states to concentrate power and resources at the centre – effectively turning politics into a zero-sum game – further adds to this problem (Diamond 2008). The winner thus literally takes all, as alluded to in the title of Chapter 7 by Bjarnesen, and losers are left struggling at the margins. What is at stake is more than just the state coffers. If you are the biggest man in a system based on Big Man networks, the seat of executive power can also be used to control appointments in key state institutions, procurement processes and the distribution of business contracts, and ensure immunity from criminal prosecution, sometimes for life (Collier 2010). This is why elections in these contexts are often referred to as ‘do-or-die’ affairs.

12 Introduction

- Competitive elec- Competitive

13 In sum, the underlying logic of the distribution of power in most states states in most power of the distribution logic of the underlying sum, In In Chapter 10, Agbiboa illustrates the logic of Big Men politics within within politics Men Big thelogic of illustrates Agbiboa 10, Chapter In tions are by their very nature conflictual processes aimed at mobilising divergent divergent mobilising at aimed processes conflictual their very by nature are tions between political actors. political competition society in stimulating and interests between and elections relationship the overarching on debate the scholarly In - authori to democracy from in transition either are in conflict societies violent that that acknowledged is it democracy, to civil war from ruletarian in transition or even war or violence cause may elections democratic of nature the competitive In societiesnon-violent 2000). the where Snyder 2005; Snyder and Mansfield (e.g. Competition, ethno-regional politics and close races politics and close ethno-regional Competition, of Lagos. As discussed in his chapter, it was in Nigeria that the concept of of the concept that in Nigeria was it discussed chapter, Lagos. As in his of re-election to the relation particularly in born, first was infrastructure’ ‘stomach in Ekiti State elections in the gubernatorial Fayose Ayo Governor by campaign Nigeria. specificto new nor neither is the practice itself in 2014, although goods,are and gifts other food, and as funds, such items’, So-called ‘stomach the ballot box. at their support ensure to in order voters to distributed widely relations power the complex in this book stress Several the contributions of glance first at which appear in this hidden practice, functions multi-layered and is largesse of the distribution Men, the Big For be in nature. to unidirectional by securing in which they system fulfilduty their welfare of a form as conceived also opportunity an are elections the voters, For their people. of the well-being has electorate Utas (2007), the by noticed As influence. and power exercise to able sometimes is this practice and of squeeze out to the most learned how party while one voting to be to loyal pretend people game: double a play to sticks without carrots learned that have politicians most Hence, another. for also to need silence Successfulcandidates election. an to win sufficient not are 2014: 55). (Bøås Utas and co-optation alliances and through the opposition between relationship the intricate to pointed have studies other of A number elections, competitive with connection in violence and fraud buying, vote in strategies illicit different deploy strategically political elites that suggesting deemed are successful strategies those how on depending locations different 2008; Collier and Bratton (e.g. election results favourable beto in delivering 2011). 2008; Vicente in spite politics Africa Man still is based Big essentially in sub-Saharan on still resources and power with democracy, multiparty of the introduction of is What elections. of the stakes raising the centre, at concentrated largely political real competi of the emergence is however, countries, new in many potential keeping methodsfor traditional of while range a power, for tion we Next, norms. democratic by being constrained are in check challengers this debate. to turn the empirical confines of the urban transport system in the mega-city mega-city in the system transport urban of the confines theempirical norms associated with consolidated democracies are not widespread and political tolerance more generally is low, there is a risk that the electoral contest will contribute to intensifying and polarising existing socio-economic cleavages and other divisions in society. According to Collier (2010), the world’s poorest democracies are more likely than others to see instances of political violence, as they generally lack the key conflict-mitigating mechanisms of consolidated and wealthier democracies: accountability and legitimacy. The added challenges of holding competitive elections in war-ravaged societies have also been well documented (e.g. Kumar 1998; Lyons 2005). What does electoral competition look like in Africa’s new democracies? Because patron–client networks are commonly organised along ethnic lines or regional constellations, elections are frequently characterised by the direct or indirect mobilisation of ethnic or regional votes (Arriola 2009; Bates 1983; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Posner 2007). In Chapter 1, Fjelde and Höglund provide an in-depth account of how and why ethnic divisions emerged as a powerful tool for violent electoral mobilisation in the context of Kenya after the introduction of multiparty democracy. They show how elite strategies used during the era of single-party rule for the purpose of securing political and economic resources and keeping competitors at bay later paved the way for exclusionary identity formations and ethnic voting. However, they argue, the historical legacy of exclusionary identity politics does not predetermine the occurrence of election- related violence along ethnic lines; it merely provides the structural conditions for the political elite to utilise an electoral strategy based on this narrative. The likelihood that the political elite will resort to electoral strategies that increase the risk of violence also depends on the challenge they face. This reasoning is supported by insights from previous works on electoral violence, where close races (Norris, Frank and Martinez i Coma 2015) and the incumbent’s fear of losing an election (Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2013) have been identified as important explanatory factors. For example, Wilkinson’s (2004) study of ethnic riots in India shows that in situations of close electoral competition at the community level, party elites have incentives to polarise the population along ethnic lines through the instigation of violent incidents for the purpose of securing electoral support from pivotal swing voters within their own ethnic community or intimidate their ethnic opponents. Wilkinson’s study is particularly important as it can help explain not only why but also when and where we are likely to see incidents of electoral violence on the subnational level. Hence, the risk of electoral violence may be higher precisely in situations where there is real political competition between parties and genuine possibilities to change existing power relations. In Chapter 2 of this volume, Sjögren demonstrates that the degree of government-sponsored violence linked to national elections in Uganda has been strongly influenced by the intensity of the competition.

14 Introduction - In societies In 15 As democracy is slowly becoming more entrenched, and electoral competi electoral and entrenched, more becoming democracyAs slowly is Institutional (dis)incentives and constraints on violence on constraints and (dis)incentives Institutional tion grows stronger, the risk of election-related violence may thus increase. As As increase. thus may violence election-related the of risk stronger, grows tion about uncertainty and high, competition remain stakes the electoral as long and Jarstad Höglund, by argued As a high price. at come may the outcome togained be benefits significant there are only not (2009) Söderberg Kovacs often costs associated high arealso there office, the executive over control from democracy as increased has even have may costs Some loss. electoral an with widely was it demonstrations, 2015 the during Burundi In ground. gained a third run to for Nkurunziza wanted why the reasons of one speculated that human for face legal accountability to having with associated the fear term was down step to were if he time in power his during committed abuses rights electoral illicit to resort politicians consequence, a As 2015). (Söderberg Kovacs both party of intimidation and harassment attacks, violent as such strategies Party election day. before long sometimes voters, potential and candidates supporters by party often interrupted, violently are events campaign rallies and Party events. purposefully various and to transported strategically who are facilities and vandalised, people, and destroyed are partyand symbols offices or attacked are administration the electoral with associated materials and the election or winning of their chances increase to their quest In sabotaged. enter often politicians position, their post-election bargaining strengthening the state or militias wings, youth militant with relationships precarious into strategies violent such in this book all explore chapters The security forces. at some closer a lookand take settings, empirical detailin different in greater violence. of thein production involved the actors of where the structural conditions of elections create major incentives for violence, violence, for incentives major create elections of the structural where conditions the regulating for place in arrangements administrative and institutional the instigating or mitigating in either role important an play can contest electoral - in the some attention considerable received has question This violence. electoral societies, where or war-torn design in divided of institutional field broader what the design of focused how on have contributions scholarly of number a large - rela the influence may held are in which elections the conditions or elections 2000; Lijphart experience the electoral Horowitz (e.g. of failure or success tive been has suggested it example, For 1977; Reynolds 1999). Reilly Reilly 2001; and for strategies inclusive and broad-based encourage that systems electoral that alleviate to likely more in society are cleavages existing across voters mobilising exclusive, more are that systems Conversely, political polarisation. the of risk and logic a winner-takes-all encourage system, the first-past-the-post as such polarised divided and in already violence encourage to likely more hence are societies1999). Reynolds (Reilly and Some of these findings are echoed in the literature on electoral violence. For example, Fjelde and Höglund (2014) find that electoral violence is indeed more likely in countries employing majoritarian voting rules, especially in societies characterised by great socio-economic cleavages. Other studies have found that considerations of the timing of elections in high-risk structural conditions may reduce the likelihood of electoral violence (Brancati and Snyder 2013; Flores and Nooruddin 2012). The electoral administrative system – for example, a politically independent electoral commission – may also influence the efficacy, transparency and political integrity of the elections, contributing to a decrease in the risk of violence due to perceptions of fraud and manipulation (Höglund 2009: 420–3). However, alleviating uncertainties about illicit manipulation is not sufficient. In fact, the documentation of such irregularities may even increase the risk of violence. Daxecker (2012) demonstrates that the presence of international election observers in African elections may add to the potential for post- election violence precisely because of their ability to detect and publicise serious irregularities in a credible manner. The monitoring of fraudulent elections by international election observers draws attention to unfair electoral processes, reduces uncertainty over whether fraud was indeed committed or not, and provides the impetus for such constituencies to take action. Moni- toring therefore may contribute to violent contestation after manipulated elections, Daxecker argues (ibid.). Election observation may also produce other unintended results. Daxecker (2014) shows that, although the presence of international observers has been proven to reduce the likelihood of violence on election day in African elections, it has contributed to an increase in violence in the pre-election period, suggesting a temporal adjustment in the use of violent strategies, not their disappearance. Asunka et al. (2017), based on a study of domestic election observation in the 2012 elections in Ghana, point to a similar pattern of adjustment across space in local constituencies. They argue that although observers were successful in reducing both fraud and violence at the polling stations which they monitored, such strategies were simply relocated to polling stations without election observers. Election observation may also have different effects on different actors. Smidt (2016), for example, finds that while the presence of international observation missions can deter violence by governments, it tends to have the opposite effect on opposition groups. While the oversight function of electoral institutions may thus produce mixed results, these are not the only institutions of relevance. Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2013) find that electoral violence is more likely to occur when there are few or weak institutional constraints on the executive power – such as constitutional checks and balances, and functioning and independent judiciaries. Such institutional constraints limit the risk that the incumbent

16 Introduction

- - 17 This suggests that, in order to understand the occurrence of electoral violence electoral violence of the occurrence to understand order in that, suggests This Chapters 1 and 2 retain the primary focus on the macro-level, but contribute contribute but the primarythe macro-level, focus on retain 2 and 1 Chapters Following this introduction, the book proceeds with eleven empirically empirically the eleven book with proceeds this introduction, Following Chapter outline uses the power at his or her disposal to steer the outcome in a favourable in a favourable the disposal outcome her steer to or his at uses the power cautions however, (2011), Mueller they argue. means, coercive through direction address to institutions improve to thein ability believing too strongly against Kenya, of Based a study violence. on electoral with associated the problems and the rule law to of adhere to incentives of in the absence that argues she these the that risk always is there institutions, legitimacy of and the integrity the political by accepted not will undermined be and ‘bypassed, institutions 100–1). (ibid. thepublic’ or elite explanatory of range a examine should we setting, particulara in empirical structuralto the conditions In addition analysis. of levels different at factors in violent engage to political actors for incentives the underlying provide that some and large at the political system to generic which are of acts – some – we arrangements multiparty competitive with associated immediately more the institutional and system the electoral the of details to attention pay should the mitigate to or serve reinforce to which may either in place, framework limited a relatively only still we have However, violence. electoral of risk work at these processes causal of details intricate the more of understanding particularly interest, of lead the outcome to factors these macro-level how and in this volume. chapters the individual to turn this, we the local For at level. of electoral violence and thereby attempt to move the scholarly debate on the the on debate the scholarly move to attempt thereby and violence electoral of forward. violence electoral of dynamics and causes explicitly by work at the processes about knowledge our strengthening to incentives elite to conditions historical and structural causes identified linking explain to able they are so, doing By electiontime. during behaviour and In study. under space in the countries time and across variations important considera thorough a provide Höglund Kristine and Fjelde Hanne 1, Chapter subsequent of analysis an by complemented elections 1992 Kenya’s of tion in inaugural this electoral violence of dynamics trace the authors The elections. forma ethnic identity exclusionary of in terms continuities underlying to vote single-party under the elite used by strategies ethnic outbidding and tions and injustice of legacies The resources. patronage control to ruleorder in shaped subsequently institutions these informal through created victimisation the country once support electoral mass and competition elite of the pattern to explain able thus are authors party The politics. competitive to returned oriented chapters by authors with extensive experience of the cases experience they of discuss. extensive with authors by chapters oriented of levels do as their vary, approaches methodological and analytical Their processes in work at micro-foundations the they all address but analysis, how and why ethnic divisions have become a powerful tool for violent electoral mobilisation in Kenya. However, they are also able to show that the degree to which the political elite is willing and able to exploit or evoke such historical narratives for electoral purposes is also dependent on the ways in which particular reforms, policies and leadership make ethnic themes more or less salient. In Chapter 2, Anders Sjögren provides additional depth to the conceptual sensibility towards temporality in the study of electoral violence. He argues that Ugandan electoral politics under the thirty-year reign of Yoweri Museveni must be understood sequentially rather than in isolation, and that the experiences and lessons drawn from past elections shape the political elite’s expectations, calculations and adaptations for subsequent ones. Sjögren examines the changing levels of state violence against the opposition across time and over five presidential elections, with an emphasis on the 2011 and 2016 elections. He finds that the degree of government-sponsored violence is strongly shaped by both the intensity of the electoral competition and the presence or absence of institutional constraints on the use of force. The closer the race, the more likely that the government will engage in strategically deployed violence for the purpose of controlling the electoral process and outcome. However, this is mediated by a number of deterring factors, in particular the incumbent’s assessment of the risks and rewards associated with deploying violence. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 all focus on important subnational variations in the countries studied. The authors of these chapters explicitly attempt to link macro- level processes and events to the occurrences of violence at the local level. Chapter 3 considers a central theme in African politics, namely the importance of land conflict dynamics in fuelling electoral violence. Through an analysis of Côte d’Ivoire’s famously troubled western cocoa regions, which saw high levels of electoral violence both in the decade leading up to the 2010–11 post-electoral crisis and during the crisis itself, Matthew Mitchell explains the conditions under which local land conflict dynamics served to fuel such violence. The key argument is that political entrepreneurs seeking power at the centre strategically revive historically grounded discourses of belonging and exclusionary narratives over land claims as a form of patronage in order to secure the electoral support of local constituencies in the periphery. Local actors, for their part, ally with national elites and reinforce such processes when they view such promises as both legitimate and feasible. In Chapter 4, Willy Nindorera and Jesper Bjarnesen analyse the geographical distribution of violence in connection with the 2015 elections in Burundi, where initially peaceful protests against incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term later turned into violent confrontations and armed conflict. Importantly, the violence that followed displayed a distinct spatial pattern, with concentration in some neighbourhoods in the capital. Nindorera and Bjarnesen tie this specific pattern of

18 Introduction - 19 The violent potentials and practices of non-state actors with alleged ties to allegedwith to ties actors non-state practicesof and potentials violent The The next set of chapters examines specific actors involved in the dynamics dynamics inthe involved specific examines actors chapters of next The set tives. Their findings speak to the importance of paying close attention to the tothe attention close paying of importance speak tothe findings Their tives. individuals. and networks groups, of the choices shape that realities contextual militia former of the trajectories follows Ebiede Marclint 6, Tarila Chapter In particular with Delta, focus Niger in Nigeria’s politics in electoral combatants fighters ex-militant how demonstrates study His elections. general the 2015 on demobilisation disarmament, the regional through gone who previously had the elections during re-mobilised were programme (DDR) reintegration and to access gain or maintain to the quest In commanders. their former through these leaders level, the governmental at political power or networks patronage the at increasing aimed to electoral carryviolence out their ex-fighters mobilise Mariam 7, Chapter In political candidates. their preferred of chances electoral remobilisation ex-combatant of analysis this general beyond takes us Bjarnesen ex-fighters. individual of the micro-level at variations important examines and on themselves found who commanders former of two narratives the Through in Liberia elections post-war in the sides the second chapter in 2011, opposing winners electoral with associated networks of trajectories the diverse illustrates Ebiede, like while much Bjarnesen, addition, In candidates. losing with and programmes DDR of survive spite in often structures rebel former that shows political purposes, to also is able she for the elite used sometimes by are and renegotiate to opportunity an as use elections ex-combatants how demonstrate their wartime links. through power and leverage In chapters. subsequent in the two further explored are political elites national electoral of the context to attention our returns Rasmussen 8, Jacob Chapter violence to a longer history of ethno-political divisions and armed conflict. conflict. armed and ethno-political divisions history of longer a to violence by the reactivated gradually were grievances historical how They alsoshow support and the opposition divide to strategy a deliberate as Nkurunziza regime Chapter In rebellion’. fact in a ‘Tutsi were protests thepublic that claims its the eastern why explain Söderberg Mimmi and Kovacs Bangura 5, Ibrahim high levels been has unusually in Sierra Leone the scene of Kono district of in to found is be key explanation the decades.that argue They for violence of party wins district. swing Whatever electoral an as position unique the district’s which means nationally, hand also the upper to gain likely is Kono in elections all highlya districtcontributes political courted is parties, by and Kono that carryto violence out order In elections. even minor of the stakes raising to with relationships dependent mutually into enter political elites national locally, gangs. youth organised bothlocal and chiefs stretch that networks their in patronage embeddedness and violence electoral of and 6 Chapters political dynamics. the local national to from level allthe way of in processes their involvement and ex-militants of the role 7 both explore methodological and analytical perspec different from but violence, electoral politics in Kenya, but this time from the perspective of the Mungiki movement, one of the key actors associated with the perpetration of electoral violence in the country, not least in connection with the 2007 elections. Over the years, the movement has assumed many different roles and forms, ranging from a youth-dominated social movement and an ethnic militia to a political party, a religious organisation and a criminal network. By analysing the movement’s elusive nature, its foundational symbolism and its ties with Kenya’s political elite, Rasmussen frames the politics of patronage played out between the political elite and the Mungiki leadership as a ‘parasitic politics’. While sometimes an effective tool in the hands of opportunistic politicians who want to access power by any means, the movement’s potential for violence is also a powerful resource that allows it to retain its influence over the country’s political agenda, even when this potential is not realised. In Chapter 9, Tariro Mutongwize discusses an equally elusive and violent non-state actor that plays an important role as a mobiliser of electoral violence: the Chipangano movement in Zimbabwe, a business entity and criminal network operating primarily in the high-density southern suburb of Mbare in the capital of Harare. While the government denies the existence of Chipangano and any alleged affiliation to the group, evidence suggests that the movement is supported by members of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Mutongwize argues that Chipangano’s pattern of disappearance and re-emergence can be ascribed to the nature of electoral cycles, during which the political leadership’s demand for potentially violent actors to secure victory at the polls spurs the reactivation of the movement’s violent potential. In exchange, Chipangano’s allegiance with political Big Men allows it to control space and daily business activity in Mbare. In Chapter 10, we shift the perspective to micro-foundations of election- related violence through an in-depth study of the intricacies of patronage politics in transit places (motor parks, bus stops and junctions) in two major local government areas in the city of Lagos in the post-1999 period. Electoral violence has become a fundamental aspect of political competition in the city and elsewhere in Nigeria, and Daniel Agbiboa contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of such processes at the local level through a study of the roles played by the city’s transportation trade unions and their standing army of the sector’s middlemen, the agberos, whose responsibility it is to ensure that the minibus drivers honour their dues to the unions. During election periods, the agberos are recruited by Big Men for the purpose of attacking rival political candidates, coercing members of the public, rigging elections and providing security to their patrons. Agbiboa provides us with a deepened knowledge of the precarious nature of such patronage politics. Elections are times of uncertainties that highlight the precariousness of both Big Men and Small Men who struggle to remain relevant and influential.

20 Introduction - 60 (29): 73–92. 60 (29): Washington DC: United States States DC: United Washington

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1 | Fjelde and Höglund - -

27 1 Ethnic politics and elite competition: elite competition: politics and Ethnic

In the early 1990s, Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi succumbed to domestic succumbed domestic to Moi arap Daniel president Kenyan 1990s, the early In specifi Kenya and Africa in generally, electoral violence on literature The |

the roots of electoral violence in Kenya in Kenya violence of electoral the roots Höglund and Kristine Hanne Fjelde Introduction 1 and international pressure to democratise after a long periodof single-party a long after democratise to pressure international and the that argued ‘repeatedly Moi elections, multiparty the face of rule. In destroy in tribaland usher parties conflict would opposition of legalization fraught were elections 1992 the Indeed, 90). 1993: (Barkan unity’ national by orchestrated people, 1,500 least at of in the death resulting violence with and violence Moreover, supporters. disenfranchise opposition to in order Moi since all in Kenya elections accompanied varying have levels at displacements been has there and in the 1990s, elections multiparty of the reintroduction political opponents. against the government by action repressive and violent cally, provides important insights to understand the prevalence of such such of the prevalence understand to insights important provides cally, the of the precariousness how example, for highlighted, have Studies violence. the electoral of the stakes and elections surrounding framework institutional (cf. competition electoral of manipulation violent precipitate may contest on scholarship existing The 2015). Linebarger and 2009; Salehyan Höglund mobilising for incentives powerful elite of the role also has emphasised Kenya the very at ethnicity place studies some While ethnic issues. divisive on history Burchard (e.g. electoral violent Kenya’s of explanation an of core violent in determining the factor key not is ethnicity that claim others 2015), as such powerful influences with interacts it rather but outcomes, electoral Gutiérrez-Romero and (e.g. Dercon process electoral a flawed of perceptions these with links up Our analysis 1998). Kahl (e.g. scarcity resource or 2012) understanding to approach rooted historically a more perspectives provide to elec violent for a powerful tool become have ethnic divisions why and how on the rich scholarship on build thereby We in Kenya. mobilisation toral politics, of the ethnicisation of the importance to points that politics Kenyan distribution land unequal of patterns historical linked to especially is it as Lochery and extra-legal the use(Anderson of 2008; Boone and 2012), 2011; 2014). We Mueller 2003; (Kagwanja a period authoritarianism during of force specificallyon focusing dimensions the political by these studies complement of elite interaction and political mobilisation in the era of authoritarian rule. Our focus is on the ways in which these dynamics created political legacies that made Kenya vulnerable to electoral violence during the transition to multiparty competitive elections. In this chapter, we trace how elite strategies to mobilise divisive ethnic issues in order to secure political and economic resources during the era of single-party rule paved the way for exclusionary identity formation and ethnic voting. Focusing on the elections in 1992, together with an analysis of subsequent elections, we show how these historical patterns shaped the incentive structures and opportunities for the political elites in the transition to multiparty rule and came to underpin elite competition, as well as mass electoral conduct. In short, we suggest that these historical legacies increased the stakes of the electoral contest and precipitated the use of violent electoral strategies as more open and competitive political processes were introduced. Moreover, the patterns of violence across elections in Kenya also underscore the fact that the historical legacies relating to ethnic animosities need to be exploited or evoked continuously by political leaders to become decisive in mobilisation for electoral violence. Our analysis highlights the importance of the linkages between structural factors and more agency-based explanations, and proposes a theoretical perspective that provides a link between seemingly disparate explanations of electoral violence in the existing literature. We argue that historical patterns of elite interaction and political mobilisation under authoritarian rule may put in place informal institutions that influence the dynamics of political competition even when the formal institutions are reformed. The historical roots of ethnic politics imply that ethnic divides can be evoked or exploited by political elites. The focus on historical legacies thus helps us identify countries that are vulnerable to violent electoral mobilisation under circumstances in which elites have incentives to rely on violent, rather than peaceful, electoral campaign strategies. Moreover, the focus on the importance of both structure and individual elite agency suggests that the significance of historically rooted informal institutions may shift over time in the post-democratisation state, depending on how particular reforms, policies and leadership make ethnic themes more or less salient. The historical perspective also provides insights for understanding spatial variations in the occurrence of electoral violence within the same country – for example, why violence has been particularly prevalent in Kenya’s Rift Valley – variations that may not be apparent from studying only present-day politics. We therefore propose the historical turn as a complement to the existing literature that has tended to address electoral violence from a short-term perspective and that does not recognise the way in which institutional and political legacies are driving factors in the risk of violence. For this reason, we place ethnic politics in a historical context in

28 1 | Fjelde and Höglund - - 29 We proceed by presenting some theoretical points of departure relating to to relating departure of points theoretical some presenting by proceed We In many places, the introduction of more open and democratic institu democratic and open more of the introduction places, many In We do not take issue with this argument directly, but we contend that the the that contend we but directly, this with argument take issue do not We Ethnic politics, identity formation and electoral violence and electoral identity formation Ethnic politics, order to understand elite strategies and elite–voter interaction around elections elections around interaction elite–voter and strategies elite understand to order 2014; Riedl 2014). (see,LeBas e.g., Mueller 2011; outlinesthe first analysis empirical The violence. electoral ethnic and politics trace the then we election, and 1992 Kenya’s in competition electoral of nature violent the influenced ethnic that politics the political action and of origins contrast we Next, explanations. additional some address and outcome electoral section, discuss we the concluding In elections. subsequent electionto the1992 policy. for implications few a suggest and research future for avenues some tions has been accompanied by the rise of interethnic violence and armed armed and violence interethnic therise of by been has accompanied tions during periods of violence risk heightened a to conflict. point studies Several weak are institutions where particularly in countries transition, democratic of 2013; Snyder and Brancati 2009; Söderberg and Kovacs Jarstad Höglund, (cf. ethnic (2000) links the of risk Snyder 2013). Hug Cederman, and Gleditsch exclusionary foment to incentives elite to democratisation during violence used by are ethnic outbidding and rhetoric nationalist Extremist identities. their retain and coalitions voter large build political support, foster leaders to (see insecure their positions renders when political competition power on hold ethnic from resulting Rather than 2005). Mann 1972; Shepsle also and Rabushka of the introduction precede rivalries that group deep-seated and animosities to in ethnic violence (2000) links the upsurge Snyder institutions, democratic democracy. electoral of phases theearly in manipulation elite reckless of manipulation the strategic and ethnic rhetoric exclusionary on reliance political survival necessarily for do not sentiments out-group and in-group authoritarian Many elections. multiparty of the surface introduction with and political support foment politicised to ethnicity leaders in Africa have violence and rhetoric their rule. to exclusionary The challenges prevent to politics multiparty to in the transition expressed are ethnic that lines along of prominence the specifically, More deeper roots. historical have thus may in states neopatrimonial postcolonial of in the politicalethnicity organisation the introduc with ethnicity the salience of for Africa the groundwork laid were African all states postcolonial not Yet, elections. multiparty of tion in which non-democratic in the ways variations substantial were alike: there maintaining and building of meet the challenge political to leaders chose societies in ethnically heterogeneous across support of political coalitions order in ethnic issues divisive on people mobilise to Africa.strategies Elite the era pave in the pre-democratic resources economic secureto political and elections multiparty when competitive political mobilisation violent for way are instituted. The political legacy shapes the strategies available to elites and contributes to making some of these transitions more prone to electoral violence than others. Across various authoritarian regime types, ethnicity is and has been a key political asset around which political leaders have built support to consolidate power; much of the political struggle in Africa since independence has centred on the control of patronage resources by ethnically defined coalitions (Bates 1983). The postcolonial state combined the modern bureaucratic state with influential informal institutions based on personalised and unconstrained power and pervasive patron–client relationships that were organised along ethnic or sub-ethnic lines (cf. Bratton and van de Walle 1994). Whereas the personalist authoritarian regimes, dominated by a single strongman, can be seen as the embodiment of exclusionary clientelist rule, other regime types also relied on the selective distribution of state patronage to forge political support among ethnic elites (Bayart 1993; Bratton and van de Walle 1994). Horowitz (2000) notes how bans on electoral contest and the institutionalisation of single-party rule shifted the bargaining between ethnically defined factions into a forum where transparency and accountability regarding ethnic representation were weaker (see also Huntington 1970). As a result, some single-party regimes became dominated by a hegemonic ethnic group (or a small number of groups) and displayed highly exclusionary practices in the distribution of state resources, such as jobs in the civil sector and public transfers, underpinned by a highly coercive state apparatus. In the next sections we explore how historical patterns of political organisation in Kenya – specifically the narrow ethnic base under single-party rule – have encouraged the formation of exclusionary ethnic identities, which served to raise the stakes of elections and ethnically based electoral mobilisation during the transition period, and which contributed to the violent outcome of the 1992 elections.

Kenya’s violent transition The 1992 elections in Kenya marked a return to multiparty politics. Why were the elections preceded by large-scale election-related violence? We are particularly interested in the ways in which ethnic politics at the time of the transition structured political competition and how this created incentives and opportunities for the incumbent to use violence as a means to win elections. First, we present the basic features and dynamics of the 1992 election. Second, we outline the main ethnic cleavages in Kenya and discuss the importance of ethnicity in political mobilisation. Third, we analyse the formation of exclusionary ethnic identities in Kenya and the policies and leadership that made ethnic themes particularly salient in the pre-democratic era, and how these two features help explain the violent 1992 elections. In addition, we discuss how

30 1 | Fjelde and Höglund - - 31 From 1970 until 1992, the Kenyan African National Union Union African National the Kenyan 1992, until 1970 From The transition to multiparty politics has its origin in a combination of of origincombination a in its has politics multiparty to transition The displace and violence by large-scale accompanied were elections 1992 The other factors, such as the importance of land, also add to our understanding understanding also our add to land, of theimportance as such factors, other outcome. electoral the violent of elections The 1992 factors. Kenyans were suffering from mounting inflation and food shortages. foodshortages. and inflation mounting from suffering were Kenyans factors. on dependedand authoritarian increasingly had regime become Moi The tribes. The minority other a few and group Kalenjin own Moi’s from support 1991, Democracy in August of formed was (FORD) the Restoration for Forum but lawyers, clergy and groups, opposition of coalition a broad representing aid foreign of in the suspension several leaders resulted of FORD the arrest reforms economic political and initiated the government until donors key by multiparty of finalised legalisation the and swiftly reacted Moi 2000). (Kirschke pervasive factionalism from suffered opposition The December in 1991. politics factor the essential divided by political were leaders its and the outset from 2014).Thesedivisions (Mueller personal conflicts by as well as ethnicity, of all rival alliances that of networks into the opposition transformed quickly candidate. presidential their own nominate to fought ment. While repressive measures had been used during previous elections, elections, been had previous used measures during repressive While ment. tenure, Moi’s during and Kenyatta, Jomo president, first both Kenya’s under by monopolised Previously in 1991. changed locus repression and of the means with shift, major a was This gangs. by committed now was violence the state, communi whole targeting violence and beingcreated out-groups in- and clear warned previously had regime Moi 2014). The 2000; Mueller ties (Kirschke volatile Kenya’s in politics multiparty of the return of the consequences about conflicts prevailing of a result as the clashes portrayed and ethnic landscape 90; Throup 1993: (Barkan election campaign a heated by fanned land, over was the government evidence that irrefutable is there However, 390). 1993: in engage purposes did not own and its for the violence in sparking involved supported officials government High-ranking it. prevent to measures adequate drawn predominantly men young of arming and the training coordinated and (KANU) was the sole political party running the Kenyan state. First president president First state. the sole was political party(KANU) running the Kenyan his after extended was rule one-party facto de that established Kenyatta Jomo constitutional 1982, In power. over took Moi arap in 1978 when Daniel death politics multiparty to shift The state. a one-party jure de Kenya made amendments 2014). Yet, (Mueller rules the political game the formal of changed clearly in 1991 Kenyans of thousands December 29 1992, on the time held the election was by destruction and displacement to due vote to their right of beenhad deprived a period over place which took the violence, In attacks. state-sponsored by caused killed and were people 1,500 least at that estimated is it years, two almost of 1). 1993: (Africa displaced 300,000 Watch from Moi’s own ethnic group, the Kalenjin (Africa Watch 1993; NCCK 1992). The police seemed unwilling to arrest the majority of the attackers and it was reported that the security forces were restrained by orders ‘from above’ (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 64). To a significantly lesser extent, there were retaliatory attacks against the Kalenjin communities in the affected areas, but these were less organised in character (Africa Watch 1993: 2). The violence had the dual purpose of guaranteeing promised resources for KANU-supporting communities and of punishing the opposition voters. The violence was designed to establish an exclusive ‘KANU zone’ in the entire Rift Valley, by expelling all other ethnic groups from the land that had been occupied by the Kalenjin before the colonial era. The introduction of a 25 per cent rule (a constitutional amendment in August 1991) made it necessary for any presidential candidate to obtain at least 25 per cent of the vote cast in at least five of the country’s eight provinces, in addition to winning a (relative) majority of the total national vote. The clashes, therefore, were meant to guarantee that none of the other candidates would obtain 25 per cent of the presidential vote in the Rift Valley (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 196). The first sporadic clashes erupted in Nandi district in November 1991 and grew in intensity in mid-January. In April 1992 the clashes entered a new, even more violent phase as the frequency of incidents rose and the number of displaced and killed people increased significantly (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 195). During the registration process of political candidates in November and December, there were various assaults, kidnappings and attacks on opposition candidates. There were some violent incidents on the polling day of 29 December; however, widespread violence did not occur. After the election, the volatile situation was largely defused, but clashes between Kalenjin and Kikuyu continued in several areas (ibid. 541–2). KANU also used its control over the state machine to its advantage in the electoral game. For instance, KANU manipulated the voter registration process and made it difficult for the opposition to organise politically by denying permits to hold rallies or open local offices (Barkan 1993: 93). Additional measures included the manipulation of the electoral commission, gerryman- dering, and the delayed registration of opposition parties. KANU emerged as the sole winner in the December 1992 election. Moi won the presidential election with 36 per cent of the vote and KANU gained 108 out of 188 seats in parliament. However, it remains questionable whether KANU actually secured an overall majority, given the various irregularities (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 517). Under pressure from supporters, the important churches and Western governments, the Democratic Party (DP) and FORD- Kenya eventually decided to take up their seats in parliament. Predictions of an uprising by the marginalised Kikuyu in the case of an electoral defeat did not materialise (ibid. 525). However, quite substantial violence continued,

32 1 | Fjelde and Höglund National politics politics National 2 Ethnicity plays an an plays Ethnicity 33

4 Ethnic and tribal groups in rural areas live relatively relatively live in rural tribal areas and groups Ethnic 3 To a large extent the victory of KANU can be explained by the failure of of the failure by be can the victoryexplained KANU of extent a large To While ethnic identity is politically salient in many African societies, Kenya’s African societies, Kenya’s in many politically salient is ethnic identity While important role in political mobilisation in Kenya: ethnic affiliation is considered considered is ethnic affiliation in Kenya: in political mobilisation role important in both patterns voting influenced has and patronage of beto a critical source 2008; Kimenyi and single-party rule during (Bratton and politics contemporary 2005). Oyugi 1995; Posner 1997; Leys Haugerud and 1972; Hydén are largely perceived as a competition between Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya Luhya Kalenjin, Luo, between Kikuyu, a competition as perceived largely are constituted is the local these groups each of at level Coastal but and people, is identification 260). Ethnic 2005: (Posner ethnic communities numerous of be may tribal in a local ethnic or other and identities setting diverse, therefore significance. greater of Exclusionary ethnic identity and victimisation and victimisation ethnic identity Exclusionary especially against Kikuyu seeking to return to their land, and was supported supported was and their land, to return seeking to Kikuyu especially against 37). 1997: (Steeves politicians KANU by to ethnicdue both divisions was This fragmentation unite. to the opposition since politics Kenyan of feature a remained has and personal conflicts, and of the destructive influence 2014). Moreover, Mueller (LeBas 250; 1992 2011: in a critical role played campaigning opposition on violence state-sponsored success. electoral KANU’s explaining ethnic politics have become formulated around exclusion and victimisation victimisation and exclusion around formulated become ethnic have politics ethnic Many violence. the use of precipitated which has extent, a large to a ethnicities’: been labelled ‘exclusionary have what are in Kenya identities has group to as which only not guidance offers that identification of form be should which groups also about but power, access to right a legitimate of ethnic identity form 2008). This 9; Mueller 2011: (Lynch power denied state a sense led which to has repression, and violence been by has shaped formation around dynamics The several groups. among injustice and victimisation of the ‒ and uprising Mau – the struggle Mau independence the violent for a settler was Kenya in this regard. illustrative are independence to transition The colonisers. the from repression particularly severe suffered that economy Although massacres. gross involved challenge the violent to response British primarily was it ethnic groups, numerous included movement Mau the Mau is which Kikuyu, The community. the Kikuyu from elements of constituted interacted population), the total (21 of per today cent ethnic group the largest also a conflictual had the relationship but the colonisers, with extensively a by spurred instance, for was, the colonisers against Resistance dimension. the ‘white’ from workers wage Kikuyu ‘undesired’ of repatriation of process around Valley and in the Rift camps, illegal squatter this created settlements; a state led to Unrest conditions. in harsh lived the squatters where Nairobi, segregated geographically, dominating a specific region and with their own ideas own ideas with their and region a specific dominating geographically, segregated specific of ruralhomelands. of emergency, which further increased a sense of grievance among the Kikuyu and formed the basis of the Mau Mau uprising. During the violence, the Kikuyu community was severely divided (Throup 1993). However, people of Kikuyu origin faced detention whether or not they were part of the uprising. When released, many of them could not return to the native reserves in the Central Province, but had to settle in illegal squatter camps in the Rift Valley. Kikuyus suffered the most during Kenya’s struggle to become independent and therefore expected that independence would produce particular benefits for the community. When Jomo Kenyatta – of Kikuyu origin – came to power in 1963, expectations were that the Kikuyu who had been forced to leave their land would get it back. However, Kenyatta supported only a small elite group, although it also included several other ethnic communities. Members of the Kikuyu community came to dominate the civil service, and the Central Prov- ince (particularly its small coffee and tea growers) was economically favoured by state policies (Barkan 1993: 87). Kenyatta’s programme to buy land from departing settlers benefitted mainly the already privileged, who had enough resources to secure land. However, this group included a Kikuyu elite that financed land buying, which resulted in many Kikuyu farmers leaving the Central Province for land in the Rift Valley. In its attempts to consolidate power, the Kenyatta regime also turned against the Luo community, which comes from Nyanza Province in the west (van Stapele 2010). The development of exclusionary ethnic identities in Kenya was also tied to the way in which political leaders sought to build political support after independence. In a context without a dominant ethnic group, a leader cannot rely solely on a core group; rather, they need the support of other groups to build a sufficiently strong base. In Kenya, there was an initial attempt at building a broad-based ethnic coalition after independence, but politics soon became exclusionary. Although other groups were included, Kikuyu came to dominate single-party rule under Kenyatta (Horowitz 2000: 435).5 KANU won the first free elections in 1963 and initially managed to unite all ethnic groups by co-opting key members of the Kenyan National Democratic Union (KADU) with promises of patronage. KADU merged with KANU in 1964 (Barkan 1993). The two parties had similar political agendas but drew support from different ethnic and social groups. KANU’s support base was primarily found in the Kikuyu community (Central Province and part of Rift Valley), and among the Embu and Meru of the Eastern Province. In addition, support also came from the Luo in Nyanza Province in the west, and – to a more limited extent – from the Kamba (Eastern Province) and Kisii (Nyanza Province). KADU’s ethnic base was among the Luhya (Western Province), the Kalenjin and associated groups (Rift Valley) and the Mijikenda (Coast Province), along with nomadic groups from the Northeastern Province and the arid and semiarid areas of Rift Valley (Barkan 1993).

34 1 | Fjelde and Höglund . - During this era, During this era, 6 7 35 , critics were dealt with harshly. In 1982, constitutional amendments amendments constitutional 1982, In harshly. with dealt were , critics Daniel arap Moi took power after the death of Kenyatta in 1978. Up until Up until 1978. in Kenyatta of death the after power took Moi arap Daniel One interpretation of Kenyatta’s co-opting of KADU was that it was an an was it that was KADU of co-opting Kenyatta’s of interpretation One In addition In the formation of ethnic identity based on victimisation continued and state state and continued based victimisation on ethnic identity of the formation that political identities of the range narrowing for responsible policies ‘were (LeBas 101). 2011: choose’ could Kenyans 1991, Moi’s tenure was characterised by unaccountable, personal, paranoid paranoid personal, unaccountable, by characterised was tenure Moi’s 1991, the Moreover, 385). 1993: Throup 87–8; rule 1993: kleptocratic (Barkan and ethnic and an from became even narrower the regime base for political support He Valley. base in the Rift was support main perspective. Moi’s geographical Kalenjin particularly own his groups’, ‘disadvantaged formerly began favouring the civil of out forced who were allied Kikuyu, theand expense tribes, of at been which had primarily directed service investments, Public 113). 1998: (Kahl especially the Kenya, parts of other to reoriented were the Centralto Province, government Moi’s for base support narrow more in a resulted This Valley. Rift ated with it’ (Klopp 2001: 477). Thus, during the Kenyatta era, support for for support era, Kenyatta 477). during 2001: the (Klopp Thus, it’ with ated and several of ethnic based groups, a coalition was on the centre at power However, 377).1993: (Throup the area depended of locally the ethnic makeup on the civil service dominated (Barkan community the Kikuyu from members land, as such resources state-controlled in accessing central 87), which is 1993: periods particularly authoritarian during of contracts, government jobs and with out fell when Kenyatta further entrenched were divisions Ethnic politics. ideological viewed initially an While as Odinga. Oginga vicehis president the from came since Odinga an ethnic dimension took the conflict dispute, through Luo leadership regime delegitimised The the ruling community. Luo Stapele (van citizens second-rank as classifying Luo by and campaigns smear Odinga’s that the in public ruling party insisted instance, For 114–15). 2010: a Luo exclusively (KPU) – was Union People’s party – Kenya newly formed the to due counter to KPU for very difficult were party;accusations such was the opposition example, an As information. over strict control regime’s in 1969, banned eventually KPU was and meetings holding from prevented 409–13). 1984: rulewhich de facto led one-party to (Mueller interethnic elite ‘pact’, where ‘in exchange for political power KADU dropped dropped KADU political power for ‘in exchange where ‘pact’, elite interethnic were These schemes Valley. in theRift schemes settlement to opposition its associ the political unrest and deal in part, to the landlessness with meant, made Kenya a de jure one-party state. In the aftermath of a coup attempt, attempt, of a coup the aftermath In state. one-party a de jure Kenya made policies Moi’s While 1993). (Barkan repressive became more even theregime became ‘Kalenjinisation’ of a perception equally, Kalenjin all benefit did not the repressive with became associated the Kalenjin and in Kenya widespread through time, 140). 2011: ‘Over (Lynch regime the Moi taken by measures patrimonial ensure to networks patronage and alliances national reorganizing … constituencies Luo and Kikuyu within many alienated KANU control, particularly over irregular allocations of land, which proceeded apace under the Moi regime’ (Klopp 2001: 477). This marginalisation of certain groups can partly be explained by deteriorating economic conditions, which eroded the basis for more inclusive governance based on patronage (Mueller 2008; Throup 1993: 383). At the same time, the Kikuyu remained the most prominent group economically, which ‘contributed to Moi’s sense of isolation and political vulnerability’ (Holmquist and Ford 1995: 177).

Ethnic political mobilisation Exclusionary ethnic identity formation and narrow interethnic elite co-optation/coalition building laid the foundations for the type of political mobilisation that transpired when multiparty elections were introduced. During the colonial period, national-level political organisation was not allowed, so when parties began operating in the post-independence era they largely became ‘federated ethnic loyalties grouped around individuals’ (Okoth- Ogendo 1972: 13). Political competition during single-party rule mainly involved group mobilisation according to locally defined ethnic identities. However, the type of cleavages that were the most politically salient changed with the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the 1990s. While the main parties in the electoral contest had an ‘ethnic appeal’, the ‘politicians’ local ethnic backgrounds were trumped by the regional ethnic orientations suggested by their party affiliations’ (Posner 2007: 1318). This was also seen in the voting patterns in 1992, which showed a very high regional concentration of votes (Throup 1993: 391). Moreover, in contrast to some other African societies, there is little evidence to suggest that there exist cross-cutting ethnic identities that serve to bridge ethnic divides (Horowitz 2016: 330). The violence that occurred prior to the 1992 election can be seen as a form of ethnic outbidding, which included an exclusionary ethnic rhetoric that served to mobilise support for violence. The violence during the election cannot be understood without reference to the Kenyan concept of ‘majimbo’, which is essentially a federal political system based on ethnicity (Anderson 2008). The first constitution in 1962 introduced this idea by dividing the country into seven semi-autonomous regions, each with its own regional assembly. Majimbo resurfaced in 1991, with destructive consequences. Moi’s KANU, representing the relatively small Kalenjin group, was in favour of majimbo as a means to mobilise support and eventually undermine political liberalisa- tion. Its connection to violence was direct: ‘ethnic’ violence began shortly after high-ranking KANU officials in favour of majimbo organised a series of rallies in the Rift Valley as a direct challenge to multiparty campaigners. These politicians demanded the expulsion of all ‘aliens’ and ‘foreigners’ (mostly Kikuyu) from land that had been in the possession of the ‘native’ pastoralist groups (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) before colonial times (Africa

36 1 | Fjelde and Höglund -

8 became synonymous meetings held by KANU KANU by held meetings majimbo 37 One of the main objectives of the KANU-supported violence in 1991 and and in 1991 violence the KANU-supported of objectives the main of One The absence of a tradition of inclusive elite negotiations created conditions conditions created negotiations elite inclusive of a of tradition absence The contributes competition electoral of violent ethnicity-focusedThis account with antagonistic neighbours and the necessity of ethnic violence. of the necessity and neighbours antagonistic with especially in the of crucial areas community, the Kalenjin unite to was 1992 Valley the Rift Since Moi. for support mass spark to and Kipsigis, and Nandi was support such seats, parliamentary of number the largest had Province ongoing was registration land severalcrucial locations In 111–12). 1998: (Kahl Hornsby and deeds (Throup communal replacing were titles individual and against groups Kalenjin the reunite helped ‘ethnicclashes’ The 198). 1998: and Gusii Kikuyu, mainly – ethnicgroups other from settlers If ‘foreigners’. Valley the Rift of areas border the western leave to be – could forced Luo would owners the former terminated, were procedures the registration before these actions, Through take over. could the Kalenjin lose and all their claims ruling his clique. and Moi support to enticed were the Kalenjin of members struggles constituted that in intra-group rooted strategy essentially was This very ethnic in its own performance electoral KANU’s to a serious threat Moi, opposed to remained had elites Kipsigis and Certainheartland. Nandi the for vote would these groups from voters many that a risk was there and therefore mobilisation ethnic violent around rhetoric The 199). (ibid. opposition and victimisation injustices, historical ideas about to connection a clear had political support. these garner to on played Moi and ethnicdivision, officials (Kahl 1998: 109). For many Kenyans, Kenyans, many For (Kahl1998: 109). officials Watch 1993: 18). The latter communities were led to believe that they would would they to led believe that were communities latter The 18). 1993: Watch theonly that and power, lost KANU and Moi if themselves out bedriven this Although Valley with semi-autonomy. Rift bea ‘pure’ would solution of rhetoric the ValleyProvince, in the Rift prominent most was incitement occurred violence in all and majimbointimidation under which the instigation of violent ethnic mobilisation became a viable became a viable ethnic mobilisation violent of which the instigation under outside emerged opposition election. The the 1992 of in advance Moi for option base; fact, in ethnic support the same have not did and power of circle Moi’s and power from because they been had excluded the opposition joined many way in political which The affiliation. regional based ethnic or on resources made ‒ brokerage’ ‘ethnic and secured was patronage via– state-based support support (LeBas cross-ethnic mobilise and unite to opposition forthe difficult it basic guarantees no were pact, ‘there elite inclusive an without Also, 2011). 2000: 396). (Kirschke posed’ the which risks the transition limit which could linked to are considerations in which elite the ways of understanding an to as such developments, historical from emanating formation ethnic identity several single-party rule. and Yet colonialism legacies from and injustices past frag clearly was while First, the opposition play. into came factors additional of the distribution with basediminishing was power Moi’s Kenya, in mented patronage to maintain support becoming narrower due to economic decline. Moi must have perceived a real threat to his continued rule, and this factored into his decision to use violence. This is in line with previous research that has highlighted several issues relating to incumbent–opposition dynamics as crucial in understanding election-related violence (e.g. Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014; Salehyan and Linebarger 2015; Sisk 2012; Wilkinson 2004). A second issue relates to long-standing land grievances present in Kenya that have underpinned electoral competition in different ways. Patterns of land ownership and exchanges in Kenya – from colonial times onwards – have resulted in very uneven land distribution in rural areas (Boone 2012). These historical developments clearly serve to explain the geography of violence and the specific tendency to violence in the Rift Valley, and they played a key role in the violence prior to the 1992 elections. For instance, the areas in which Kikuyu migrants had established farms under Kenyatta were also the locus of violence in 1991 (Kahl 1998; Boone 2011). These insights, however, do not contradict our analysis of Kenya’s vulnerability to election-related violence, but rather serve to reinforce an understanding of how ethnic mobilisation ties in with real and perceived historical grievances. Third, the electoral system in place in Kenya in 1992 may have encouraged electoral violence. Kenya was operating under majoritarian electoral institutions, and research has shown that these raise the risk of electoral violence by augmenting winner-takes-all dynamics (e.g. Fjelde and Höglund 2016; Reilly and Reynolds 2000). In addition, the introduction of the 25 per cent rule – which made it necessary for presidential candidates to win at least 25 per cent of the votes in at least five provinces – gave Moi a clear electoral advantage (Kahl 2008: 203). At the same time, it failed to provide the opposition with enough incentive to unite across ethnic divisions. Finally, international attention and monitors were unable to discourage electoral violence in Kenya in 1992. Electoral fraud was rampant. Although international monitors were on-site, they could not prevent irregularities. It is particularly interesting to note, as suggested by previous research, that international attention to the elections may have shaped the timing and forms of violence (Daxecker 2014). The decision of the donor community to stop financial aid at the end of 1991 was a major reason why the Moi regime was willing to reintroduce party pluralism. International support remained conditional on democratic progress, which limited government possibilities to directly engage in open conflicts with opposition supporters. Instead, KANU resorted to subtle tactics of extra-legal intimidation and violence to disempower its critics. Although the widespread attacks caused substantial casualties and raised considerable concern among donor countries, the government could portray these attacks as ‘ethnic clashes’ over land (Africa Watch 1993: 15; see also Kirschke 2000). The strategy, therefore, must be viewed as a deliberate

38 1 | Fjelde and Höglund - 39 The violence following the December 2007 election garnered the most most the election the garnered December 2007 following violence The Violence has remained a pervasive feature of electoral politics in Kenya. It It in Kenya. politics electoral of a pervasivefeature remained has Violence move to influence the electoral game while avoiding international censure censure international avoiding while game electoral the influence to move aid. of loss and 1992 beyond violence Electoral chisement. Moi and KANU were able to win the elections although their their although win the elections to able were KANU and Moi chisement. victory parliamentary particularly was small. it violence, pre-electoral of instances were there Although far. by attention casualties: of in a high number resulted that the eruption post-electoral was people half displaced a million than more and deaths 1,500 approximately and area in hitthe of violence wave first The Southall 2010). and (Kagwanja militias Kalenjin well-organised where Valley, Rift in North Eldoret around their Kikuyu mainly (PNU), Unity National of the Party of supporters attacked spilled the violence wave, a second In also communities. Kisii but neighbours as confrontations major Rift, in South with Nakuru and Naivasha to over Similar Luo. and Kalenjin against attacks started retaliatory groups Kikuyu between slums in Nairobi’s place took counter-attacks and attacks of patterns to forcefully the policeresponded where Kisumu, in and Kikuyu, and Luo equally not was the violence that note to important is It looting. and protests response a was violence of the share main The Kenya. throughout severe the election, there to Prior election result. seen unjust was an as what to – Raila candidate the victory opposition of hope for beenhad widespread political a sense Over of the years, change. of message his – and Odinga and grown had groups non-Kikuyu among marginalisation economic and of centralisation The Kikuyu. against deep with resentments combined had weak, were also had peaked, political institutions the president around power (Mueller institutionalised normalised become and had political violence and Kibaki won had Mwai the incumbent that announced was it 2008). When has ‘become a routine aspect of Kenyan politics, and “ethnic clashes” are now now are clashes” “ethnic and politics, Kenyan aspect of routine ‘becomea has to important is it Yet, 503). 2001: (Klopp process’ bargaining the elite part of violent among and, been equally violent all have elections not recognise that occurredthe violence 1992, in as 1997, In varied. have dynamics elections, the election. swing to the regime by the election, orchestrated before primarily clashes continued and conflicts polling-day also considerable were there But young of militia groups Valley involving the Rift of constituencies in some opposition tribes. other Internal also from but Kalenjin predominantly men, Mazrui (Rutten, violence intra-KANU also significant led defections to and a backdrop against held Laaksowere elections 2002; The 2007). Grignon and reforms. calling for a civil movement and in the political arena instability of opposition co-opt the opposition, split to sought KANU win the elections, To disenfran and harassment with irrelevant protesters render and politicians the election, violence escalated and diffused quickly and did not come to a halt until elite-level negotiations resulted in a power-sharing agreement and the leaders called for the violence to stop. In contrast to 1992, 1997 and 2007–08, the elections in 2002 and 2013 were significantly more peaceful. Why? In 2002, the violence that took place was predominantly pre-electoral, occurring during the nomination period. In addition, there were isolated events in highly competitive constituencies in Rift Valley and Nyanza. Compared with previous elections, this presidential contest was between two Kikuyu candidates – Moi’s designated successor Uhuru Kenyatta, and Kibaki, who represented a broad, united and interethni- cally based opposition front under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). As expected, NARC won the election, and many KANU leaders seemed to accept that popular sentiments had finally turned against the old regime. Thus, while underlying issues of land and equality remained unresolved, these disputes were not activated by the political leadership. However, there were reasons for concern due to the ongoing latent diffusion of informal violence, especially originating from the Mungiki movement, blurring the lines between criminal and political violence (Kagwanja 2003, see also Rasmussen, Chapter 8 in this volume). State responses to this violence contributed to a further institutionalisation of extra-legal state violence during the Kibaki regime, which in turn contributed to the popular discontent that played into the explosive aftermath of the 2007 elections. The 2013 elections were held under a new constitution and saw the creation of the Jubilee Alliance, which brought together Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, representing ethnic groups across the 2008 conflict lines and making this particular divide less salient during the election. The opposition was led by Raila Odinga, who again lost – by a narrow margin and amid accusations of electoral malpractice. A major difference this time was that the opposition challenged the result through constitutional means, rather than street protest. While generally considered relatively peaceful, localised violence connected to the election did occur, especially in North Rift Valley, the Coast and in Northeastern Province (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2014; Long et al. 2013). The August 2017 elections were again held amid fears of violent mobilisation and escalation. More than a year ahead of the elections, the opposition criticised the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) for being partial, and this distrust persisted throughout and beyond election day. Communal tensions arose in several areas, and only a few days before the election, a high-profile IEBC member was killed. The immediate aftermath of the election saw some limited protest by the disappointed opposition supporters, but this was heavily suppressed by the government (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2017). However, the opposition refused to accept defeat and challenged the election results in court, resulting in a ruling by the Supreme Court in

40 1 | Fjelde and Höglund - 41 In many societies, political elites view ethnic kin as their most reliable societies, view reliable ethnic kin their political most as elites many In ethnically based and electoral to violence, subject are that countries many In favour of new presidential elections. The trajectory of the electoral process process electoral of The trajectorythe elections. new presidential of favour institutions formal via resolved the can be conflict electoral how illustrates Kenya. in elections of nature the contentious also shows but exist, that Conclusions political supporters, and ethnic identity can be used as a tool to facilitate be facilitate can used to a tool as ethnic identity and political supporters, constituencies electoral significant mobilise to collective action and low-cost all societies not politicisedwith Yet 2007). Posner 2004; (Arriola 2009; Chandra history gives electoral violent Kenya’s violence. face electoral ethnic identities societies political some to particularly become why vulnerable to as clues some to prior political mobilisation the violent that suggests Our analysis violence. very of strongly the background be against understood election must the 1992 and inequality perceived linked to polarised politicised ethnic and identities, ethnic distinctions where places In roots. which also historical had exclusion, elevated. are elections of the stakes power, state to serve claims for a basis as the case is – as also ethnic leads to voting when ethnic mobilisation Moreover, encourage may 2008) – several mechanisms Kimenyi and (Bratton in Kenya would we discusses 93) why (2015: Kuhn instance, For violence. election-related high. is In ethnic voting where common be expectto more violence electoral standard many ethnic election basically census, when an an becomes essence, ineffective – will prove patronage of promises – including strategies campaign becomes violence situations, such In voters. mobilise to political candidates for also to and voters opposition discourage to resort) even a last (or a means undecided voters. suppress underlying address curb to violence, been has a means reform constitutional the Kenya, In cooperation. cross-ethnic for incentives create grievances and violence. electoral the 2007 to partially was response a direct constitution 2010 the and inconclusive remains process the reform of the outcome However, in can be interpreted package reform of the dimensions different of impact of restructuringpolitical the hand, one on the instance, For ways. different crea election:‘the thein 2013 the stakes reduce helped have may institutions in which many governments 47 with new county a new constitution of tion while that, meant seats, secure to county-level able were supporters Odinga they often Democracy and nationally, lost (CORD) Reforms the Coalition for elections’ presidential of controversial the blow the softening locally, won seen as in and hand, 2014: 4). On the other Willis and (Cheeseman, Lynch resources over control and power of devolution that signs are cases, there other local-level and of politics, the importance elevated has local to government to local the level level national the servedthis has conflict from displace to is implication The 2011). see 2016; (ICG also it Angerbrandt solving than rather that reform to address election-related violence through constitutional reform may have unintended and counterproductive effects. This analysis of Kenya’s vulnerability to electoral violence is not intended to be deterministic in its approach. Rather, the varying outcomes across electoral contests in Kenya show how a mix of circumstances are necessary for electoral violence to happen (see Sjögren, Chapter 2 in this volume for a similar argument). Yet, we argue that in explaining electoral violence, it may be important to know where ethnic divisions came from and why they have endured, especially when violence itself shapes the identities that gain salience (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). This also implies that efforts to reduce the risk of electoral violence – for example through institutional reform or active democracy support – must recognise ethnic distinctions without reinforcing them. While our analysis focuses on top-down strategies that deliberately or inadvertently serve to uphold ethnic saliency, other studies have focused on the ways in which local narratives of ethnic ‘others’ interact with elite manipulations. For instance, several studies highlight the ‘immigrant metaphor’ and ‘son of the soil’ dynamics as rationales behind the persistence of ethicised land conflict in Kenya (Jenkins 2012; Klaus and Mitchell 2015). Combined, these factors explain how violence can become a widespread phenomenon driven from both above and below. Policies to reduce the risk of electoral violence must therefore strive to mitigate elite incentives to resort to divisive electoral strategies, while also recognising how political, social and economic inequalities across the population makes such strategies viable.

Notes 1 This study was funded by the lines and to govern in discriminatory Swedish Research Council 421-2010-1515 fashion. and Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, grant P16-0124:1. They also find that, overall, ‘voting in 2 Bratton and Kimenyi (2008: 276), in a Kenya is … defensively and fundamentally survey from 2007, find that: an ethnic census’ (ibid. 287). 3 For instance, the Kalenjin community Although Kenyans downplay subsumes many smaller tribes, including ethnicity when portraying themselves, Nandi, Sabaot, Pokot and Marakwet (Lynch they are less charitable in their 2011). assessments of fellow citizens … 4 ‘Prior to independence, the Kenyans do not easily trust co- British assisted the Kenyans in creating nationals who hail from ethnic groups administrative districts that were drawn other than their own. They also think around existing ethnic settlements’ that political conflict is all too common (Burchard 2015: 58). among people of different ethnic 5 The coalitions that have formed backgrounds, especially in the national have adopted different ethnic political arena. Finally, they worry that constellations, pointing to the strategic their co-nationals are prone to organize nature of the leadership’s use of ethnicity politically along exclusive ethnic in politics (Burchard 2015: 57; Lynch

42 1 | Fjelde and Höglund

46 (3): 46 (3): 57 (5): 822–53. 55 (1): 75–103. . Boulder CO: Lynne . Boulder CO: Lynne Journal of Eastern African African Eastern of Journal 2 (2): 272–89. 44 (10): 1311–42. State Versus Ethnic Claims: Claims: Ethnic Versus State Competition and the Rationality of of the Rationality and Competition Africa’ in Contemporary Politics Olorunsola V. and Rothchild in D. (eds), . Boulder CO: Dilemmas Policy African Press. Westview NY: York . New Belly the of Politics The Longman. of the Geography and Land Rights Kenya of The Case Electoral Violence: Political Comparative in the1990s’, Studies African in Kenya’, Politics Distributive ReviewStudies Timing of Election Impact Kill: The Journal of Stability’, Post-conflict on Conflict Resolution in Ethnicity Putting in Kenya: ‘Voting Perspective’, Studies Political Regimes and ‘Neopatrimonial 46 Politics World in Africa’, Transitions (4): 453–89. and Causes Africa: Sub-Saharan in Consequences Rienner. Civil War’, Ethnic and ‘Elections (2013) Studies Political Comparative 387–417. Ethnic and Patronage Succeed? Parties NY: York . New India in Counts Head Press. University Cambridge Discontent: (2014) its ‘Democracy and Elections’, 2013 Kenya’s Understanding 8 Studies African Eastern of Journal (1): 2–24. the Devil for ‘Voting (2017) Willis Election’, 2017 Know: Kenya’s You Economy Political Review African of Bates, R. H. (1983) ‘Modernization, Ethnic Ethnic ‘Modernization, R.H. (1983) Bates, Africa: in State The (1993) J.-F. Bayart, Allocated Boone, ‘Politically C. (2011) Conflictand Boone. ‘Land C. (2012) ‘Time to (2013) Snyder J. and D. Brancati, (2008) M. S. Kimenyi M. and Bratton, (1994) de Walle N. van M. and Bratton, Electoral S. M. (2015) Violence Burchard, S. Hug Cederman, and L., K. Gleditsch Why K. (2004) DoChandra, Ethnic Willis J. and Cheeseman, N., G. Lynch J. and Cheeseman, N., G. Lynch 43

42 (10): 42 (10): 2 (2): 328–43. Journal of Eastern Eastern of Journal 4 (3): 85–99. 29 (1): 15–31. 29 . Berlin: Verlag. Lit A further polarising event was the the was A further event polarising Lower levels of group identity in in identity group of levels Lower LeBas argues that, pre- that, LeBas argues

8 7 Decentralisation and Conflict: The Conflict:The and Decentralisation Nigeria’, Crisis in Kaduna, Sharia Journal of Contemporary African Studies State-sponsored Ethnic Violence in in Violence Ethnic State-sponsored Rights Human NY: York New Kenya’. Watch. D. in Idea’ an of History Troubled N. Cheeseman (eds), Our and Branch since Kenya in Politics Eat! to Turn 1950 in Kenya’s Exodus and ‘Violence and Predictable 2008: Valley, Rift Preventable?’, Studies African Political Stability in Africa’, in Africa’, Stability Political Studies Political Comparative 1339–62. Journal of Election,’ a Flawed from Democracy 6 urban areas help explain why the 1991–92 the 1991–92 why explain help areas urban largely remained in Kenya violence did not and in rural areas contained furtherescalate 117). 1998: (Kahl independence, ‘organised labor served labor ‘organised independence, independent structure a mobilizing as instance, For 101). (2011: ethnicity’ from a prominent who was (Luo), Mboya Tom important held leader and trade unionist the and KANU within positions several from support drew government, ethnic groups. assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969. Mboya Tom of assassination Angerbrandt, H. (2011) ‘Political ‘Political H. (2011) Angerbrandt, References References Rule: and ‘Divide (1993) Africa Watch The (2008) ‘Majimboism: D. Anderson, E. Lochery and (2008) D. Anderson, and Arriola, L. (2009) ‘Patronage Barkan, J. D. (1993) ‘Kenya: Lessons Lessons ‘Kenya: (1993) D. J. Barkan, 2008). Consider, for instance, the politics thepolitics instance, for Consider, 2008). Kalenjin a prominent Ruto, William of Raila Odinga who supported politician, the in 2007 community the Luo from who sided Uhuru with election, and in community the Kikuyu from Kenyatta 2008). (Lynch 2013 blog. Available at http://roape. Systems’ in S. Huntington and C. P. net/2017/08/14/voting-devil-know- Moore (eds), Authoritarian Politics in kenyas-2017-election/ (accessed 26 Modern Societies. New York NY: Basic November 2017). Books. Daxecker, U. E. (2014) ‘All Quiet on Hydén, G. and C. Leys (1972) ‘Elections Election Day? International Election and Politics in Single-party Systems: Observation and Incentives for Pre- The Case of Kenya and Tanzania’, election Violence in African Elections’, British Journal of Political Science 2 Electoral Studies 34: 232–43. (4): 389–420. Dercon, S. and R. Gutiérrez-Romero ICG (2016) ‘Commentary: Kenya: (2012) ‘Triggers and Characteristics of Development, County Governments the 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence’, and the Risk of 2017 Election World Development 40 (4): 731–44. Violence’. Brussels: International Fearon, J. D. and D. D. Laitin (2000) Crisis Group (ICG). 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(1995) The Culture of ‘Kenya’s Uncertain Democracy: The Politics in Modern Kenya. Cambridge: Electoral Crisis of 2008’, Journal of Cambridge University Press. Contemporary African Studies 27 (3): Höglund, K. (2009) ‘Electoral Violence in 259–77. Conflict-ridden Societies: Concepts, Kahl, C. H. (1998) ‘Population Growth, Causes, and Consequences’, Terrorism Environmental Degradation, and and Political Violence 21 (3): 412–27. State-sponsored Violence: The Case of Höglund, K., A. Jarstad and M. Söderberg Kenya’, International Security 23 (2): Kovacs (2009) ‘The Predicament 80–119. of Elections in War-torn Societies’, Kahl, C. H. (2008) States, Scarcity, and Democratization 16 (3): 530–57. Civil Strife in the Developing World. Holmquist, F. and M. Ford (1995) ‘Stalling Princeton NJ: Princeton University Political Change: Moi’s Way in Kenya’, Press. Current History 94 (591): 177–81. Kirschke, L. (2000) ‘Informal Repression, Horowitz, D. L. (2000) Ethnic Groups in Zero-sum Politics and Late Third Conflict. Berkeley CA: University of Wave Transitions’, Journal of Modern California Press. African Studies 38 (3): 383–405. Horowitz, J. (2016) ‘The Ethnic Logic Klaus, K. and M. I. Mitchell (2015) ‘Land of Campaign Strategy in Diverse Grievance and the Mobilization of Societies: Theory and Evidence from Electoral Violence: Evidence from Kenya’, Comparative Political Studies Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya’, Journal of 49 (3): 324–56. Peace Research 52 (5): 622–35. Huntington, S. (1970) ‘Social and Klopp, J. M. (2001) ‘“Ethnic Clashes” Institutional Dynamics of One-party and Winning Elections: The Case

44 1 | Fjelde and Höglund 40 (11): (11): 40 . Nairobi: . Nairobi: 2 (1): 41–69. 71 9–34. (282): 50 (1): 23–49. 50 . Washington DC: United States States DC: United . Washington . Cambridge: . Cambridge: Africa in Politics Ethnic Press. University Cambridge in Africa’, Cleavages Ethnic and Studies Political Comparative 1302–27. of A Theory Societies: Plural in Politics OH: . Columbus Instability Democratic Merrill. Conflict in and Systems ‘Electoral D. and C. Stern in P. Divided Societies’ (eds), ConflictDruckman Resolution DC: . Washington War Cold the after Press. Academy National . Africa in Systems Party Democratic of University Cambridge NY: York New Press. The Count: the for Out (eds) (2001) Prospects and Elections General 1997 . Kampala: Kenya in Democracy for Publishers. Fountain Social and ‘Elections Conflict Studies in Africa, 1990–2009’, in Comparative International Development Sudan and Nigeria Violence: related in Perspective’ in Comparative in Fear: A. Bekoe Voting (ed.), D. Sub-Saharan in Violence Electoral Africa Press. Peace for Institute Nationalist and Democratization and Western Provinces Western and of Churches Council of National (NCCK). Kenya in Change Constitutional of Politics 1963–69’, Independence, since Kenya African Affairs 1992 General The Electoral Process: African of Journal Elections in Kenya’, SciencePolitical Institutions and and Institutions N. (2005) D. Posner, Change ‘Regime N. (2007) D. Posner, (1972) K. A. Shepsle A. and Rabushka, A. Reynolds (2000) and B. Reilly, Riedl, (2014) R. Authoritarian B. Origins Grignon F. and M., A. Mazrui Rutten, (2015) C. Linebarger I. and Salehyan, Election- ‘Evaluating (2012) D. T. Sisk, Violence: to Voting (2000) From J. Snyder, Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O. (1972) ‘The (1972) O. H. W. Okoth-Ogendo, in the ‘Ethnicity (1997) O. Oyugi, W. 45 35

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46 2 | Wielding the stick again: the rise and fall and rise of state violence during presidential elections in Uganda

Anders Sjögren

Introduction In four consecutive elections, Uganda’s president Yoweri Museveni has faced the opposition leader Kizza Besigye as his main challenger for the presidency. All these presidential contests have been charged, but to different degrees and expressed in different ways. The 2001 and 2006 elections were marred by various forms of violence, not exclusively but mainly exercised or sanctioned by the state or by the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), targeting opposition politicians or supporters. The presence of the government security apparatus loomed large over these campaigns: a sizeable number of people on the opposition side were injured and threatened, and during the 2006 campaign Besigye was arrested and charged with treason, leading to major riots. By contrast, the elections of 2011, though underpinned by tension between Museveni and Besigye, were more peaceful (as were the 1996 elections) and instead characterised by the large amount of money spent by the government side during the campaigns. The 2016 elections, however, were again marked by a higher degree of outright violence or threats of violence. This chapter, drawing on official documents, media material and reports by election observers, examines the changing levels of state-executed or state- sanctioned violence against the opposition over the five most recent presidential elections, with an emphasis on the 2011 and 2016 elections. The earlier three elections, which have received previous treatment in the literature, are used as an illuminating backdrop. How can this variation be explained? While shifting levels of electoral violence within countries over time is common, this is as yet an understudied topic relative to research on electoral violence that compares different countries. This chapter situates the research problem in the context of research on the use of state-organised violence as one mechanism among others to influence the outcome of elections, and builds on existing arguments which hold that the degree of government-sponsored violence is shaped by the intensity of the competition and institutional constraints that may limit the use of force (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014). It goes beyond existing research by emphasising the 47 sequential aspect of elections and the significance of the ways in which experiences and lessons drawn from past elections shape expectations, calculations and adaptations for subsequent ones. The findings lend support to this: the lower degree of competition in combination with a particular set of deterring factors – such as interventions by the international justice system – that emerged from elections in other countries, as well as from other political events such as popular uprisings, made violence a less desirable government strategy in 2011. In 2001, 2006 and 2016, competition was fiercer and the deterrence factors were less significant. It should be stressed that government violence has been used in all these elections; this chapter analyses the degrees of such violence. Following this introduction, the first section presents the main contributions to research about incumbents’ use of violence in the context of elections and then develops theoretical arguments, drawing and elaborating on this body of research. The chapter proceeds by outlining the context of the study: the history of electoral violence in Uganda and the character of electoral politics under the NRM government. The following section first describes the 1996, 2001 and 2006 Ugandan presidential elections before examining in greater depth the 2011 and 2016 elections. The chapter concludes by summarising the findings and relating them to the theoretical arguments, and then closes with a discussion of policy implications. Although elections for the presidency and the parliament have been held simultaneously since 2006, the study is limited to violence in relation to the presidential elections, by far the most significant in Uganda’s presidential system, especially in deciding the government’s propensity for using violence.1

Previous research on government-sponsored violence The rapidly expanding field of electoral violence has undergone conceptual, theoretical and empirical developments over the last decade – for overviews, see Höglund (2009a), Staniland (2014) and Straus and Taylor (2012). This chapter examines variations over time of one important – and the most common (Straus and Taylor 2012) – variant of electoral violence: state-organised violence. In line with existing literature, the chapter approaches state-organised violence as one instrument among others – such as public financial resources, control over information and the utilisation of legal-administrative measures – deployed strategically in order to manipulate elections in electoral autocracies (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Fjelde and Höglund 2016; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014; Schedler 2013: 93; Staniland 2014: 107–12). In such contexts autocratic governments exercise power within nominally democratic institutions and face the challenge of balancing credibility and control (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013: 622). Competitive elections are held, but the playing field – the balance between the opposition and the incumbent with regard to access to

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2 - - - 49 It is posited here that these aspects are significant as well well as these significant aspects that are here posited is It 3 When do governments make use of violence during elections? While much much While elections? during violence use of make do governments When As structural and institutional factors are often constant in such cases,such in these constant often are factors institutional structural and As varia its than rather violence for propensity a general explain may factors Existing relevant. to more be appear factors which contest-specific for tion, are structuring in violence factors significant the most that suggests research constraints institutionalised of the nature and threat the electoral of the level Jablonski and Hyde (Hafner-Burton, terms – both in overall incumbents on (Bhasin violence of targeting and the timing shaping to regard with 2014) and 2013). Gandhi and Framework and argument: competition, rewards, sanctions and sanctions and rewards, competition, and argument: Framework experiences chapter this above, noted research previous from the findings on Drawing incentive by shaped is violence government-sponsored of the degree that proposes the possible and challenge the electoral of the intensity include that structures such that and violence, from abstaining or using for sanctions and rewards and elections prior experiences from by critically informed are calculations It elsewhere. and both the country within in question political events, other high-stakes elec competitive all the more beingequal, things that, posited is This violence. government-sponsored for the higher the propensity are, tions the balance between the of and risks assessments governments’ by mediated is to reference experience. With by shaped violence, in deploying involved rewards resources, media and the law (Helle 2016) – is uneven, and incumbents are to to are incumbents and uneven, – is 2016) (Helle the law media and resources, from Borrowing process. the electoral distort willing to and varying able degrees as electoral violence state-organised I define Jablonski, and Hyde Hafner-Burton, threaten or employ ruling party leaders and agents in which incumbent ‘events or during before, voters potential and the political opposition against violence tolerated or sponsored be executed, may violence Such 150). (2014: elections’ after its eye to a blind turn or it case delegate who in the latter agencies, state by in the shape come may 2014: 109–10). It Staniland (Schedler93; 2013: exercise to low-intensity, be tends it often more but full-scaleattacks, of sustained and (Schedler 92). 2013: intermittent selectiveand cross-country work has been done, relatively little attention has been has paid attention little relatively been has done, work cross-country time. over political entity in the same violence of in the level variations to as sensitive to contest-specific situations and will be utilised in the present willand utilised present be in the situations contest-specific to sensitive as instead First, complemented. and they need be that to elaborated but study, in order sanctions and rewards to refers this study constraints, institutional of constraining, and both enabling incentives, scope of a broader capture to this Second, study institutionalised. formally they are not whether or and elec aspect the sequential of emphasising by research existing to contributes tions and that learning experiences need to be considered when explaining when explaining experiences learning need be to considered that and tions time. over violence government-sponsored in variations democratisation, similar incentive structures have been framed by Lindberg (2009: 320) – drawing on Dahl’s famous formulation – as rulers’ assessments of the costs of oppression weighed against the costs of toleration. The study investigates these dimensions for the Ugandan 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 presidential elections, with an emphasis on the last two. Starting with the electoral threat, the literature suggests that incumbents may be tempted to make use of violence in order to supress registration or turnout, or both, among assumed opposition supporters when they face electoral loss4 or a close race – or, it should be added, when they run the risk of not achieving a sufficiently wide margin of victory for purposes of prestige or instrumentality, for instance when they need to reach or stay above important thresholds, such as parliamentary absolute majorities or supermajorities (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013: 622).5 The electoral challenge may vary geographically, and thus shape strategies for spatially targeted violence. Incentive structures also involve the potential rewards and sanctions or risks associated with deploying or avoiding violence, domestically as well as in relation to external actors. Some of the rewards have been alluded to above: in many cases, government-sponsored violence is exercised in order to disenfranchise constituencies. Again, such violence may be executed sporadically and intermittently, and by proxy, so that governments can reduce the risk of attention and condemnation. Violence may also be targeted towards selected groups or actors, with the expectation that such victimisation of dissent will produce indirect intimidation effects on opposition supporters, swing voters and moderate government supporters (Bhasin and Gandhi 2013: 623).6 It should be noted that there may be other beneficial effects for governments in exercising overt or covert violence that are not immediately tied to the shaping of the electoral outcome, but which are easily displayed during elections. Such rewards could include a more general signalling of armed strength to actors within the state, as well as to political supporters and opponents in order to enforce cohesion (Schedler and Hoffmann 2016). This is likely to be an important consideration in the case of the NRM government, whose power rests on coercive state institutions to a large degree. In relation to possible risks associated with violence that might deter governments from using it, Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski (2014: 158) point to credible threats by contending actors of using political or judicial accountability mechanisms to punish perpetrators. These mechanisms could be domestic or international, such as sanctions, withdrawn international development assistance or charges in international courts or tribunals. As far as domestic mechanisms are concerned, this chapter argues that impunity is part and parcel of electoral autocracies, albeit to varying degrees, and that therefore domestic accountability mechanisms can be expected to be weak. This is particularly probable in cases such as Uganda where violence has previously been exercised with impunity. Violence

50 2 | Sjögren - These actors can also can be These actors 8 , several inter-state and civil civil and , several inter-state

7 51 It is important to appreciate the complex role and significance of experiences significance and role the complex appreciate to important is It After a five-year war, Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) took (NRA) took Army Resistance National Museveni’s war, five-year a After and expectations in influencing the behaviour of governments, opposition opposition governments, of the behaviour in influencing expectations and in change and continuity in shaping and external actors and parties, citizens certain for usefully can elections be While compared violence. state-organised fundamentally alsoand they are events; discrete entirely purposes, not they are particular election one for conditions where trajectories, historical partsof over time same theoften are actors The ones. prior experiences from on builds both experiences such shape and elections, previous from lessons draw and stages. later at calculations and structures incentive Electoral authoritarianism and the ebb and flow of state-organised state-organised of and the ebb and flow authoritarianism Electoral violence in Uganda was politics Ugandan 1962, independence in after decadesDuring the first The rule. authoritarian and turmoil political conflict, violent by characterised experiencedcountry has military two coups d’état wars and a large number of armed insurgencies. None of the country’s seven seven the country’s of None insurgencies. armed of number large a and wars of a national peacefulno and election,result as a left has power state of heads the political Following 1980. between and held independence were elections (UPC) Congress People’s between the Uganda – when a falling out 1966 crisis of all abolish to government led the central kingdom Buganda and government decisions its use the to military and enforce semi-federal to units, and kingdoms 1971; until because postponed were 1967 scheduled for elections – the general general The held. never they were however, year, the military that of takeover were power, the UPC to and Obote Milton which brought 1980, of elections for reason this the stated was rigged2008: 19); as (Carbone regarded broadly a wage to in the elections, third whose a distant party came Museveni, Yoweri the government. guerrillaagainst war might also be deployed to a lesser degree, or by intimidation rather than than rather intimidation by or a lesser degree, to also bemight deployed means other than be efficient to less it estimate if incumbents force, direct 2012). Vicente (Collier and manipulation of expected to learn from elections as well as from other political events else political events other from as well as expected elections learn from to sanctions and rewards perceived and challenges electoral Furthermore, where. electoral an over dynamically evolve often violence the use to of in relation in particular crafted circumstances Electoral strategies campaign. cycleor intended always they – as are competition of the level only not reshape may – violence. using not or – using for structures also the incentive do – but to expect elections the 2011 would that we this argument, from on Following a particular and/or challenge modest electoral a more by characterised were high of the deployment reduced that sanctions and rewards perceived set of violence. of levels power in 1986 and imposed a ban on party political activity in the name party political in the activity on name imposed a ban and in 1986 power of national unity, as parties were alleged by the new government to have been based on and to have promoted ethnic and religious sectarianism. Uganda was declared to be ruled under a no-party system (renamed the Movement system in the 1995 constitution), in which elections to political assemblies at all levels, from the very local to the national, were contested on the basis of individual merit. New avenues for local-level participation and (restricted) competition were opened up by the introduction of councils, and, following the enactment of a new constitution in 1995, elections to the National Assembly and the presidency were held in 1996 and again in 2001 (Carbone 2008). From the mid-1990s, both the old political parties and the emerging opposition within the NRM increasingly protested against what they regarded as the imposition of a one-party state and demanded the return of multiparty politics. Museveni finally conceded to the demands in 2003, and the change was confirmed through a referendum on the matter in 2005. In the process, however, presidential term limits were abolished, and Museveni was accordingly able to retain his grip over Ugandan politics (Makara, Rakner and Svåsand 2009). While control of the opposition under the no-party system was ensured by law, domination in the new dispensation has been conducted using a combination of means, and has been reproduced through elections every five years. The concentration of power in the presidency is considerable; the NRM has enjoyed strong majorities in parliament throughout; party and state functions have become increasingly fused; and Museveni’s power ultimately rests on his firm control of the security apparatus – the police, the military and the intelligence services (Sjögren 2013; Tripp 2010). While in overall terms Uganda has been more stable under Museveni than under past regimes – and, during the last ten years, more peaceful – certain structural factors create a high general propensity for election-related violence. These include sharp divides between government and opposition and bitterly fought elections; weak and partisan regulatory institutions, including the electoral management body, the police and the judiciary; pronounced political involvement by the military; and perceived political victimisation and exclusion of opposition politicians and supporters. These features, along with all other important structural and institutional factors, except the transition from no-party to multiparty politics in 2005, have not changed during the period under study; it can therefore be assumed that the differences between elections in terms of the degree of violence are caused by dynamics specific to the respective contests.9 This again underlines the importance of analysing variations in electoral violence over time, and doing so by relating historically created patterns to incentive structures particular to each electoral contest (for a similar perspective, see Fjelde and Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume).

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- - While elections elections While 53 The unprecedented level of electoral violence in 2001 prompted a parliamen prompted in 2001 electoral violence of level unprecedented The The 2001 presidential election, on the other hand, was anything but violence- but anything was hand, other on the election, presidential 2001 The under the Movement system did not allow for formal party affiliation, Museveni’s Museveni’s party affiliation, formal for allow not did system the Movement under political parties with associated nevertheless were 2001 and 1996 in contenders opponent main Museveni’s 1996, the NRM. In from distinct groups pressure or Museveni and (DP), Party the Democratic leader of Ssemogerere, Paul was the Evidently, the votes. of 75 per cent victory securedaround landslide a with above appears it and incumbency, of all the advantages enjoyed president sitting of functions the administrative and monetary resources use made of he all that state-sponsored of the level However, 1997). (Muhumuza state the Movement expectations, the theoretical with low; was beviolence consistent this would a few were there very While was limited. Museveni to threat theelectoral as campaigns, Ssemogerere’s at targeted violence outright and threats of incidents while 187), and 2003: (Tukahebwa in the south-west particularly in Rukungiri by the electorate intimidate to sought messages campaign Museveni’s of some victory opposition an of in the event war and chaos to a return suggesting peaceful as be by to considered election has 20), the 1996 2003: (Makara andlarge. 1996–2006: from consent to challenge and crackdown crackdown and to challenge consent from 1996–2006: tion had indeed been marred by serious irregularities, including vote buying, buying, vote including serious irregularities, indeed had been by tion marred by exercised mainly violence, state-sanctioned and administration fraudulent themilitary. reportwidespread, documented The the matter. tary on report select committee and activists orchestrated and supporters opposition of harassment systematic the Uganda security including agencies, state of a wide range by conducted unofficial various and organs intelligence (UPDF), Forces Defence Peoples RA and where areas in particularly groupings, militia state-sanctioned but Select Parliament (Uganda a threat constituted candidates opposition other threatened, were people of number 7). A great Chapter 2002: Committee The their lives. lost people seventeen and detained and abducted beaten, surprise a as come have to appears challenge electoral Besigye’s of strength free. For the first time Museveni faced a strong challenge from within the the within from challenge Musevenistrong faced a time the first For free. Besigye, the growing Kizza of became the voice colonel, army NRM. A retired developed had that political intolerance and corruption with dissatisfaction the presidency for Museveni stood he against the NRM, and sectionswithin of the (RA). In Agenda Reform group the pressure linked to independent, an as Besigye’s against 69 per cent – gaining margin a big by won Museveni end, on Museveni to a serious challenge presented bid Besigye’s – but 28 per cent region the home Uganda, south-western the NRM; within within fronts: three Besigyenullifyto filed a the the military. petition within both and men; of by the election result Court ruling upheld whileelection, the and Supreme the elec that the petitioner with agreed the judgment two, to votes three to the government, and therefore violence was used alongside other means in order to influence the electoral outcome and to prevent the divisions within the NRM to widen and deepen. In the longer run, such divisions could not be prevented, and multiparty politics was reintroduced in 2005. Besigye had escaped into exile after the 2001 elections, but he returned to Uganda in October 2005 in order to be the flag-bearer of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC). Soon afterwards, he was arrested and charged with treason, concealment of treason and rape. Although he was eventually freed of all accusations, his presidential campaign was disrupted. Besigye’s arrest triggered widespread riots, which met heavy-handed treatment from the state security organs; on one occasion the High Court in Kampala was surrounded by a previously unknown security force. Throughout the campaigns, the presence of the security apparatus, including the UPDF, was highly visible and its conduct partisan (Human Rights Watch 2006), although Kibandama (2008: 147) argues that there was a shift in emphasis from the overt violence in 2001 to more indirect and structural forms of violence, such as intimidation, in 2006. The overall violent character of the 2006 election needs to be seen against the backdrop of a general pattern of increasingly coercive political rule and the militarisation of the state apparatus (Human Rights Watch 2006; Sjögren 2013; Tripp 2010). The political challenge to the NRM grew in strength, as reflected in the results of the presidential election, in which Museveni received 59 per cent and Besigye 37 per cent. Again Besigye appealed, again the Supreme Court validated many of the grounds of the petition – and again it still upheld the results (Murison 2013).

2011: toleration outweighing repression The unanimous view among analysts is that the 2011 polls witnessed substantially less open state-organised violence than the two general elections that preceded it (Gibb 2012: 460; Izama and Wilkerson 2011: 70–1; Perrot, Lafargue and Makara 2014: 30–2). This relative change does not mean that the elections were entirely peaceful. Lower-level opposition activists were targeted, a government-friendly paramilitary group occasionally attacked opposition supporters (Makara 2014: 132–3), and, around election day, the country witnessed heavy military and police deployment (Izama and Wilkerson 2011: 69). However, while the impact of such a demonstration of force should not be neglected, the presence of the security forces remained at the level of a silent threat, and the government strategy throughout the campaigns did not revolve around intense harassment of the opposition of the kind that had marked previous elections. To what extent did this reflect the effect of a less even electoral playing field, one where the government was more confident about the prospects for electoral victory? With hindsight, the outcome would suggest that it did: the

54 2 | Sjögren - 55 This was not immediately obvious when the campaigns began in October began when campaigns the obvious immediately not was This (where Acholi as such regions to out the NRM reached time, the same At in another relative is it phenomenon; a changing only not is Electoral threat mentary seats. Even when these results are treated with a degree of caution, caution, of a degree with treated are when these results Even mentary seats. observers the and of the opposition by voiced the critique by warranted as (COG neutrality EU-EOM 2011; and competence of lack ElectoralCommission’s the challenge failed to the opposition that 2014), they imply Makara 2011; manner. serious a in government years, five for elections for parties prepare to been had Opposition 2010. able weaknesses, the most government on capitalise to seemingly be able would and the deteriorating scandals and a series corruption of whichwere of visible 2011: Wilkerson and (Izama kingdom Buganda the influential with relations advantages potential translate to however, difficult, it found opposition The 66). occurring splits with divided, was a start, it For strength. competitive real to alliance electoral a proposed parties, and opposition within and both among Buganda mobilise to easy not it was Furthermore, effectively. materialised never the central with disquiet widespread of sources the many bloc, as vote a as because the Buganda and the region, within divisions caused government political on needed carefully tread to themselves representatives kingdom 2014). (Gay matters and prospects) electoral the government’s improved had the war of the end in 2006; in this they some had strongholds been which had opposition Teso, presence its reactivated had NRM also The showed. later the results as success, that a strategy in 2010, drive membership the country a huge with throughout competition while And internal networks. campaign its for the groundwork lay independent many to leading the party, within increased positions electoral for the benefiting serious factional fallout any in result this did not candidates, a such of used resources began, the government campaigns When opposition. in the post-election inflation rising to the expenses contributed that magnitude to which extent the over Rakneris a debate period and 2014). There (Helle victory (Conroy-Krutz Museveni’s to contributed extravagance this financial is it but 2011), Wilkerson Raknerand and 2014; Izama Helle Logan 2012; and initially the opposition summary, In unprecedented. was the level that agreed a divided produced the campaigns but posed challenge, electoral a potential the that NRM – a reminder resource-rich energised and an and opposition during campaigns. shift may threat electoral of level for field playing The capture. to difficult this more is although sense too, Key be to level. likely not is government a Museveni under elections Ugandan the military the the police, Electoral as Commission, and such institutions, result was a major triumph for Museveni and the NRM. In the presidential thepresidential the In NRM. and Museveni for triumph a major was result to 68 per cent gaining victory, of margin his increased election, Museveni the parlia of per 70 cent claimed NRM candidates and per 26 cent, Besigye’s have long been and are likely to remain partisan, something the Ugandan electorate is well aware of. It could be argued that, at least to some extent, Museveni had already won the 2011 elections with the Supreme Court ruling on the electoral petition in 2006, a ruling that contributed to diminished faith in electoral politics among opposition supporters. Some indications that this might have been the case include the lower figures for Besigye compared with the 2006 results; a lower turnout (59 per cent, down from 69 per cent in 2006), especially in opposition strongholds; and the fact that Museveni and the NRM were able to make inroads into and (re)capture some regions. With regard to the use of violence, however, the main difference compared with 2006 lay in the changing structures of potential rewards and sanctions. Starting with the advantages of refraining from violence, the NRM needed to counter the possible loss of support in Buganda by seeking to capture new constituencies in the north, and by recapturing parts of the east. A combination of factors favoured a rewards- and resource-based strategy in these areas. The northern parts of the country, and especially Acholi, were among the poorest and had suffered from rebellions, wars and coercive government behaviour. In order to win over that segment of the electorate, the NRM invested heavily in government development programmes in the region. Furthermore, such expenditures had become easier to justify following the discovery of oil in western Uganda and the prospects of massive future revenue, and promises of immediate and future financial rewards constituted the core of the NRM campaign throughout the country (Helle and Rakner 2014). Turning to the constraining factors, Museveni and the NRM are likely to have drawn lessons from events following the flawed elections in Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, when state-organised violence and violent protests in different combinations resulted in international interventions, political agreements and coalition governments in Kenya and Zimbabwe, and civil war (and the eventual overthrow of the government) in Côte d’Ivoire. Other deterring examples came from North Africa, where popular protests had ousted sitting presidents in several countries. These examples are likely to have contributed to a more restrictive approach to excessive violence for two reasons: one was the uncertainty linked to uprisings, and the other was the fact that political leaders in Kenya had been charged with crimes against humanity before the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. One opposition presidential candidate, Olara Otunnu, threatened Museveni with a similar fate should he use coercive state power against the population (Izama and Wilkerson 2011: 70). While Museveni made repeated public reference to these examples, warning the opposition against emulating them (ibid. 69), he had to weigh the necessity of preventing insurgencies against the risks of being held accountable for state-organised violence. The balancing act resulted in a politics of signalling the threat: indicating rather than exercising military

56 2 | Sjögren - - The 2016 general elections elections general 2016 The

57 To conclude, both the more limited electoral threat and a new set of struc newa set of and threat electoral limited both the more conclude, To Before turning to the 2016 elections, it is useful to provide a brief discussion discussion brief a useful is provide to it elections, the 2016 to turning Before 2016: repression outweighing toleration again toleration outweighing 2016: repression ment of Besigye reached the public, violent riots erupted in Kampala and in in and Kampala in erupted riots Besigye violent of the public, ment reached in contrast government, The the country. around centres urban other many to appeared the characterised campaigns, had that constraint thestrategic to old its to a return with the challenge to responded and unaware be caught security (Izama its agencies of deployment heavy-handed and a massive ways: 77). 2011: Wilkerson and state-organised limit to contributed sanctions and rewards potential of tures dynamically were these factors Furthermore, elections. in the 2011 violence negligible, not was Museveni to challenge the initial electoral While linked. discouraged structures that incentive The either. overwhelming not was it the use of encouraged and hand the one on violence overt usethe heavy of the turned the other on support electoral for rewards and resources state-based relatively had opposition The moderation. greater towards strategy government support mobilise not could time it the same at – but campaign to freedom more elections. in past as credibly as repression government to resistance around clearly, weaknesses more and own disunity its also displayed opposition The edge. competitive its of some lost thus and and violence overt more slightly displayed and fought intensely and tightly were expressed elections, the 2011 than intimidation state of higher levels considerably and politicians opposition of arrests and harassment repeated as visibly most Rights 753–5; 2016: Human Bareebe FHRI 2016; and (Abrahamsen supporters reflected inthe not was 57–8). competition tense 2016: The Uganda Network power, and doing so with more skilful timing, targeting and fine-tuning than than fine-tuning and skilful targeting timing, so more with doing and power, 2006. and 2001 in in violence state of deployment the heavy and protests work’ the ‘walk to of – as strictly these election-related to not this – even though was response violence. state and protests electoral potential future this episodeconditioned work’ ‘walkto the launched opposition elections, the the after months Two of cost was the rising marches protest of these target stated The campaign. of in particular effect transport – an the high of cost and in general living forpolitical grievances opening an offered they but also – post-election inflation popular that stated clearly had Museveni (Goodfellow 2013). broadly more be Africa not would witnessed in North the kind then recently of protests protestors Many hard. down the police clamped and in Uganda, tolerated dead. Besigye shot person arrested was one and injured, dozens arrested, were so badly manhandled was time he the third weeks; a few times within three treat the brutal news of When abroad. seek to medical had he care that official results: the Electoral Commission declared Museveni the winner of the presidential election with 61 per cent against Besigye’s 35 per cent, while the other supposed main opposition candidate, Amama Mbabazi, got a paltry 1.4 per cent. It is probably wise to treat the results with caution, as there are strong reasons to suspect that the 2016 elections were more fraudulent than those of 2011. Indeed, this was one of the reasons why Mbabazi challenged the election results in the Supreme Court, which ruled to uphold them. There had been early signs of state-organised electoral violence. For at least a year prior to the elections, and possibly longer, the government had recruited so-called crime preventers with the stated objective of engaging in community policing; the government’s target was to recruit more than 1.5 million crime preventers across the country. In reality, and following a long- standing tradition of government-sponsored vigilante groups, they functioned as a semi-formal NRM militia, who in many cases intimidated, extorted and assaulted opposition members and supporters (Human Rights Watch 2016b). Various agents representing the formal state apparatus were also active in suppressing the opposition. The regular police frequently broke up opposition rallies and kept opposition leaders, including Mbabazi and Besigye, under ‘preventive arrest’ (Amnesty International 2015: 11), and representatives of the state and the ruling party threatened potential protestors against election results with the ultimate consequence: death (Kirunda 2016; Wesonga 2016). State repression against Besigye accelerated as the elections approached (Sserunjogi and Kafeero 2016). During the last week of the campaigns, he was arrested four times, and following the election on 18 February he was detained in his home (Daily Monitor 2016b) for six weeks. A number of events that occurred after the 2011 elections were significant in shaping the electoral threat and the structures of potential rewards and sanctions for the government in the elections of 2016. While on one level the ‘walk to work’ protests were a victory for Besigye, transforming him from electoral loser to internationally recognised victim of government repression, the extra-parliamentary opposition strategy did not result in any substantive concession from the government. Instead, the main pattern of events over the next few years ran in the other direction. In 2013, parliament passed – and the president soon signed – the Public Order Management Bill. This legislation serves to restrict public gatherings: in order for more than three persons to meet and discuss issues of a political nature in public places, the police must be notified in writing seven days in advance and they have the right to refuse such applications and break up meetings (Kagoro 2016: 167).10 Two months after the end of the ‘walk to work’ protests, Besigye declared that he would step down as party leader of the FDC. When, in 2012, Mugisha Muntu beat Nandala Mafabi in the struggle for party leadership, this was widely regarded as a victory for the more moderate faction of the FDC and

58 2 | Sjögren - Prior 12 59 2016a). 2016a). The electoral challenge to the incumbent was was to incumbent the challenge electoral The 11 Once the campaigns took off, however, Besigye gradually proved to to be the Besigyeproved gradually however, off, took the campaigns Once The electoral threat to Museveni was thus greater. The incentive structures of structures incentive The greater. Museveni was thus to electoral threat The At the outset of the campaigns in November 2015, Museveni seemed face to Museveni 2015, in November the campaigns of the outset At to and at the beginning of the campaigns, Mbabazi appeared to be the main be to the main Mbabazi appeared the campaigns, the beginning of at and to blocked –were Besigye’s and – meetings His harassment. government of target (Amnesty Act Management Order the Public to who the referred police, by arrested; repeatedly were supporters his both Mbabazi and 2015); International several between serious skirmishes Museveni were there in December 2015 and 2016). (Kigambo Mbabazi supporters and Mbabazi in all ahead of far he was only Not Museveni. to challenger main intensity rallies, the emotional at attendance of in terms polls and opinion a stronger up put would he that also suggested received he the support of to return recent relatively his extent, some To in 2011. than performance similar campaign, surprisehis to effect an energising offered politics national atten government 2006. Consequently, occurred had and in 2001 what to treated Besigye, to and turned repeatedly who detained increasingly was tion assertion The the campaigns. of the end towards brutality considerable with as Besigye grew in strength that that – one posed challenge electoral a real polls opinion While some support. statistical – finds evolved the campaigns a to one poll pointed a least Museveni, victoryfor first-round a indicated (Dailyrun-off potential Monitor potential rewards and sanctions also differed from those in 2011, and were less less were and those in 2011, alsofrom differed sanctions and rewards potential obviously campaigns The violence. state-organised on restraints to conducive of two kinds. Mbabazi was a dark horse. His electoral strength was untested, untested, was strength electoral His horse. a dark Mbabazi was kinds. two of beyond and within networks strong resources, vast of abounded rumours but strategies. electoral Museveni’s of knowledge deep inside the NRM and a departure from Besigye’s confrontational leadership style. The NRM on its its on NRM The style. leadership confrontational Besigye’s from a departure the about rumours struggle.part also a leadership witnessed Long-standing in culminated Mbabazi, Amama Minister, thePrime of ambitions presidential 2014. in September A year position cabinet his from the latter of the removal in Meanwhile, president. to for run intention his Mbabazi finally declared later, and again, once as Besigye FDC the himself flag-bearer a surprise move offered However, candidate. presidential elected the party’s was as 2015 September in a to create efforts its nor reforms electoral for demands opposition neither BesigyeThus, and outcome. thein intended resulted alliance electoral united setting. electoral unreformed an in candidates as Mbabaziboth ran failed alliance had the opposition While in 2011. than threat electoral a stronger ran Besigye still reconcile in the NRM but Mbabazi – who formally to was and a was – there Alliance the Democratic by backed candidate independent an as Museveni that a run-off, something of in the event that, understanding general the backing get would candidate the remaining avoid, to want probably would Museveni. against the others of displayed extensive use of other types of resources, too; the NRM did not abandon its campaign strategies from 2011. The money spent by contenders during the campaigns – by far the greatest part of it by NRM candidates – dwarfed even the expensive 2011 campaigns (ACFIM 2016). However, oil extraction has not begun yet, and with the current low world market prices, future revenue from this seems uncertain. The political significance of this is that promises of future development programmes based on oil revenue were likely to appear less convincing than in 2011. The government also attempted to control information flows (Human Rights Watch 2016a) and made use of administration and law in order to prevent the opposition from reaching out to the electorate. The more widespread use of intimidation and overt violence compared with the 2011 elections would suggest, however, that these measures were deemed to be insufficient. The temptation to make use of violence was thus stronger. The deterrence mechanisms that had been significant five years before were also weaker in 2016. While it was always likely that the Ugandan security forces would be able to contain riots by the use of force, at least in the longer run, the political costs of doing so seemed to be lower in 2016. Constraints could also be imposed by important international actors. Experiences from the military takeover in Egypt in 2013, however, suggested that while the United States and other important external actors might voice protests, they would have no choice but to continue cooperating with an important regional ally such as Uganda. Furthermore, events at the ICC showed that Uhuru Kenyatta, after becoming president of Kenya, had been able to manoeuvre his way out of the trial against him, while Laurent Gbagbo found himself still in court after having lost power in Côte d’Ivoire. It is possible that Museveni concluded that these trajectories underlined the importance of retaining power. In summary, the urge for the government to make use of violence was stronger in 2016 than in 2011 due to more intense competition, and the risks involved were probably perceived as smaller following diminishing sanctions.

Conclusions This chapter has examined changes in levels of state-organised violence against the opposition in Uganda between 1996 and 2016, focusing on why previous high levels of violence fell in the 2011 elections but increased again in 2016. The findings give support to the argument that the level of government-sponsored violence is shaped by incentive structures that include the intensity of the competition and the rewards and sanctions for using or abstaining from violence, and that these are informed by experiences drawn from previous elections and other significant political events that pose serious challenges to the government. With regard to the electoral challenge, the chapter demonstrates that in 2011 President Museveni faced a more divided

60 2 | Sjögren - - 61 In examining the potential incentive structures that inform decision making making decision inform that structures incentive the potential examining In state- of experience Ugandan arisethe from that The policy dimensions tion was perceived as more serious, and the constraining factors that were were that factors the constraining serious, and more as perceived was tion above, As stated later. years five important less had in 2011 become significant of mechanisms whether different precision with to determine difficult is it reinforce mutually or substitute manipulation electoral government-organised complementary they were that suggests assessment overall an but other, each in than of violence a higher was level There elections. Ugandan in the 2016 measures the administrative and ever before, than spent was money more 2011, cruder. were outcome the influence takento processes learning that demonstrates the chapter violence, the use of about heavily particular are of elections dimensions the contextual that and matter, country both and in the same elections, past from drawn lessons by shaped not is manipulation) electoral of forms other (or violence Whereas elsewhere. experiences such progression, a linear in the sense of cumulative necessarily as in thepresent behaviour for structures the incentive critical in shaping are manipulation of forms other and Violence the future. of expectations as well complex and lingering between them – have – or elections past during exercised opposi themselves, governments the including actors, on all significant effects beyond thisargument exploring In external actors. and parties,tion citizens Mahoney (see analyses and sequential Falleti case, comparative the Ugandan be to a fruitful appear approach. time would over violence electoral of 2015) but decipher easy to election rigging are and violence electoral organised the ofconstruction in the actors international of role The to upon. difficult act the mid-2000s, the to 1990s the early From been has considerable. NRM state international important thein good was most books of government Ugandan assistance development of amounts substantial Uganda whoallocated to actors, changed government Museveni the towards attitude The political support. and external actors, most among acceptance reluctant to embrace enthusiastic from real exercising scope for limited rather with themselves found the latter but opposition and a slightly weaker main contender than in 2001, 2006 and again again 2006 and in 2001, than contender main weaker slightly a and opposition sanctions and rewards potential of the structures importantly, More in 2016. than violence using in constrained more Museveni was in 2011, different: were Kenyan of the the view aftermath of In elections. subsequent and in previous the ICC, before charged when were 2008, leaders in post-electionviolence theongoing and elections, the 2010 following d’Ivoire Côte in thecivilwar was Africa, the government in North governments of ousting and uprisings with crackdowns also violent but protests popular only not avoid to keen oil anticipated of in command now was it addition, In uncertain outcomes. geared more electionstrategy an of the possibility up whichopened revenue, after 2016, both 2006 and In monetary resources. of the distribution towards the opposi from the challenge the ruling party, from away broke factions influence with regard to urging respect for civil and political rights, if indeed that were ever considered a priority (Anderson and Fisher 2016; Fisher 2013; Sjögren 2013). While many foreign governments have repeatedly voiced their concerns, and most foreign election observers have in various assessments stated that Ugandan elections over the last decade have not been fair by international standards (COG 2006; 2011; 2016; EU-EOM 2006; 2011; 2016), such pronouncements are unlikely to persuade the Ugandan government to level the electoral playing field. As long as the stakes of presidential elections are high, the opposition relatively competitive, and past impunity effectively rewarded rather than accounted for, the temptation to seek to manipulate electoral outcomes using various means, including violence, will remain strong.

Acknowledgements 5 Another possibility is that The author wishes to thank Jesper opposition violence comes first, and Bjarnesen, Johan Brosché, Hanne Fjelde, that government-sponsored violence is Kristine Höglund, Mimmi Söderberg best explained as a response to this. In Kovacs, Anders Themnér, Maria Wendt Uganda, this has not been the case. The and the anonymous reviewers for riots in November 2005 in the run-up to insightful comments on earlier versions. the 2006 elections following the arrest of Kizza Besigye are an example of the Notes opposite: how state repression triggered riots by opposition supporters – which 1 This is not to suggest that led to more state repression. parliamentary elections (or party primary 6 Other means of repression not elections) in Uganda are peaceful captured by the definition of electoral affairs. The level of violence in the NRM violence noted above, such as actual primaries and the parliamentary elections or threatened economic or social in 2016 was high. victimisation, may be deployed to achieve 2 For exceptions, see the case studies the same goal (Schedler 2013: 93). of Ethiopia (Smith 2012) and Sri Lanka 7 However, it is difficult to determine (Höglund 2009b). whether violence substitutes for or 3 These factors may explain not complements the use of money or only electoral violence, but also administrative fraud, let alone the whether, when, how and to what extent precise degree to which this might be governments embark on election rigging the case; according to Schedler (2013: in general. An investigation into the 201) no law-like hierarchy of preferred precise composition of the various manipulation mechanisms can be methods of manipulation in different established. They might combine in elections in Uganda falls outside the different ways, depending to a large scope of the chapter. Similarly, the extent on the character of the perceived chapter will not systematically examine threat and the incentive structure in possible changes in the overall level a particular election. This may affect of electoral manipulation over time; the timing and targeting not only of however, brief reflections on the latter violence, but also of the use of money, will be offered in the concluding remarks. information control and administrative 4 Unless forthcoming defeat seems and legal regulation in relation to groups inevitable, in which case incumbents may and regions. choose to accept it. 62 2 | Sjögren 50 , 21 January. (2016a) ‘Museveni Lead ‘Museveni (2016a) (2016b) ‘One Month Month ‘One (2016b) . Boulder CO: Lynne . Boulder CO: Lynne , 20 March. 32 (4): 620–31. 32 . London: Commonwealth Authoritarianism in Africa: . Democracy without Development ZedLondon: Books. Regime Learning: ‘Authoritarian the Arab from Insights Comparative 274. Paper Working GIGA Uprisings’. Global of German Institute Hamburg: (GIGA). Studies Area and Repression State of Targeting and Electoral Elections’, in Authoritarian Studies Comparative in Politics Ugandan Perspective Rienner. 23 February Elections, Parliamentary 2006. London: Commonwealth (COG),Observer Group Secretariat. Commonwealth 18 February Elections, Parliamentary 2011 (COG),Observer Group Secretariat. Commonwealth . London: 2016 18 February Observer Group Commonwealth Secretariat. (COG), Commonwealth Ugandan the 2011 and ‘Museveni Matter?’, Election: Did the Money Studies African Modern of Journal (4): 625–55. Drops to 51 Per Cent in New Poll’, Poll’, in New Cent 51 to Per Drops Daily Monitor Later: What Next for Besigye?’, Daily Besigye?’, for Next Later: What Monitor 23 Elections Parliamentary and European 2006. Brussels: February Election Observation Mission Union (EU-EOM). 2011. 18 February Elections General Election Union European Brussels: (EU-EOM). Observation Mission Bank, A. and M. Edel (2015) M. Edel (2015) Bank, A. and ‘Timing (2013) Gandhi J. and T. Bhasin, Democracy? G. (2008) No-Party Carbone, and Presidential COG(2006) Uganda and Presidential COG Uganda (2011) Elections, General COG Uganda (2016) (2012) C. Logan and J. Conroy-Krutz, Daily Monitor Daily Monitor Uganda: Presidential Presidential (2006) Uganda: EU-EOM Report Final Uganda: (2011) EU-EOM 63 115 . London: Amnesty Amnesty . London: . Kampala: Alliance Alliance . Kampala: It should be noted that, since since that, be noted should It The way in which the campaigns in campaigns which the way The The rules stipulate that if none of of none if that The rulesstipulate The shift in political regime does inshift political The For discussions on the learning thelearning on discussions For

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64 2 | Sjögren . 47 . Oxford: . Oxford: Comparative Politics Comparative 23 (1): 23 (1): Democratization , 16 February. . Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. . Boulder CO: Lynne 7 (3): 492–508. . Washington DC: United States States DC: United . Washington . Washington DC: United States States DC: United . Washington (1): 99–118. Electoral and ‘Democratization Africa, 1990– in Sub-Saharan Violence in A. Bekoe Voting (ed.), 2008’ in D. Sub-Saharan in Violence Electoral Fear: Africa Press. Peace for Institute a Hybrid in Power of Paradoxes Regime African African Elections’, 1996 in Uganda’s 2 (1): 168–79. Science Political of Journal Electoral Fraud and Election Petitions African Eastern of Journal in Uganda’, Studies Looking Back (2014) ‘Introduction: Elections in Multiparty the 2011 at J. S. Makara, in S. Perrot, Uganda’ (eds), M.-A. Fouéré and Lafargue Regime: a Hybrid in Elections . Polls 2011 Ugandan the Revisiting Publishers. Fountain Kampala: Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism Press. University Oxford Elite Authoritarian ‘Communicating Cohesion’, 93–117. Governance: State Technocratic and Formation in Contemporary Uganda Publishers. Fountain Kampala: of The Consequences Massacre? in in Ethiopia’ Electoral Violence in Fear: A. Bekoe Voting (ed.), D. Sub-Saharan in Violence Electoral Africa Press. Peace for Institute Besigye Block Rally One ‘Police as The Daily Injured’, Killed, Scores is Monitor Democracy’, Straus, S. and C. Taylor (2012) (2012) C. Taylor S. and Straus, Uganda: Museveni’s A. M. (2010) Tripp, Muhumuza, W. (1997) ‘Money and Power Power and ‘Money (1997) W. Muhumuza, Politics: ‘Judicial (2013) J. Murison, S. Makara and Lafargue J. S., Perrot, of Politics The A. (2013) Schedler, (2016) Hoffmann B. A. and Schedler, Militarism Between A. (2013) Sjögren, a or Disturbance ‘A L. (2012) Smith, (2016) S. Kafeero Sserunjogi, E. M. and and (2014) ‘Violence P. Staniland, 65 10 (1): 155–72. , 2 February. Baltimore MD: Johns MD: Johns Baltimore 22 Democracy of Journal

. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Vergleichende für Zeitschrift . Kampala: Fountain Fountain . Kampala: , 2 January. . Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Fountain . Kampala: (2009) ‘Turnaround: The National National The (2009) ‘Turnaround: the and Movement Resistance System a Multiparty of Reintroduction Political International in Uganda’, Review (2): 185–204. Science 30 Hopkins University Press. University Hopkins Elections, in Recent Issues in Uganda: G. B. in S. Makara, 1996–2001’ E. Byarygaba (eds), F. and Tukahebwa Uganda: in Democracy for Voting . Kampala: Elections Recent in Issues LDC Publishers. Dispensation: Political a Multiparty of the Electoral Role The Commission in S. Elections’ 2011 in Uganda’s A.- and Lafargue J. S. Makara, Perrot, a Hybrid in (eds), Elections M. Fouéré 2011 Ugandan the Revisiting Regime: Polls Will Be Shot Dead – Jinja RDC’, The RDC’, Dead Be – Jinja Shot Will Daily Monitor in Transition’ of Elections a Mode as Democratization (ed.), S. I. Lindberg of Mode A New Elections: by Transition Publishers. East The Campaigns’, in Uganda Large African Question in the 2006 Presidential and and in the 2006 Presidential Question S. Kizza, in J. Elections’ Parliamentary L. Rakner and (eds), ElectoralMakara Understanding Uganda: in Democracy Processes and the Institutional 2006 Multiparty the of Outcomes Elections Politikwissenschaft ‘Uganda: Museveni’s Triumph and and Triumph Museveni’s ‘Uganda: Weakness’, (3): 64–78. in Uganda: Authoritarianism of the Hand Hidden Not So The Military’, Makara, S., L. Rakner and L. Svåsand S., L. Rakner L. Svåsand Makara, and Makara, S. (2003) ‘Voting for Democracy for ‘Voting S. (2003) Makara, Elections in S. (2014) ‘Managing Makara, Kirunda, A. (2016) ‘Election Saboteurs Saboteurs ‘Election Kirunda, A. (2016) Theoryof Lindberg, S. I. (2009) ‘A Kigambo, G. (2016) ‘Violence Looms Looms ‘Violence G. (2016) Kigambo, Kibandama, A. (2008) ‘The A. Kibandama, Security Izama, A. and M. Wilkerson (2011) (2011) M. Wilkerson and A. Izama, ‘Competitive (2016) J. Kagoro, Tukahebwa, G. B. (2003) ‘“Block Uganda Parliament Select Committee Voting” in South Western Uganda: (2002) Report of the Parliamentary The Case of the 1996 Elections in Committee on Election Violence. Rukungiri District’ in S. Makara, G. B. Kampala: Parliament of Uganda. Tukahebwa and F. E. Byarugaba (eds), Wesonga, N. (2016) ‘Lumumba Shoot-to- Voting for Democracy in Uganda: kill Threat Sparks Outrage’, The Daily Issues in Recent Elections. Kampala: Monitor, 1 February. LDC Publishers.

66 3 | Land conflict and electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire: a micro-level analysis

Matthew I. Mitchell

Introduction In recent years Africa has been beset by an upsurge of electoral violence. Although rare during the era of one-party regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, the reintroduction of multiparty elections in the 1990s has led to outbreaks of electoral violence in a wide range of countries including Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe. However, one of the worst instances of such violence undoubtedly took place during the 2010–11 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, in which over 3,000 people were killed and 500,000 were displaced (UNHRC 2011). While there are a number of factors that triggered this violence, central among them is the explosive issue of unresolved land conflicts that have plagued the country since the late 1990s (McGovern 2011; Mitchell 2012a; Straus 2011).1 Yet notwithstanding the growing recognition of the importance of land conflict dynamics in fuelling electoral violence (cf. Straus 2012), there is little systematic research that theorises the interconnections between the contentious politics around land and electoral violence.2 Moreover, most attempts to analyse electoral violence have adopted a macro-level perspective when examining this phenomenon (e.g. Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Goldsmith 2015; Höglund 2009; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001). Consequently, there is little work that explores the micro-level dynamics and causes of electoral violence, and this prevents us from understanding the local cleavages and contextual factors that help explain instances of land conflict (Berry 2009; Derman, Odgaard and Sjaastad 2007). In short, while we know relatively little about the causal dynamics underlying electoral violence in Africa, we know even less about the relationship between land conflict and electoral violence. This chapter addresses an important gap by theorising the relationship between land conflict and electoral violence. In so doing, it provides a micro- level analysis to explain how land conflict dynamics can serve to fuel electoral violence. Building on the work of Kalyvas (2003: 476), the core argument is that actors seeking power at the centre use resources and symbols in order to ally themselves with actors on the periphery who are fighting local conflicts, which results in the ‘joint production of action’. As such, the ontology of

67 land-related electoral violence has both a material and a symbolic dimension given the multiple meanings and values attributed to land. Actors seeking power at the centre strategically use the land card as a form of patronage to secure the support of actors in the periphery. The use of nativist discourses of belonging has proven to be a particularly useful strategy for politicians during elections (cf. Geschiere 2009), as electoral promises to redistribute land play upon the idea of land as both a resource and a symbol. Local actors, for their part, ally with elites when they view such promises to restore or secure their rights or claims to land as both legitimate and feasible (cf. Klaus and Mitchell 2015). For land conflicts to become electorally charged issues, however, conditions must be fertile on the ground. The presence of competing narratives over contested claims to land can provide a powerful vehicle for violent collective action when they involve competing groups’ rights to land. More specifically, such conflicts tend to pit insiders (i.e. natives, indigenes and autochthons)3 against outsiders (i.e. migrants, strangers or aliens). While land conflicts obviously exist and occur outside the channels of electoral competition, they can provide political entrepreneurs (including national and local electoral candidates, political parties and party activists) with an instrumental electoral strategy to secure the support of local constituents. The force of exclusionary narratives is magnified during electoral periods since elections tend to heighten debates over belonging and raise the stakes of land as they provide windows of opportunity to revisit and/or redistribute groups’ access and rights to land. Land conflicts that boil over during electoral moments are thus the result of a joint production of action. Such forms of conflict ultimately challenge the conventional wisdom that privileges national over local dynamics in explaining the outbreak of electoral violence, as it highlights the key role of micro-level dynamics that also motivate violent conflict (cf. Autesserre 2010). In theorising the relationship between land conflict and electoral violence, the chapter focuses on the history of land conflict and electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Notwithstanding the unparalleled levels of violence during the 2010–11 post-election crisis, Côte d’Ivoire has a long and troubled history of land conflict and electoral violence. As such, the chapter proposes to examine the causal mechanisms linking contested claims over land with electoral violence from both a historical and a more contemporary perspective. In so doing, it focuses its analytical lens on the country’s far west cocoa regions, where land conflict and electoral violence have been most pronounced both in the decade leading up to the 2010–11 post-electoral crisis and during the crisis itself. The arguments developed here are informed by in-depth fieldwork conducted in 2012 in Côte d’Ivoire. The field research sheds light on the more neglected and localised micro-level dynamics linking land conflict and electoral violence.

68 3 | Mitchell - To

69 The contentious politics around land and elections in contemporary Côte Côte in contemporary elections and land around politics contentious The Houphouët- by espoused policies tenure land and liberalThe immigration The chapter is organised as follows: the next section provides a brief brief a provides next sectionthe follows: as organised is chapter The Contentious politics around land and elections in Côte d’Ivoire land and elections in Côte Contentious politics around thons), NGOs, politicians, security officials, and traditional authorities. and traditional security officials, politicians, NGOs, thons), To garner insights from a wide variety of actors on the ground, the chapter the chapter the ground, on actors a wide of variety from insights garner To such stakeholders, of a range with conducted were interviews that upon draws autoch and (migrants residents local landowners, officials, government as d’Ivoire have their origins in colonial and postcolonial migration into the the into migration postcolonial and colonial in origins their have d’Ivoire foreign and both internal the 1920s, as early As cocoa regions. country’s work to d’Ivoire Côte of regions the south-eastern descended upon migrants the in these becameregions, scarcer land As cocoa sector. in the burgeoning parts arriving in the south-western eventually westward, shifted cocoa frontier the of some While in 1960. independence the country to in the lead-up of arrangements, sharecropping into entered and wages for worked migrants first received occurred when migrants relations in land–labour a transformation by spearheaded was This transformation farm. and clear to their own of land who implemented Houphouët-Boigny, Félix president, founding d’Ivoire’s Côte to belongs the land that stated that policy in 1963 tenure land a controversial colonial- a policy such contradicted Although productive. those it who make transformed rapidly it ownership, land governing legal arrangements inherited d’Ivoire Côte of landscapes demographic and thesocial, economic political, these of shall see, we the socio-political As 2000: 105). implications (Chauveau serve to would fundamentally alter policies tenure land and flows migration fuel provide and in the cocoa regions migrants between and hosts relations electoral violence. and conflicts land future for which in turn the cocoa of sector, expansion the rapid facilitated Boigny quote Kalyvas (2003: 481), the micro-level insights garnered from fieldwork fieldwork from garnered insights 481), the micro-level (2003: Kalyvas quote paths, the various exploring for possibilities empirical ‘fascinating provide as local and cleavages, central of combinations modalities, and trajectories, their consequences’. as well in elections and land around politics overview the contentious historical of conflict the land on light shed to the analysis then narrows It d’Ivoire. Côte dynamics – cocoa regions west far the country’s characterise that dynamics the penultimate In politics. electoral of the explosiveness feed into in turn that to theorise electoral violence with conflict land connects section, the chapter intertwined become electoral violence and conflicts in which land the ways local and levels. both the national logics at and actors engage that processes presidential the 2015 of analysis a brief with concludes the chapter Finally, question the land to related discusses the and policyelections implications beyond. and d’Ivoire Côte in gave rise to a period of impressive economic growth and political stability during the 1960s and 1970s known as the ‘Ivorian miracle’. However, with the downward spiral of the economy in the mid- to late 1980s, cracks began to appear in the Ivorian model of growth. Along with the economic uncertainties of the day, the end of the Ivorian miracle ushered in a new era of political uncertainty. Facing pressure from the international community and an increasingly economically (and politically) disgruntled citizenry, the ailing Houphouët-Boigny agreed to hold the country’s first multiparty elections in 1990. While Houphouët-Boigny easily defeated his main rival candidate in the elections, garnering over 80 per cent of the vote, the main opposition party at the time – the Front Populaire Ivoirien under Laurent Gbagbo − attempted to build an electoral campaign by ‘arousing an Ivorian xenophobic nationalism’ that took aim at the ruling party’s historical favouritism of foreigners (Crook 1997: 222–3). As a member of the Bété ethnic group, with origins in the central-west cocoa regions, Gbagbo was able to mobilise support among the disgruntled autochthonous peoples by playing upon the contentious issues of migration and land tenure arrangements, which in some places had rendered them minorities in their own home regions (McGovern 2011). The contentious politics around land and belonging would reach new levels after the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. In order to eliminate his political rival, Alassane Ouattara, President Henri Konan Bédié took a page out of Gbagbo’s political playbook and adopted the exclusionary policy of Ivorian nationalism embodied in the slogan of ivoirité – or Ivorianess. This nationalist policy was institutionalised through a new electoral code, which prevented Ouattara from competing in presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 on the grounds that he was not eligible based on the supposedly foreign origins of his parentage. The politics of ivoirité and the ethnicisation of electoral politics during the post-Houphouët-Boigny years clearly heightened tensions between the predominantly Muslim northern and the Christian southern regions, as the former came to view Ouattara’s exclusion as their own, given his Muslim and northern origins. Such divisions would be further exacerbated by President Gbagbo’s embrace of ethnonational politics, divisions that would eventually culminate in the outbreak of civil war in 2002. Although the civil war pitted the north against the south, the most acute violence in the early years of the conflict was in the western cocoa zones, where tensions between ethnic groups over land ownership, control of property and ivoirité exploded, and resulted in mass expulsions and the exodus of tens of thousands of migrants.4 The mass displacement caused by the civil war further complicated the explosive and unresolved issues over land in the western cocoa regions. As McCallin and Montemurro (2009: 5) note: ‘While people were displaced, many of the plots they had planted were sold or leased by others, so depriving IDPs

70 3 | Mitchell - - - - 71 Despite a lull in violence during the late 2000s, the political and security 2000s, the political and the late during in violence a lull Despite The outbreak of violence in these regions and the protracted nature of of nature protracted and the regions in theseof violence outbreak The As the introduction to this chapter argues, for exclusionary and anti- and exclusionary for argues, this chapter to the introduction As Land conflict in the western cocoa regions: a micro-level perspective regions: a micro-level cocoa western Land conflict in the nating foreigners and northerners as the “enemies” of Côte d’Ivoire’. In sum, sum, In d’Ivoire’. Côte of the “enemies” as northerners and foreigners nating and land over rights – contested the conflict of causes root the underlying displace the massive of politicised a result as – became increasingly belonging political elites. by rhetoric exclusionary and ment Ouat (Gbagbo and when both candidates the worse for a turn took climate elections. presidential of 2010 the round victory claimed the tara) second after and the Ouattara actors international by efforts countless Notwithstanding finally the was crisis political channels, through the stalemate end to camp Gbagbo 2011, arrested was 11 April military when, on through means resolved to it Suffice 2012b). palace (Mitchell presidential of the siege ten-day a after play would question the land a surprise as that come have not should it say, the post-electoral during and the elections in the to run-up role a prominent described conflicts land above the unresolved will show, the chapter crisis. As that in the post-election violence role causal underlying a key play would (UNHRC 3,000 people over of in the death resulted have to estimated is post-electoral behind the 2010–11 while forces such, the causal As 2011). Straus (cf. dimensions military political, economic and complex have violence served land levels fuel the terrible to around politics the contentious 2011), violence. electoral of of their principal means of subsistence on their return and fuelling inter- fuelling and their return on subsistence of means their principal of tensions.’ community and autochthony the conflict served to furtheraround radicalise discourses the discourse explain, 85) (2007: Marshall-Fratani and Banégas As belonging. desig form, ultranationalist and xenophobic resolutely ‘a took autochthony of immigrant rhetoric to resonate among local populations, large sections of sections of large local populations, among resonate to rhetoric immigrant cocoa Ivorian indeed was This casethe in the besociety receptive. must through supporters mobilise to political elites of the ability where regions, the state fractured by facilitated greatly was discourses autochthony the use of in theseregions. communities migrant and between autochthons relations of by shaped has been fundamentally relations of these state contemporary The countryside in the Ivorian building state of processes historical deep-rooted migra of political economy the changing above, alluded to As (Boone 2003). the shifting political power explain to helps relations land–labour and tion local from away power of the wresting the local namely, at level: relations this sense, this provides In political authority. of the centralisation and elites described dynamics the contemporary understanding for the critical subtext are they spaces;apolitical rather, not are cocoaregions west far The below. deeply politicised places, albeit where grievances are more often mobilised as a result of national historical and political processes. In writing about autochthons’ perceptions of migrant populations during the Ivorian crisis, Chauveau and Colin (2010: 94–5) provide a detailed summary of autochthons’ grievances against allochthons (i.e. native Ivorians who are not original inhabitants of the soil):

the strangers have become richer and richer, whereas local families are struggling; they invest at home the money they earn locally; they show no interest in village affairs; they no longer respect their duty of gratitude towards the local community; the Ivorian strangers do not vote for the autochthons’ candidates and their numerical importance gives them a political advantage.

Echoing these insights, I draw upon findings from the field to argue that four interrelated factors provided key ingredients for the explosive nature of land-related conflict and electoral violence in the western cocoa regions. These factors, in essence, created fertile conditions for elites to instrumentalise the land question in Côte d’Ivoire. As we shall see in the following section, the joint production of action was made possible given the salience of land conflicts at the local level, which in turn would incentivise disgruntled autochthons (in particular) to ally with key actors in the centre. But before we can turn to this analysis, we must first consider the following critically important enabling conditions: (1) the lack of integration of migrant populations; (2) autochthons’ loss of land; (3) the disputed nature of land sales; and (4) the weakening of chieftaincies.

Lack of integration of migrant populations In addition to being both outnumbered and outperformed, many autochthons cite the pervasive unwilling- ness of migrant populations to integrate into the local community as a major source of resentment. The lack of integration of migrants throughout the cocoa regions can be physically observed in many towns and villages by the simple fact that autochthons and migrants often live on opposite sides of the roads that divide these communities. However, it is the nature of the campements system – whereby thousands of migrant-inhabited communities have developed in the forests, often many kilometres from local autochthonous villages – that is perhaps an even greater source of autochthons’ frustration vis-à-vis migrants. While expressing concerns about the Baoulé invasion of his community, one autochthon chief stated: ‘The Baoulés don’t come and settle down in the village, they create their own campements!’5 This critique of Baoulé migrants was echoed by a senior figure in President Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Républicains party, who suggested that ‘quite often the Baoulé, when they arrive, they stay in their own plantations, in their own villages, and they don’t participate in community

72 3 | Mitchell

8 73 In writing about the acrimonious nature of of nature the acrimonious about writing In 7 . , to say because of you I was able to have land. The first first The land. have to able I was you because of say , to

6 I think a lot of it has to do with a loss of status in their own land, in their in their land, in their own status of a loss do with to has it I think of a lot these watching they’re this land away giving by zone, in their own area, own other Coast from or Ivory parts whether they of other be from outsiders, some and them successful, become watching Africa, they’re West parts of migrants did this. Nowadays, the youth no longer do this. They no longer do this. Theyno longer longer no the youth did this. Nowadays, migrants their thank tuteurs to come of lack the manifestation another yet represents tradition break with This Until recently, relations had always been good. Those who came from been good. Those always had from came who relations recently, Until the children years, recent them. In received respectedelsewhere those that different adopted theyhave those first, who of came the descendants of respectful; less less are are Theythey their fathers. from behaviour when the first example, them … For those who of received considerate of the at end the often them land, gave parents when our came, migrants to money or even goods, fish, period, they the holiday brought during year theirthank tuteurs This lack of integration has recently taken both generational and symbolic symbolic and generational taken both recently has of integration This lack The intervieweeThe furthernoted: Autochthons’ loss of land loss Autochthons’ life, and I believe this contributed a great deal the friction to a great between these I believethis contributed and life, populations’. host–stranger relations in the south-western cocoa regions, McGovern highlights highlights McGovern cocoa regions, in the south-western relations host–stranger witnessed have which autochthons to the extent namely, cause: underlying another Burkinabè) (notably migrants in certain areas, Whereas, their lands. of the loss in their work, from the harvest resulting from paid who were labourers as worked Bété ethnicand groups) the Guéré to home are those that (notably regions other of these status the over tensions outright. Consequently, sold often was land the outright the frequencyof such, As 2011). (McGovern ubiquitous are lands in contributing factor been has a major migrants to autochthons by lands sale of of root the to explain asked When in cocoaregions. conflict the the violent to key a as land of the loss interviewees most cited in these theviolence regions, one example, For d’Ivoire. in Côte narrative conflict in the broader ingredient their with have people the relation do with to has it of lot ‘A stated: journalist … labour migrant using or themselves, the land using whether they’re and land autochthons.’ with the no longer is ownership is thewhen conflict the of Most of integration of migrant populations in local communities, and, consequently, consequently, and, in local communities, populations migrant of integration of the joint for fertile conditions created friction of that source additional an is violence. electoral of production dimensions, as observed by one local chief who lamented the behaviour of of the behaviour local observed as who lamented chief one by dimensions, chief: to the According original migrants. of the theoffspring are getting quite rich, and you know, there’s the whole problem of village jealousies and things like that.9

The sense of autochthons’ loss of land has been further compounded not only by the fact that they have lost control of their lands, but also owing to the bitter reality that migrants have surpassed them economically by exploiting these lands. As one president of the local youth association argued:

Because you are a tuteur and you give a parcel of land, after five years the migrant has made himself because he has farmed, and because you are lazy you have not, and so there are jealousies; because those who received the land quickly progressed whereas the others have remained in poverty.10

The sense of autochthons’ loss would become most pronounced when many autochthon youth returned to their home towns during Côte d’Ivoire’s economic crisis. In the words of one local autochthon chief: ‘The youth who returned from school, who could not get jobs in the city, returned to find a situation in which all of the lands that belonged to their parents are now occupied by others. So the youth ask, where will we stay? How will we live?’11 These questions would trigger fierce electoral debates over citizenship and belonging, and serve to fracture the social contracts that had bound autochthon and migrant populations for decades.12

The disputed nature of land sales On a related point, a third source of conflict between autochthons and migrants revolves around the disputed nature of land sales. The unresolved and seemingly irreconcilable positions surrounding the ownership of land are at the heart of the enduring tensions between these groups. While the vast majority of autochthons boldly claim that the land was never sold and that it was merely leased, rented or lent to migrant populations, migrants overwhelmingly reject these declarations, stating that their ancestors – and, more recently, themselves – purchased the land outright. Consequently, it is not simply autochthons’ sense of loss of land that fuels tensions in the cocoa regions; rather, the disputed nature of land transactions poses a major obstacle to resolving these protracted conflicts. A sample set of responses from both autochthons and migrants over the perceived nature of land sales in the far west cocoa regions provides striking evidence of the contested claims to land. Autochthons, for their part, consistently declare that: ‘The land cannot be sold, it can only be allocated, we lease it to you, we rent it [to] you; the land is a property for decades and decades, an individual cannot sell it, he can rent it.’13 They add that: ‘We only leased the land – the word “sold”, we do not know it.’14 As the following quotation highlights, autochthons generally reject the premise that lands were sold outright:

74 3 | Mitchell - - - - 18 As one respondent respondent one As 17 . Thus, notwithstanding its its notwithstanding . Thus, 75

15 or ‘“Let you use” is not a term that exists. People often make make often People exists. that term a not is use” you ‘“Let or 16 The above comments are indicative of the polarised perspectives of autoch of the of polarised perspectives indicative are comments above The Meanwhile, migrant responses capture the fundamentally different inter different the fundamentally capture responses migrant Meanwhile, furtherheight were ownership and sales land surrounding uncertainty The Do they constitute sales? What we recognise is not that they purchased the the they purchased that not recognise is we sales? What Do they constitute you that liquor gin or of A bottle land. purchase cannot because you land, not is forest of hectares 20 you to give accepts that a local community offer which is it, for paid have you that claim you But 20 hectares! for the price true!not pretation of the nature of these land transactions. They state that is that ‘This state They these transactions. land of the nature of pretation receiving without something purchase cannot We false, a paper. everyone has receipt,’ a ownership land around ambiguity The land. over claims migrant and thon consolidate or redistribute to promises electoral why further underscores implica dangerous One political support. up shore help land to claims groups’ violent that a signal local to populations provides this ambiguity that is tion efforts opponents’ off fend to be required may attacks pre-emptive or resistance land. contested reclaim to Mitchell (cf. 98–759) (Loi 1998 in law a new land of the introduction ened by recognise and identify, to aimed law the new land terms, concrete 2014). In foreigners whileexcluding transfers customary through acquired rights protect Colin and Chauveau As Colin 86). 2010: and (Chauveau ownership land from that autochthons by forward put the claims ‘bolstered the law note, 86) (ibid. the new as policy rights’, property of holders legitimate the only they are certifying and identifying of in the process rights customary to priority ‘gives improvements potential some Despite their registration’. to prior rights land cocoa west in the far particularly was controversial it the new law, by proposed and ownership land for prerequisite a citizenship national making By regions. the new rights, land of source the essential as rights customary establishing by non-indigènes’ of expropriation for legal foundation ‘a policyland established (Booneserved 75). 2007: law The to zone’ in theforest rights land acquired renegotiate them to required it as rights, land migrants’ Ivorian undermine tuteur their autochthonous with their agreement around clarity greater providing insecurity and reducing of purported objectives This, problems. theland exacerbated instead law land the 1998 ownership, land for fertile ground sales, land provided of nature the disputed with combined question. the land of thepolitical instrumentalisation provocatively noted: ‘Nobody here received a free piece of land from a Guéré. a Guéré. from land of a free piece received here ‘Nobody noted: provocatively share.’ to like don’t Guérés freely. give to like don’t all, Guérés of First distinctions between leasing and selling. Listen, it’s the same term. So the same when it’s selling. Listen, between and leasing distinctions a purchase.’ means it land, leasethey a portion of say The weakening of chieftaincies The final factor that has served to further strain host–migrant relations in the far west region is the weakening of chieftaincies. In writing about the implications of the absence of a neo-traditional chiefly elite in the region, Crook et al. (2007: 12) note that land relations ‘have relied more on social bargaining and informal arrangements which were often overridden by the state’, and that such conditions have ‘provoked politicised ethnic conflict and perceptions of dispossession amongst host communities’. In recent decades, the Ivorian crisis has further weakened chieftaincies throughout these regions to the point where local authorities in the Ivorian south rarely occupy positions of notable power. As one head of a leading NGO suggested: ‘because the chiefs have been weakened, they are weakened in their ability to play a leading role in their capacity to resolve conflicts. This, in turn, weakens their credibility in the eyes of the locals.’19 While the interviewee noted that the weakening of chieftaincies is not the root cause of the violence in these regions, he argued that it nevertheless facilitates such violence.20 While the absence of strong traditional authorities may serve to undermine the ability of local communities to resolve their own disputes over land, the question that remains is which factors contributed to the recent deterioration of local authorities. In answering this question, one respondent provided a particularly insightful account of the downfall and complexities of chieftaincy rule in the cocoa regions. According to the interviewee:

This started if you go back to the 1990s and you had the cadres coming back from the city who no longer respected traditional chiefs and started already eating away at their power, but [it] has been made much worse by the conflicts. You have a chief who dies and then there’s a struggle for power. In every community you have the chief of the autochthons, you have the chief of the allogènes, you have the chief of the allochthons, then you have the chief of the campements who responds to the chef de village, and it’s very, very unclear in every community where the real power lies. And that makes a big difference. If you still have strong traditional leaders who are respected then they are able to solve conflicts more easily.21

Thus, while traditional chiefs continue to occupy important roles in local communities, their weakened ability to resolve local disputes over land (and other issues) enables political elites from the centre to more easily manipulate the land question. If chiefs had the capacity to peacefully manage and resolve land conflicts within their jurisdiction, political elites would presumably have less fodder for their attempts to mobilise supporters on the basis of electoral promises to revisit groups’ rights and claims to land. Instead, a weakened chieftaincy further enables the use of divisive politics around land as a potent electoral strategy.

76 3 | Mitchell - - Such interpretations are are interpretations Such 23 This sentiment was shared by an an by shared was This sentiment 22 77

24 The alliance between local and national actors is illustrated through the the through is illustrated actors The alliance localnational between and This is when things were exacerbated, when they came to power, when when to power, when they came exacerbated, were is This when things the Dioulas, that heads compatriots’ his into put he power to Gbagbo came They’re their lands. will you we give will we them away, chase the Malinkés, So the seeds the conflict, because these of are invaders. Chinese, they’re otherwise as heads we people’s these ideas into put that the ones they are in harmony. lived The Ivorian case provides a particularly striking example of the dangerous of dangerous the a strikingparticularly example provides case Ivorian The between the communities ‘Life chief: local one autochthon to According In sum, the weakening of chieftaincies coupled with the lack of integration of integration lack with the coupled chieftaincies of the weakening sum, In autochthonous youth president from a neighbouring region, who stated: ‘It’s ‘It’s who stated: region, a neighbouring from president youth autochthonous was The population all these disagreements. brought especially that politics hatred.’ preached who politicians by manipulated Land conflict and electoral violence: the ‘joint production of action’ ‘joint production the violence: electoral Land conflict and corroborated by allochthons, members of NGOs and journalists. In the words the words In journalists. and NGOs of members allochthons, by corroborated village chief: allochthon an of comments of a head of an international NGO: ‘The entirety of these conflicts, of these conflicts, ‘The NGO: entirety international an a head of of comments all level, reverber the national at tensions and the political manipulations of ated to the local level where they were amplified. If there had only only been had the If there amplified. the local they to where were level ated consequences of national interventions in local dynamics. McGovern (2011: (2011: local in McGovern dynamics. interventions national of consequences the is neighbours its from apart sets d’Ivoire Côte ‘What that: notes 69–70) in their these localrecuperated tensions have politicians in which national way to and advantage, their electoral to resentment of the politics turn to attempts the pursuit In power.’ to on hold accede and to violence the use of encourage autochthons’ harnessed political elites level, the national at political power of a with autochthons – arming approach strategic a employing grievances by in their favour power theof balance restore to politicalideology promised that is process in this elites of political role insidious The their lands. return and Many region. west far inthe fieldwork recent in thefrom findings illustrated in whichpolitical ways thedeleterious emphasised intervieweesconsistently the provided in so instrumentalised local doing, grievances, and, land elites conflict. host–migrant of rounds numerous for spark everything the area, dete good invaded was politics in the beginning. When everything!’ destroyed Politics riorated. of migrant populations, autochthons’ loss of their lands, and the disputed the disputed and theirlands, of loss autochthons’ populations, migrant of the explain help that factors interrelated four sales land constitute of nature in the migrants and autochthons among land surrounding politics contentious section these conflicts reveals, land the following As cocoa west regions. far land- of production the joint of the possibility for ingredient a key provide collide. motives and interests when local national violence electoral and related land disputes, the country would have remained stable. We would have far fewer problems.’25 This account was echoed by a renowned Ivorian journalist, who stated:

Before 1990, a lot of the problems were resolved within the communities … these conflicts existed before, but they were resolved within a local system where the village chief and the autochthons or allochthons discussed matters and came to agreements. But since 1990, politicians exacerbated these problems and said that strangers had to leave the land … and the local politicians pushed or encouraged the youth to expropriate allochthons who had legally or justly acquired the lands by buying the land with gin or a little bit of money … so the principal source of the conflict was due to the political instrumentalisation.26

In sum, the interaction between local grievances and national politics proved to be politically explosive. While elites at the centre and actors on the ground engaged in the joint production of violence throughout much of the 2000–10 period of political turmoil in Côte d’Ivoire, the events of 2010–11 clearly capture the interconnections between existing land conflicts and electoral logics. As Kalyvas (2003: 486) explains, the concept of alliance ‘entails a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive local advantage; in exchange the former rely on local conflicts to recruit and motivate supporters and obtain local control, resources, and information’. The notion of alliance has important implications for understanding the land conflict–electoral violence nexus in the far west region. Given the electoral geography of the elections27 – characterised by both ethnic cleavages and close regional electoral races – candidates at the national level strategically used the land issue to try to mobilise support. The tactical decision to use the land card has deep roots. As Bassett (2011: 471–2) writes, ‘Gbagbo’s popularity in these forest region departments mainly revolves around his ethno-nationalist politics regarding land ownership and citizenship … Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) party has consistently supported local peoples over “foreigners” in forest region land disputes.’ Yet while the far west has historically been a relative electoral stronghold for Gbagbo, the region is home to large numbers of pro-Ouattara migrant populations. Writing before the 2010 elections, one leading correspondent presciently noted: ‘The battle in the West will be very heated’ (Airault 2010). Understandably, then, Gbagbo strategically used the electoral promise of land as both a resource and a symbol to build an alliance with actors on the periphery – in this case, local autochthonous populations in the far west – in their efforts to seek electoral power at the centre. In this sense, the transaction between supralocal (i.e. political elites) and local (autochthons)

78 3 | Mitchell 79 2010). Such comments have deep connections with with deep connections have comments Such 2010). The precarious nature of host–migrant relations and the explosiveness of of explosiveness and the relations host–migrant of nature precarious The Evidence of the instrumentalisation of local land grievances during the the local grievances of during land the instrumentalisation of Evidence in engaging of local actors incidents isolated means no by are These examples the enduring tensions surrounding land, as they were ultimately employed to to employed ultimately they as were land, surrounding tensions the enduring their regain to efforts autochthons’ support to commitment signal Gbagbo’s condoning The people). non-indigenous (i.e. allochthons from land over control full Gbagbo on was by violence the use of – of even encouragement – and about Speaking again elections. of round first the after in the days display dead; you yet not is snake ‘the that declared he Ouattara, Alassane rival, his (ibid.). stick’ your down put not must the why understanding for a critical background provide question the land the of the height at violence experienced high of levels such region west far of respects the epicentre in many was Abidjan crisis. While post-electoral experienced high similarly d’Ivoire Côte parts of the western the violence, those half killed of nearly for accounting estimate one – by violence of levels between electoral the then, connection is What, the crisis (CNE 2012). during the the crisis and post-electoral of cleavages the macro-level along violence militaryof political, multiplicity a land? Certainly, over conflicts ubiquitous involved implicit – and sometimes even explicit – promises to strengthen strengthen to – promises even explicit sometimes – and implicit involved their crucial electoral for in exchange land to rights and access autochthons’ action of production the joint this enabled (2003), Kalyvas Echoing support. violent in engage and mobilise to incentives given were local as communities periods. post-electoral and actsboth in the pre- A United elsewhere. been crisis has documented post-electoral 2010–11 well humanitarian international and rights human of violations on report Nations pro- the elections, to the lead-up during how, notes region west in the far law viewers television and both radio listeners bombarded Gbagbo media outlets the documents report similarly The migrants. at aimed messages hate with of crisis. the post-electoral days in leaflets the early xenophobic of distribution urged leaflets the vengeance’, ultimate for titled come ‘Thehas hour Ominously kill and away chase to west the far of daughters and sons the autochthonous additional Moreover, 4–6). 2011: (ONUCI migrants foreign and both Ivorian land migrants’ expropriate to threatened autochthons how highlight accounts 2010). lose(Airault to the elections Gbagbo were that thein event Instead, land. over control and secure to access to increased ploys opportunistic the highest at political actors by employed strategies of the product they are theexclusionary embraced consistently who have government, of echelons electoral of in their pursuit populations divide to autochthony of language even the elections to the in run-up reported, news source one As power. were there that saying as occasions countless on Gbagbo quoted was himself for a candidate and d’Ivoire Côte for candidate … a types candidates of ‘two Afrique (Jeune foreigners’ and strategic factors helps explain the more direct or proximate causes of the electoral violence in the far west region (Straus 2011).28 And yet below the surface the contentious politics around land in the far west and the use of exclusionary and hostile discourses by the country’s political elites served to create fertile conditions for the eruption of electoral violence at the micro-level. In this way, to paraphrase Kalyvas (2003), the interaction between local and master cleavages proved to be particularly explosive in Côte d’Ivoire’s far west region, given the overlapping interests and motives of actors at the centre and the periphery. In short, the ontology of electoral violence here cannot be understood without integrating the land dynamics and electoral logics unique to the far west region. While the case of Côte d’Ivoire sheds light on the explosive ways in which land grievances can be mobilised during elections (cf. Klaus and Mitchell 2015), it further underscores the perils of employing nativist discourses as an electoral strategy. The use of the concept of autochthony represents an alarming trend as it provides a powerful weapon in the arsenal of political entrepreneurs. While scholars have noted the slippery and fluid nature of this identity category (e.g. Geschiere 2009), the basic essence of autochthony is that one is either from the soil or not of the soil. As such, the autochthony category is particularly amenable to political mobilisation as it can serve to entrench notions of groups’ status as strangers to the land. This in turn can give rise to burning questions about their rightful place in the country’s polity. As the troubled electoral history of Côte d’Ivoire reveals, the use of this concept has been a central motif in the political and electoral tactics of the country’s elites for decades. To what extent, then, have this concept and the enduring challenges regarding land continued to undermine prospects for peace in Côte d’Ivoire?

Conclusions: the politics of land in the 2015 elections and beyond On 25 October 2015, Ivorians voted in the first presidential elections since the post-electoral crisis of 2010–11. With nearly 84 per cent of the overall vote, the incumbent Alassane Ouattara easily secured the presidency. The sizeable margin of victory was in no small measure due to the divided and dysfunctional nature of the opposition, and the impressive economic recovery that the country has experienced over the last few years under the tenure of President Ouattara (World Bank 2015). To what extent (if any) did the land question play a role in destabilising the presidential vote? While pre-electoral protests in the months leading up to the elections resulted in the loss of lives and injury, such protests hinged more on the lingering debates surrounding the incumbent’s eligibility as a presidential candidate (Broadhurst 2015). The short answer is that the politics of land failed to emerge as a major electoral cleavage issue.29 Given the fractured state of

80 3 | Mitchell

- - 30 81 The joint production of action therefore did not materialise, as there was was as there materialise, not did of action therefore production The joint Numerous story. be to different a prove this could elections, Beyond the 2015 The slow progress on the implementation of the new land reforms has has been reforms newof the land on implementation the progress slow The tion (Human Rights Watch 2013; ICG 2014; Mitchell 2014). Despite the recent the recent 2014). Despite 2014; Mitchell ICG 2013; Watch Rights (Human tion have there laws, nationality and tenure land the highly to controversial changes reforms. such enforce and to implement been yet efforts meaningfulas no practical chal of 271–3) (2016: a multiplicity is highlights, there Pritchard As such One law. land the country’s of adoption and the application facing lenges governing the legal framework of awareness of the lack to relates challenge When challenge. of this is illustrative quotation following The tenure. land Special the resolved, been have conflicts whether the land a reporter by asked d’Ivoire in Côte Operation Nations the United of Head and Representative law thebut I think that continue, withland linked conflicts The ‘No. stated: problem The them. resolving for conditions modifiedprovides 1998 in 2014 of to how know populations sothat explained been sufficiently not has it that is (Duhem 2015). these problems’ with sorts of confronted actwhen they are the opposition and the lack of electoral incentive on the part of Ouattara to to Ouattara thepart of on incentive electoral of the lack and the opposition violence electoral land-related large-scale of theabsence card, theland play overwhelming victory The of a surprise. as the Ouattara come not should political the incumbent’s to a further disincentive provided side undoubtedly purposes. electoral for land of the issue instrumentalise to attempt to opponents the land trying run around the violence of risk why mobilise to put, Simply is outcome the electoral when the contesting successfully likelihoodissue of work echoes earlier a conclusion Such 2015)? Mitchell and Klaus (cf. solow less much is violence that which argue violence electoral the triggers of on margins vote narrow with close elections occur to of the in absence likely 2004). (Wilkinson the current In land. of try to the power harness to political appetite of a lack equally were the periphery region on west in thefar actors political context, the retains population the non-indigenous as violence, to resort to unlikely the security Given 2016). Mitchell and (Côté in the region power balance of 2015) Watch Rights Human (cf. area the in incumbent the of stranglehold politically not was it in the country, dynamics electoral the contemporary and (autochthonous) Ouattara’s – for dangerous even possibly – and expedient channels. electoral through land vocalise to their grievances over opponents to emerge failed at localthe level thus conflicts land the unresolved short, In failed and political elites competing the country’s among cleavage a master as the local level. at actors mobilise to ques the land resolving for challenges the highlighted enduring have reports further complicated by the problem of displacement (Pritchard 2016). The The 2016). (Pritchard displacement of the problem by further complicated 2000s were the early of the civil war during the displaced of numbers huge been has some there While 2010–11. of hostilities the renewed by compounded progress in allowing some people to return to their lands, a recent estimate suggests that there may be as many as 300,000 who are still displaced (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). It is therefore hard to imagine how the contentious politics around land can be meaningfully resolved given the state of flux surrounding groups’ access to and control over land. In sum, until the land question is resolved, it will continue to pose a serious threat for future rounds of elections. A different electoral context – one in which Ouattara (or his successor) and his supporters no longer enjoy such a fragmented political opposition – could incite political elites to once again instrumentalise the issue of land.31 If or when this occurs, the joint production of action could again unite elites at the centre and actors on the periphery in their quest to pursue their objectives, whether they be motivated by the desire to seek greater private gains or to rectify perceived injustices of the past. As Côte d’Ivoire’s history has shown, under this scenario the instrumentalisation of land could once again be a trigger for electoral violence. What policy implications can be drawn from this micro-level analysis of the links between land conflict and electoral violence? Balcells and Justino (2014: 1346) underscore the need to establish a better theoretical understanding of the link between macro-level political processes and local conflict dynamics, as they rightly note that such an understanding is critical for the development of policies designed to break vicious cycles of violence, war and underdevelopment. Yet despite the centrality and causal significance of the micro-foundations of conflict, ‘most programmes of conflict resolution, prevention and mediation are typically driven by regional, national and international perspectives’ (Verwimp, Justino and Brück 2009: 308). This echoes the core finding in this chapter: namely, that any approach to mitigate future land-related electoral violence must consider the ways in which national and local forces and factors collide to produce the joint production of action. In so doing, we must therefore ‘explore the social production of violent conflict, and how land becomes part of larger patterns of violent contestation’ – notably in the context of elections (Van Leeuwen and Van der Haar 2016: 95). In concrete terms, it is clear that more needs to be done to support and strengthen the development of reforms aimed at improving the governance of land. As recent research shows, the insecure and unenforceable nature of property rights regimes is a leading contributory factor to host–migrant conflicts over land (Côté and Mitchell 2017). Given the propensity of political elites at both the national and the local level to try to mobilise electoral violence by using the land card, one obvious safeguard against this is to create more certainty and enforcement in the area of property rights. While this may prove to be a tall order in places such as Côte d’Ivoire, the stakes are high as land-related electoral violence shows no sign of abating.

82 3 | Mitchell contingent in Moyen in Moyen contingent In Chapter 5 of this volume, this volume, 5 of Chapter In Author interview, allochthon allochthon interview, Author Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author Author interview, assistant leader leader assistant interview, Author Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author Author interview, head of leading leading head of interview, Author Author interview, spokesperson of of spokesperson interview, Author Author interview head (in English), Author On the role of youth in fuelling in fuelling youth of On the role Author interview, Burkinabè cocoa Burkinabè interview, Author Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author

19 17 11 21 20 18 16 23 13 15 12 14 24 22 communities in in communities allogène and allochthon 2012. 10 May Region, Cavally Moyen of localof dozo 2012. 8 May Region, Cavally Moyen Cavally Region, 9 May 2012. May 9 Region, Cavally Moyen Bangura and Söderberg Kovacs provide provide Söderberg and Bangura Kovacs of the role on analysis alternative an of in casethe that, argue They chiefs. a played chiefs traditional Sierra Leone, localto in contributing role active more violence. of instances NGO in Abidjan, 24 April 2012. 24 April in Abidjan, NGO farmer in Moyen Cavally Region, 9 May 9 May Region, Cavally in Moyen farmer 2012. village chief in Bas Sassandra Region, 12 12 Region, in Basvillage chief Sassandra 2012. May village chief in Haut Sassandra Region, 5 5 Region, Sassandra in Haut village chief 2012. May autochthony discourses, see Chauveau see discourses, Chauveau autochthony Marshall-Fratani Bobo and and (2003) (2006). 5 Region, Sassandra in Haut village chief 2012. May village chief in Bas Sassandra Region, 12 12 Region, in Basvillage Sassandra chief 2012. May chief of lands in Moyen Cavally Region, Region, Cavally in Moyen lands of chief 2012. 9 May community youth president in Moyen in Moyen president youth community 2012. 9 May Region, Cavally of leading NGO in Abidjan, 1 May 2012. 2012. 1 May in Abidjan, NGO leading of those are the autochthons again, Once the of viewed the original as inhabitants native to refers allochthons soil whereas the host to migrants who are Ivorians refers allogènes Meanwhile, community. migrants. non-Ivorian to 83 ). system system ’ can be ’ can tutorat Author interview, autochthon autochthon interview, Author Author interview, senior figure figure senior interview, Author Ibid. According to one estimate, Côte Côte estimate, one to According Author interview (in English), Author Recent exceptions include Boone include exceptions Recent Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author ‘Autochthons’ refers to those who, those to who, refers ‘Autochthons’ Author interview, local autochthon local autochthon interview, Author

The CNE (2012) report provides provides report CNE (2012) The

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 president of local youth association in in association local of youth president foreign journalist in Abidjan, 2 May 2012. 2 May in Abidjan, journalist foreign translated as ‘guardian’. The The ‘guardian’. as translated regulating for institution informal an is (i.e. between first-comers relations tuteurs (i.e. newcomers and guardians) village chief in Bas Sassandra Region, Region, in Basvillage chief Sassandra term ‘tuteur The 2012. 12 May in Rassemblement des Républicains des Républicains in Rassemblement Although 2012. 2 May party in Abidjan, foreigners) and (both Ivorian northerners violence more of been the target have from originally the Baoulé (whothan are seem to the latter d’Ivoire), Côte central of their lack for criticism greater receive integration. village chief in Haut Sassandra Region, 5 5 Region, Sassandra in Haut village chief all interviews that were Note 2012. May by translated and in French conducted unless otherwise stated. the author d’Ivoire’s civil war resulted in the internal in the internal resulted civil war d’Ivoire’s 1 million than more of displacement of 80 per cent approximately with people, (see in Abidjan these residence taking up 2006: 72). Chirot literally, emerged directly from the soil. the soil. from directly emerged literally, a detailed See (2009) for Geschiere autochthony. of the concept of analysis (2014), Boone and Kriger (2012), Côté Côté (2012), (2014), Boone Kriger and and Klaus and (2016) Mitchell and (2015). Mitchell a detailed account and a geographical a geographical and a detailed account of forms the different of breakdown the electoral during committed violence was there shows, period. the report As as such death, of causes of a wide range political or for committed executions both security by forces ethnic reasons acts violent and torture, citizens, and detention. during committed Notes village chief in Haut Sassandra Region, 4 Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine. May 2012. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. 25 Author interview, head of Basedau, M., G. Erdmann and A. international NGO in Abidjan, 24 April Mehler (eds) (2007) Votes, Money 2012. and Violence: Political Parties and 26 Author interview, Ivorian Sub-Saharan Africa. Uppsala: Nordic journalist in Abidjan, 2 May 2012. Africa Institute. 27 See Bassett (2011) for an analysis Bassett, T. J. (2011) ‘Winning Coalition, of the electoral geography of the 2010 Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential elections. Presidential Elections’, African Affairs 28 For a more detailed overview of 110 (440): 469–79. the electoral violence dynamics in the Berry, S. (2009) ‘Property, Authority and far west, see CNE (2012), ICG (2014) and Citizenship: Land Claims, Politics and ONUCI (2011). the Dynamics of Social Division in 29 Piccolino (2016: 102–3) notes that West Africa’, Development and Change the pre-electoral and electoral campaigns 40 (1): 23–45. focused more on issues relating to the fate Boone, C. (2003) Political Topographies of Laurent Gbagbo, the fairness of electoral of the African State: Territorial institutions, the state of the economy, Authority and Institutional Choice. and broader themes linked to transitional New York NY: Cambridge University justice and democracy. Press. 30 Author’s translation from French. Boone, C. (2007) ‘Africa’s New Territorial 31 Piccolino (2016: 106) argues Politics: Regionalism and the Open that the selection of a successor to Economy in Côte d’Ivoire’, African Ouattara may prove to be a particularly Studies Review 50 (1): 59–81. destabilising process. Boone, C. (2014) Property and Political Order: Land Rights and the Structure of Conflict in Africa. New York NY: References Cambridge University Press. Airault, P. (2010) ‘Présidentielle: Boone, C. and N. Kriger (2012) ‘Land La bataille de l’Ouest n’est pas Patronage and Elections: Winners and gagnée par Laurent Gbagbo’, Jeune Losers in Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire’ Afrique, 27 October. Available at in D. A. Bekoe (ed.), Voting in Fear: www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan ARTJAJA2597p038-039.xml0/ Africa. Washington DC: United States (accessed 27 October 2010). Institute for Peace Press. Autesserre, S. (2010) The Trouble with Broadhurst, C. 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86 4 | The geography of violence in Burundi’s 2015 elections

Willy Nindorera and Jesper Bjarnesen

Introduction In the span of less than a year, Burundi’s strides towards a sustainable peace following its civil war were marred by an escalation of electoral violence and a rapid descent into outright authoritarianism. At the end of April 2015, the proclamation of incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term led to a major crisis against a backdrop of violent clashes, mainly in the capital of Bujumbura, between civilian protestors opposed to this candidature and the security forces, supported by the ruling party youth wing, the Imbonerakure.1 Violence was limited, however, to specific neighbourhoods in the capital and to certain districts in the provinces. The aim of this chapter is to decipher the geography of this violence: what factors explain the concentration of electoral violence in the city of Bujumbura? Why were particular neighbourhoods in the capital the locus of electoral violence, while others were left relatively untouched? What explains the delimitation of electoral violence in rural areas to specific municipalities? In line with what seems to be a general tendency across African states and in other parts of the world (Goldsmith 2015; Reilly 2011; Taylor, Pevehouse and Straus 2013), electoral violence relating to Burundi’s 2015 elections seems to have been driven primarily by the quest for government survival. In a context of intense frustration, especially among urban youths, over high unemployment rates, poverty, lack of prospects and civic rights, the Nkurunziza regime resorted to a strategy of intimidation and repression in order to discourage opposition, both armed and peaceful. This chapter suggests that the specific geography of these forms of electoral violence is central for understanding the social divisions and post-conflict political stratifications that have shaped Burundi’s current conflict landscape. This chapter contributes to the micro-level exploration of the dynamics of electoral violence, as called for in the introduction to this volume, and more specifically to an understanding of how these subnational dynamics came to be unequally distributed geographically, within the capital as well as across the Burundian territory, during the turbulent months following the April 2015 protests. This analysis of Burundi’s geography of violence

87 thus explores empirically the interplay between electoral politics and public protests (McAdam and Tarrow 2010), providing some explanations for the recent observation that ‘protests across Africa seem unable to effect substantive reforms in national politics despite their success in bringing tens of thousands of people into the streets’ (Branch and Mampilly 2015: 6). Given the current interest in public protests among scholars and policy makers, as well as political activists across the African continent and beyond (cf. Arnould, Tor and Vervaeke 2016), the chapter presents a sobering account of how popular mobilisation may play out in an increasingly authoritarian state (Schedler 2013: 389). Given the concentration of electoral violence in the city of Bujumbura, the Burundian capital will be the main geographical area under scrutiny, and our analysis will largely be limited to the period from the end of April 2015 until April 2016. This period covers the bulk of violence in Bujumbura, while the following months were marked by a de-escalation of violence. The chapter is based on literature research (press articles, studies and reports by NGOs and United Nations organisations, academic research, etc.); statistical surveys that explain the geographical distribution of violence; and the maps, graphs and statistical data produced by various NGOs that provide a clear visualisation of the geography of violence during the period. It is also based on interviews with people who witnessed the violence first-hand. A focus group was also organised with young academics living in two of the neighbourhoods affected by the violence, who thus observed the dynamics that motivated the violence and its repercussions on the lives of the inhabitants. These methodological choices were made in light of a security situation in which more systematic empirical data collection was deemed too dangerous for both the researchers and the informants. The chapter’s analysis should be read with an awareness of the limitations that this selection of material has implied. The chapter first summarises Burundi’s history of electoral violence from its independence in 1962 until the most recent crisis, and continues with a more detailed consideration of the run-up to and aftermath of the 2015 elections. The bulk of the chapter then analyses the specific geography of electoral violence during the period under consideration, emphasising three patterns and suggesting some explanations for their occurrence. Firstly, we explore the reasons for the centrality of the city of Bujumbura in the confrontation between protestors and security forces, emphasising the demographic particularities of the capital in relation to the rest of the country. Secondly, we consider the uneven distribution of violence within the capital, drawing links to the roles of specific neighbourhoods during the country’s recent civil war. Finally, we discuss the occurrence and distribution of violence outside the capital, documenting aspects of the electoral crisis that have been largely overlooked in news reporting and subsequent debates outside Burundi.

88 Figure 1: Map of Burundi, designed by Henrik Alfredsson Electoral violence in Burundi Burundi has a troubled contemporary history marked by cycles of violence, most often of an ethno-political nature. Burundi’s first postcolonial crisis in 1965 was the result of an attempted coup, accompanied by ethnic massacres led by Hutus (the ethnic majority) in the armed forces frustrated by the defeat of the Hutu candidates of the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) in the parliamentary elections of that year. The coup failed and about sixty Hutu who were presumed to be behind the coup were executed following a controversial trial (Ngayimpenda 1998). In 1966, the army overthrew the monarchy. Power was now in the hands of the Tutsi minority, mainly from the Bururi Province in the south of the country (see Figure 1). The takeover of the various levers of power, including the historically influential army, by an ethnic minority and the subsequent exclusion of the Hutu majority were the main causes of the violent crises in 1972 and 1988. In the aftermath of the latter, President Pierre Buyoya initiated political reforms to resolve the issue of ethnicity by opening state institutions to the majority. This process led to a return to multiparty politics and democratic openness in the early 1990s. Expecting the broad support of its policy of national unity and political reforms to lead to success at the ballot box, the government held the first democratic elections based on universal direct suffrage in 1993, after nearly thirty years of single-party rule. Given their demographic disadvantage, the Tutsi minority – particularly those within the army and the senior civil service – feared that this electoral process would be detrimental to its security and interests (Ben Hammouda 1995). In June 1993, the presidential elections were decided with a landslide victory for Melchior Ndadaye of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), a Hutu-dominated party advocating change and deeper reforms. FRODEBU reinforced its victory in the legislative elections, causing further concern among a large number of Tutsi. In October 1993, an army faction opposed to the transfer of power assassinated president-elect Ndadaye and several senior officials. This event triggered the deadliest armed conflict in Burundi’s history. In the early 2000s, a number of peace agreements between the transitional government and the various Hutu insurrections put an end to the civil war and initiated institutional reforms. These reforms included a restructuring of the defence and police forces, with the integration of Hutu rebels; the establishment of ethnic and gender quotas in most state institutions; and the periodic organisation of pluralistic elections based on universal suffrage. The most influential agreement was the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, brokered by Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere, which was signed on 28 August 2000.2 The Arusha Accords contain numerous provisions including a number of institutional reforms that would later be incorporated into the 2005 constitution, which is still in force at the time of writing.3 90 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen - - - 91 and although the electoral process was tense and subject to to subject and tense was process the electoral although and 4 The 1993 crisis and subsequent civil war caused socio-political trauma in in socio-politicalcaused civilwar trauma subsequent and crisis 1993 The The CNDD-FDD’s first term, owing to popular social reforms, was welcomed welcomed was reforms, popular tosocial owing term, first CNDD-FDD’s The tions originating in former rebel groups, including the National Council for Council for the National including groups, rebel in former originating tions Democracy of the Defence for Democracy of the Forces the Defence and on relying in areas, rural gained popularity CNDD-FDD The (CNDD-FDD). which rural Hutu, young of primarily consisting a movement as theirimage political Its the civil war. during rhetoric articulated in populist already was the of one police forces, and thedefence of the reform emphasised platform the Hutu of demand the main and the peace of negotiations issues main the Hutu at aimed propaganda and discourse underground its But majority. base, also electoral played potential its as which the party perceived electorate, concerned primarily electorate an For (ibid.). intimidation and fear on strongly in the event war to a return wary the of risks and of peace security, with and of much not indeed, was – or, clear was the choice defeat, a CNDD-FDD of victorythe for in a large resulted elections 2005 the all. Thus, at a choice CNDD-FDD, Burundian society (Nimubona 2004). When elections were held in 2005, many many in 2005, held were elections When 2004). societyBurundian (Nimubona conflict, armed into relapse their country would that afraid were Burundians a as process the electoral perceived now the population part of a large as – the National group rebel one as violence, potential and tension of source underground remained (FNL) – still and disarm refused to Liberation of Forces several the arrival of the forma political scene saw Moreover, 2005). (ICG some violence, it did not lead to a new crisis. A more enduring outcome of of outcome enduring lead a new crisis. A more to did not it violence, some lines principal dividing political in shift the a was thesefurthermore, elections, period the characterised postcolonial to that divisions the interethnic from Hutu-dominated between the main primarily tensions, intra-ethnic increasing politicalparties. the ruling party however, time, the same At the population. parts of large by which a series led political to of authoritarianism, for a propensity displayed rights human well as serious as power, in years five first its crises during percep popular surprisingly, Not corruption. in increase an and violations the from varied significantly in government performance the party’s of tions were people where thecountryside, than appreciative being less the city outset, for Preparations their basic discussed needs, as below. about concerned more other among characterised, climate in a tense place took elections the 2010 the of civil liberties the instrumentalisation of the restriction and by things, increas the ruling to party’s attesting the police, and the defence judiciary, thereby CNDD-FDD The 2010). (ICG practices governing authoritarian ingly and all mobilised means and process the electoral of the direction controlled also exacerbated were Tensions in power. disposal remain its to at resources Rwasa, Agathon by of FNL, led the rebels Hutu The new circumstances. by demobilised now by had elections, in the previous participated who not had Figure 2: National distribution of votes in 2010 municipal elections. Map by Henrik Alfredsson, based on results announced by the National Independet Electoral Commmission (CENI). 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen - - - - 93 Burundi’s history of electoral violence prior to the 2015 elections, there elections, the 2015 to prior violence electoral history of Burundi’s tion of the activities of opposition parties outside the capital; the instrumental the instrumental the capital; parties outside opposition the activities of of tion serve to security forces the national and system the justice of transformation force; of show as a figureheads opposition some of the arrest interests; regime the institu within positions central to loyalists regime of the appointment and electoral the national as such democracy the rule law, and of safeguarding tions still should however, worrying These changes, commissions. rights human and which remained Agreement, the Arusha of the backdrop be against understood hardliners. by CNDD-FDD the challenged increasingly being in effect, despite which authoritarianisms’, ‘electoral of example a straightforward not is fore, regular including democracy, façades of Schedler‘institutional as characterises repro (and conceal to in order executive, the chief for elections multiparty (Schedler 1), since 2006: governance’ authoritarian of realities harsh duce) the civil of theend since been introduced have reforms democratic genuinely an in points consistently record government’s the CNDD-FDD However, war. a of transition the complicated to a testimony perhaps direction, authoritarian Hatz and a political party Söderberg (cf. into Kovacs movement rebel former a military leader Nkurunziza,a civilian from to Pierre chair, its and 2016), these elsewhere, been transitions has documented well As 2017). (Burihabwa rendering operationality, of a military and ethos the persistence entail often describes Themnér as what or military-civilian hybrids, elected into leaders (2017). democrats’ ‘warlord and transformed into a political party, running for the first time in the 2010 in 2010 time the the first running for political a party, into transformed and Secondly, by CNDD-FDD. the as a threat serious was This perceived elections. been had indirect elected by the president Accords, the Arusha with in keeping Finally, suffrage. direct universal beto elected by now was but 2005, in vote for the Imbonerakure, wing, youth the its ruling party been had mobilising This 2010). Watch Rights time (Human some for intimidation of a campaign to connected movements youth of the formation incited in turn, intimidation, between these confrontations violent led partiesto and opposition the main by the won again, once were, elections municipal first The 2010). (ICG groups except in all the country, parts margin of a considerable with CNDD-FDD, While 2). (see Figure Mwaro Bururi parts and of some and Bujumbura for it was electionobservers,by however, deemed was ballot legitimate this first intimidation and fear of the climate who denounced the opposition, rejected by the opposition reasons, the same For process. theelectoral marred had that the their safety, to threats with Faced elections. the following decided boycott to initiated elections therefore 2010 The exile. into leaders went opposition main executions, extrajudicial numerous by marked was a new political crisis that (UN Security things other Council Between 2015 2011). and theamong 2010 became regime the CNDD-FDD of tendencies authoritarian the cycles, electoral obstruc This by deliberate periodthe evident. characterised was increasingly The build-up to the 2015 elections The 2015 electoral process generated tensions early on. As early as 2014, there were unmistakable indications of CNDD-FDD’s desire to win by any means necessary. The tightening of laws on civil liberties, irregularities in the early stages of the electoral process, increased pressure on and harassment of the media and civil society, inopportune interference in the functioning of opposition parties, the reinforcement of the Imbonerakure and their massive deployment across the country, and their formation as militia units5 – these were all indicators of the CNDD-FDD’s intentions. As such, the record of its ten years in power was largely poor, and many expectations were dashed, particularly from a socio-economic perspective. A 2014 Afrobarometer survey of the general perceptions of the population in the social, political and economic spheres reveals high levels of dissatisfaction in rural communities, and even higher levels in urban areas, especially regarding living conditions and government performance on development issues. For example, 57 per cent of respondents across urban and rural populations gave a negative assessment of their overall living conditions, and 72 per cent of urban respondents estimated that overall economic conditions had declined during the last year, while 51 per cent of rural respondents provided similar answers. Finally, 78 per cent of urban respondents provided a negative assessment of the overall economic situation, as did 51 per cent of rural respondents. In short, frustration had risen by the end of the government’s second term, especially among urban populations. The lack of prospects for young people, who were increasingly faced with unemployment, underemployment and poverty, and the determination of certain opposition parties not to accept authoritarian rule heightened the risk of renewed violence and instability (UNDP and MFPDE 2014). The CNDD-FDD was the manifestation of a rebel movement whose transformation into a political party proved to be flawed. The party’s propensity to resort to force and confrontation, to the detriment of dialogue and compromise, had been a constant since its arrival on the scene largely due to the vestiges of its wartime past and the strong influence of its former military wing. Indeed, as already implied, the former rebel movement never truly departed from the violent culture it had developed during its underground years (see also Rufyikiri 2016). Moreover, despite having more contact and forming alliances with the outside world, it tended to inflate certain potential threats and even to fabricate them, such as the frequently raised danger of a Tutsi resurgence to its colonial and postcolonial dominance, especially when the party was confronted with internal difficulties and in need of scapegoats. This inflammatory political rhetoric by the authorities framed those who opposed Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third term as the same people responsible for the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye in the aftermath of the 1993 elections 94 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen If 6 The Arusha 95 The CNDD-FDD deployed this rhetoric as a response to virtually any line line any to virtually response as a rhetoric this deployed CNDD-FDD The The first months of 2015 were extremely tense. In March 2015, several senior 2015, several senior March In tense. extremely were 2015 of months first The Agreement clearly states that the president of the republic may hold no more more no hold may the republic of the president that states clearly Agreement on ambiguous more is constitution The Burundian in office. terms two than elected is state the head of that articles its of one in states It this subject. once, while only renewable term five-year a for suffrage direct universal by of the president the first exception, an as that, stipulates provision another the Senate and Assembly be the National can elected by republic post-transition of Conscious their members. of majority a two-thirds by in congress, meeting Nkurunziza, in term, Pierre a third of in the event challenges the forthcoming constitutional a proposing by obstacle this to circumvent wanted 2005, since office effectively have would amendment 2014. the This beginning of at amendment vote. by a single to failedpass proposal the but limit, offset two-term the The controversy over Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy candidacy Nkurunziza’s Pierre over controversy The (Madirisha 2015), or, more bluntly, it associated them with a Tutsi menace menace Tutsi a them with associated it bluntly, more or, 2015), (Madirisha 2015). (Bensimon needed be to eliminated that knew it that electorate an of the support garner to attempt in an criticism, of the same At 2016). (ICG frustrated and disillusioned increasingly growing was tensions internal the rulingtime, party by being destabilised gradually was of the dominance and administration neopatrimonial linked in part its to this backdrop Against 2015). Watch (Impunity generals corrupt of a quartet the term was the third of the question political climate, tense already an of the within tensions exacerbated and 2015, of the violence ignited that spark rulingparty. CNDD-FDD officials signed a letter opposing the third term. This movement, movement, term.This opposingthe third signeda letter officials CNDD-FDD was party congress a CNDD-FDD When supressed. quickly was however, Nkurunziza’s ambitions in this regard were still somewhat hidden, the public hidden, the public still somewhat were in this regard ambitions Nkurunziza’s Faced unequivocal. were in contrast, the ruling party, the leaders of speeches of presidential candidacy in the 2015 Nkurunziza’s likelihood of the increasing with 2015 in early a coalition formed civil society of organisations hundreds elections, to to the take to upon callthe people vowed and Term’ the Third called ‘Stop and term the third against mobilise to prepared actively opposition The streets. organising already was the CNDD-FDD Conversely, do the same. to threatened in which candidacy, Nkurunziza’s support the country to across demonstrations of opponents at slogans menacing shout would Imbonerakure the mobilised a wary the of risk of community, part, the international its For the candidacy. several high-level term, dispatched a third of the prospect by crisis caused violent of out office running for Nkurunziza from dissuade to Bujumbura to missions Vandeginste (Reyntjens, the constitution and Agreement the Arusha respect for 2016). Verpoorten and announced for the end of April, the capital was already in turmoil (Reyntjens, Vandeginste and Verpoorten 2016).

Understanding Burundi’s geography of violence On 25 April 2015, the CNDD-FDD party congress proclaimed the president’s candidacy for the presidency at the general elections scheduled for May to August 2015. The following day, residents from several neighbourhoods of the capital initiated peaceful demonstrations to protest against Nkurunziza’s candidacy. The first casualty occurred on the very first day of the protests. Despite the initially peaceful nature of the demonstrations, the police forces responded brutally, blocking the protestors’ path towards Place de l’Indépendence in the city centre (see Figure 3) and employing tear gas, batons and rubber bullets to keep them back. In some neighbourhoods, the police were already using live bullets at this early stage of the protests. The regime thus used disproportionate repression to discourage further demonstrations. When protests persisted, the authorities turned to unrestrained violence with the aim of spreading fear before resorting to a campaign of terror in the districts involved in early May, mobilising mainly the Imbonerakure and special units of the police and the national intelligence service. This repression was organised through a parallel chain of command within the police forces and, to a lesser extent, in the army, based on past allegiances, the infiltration of several police units by the Imbonerakure and the use of ethnic loyalty as a political strategy. In this regard, the ethnic discourse of some authorities, who called for the annihilation of the protesting neighbourhoods in exchange for material gains, was deeply worrying to the international community (Ba and Muhorakeye 2015). In the space of a few months, peaceful protests had turned into an armed insurrection, and, to stifle any further opposition, the authorities deployed every means possible. These methods included mass arrests, public beat- ings, live ammunition aimed at unarmed demonstrators or fired blindly into protesting neighbourhoods, torture, kidnappings, often followed by extrajudicial executions with the bodies subsequently found in the main opposition strongholds, and rape committed in households in these same neighbourhoods (UNCAT 2016). This diverse toolbox of brutality, in other words, amounted to a deliberate strategy to create fear and submission, the main targets of which were protestors in the neighbourhoods of Musaga, Nyakabiga, Jabe, Mutakura, Cibitoke and Ngagara, and, to a lesser extent, Kanyosha and Bwiza (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the ruling party also used the unfolding violence to settle scores within its own ranks, blaming the opposition parties for the killings. For example, after a police commissioner in Kamenge was killed in early May, the police spokesperson – once he had deserted and gone into exile – revealed that the assassination had been carried out on

96 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen The initial violence initial The violence Ex-combatants would help in the in the help would Ex-combatants 7 97 2016). In a communiqué published in mid-January 2016, the United the United 2016, in mid-January published a communiqué In 2016). Overall, the excessive use of force by police and the Imbonerakure, most most the Imbonerakure, police and by force use of Overall, the excessive was thus mainly enacted by the police forces and the Imbonerakure youth mili - youth the Imbonerakure and the police forces enacted by mainly thus was armed an into escalated aggression this one-sided that later only was tias. It in several neighbourhoods security and forces between protestors confrontation this followed that observed the violence general, in the months In the capital. of the in which demonstrations neighbourhoods to limited mainly was escalation confrontations violent The taken place. term had third the president’s against Why the capital was the primary site of violence the primary the capital was Why Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern that ‘[a] that concern expressed Rights Human for Commissioner High Nations the crisis, of ethnic dimension the increasing ll the alarmsignals, including 2016). (OHCHR red’ flashing are regime the that indication clear a was demonstrators, unarmed against often a response, all In costs. at in power president trywould the outgoing keep to parties, facilitated opposition the major within factions of gradual militarisation armed within the desertersand from fighters rebel former of the presence by neighbourhoods of the youth The turn. take a violent to led the protests forces, claiming by arms of use the justified intense most were in which confrontations the murderous their from local areas theneed protect to and self-defence who the protestors Among the Imbonerakure. the police and of incursions were the demonstrations certain during neighbourhoods support to came in in the nocturnal clashes role active an who played FNL ex-combatants, youths other in training assisted and several the involved neighbourhoods of weapons. in the use of areas in the same the orders of his superiors. Such targeted assassinations may account for for account may assassinations targeted Such superiors. his of the orders Kamenge, of in the neighbourhoods violence of instances sporadic the more to lines of front the shifting occasional with together Buterere and Kinama its peak reached violence The these areas. of the periphery the interior to or down locked effectively the army when the police and 11 December 2015, on surrounded districts were All the protesting area. metropolitan the entire forces armed the various of elements besieged by them were of some and arrests mass killings and in mass who engaged the Imbonerakure, by assisted (Le worst the feared now community international The 2015). (Malagardis Monde nightly defence of these neighbourhoods, setting up rotas for patrols and and patrols for rotas these up setting neighbourhoods, of defence nightly often in theseneighbourhoods armed groups The the police. even ambushing armed an organise to who came the area, outside from people of consisted role active an also played the political opposition from struggle. actors Some and logistics, weapons supplying the insurrection, armed of in the organisation seemed insurrection the armed 2016, early In the protestors. to ammunition the regime, of force the overwhelming by weakened been considerably have to destination. unknown an for left and up packed essentially and affected certain areas adjacent to these neighbourhoods, including Rohero and Bwiza, mainly because of the mobility of some protestors. During this time, the interior of the country was less affected. The rural districts of Mukike, Mugon- gomanga (both in Bujumbura Rural province), Rusaka (Mwaro province) and Mugamba (Bururi province) were the main areas affected by violence (see Figure 1), although not with the same intensity as in the capital. This section analyses the particular geography of violence in the months following the initial protests against Nkurunziza’s third term. Despite the presence of some pockets of protest in certain parts of the Bujumbura Rural province, the capital was the undisputed centre of the demonstrations and, consequently, of the violence that accompanied them. In fact, like most other African capitals, Bujumbura is the main location in which protest against those in power emerges (Raleigh 2015). All available studies on the demands and concerns of the population as reflected in opinion surveys reflect a marked discrepancy in general perceptions between rural and urban areas (Ministry of the Presidency 2008; Afrobarometer 2012; 2014; CENAP 2014). Bujumbura shows greater dissatisfaction on issues related to governance, justice, security and the performance of government authorities and services. As early as May 2008, the diagnostic survey on governance in Burundi (Ministry of the Presidency 2008) revealed very different expectations among the respondent groups. When asked what they perceived to be their main concerns, the surveyed households, predominantly located in rural areas, cited in ascending order of priority increasing unemployment, poverty and access to land, whereas civil servants, entrepreneurs and NGOs, mainly based in the capital, identified insecurity/crime, impunity and corruption. At the end of 2012, an Afrobarometer survey, particularly on attitudes towards democracy, highlighted a marked contrast between the city and the countryside regarding trust in institutions, with urban communities expressing a 20 per cent lower level of satisfaction than people in the countryside. A survey conducted by the same organisation in 2014 (Afrobarometer 2014) showed the same contrasts, notably on the question of the limitation of presidential terms, in answer to which city residents expressed a markedly more pronounced opposition to a third term (82 per cent against in the urban areas compared with 59 per cent in the rural areas). The same survey highlighted city dwellers’ much more critical opinions on the level of corruption and the will to combat it. In the same year, an opinion poll conducted by the Conflict Alert and Prevention Centre (CENAP) on perceptions of security needs led to contrasting results on the question of the performance of the Burundi police and of the national intelligence service depending on the respondents’ location, the city being once again much less lenient than the countryside (CENAP 2014). Clearly, the view of city dwellers is generally much more unfavourable towards issues relating to governance. This is due to different factors. First, the

98 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen 8 These 9 (literally ‘Citizen Broom’) movement movement Broom’) ‘Citizen (literally 99 In fact, young people have woken up because democracy up be started to has woken have people fact, young In civil societies, the media, is there are there because there practised a little, Moreover, independent media – radios in particular – are popular in in popular media – radios in particular independent – are Moreover, level of education of the urban population is significantly higher than in higher rural than significantly is population the urban of education of level academic infrastructure is and educational of amount large a Indeed, areas. has Bujumbura outside education to access whereas in the capital, concentrated example, decades. For recent in improvements despite been problematic always the thirty-three of 75 than accredited per cent more to host is Bujumbura Education (Ministry in Burundi Higher of higher institutes and universities of civil the partservice, the greater Secondly, 2015). Scientific Research and the services NGOs, businesses, and sector, the private enterprises, state-owned a result, As the in capital. concentrated are all the embassies and UN system Put based in Bujumbura. are people highly educated of majority the vast these demographics and knowledge, to access concentrates the capital simply, corrupt its for condemned is that be a government to critical of likely more are addition, In performance. poor economic its and authoritarianism its practices, political parties well as including makers, opinion all major of thecentre as in these actors for activity of also is the centre the capital civil society, as more is thus urban population The outreach. and involvement public of terms critical other political leaders and of the discourses access to able immediately this particular to appeal to their messages adapt to tend who in turn voices, opposition of the political success relative The the population. of segment casea is point. in (MSD) Development and Solidarity for partyMovement factors were emphasised by a young protestor interviewed by Radio France Radio interviewed by France protestor a young by emphasised were factors (RFI): Internationale Bujumbura and have contributed to an increased awareness of civic rights rights civic of awareness increased an to contributed have and Bujumbura the critical look at take a more to populations urban encouraged have and economic and abuses rights human the view in numerous of authorities public and the internet to access Increased the press. by reported embezzlement the and thecapital in channels television international of the availability have in the elsewhere world developments of images to access consequent news of particular, In urbanites. many of the outlook to also contributed a belief inspired the continent on elsewhere autocracies against revolts popular could Burundi of in the streets the mobilisation that youths urban among civil society that clear is it example, For (RFI 2015). changes lead similar to the Balai as such Citoyenmovements over blew that protest of on winds the influence some had Faso in Burkina in civil societyof organisations presence the strong Similarly, Bujumbura. human and governance of in the fields those working – namely, the capital particularly through culture, and awareness this civic – alsorights encouraged liberties. and rights of promotion and the protection for campaigns is all this that raises young people’s awareness. They try to show them how they can defend their rights peacefully. That’s what is happening right here. (RFI 2015)

For all these reasons, Bujumbura had been the main stronghold of the opposition for several years prior to the 2015 elections, as evidenced by the results obtained by the opposition in the capital during the 2010 municipal elections (see Figure 4). Although the CNDD-FDD won the elections with 28 per cent of the votes, this victory was primarily the result of a divided opposition, with six opposition parties (if UPRONA is included, as its electoral base is opposed to the ruling party) sharing more than 69 per cent of the vote. Compared with the national results, in which the CNDD-FDD carried 64 per cent of the vote (see Figure 2), Bujumbura was clearly far less favourable to the ruling party. Following the 2010 elections, the attitude of the authorities towards the population of the capital became markedly apprehensive. Many young people in Bujumbura were increasingly appalled by the personalisation of power and the cases of embezzlement and misappropriation by a small group at the head of government, as reported by the media, in an environment characterised by widespread corruption, clientelism and nepotism.10 Moreover, favouritism shown towards members of the CNDD-FDD for access to employment and even certain basic services, together with discrimination against members and alleged supporters of the opposition, created a sense of exclusion felt by the majority of young people in the capital. In this regard, the measures taken in Bujumbura by the National Commission on Land and Other Assets (CNTB), an institution perceived as being controlled by the ruling party, to systematically dispossess owners of houses whose ownership was claimed by former refugees, regardless of how that ownership was acquired, also contributed to turning a large part of the youth in the neighbourhoods affected by these measures against the government.11 Notably, the case of Justin Nyakabeto and his family, who were evicted from their house in Ngagara, lead to the arrest and conviction of ten youths who were part of the group of protestors who rallied to oppose these measures (Reyntjens, Vandeginste and Verpoorten 2015). The government’s neopatrimonial practices and the feelings of exclusion and marginalisation among the young people from the protesting neighbourhoods coupled with their increased civic awareness and, in many cases, their politicisation were decisive factors in the capital’s strong mobilisation against the president’s third term, which was seen as tantamount to keeping the CNDD-FDD in power. By comparing Figures 3 and 4, one can see that the neighbourhoods in which demonstrations were mobilised during the 2015 protests – most importantly Cibitoke (which included Mutakura), Musaga, Ngagara and Nyakabiga – voted for the opposition by a very large majority in 2010. The MSD opposition party,

100 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen

- - Poverty was undoubtedly undoubtedly was Poverty 12 101 Not only were these populations poor, but the young people people the young but poor, these populations were only Not 13 Unemployment, underemployment and, above all, the lack of prospects for for prospects all, of the lack above and, underemployment Unemployment, The identity factor also played a role in the protests. The decisions of The decisions protests. in the role a played also factor identity The neighbourhoods were Bujumbura in violence and protest of centres main The ment rate in urban areas at 14.7 per cent (ISTEEBU 2015). The same survey The same 2015). (ISTEEBU 14.7 per cent at areas urban in rate ment declared who were respondents of per 30.1 cent the in city, that, highlighted the northern neigh from people Young in fact underemployed. were active students mostly a focus interviewed group, during Bujumbura bourhoods of in their people young most that said employment, of in search youths and unemployment, and Poverty unemployed. were neighbourhoods respective in these neighbourhoods often lacked employment opportunities. employment lacked thesein often neighbourhoods the protesting of the people for frustration of sources major were people young precarious have they to tended employed, they were When neighbourhoods. which they for and qualification of their level to correspond did not jobs that their basic needs. A survey covered hardly that wages inadequate received the unemploy in 2013–14 put conditions living households’ on conducted 2010). The dominance of the opposition parties, and particularly the MSD, and particularly parties,MSD, the opposition of the dominance The 2010). hence and protests of 2015 the mapping the influenced greatly in these areas violence. of theirgeography Tutsi the expense of at refugees Hutu former favoured the CNTB essentially Tutsi, many among of victimisation a in sense This resulted families. policy they were that felt already ethnic group the minority where in a context the of the easing despite Indeed, 2012). (Afrobarometer against discriminated community the Tutsi of the concerns society, ethnic in Burundian divide above. mentioned the reasons term for second Nkurunziza’s during increased was youth Tutsi of in the mobilisation element important another addition, In challenge to officials CNDD-FDD of some willingness expressed the often ethnic quotas, including Agreement, the Arusha of the achievements of some the security collective the of of guarantee a been as which had perceived in the defence the equal representation to the very regard at with least Tutsi, certain leaders radical of discourse the increasingly Finally, police forces. and threatening the Imbonerakure’s in the and ruling the ethnic party issue on were demonstrations during minority the Tutsi against slogans indirect) (albeit of urbanites Tutsi among awareness a rising to contributed that also factors in power. Nkurunziza remained they if President face could that the dangers Nyakabiga, Musaga, incomes. low with people young of population a large with civil servantsto and all home were Jabe and Ngagara Mutakura, Cibitoke, sectors. informal and the private from workers in fact, party the leading was in all these (Le neighbourhoods Visionnaire another factor behind the mobilisation, since the living conditions of people people of conditions the living since behind the mobilisation, factor another decade the CNDD-FDD’s during improved in these not had neighbourhoods in these the inhabitants of most for deteriorated in power; in fact, conditions neighbourhoods. Figure 3: Distribution of violent incidents within Bujumbura city, April–November 2015 Map by Henrik Alfredsson, based on data provided by ACLED. Figure 4: Distribution of votes in 2010 municipal elections, Bujumbura city. Map by Henrik Alfredsson, based on results announced by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). therefore, were decisive factors in the protests (see also Donovan-Smith and Ndayisaba 2015; Morice 2015). To all the aforementioned motivating factors must be added the gains obtained or sought by a segment of the protestors. The mobilisation against Nkurunziza’s third term was financially supported by many Burundians from the interior and the diaspora. Funds collected were allocated at the discre- tion of the donors to civil society organisations involved in the protests or to officials of opposition parties who themselves distributed these funds to the organisers of the demonstrations in the neighbourhoods concerned.14 Obviously, these funds and the various items that were bought and collected (drinks, food, mobile charge cards, etc.) were a motivation for some, but their unfair distribution or mismanagement led to tensions among protestors in certain neighbourhoods.15

Why some neighbourhoods of Bujumbura were left untouched by violence As already stated, not all neighbourhoods of Bujumbura were involved in or affected by the protests. For example, Kamenge and Kinama, two very poor, predominantly Hutu, neighbourhoods in the northern part of the city, were spared major incidents during the protests. The same was true of the neighbourhoods of Rohero and Gihosha, and, to a lesser extent, Kanyosha. This particular geography of violence may be understood in relation to a series of demographic observations. Firstly, the mapping of the results of the 2010 elections provides a partial explanation for this distribution (see Figure 4). As can be seen, the neighbourhoods of Kamenge and Gihosha, and, to a lesser extent, Bwiza, voted in high numbers for the CNDD-FDD in the 2010 elections; this may be a primary reason for the relative calm in these areas during the protests in 2015. Secondly, the menacing Imbonerakure presence in Kamenge, Kinama, Kanyosha and Buterere – which are all neighbourhoods with the same social and ethnic configuration, and predominantly supporters of Agathon Rwasa’s FNL – dissuaded potential dissidents from mobilising, or at least from organising protests within those particular areas. Thirdly, Gihosha and Rohero are both principally upper-middle-class neighbourhoods, and, as already stated, those involved in direct confrontations with the security forces tended to be from a less privileged socio-economic background. Fourthly, the Rohero neighbourhood has a generally ageing population, and relatively few young adult residents, which may account for the lack of mobilisation in that area. Finally, Kamenge is the neighbourhood where the armed conflict began in 1993–94 and is therefore considered to be the historical stronghold of the CNDD-FDD insurrection. Also, many members of the defence and police forces from the former insurrection live there. These historical ties may explain the reluctance of Kamenge residents to mobilise against the regime.

104 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen - - - 105 Despite the official rhetoric insisting that protests and violence were were and violence protests that insisting rhetoric the official Despite These micro-dynamics of popular mobilisation may account for a neighbour a for account may mobilisation of popular These micro-dynamics In addition to these dissuasive factors, the central location of the neighbour of location the central factors, these to dissuasive addition In Why violence in the provinces was limited to specific districts districts limited to specific was violence in the provinces Why was regions interior in Burundi’s the crisis, the the situation beginning of From as observers To capital inthe capital. intheassess than to difficult more much this the country, outside from events of the unfolding those to as following well including Bujumbura, the outside media restricted access to due primarily was access the limited and radio stations, main the country’s of down the shutting These organisations. rights human international and NGOs for the interior to hinder to the authorities by deliberately been reinforced seem have to measures limit to in order the interior, and in the capital between actors communications this In the country. parts of other to movement the protest of the expansion the systematic on 2016 27 July of release press Watch’s Rights Human regard, the by committed in the interior, alleged opponents of relatives sexual of abuse external been to unknown previously had that revealed a reality Imbonerakure, 2016). Watch Rights observers(Human confined to a few Tutsi neighbourhoods in Bujumbura, there were opposition opposition were there Bujumbura, neighbourhoods in Tutsi few to a confined suppressed. quickly these were but the provinces, of in most mobilisations hood of Rohero, which includes most of the city centre, may have provided provided have may centre, the city of most which includes hood Rohero, of to seem protestors be to The focused there. protests for incentive a major in part to visibility, achieving of the importance of aware been acutely have Senegal and in recent Faso in Burkina the successful mobilisations emulate in their mobilising to limited not obviously were protestors Furthermore, years. also were residents Kinama that appears it example, For neighbourhoods. own support to went Kanyosha while from people Cibitoke, and in Mutakura active late movement the protest joined Buterere Musaga. of area the neighbouring mobility This Ngagara. as such neighbourhoods protesting other supported or Bujumbura’s served essentially neighbourhoods across reinforce to protestors of neighbour on focused Security their operations violence. forces of geography from protestors in response, and, be the regime, to hoods critical of known confrontation. of rallied these to zones areas other those to similar in the patterns voting which displayed hood Buyenzi, as such of violence the large-scale being spared in the city, confrontation of centres parts in other initially mobilised have may activist residents Its areas. other a to in the protests involvement direct more thearea’s postponing the city, of militarised more a into transitioning when was already the conflict stage later the from predominantly is population Buyenzi’s addition, In confrontation. in role confrontational taken a less has which historically minority, Muslim of one was Buyenzi in factthe is This that evident authority. state to relation thein 1990s. violence interethnic spared neighbourhoods the few Ultimately, only a few rural municipalities, mainly located in the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Bururi and Mwaro, could maintain the demonstrations and expose themselves to the violence of the police and the Imbonerakure. Apart from Bujumbura City, protests were observed in the following provinces: Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Cankuzo, Cibitoke, Gitega, Kirundo, Makamba, Muramvya, Muyinga, Mwaro, Ngozi, Rumonge and Rutana. Only the provinces of Bubanza, Karuzi, Kayanza16 and Ruyigi were left untouched. In the provinces listed, reports mainly located protests in the provincial centres, although rural municipalities were affected in several provinces (most notably Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, Gitega, Muramvya, Mwaro, Ngozi and Rumonge). The protests in the provinces primarily occurred in rural municipalities where the opposition had achieved significant results in the 2010 municipal elections. In these districts, the MSD tended to be the largest party, with UPRONA and the FNL recording significant results as well. The CNDD-FDD generally performed poorly in these particular districts. Furthermore, the districts where protests were mobilised often had a relatively low presence of Imbonerakure militia. The violence outside the capital was therefore mainly limited to the provinces of Bururi, Bujumbura Rural and Mwaro, and political allegiance seems to have been one of the determining factors in this geography of violence. In its attempts to deliberately ethnicise the crisis, the government has often argued that, even in rural areas, only the municipalities with a Tutsi majority were affected by the protests. This argument is partially true in that several of the protesting rural municipalities do have a large Tutsi population. The protesters in Bururi, Bujumbura Rural and Mwaro, often young people with a relatively high level of education, were undoubtedly sympathetic to the more targeted calls for action from civil society organisations: for instance, for the liberation of imprisoned human rights activists, against high prices, and against corruption. One would expect that this tendency may have been nourished by the fears aroused by the ethnic rhetoric of a government caught up in the same radical ethnic ideology that had characterised the CNDD- FDD as a military movement (Nindorera 2012). To this must be added the frustration felt in some provinces marginalised by the government because of their presumed association with the Tutsi elites of the past, among these primarily the province of Bururi, which had been the heart of power under the Tutsi military regimes. Moreover, several of the most active personalities in the ‘Stop the Third Term’ campaign came from some of these municipalities and wielded greater influence there because of their social networks (family, neighbourhood, etc.). Finally, it appears that one or more of the armed groups that mobilised when the opposition became more militarised retreated to these particular provinces, or at least used them as a support base. This was undoubtedly in line with the dual strategy of choosing a field of operation, primarily in certain rural municipalities of Bururi and Bujumbura Rural, that

106 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen

17 107 although it can accommodate less than a third of this this of a third than less accommodate can it although 18 19 The protests also extended to rural municipalities with a large Hutu majority majority Hutu a large with municipalities to alsorural extended protests The This chapter has analysed the historical and socio-political dynamics that and socio-politicalthat dynamics analysed historical has the chapter This on impact major a have not did in 2015 elections to linked the violence The A final factor related to the protests in the provinces was the closure of of closure was the provinces in the protests to the related A final factor Conclusion Conclusion the police had difficulty accessing because of its steep terrain combined with with combined terrain steep its of the difficulty police accessing had because environment. favourable politically a of thepresence the capital of south Nyabiraba, and Rural Kanyosha as the such FNL, to loyal the Finally, time. some been had for men armed reported of the presence where in the campaign involved civil society various organisations of local branches thein provinces. protests mobilising in active were term the third against informed the uneven distribution of violence in Burundi’s 2015 elections. elections. 2015 in Burundi’s violence of distribution the uneven informed actors main of the incentives the explored has chapter prism, the this Through candidacy for Nkurunziza’s Pierre against mobilisation thein popular involved these against behind reprisals the brutal the motivations as well term, as a third youth the links between the Imbonerakure considered have We protests. public which were the ruling CNDD-FDD, and police forces, the national movement, chapter The peaceful initially were protests. what to response the state to central theNkurunziza regime by deployed was violence state that suggests thereby opponents. silenceits and power consolidate to strategy deliberate a part as of the country of in the the localities people in the interior of conditions the living not was their repression as time, time to from protest of the wave who joined the Musaga, mainly was It City. in Bujumbura as constant as or vigorous as paid that neighbourhoods Ngagara and Mutakura Cibitoke, Nyakabiga, Jabe, victims. The of number the greatest recorded that the crisis and for a price Burundi of in the prisons been incarcerated who have people of thousands saw areas These these locations. from people young mostly then are since number on its campuses; the great majority of students have to find their find their to have students of majority the great campuses; its on number such neighbourhoodsmodest reside in they often and accommodation, own first the During by. close being of advantage the has which Nyakabiga, as for their support show to went students many the demonstrations, of days thestudent to end an put To Nyakabiga. including in areas the protestors expelled and the closed the university immediately the authorities protests, in the their homes to return them to forcing thus the campus, from students demonstrations the country, of several localities In in the interior provinces. who been had expelled fuelled the students in part by subsequently were with frustrated became idle and a result, as who, and their university from thegovernment. the University of Burundi. Most of the university’s faculties and campuses campuses faculties and the university’s of Most Burundi. of the University more has university The in the capital. area the Nyakabiga near located are students, 13,000 than the departure into exile of many young people and were virtually emptied of families, who preferred to settle in districts that were less exposed to police repression or to flee to the interior of the country, or to either Rwanda or Tanzania, which have received up to 85,000 and 250,000 Burundian refugees respectively (UNHCR 2017). The crisis also had an impact on the economic activity of these neighbourhoods, as many businesses had to close. Residents of the protesting neighbourhoods first experienced police violence coupled with deprivation and harassment inflicted upon them by young demonstrators, as, for example, people were prohibited from going to work or pressured to take part in compulsory nocturnal security rounds. They subsequently experienced arbitrary arrests, kidnappings and ill-treatment by the police and the Imbonerakure before being subjected to killings and summary executions, which sometimes targeted entire families (Deutsche Welle 2015); the obvious aim of this was to create a climate of terror in these particular neighbourhoods. Beyond the visible effects of the crisis on these localities, other equally serious consequences have been less perceptible. These areas have lived – and, for some, continue to live – in a climate of fear and terror, with the police still making regular arrests. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the psychological consequences of the suffering endured by these populations. The protests and the violent response from the Burundian security forces were mainly fuelled by a combination of political, identity, socio-economic and socio-demographic factors. Bujumbura is the main stronghold of the opposition because it concentrates the country’s intellectual elite, reluctant to adapt to an authoritarian power characterised by poor governance and poor economic performance. It is also a locus for political opposition because of its large population of young people, most of whom are unemployed or underemployed and hence have uncertain prospects for the future. Living under precarious living conditions with many frustrations, these young people were more sympathetic to the mobilisation speeches of the campaign against the president’s third term. To some extent, these urban youths were exploited by some of the political formations of the opposition and by part of civil society involved in the ‘Stop the Third Term’ campaign in their efforts to prevent President Nkurunziza’s candidacy. These protests, perceived by the authorities as being essentially a Tutsi uprising with ulterior motives, resulted in the violent retaliation of the defence and police forces, which subsequently led to the emergence of an armed insurrection. The causes of the election-related violence in Burundi in 2015 are characteristic of the crises affecting other African countries confronted with electoral processes and where the demands of a large part of the population contrast with the policies of governments obsessed with their own political survival and that resort to force and manipulation to maintain their positions (Höglund 2009). Unfortunately, the impotence and inability of African and international

108 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen - - - Focus group with youths from from youths with group Focus The 2014 Afrobarometer survey 2014Afrobarometer The Ibid. A majority of four-fifths of the votes votes ofthe four-fifths of A majority Focus group with youths from from youths with group Focus Interview with the political scientist the political with Interview scientist Focus group with youths from from youths with group Focus ‘Militia units’ is the categorisation the categorisation is units’ ‘Militia

10 11 12 9 8 7 6 5 neighbourhoods in the north of in the neighbourhoods north of 2015. May Bujumbura, neighbourhoods in the north of in the neighbourhoods north of 2015. May Bujumbura, reveals that in the urban populations populations in the urban that reveals Jean-Salathiel Muntunutwiwe, professor professor Muntunutwiwe, Jean-Salathiel November Burundi, of the University at 2015. neighbourhoods in the north of in theneighbourhoods north of 2015. June Bujumbura, is required to approve an amendment to to amendment an approve to required is the constitution. accorded to the armed Imbonerakure the Imbonerakure armed to accorded (OHCHR Nations the United by groups 2015). 109 ’ (literally ‘those who who ‘those ’ (literally They received 57 per cent of the of the received They57 per cent The agreement is available at https:// at available is agreement The The 2005 constitution is available available is constitution 2005 The ‘Imbonerakure

4 3 Inspired by the overall theme of this volume, it will be important to analyse analyse to will beit important this volume, of theme theoverall by Inspired 1 2 votes in the municipal elections that that elections in the municipal votes the Senate of thecomposition determine in the the votes of 58 per cent and elections. legislative at www.assemblee.bi/Constitution-de-la- at Republique-du. peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/arusha- peace-and-reconciliation-agreement- burundi. Notes tion to prevent and/or stem crises and electoral violence, and without better better without and violence, electoral crises stem and and/or prevent to tion African regional of initiatives and in the actions coherence and coordination actors. international thevarious and organisations lead, this in Burundi; could violence electoral further of the micro-politics local of the grievances impacts (cf. of understandings better to example, for of workings the inner of and violence, of the geography on 2003) Kalyvas theNkurun within patronage and power of hierarchies and the networks as the seems particularly urgent research further This callfor ziza regime. to continue in Burundi peace political stability and sustainable for prospects violence post-electoral from the transition In writing. of the time at deteriorate of geography Burundi’s underlying the factors authoritarianism, outright to thein ‘joint component be to central a prove may here considered violence 476; Söderberg 2003: cf. (Kalyvas political violence continued of production’ case, elec in the Burundian Tragically, in this volume). Introduction Kovacs, (2014) Bøås as Utas and indeed thenew become battlegrounds, have tions sense. acute most a in and phrased it, have organisations to manage these conflicts tend to perpetuate and multiply these multiply and to perpetuate tend these conflicts manage to organisations democracyof Africa in for tested will crises. consolidation The be severely will determina and sustained a more of the in absence come time to a long see far’ in Kirundi) is the official name name the official is in Kirundi) see far’ youth party’s the ruling CNDD-FDD of civilian this broad of Segments wing. been military given have organisation In militias. as mobilised and training use the term primarily we this text, signify to the youth ‘Imbonerakure’ the during and to prior active militias their during and 2015 in April protests aftermath. surveyed, 76 per cent of respondents saw Arnould, V., A. Tor and A. Vervaeke the economic situation of the country (2016) ‘Africa Uprising? The Protests, as ‘bad’ and 47 per cent as ‘very bad’; 57 the Drivers, and the Outcomes’. Brief per cent of respondents described their 33. Paris: European Union Institute for living conditions as ‘bad’ compared with Security Studies (EUISS). Available at 11 per cent ‘good’, while 29 per cent did www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/ not want to express their opinion on this article/africa-uprising-theprotests-the- issue (Afrobarometer 2014). drivers-the-outcomes/. 13 Of the urban population questioned Ba, M. and N. Muhorakeye (2015) in the 2014 Afrobarometer survey, 72 ‘Burundi: Appels à la haine et per cent were of the opinion that their ultimatum à hauts risque’, Jeune living conditions were worse than in the Afrique, 6 November. Available at previous year (Afrobarometer 2014). www.jeuneafrique.com/277636/ 14 Interviews with civil society leaders politique/burundi-appels-a-la-haine- in Bujumbura, May–November 2015. et-ultimatum-a-hauts-risques/. 15 Focus group with youths from Ben Hammouda, H. (1995) Burundi: neighbourhoods in the north of Histoire économique et politique d’un Bujumbura, May 2015. conflit. Paris: Éditions l’Harmattan. 16 At the beginning of July 2015, Bensimon, C. (2015) ‘Crainte de violences Kayanza experienced brief clashes au Burundi après le discours du between an armed group, which was président’, Le Monde Afrique, 6 quickly neutralised, and the police. November. Available at www.lemonde. 17 Interviews with civil society leaders fr/afrique/article/2015/11/06/crainte- in Bujumbura, May–November 2015. de-violences-au-burundi-apres-le- 18 The total of 13,000 students is discours-du-president_4804870_3212. stated on the University of Burundi html. website (www.ub.edu.bi/). Bøås, M. and M. Utas (2014) ‘The 19 Focus group with youths from Political Landscape of Postwar Liberia: neighbourhoods in the north of Reflections on National Reconciliation Bujumbura, May 2015. and Elections’, Africa Today 60 (4): 47–65. References Branch, A. and Z. Mampilly (2015) Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Afrobarometer (2012) ‘Survey Overview: Change. London: Zed Books. The Quality of Democracy and Burihabwa, N. Z. (2017) ‘Continuity and Governance in Burundi’. Round 5. Contingency: The CNDD-FDD and its Compiled by Groupe de recherche Transformation from Rebel Movement et d’appui au développement des to Governing Political Party in initiatives démocratiques (GRADIS) Burundi’. PhD thesis, University of and the Institute for Development Antwerp. Studies (IDS), University of Nairobi. CENAP (2014) ‘Study on Security Needs Available at http://afrobarometer. in Burundi. 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112 4 | Nindorera and Bjarnesen (UNDP) and Burundian Ministry of Ministry Burundian of and (UNDP) Economic of Planning and Finance Available (MFPDE). Development www.bi.undp.org/content/dam/ at burundi/docs/publications/Povred/ NHDR_2013_Burundi_Web.pdf. January– Appeal Supplementary Geneva: United December 2017’. for Commissioner High Nations www. at Available Refugees (UNHCR). unhcr.org/59244aa77.pdf. UNHCR (2017) ‘Burundi Situation 2017. 2017. Situation ‘Burundi (2017) UNHCR 113 Add.1. New York NY: United Nations Nations United NY: York New Add.1. (UNCAT). Torture against Committee http://tbinternet.ohchr. at Available org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/ Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT/C/ BDI/CO/2/Add.1&Lang=Fr. au 2013 humain développement le économique, Burundi: ‘Croissance promotion des innovations et emploi United . Bujumbura: jeunes’ des Programme Development Nations UNDP and MFPDE (2014) Rapport MFPDE and UNDP sur 5 |Competition, uncertainty and violence in Sierra Leone’s swing district

Ibrahim Bangura and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs

Introduction At the end of December 2015, a parliamentary by-election was held in one of the eight constituencies in the eastern district of Kono in Sierra Leone. Two candidates from the dominant political parties in the country – the incumbent All People’s Congress (APC) and the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) – campaigned for the seat. During the final campaign days, both parties sent well-known national political figures from the capital Freetown to the constituency to demonstrate support for their local party candidate. In both cases, their convoys were accompanied by a large number of supporters. The process soon turned violent, with clashes between stone-throwing youth. The ensuing riot – in which a vehicle belonging to a deputy minister was burnt out and several people sent to hospital – prompted President Ernest Bai Koroma to issue a decree for the deployment of the national army to assist the police in quelling the violence (Sierra Leone Telegraph 2015; Patriotic Vanguard 2015). The incident is not unusual. Since the beginning of party politics in Sierra Leone in the early 1950s, elections in Kono have seen higher levels of electoral violence than most other districts in the country.1 Such violence has ranged from attacks on both political candidates and voters to the destruction of property including houses, vehicles and offices of rival parties and their representatives, and the disruption of campaign rallies and meetings. Why is it that a local parliamentary by-election of seemingly limited political value far away from the capital would warrant the presence of national politicians and generate such tension, violence and destruction? The purpose of this chapter is to address this puzzle. More precisely, we ask the following research question: why are elections in Kono District more likely to be accompanied by election-related violence compared with other areas in the country? We argue that the answer is to be found in the district’s unique role as an electoral swing district. In a country strongly governed by an overlapping ethnic and regional divide that splits the country into two almost equally sized voting strongholds, Kono is both ethnically diversified and cosmopolitan in character. Its electorate may swing in either direction, thereby potentially determining

114 5 | Bangura and Kovacs - 115 This chapter primarily draws on findings from interviews and focus group interviews group focusand from on findings draws primarily chapter This We argue that the key explanation for why we see electoral violence in in see we violence electoral why for the explanation key that argue We Political competition, swing areas and electoral violence and electoral areas swing competition, Political tive, and the various and plentiful manifestations of electoral violence at at violence electoral of manifestations plentiful and the various and tive, dynamics violent consider We detail. described thelocal greater are in level intra- also in between and violence elections but elections, the general around between the linkages understand better to order In party violence. electoral dicuss the local we level, at dynamics violent and competition national-level and chiefs traditional between political elites, relations dependent the mutually remarks concluding some Lastly, gangs. youth particularly organised youth, presented. are the outcome of national elections. This raises the stakes of all elections in of in allelections stakes raises the This elections. national of the outcome and between in elections, local the general by-elections including the area, all a highly theirefforts district political courted parties. by In Kono renders local and politicians both national contests, in electoral hand the upper gain to the purpose both of for strategies coercive or violent of a wide range to resort parties other from of supporters potential preventing and voters mobilising carry to in order However, the competition. of favour in their votes casting need to thepolitical elite theground, on strategies such implement and out local and chiefs – notably local with actors relationships precarious into enter to political connections on dependent are – who in turn gangs local youth this way, In platforms. power their own maintain and resources to access gain dependent mutually of in the collide establishment local and interests national of violence the specificcharacter to contribute together that relationships Kono. in elections around between and December 2015 Freetown and in Kono carried out discussions literature the theoretical of begin discussion a short with We 2016. November particularly in the African violence, electoral and states pertaining swing to overviewSierra in Leone, an dynamics of by political followed is This context. this Against level. the national at violence electoral of trends focuswith on perspec a historical district a swing from analysed as is Kono background, Kono District – particularly during close electoral races – is the perception theperception is – races close electoral District particularly– during Kono of one as Sierra Leone districts the of fourteen among out stands Kono that election results. to districts comes swing when it potential important the most the new to relatively is voters’ ‘swing or areas’ ‘swing of the notion While in defined, rarely albeit to, referred frequently is African it politics, on literature the Due firmly settings. to democratic established more from media reporting often and system, electoral a winner-takes-all two-party system, entrenched are states so-called and battleground voters swing elections, highly competitive national of the outcome determining in role key a play to perceived commonly relatively remains voters’ ‘swing of this, the concept of spite In elections. undeveloped in the scholarly literature, with many different understandings and empirical operationalisations (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013).2 According to Mayer (2007: 359), a swing voter is ‘a voter who could go either way, a voter who is not solidly committed to one candidate or the other’. Their final allegiance is undecided right up until the day of the election. The concept of battleground states, while related, is conceptually different, in that it refers to states that ‘cannot be firmly counted on to support one candidate or the other, those states that are potentially winnable by both major-party candidates’ (ibid. 361). Individual voters in such states may not be potential or actual swing voters, but the outcome of the final vote in the state is contested and relatively few votes in one direction or the other could swing the entire state, following the logic of the majoritarian electoral system. But it could also be that the ‘electoral volatility’ (Lindberg and Morrison 2005) of such states are high, with significant changes in voting patterns across time. In the scholarly debate on African elections, the notion of ‘core’ versus ‘swing’ voters has been largely missing. Instead, the debate has been dominated by two narratives: one that suggests that voting patterns are largely driven by identity markers, notably ethnicity (e.g. Bates 1983; Posner 2005); and one that highlights the importance of clientelism and the distribution of private goods in exchange for votes (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). However, with the strengthening of competitive multiparty elections on the African continent, additional narratives are emerging that suggest a more complex picture of voting patterns that are not readily understood from the perspective of one prism alone. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) suggest that analytical concepts traditionally used to analyse politics in more established democracies may increasingly gain importance in explaining the nuances of politics in Africa’s new democracies, alongside other, more well-established notions of ethnic policies and clientelism. For example, they argue that the two-party alignment in Ghana builds on the existence of a core voting population, defined as those who consistently vote for the same party in each election on the basis of party loyalty determined by regional or ethnic ties and swing voters whose allegiance switches between elections depending on government performance and political issues (Lindberg and Morrison 2005). This is echoed in the work of Whitfield (2009), who argues that in close electoral races in Ghana, the outcome of elections is likely to be determined by voting in critical swing regions. Importantly, however, increasingly competitive party politics does not appear to have undermined traditional patronage politics. In these hotly contested areas, the practices of clientelism become even more intensified and widespread. ‘When a small number of swing voters can shift the plurality one way or the other, the value of each potential swing voter increases, thus creating incentives for candidates to use all available means in their campaigns,’ Lindberg and Morrison argue

116 5 | Bangura and Kovacs - - 117 This reasoning is supported by previous works on electoral violence, where where electoral violence, on works previous by supported is reasoning This political close of situations in that propose we these Basedinsights, on Since the start of party politics, elections in Sierra Leone have been been have in Sierra Leone party elections the politics, start of Since Elections and violence in Sierra Leone Leone Elections and violence in Sierra ances – and the mixture of motives that this entails – help explain the specific explain – help this entails that motives of the mixture – and ances the ground. on emerge that violence of trends and patterns (2008: 120). Collier and Vicente (2011) likewise argue that in situations of close close of in situations that likewise (2011) argue Vicente 120). Collier(2008: and strategy in intimidating a particularly is effective violence competition, electoral weak political parties, method for will and be the preferred voters swing all other that, suggest (2017) et al. Asunka challenger. or whether incumbent either the election, using manipulate to party being equal, things incentives areas. competitive in greater are violence, or fraud (Norris, factor explanatory an important beenas identified closeraces have of study (2004) Wilkinson’s example, For 2015). i Coma Martinez and Frank at competition close electoral of in situations that shows ethnic in India riots polarise to the population incentives have party elites level, the community the purpose for incidents violent of the instigation ethnic through lines along their own within voters swing pivotal from securingof support electoral study Wilkinson’s their ethnic opponents. intimidate to or ethnic community also when but why only not explain to help can it as particularlyis important the subnational on violence electoral of see to incidents likely are we where and likely is areas swing in perceived violence electoral the of risk Hence, level. political real competition is there where in situations beto higher precisely relations. power existing change to possibilities betweengenuine parties and more in new democracies are politicians stake, at is when much competition, the purpose both mobilising of for strategies violent the use to of resort to likely swing Perceived voters. swing potential of number large a intimidating and strategies, such of be to the target areas other than likely more much are areas in ethnic to loyalties, appealing notably mobilisation, of means traditional as as be to regarded unlikely is largesse of the distribution with combination to politicians national also requires strategies in violent Engaging sufficient. perpetrators, local act whoseek local proxy alliances with can as out actors local alli Such 2003). (Kalyvas violence of production’ in the ‘joint resulting dominated by the competition between the SLPP and the APC, and the bulk thebulk the and APC, and between theSLPP the competition by dominated be in the country then can since traced violence the to back inter-party of in particular is, parity – that of strugglepower situations between them. In govern in change a for prospects significant races with in close electoral one-party times of while at increase, to tends violence – inter-party ment competitive the most of Two subsides. violence election-related dominance in out stand 2007, and in the post-independence era, in 1967 elections general In in the country. recorded elections alsoparticular violent being the most for both elections, the incumbent SLPP was challenged by the APC in opposition, and eventually had to concede power. The SLPP was formed in 1951 when party politics was introduced in what was then still a British colony. At that time, the party had its primary electoral base outside the capital of Freetown. As such, the SLPP worked in close cooperation with traditional authorities and chiefs from the outset, and was dependent on their support and mobilisation of the electorate in rural areas (Harris 2011: 41–3). While the first elections in the 1950s and early 1960s were characterised by relative openness and fair electoral play, the first decade of independence saw increasing levels of violence around elections throughout the country as the APC gradually emerged as the key national competitor to the SLPP. The ethno-regional logic was evident from the start, with the SLPP drawing most of its core supporters from the Mende ethnic group in the south-east of the country and the APC being the party of choice among the Temnes and Limbas of the north and the north-west, as well as the Creoles in the western area including Freetown (ibid. 61–4). Following highly contested and violent elections in 1967, the APC won the national elections for the first time, with Siaka Probyn Stevens emerging as prime minister. In 1969, a de facto one-party state was declared. State decay and widespread repression under Stevens, combined with a range of other factors, contributed to the onset of civil war in 1991, and a decade of violent destruction followed. In 1992, a group of lower-ranking front-line soldiers, fed up with the incapacity of the APC to manage the war, overthrew the government and established a military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). After three years in power, the NPRC was forced by growing internal and international pressure to organise elections to re-establish civilian rule, and Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP was elected president. The civil war continued, however, and the next few years would see both another violent coup and several attempts by the armed opposition to enter the capital with force (see, e.g., Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005; Keen 2005). It was not until February 2002 that the war was officially declared ended, with the first post-war elections scheduled for May the same year. The SLPP and President Kabbah were able to benefit greatly from the perception of having brought peace to the country, and won with over 70 per cent of the votes cast. By then, the APC was still suffering from the negative perceptions of its days in power during the one-party regime, but still succeeded in securing 23 per cent of the votes, which was a major step forward compared with the elections of 1996, when the party had gained a mere 5 per cent of the national votes (Kandeh 2003). The stage was therefore set for a re-emergence of the pre-war SLPP–APC competition in the post-war period. In the general elections in 2007, the APC was again able to challenge the SLPP in a closely contested race. The SLPP was perceived by many to have

118 5 | Bangura and Kovacs Meanwhile, Meanwhile, 3 119 The APC spent the subsequent years attempting to take maximum advantage advantage maximum to take attempting years subsequent the spent APC The violence electoral of pattern the general overview this brief demonstrates, As failed to deliver the peace dividends despite significant international support. support. international significant thepeace despite dividends deliver failed to among support Ekuma limited held Berewa The selectedSolomon flag-bearer the long-serving that concerns who expressed electorate, the SLPP parts of large the ground. on realities with touch of out was leadership SLPP the APC had carried out a major reorganisation to distance itself from its its from itself distance to reorganisation major a carriedthe APC had out promise convincingly to able was party leader Bai Koroma and Ernest past, highly was the election campaign level, the national At change. for agenda an the APC of between supporters only not violence widespread with contested, for Movement the People’s also and between the SLPP but the SLPP, and Charles led by the SLPP, party from (PMDC), a splinter Change Democratic in the Berewa. to split The primaries the SLPP lost who bitterly had Margai, instrumental was country the of base south-east the in support SLPP traditional behind thein the APC victory the the PMDC as APC, support of threw its as winner the emerged eventually Koroma in run-off, which in a very violent 2008). (Kandeh state over control its consolidate to attempting by incumbent as role its of including areas, contested electorally into inroads making and institutions number a in 2012 saw elections general The to period the up leading Kono. general post-war The third areas. SLPP in traditional by-elections violent of and a close a reinvigorated race between also elections the saw APC and with Bio, Maada leader Julius junta NPRC former led by SLPP militant more the elections However, running high severalin the country. parts of tensions to due the at least partly was This in 2007. than violent less generally were Koroma the country. throughout implemented securityincreased measures of None secured APC victory term in power. a second an eventually and per1.5 than secure more to able were Bio, from apart candidates, theother of the landscape political the polarisation confirming cast, the votes of cent defeat, electoral concede refused initially to Bio Sierra Leone. in post-war post-election the immediate rigged, and were the elections that suggesting strongholds especially in SLPP violence, electoral of incidents period minor saw the but officially, result the contested SLPP The 2012). (SöderbergKovacs elections, 2012 the After dismissed the petition. Court eventually Supreme internal contentious but subsided, temporarily competition political inter-party struggles power ensued. between the competition the electoral by be can in Sierra Leone explained to yet are we However, level. the national at power for contenders major two why and violence, of the geography of patterns the subnational understand of see to outbreaks others than likely more the country are of areas some violence. election-related The strategic logic of electoral violence in Kono In a country otherwise strongly driven by a relatively predictable ethno- regional logic when it comes to voting patterns, Kono is an exception. Located in the east of the country, the district is situated between the northern APC/ Temne voting block and the southern SLPP/Mende voting block. People belonging to the Kono ethnic group are considered the ‘indigenes’ of the area, but they are not in a majority, and the district is characterised by its cosmopolitan nature with many different ethnic groups. Neither of the two main contenders can safely consider the district to belong to their electoral stronghold. The outcome of the vote in the district is always uncertain, and, over time, it has shifted considerably. In the general elections in 2012, the APC claimed six out of the eight constituencies in Kono, while the SLPP won two. However, only ten years earlier, in the first post-war elections in 2002, the pattern was the direct opposite, with the SLPP winning six constituencies and the APC only two. In the 1996 elections, during the civil war, the SLPP won all eight constituencies. This has given Kono a reputation for being politically unstable and unpredictable.4 Due to the strategic importance of the outcome of the vote in Kono, the district usually attracts a disproportionate amount of attention from national politicians at the time of elections. This is especially the case in close races, when the chance of a change of government is high. In these instances, Kono’s role as a swing district becomes more important, and both the major parties use violence to galvanise voters of their own party and to prevent the other party from campaigning and its supporters from accessing the polls. Both the 1967 and the 2007 general elections are cases in point, and the developments in Kono around these two elections will be discussed in greater detail below. However, a closer look at Kono also reveals a strategic pattern of violence between the general elections, as the political parties attempt to hold ground and make inroads in preparation for the next general elections. By-elections in particular have seen outbreaks of election-related violence. Findings from our case study also point to the strategic role of intra-party violence as various contenders struggle for power and positions.

Swinging the vote and tipping the balance In 1967, the general elections were closely contested on the national level between the ruling SLPP and the APC. One of the cornerstones of the APC’s strategy was to attempt to tip the vote in Kono. Grievances against the ruling SLPP had been mounting among the population in the district since independence due to the party’s involvement in the exploitation of the area’s diamonds in collaborations with some of the local chiefs. The APC was able to capitalise on this local power divide, and built up a local network of its own in the district primarily consisting of wealthy but excluded Lebanese diamond dealers, disenfranchised miners, and 120 5 | Bangura and Kovacs The APC APC The 5 The fact that fact The that 8 Alliances with local power holders local holders with Alliances power 6 121 7 As the quote demonstrates, the APC leadership consciously used Kono used Kono consciously leadership APC the demonstrates, quote the As At this point, the previously SLPP loyal chiefs began to waver in their in their waver began to chiefs loyal SLPP the previously this point, At to APC activities turnedblind eye They a the government. of support who people important alsoturncoats, criticalwere There their land. on the APC presidential of the wife Koroma, APC. Sia to SLPP from went critical was Kono Kono. also from came Bai Koroma, Ernest candidate to say to there went We there. winning on focused we hard and us for Have party. your are We the the people. party APC is ‘Look, everyone, of of war?’the end Ex- since the SLPP the from anything benefited you the and Forces’, called Task them ‘Security We recruited. were combatants look to bandanas and uniforms them black gave We leaders ‘Marshalls’. a cycle of and back us they attacked the SLPP, attacked We fearful. more began. retaliation In 2007, the country again experienced the country again a very race with close electoral 2007, In the locally based opposition party Kono Progressive Movement (KPM). All the All (KPM). the Movement Progressive partythe locally Kono based opposition in constituencies households chieftaincy marginalised from came leaders KPM over the licensed dealers presided Importantly, resources. diamond lacked that The operations. mining illicit protect and defend to set originally up gangs youth the APC, which undertook a for became instrumental these with gangs liaison minute, the last in the districtAt 72–8). 1995: (Reno election campaign violent the district, heading also chief decided support to the paramount Chief Brewah, of APC, the in favour balance national the tipped vote Kono the The APC. return In power. to Siaka Stevens brought and elections the national which won cabinet with rewarded were politicians local Kono support, their electoral for regime. one-party Stevens’ throughout appointments high-profile and positions the APC flag-bearer Koroma was married to a woman from Kono certainly certainly Kono from woman marriedto a was Koroma the APC flag-bearer indigenes to convince the local population to vote for their party. for vote to the local population convince to indigenes significant prospects for regime change as the APC challenged the incumbent incumbent challenged the as APC the change regime for prospects significant come would votes the deciding the APC that to clear was it on, Early SLPP. strategy. campaign their affected directly that something Kono, from were struck and ex-combatants were recruited in order to gain an inroad inroad an gain to order in recruited were ex-combatants and struck were a of the words In voters. potential mobilise to and the communities into member:APC high-ranking leadership assessed – rightly, as it turned out – that they could capitalise on the the on capitalise they could that – out turned it as assessed rightly, – leadership much from benefited not had Kono in the district that perception widespread in the found vocal the were most critics of Some regime. Kabbah the post-war the disarmament, with unhappy were many where community, ex-combatant conflict. the after through they went process reintegration and demobilisation Solomon candidate presidential the SLPP of the unpopularity with Together the PMDC, believed of the the leadership APC Berewa the formation and shift. power a ripe for were conditions helped. But perhaps even more importantly, Koroma strategically selected a running mate from the district, Chief Samuel Sam Sumana, a well-known local strongman. These local alliances also enabled the party to recruit youth as foot soldiers of violence through Sam Sumana’s patronage network. Consequently, the entourage of Berewa was attacked when he went to campaign in Kono and many SLPP candidates in the district were assaulted and harassed by youth loyal to Sam Sumana. This caused several local SLPP candidates to drop out of the race and traditional SLPP voters were scared away from the polling stations.9 But several sources also testify to violent acts carried out by SLPP supporters who were neither prepared nor willing to face the reality of defeat. For example, there were alleged assassination attempts on both Koroma and Margai as they campaigned in the district (Kandeh 2008: 618). The patterns and trends of electoral violence in Kono clearly speak to the strategic logic at work. The key purpose of every election campaign is to ensure access to territory: to hold speeches, distribute resources and promises, and build new alliances and patronage relations. This is why local election rallies are seen as an instrumental component of the national election campaigns. In the words of a local businessman in Kono:

The common villager is easily persuaded, easily moved, as they have little other information at hand to compare with. Many are illiterate, and only a few have radios. The rallies and campaigns are therefore of critical importance to the politicians. This is when you have the chance to appeal to people’s loyalties, to send messages and make promises.10

For the same reason, it is perceived as crucial to prevent the other party from gaining territorial access to your claimed areas. Most politicians believe that, if their opponents have access, there is a risk that they will be able to convince the people with their promises and the distribution of largesse. Party loyalty cannot be counted on, especially in Kono. In the words of a high-ranking APC member in Kono:

Money is very important here. You have to show strength. That is very important in delivering people. You can sway them if you are strong enough, if you have money. They will be on your side. The economy in the area is going down. The diamond mining is no longer as lucrative for the average person. Before you could just go out and take your sieve with you. Now the youth are much more dependent on politics. But you cannot trust these people. They are not stable. They will fool you.11

In order to prevent the other party from gaining access to potential swing voters, violence is often used to obstruct or interrupt the rival party’s rallies. Youth gangs are used to make sure that roads become inaccessible and bridges cannot be crossed, or to directly attack campaign vehicles, in order to prevent

122 5 | Bangura and Kovacs In addition, both both addition, In 13

14 But a closer look at electoral dynamics dynamics electoral a closer look at But But electoral violence does not always always does violence not electoral But 123 12 We called on the leaders of our ex-combatants. We told [them] we needed [them] we told We ex-combatants. our called the leaders of on We in kind paid Others were payroll. and contract on were Some their help. attacked. were all was We very organised. It small money. and alcohol with to several went forces’ ‘securitytask The fire. for Fire back. attacked We both locally recruited and were Ex-combatants maimed. Killedplaces. and necessarily not could local The combatants the country. of areas other from be a security as trusted, so neededwe measure. spies Holding ground and making inroads inroads and making Holding ground the other party from gaining entry. gaining partythe from other in Kono reveals that the district’s role as a swing district also helps explain explain district a swing as also helps role the district’s that reveals in Kono national competitive in less intimidation coercive and violence occurrences of power relative of in situations Even in between elections. general and elections theusedin district long-term a as violence both political parties have asymmetry, general 2002 The ‘inroads’. strategic make and ground’ ‘hold to tool strategic SLPP the of civil war, the end the After case a point. in are in Kono elections win the to favoured strongly was and hand the political with upper emerged stood APC the little in particular, Kono In war-ravaged elections. post-war first this, the SLPP of spite In constituencies. the district’s of any in winning of chance violence in district,the including influence its protect to used possible all means For supporters. potential and candidates APC of intimidation widespread and into secret society come to the Poro mobilised local members SLPP example, away. ran ‘outsiders’ that sure make to day, voting before the day town Koidu see to the so-called allowed not are non-initiates local to traditions, According with so associated is a secret society) doing of and spirit (the masked ‘devil’ difficulty also testify great APC politicians to even death. or measures, punitive a local party office have the APC did not the time, At in the area. campaigning they as the feared APC in their houses, host to dared people few and in Kono all APC party Consequently, local strongmen. by SLPP attacks and retaliation in secrecy. and night at held in themeetings district were parties recruited ex-combatants for protection and intimidation. According to a a to According intimidation. and protection for parties ex-combatants recruited official: APC national high-ranking target members and supporters of the other party and competing candidates. In In candidates. competing party theand other of supporters and members target violence the competitor, of the stronghold are that areas in or areas contested away scare to the electorate at aimed directly sometimes is thechallenger by the rivalparty as gets that sure making By side. the other for voters potential theelection of the parity increase to hopes the challenger possible, as votes few from imported deliberately are supporters youth circumstances, such In results. violence, of Rumours the violence. the local district orchestrate outside to and home at stay people make to tend perpetrators, unknown especially by distances. long travelling avoid In the eyes of the APC, their strategy paid off although they predictably lost the national elections. In Kono, the APC did not win a single constituency, but the voting patterns showed that they had been able to make significant inroads in the district, which they believed would be instrumental in future elections. According to a senior member of the APC, this was due to the fact that they ‘put up a good show’ in the district.15 As the quote above shows, they were also able to build local alliances and patronage relationships that could be activated in the next general election. In addition, because of Kono’s role as a potential swing district, by-elections there are seen as important opportunities for strategic manoeuvring in between general elections, and have often been marred by violence. According to the APC district chairperson in Kono:

By-elections are very critical as it is very important not to lose any seat. They will be important in determining the outcome of the next general election. In between elections, it is vital to have a strategy in place. The opponents are hoping to gain ground, and you have to hold the ground.16

As demonstrated by the quote, the parties generally believe that by increasing their political influence in a constituency, however small and remote, they will improve their chances of running a successful electoral campaign in the area in the next elections. But the purpose is also symbolic. The intention is to send a signal of strength, in order to convince potential turncoat politicians and swing voters who may be convinced to cross the floor in the run-up to the next elections. In the words of a high-ranking APC member:

We spend about four times as much on some of these by-elections as we spend on the general elections. All resources are concentrated in one area, instead of being divided and spread across. Here all efforts are concentrated [in] one place. Either you coerce them or you convince them. In reality, the importance of by-elections is mostly symbolical. It does not guarantee you support in the general elections. So it makes no sense. But it is perceived as an important signal.17

The by-election in Constituency 25 in Kono in December 2015, described in the introduction to this chapter, illustrates this point. In the 2012 general elections, the APC was able to win six of the eight parliamentary seats in the district. Constituency 25, however, was relatively evenly split between the two parties, and the APC was able to secure only a very narrow victory. The unexpected death of the elected APC parliamentarian in 2015 was thus a major source of concern for the APC, which was keen to hold the seat. The SLPP, meanwhile, considered the by-election as an important opportunity to retake an area lost with a very small margin.18

124 5 | Bangura and Kovacs

21 A different kind of electoral violence – electoral violence of kind different A 125

19 In this process, violence is frequently employed as a a as employed frequently is violence this process, In 20 The most contentious intra-party fighting inthe post- fighting intra-party contentious most The 22 The event effectively split APC members and supporters into two two into supporters and members APC split effectively The event 23 In Kono, the Sam Sumana controversy had particularly damaging effects. effects. particularly had damaging controversy Sumana the Sam Kono, In For example, in the period following the general elections in 2012, violent violent 2012, in elections the general in the period following example, For According to a local councillor in Kono, it is sometimes worth spending spending worth sometimes is it in Kono, a local to councillor According incidents relating to intra-party politics far overshadowed traditional APC– traditional overshadowed far politics intra-party to relating incidents particularly in Kono. perhaps but the in country a whole, as animosity SLPP 2012 period, however, was associated with the ruling party. The re-election of of re-election The the ruling with party. associated was period,2012 however, signalledof term in office last the beginning and a second for Koroma President competing contenders of number a large with struggle in the party, intense an the sidelines. to forced were several individuals this process, succeed him. In to ofthe vice office cases the from dismissal was controversial the most of One in Koroma President – by Sumana Sam Samuel strongman – Kono president 2015. March Maada Bio lost the presidential race in 2012, and many in the party believed many and 2012, race in the presidential lost Bio Maada Alpha as – such Other contenders down. step to him time for was it that in change for agitated and – emerged Yumkella Kolleh Kandeh and Timbo and this opposed critique strongly however, Bio, Maada leadership. the party’s from ex-militias including youth, of network use loyal his to hesitate not did through attempts such any resist forcefully to regime, the NPRC of the days intimidation. violent and one that has significant importance for understanding political dynamics in in dynamics political understanding for importance significant has that one and main the two been within – has violence intra-party years few in thelast Kono shaped is system the electoral as the political well as as Just political contenders. party hierarchies. within losers for room little is logic, there a winner-takes-all on the maintain and struggle create to a constant in involved are members Party the party up move or on they remain can will ensure that connections right are periods, which during transition struggle This intensifies normally ladder. field playing a large and plans succession non-existing or weakriddled often with formed are ‘camps times, such At power. for competing candidates prospective of shaped’. alliances are and camps, with fierce and far-reaching consequences, including several incidents several incidents including consequences, far-reaching and fierce with camps, violence. of The intra-party struggle for power for power struggle The intra-party Because he was a local Big Man, his patronage networks ran deep through the the deep through ran networks patronage his Because a local was he Man, Big resources in by-elections even in perceived strongholds of the other party. party. the other of strongholds in perceived even by-elections in resources still seen important making are as you a very get small if you percentage, Even to in referred is phenomenon This claim. later may you area in an inroads APC came the after example, For strategy. a ‘top-up’ as politics Sierra Leone’s win important in several to the party strategically in 2012, able was power to including strongholds, SLPP believed be generally to firm traditional areas Bo Kenema. and Kailahun, strategy to intimidate or frighten competitors and display strength and power. power. and strength display and competitors frighten or intimidate to strategy district. Some APC party members and supporters decided to remain loyal after his dismissal, hoping that they would be rewarded on his return. This group of people found themselves barred from the local party office, and many had to leave the district altogether. Other perceived loyalists were reshuffled out of power. For example, the mayor of Koidu Town was suspended in July 2016, together with a group of other colleagues within the local district administration. The formal allegations concerned corruption, but many speculate that it was rather the mayor’s close ties to the former vice president that was the reason behind his political downfall.24 The suspension of the mayor brought the local district council to a virtual standstill for months, and the councillors were deeply divided over the issue. Other APC party members and supporters were quick to shift camp and throw their support behind other Big Men who remained in the good books of the president and his closest allies. Due to the almost complete politicisation of the socio-economic space in Sierra Leone, there is little room for impartiality. Consequently, all individuals in Sam Sumana’s patronage networks were forced to take sides, including the paramount chiefs and the local youth gangs, which split into two camps.25 These divisions were strongly played out in social media, houses were vandalised and there were several cases of violent interruptions of party meetings.26 According to the Office of National Security (ONS) and the Political Party Registration Commission (PPRC), the Sam Sumana controversy was the number one cause of election-related violence in Kono in the 2015–16 time period.27

Forceful intermediaries: local chiefs and traditional authorities In order to understand the specific character of electoral violence in Kono, we also need to better understand the precarious relationships that national politicians enter into with local actors in order to implement violent strategies for mobilisation and intimidation. Traditional authorities are one of the most important political intermediaries between the political elites and people at large in areas outside city centres in Sierra Leone. In Kono, in particular, many local chiefs are considered to hold great influence and legitimacy in their chiefdoms. As such, they play an instrumental role as both instigators and victims of electoral violence. According to the Constitution of Sierra Leone, chiefs are the ‘custodians of the land’ in all the rural areas of Sierra Leone, where they are responsible for law and order and serve as agents of administration for the government, with the right to collect local tax. According to the Chieftaincy Act of 2009, they are also expected to contribute to development in their chiefdoms (Conteh 2016: 34–5). Although chiefs are not expected to ‘take active part in partisan politics’, they often end up being one of the most important political intermediaries for politicians seeking to influence elections at the grassroots level (ibid. 35). This is a practice with historical roots in Sierra Leone. The British were dependent

126 5 | Bangura and Kovacs In traditional traditional In 32 Chiefs are therefore therefore Chiefs are 30 They may also attempt attempt also Theymay 33 127 Most chiefs also have a vested interest in in interest a vested also chiefs have Most 29 In the 2012 election campaign in Kono, for for in Kono, election campaign the 2012 In 28 Their political leverage, however, is dependent on their ability to deliver to deliver ability on their is dependent however, leverage, Their political 31 In Kono, the role of the chiefs as informal power brokers grew increasingly grew increasingly brokers power informal as the chiefs of the role Kono, In was system chiefdom Sierrathe in of civil war Leone, the end the After to prevent supporters of the other party from participating in party in rallies participating or party the other from of supporters prevent to a civil to According force. or violence of threats through sometimes voting, societyKono: in activist example, the incumbent APC was seen using both carrots and sticks to get get to sticks and seen both APC was carrots using the incumbent example, the local of chiefs. the support sustaining favourable connections with the government in power. In order order In in power. the government with connections favourable sustaining in their projects development for and contracts secure fulfilto duties their political connections. on dependent they are chiefdoms, on local chiefs to carry out tasks that the colonial state was unable to perform perform to unable was state the colonial local carry that tasks to on chiefs out and money with rewarded were return, in chiefs, The capital. the distant from to grow them the local This allowed level. at them authority gave goodsthat practice This the day. of while serving government the locally, powerful and rich each chiefdoms, geographical of the establishment through formalised later was 32–3). 1995: (Reno chief paramount assigned an headedby as both 1930s, in the gold and of diamond discoverythe after important found companies mining the international and administrators thelocal state (Reno mining illegal diamond control to the chiefs on dependent themselves immediately party were the chiefs politics, of the introduction 45–6). With 1995: (Conteh agents’ between parties ‘vote-catching as the competition into drawn became the the chiefs most party in particular, the incumbent For 12–13). 2016: to chiefs for distributed were rewards Financial local intermediaries. important violently and the party in government for support electoral mobilise actively local support, their loyal for exchange In the opposition. intimidate and harass 1995). (Reno posts thein capital cabinet gained strongmen of much retain to chiefs the This allowed reform. limited revitalised only with 121;Jackson 2011: at localseethe also (Harris level influence their traditional surface leases land and over making decision in particular, Kono 2006). In both wealthy grow to chiefs some allowed has chiefdoms diamond-rich in rent 30). 1990: Murphy 2014: 333; Robinson Reedand (Acemoglu, influential and alliances into in entering interest a strategic has the political elite such, As election time. at chiefs with voters; hence, they participate actively in election campaigns and put pressure pressure put and in election campaigns actively they participate hence, voters; calling for their they lead. Sometimes around go section follow to on chiefs stations. polling the to transport provide or vote to people the ultimate swing actors, known as always ‘favouring the government of the the of the government ‘favouring always as known actors, swing the ultimate d a y ’. strongholds of the other party or in contested areas, this has often put the the put often this has areas, in contested party the other or of strongholds in their own people of the political preferences to opposition in direct chiefs of use the involve often voters mobilise to their attempts and chiefdoms, violence. occasionally and intimidation, and threats Chiefs are controlled by politicians and they simply do what they want. If the interest of the politician is to see violence, the business of the chiefs will be to mobilise the youth and get them ready to act out the politician’s wish.34

Occasionally chiefs also punish voters after the election results have been announced. For example, in one of the two chiefdoms in Constituency 25, after the by-elections in December 2015, the local chief put up the election results showing the APC victory on the office wall for everyone to see, with the idea of publicly shaming the minority who had voted for the SLPP. In addition, the chief used his local influence to make sure schools were closed and roads were blocked, and motorcyclists in Koidu Town, so-called ‘okada riders’, were prevented from picking up passengers in villages with suspected SLPP voters.35

Local gangs and foot soldiers of violence Although mainly orchestrated from the top, electoral violence in Kono – like elsewhere in the country – is primarily carried out by people who are generally referred to as ‘thugs’ in Sierra Leone: youths who are recruited by politicians to orchestrate violence.36 While the national and local elites are dependent on these individuals and groups to do their dirty work on the ground, the youth are equally dependent on their Big Men networks for survival and possibilities for social advancement. The character of this mutually destructive dependency explains the specific shape and form of electoral violence in Kono. A number of context-specific factors make Kono stand out as a particularly fertile area for recruiting such youth as foot soldiers for violence. Since the discovery of gold and diamonds in the 1930s, Kono has generated significant wealth for the political elites yet remains one of the poorest districts in the country. This discrepancy is a common source of grievance among people in the district. In the post-war period, this frustration has increased due to the decline of alluvial diamond mining, which is no longer as productive as it used to be. Kono was also heavily affected by the civil war and was one of the last areas to be held by the rebel forces. After the war, many former fighters stayed in the area to work in artisanal mining and the district is commonly thought to hold the largest concentration of ex-combatants in the country.37 Fifteen years after the end of the war, however, it is often hard to separate ex-combatants from urban youth in general, and the dividing lines are often blurred. In Kono, many young people are pessimistic about their prospects and see compliance with the wishes of the elites as their only way out. A type of patronage system referred to locally as godfatherism has thus emerged, where youth turn to the elites and those with perceived economic resources and ask ‘Bra u borbor dae?’ (‘Boss, is there anything for your boy?’). This dependence

128 5 | Bangura and Kovacs Or, in in Or, 40 38 129 41 When elections draw near, politicians approach the gangs the gangs approach politicians near, draw elections When 39 The incumbent always has an advantage in these situations, as they both have as they have both in these situations, an advantage has always incumbent The The dependency goes both ways, and engaging in electoral violence on on violence electoral in engaging and dependencygoesThe ways, both There is nothing to fight against in the system. At the end you fail, you can can you fail, you end Atthe inthe system. against to fight nothing is There they When a patron. of survivethe help with only can them. You beat never party, the other at stones throw they high. say When how ask you jump, say they when theyand trust you, do it them, just question Don’t do so. you have jobs. Our youth minor get to you even help and money some you give it. using learned this effectively survival they are and strategy the words of Christensen and Utas (2016), they invest in the future through through in the future they (2016), invest Utas and Christensen of the words particularly are elections of the stakes When debt. perceived of the creation in loyal bring usually politicians national however, high in a specific locality, the local district. outside This serves from violence to increase of instigators the with be to familiar unlikely are the perpetrators as violence, of the level local as people also fear, increases it but restraint, less show hence victims and recognise them. to unable are has played into the hands of the politicians, particularly around election time. election time. particularly around the politicians, of the hands into played has miner: diamond a Kallay, of the words In the capacity to mobilise greater resources and can make use of the institutions the institutions use of make can and resources greater mobilise to the capacity violence. of soldiers their foot protect to the police, including the state, of committed. violence for impunity of a culture establishing to contributes This behalf of a political party is often seen as an opportunity to access ready cash ready cash to access opportunity an seen a politicalas party behalfoften of is by organised is the violence of Most future. promising more a to ticket a or the chiefs, like Much in Kono. known they as are ‘cliques’, – or gangs youth while they also the top, from orders follow and on dependent leaders are gang market. on their servicesthe in offering bidders to highest the interest an have in Kono, gangs such twenty about were there that estimated was it 2016, In a former Adamou, led the by district: one dominated gangs major two although the and commander mid-level Council (AFRC) Revolutionary Armed Forces alias Ali, led by one and Kono, in force’ task the‘security APC of chairperson Following commander. (RUF) Front United Revolutionary a former Point’, ‘Gun ‘Friends to their name changed crew Adamou’s controversy, Sumana the Sam political allegianceto its faction declared while a breakaway Sumana’, Sam of Diana Konomanyi. to offer money, alcohol and cigarettes – so-called ‘moral boosters’ – in exchange – in exchange boosters’ ‘moral – so-called cigarettes and alcohol money, offer to term, short which serves deliberately are rewards These assignments. violent for Utas and Christensen by noted As dependence. long-term of a guarantee as these Big of feature this a typical is Sahlins (1963), on building 29), (2016: expected indefinitely) (sometimes postpone the tendency to networks: Man debt. of mechanisms far-reaching and extended create thereby and reciprocities theirloyalty demonstrate in activities that engage times, the gangs other At acts will such berewarded. that recognised and hoping support, and Although some individuals have been arrested and rearrested several times, they are often seen on the streets again the following day. At times, election officials have also been intimidated and sometimes attacked, with few repercussions.42 Many therefore suspect that the local police protect these gangs, and that the police are under political influence from the capital.43

Concluding remarks We began this chapter by asking why elections in the district of Kono have seen such high levels of electoral violence. We argued that the key explanation is the district’s unique role as a national swing district. Since the outset of party politics, the voting pattern in Sierra Leone has been strongly driven by an ethno-regional logic, which at times of close electoral races divides the country in two almost equally sized strongholds, the north/north-west and the south/south-east. Kono is a key exception to this trend, with important implications for its potential to swing the national vote and determine the outcome of general elections, which has happened in a couple of critical instances. Consequently, the district is heavily courted both in the run-up to the general elections and in between elections, for example during by-elections, with the two major party contenders trying to hold ground in perceived strongholds and making strategic inroads into perceived opposition areas or in contested constituencies. The findings from Kono clearly speak to the instrumentality of electoral violence in this context. Geographical control is the key mechanism at work. In order to win elections, the political elite not only need to display strength in numbers in local rallies and distribute resources and political promises; they also need to make sure that competitors are kept from doing the same. To this end, roads and bridges are blocked, campaign vehicles attacked, and the rallies and campaign meetings of the opposition are disrupted and disturbed. On the day of the election, violence serves an additional purpose: to frighten opposition supporters and keep them away from the voting stations. By affecting the turnout in contested areas, parties can swing the outcome in a small single-member constituency. Even when a party stands little chance of winning a constituency, a local presence can ensure that they are able to ‘top up’ their numbers, and hence gain a foothold in the area – and this may pave the way for future electoral benefits. Another common source of electoral violence in Kono is intra-party violence relating to the struggle for control within political parties. In Kono, this type of violence has at times far exceeded inter-party violence in both frequency and intensity. A number of additional factors tied to the socio-economic context of Kono and the Big Men networks between political elites, local chiefs and youth gangs serve to explain the more specific character and pattern of this violent dynamic. Traditional chiefs are known to largely favour the government of the day, as they are dependent on political connections and strategic

130 5 | Bangura and Kovacs - Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) point point (2013) Lindberg and Weghorst

2 to the existence of at least three different different three least at of the existence to swing measuring empirically to approaches including literature, in previous voters party of lack ambivalence, self-reported votingbehaviour. andpast affiliation 131 Author interviews with intelligence interviews intelligence with Author

The findings from this case study point to the relevance of studying elec studying of relevance tothe point study case this from findings The 1 officer at the Office of National of Security atthe Office officer election 2011; January Freetown, (ONS), National Electoral atthe officers Koidu (NEC) in Kono, Commission 2016. 22 November Town, Notes toral violence as a strategic instrument used by the political elite in new and in new and the political elite used by instrument a strategic as violence toral In this outcome. and contest electoral the influence democracies to emerging a useful analytical proves voters swing and areas swing of the notion context, theoretical established more that also shows the case study However, tool. ethnic identity of that in Africa elections – notably of theviews dynamic of the in understanding concepts equally relevant – are clientelism and politics democracyof Sierra in strengthening The work. at mechanisms intricate more the as elections of period in theLeone post-war the (re-)establishment and not have political power of the distribution for mechanism important most the traditional or politics patronage either of theundermining gradual ledto case fact, study our In in the country. divide regional ethnic and overlapping period in the post-war politics has multiparty competitive the opposite: suggests tool important an as ethnicity of the politicisation reinforced and strengthened rationales and channels new resources, provided has and votes mobilising for politics. Man Big for alliances for maintaining their local authority, wealth and power. As such, such, As power. and wealth their localauthority, maintaining for alliances try their in party in villagers and politics mobilise to engage theyfrequently constituencies In choice. of candidate their party or for vote to constituencies such areas, in contested or the opposition of strongholds traditional are that coercive and of violence of threats form in the comes often mobilisation be followed the ballot may of the outcome and intimidation, and harassment numbers of large – consisting youth district’s The collective punishments. by in local gangs organised ex-combatants and youth urban marginalised of thein district. violence theoccurrence of to also central are – cliques or the for the district generated has of the resources that the wealth Despite the population of majority decades, thegreat many for elites its countryand survival. struggling their everyday for margins, at the been left have in Kono the before, than productive industry less is mining diamond The alluvial few thein last dramatically up gone have prices and stagnated has economy on dependent army readymade a produced have These developments years. used instruments as are youth Such political godfathers. to vulnerable and benefits short-term for rivals in exchange of intimidation and coercion of promises. long-term and 3 Author interviews with SLPP 23 Sam Sumana was first expelled members and supporters, Bo, Pujehun from the APC and later removed as vice and Kenema, January 2011. president. The decision was ruled as legal 4 Author interviews with civil society by the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone, activist, Koidu Town, 14 December 2015; but was later referred to the sub-regional staff of a local NGO, Koidu Town, 12 court of the Economic Community of December 2015. West African States (ECOWAS) in Abuja, 5 Author interview with high-ranking Nigeria. APC member, Freetown, 14 January 2016. 24 Author interview with 6 Ibid. representative of WANEP in Kono, Koidu 7 Ibid. Town, 22 November 2016. 8 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 9 Author interview with high-ranking 26 Author interviews with officers SLPP member, Freetown, 15 April 2016. at the ONS in Kono, Koidu Town, 10 Author interview with 25 November 2016; representative of businessman from Kono, Freetown, 15 WANEP in Kono, Koidu Town, 22 January 2016. November 2016. 11 Author interview with the APC 27 Author interviews with officers District Chairperson in Kono, Koidu at the ONS in Kono, Koidu Town, 25 Town, 24 November 2016. November 2016; PPRC official, Koidu 12 Ibid. Town, 22 November 2016. 13 Author interview with high- 28 Author interview with the APC ranking APC member, Freetown, January District Chairperson in Kono, Koidu 2016. Town, 24 November 2016. 14 Ibid. 29 Author interview with civil society 15 Ibid. activist, Koidu Town, 15 April 2016. 16 Author interview with the APC 30 Author interview with PPRC District Chairperson in Kono, Koidu official, Koidu Town, 22 November 2016. Town, 24 November 2016. 31 Author interview with Deputy 17 Ibid. Chief Administrator, Koidu New 18 Author interview with election Sembehun City Council, Koidu Town, 24 officers at the NEC office in Kono, Koidu November 2016. Town, 22 November 2016. 32 Author interview with officers 19 Author interview with Kono at the ONS in Kono, Koidu Town, 25 District Council member, Koidu Town, November 2016. 24 November 2016. 33 Author interview with Mandingo 20 Author interview with high- tribal head, Koidu Town, 25 November ranking APC member, Freetown, 14 2016. January 2016. 34 Author interview with civil society 21 Based on author interviews with activist, Koidu Town, 14 December 2015. election officers at the NEC office in 35 Author interview with PPRC Kono, 22 November 2016; officers at the official in Kono, Koidu Town, 22 ONS office in Kono, 25 November 2016; November 2016. representative of the West Africa Network 36 As noted by Utas, ‘youth’ in the for Peacebuilding (WANEP) in Kono, 22 context of contemporary urban West November; Political Parties Registration Africa is not primarily a reference to Commission (PPRC) official in Kono, 22 an age group, but rather to a particular November 2016, all Koidu Town. social status: ‘a social category of people 22 Author interview with the SLPP living in volatile and dire life conditions District Secretary in Kono, Koidu Town, … who have yet to become social adults, 24 November 2016. people who have been marginalized

132 5 | Bangura and Kovacs 41 (2): 6 (2): 23–47. 6 (2): 23–47. 153 (1–2): 117–47. (1–2): 117–47. 153 . Saarbrücken: . Saarbrücken: 106 (422): 95–111. 106 (422): 95–111. . Cambridge: Cambridge Cambridge . Cambridge: Public Choice 1 (3): 475–94. Chieftaincy in Sierra Leone: History History Leone: Sierra in Chieftaincy and Electoral Process Publishing. Lambert Academic of the Destruction and RUF The Africa: IN: Indiana . Bloomington Leone Sierra Press. University Patronage: Elections and Parties, Neo- on Thoughts Random African and patrimonialism G. in M. Basedau, Democratization’ (eds), Votes, A. Mehler and Erdmann Parties Political Violence: and Money . Uppsala: Africa Sub-Saharan in Africa Institute. Nordic Conflict Africa: West in Democracy in Justice and Elections Resolution, I. . London: Liberia and Leone Sierra Tauris. B. of Local Politics The Cards? Deck of in Sierra Leone’, Reform Government African Affairs and Action Violence”: “Political of on Perspectives in Civil Wars’, Identity Politics Journal of 2002’, conflict Elections Studies African Modern of 189–216. Sierra Leone’s and Assistance Donor of Elections Second Post-conflict Bribery and Fraud: The Political Political The Bribery Fraud: and Election in Sub-Saharan of Economy Africa’, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Africa: in Experiments Democratic Comparative in Transitions Regime Perspective Press. University Debt Ambiguous and ‘Ex-militias Elections Post-war during Relations African Conflict and in Sierra Leone’, Peacebuilding Review Conteh, M. N. (2016) Paramount M. N. (2016) Conteh, West in Gberie, A Dirty L. (2005) War Gyimah-Boadi, ‘Political E. (2007) and Civil (2011) D. War Harris, Old an (2006) ‘Reshuffling P. Jackson, ‘The S. N. (2003) Ontology Kalyvas, Post- Leone’s ‘Sierra (2003) D. J. Kandeh, Incumbents, (2008) ‘Rogue D. J. Kandeh, Collier, P. and P. Vicente (2011) ‘Violence, ‘Violence, (2011) Vicente P. and P. Collier, Bratton, M. and N. van de Walle (1997) (1997) de Walle van N. M. and Bratton, (2016) M. Utas M. M. and Christensen, 133 122 (2): 319–68. Author interview with former interview former with Author Author interview election with Author Author interview with former interview former with Author Author interviews with former interviews former with Author Author interview with diamond interview diamond with Author Author interview with officers interview officers with Author Author interview with Author

43 38 39 Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Sierra The Terror: and Democracy . Dakar: CODESRIA. War Civil Leone Development Economic (2014) ‘Chiefs: Civil Society of Control Elite and Journal of Political in Sierra Leone’, Economy E. Kramon and G. Ofosu (2017) (2017) G. Ofosu and E. Kramon Violence: or Fraud ‘Electoral Party of Observers Effect The on British Strategies’, Manipulation . Science Political of Journal https://doi.org/10.1017/ at Available S0007123416000491. of the Rationality and Competition Africa’ in Contemporary Politics Olorunsola V. and Rothchild in D. Claims: Ethnic Versus (eds), State . Boulder CO: Dilemmas Policy African Press. Westview 37 42 40 41 officers at the NEC in Kono, Koidu Town, Town, Koidu Kono, atthe NEC in officers 2016. 22 November representative of WANEP in Kono, Koidu Koidu in Kono, WANEP of representative 2016. 22 November Town, miner, Koidu Town, 20 December 2015. Town, Koidu miner, member of the Gunpoint gang, Koidu Koidu gang, the Gunpoint of member 2016. 23 November Town, Abdullah, I. (ed.) (2004) Between (2004) I. (ed.) Abdullah, A. Robinson Reed J. and T. D., Acemoglu, References M. Golden, S. Brierley, J., Asunka, Ethnic ‘Modernization, R. H. (1983) Bates, into what they see as a chronic state state theysee what a chronic as into in italics 1, 2012: (Utas youthhood of original). at the ONS in Kono, Koidu Town, 25 25 Town, Koidu in Kono, the ONS at 2016. November member of the Gunpoint gang, Koidu Koidu gang, the Gunpoint of member representative 2016; 23 November Town, 22 and Town, Koidu in Kono, WANEP of 2016. 25 November member of the Gunpoint gang, Koidu Koidu gang, the Gunpoint of member 2016. 23 November Town, 2007’, Journal of Modern African Politics in Sierra Leone. Cambridge: Studies 46 (4): 603–35. Cambridge University Press. Keen, D. (2005) Conflict and Collusion in Sahlins, M. D. (1963) ‘Poor Man, Rich Sierra Leone. Oxford: James Currey. Man, Big-man, Chief: Political Kitschelt, H. and S. I. Wilkinson (2007) Types in Melanesia and Polynesia’, Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns Comparative Studies in Society and of Democratic Accountability and History 5: 285–303. Political Competition. Cambridge: Sierra Leone Telegraph (2015) ‘Did Cambridge University Press. Sierra Leone Vice President Foh’s Lindberg, S. I. and M. K. C. Morrison Hate Speech Spark Violence in (2005) ‘Exploring Voter Alignments Kono?’, Sierra Leone Telegraph, in Africa: Core and Swing Voters in 18 December. Available at www. Ghana’, Journal of Modern African thesierraleonetelegraph.com/?p=11061 Studies 43 (4): 1–22. (accessed 15 April 2017). Lindberg, S. I. and M. K. C. Morrison Söderberg Kovacs, M. (2012) ‘“Ampa (2008) ‘Are African Voters Really Ampoh!”: Sierra Leone after Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey the Announcement of the 2012 Evidence from Ghana’, Political Science Election Results’. Mats Utas blog, Quarterly 123 (1): 95–122. 30 November. Available at https:// Mayer, W. G. (2007) ‘The Swing Voter matsutas.wordpress.com/2012/11/30/ in American Presidential Elections’, ampa-ampoh-sierra-leone-after-the- American Political Research 35 (3): announcement-of-the-2012-election- 358–88. results-guest-post-by-mimmi- Murphy, W. P. (1990) ‘Creating the soderberg-kovacs/ (accessed 15 April Appearance of Consensus in Political 2017). Discourse’, American Anthropologist 92 Utas, M. (ed.) (2012) African Conflicts (1): 24–41. and Informal Power: Big Men and Norris, P., R. W. Frank and F. Martinez Networks. London and New York NY: i Coma (2015) Contentious Elections: Zed Books. From Ballots to Barricades. New York Weghorst, K. R. and S. I. Lindberg (2013) NY: Routledge. ‘What Drives the Swing Voter in Patriotic Vanguard (2015) ‘Kono: Africa?’, American Journal of Political SLPP’s Gbondo Was No Match for Science 57 (3): 717–34. APCs Tucker’, Patriotic Vanguard, Whitfield, L. (2009) ‘“Change for a 21 December. Available at www. Better Ghana”: Party Competition, thepatrioticvanguard.com/kono-slpp- Institutionalization and Alternation in s-gbondo-was-no-match-for-apc-s- Ghana’s 2008 Elections’, African Affairs tucker (accessed 15 April 2017). 108 (433): 621–41. Posner, D. N. (2005) Institutions and Wilkinson, S. I. (2004) Votes and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: Violence: Electoral Competition and Cambridge University Press. Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge: Reno, W. (1995) Corruption and State Cambridge University Press.

134 6 | Ex-militants and electoral violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta

Tarila Marclint Ebiede

Introduction Electoral violence has shaped the outcomes of elections since Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999. The overarching narrative that has emerged from research on this subject is that electoral violence in Nigeria is driven by unbridled neopatrimonialism (Omotola 2010; Albert 2005; Adetula 2014). As a theoretical lens, neopatrimonialism tends to view elections as a process dominated by elites competing for political power. Other actors in the field of play are often conceptualised as ‘clients’ of the dominant political actors. However, electoral competition is not limited to political elites alone. It involves a broad range of actors belonging to different socio-economic groups in society. In most cases, these actors are youths. There is a tendency to view these youths as ‘clients’ who express their agency in the interests of a political ‘patron’. This view does not provide a complete picture of the agency of youths in the electoral process, especially as it relates to electoral violence. In this chapter, I argue that these youths, just like the elites, are similarly competing for power and influence as they engage in the electoral process. There is a need to explain the agency of these youths in the study of electoral violence in Nigeria’s prevailing democratic order. To explain the agency of youths in electoral violence in Nigeria, this chapter focuses on ex-militants in the Niger Delta region. Ex-militants are an important youth group in conflict-affected societies. Ex-militants are often categorised as marginalised youths (Maclay and Özerdem 2010), whose agency is predetermined by the actions and interests of their political patrons (Themnér 2015; Themnér and Utas 2016). However, Iwilade (2017) argues that ex-militants act in their own self-interest. According to him, ex-militants use their past history and profile as violent actors to negotiate for opportunities with political patrons. In this chapter, I argue that ex-militants engage in the political process as individuals in a struggle to maintain their place of power in their local communities and the political processes within the state. While not denying the important place of perverse competition for political power among elites in Nigeria’s electoral process, the perspective that emphasises the agency of ex-militants provides a nuanced explanation of the factors that shape the

135 political process in conflict-affected societies such as the Niger Delta. Although this is not a general rule, ex-militants are likely to engage in electoral violence in pursuit of their interests in the political process. Therefore, to explain the motivations of people who are not within the conceptual frameworks of ‘elites’ in the political process, this chapter seeks to examine when and why ex-militants engage in electoral violence. The central argument in this chapter is that ex-militant leaders mobilise their ex-fighters to carry out electoral violence with the aim of influencing the outcome of elections in ways that maintain their position of power and influence in their communities. I argue that there is a greater level of violence where there is political factionalism among ex-militant leaders. This is especially the case in societies where more than one militant group exists. Leaders of these groups, who are often in competition with each other, align themselves with different political parties. As opposing political parties compete during elections, ex-militant leaders tend to mobilise their ex-fighters to carry out acts of violence that can determine the outcome of the electoral process. This action is motivated by the ambitions of ex-militant leaders to maintain or gain access to patronage networks or political power at the governmental level. Ex-militant leaders use the power they gain from political processes within the state to assert themselves in their local communities. Hence, electoral violence is as much an outcome of elite competition for power within the state as it is of competition for power by ex-militant leaders within their own communities. Methodologically, this chapter draws on fieldwork conducted in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. Data from this fieldwork includes interviews conducted with ex-militants and members of communities, members of political parties and government officials in the Niger Delta. The chapter also relies on data on events documented by the Partners for Peace (P4P) project (Partners for Peace 2015), which is available online. The P4P project collects data on political violence in the Niger Delta, including incidences of electoral violence that involve ex-militants. In addition, the chapter relies on newspaper reports. These different sources are triangulated to produce a coherent empirical narrative of electoral violence during the 2015 general elections in three states in the Niger Delta region: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states. These states are often referred to as the ‘geographic Niger Delta’ (Tamuno 2008).1 The focus on the three core Niger Delta states is deliberate; although all oil-producing states have a history of protest movements against the Nigerian government, these states are known to have been the stage for armed militancy in the region. Ex-militants, the focus of this chapter, have a greater presence in the political processes of these states. The chapter is structured as follows: this introductory section is followed by an overview of the current literature on ex-combatants and electoral violence in post-conflict societies.2 The subsequent section discusses the relationship

136 6 | Ebiede - 137 Mainstream peace and conflict studies often maintain that there is a is a need there that maintain often studies peace conflict and Mainstream to in post-conflict subject societies is of ex-combatants The trajectory Lyons to According post-conflict in societies can be contentious. Politics ings of ex-militants’ involvement in electoral violence in the Niger Delta, and and Delta, in the Niger violence in electoral involvement ex-militants’ of ings insurgencies. armed experienced organised societies have other in that societies violence in post-conflict and electoral Ex-combatants between electoral violence and armed militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. region. Delta Niger Nigeria’s in militancy armed and violence between electoral and fourth present in section,the in I out which set are arguments main The in electoral involved were ex-militants why explains that the data analyse chapter The Delta. in the Niger elections general the 2015 during violence the from gained insights theoretical highlights that a conclusion with ends understand current to enhance seek These insights presented. data empirical to manage ex-combatants’ transition from violence to civilian life in societies life civilian to violence from transition ex-combatants’ manage to demobilisation (Berdal conflict 1996). Disarmament, violent from emerging this manage to initiated usually are programmes (DDR) reintegration and is It 2010). Nations United 2010; Sambanis and (Schulhofer-Wohl transition fighting that willensure programmes DDR of expectedthe implementation that networks and that (Berdal 1996), disarmament after weapons no have groups Finally, programmes. will demobilisation be through disbanded groups and they that ensure to training and support receive commonly ex-combatants in the socio-political of life participate and incomes earn sustainable can 2012). Özerdem 2006; (Spear violence to resorting without their communities in participating after social and they realities encounter economic political, their group that shown has ex-combatants on Research programmes. DDR and Vries (De end even when conflicts be to relevant continue structures survival forthe economic could be significant networks These 2011). Wiegink also could serve and 2010) Reno 2007; political as (Peters ex-combatants of focuses on chapter This 2012). their leaders (Utas and ex-combatants for capital in the political processes use their networks in which ex-combatants the ways violence. electoral lead to can their societies that of ways in societies– particularly in such elections political 6), – and processes (2002: external legitimacy and and internal of issues the contentious ‘settle to aim of societaldisorder, the circumstances difficult under be organized must contentious This breakdown’. institutional and distrust, fear, insecurity, general out a path as when democracy evident introduced is even more is politics an 2008). are in Elections Sisk post-conflict and societies conflict of (Jarstad riftssuch societies, in the reveal existing can expose that historical exercise politicised societies as criminality seek produce to generate and animosities all violent societies from emerging Not 2005). (Kynoch a new political order to create elections hold or processes democratisation into enter conflicts the very that that issues a high is possibility there and political consensus, shape violent conflicts are at the heart of electoral politics in post-conflict societies seeking to democratise. As citizens, ex-combatants also participate in the post-conflict electoral process. This participation takes different forms, often depending on the way in which the conflict was terminated. Armed groups might emerge as political parties as part of the peace agreements that lead to the termination of conflict. In this case, ex-combatants often become members of the political party that evolves out of their former armed group. Political parties that emerge from armed groups in post-conflict societies are shaped by structures and networks that were created during the armed conflict (Söderström 2011a). In the absence of a transition from armed group to political party, ex-combatants still participate in the political process, but as part of political structures that include other members of society who may not have been part of any armed group. Whether or not political parties emerge out of armed groups, ex-combatants who are interested in politics tend to seek membership of political groups to enable them to register their presence in the political process of their societies. Ex-combatants’ interest in asserting themselves in political processes could take different forms. In Liberia, it has been shown that the involvement of ex-combatants in politics can be driven by democratic ideals such as inclusion, as well as by non-democratic confrontational discourses (Söderström 2011a; 2011b). Maclay and Özerdem (2010) argue that involving ex-combatants in political processes in societies emerging from conflict enhances their civil participation in politics. However, the reality of ex-combatant involvement in politics does not necessarily reflect these ideals of democratic political participation. Instead, existing evidence shows that the shape and form of political involvement reflect the nature of politics in societies emerging from conflict (Bøås 2011; McGregor 2002; Reno 2010; Utas 2012). In many of these societies, politics is characterised by patron–client relations, perpetuating relationships and norms that were forged during the time of conflict. In fact, some of these patron–client relationships and norms may have been responsible for the outbreak of violence in the first instance (Peters 2007). A core feature of patronage politics is the relationship between those who seek to gain and maintain political power (patrons) and those who are used to achieve this goal (clients) (Alapiki and Ukiwo 2013). In societies characterised by such politics, patrons buy the support of clients through promises of rewards and access to political patronage when the patrons gain control of the state. Competition for control of the state emerges from the reality of state domination in state–society relations and economic activities in most African postcolonial countries (Ake 1996). The economic approaches adopted by most African states following independence ensured that policies such as the nationalisation of assets, increased state investment in service delivery and control of the sale of privately grown commodities such as cocoa, groundnuts,

138 6 | Ebiede - 139 Ex-combatants are drawn into the political culture of their societies of when the political culture into drawn are Ex-combatants The relationship between electoral violence and armed militancy can be and electoral violence between relationship The Armed militant groups emerged in Nigeria’s Niger Delta in the mid-2000s. The the in mid-2000s. The Delta Niger in Nigeria’s emerged groups Armed militant civil society militant scholars, activists and popularised by narrative overarching grievances against community of expression an militancy armed is that is groups 2009). (IOCs) Obi (Ibaba 2005; companies oil international and state the Nigerian trajectories different through emerged militants armed that shown has Research participated have to known are groups militant who joined Youths 2011). (Ebienfa intra- inter-communal, intra-communal, including violence, of forms in various known became of what foundations The criminalethnic, violence. political and in the political violence of network a complex by laid militancy armed were as Delta. Niger Electoral violence and armed militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Delta Niger in Nigeria’s and armed militancy violence Electoral tive can provide new answers to the question of why ex-combatants engage engage ex-combatants why of the question to new answers provide can tive post-conflict in societies.violence electoral in kola, cotton and oil palm were implemented through so-called government so-called through government implemented palm oil were and cotton kola, in available were that resources that These ensured boards. policies marketing which thestate, on bestowed increasingly were post-independence countries that meant notes, 6) (ibid. Ake This, the centre. at power of theincreased value threatening’, always violent, often arbitrary, ‘immense, remained power state all means’. ‘by power maintain and obtain to sought the political class that and According in Africa. to states post-conflict can be extended description This state; of the postcolonial conception Ake’s fit states such (2011), Arowosegbe to but history, colonial by shaped only not are governance and politics however, and such occurredsocieties in (Vlassenroot have conflicts that violent also by practice a common is power for competition Unbridled Raeymaekers 2004). a violent it creates state, as in in post-conflict the societies,postcolonial and, elections. during manifests often that politicalculture In elections. as such processes in post-conflict political they seek participate to in post-conflict ex-combatants the of agency that argued is it instances, many Utas and Themnér 2015; (Themnér by patrons political influenced is politics ex-combatants of the actions perspective on a nuanced that I argue 2016). their local of the politics within located they are how account take into would of seem be to acting in the may interests ex-combatants While communities. they also could be they acting in their whom see patrons, as political elites it Therefore, communities. their immediate of the politics within interests own to act process in the electoral ex-combatants how also examine to important is This perspectheoretical their community. within interests their own advance traced to the run-up to the 2003 general election in the core Niger Delta Delta Niger election in the core general thetraced 2003 the to run-up to street from youths armed and recruited the political class of Members states. and small arms of which the led proliferation to movements, youth and gangs light weapons in local communities in the Niger Delta (Best and Von Kemedi 2005). As Asuni (2009) shows, politicians who provided arms to youths did not recover those weapons after the 2003 elections. Armed with different types of weapons, some of these youths began to engage in criminality in their local communities. However, in a remarkable turn of events, Ateke Tom and Asari Dokubo, two notable youth leaders who had been hired by Peter Odili, the governor of Rivers State at the time, transformed into armed militants. Ateke Tom established the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), while Asari Dokubo started the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF). This marked the beginning of the transition of youths who had been involved in electoral violence into armed militants engaged in a violent campaign against the Nigerian state and IOCs in the oil fields of the Niger Delta. This anti-state violence became formalised in 2005 following the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (Bøås 2011), an umbrella organisation for armed militant groups in the area. The formation of MEND also led to a proliferation of armed groups in the Niger Delta, as youth engaged in anti-state violence began to find a voice and a network through MEND. As MEND gained traction, it also became a powerful actor in the politics of the region. Armed militants affiliated with MEND gained more power and influence in their communities, which in turn changed the position of the militants – and particularly of the leaders of armed groups – in their local communities. Militant leaders who started as clients recruited by political patrons to carry out violence became dominant in community politics. This change is not surprising, as armed militant leaders have been able to build their own power independent of their erstwhile patrons. This was done through their engagement in oil theft, hostage taking and patronage from IOCs and gave such leaders the leverage to negotiate their position in the political processes of their communities on their own terms. Hence, MEND was not simply a platform for the expression of anti- state violence; it was also a means for youths to gain a position of power and influence in communities where violence plays an important role in the political process.

The limits of Nigeria’s DDR programme In June 2009, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua announced an amnesty and DDR programme for armed groups in the Niger Delta. The DDR programme was designed to facilitate the termination of the insurgency in the region and was meant to disband militant groups and facilitate their reintegration into society. It started with the disarmament phase. Armed militant groups, led by their leaders, handed in their weapons and each fighter signed an oath of repentance. The militant leader was responsible for identifying members of his group, but each militant took the oath as an individual fighter. This was followed by the encampment of repentant militants. Technically,

140 6 | Ebiede - 3 141 I would do what my leader tells me to do. Why not? He is my boss na … boss … na my is He not? Why do. to me leader tells my do what I would the than more me for caring is He me. for caring boss; is he my is He Yes. As this quote illustrates, it was the leaders of the militant groups who guar groups the militant the leaders of was it illustrates, this quote As During the interview, he [the ex-militant leader] reports that he has 2,000 2,000 has he leader] that reports [the ex-militant he During the interview, them brought He leader. them? The brought them. Who brings and people registered you disarming during and they disarming, lined up during bring to even decide not can he careful, not are you If individuals. them as of demobilisation. at the point fighters his of some forward If successful, DDR is likely to reduce the power and influence of leaders of leaders influence and the power reduce to likely is DDR successful, If bythe envisioned was what from differs ex-combatants most for reality The the armed groups were demobilised in the camps, where repentant militants militants repentant where the in camps, demobilised were groups the armed demobilisation two-week a part advocacy as of training non-violent given were vocational or select educational to individual asked were Ex-militants exercise. thenecessary gain themto skills and enable would that programmes training programme the DDR of implementation Ideally, employment. for knowledge society. into reintegration themfor prepare therefore would anteed the participation of their fighters in the amnesty and DDR programme, programme, DDR and amnesty in the their fighters of the participation anteed not were who youths freeloading included cases, in some the ‘fighters’ and, sustain to tended process This 2012). (Nwajiaku-Dahou group armed an part of this loyalty of example their leaders. An towards ex-militants of the loyalty interview:an during fighter ex-militant an from be can seen response a in of armed groups. This is because the network of armed combatants and their and their armed combatants of is network This because the groups. armed of militia of the political power the of basis perpetrate are to violence ability of leaders that means programme DDR implemented leaders. A successfully theirin communities power of lose theirto position likely are groups armed is especially This political processes. casethe such when broader in as well as leaders lose their power, militant If power. of source other no leaders have The political patrons. of clients as their status to return to likely they are is Delta in the Niger programme DDR and amnesty an of implementation their power leaders will seek maintain to militant how case for a test therefore in processes post-conflict and societies. political in communities influence and violence in electoral ex-militants of the involvement that I argue this chapter, In of outcome an is Delta Niger in Nigeria’s elections general the 2015 during in influence and power of position a struggle maintain to leaders’ ex-militant the state. within politicalin processes and theircommunities the into fighters leaders in enrolling armed of the role First, programme. DDR and their between fighters relationship the existing reinforced programme DDR DDR the enter to eligible were all fighters Although 2016). (Ebiede leaders is captured This theirnames. they needed submit theirto leaders programme, (PAP): Programme Amnesty Presidential ofthe interview official in an an with government. How much are they paying us? Is it not 65,000 naira? He is doing more than that. He started our journey in life to be somebody. Every leader you see, if he says, ‘My men, I want to see you today and this is what I want you to do’ … Why not?4

In this statement, the ex-militant fighter explained the logic behind his loyalty to a militant leader. He demonstrates that his loyalty towards his ‘boss’ supports his social status, which he conceptualises as his ‘journey in life to be somebody’. He notes that this loyalty also guarantees his livelihood, as the limited payment from the DDR programme is not enough to sustain him. For this reason, he believes, he and other ex-militants will always remain loyal to their leaders and do their bidding if the need arises. This is also confirmed by ordinary civilians in communities who report that members of armed militant groups ‘are still together’ despite having participated in the DDR programme.5 The loyalty of ex-fighters to their ex-militant leaders has implications for the mobilisation for violence during the electoral process. As an ex-militant from Ologbobiri in Bayelsa State explained: ‘I will do what master says I should do. Nobody can stand us in that river.’6 This means that the ex-militant and his group will ensure that political rivals do not pilot their boats on the river leading to rural communities where voting is expected to take place. Most communities are accessible only via the waterways, and so armed groups can disrupt the political campaigns of opposition groups and capture electoral materials when they are being transported by water. This example shows that one way in which ex-militants demonstrate loyalty to their former leaders is by doing their bidding during elections – and this can include violence. Ex-militant fighters who continue to benefit from the support of their leaders are easily mobilised by these leaders for election purposes. Those who do not rely on such support or patronage tend to be independent. For example, another ex-militant fighter associated with Africa Ukparasia explained that he no longer participates in the political activities of his ex-militant leader, even though he still remains friendly with him. The reason he gave for this was that he does not rely on him for financial support. According to him, ‘I have my business and I can take care of myself. Africa remains my man, but I don’t like politics.’7 The different positions of ex-militants who remain loyal to and available for mobilisation by their ex-militant leaders and those who are not available for mobilisation demonstrate the importance of a patron–client relationship in the mobilisation of ex-militants during elections. This relationship is similar to that between the ex-militant leaders and their own political patrons – the ex-militant leader can be a client as well as a patron.

142 6 | Ebiede - 2013). 2013). 2014). As a result, the the a result, 2014). As 143 At the national level, ex-militants seem to represent the the seem represent to ex-militants level, the national At 8 Ex-militant leaders also emerged as prominent political actors in their their in actors political prominent as also emerged leaders Ex-militant local their in candidates PDP for campaigned leaders ex-militant Key Nigeria’s 2015 general election was an election with high stakes – and in the the in highand – with election stakes an was election general 2015 Nigeria’s interests of the Niger Delta region; however, politics at the local level showed the local showed level at politics however, region; Delta the Niger of interests their place entrench to sought the PDP of support in who were ex-militants that stake at was What politics. in community Men’ ‘Big and ‘godfathers’ ‘patrons’, as their but level, the national at power of the loss simply not was ex-militants for leaders ex-militant Hence, own communities. within their influence of position support to influence and resources financial ex-fighters, of usedtheir networks Ex-militants and electoral violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta Niger in Nigeria’s violence and electoral Ex-militants In response, Edwin Clark, a notable member of the Ijaw ethnic group, noted noted ethnic group, the Ijaw of member a notable Edwin Clark, response, In governance in his ethnicity Ijaw Goodluck to Jonathan’s allusion Obasanjo’s Will (The ‘pejorative’ and ‘myopic’ style ‘contemptuous’, as Delta. thein Niger the political elites high for stakes of one electionwas 2015 new The 2012). Ebiede and militancy (Ukiwo armed of result a as communities government by by inclusion their exemplified leaders is ex-militant of power contract, protection the pipeline as such schemes, industryin oil patronage Maritime security the Nigerian in waterways through their patronage and ethnic-based Theseand the 2016). perks (PM News (NIMASA) Agency Safety during the PDP leaders support ex-militant most made political mobilisation leaders ex-militant most elections, in 2015 the Thus, elections. general the 2015 2015). (Eziukwu Jonathan President for their support declared some years, the over gained and power their influence Using communities. their armed within ex-militants other nominating as far as went ex-militants the elec during elected positions run to for loyalists civilian other or groups political parties within nominate to opportunities received Ex-militants tions. at elected positions and political appointments for candidates their preferred level. the regional Niger Delta region, the stakes were particularly high for the regional political political theregional particularly high for were thestakes region, Delta Niger Democratic (People’s Jonathan Goodluck president, incumbent The elites. against competing was State, Bayelsa from ethnic Ijaw an PDP), or Party ethnic Fulani an APC), or Congress (All Progressives Buhari Muhammadu Goodluck Jonathan’s region. West North thein country’s State Katsina from to opportunity an Delta Niger inthe elites political given had term in office Usman and (Owen benefits its from gain and the presidency closer to come Delta the Niger from political elites appointments, statutory from Apart 2015). they something government, the national within securedhad opportunities In politics. Nigerian of been the ethnic to nature denied historically had due criticised President Obasanjo President former the elections, the to run-up so to be to “possessed”, yourself allow to you ‘For thus: Goodluck Jonathan a is man” “Ijaw an as Nigerians of the rest of most of the exclusion to say, (Premium Times happen’ been to allowed have never should that mistake candidates during the elections with the aim of maintaining their position of power within local communities. The actions undertaken by ex-militant leaders in support of their preferred political parties, mostly the PDP, led to electoral violence during the 2015 general elections.

Regional dynamics The popularity of the PDP in the Niger Delta did not deter some regional political elites from joining the APC. The Rivers State governor at the time, Rotimi Amaechi, was among five PDP state governors who defected to the APC due to political differences within the PDP. The other four were Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso (Kano), Murtala Nyako (Adamawa), Abdulfatah Ahmed (Kwara) and Magatakarda Wamakko (Sokoto), all from states in Northern Nigeria. In Bayelsa State, Timipre Sylva, a former governor and prominent member of the PDP, also moved to the APC. The defection of Rotimi Amaechi and Timipre Sylva and their supporters to the APC was evidence of deep elite factionalism in the Niger Delta during the 2015 general elections. Elite factionalism also extended to ex-militant leaders in the Niger Delta, something that was particularly evident in Bayelsa State during the 2015 electoral process. Generally, most ex-militant leaders in the state declared their support for President Goodluck Jonathan and the PDP (Eziukwu 2015). However, a faction of ex-militants led by ex-militant leader Africa Ukparasia defected to the APC. Ukparasia’s personal declaration of cross-carpeting was significant because many ex-militant fighters remained loyal to him, their former leader.9 Ukparasia’s political move was the result of his post-militancy political experience, which had been informed by the alliance that had been established and formalised with Timipre Sylva when the latter was governor of Bayelsa State, from 2007 to 2012. During this period, Sylva established links with ex-militant leaders in Bayelsa State by managing the peace process that led to the end of militancy in the state. Within this process, he provided opportunities for militant leaders to nominate their allies for positions on the Bayelsa State Peace Committee. Ukparasia’s ally and preferred candidate, Chief Tiwei Timipa Orunimighe, was also given the position of chairman of Southern Ijaw Local Government Council in 2009 (Ukiwo and Ebiede 2012). This appointment served to integrate Ukparasia into Chief Sylva’s patronage network in Bayelsa State. The PDP denied Sylva the opportunity to run for a second term in the state elections (Oyadongha 2012), which left him in a political wilderness immediately after the 2011 elections. Hence, he also quickly transferred his allegiance to the APC when it was established in 2013. Ukparasia’s local political ally, Orunimighe, was also removed from his position as local government chairman by Henry Seriake Dickson, the new governor of Bayelsa State. As a result, Orunimighe also defected to the APC and became the party’s chairman

144 6 | Ebiede - This 10 145 There was less factionalism in Delta State. Government Ekpomopolo Ekpomopolo Government State. in factionalism Delta less was There leaders in ex-militant which way the described illustrate above examples The The Niger Delta was one of the regions in the country with the most in most country the with the regions of the one was Delta Niger The shows that the participation of ex-militant leaders in the electoral process in in process leaders in the electoral ex-militant of the participation that shows they gain. can the patronage by driven clearly is State Bayelsa remained leader in the state, the ex-militant key Tompolo), as known (commonly the for NIMASA a beneficiary is of securityfrom He contracts in the PDP. oil for (NNPC) Company Petroleum National the Nigerian from and waterways at State of Delta governor The 2015). Okhomina and (Edegbe,Midat pipelines the supported and thein PDP also remained Uduaghan, Emmanuel thetime, the ruling political elite and Both ex-militants Goodluck of Jonathan. re-election addition, In Jonathan. of in the re-election agenda common a shared thein PDP in governorship, the deputy for candidate the PDP’s nominated Ekpomopolo inDelta holders political office several aspiring other supporting to addition within the political opposition of members active were there Although State. the state; within members between PDP divisions no were there State, Delta political opposition based pre-existing on were State in Delta divisions any in this different significantly were State Rivers and State Both lines. Bayelsa the the period contest the elections, to In up leading State. Delta from regard the led by another and between Amaechi was a faction led by State in Rivers leaders within All the ex-militant Wike. Nyesom candidate, gubernatorial PDP aligned the PDP. with were State Rivers The Delta. thein Niger power for the political competition within nested are the fragile on discussions theoretical earlier reinforces here explained situation unbridled and the conflicts violent in societies politics from of emerging nature are societies. such in Ex-combatants actors by political power for competition a dominant Delta, seen as in the Niger But, those actors. of subset one just the involve is in election processes ex-combatants of in the involvement factor thosein processes. groups armed former theof leaders of ment Ex-militants and electoral violence during the 2015 elections violence during Ex-militants and electoral in Bayelsa State. Sylva continued to enjoy the loyalty of some local politicians local some politicians of theloyalty enjoy to continued Sylva State. Bayelsa in Ukparasia, political networks. old his in and servedwho had government his in among was State, leaders in Bayelsa ex-militant prominent the most of one thissupport But Sylva. with political his relationship those who continued victorious. as if the emerged APC rewards alsowas of based expectations on of government the that explained Ukparasia to loyal fighter ex-militant An and leaderto their offered the promises kept not had Goodluck Jonathan receiving. leaders were ex-militant other deniedhad him the patronage reports of election-related incidents in connection to the 2015 electoral process process electoral the 2015 to connection in incidents election-related of reports example, for place: took of violence forms Different 2015). Peace for (Partners of between supporters clashes were there destroyed, were election materials political candidates, ex-militants were used as hired political ‘thugs’, political rallies were violently disrupted and shootings were reported. There were, however, important geographical variations between the different states of the region. In Delta State, there were disruptions of political rallies and attacks on political leaders, but little or no violence in areas dominated by ex-militants. This was due to the relative consensus among the leading political elites and ex-militant leaders. Government Ekpomopolo, the ex-militant leader of MEND in Delta State, supported the PDP. Ekpomopolo’s charismatic leadership and large following meant that there was little or no dissent within the communities where he operated as a warlord. Bayelsa State had a different experience. The factionalism that occurred as a result of the defection of Africa Ukparasia meant that he was likely to lose his place of power in community politics and within the state if the APC did not emerge victorious in any of the state- level elections. Other ex-militant leaders in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area – the locality where Ukparasia had influence and power – maintained their support for the PDP, thereby intensifying the competition for power. In Rivers State, ex-militant leaders continued to support the PDP. However, the APC led by Governor Rotimi Amaechi made significant efforts to campaign in communities where ex-militant leaders wielded power and influence. This brought both parties into a space of confrontation, which often led to violence. The increased probability of violence in Rivers and Bayelsa states calls for a closer analysis of events there.

Bayelsa State The presidential election held in March 2015 did not result in widespread electoral violence in Bayelsa State. In sharp contrast, the December 2015 governorship election in Bayelsa State recorded incidences of violence.11 This election was declared inconclusive following an outbreak of violence involving ex-militants in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area. Henry Seriake Dickson, the governor of Bayelsa State, described the elections as a ‘war’ due to the intensity of the violence. Reports of violence recorded during this period showed that it was related more to the legislative elections: for example, ex-militants destroyed campaign materials belong to a politician campaigning for legislative office in Brass on 25 January 2015 (Partners for Peace 2015). In Ekeremor, supporters of PDP and APC candidates clashed on 7 February 2015 and PDP party loyalists destroyed opposition campaign materials in Kolokuma Opokuma on 5 February (ibid.). Violent confrontation involving supporters of different political parties was also seen in Nembe on 31 January 2015 (ibid.). These examples show the specific pattern of election violence in Bayelsa State during the 2015 legislative elections; however, they also show that ex-militants were not involved in all cases of election violence. The only instance where ex-militants were involved occurred in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area during a local legislative election in Constituency 4 (ibid.). This constituency was home to ex-militant leaders Africa

146 6 | Ebiede - - -

14 2015). The state governor sought to to sought governor state The 2015). 147 who started shooting. This information is impor information This who started shooting. 15 in particular witnessed a violent confrontation between armed between armed confrontation in particular witnessed a violent 13 – they struggled to ensure that politicians and community members who who members community and politicians – they that struggled ensure to 12 The quote above illustrates the role the ex-militant leaders and ex-militant ex-militant and leaders ex-militant the role the illustrates above quote The ofthe nature reflects dynamic the that information also contains quote The We were going to the local government secretariat. Africa and his boys were were Africa boys his secretariat. and the local to government going were We Africa told the other. on were boys his and Joshua and town side of one on they But take the election materials. him to allow to boys his and Joshua Africaother Ogun and Boss before afterwards too long not was It refused. injured. Several boys. were persons Joshua at started shooting boys Electoral violence occurred across Bayelsa State during the governor during State Bayelsa occurred Electoral violence across ex-militants that led to the cancellation of the election results for the entire the entire for the election results of the led cancellation to that ex-militants the provided the event to A witness 2015). (Ukpong area local government account: following tant for a number of reasons. Ogun Boss had supported the PDP during the the during the PDP Ogun Boss supported had reasons. of a number for tant During this period, he State. in Bayelsa elections legislative and presidential Boss had the APC. However, who supported opposed Africahad Ukparasia, security infrastructure oil of control the over PDP the with disagreements (Premium in the state Times contracts to failure Boss’s control. total Ogun Boss wanted but these contracts, control had he that government the PDP oppose led him to these contracts be awarded may leaders ex-militant though even that, shows clearly This supported. once Ukparasia and Joshuan Mackiver, who supported different candidates for the the for candidates different who supported Mackiver, Joshuan and Ukparasia while candidate, the APC supported Ukparasia office: 4 legislative Constituency community with conducted Interviews candidate. the PDP supported Mackiver during this ex-militants between confrontation the that confirmed members rivalry leaders in the of between the result election was ex-militant the two area fighters had in the election violence and shows that the violence seemedto violence the that shows and election in had the violence fighters why us tell does not it However, between factions. two be a confrontation against insurgency in an collaborated leaders, who previously had ex-militant during each other against confrontation in a violent engaged state, the Nigerian the understand need to we thisquestion, answer to order In the elections. in the insurgency of the end leaders at thesepolitical ex-militant alliances of the APC, while joined had Joshua Africawhich they Ukparasia participated. Both trieda method men they use violence, to the PDP. joined Mackiver of the chances enhance to a means as both the insurgency, had used during theirpolitical parties. respondent The patrons. their political parties to and loyalty leaders’ ex-militant Ogun Boss was it that noted ship elections held on 4 December 2015. The Southern Ijaw LocalIjaw Govern The 4 DecemberSouthern 2015. on held elections ship Area ment belonged to their network occupied positions of public authority within the state the state within authority public of positions occupied theirnetwork to belonged the community. and be seen as clients in a patron–client relationship with political office holders, they also exercise their agency in negotiating their place in this relationship. To do this, they resort to violence or the threat of violence. Thus, ex-militant leaders should not be seen as clients without agency, but rather as actors who use their history and socio-political categorisation as entrepreneurs of violence to negotiate a place in the political system of the Niger Delta. In order to do this, the ex-militant leader mobilises his ex-fighters, especially those who continue to benefit from his continued dominance in the political system. This struggle is one factor that leads ex-militant fighters to participate in election violence even after participating in a DDR process. The outcome of the Bayelsa State election shows the plausibility of this argument. Henry Seriake Dickson of the PDP was finally declared winner of the governorship election in Bayelsa State. In return, he appointed Joshua Mackiver, an ex-militant leader who had been engaged in the violent confrontations in support of his governorship candidacy, as chairman of Southern Ijaw Local Government Area (Oyadongha 2016). Africa Ukparasia lost his position of influence in the politics of the local government area and in Bayelsa State in general. This illustrates that the expectations of reward serve as a motivation for support, and that this leads ex-militants to engage in election violence.

Rivers State There were repeated incidences of violence in the period leading up to and during the elections in Rivers State. Data from the Partners for Peace project shows that violence occurred in several local government areas in Rivers State. For example, armed youths attacked and destroyed the campaign materials of the APC in Asari Toru Local Government Area on 18 January 2015. Also, armed youths bombed the site of a planned APC rally in Port Harcourt, the capital of Rivers State, on 24 January 2015. Reports also show that ex-militants, using violence against election officials and party agents, hijacked election materials in Degema Local Government Area on 23 January 2015. Attacks were also reported in Gokana and Obio Akpor Local Government Areas during the period of the elections (Partners for Peace 2015). Reports of electoral violence in Rivers State show that not all acts of violence involved ex-militants. Some of these acts were carried out by youths who were not involved in armed militancy. This does not come as a surprise, as election violence was a common phenomenon in the region long before the involvement of ex-militants in politics (see Human Rights Watch 2007). However, cases of election violence reported in areas dominated by ex-militants tended to be more intense and destructive during the 2015 elections in Rivers State. For example, an APC campaign rally in Okrika, the home town and base of Ateke Tom, was violently disrupted by ex-militants (Ibanga 2015). After the elections, the Rivers State government set up a commission of inquiry on violence during elections, and witnesses testified that members of the APC

148 6 | Ebiede - - 149 Ex-militant leaders also have an interest in ensuring that their preferred theirpreferred that ensuring in interest an also leaders have Ex-militant in role a significant to APC played the alsoAmaechi of defection The The motives behind the involvement of ex-militant leaders in election election leaders in of ex-militant involvement the behind motives The credited was occurredOkrika in Area that violence The Local Government ment led by the APC would terminate these patronage contracts, which would which would contracts, these patronage terminate the APC would led by ment fears These in the community. position privileged his from Ateke displace presi as in sworn was Buhari Muhammadu APC’s the after became reality leaders. This ex-militant to all cancelled contracts and 2016 May 29 on dent who mobilised Ateke, as such leaders, ex-militant of highlights the anxieties in localelections their areas. the won PDP the that to ensure their ex-fighters not did interest Ateke’s Thus, level. the state at victorious emerge candidates elections. in the the presidential victory trying with end the PDP of ensure to the goes beyond back in election violence involvement Ateke’s Historically, militancy armed started was when he into fact, foray his In elections. 2015 the 2003 during the PDP by election violence for hired a so-called ‘thug’ creates in the PDP membership continuous 2009). Ateke’s (Asuni elections the party that ensure to continue him to for a motivation and a relationship PDP of the success is This the because domain. his within victorious emerges patronage. continued for possibilities creates state the subnational of the level at fighters, ex-militant his mobilising by in this process engages therefore Ateke intimidation election materials, of in the hijacking who then involved become theopposition. of members of harassment and voters of noted, already As State. fuelled in Rivers election violence that the anxieties the APC as of the emergence despite in the PDP leaders remained ex-militant were also violently attacked during the general elections in Akuku-Toru Local in Akuku-Toru elections the general during attacked also violently were 2015). Government State (Rivers Area Government with be could compared elections the 2015 during State in Rivers violence in the highlight differences would comparison a Such State. those in Bayelsa in election The violence states. the in two the political networks of workings confronted groups ex-militant that shows discussed as earlier, State, Bayelsa ex-militant State, in Rivers However, the election process. during each other carried violence the Thus, in the then ruling PDP. remain to leaders tended were parties, who opposition those in the targeted fighters ex-militant by out With the armed. necessarily not were and fighters ex-militant necessarily not election leaders in violence of ex-militant role the this difference, of exception states. thein two similar was ex-militant the Tom, Ateke of control under the fighters ex-militant to mainly was elections in the 2015 interest Ateke’s 2015). (Ibanga the NDV leader of elites, Ijaw many like 2013): (Olapade PDP the for support by his defined other like and, government, PDP-led of the the patronage benefited from he power and privilege of position a him gave this leaders, patronage ex-militant govern a that fears were There influence. most had Okrika, he within where a governing party in the state. Thus, the continued governance of the APC in Rivers State would probably have meant the political alienation of ex-militant leaders who supported the PDP. This risk of political alienation increased the stakes of the elections for ex-militant leaders such as Ateke Tom, who were driven by these anxieties to mobilise ex-militant fighters who remained loyal to them during the elections in Rivers State. Ex-militant leaders in Rivers State were reported as being involved in election violence even before the emergence of armed militancy in the Niger Delta (Human Rights Watch 2004). In fact, as argued by (Ukiwo 2011: 27), ‘militancy has thrived in the region because guns rather than votes count during elections’. However, the analysis so far shows that the continuous involvement of ex-militant leaders and ex-militant fighters in election violence does not lie within the linear patron–client relationships that characterise mobilisations for political violence. Instead, ex-militant leaders have emerged as actors who continuously negotiate their place within the political context of their communities. They use resources available to them to negotiate this place, including their ex-fighters. In situations where the electoral process is susceptible to influence by violence, they deploy their ex-militant fighters to carry out violent actions that could influence the outcome of the elections. The PDP emerged victorious in the governorship elections and in a majority of state legislative elections in Rivers State. This victory was an outcome of a violent contest that led to the repeated cancellation of elections in certain areas. The violence could be interpreted as an unbridled contest for political power by the political elite, but one could also argue that it is also the result of the struggle of ex-militant leaders to remain powerful in their communities and to maintain informal positions of influence in state politics.

Conclusion This chapter has examined when and why ex-militants engage in electoral violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. The theoretical premise is that ex-militant leaders have gained power in their communities and in the wider political processes of the state. To maintain this power, ex-militant leaders have to ensure that the political party they support emerges victorious in elections, which is why they engage in the electoral process. This goes beyond the notion that ex-militants and their leaders are clients whose agency is mainly expressed in support of political elites. The evidence and analysis show that ex-militant leaders tend to act as patrons or ‘Big Men’ themselves in their communities and local governments, and that they maintain this status due to patronage contracts they have with Nigeria’s oil industry. In addition, ex-militant leaders remain influential among their ex-fighters because of the nature of the Niger Delta DDR programme, which ensures that ex-militant leaders control the participation of their ex-fighters in the DDR process. To maintain their power and privilege

150 6 | Ebiede - 151 This chapter demonstrates the need for policy makers and electoral electoral and policyneedfor makers the demonstrates chapter This The findings in Rivers and Bayelsa states show that this theoretical claim claim theoretical this that show states Bayelsa and Rivers in findings The tend leaders ex-militant that show chapter inanalysis this and findings The tions of power and privilege in their communities. Electoral violence is a way a way is Electoral violence in their communities. privilege and power of tions of a result as gained they have the power maintain leaders to ex-militant for struggle is a It them for Delta. Niger militancy in and the conflicts the violent in the political process. Men’ ‘Big of ‘clients’ being disposable to revert to not ex-militant with relationship continued their fighters, ex-militant ordinary For argues chapter This violence. in electoral engage leads them to what leaders is An multilayered. and complex are violence behindelectoral thenetworks that in the the conception that is this complexity from drawn insight important in the ‘clients’ and ‘brokers’ ‘middle-men’, leaders as ex-militant of literature ex-militant Instead, is incomplete. conflict societies from of politics emerging societies. this way, such in In patrons and Men act Big as to tend leaders power of their positions since game, zero-sum seea as elections ex-militants elections. of outcomes on the dependto tend influence and elections for leaders when preparing ex-militant with engage to institutions and leaders ex-militant Often, conflict. armed in societies from emerging process. in the political actors dangerous viewedas are potentially ex-fighters been by addressed have should ex-militants of the concerns that assumed is It Ex-militants the reality. of falls short this assumption But programmes. DDR DDR attending their society of political after processes the broader focus on focus may while ex-fighters ordinary that, I show this chapter, In programmes. political about concerned leaders are ex-militant opportunities, economic on are ex-combatants Clearly, the state. within and theirin communities power for needa is there Hence, processes. political post-conflict in actors passive not specific develop policy to instruments institutions electoral policyand makers elections. post-conflict in ex-combatants seek engage to that locally and in the broader political processes of the state, ex-militants tend to to tend ex-militants the state, of political processes locally in the broader and carryelectoral to out militia networks and resources their material mobilise Delta. Niger in elections the of outcome the influencing of the aim with violence focus to tend State leaders in Rivers Ex-militant ways. in different manifests on theirfocus was Hence, thein state. the PDP of the power maintaining on This process. electoral the 2015 the APC during of members attacking violently the elections of the outcome on impacted that violence in electoral resulted Unlike Bayelsa control. and influence leaders had ex-militant where areas in State in Rivers ex-militants among factionalism internal no was there State, in Bayelsa recorded was that electoral violence major The the elections. during political opposing of support in who were ex-militants occurred among State states in intense to more be is likely electoral violence that parties.shows This party lines. along split are groups militant where their posi maintain to is, that interests: their in their agency own exercise to Notes 1 Other states included in the official armed insurgency in the Niger Delta. definition of the Niger Delta are Abia, 14 Telephone interview by the author Imo, Ondo, Akwa Ibom, Cross River with Coronation Topko, 10 December and Edo states. This definition emerged 2015. in 2000 following the creation of the 15 This is an alias. The original name Niger Delta Development Commission of the ex-militant is Paul Eris. He is an (NDDC). indigene of Peremabiri community in 2 Ex-militants as a social category are Southern Ijaw Local Government Area. often referred to as ex-combatants in the literature of peace and conflict studies. References 3 Author interview with DDR official, Adetula, V. (2014) ‘Money Bags, Violence Abuja, January 2014. and Electoral Democracy in Nigeria’. 4 Author interview with ex-militant Paper presented at the Nordic Africa in Ologbobiri, Bayelsa State, January Days (NAD), Nordic Africa Institute, 2014. Uppsala, Sweden, 26–27 September. 5 Author interview with community Ake, C. (1996) Democracy and member, Ologbobiri, Bayelsa State, Development in Africa. Washington December 2013. DC: Brookings Institution. 6 Author interview with ex-militant, Alapiki, H. and U. Ukiwo (2013) Ologbobiri, Bayelsa State, 14 December ‘Anxious Godfathers, Errant 2014. Godsons: Neopatrimonialism and 7 Author interview with ex-militant Democratisation in Nigeria’, Politeia 32 member, Ologbobiri, Bayelsa State, (1): 40–58. September 2015. Albert, I. O. (2005) ‘Explaining 8 Author interview with Ibaba S. “Godfatherism” in Nigerian Politics’, Ibaba, a Nigerian scholar, Yenagoa, African Sociological Review/Revue Bayelsa State, February 2014. Africaine de Sociologie 9 (2): 79–105. 9 Author interviews with ex- Arowosegbe, J. (2011) Reflections on the militants from Africa Ukparasia’s Challenge of Reconstructing Post- faction in Ologbobiri, Southern Ijaw conflict States in West Africa: Insights Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, from Claude Ake’s Political Writings. November 2014. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. 10 Author interview with ex-militant Asuni, J. B. (2009) Understanding the in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 12 September Armed Groups of the Niger Delta. 2015. 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154 6 | Ebiede . New York NY: United United NY: York . New Conflict and Social Conflict , 7 December. Available at at Available , 7 December. ‘Beyond Amnesty: ‘Beyond The Challenges Democracyof Sustainable and Delta’, in the Niger Peacebuilding 6 (2): Digest Research Delta Niger 109–33. Elections in Southern Cancels Declares Local Government, Ijaw Premium Elections Inconclusive’, Times www.premiumtimesng.com/news/ headlines/194772-breaking-bayelsa- inec-cancels-election-in-southern- ijaw-declares-election-inconclusive. 2016). (accessed 2 June html Disarmament, Demobilization and in Practices (DDR) Reintegration A Contribution Operations: Peace to the New Horizon Discussion on UN for Opportunities and Challenges Peacekeeping Peacekeeping of Department Nations Operations. and Men Big Power: Informal and NY: York New and . London Networks Zed Books. (2004) . Congo DR Eastern in Transformation Press. Academia Ghent: Ukiwo, U. and T. M. Ebiede (2012) (2012) Ebiede M. T. and U. Ukiwo, INEC ‘Bayelsa: C. (2015) Ukpong, Second (2010) Generation Nations United African (2012) M. (ed.) ConflictsUtas, Raeymaekers T. K. and Vlassenroot, 155 18 (3): 255–80. 47 (3): 334–53. . London and New York York New and . London Civil Wars , 3 January. Available Available , 3 January. (2014) ‘Chief Edwin Edwin (2014) ‘Chief NY: Zed Books. NY: Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis’ in in Crisis’ Delta the Niger Oil and (eds), Oil S. A. Rustad and C. I. Obi Delta: Niger the in Insurgency and of Politics Complex the Managing Petro-violence ‘Governance through Brokerage: Brokerage: through ‘Governance War in Post-civil Governance Informal Societies’, at http://thewillnigeria.com/ at Chief-Edwin-Clarks-letter-to- (accessed Obasanjocompressedpdf.pdf December13 2017). of the Micro-politics and Networks in Liberia’, Statebuilding and Violence Politics Comparative Clark’s Letter to Obasanjo’, Obasanjo’, to Letter Clark’s Will The 27 (1): 27 (1): Policy Security Contemporary 168–89. the at presented Paper Delta’. Niger the on Conference International and Oil Industry State, Nigerian the by organised Delta, the Niger Science, Niger Political of Department with in collaboration University, Delta Environmental Applied for the Center Missouri- of University Research, Kansas City. Ukiwo, U. (2011) ‘The Nigerian State, State, ‘TheNigerian (2011) U. Ukiwo, Themnér, A. and M. Utas (2016) Utas (2016) M. and A. Themnér, Themnér, A. (2015) ‘Former Military ‘Former A. (2015) Themnér, Tamuno, T. T. (2008) ‘The (2008) Geographic T. T. Tamuno, Will The 7 | The winner takes it all: post-war rebel networks, Big Man politics, and the threat of violence in the 2011 Liberian elections

Mariam Bjarnesen

Introduction In October 2011, Liberia faced one of its sternest post-war challenges – the second general elections following two brutal civil wars (1989–96 and 1999–2003). While the international peacekeeping mission, United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), had organised the first post-war elections held in 2005, this time the Liberian state resumed full responsibility. The elections were widely seen as a test of the country’s security-political situation, and as an opportunity to consolidate Liberia’s fragile peace. Yet there were also fears of renewed instability, or even violence. The elections would be telling, and not only in terms of the final electoral results. More importantly, the pre-election political mobilisation and the manner in which the elections were conducted would, it was thought, be a powerful gauge of Liberia’s security system and how far the country had come since the 2003 peace agreement. In most post-conflict countries, much is at stake and tensions are high during elections (e.g. Harris 2011; Lyons 2005; Obi 2007). The 2011 Liberian elections were no exception. Specifically, they illustrated how important it is for many ex-combatants to become what they regard as ‘politically active’, but, more than this, they highlighted the importance of supporting the ‘right’ political candidate. During elections, Liberians in general, and perhaps ex-combatants in particular, partly due to their violent potential, have access to opportunities that are usually out of their reach. These political events are the moments when the otherwise distant political elite has to listen to the Liberian people. But the difference between winning and losing in Liberia can be immense, something that can be demonstrated by following networks on both sides of the dividing line. For my informants, political involvement was very advantageous for one side; for the other, it was disastrous. In this chapter I use the elections as a point of departure for analysing the role of Liberian ex-combatants, and how such a political event can highlight the relevance of talking about what I refer to as ‘post-war rebel networks’, eight years after the war came to an end. The empirical research that informs this chapter was gathered through in-depth interviews with a distinct category 156 7 | Bjarnesen - - - networks simply because the because the simply networks 157 The chapter analyses whether a lingering temptation to mobilise such such mobilise to temptation analyses a lingering whether chapter The Elections in post-conflict countries are often seen as important markers of markers important often as seen are countries Electionspost-conflict in Post-conflict elections – the final break with war? break with elections – the final Post-conflict individuals I have followed within these structures mainly have a past as rebel rebel as a past have these within mainly structures followed I have individuals of support in ex-combatants I specificallyfollowed this chapter, For soldiers. candidates important the most were ultimately, who, candidates the presidential the from Sirleaf Ellen Johnson president – the incumbent elections in the 2011 the from candidate the presidential Tubman, Winston (UP) and Party Unity elections. the after and during (CDC) – before, Change Democratic of Congress during still existed violence electoral of perpetrators potential as networks takes its Liberian the It 2011 elections. during, and to, the up time leading of a form as politics’ Man Liberian ‘Big of the concept from departure of point conceptualisation This 2007). Utas and Jörgel 2012a; (see, Utas e.g., clientelism lack apparent an is in Liberia, there the idea where that elsewhere as embraces impor with Men Big individual depend people on state, a well-functioning of illegal themilitary activitieswho politics, perhaps or business, in positions tant them for benefits mutual with their followers provide to use their resources that is ex-combatants of perception a general Furthermore, their networks. and this Following instability. and violence post-war linked with intimately they are run would elections post-war during ex-combatants of logic, the mobilisation of findings the central of One violence. in resulting ultimately of risk great a the outcomes, violent of examples whileare there that, suggests this chapter post-war times of during political candidates by ex-combatants of mobilisation through the elections purpose winning of for done necessarily not is elections that general point more the underscores conclusion This violence. the use of result automatically does not political events in such involvement ex-combatant violence. electoral in of Liberian ex-combatants: namely, ex-combatants for whom the networks the networks whom for ex-combatants namely, Liberian ex-combatants: of words, other in focushere, The important. remain the war during established their each links to maintained actively who have soldiers rebel former on is formalised, not but organised, in an combatants, former other to or other, I choose use rebel the to term post-war manner. a state’s transition from war to peace. Elections are therefore prioritised within within prioritised therefore peace.to Elections are war from transition a state’s democracyafter promoting and states rebuilding at aimed efforts international elec particular, in interventions international In high-profile conflicts. violent and signalling in both the domestic value, symbolic important an also have tions prevailed. has authority government a legitimate that arena the international recon state of process in the step an essential representing is This seenas (Reillybuilding 2013). state post-conflict part of a central thus struction, and the question us makes still violence naturally when occurs, electoral it Yet, the democratisation of the newly peace achieved the state of and sustainability process in general. Electoral violence – together with its causes, perpetrators and consequences – has received increased attention for these reasons in recent years (e.g. Höglund 2009; Laakso 2007; Mehler 2007). Such research is of great value, not least because it can tell us something about the level of stability that a country has reached after a conflict. But should this lead to the conclusion that the absence of electoral violence is a sign of a state’s final break with war? In this chapter, I suggest otherwise. Moran (2006), in her research on violence and democracy in Liberia, notes the Western tendency to view these two concepts as occupying opposite ends of an evolutionary scale whereby the successor to widespread violence is imagined to be democracy. Moran questions whether democracy and violence really are separate, or even separable, or whether there is violence in democracy and democracy in violence. Moran asks if a people really can be said to ‘choose’ democracy over war and vice versa. In answer to these questions, she argues that in Liberian political discourse violence and democracy are not conceptually opposed, but rather are aspects of the same understanding of legitimacy. She suggests that Liberian history can be understood as an ongoing interplay between themes of democracy and violence enacted at both local and national levels (ibid.). In this chapter, I approach the 2011 Liberian elections from a similar perspective. I suggest that the elections, despite the relatively low levels of violence, cannot be seen as a final break with war. On the contrary: the elections in this case make Liberia’s wartime past more evident. War and peace are entangled, not opposed, and the elections illustrate this continuity. For instance, as pointed out by Harris and Lewis (2013) in their analysis of the Liberian elections, many of the political actors with high levels of popularity who had built on their war records returned in 2011, illustrating that the time that had passed since the war did not appear to have altered the political environment. The use of post-war rebel networks during post-conflict election processes, whether or not this leads to the use or threat of violence, is an illustrative example of these war–peace entanglements.

Liberia’s recent history of electoral violence The use of wartime structures and ex-combatants in order to win elections is not a new phenomenon in Liberia. As Lyons (1998), among others, observed during the 1997 elections after the first civil war, the former National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel leader Charles Taylor converted his military organisation into an efficient mass-mobilising political party where patronage replaced guns and rallies roadblocks, in order to win the political competition. Taylor’s political party – the National Patriotic Party (NPP) – provided a civilian platform from which he could compete for votes during the elections, but in reality the organisation remained fundamentally militarised (Lyons 2005). Taylor then convinced the UN monitors to accept the result of the elections

158 7 | Bjarnesen - 159 who won the second senator seat, campaigned on his record of defending defending of record his on campaigned seat, senator the second who won 1 According to Harris (2011), many rebel generals and leaders of insurgent insurgent leaders of and generals rebel many (2011), Harris to According tive deals within the National Transitional Government of Liberia of (NTGL) Government Transitional deals the National within tive a have to continued soldiers rebel former and the war Still, in business. and had been theafter agreement peace elections on even the impact significant and the war of (2008), the ending Sawyer by demonstrated As signed in 2003. Liberia make a political did not warlords and the oligarchy of the removal candidates the Sawyer, by noted as elections, 2005 the During rasa. tabula the during local security communities for provided have to claim who could groups armed with associated Candidates the voters. by favoured were wars both County, Nimba elected. In were their people among records credible with leader theformer Johnson, Prince combatants. as a past had elected senators Liberia of (INPFL), Front Patriotic National Independent group the rebel of the conflict them during of protection his of voters reminded who constantly the won war, be another there should them again defend to ability his and Adolphus commander NPFL former The a landslide. by seat senate senior Dolo, in which his NPFL had intimidated voters, and he was elected president (Reno (Reno electedwas president he and voters, intimidated had NPFL in which his in post-conflict voters attract to way the easiest Reilly (2013), by noted As 2011). the veryappealto generated the insecuritiesto societies same that often is of instead argues, cases, such Reilly In place. in first original conflict the a policy with post-conflict partieshave appeals, winsupport to attempting along voters mobilise instead and policy choices downplay to incentive strong the Liberian case In lines. this be seems to true, wartime insecurities as identity in all role important an played have to appear aspects identity as well of as aspect remarkable a that however, noted, be should It elections. post-conflict groups rebel of disappearance the virtually was elections complete the 2005 of for (Liberians United LURD group the rebel neither as thein political process, Democracy for in (Movement Democracy) MODEL and nor Reconciliation chairman the political former parties. Conneh, Sekou into Liberia) transformed own his of candidate a presidential as in the elections reappeared LURD, of wife estranged as his ineffectual rather was the attempt but political party, and Sirleaf Johnson decided support Conneh to co-leader Aisha former and 2011). (Harris theinstead UP lucra pursuing and Taylor been unseating with satisfied seemed have to forces Nimba County against LURD forces in 2001. Sawyer (ibid.) notes that a similar a similar that notes (ibid.) Sawyer in 2001. forces LURD against County Nimba also could the be elections, the seen country parts during of pattern in other election at transformation rebel of dynamics Such a lesser extent. to although Anders by noted As questions. democracies important time in post-war raise a post- into as Dolo such general of a wartime (2017), the Themnér evolution countries: war-torn many facing problem highlights a central democrat war Men violent with Big by contested a game becomes often politics electoral that political weak authoritarian and façade institutions of in a context backgrounds parties. As Themnér observes, a central question is therefore what this recurring tendency implies. Will former warlords on the political scene continue to employ wartime tactics, such as inflicting fear, orchestrating violence, committing abuses and engaging in criminal activities? Or will they choose more democratic paths and seek to reconcile war-affected groups? In his research on warlords turned politicians, Themnér comes to the important conclusion that these actors are not a priori reckless and irrational, bent on spoiling peace processes and democratisation, and that there is little evidence that they would automatically engage in aggression. On the contrary, Themnér (ibid.) finds that most so-called ‘warlord democrats’ act in a warlike manner only under very specific conditions. In this chapter, following a similar logic, I examine the consequences of how, why and when post-war rebel networks, rather than individuals, become involved in electoral politics, particularly considering the risk of violence, instability and the continuation of wartime logics.

The 2011 Liberian elections and the involvement of ex-combatants In August 2003, the government of Liberia, and the two rebel groups the LURD and the MODEL, signed the comprehensive peace agreement that came to mark the end of war in Liberia. Years of brutal fighting had left the war-torn republic with overwhelming challenges. The fragile state was to be rebuilt and security re-established. With major assistance and funding from the international community, Liberia underwent a disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) process of ex-combatants, which disarmed over 100,000 combatants. With this process, which lasted until 2009, Liberia was to integrate former combatants into civil society and disrupt lingering post-war rebel networks (UNMIL Today 2009). Nevertheless, in 2011, at the time of the second post-war elections, these networks were mobilised in different capacities by the main political candidates, as we shall see in this chapter.

Winston Tubman and the vigilante leader In 2009, I met Alex for the first time. Alex had emerged as a leader of a vigilante group in Sinkor, Monrovia a few years earlier. The group saw themselves as local defenders: defenders of their community in an area that the Liberian National Police (LNP) did not dare enter at night. At dusk, the young men of the group gathered. Following Alex’s instructions they were divided into smaller groups and took turns to patrol the neighbourhood until the early morning hours. Anyone not belonging to the community who was found wandering in their streets was stopped and questioned. Suspected criminals, or anyone caught committing a crime, were to be brought directly to Alex and then handed over to the police for further investigation. This did not always happen, however. From time to time, the vigilantes not only took it upon themselves to be the neighbourhood’s watchmen; they also considered

160 7 | Bjarnesen 161 One might also say that Liberian politicians had had Liberian politicians that also say might One 2 Alex had not been a rebel soldier. Among the approximately fifty men who men fifty who the approximately Among been soldier. a rebel not Alex had its also with came vigilantes as rebels former having of the advantages But taken a new for had turn life 2011, in September Alex again I met When themselves fit to determine the captured individual’s guilt or innocence after an after or innocence guilt individual’s determine to captured the fit themselves (seeKantor also punishment inflict to as the well as interrogation, on-the-spot 2011). Persson and made up the vigilante group, that made him an exception. The group’s members members The group’s exception. him an made that group, the vigilante up made rebel of Liberia and parts ethnic groups, backgrounds, different from came their status and their community only not was shared they now What factions. of the members The unemployment. also and poverty but ex-combatants as little a contributed most but vigilantes, the to pay afford not could community these young of some for this way, In going. the food group keep to or money also was a way it meal, but secure to a daily a way was being a vigilante men, members vigilante to According the war. skills learned use during of make to Alex been had was because chosen he thecommunity, of members other and in He, in the neighbourhood. a trusted man and known, well respected, well neighbourhood skillsinformal as good the made ex-combatants’ turn, use of had movements rebel of service years Their different in securityproviders. to where and area, secure to an how themselves, organise to them how taught suspected ambush their neighbourhood and protect to in order take positions others and as Alex importantly, more but, fight, to criminals.They how knew others by feared and fearless were they out, pointed often in the community group vigilante the that The knowledge nature. violent their perceived for a deterrent had words, in other ex-combatants, of composed primarily was outsiders. on effect hands own their into to take law the likely more were perils. ex-combatants The suspected The the to criminal rule was be that punishment. to came when it from broken above, noted as to was, the and then police Alex first to brought fearless and their war experiences past from ex-combatants’ The time. time to Catching control. to difficult and them unpredictable made violence to attitude more were the ex-combatatants a crime, committing in thea person act of towards attitudes community’s The violence. likley spontaneous to resort to who was member a community As ambivalent. thus were group the vigilante support strong enjoyed the group me, told group the vigilante part of not the were LNP non-existent: was because the alternative in the community skills fearless in securityand ex-combatants’ trusted. The nor present neither the community, in the eyes of security them providers valuable made attitude they be could controlled a certain to extent, least at time, the same while at it. against a threat constituting of instead the community for theyas worked politics’, into ‘gone had him around the men Alex and group. his and him themselves. it theyas saw reached out to the ex-combatants. Alex had been approached by Winston Winston by Alex been had approached the ex-combatants. to out reached Tubman – the man who, in May 2011, had been chosen as the presidential candidate for the CDC party. After being nominated, Tubman set out to arrange his personal protection, primarily by establishing his own informal security group. Tubman wanted men around him who could work as his personal bodyguards, and who could protect him when campaigning but possibly also show force, power and status. To find men suitable for the job, Tubman turned to Alex. This was not the first time Tubman had run for president and not the first time he had approached Alex. Like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Tubman, the nephew of Liberia’s longest-serving president, William Tubman, was part of and brought up within the old Americo-Liberian elite.3 He had degrees from the London School of Economics, Cambridge and Harvard University and had owned his own law firm. During Samuel Doe’s years in power, Tubman served as Liberia’s Minister of Justice. After the fall of Doe, Tubman had continued his career as a diplomat within the UN and had just left a position as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Somalia in time for the 2005 elections (BBC News 2005). Tubman then ran for Doe’s old party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) (see also Harris 2011). Tubman had got to know Alex and had called on him to establish an informal security force of ex-combatants to accompany him during his campaigning in the 2005 elections. Tubman had lost the race against Ellen Johnson Sirleaf back then, and Alex and his men had returned to their normal life and business. But for the 2011 elections, Tubman needed the vigilante leader and his network once again. The security force established around Tubman and the CDC party came to resemble a military unit in many ways. Alex and four other men, the others being former rebel generals, were chosen as the unit’s main commanders. Some of these men had also worked for Tubman in 2005, while others were new recruits. Each commander had a specific task and main responsibility for areas such as Tubman’s overall day and night-time security, campaigning and motorcade security, private residence and party headquarters security, and so on. Under each commander, Alex assigned ex-combatants from his vigilante group to work as security providers. The group closest to Tubman was composed of approximately twenty-five men. However, the overall informal security network around CDC was much larger. George Weah, the well-known footballer and former CDC presidential candidate from 2005, ran for the vice presidency under Tubman during the 2011 elections. He also had his own personal informal security force, resembling in structure the one organised for Tubman. Finally, there was an additional informal security group working for the CDC party, which some informants called the ‘Battle Cry’. The Battle Cry was a much larger group, composed of approximately 1,000 men and a few women, most of whom were ex-combatants. The Battle Cry did not operate autonomously but was under the command of Tubman’s security

162 7 | Bjarnesen Michael had had Michael 163 4 At the end of the second Liberian civil war in 2003, a network of an an of network a 2003, in war Liberian civil second the of end the At achieved what many only dream of and had secured employment in the formal in the formal securedhad employment and of dream only many what achieved If security institutions. the country’s of sector: one within position a senior and status civilian acquire which ex-combatants by the process is ‘reintegration Michael 2005), in UNDDRRC stated (as income’ and employment sustainable gain But life. civilian into certainlyhad been integrated socially economically and networks, wartime rebel his of abandonment in his not lay success Michael’s the opposite. rather but Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the former LURD general general and the former LURD Ellen Johnson Sirleaf group. The group’s members were located both in Monrovia and out in the in the out and Monrovia in located both were members The group’s group. during security group Tubman’s for reinforcements as worked and counties area secure an and check to was the group example, For campaigning. his villages and in towns arrived security closest his group and Tubman before regular payment any Cry received of Battle never members The campaign. to food drinkssometimes, and, and given often the CDC were from party but to closest security group of Alex’s members The money. of small amounts the CDC from payments regular more somewhat on count could Tubman the wider security of of the structures members for them, as for party but, electoral eventual an of promise and the hopes were mattered what the party, the other Alex and this with talkedI about When Tubman. Winston victoryfor Tubman If allvery they were enthusiastic. the security of group, commanders permanent victory imply the would that sure they felt win the elections, to were into be incorporated would the very the least, commanders security jobs. At within other or in positions aseither the official bodyguards security system, where to about think want even not They did security theformal institutions. would a defeat that sure they were but lost, if Tubman up end they would victoryA for poverty. and their struggle them with unemployment with leave give not would they argued, Sirleaf, Ellen Johnson president the incumbent at all. benefits themany estimated 5,000 ex-combatants (predominantly ex-LURD rebels) took control control took rebels) ex-LURD (predominantly 5,000 ex-combatants estimated Guthrie as then known rubber plantations, lucrative the country’s of one of the illegal (UNMIL 2006). Although plantation Darby Sime renamed later and as on stayed of ex-combatants ended networks in 2006, officially occupation forthcoming). (Bjarnesen the new management for securityinformal providers this that evident more and became more it approached, elections the 2011 As in in political developments play to a new had role network rebel post-war plantation at the active remained had generals rebel Liberia.former Three ex-combatants the them, through and, takeover, government the following political influential to connected were security force the plantation within hand, one on the key dependence actors, between political mutual The actors. rebel post-war influence to the ability with commanders rebel former key and networks, on the other, becomes particularly evident by following the trajectory of Michael as one of the three main commanders at the plantation. Through Michael, the ex-combatants at the plantation could be used for political purposes, and through him the ex-combatants could take advantage of this political event. Michael had already successfully managed to secure and leverage political connections during his time in control of Guthrie. Authorities and politicians, even at the highest level of the transitional government (the NTGL), cooperated with the rebel leadership occupying the plantation after the war. In doing so, they managed to take advantage of the financial resources generated by the rubber industry. After the 2005 national elections, Johnson Sirleaf’s government negotiated with the rebel commanders in order to regain control over Guthrie, and Michael was the main negotiator on the side of the occupiers. He thus became the gatekeeper between the political and economic elite and the ex-combatants at the plantation. The elite needed the ex-combatants and the ex-combatants needed the elite. Michael could operate as the link between these actors, making cooperation possible and a mutual dependence fruitful for both sides. Even after he and the other ex-combatants had officially handed over control of Guthrie in 2006, Michael remained an important actor for the politicians and the ex-combatants alike. He successfully negotiated reintegration benefits for his former combatants with the Sirleaf Johnson government, but he also stayed in close contact with the ex-combatants who remained at the plantation as informal security providers (Bjarnesen forthcoming). Michael also used the contacts he gained during his time managing the plantation for his own benefit in order to secure employment within Liberia’s official security structures, namely the Intelligence Department of the LNP. Further- more, Michael had done what few ex-combatants have had the ability to do: he had invested some of his resources in university studies and, in 2012, he obtained a degree in criminal justice.5 While using his skills and contacts, Michael continued to progress within the official security structures, as he later attained a senior position in one of Liberia’s formal security institutions. For the 2011 elections, Michael once again became important for the political elite as well as for the ex-combatants in his network. In March 2011, during the voter registration process, he launched an ex-combatant organisation based around the Sime Darby plantation area. When Michael first had the idea, he presented it to a senior local politician in Sirleaf Johnson’s government in Bomi County, where the rubber plantation is located, who decided to sponsor the project. Michael came up with the idea because he wanted an organised network for ex-combatants’ rights. He wanted, he said, to keep them out of trouble, drugs and criminal activities, and he wanted to work for their employment opportunities by using his links to the political elite. Whatever motives Michael had for starting the organisation, it was evident that, for the politicians facing

164 7 | Bjarnesen - In this way, Michael’s influence over over influence Michael’s this way, In 6 165 These events marked the beginning of the end for for of end the the beginning marked These events 7 Michael and two other former rebel generals, constituting the leadership theleadership constituting generals, rebel former other two and Michael The results of the first round of the presidential elections, held on 11 on held October elections, presidential ofthe round of first the results The Winners and losers in the 2011 elections and losers Winners a forthcoming election, supporting Michael’s organisation was a strategic way way strategic a was organisation Michael’s election,supporting a forthcoming his in enlisted 1,000 ex-combatants soon over had Michael votes. gaining of thenetwork. approached level the highest at politicians and organisation The herself. the president with meetings few a had even theorganisation, of commanders the former and Michael these that was meetings of outcome and thein elections the UP and Sirleaf Ellen Johnson promote to promised promises and support financial for in exchange phase the pre-election during the should the ex-combatants, of some for higher education for scholarships of first he explained, Michael As power. in remain government Johnson Sirleaf ‘I said, he then, as the elections, for register to the ex-combatants encouraged vote.’ to how when and them why, told the hopes and dreams of a better future that Alex and the men around him him around the men Alex and that future a better of dreams and the hopes Sirleaf’s victory Johnson President phase. the pre-election during held had later. days few a declared was 2011, were released on 25 October, giving incumbent president Ellen Johnson Ellen Johnson president incumbent giving 25 October, on released were 2011, Tubman Winston by followed the votes, of the lead 43.9 per with Sirleaf cent presidential a now Johnson, Princerebel leader former The per cent. 32.7 with came party, (NUDP) Progress Democratic for Union the National for candidate the candidates of none As (NEC 2011a). the votes of 11.6 per with cent in third faced a Tubman and Sirleaf Johnson majority, absolute secure to an managed Tubman Winston However, 2011. November 8 on to electionheld be run-off Sirleaf’s been the electionhad therigged CDC Johnson that in and claimed urged and round the second the of CDC and pulled out Tubman favour. other informants my and Alex For the run-offs. boycott to their supporters conse the CDC, immeasurable had and this decision Tubman who supported quences. They felt cheated out of the election victory and were convinced that that convinced election of were the victory and out cheated felt They quences. international of the approval of regardless been had the elections fraudulent, observerselection and and Liberians observers. rapidly, grew Their frustration calm pre-election the relatively despite violence renewed fear to started now the presidential of round the second before the day period. On 7 November, informants my that a day on deadly, turned eventually the protests elections, gathered had of CDC supporters Thousands Monday’. ‘Bloody as to refer elections. the run-off boycott to voters urge to the party headquarters outside prevent to a road blocked UN forces by police backed as out broke Violence also used was gas but Tear the city. into the CDC marching from activists the CDC diedactivists after among man young one least at and bullets, live in the head. being shot the ex-combatants as voters became equally significant. became equallysignificant. voters as theex-combatants Alex was dejected when I met him after the elections. Tubman had left the country, leaving Alex and his men without work. Not only was Alex without a job, he seemed to be unable to find a new one because of his former commitment. Alex’s main strength, which Tubman had clearly exploited – namely, that he had been a well-known and respected man in his community with the ability to mobilise whole networks of ex-combatants – had now become a weakness. The opposition knew him well and no one wanted to employ him. With the victory of President Johnson Sirleaf, security positions within the formal security institutions were now completely out of reach, Alex and all my pro-CDC informants argued. But these positions were not beyond reach for ex-combatants on the winning side, those who had supported the president before and during the election process. Now Johnson Sirleaf had to pay them back with whatever means she had, leaving nothing for the losing side. As Alex explained: ‘CDC can do nothing for the ones they mobilised. They are left with nothing. And now things are even worse than before as the winning side don’t want to have anything to do with them.’8 Alex had not only looked for jobs within the formal security institutions, he had also visited almost all the private security companies, but no one, he said, was willing to offer a position to a man who so clearly was connected to the losing side. For Alex and the ex-combatants working for him this was a ‘winner-takes-all’ situation, and they had supported the ‘wrong’ candidate. Furthermore, Alex was not only miserable due to his inability to find a job; he was also afraid. In December, only a few weeks after the Johnson Sirleaf victory, Alex’s house was attacked. Masked men broke into the house in the middle of the night. They took everything of value and smashed the rest, leaving Alex’s small home completely ravaged. Alex and others in the neighbourhood strongly believed that this was a retaliatory act, due to the fact that he was a CDC man, that he had not been loyal to the ruling elite of Liberia. The police, he said, had not investigated the incident and could even have been involved. He had no evidence of this suspicion, but this was what he and others believed. From then onwards, Alex did not dare spend another night in his old house. He feared another attack, he feared revenge and retaliation, and he even feared for his life. For six months, he had been moving around all over Monrovia, spending the nights at different friends’ houses. He never wanted to stay in the same place for long, and he was careful not to let too many people know his whereabouts. In all the years I had known him, Alex had been proud to be a well-known man in his neighbourhood. Now he saw this distinction as his biggest disadvantage. He and many ex-combatants around him had staked everything when they took sides in the elections. This political event had been their most promising option, and a risk they considered worth taking. But they had lost everything.

166 7 | Bjarnesen This was the government’s government’s was the This 9 167 had ‘won Bomi for Ellen’. He said this jokingly, but it was not not was it but this jokingly, said He Ellen’. Bomi for ‘won had During the Sierra Leonean general elections in 2007, Christensen and Utas Utas and Christensen in 2007, elections During general the Sierra Leonean For Michael, the outcome of the elections meant something entirely entirely something meant the elections of the outcome Michael, For Michael has remained important for a large network of ex-combatants, despite despite ex-combatants, of network a large for important remained has Michael The potential of post-war rebel networks for electoral violence violence for electoral networks rebel The potential of post-war (2008) followed what turned out to be a remobilisation of ex-combatants into into ex-combatants of be to remobilisation a out turned what followed (2008) mobilising for political parties. exactmotives The the major for squads’ ‘security Utas and as but Christensen specified, officially never were ex-combatants of trust a lack alongside argued that, themselves fighters the former found, them as employ political to leaders chose securityin the formal institutions, different. As I could see when we met again in April after the elections, elections, the after April in again met we see could I when As different. from benefited clearly had ex-combatants of network his and Michael feel could Michael that victoryThe meant Sirleaf’s victory. EllenJohnson most he a position the security institution, at secure position in his more his For been had a new if there political lost leadership. have would likely politicians senior with used had personal contacts his Michael ex-combatants, had He studies. university for scholarships twenty over for funding get to choosing the scholarships, for the candidates been who appointed the one a high had school who already network in his those ex-combatants among recommend to managed had He promising. as saw he whom and diploma contacts his through security informal positions different for severalothers organisations. private and institutions various at way of paying him back for the support he had mobilised during the electoral the electoral during mobilised had he the support for him back paying of way Bomi voting of in round first from the results official election The campaign. he based where was and organisation ex-combatant Michael’s where County, per 65.3 cent Sirleaf Ellen Johnson gave network, his part of the main had the second In 28.7 per cent. Tubman’s Winston with compared the votes, of a clear won Sirleaf Johnson the elections, boycotted had Tubman as round, told and laughed often Michael victory (NEC 2011b). per 92.4 with cent he that me course, of is, It truth statement. some behind his saw he that tell to hard of network his and Michael influence much how precisely say to impossible evident, is what the Liberian but on actually elections, had ex-combatants him with in their contacts invested the politicians much how from judging significant. was impact the is that fighters, former his and smalland favours for to him They come years. many for being over the war they lucky, him, if they because are through importantly, most but, handouts, other on the the Liberianelite, For employment. finding of the possibility have and large is ex-combatants of network His valuable. as just is Michael hand, these access rebel post-war can others and him politicians through and loyal, employing unofficially votes, mobilising personal gain, whether for structures purposes. or social, political other financial or securityproviders, they were afraid of the consequences of not mobilising them. The politicians, in their eyes, feared another uprising and were therefore forced to work with them. Other statements indicated that the task forces, in addition to providing security for the politicians, were also used by the political elite to intimidate voters and to ‘create a general state of panic’ (ibid.). Furthermore, Christensen and Utas’s informants also regarded the elections as an opportunity to benefit in ways the end of the war had never offered them. But the most important motivating factor for the ex-combatants was their expectations for the future. Their participation in the security squads, they believed, could bring future benefits such as jobs and education. Many of these incentives were also relevant for my informants in the 2011 Liberian elections. However, during the elections, Liberia witnessed far fewer violent incidents than Sierra Leone did. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore why the use of post-war rebel networks led to more violence in Sierra Leone, the issue of time passed since the war might be a factor worth mentioning in brief. In the Sierra Leonean 2012 elections, the levels of violence decreased compared with those in 2007, and were only a matter of small-scale and localised incidents, which did not suggest a high level of central planning, as noted by Conteh and Harris (2014). As the same authors have pointed out, it may be that violence in the Sierra Leonean case was no longer an efficient vote-collecting strategy for the main parties. More importantly for this study is the fact that the Liberian case questions the assumption that post-war rebel networks are used simply with the motive of mobilising electoral violence, a conclusion one might otherwise be tempted to draw if one analysed the 2007 Sierra Leonean case in isolation. In the Liberian case, the use of networks of ex-combatants does not seem to have been intended to create an overall state of panic in any sense, even though the politicians surrounded by ex-combatants while campaigning could have had an intimidating effect on the public. For Winston Tubman, for example, campaigning in the company of the network of ex-combatants Alex could provide could also have been a way to show force, power and status, thereby attracting votes. Hoffman (2011) found examples of a similar logic during the 2005 Liberian elections, when a businessman from Grand Cape Mount County decided to run for the House of Representatives. The businessman found a former rebel commander an indispensable ally, as he had the capacity to mobilise ‘supporters’ in Monrovia. Due to his connections higher up in the Liberian hierarchy, the commander, who kept a network of ex-combatants close to him, learned that the businessman needed young men who could rally for him on appointed days, taking to the streets wearing his party colours on T-shirts. The businessman needed, as Hoffman argues, a display of force and support. With ex-combatants dancing, shouting and marching in his name he manifested power. With his army of ‘violent labour’

168 7 | Bjarnesen - 169 Lyons (2005) emphasises selective incentives – such as patronage – as one one – as patronage as – such selective incentives emphasises (2005) Lyons At the same time, the strategic use of post-war rebel networks by the the by networks rebel post-war use of the strategic time, the same At Tubman’s mobilisation of the ex-combatants in 2011 could be seen from be could seen in 2011 from the ex-combatants of mobilisation Tubman’s Post-war rebel networks as a resource for stability and livelihood and for stability as a resource networks rebel Post-war he could make it clear to the Liberian people that he had the strength to to the strength had he theLiberian that to people clear it make could he (ibid.). govern of the major ways in which political parties mobilise support during post- during in which political parties support mobilise ways the major of form take the may in militarised elections societies.conflict incentives Selective benefits non-material or as salarysuch benefits, or employment, material of a join to be might willing Individuals efficacy. of feeling a or prestige as such because the selective incentives insurgency or social movement politicalparty, able during political events such as elections even long after war has ended. ended. has war after long even elections as such political events during able the political use of the equally strategic overshadow not should political elite mobilised Laakso by groups (2007), noted As networks. rebel post-war by elite a merely as be disregarded not should violence of perpetrators potential as the for campaigning political Violent leaders. by reserve manipulated passive political gain to groups marginalised party bewinning can for a strategy of the with the well Liberian case fits argument This elections. after power not were their networks although elections, the 2011 during ex-combatants The fact such. as campaigning thepurpose specificbeing used of violent for rebel post-war manipulate and use of make to wanted the political elite that ex-combatants’ the from away doestake not benefit their own for networks political of in their support choices strategic make to ability and agency own within of ex-combatants the all that observation imply This doesnot candidates. to came action when it of freedom the same had networks rebel the post-war who ultimately Michael, as such actor An taking sides in the political game. room more had between sides, obviously the two a gatekeeper become had rebel post-war Still, ex-combatants. low-ranking most than manoeuvre for in this the political elite of in thehands tools passive from far were networks to take one, a risky albeit opportunity, an rather were elections The regard. ex-combatants – both for soldiers rebel their as wartime pasts of advantage among in Liberia and post-war positions influential who secured had more not. who had themajority a similar perspective, as a public display of force and power, partly through partly through power, and force of display a public perspective,a similar as even more perhaps But ex-combatants. control to ability his demonstrating these to networks access having elections, the 2011 in the case of importantly benefits, promised for in exchange votes mobilise to way be effective could an still well were their dependants and ex-combatants of the networks that given the how shows argue, would I This, loyal. and large operational, connected, necessarily not – and one only is networks rebel post-war of potential violent valu these finds actors the political elite – aspect why of important the most are available only to those who participate. In order to maintain the benefits of selective incentives, a difference in the treatment of one’s in-group and out-groups is required. Patronage distributed only to supporters of political parties is an example of this (ibid.). In the case of the 2011 Liberian elections, it is clear that the political elite used this strategy to mobilise support among ex-combatants and that both the material and non-material benefits of the selective incentives were significant for the mobilised ex-combatants. For my informants, the elections were above all else an opportunity to find employment. As pointed out by Jennings (2008), among others, in Liberia, the language and expectations of what the reintegration process was to bring about were clearly incompatible with the implementation and resources assigned for this task. As Jennings notes, the reintegration concept in itself is vague, and could refer to either a minimalistic or a more ambitious reintegration agenda. In the Liberian case, this led to heightened expectations, followed by frustration and dissatisfaction among the ex-combatants. Many were unable to find paid employment after completing the DDRR training courses, accusing the DDRR process of failing to improve their situations and leaving them with unfulfilled promises. As early as December 2003, disappointment in the process had led to riots that caused the deaths of nine people and a temporary suspension of the DDRR (ibid.). One of the fundamental issues was that ex-combatants were under the impression that completion of the DDRR would automatically lead to employment. This, in fact, was impossible for the weak Liberian state and economy to accomplish. Ex-combatants, like most Liberians, had to find their own way to rebuild their lives and secure their livelihood. For some of the ex-combatants who had spent years in the war with their fellow fighters, leaving their closest network, their wartime rebel structure, was not a realistic alternative. Munive (2010) has analysed the concept of unemployment in Liberia in relation to youth and ex-combatants. With an estimated 85 per cent unemployment rate, finding work for Liberia’s youth is, of course, an enormous challenge. However, as Munive concludes, since most of the economy is informal in Liberia, the term ‘unemployed’ is of questionable utility. The international community, Munive argues, has viewed ex-combatants and young people in general from a bureaucratic perspective, casting those without formal employment as unproductive, making it imperative to transform ‘unruly’ ex-combatants into productive citizens. But in reality, Munive shows, contrary to these representa- tions, young people are actively engaged in economic activities for survival, activities that constitute the backbone of the Liberian post-war economy. As formal employment is not an option for Munive’s informants, informality becomes the sole means of survival (ibid.). For the Liberian ex-combatants I have followed before, during and after the elections, the use of their wartime rebel structures became a way to access

170 7 | Bjarnesen , rather than abandon, wartime wartime abandon, than , rather 171 The disbanding of rebel structures is commonly considered vital due to to due vital considered is commonly structures rebel of disbanding The ex-combatants, about preconceptions of this critical reading Following the informal labour market in post-war Liberia. And as the case studies Liberia. post-war in the case as studies And market labour the informal this time. during their particular highin was demand labour shown, have their skills security in on the war; learned during draw they Ex-combatants mobilising in efficient and they be can influential and violent potentially are to loyal and large often are their networks as their candidate, for support therefore it ex-combatants, many for that, argue I would commanders. former preserve to important strategically becomes rebel structures in order to find employment. The 2011 elections undeniably undeniably elections 2011 The employment. find to in order structures rebel post- of thedissolution and ex-combatants of the reintegration that illustrate the Liberian of the interests to be counterproductive would structures rebel war mutual a way, In this policy. official of the messages to contrary political elite, years still eight existed the elite and dependence between the ex-combatants elections, national as such during events And over. declared was war the after the stakes Nonetheless, visible. even more dependence becomes this mutual when they take sides in political the ex-combatants high for incredibly are formal gain even to opportunity an provide sometimes this can While events. survival as in Liberia connected is also disastrously, end may it employment, the political elite. to connections the right having to ways many in an constitute structures rebel in lingering ex-combatants viewthe general that country a post-conflict drive to the potential security have and risk imminent consequently – and a rebel of the image that argue I would warfare. into back acts committed violent of a consequence only not – is ex-combatant an of that often and superficial the stereotypical, of also a product but the war, during been described have combatants its and in which the war ways misleading out points (2013) McMullin As elsewhere. in the media and represented and in Liberia, DDRR a threat practice of and the discourse of assessment in his threatening naturally and inherently as ex-combatants portrays that narrative to According ex-combatants. on debate the post-conflict to peace dominates of discussed terms in and be monitored to tend ex-combatants McMullin, of independent warfare, lead renewed could to their disappointment how in which the ways of independent and in war result could that variables other All ex-combatant be these variables. linked to might other this dissatisfaction of poses the recurrence it the risk to of terms in monitored thus is activity anchored is threats as this ex-combatants view of argues, McMullin As war. ideology education, lack antisocial, are ex-combatants that in the assumptions and greedy apolitical, barbarically violent, irrational, political beliefs, are and towards gravitate theynaturally of war, end the after that, nihilistic, and criminallives. networks rebel post-war the use of that unconditionally assume cannot we renewed of a risk to Liberian contributed in the necessarily 2011 elections war. Such an assumption would rely on the notion that organised networks of ex-combatants would automatically perpetrate violence. In fact, I would suggest that the involvement of post-war rebel networks during the election process could possibly have had conflict-mitigating effects, as the elections gave many ex-combatants some form of employment opportunity, albeit informally. Furthermore, there were no signs of any remobilisation to new rebel factions during the elections. Clearly, as Mitton (2009) points out, success in politically reintegrating ex-combatants should not be judged solely by the absence of renewed violence or the conduct of free and fair elections. The extent to which ex-combatants have faith in the political system and peace to deliver solutions to their problems of social and economic disparity is more relevant (ibid.). Applying this understanding to the 2011 Liberian elections, we must conclude that the relatively peaceful completion of the elections is not sufficient to say that a successful demobilisation of ex-combatant networks has been achieved, nor that these first post-war elections organised by the Liberian authorities signalled a final break with the country’s wartime past. Former fighters were instead politically useful in their capacity as ex-combatants, highlighting how war and peace continue to be intimately linked in Liberia. Bøås and Utas (2014) come to a similar conclusion. With a point of departure in the historical background of the country’s conflict, they conclude that Johnson Sirleaf’s electoral victory should be interpreted neither as an indication that the country has entered into a new stage of peace and reconciliation, nor as evidence of a strengthening of the country’s democratisation. Instead, the authors suggest, the electoral results could even be seen as cementing the old cleavages that led to civil war in the first place (ibid.). The ‘winner-takes-all’ effects of the Liberian 2011 elections for the ex-combatants considered in this chapter support this analysis.

Conclusions This chapter has reached two overarching conclusions. Firstly, the 2011 elections in Liberia did not bring about the envisioned final break with past wars. The lingering presence of post-war rebel networks and their continued usefulness to political Big Men are clear indicators of this continuity. Rebel networks can remain relevant long after war has come to an end despite years of demobilisation and reintegration efforts. In times of elections, they can become important pawns in the political game. The elections proved to be an opportunity for Liberian ex-combatants that could lead to post-election advantages, though only on the winning side. In this sense, a genuine democracy was far from strengthened, as, in the eyes of the losers, the winning side was not considered more legitimate than it had been before the elections. Yet, these continuities with Liberia’s wartime past might not be the real problem, which leads us to the second overarching conclusion of this chapter:

172 7 | Bjarnesen 173 We might therefore be forced to view post-war rebel networks in a rather in a rather networks view rebel to post-war be forced therefore might We that the presence and use of post-war rebel networks in times of elections elections times in of networks rebel post-war use of and the presence that are wars The past violence. in result automatically, or necessarily, not may to continue the country must social and political reality and Liberia’s part of the structures and – both theactors incorporate sometimes deal and – with the of the end at vanish simply they as do not atrocities, past for responsible for their mobilisation themselves, ex-combatants the perspective of From war. secure to strategy entrepreneurial an part of primarily was elections the 2011 take part to in potential a desire by being motivated than rather employment, - involve the that The Liberian caseshows warfare. renewed or violence electoral for or elections, as such in political events ex-combatants organised of ment as violence, to precursor inevitable an not is contexts, in other and tasks other ofpost-war generalperception as the finding is a central This assumed. often is lead automatically may existence continued their mere that is networks rebel as such political events important with – in connection violence renewed to shown has chapter This war. to case, in a return in the worst or, elections, the for outcomes positive have can networks rebel post-war theuse of that are these as actors stability, post-war also for but themselves ex-combatants otherwise them. closed opportunities to given presence, continued has been Their case. the traditionally than light different more societies post-war a far is and in general, elections post-war in times of contexts in and post-war elections, During assumed. often than issue complex be can used – or perpetrate to violence networks rebel post-war in general, also be they may – but potential their violent to due intimidate, to merely purposes.spectrum The activities in of non-violent post-war entirely used for such be needs to from analysed and broad is engage can which these networks with all actors that assume we be to If fully understood. a perspective in order are networks, rebel post-war including in war, engagement active a history of appreciate to we fail war, the methods after violent to resort to predetermined will also to fail We be ways. could used positive in constellations such how beingused for theselead to networks may that the circumstances understand of capable and to accustomed they are that forget not should we ends: violent other by or the political elite by way thein wrong Used warfare. and violence to dangerous potentially are they actors, influential and powerful financially the Liberian that doubt no peace Liberia.is and of There stability the future post-war use of strategic its with game a dangerous playing was political elite be can their as seen And, from elections. the 2011 during structures rebel the ex-combatants. so the elections, too were side of theexperiences losing on Notes 1 Adolphus Dolo was also known as bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15624471. General Peanut Butter during the war. Bjarnesen, M. (forthcoming) ‘From 2 This was a common expression Perpetrator to Protector?: Post-war among my informants in order to explain Rebel Networks as Informal Security their participation primarily as informal Providers in Liberia’. Athens GA: security providers during the 2011 University of Georgia Press. elections. Bøås, M. and M. Utas (2014) ‘The 3 The Americo-Liberians are Political Landscape of Postwar Liberia: descendants of freed American slaves of Reflections on National Reconciliation African background who were sent to and Elections’, Africa Today 60 (4): Liberia between 1817 and 1867. The group 47–65. ruled the country in an apartheid state Christensen, M. M. and M. Utas (2008) manner and declared Liberia independent ‘Mercenaries of Democracy: The in 1987. “Politricks” of Remobilized Combatants 4 Personal communication with Alex in the 2007 General Elections, Sierra and two of the other main commanders L e o n e’, African Affairs 107 (429): 515–39. of the informal security group at various Conteh, F. M. and D. Harris (2014) ‘Swings occasions in Monrovia during September and Roundabouts: The Vagaries and October 2011. of Democratic Consolidation and 5 While few ex-combatants have had “Electoral Rituals” in Sierra Leone’, the ability to study at university, some of Critical African Studies 6 (1): 57–70. the more influential former commanders Harris, D. (2011) Civil War and Democracy appear to have earned degrees in criminal in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, justice sponsored by politicians or other Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and influential actors. Liberia. London: I. B. Tauris. 6 This section is mainly based on Harris, D. and T. Lewis (2013) ‘Liberia in personal communication with Michael in 2011: Still Ploughing its own Democratic September and October 2011 and April Furrow?’, Commonwealth and 2012. However, much of the information Comparative Politics 51 (1): 76–96. in the chapter is also based on several Hoffman, D. (2011) The War Machines: interviews and meetings with ex- Young Men and Violence in Sierra combatants and workers at Guthrie, Bomi Leone and Liberia. Durham NC: Duke County, Liberia, from 2010 to 2012. University Press. 7 See, for example, BBC News (2011) Höglund, K. (2009) ‘Electoral Violence in and Utas (2012b). Conflict-ridden Societies: Concepts, 8 Conversation with Alex, Monrovia, Causes, and Consequences’, Terrorism 12 April 2012. and Political Violence 21 (3): 412–27. 9 Personal communication with Jennings, K. M. (2008) ‘Seeing DDR from Michael on several occasions in Monrovia Below: Challenges and dilemmas Raised in April 2012. by the Experience of Ex-combatants in Liberia’. Fafo Report 2008:03. Oslo: Fafo. References Jörgel, M. and M. Utas (2007) The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal BBC News (2005) ‘Liberian Poll: The Main Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea Contenders’, BBC News, 5 October. and Sierra Leone. Stockholm: Swedish Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ Defence Research Agency. africa/4309302.stm. Kantor, A. and M. Persson (2011) ‘Liberian BBC News (2011) ‘Liberia Election: CDC Vigilantes: Informal Security Provision Monrovia Protest Turns Deadly’, BBC on the Margins of Security Sector News, 7 November. Available at www. Reform’ in M. Ekengren and G. Simons 174 7 | Bjarnesen . London 10 (1–2): 10 (1–2): 107 (427): 107 177–99. . Cambridge: Cambridge Cambridge . Cambridge: . London and New York NY: Zed NY: York New and . London . Monrovia: United Nations Nations United . Monrovia: Africa: Ex-military Leaders and Electoral Electoral and Leaders Ex-military Africa: Politics Books. Demobilization Disarmament, Nations Centre Resource Reintegration and www. at Available May. (UNDDRRC), unddr.org/what-is-ddr/introduction_1. aspx. the into Tapping Plantations: Rubber Future in Liberia (UNMIL). Mission 6 (2): 1. UNMIL Today . Networks and Men Big Power: Informal Zed Books. NY: York New and London Odd Election and On CDC Popularity 5 April. blog, Utas Mats Results’, http://matsutas.wordpress. at Available Monrovia: National Elections Elections National Monrovia: www. at Available (NEC). Commission necliberia.org/results2011/county_3_1. html. Post-conflict of the Challenge and African Africa’, in West Democratisation Journalof Affairs International 1–12. in M. Berdal Development’ Political of Economy Zaum (eds), Political D. and Statebuilding: Power afterPeace Routledge. NY: York New and to African Africa: Approaches New History Press. University Politics: Post-conflict in Liberia’s Elections’, the 2005 Observations from African Affairs com/2012/04/05/liberia-post-election- on-cdc-popularity-and-odd-election- results/. Warlord Democrats in in Democrats Warlord A. (2017) Themnér, United DDR?’, Is ‘What (2005) UNDDRRC Liberia’s in Rights UNMIL (2006) Human Up’, Wraps (2009) ‘DDR UNMIL Today M. (ed) African (2012a) Conflictsand Utas, ‘Liberia M. (2012b) Post-election: Utas, Obi, C. (2007) ‘Introduction: Elections Elections ‘Introduction: C. (2007) Obi, Post-conflict and ‘Elections (2013) B. Reilly, Independent in Warfare (2011) W. Reno, Patterns A. (2008) ‘Emerging Sawyer, 175

. 39: 385–414. 39: . Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner. . Boulder CO: Lynne and Violence in Africa: Systematic Africa: in Systematic Violence and Empirical against Reflections G. in M. Basedau, Background’ (eds), Votes, A. Mehler and Erdmann in Parties Political Violence: and Money Nordic . Uppsala: Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Institute. Political The Disengagement: Sierra Leone’s of Reintegration in M. Front’ United Revolutionary (eds), Reintegrating Ucko Berdal D. and Politics, Conflict: after Groups Armed and . London Transition and Violence Routledge. NY: York New PA: . Philadelphia Democracy of Press. Pennsylvania of University Nordic People’, Young “Unemployed” 18 (3): 321–38. Research Youth of Journal Elections: National Legislative Elections National Monrovia: Tally’. www. at (NEC). Available Commission necliberia.org/results2011/. Elections: Bomi County’. Legislative Farnham: Ashgate. Ashgate. Farnham: G. in M. Basedau, in Africa’ Violence (eds), Votes, Mehler A. and Erdmann in Parties Political Violence: and Money Nordic . Uppsala: Africa Sub-Saharan AfricaInstitute. Current History Elections’, to Anarchy 229–233. (619): 97 to Road Uncertain the and Elections Peace of Stigmatisation The Separation? of Review War’, after Ex-combatants Studies International The Politics of Security Sector Sector of Security Politics (eds), The Opportunities and Challenges Reform: Role Global Union’s European the for Mehler, A. (2007) ‘Political Parties Parties ‘Political A. (2007) Mehler, with K. (2009) ‘Engaging Mitton, Violence The H. (2006) Liberia: M. Moran, of ‘The (2010) Army J. Munive, and Presidential ‘2011 NEC (2011a) and Presidential ‘2011 NEC (2011b) Laakso, L. (2007) ‘Insights into Electoral Electoral into ‘Insights L. (2007) Laakso, from Path ‘Liberia’s (1998) T. Lyons, Politics: Demilitarizing (2005) T. Lyons, or ‘Integration (2013) J. McMullin, 8 | Parasitic politics: violence, deception and change in Kenya’s electoral politics

Jacob Rasmussen

Introduction

We are not a violent organisation. But I can’t say that some of our members weren’t violent [during the 2008 post-electoral violence]. It is young men; of course they are angry. The government can’t tell them not to be angry.1

Since the introduction of multiparty elections in Kenya in 1992, the electoral process has been characterised by violence in one way or another (Fjelde and Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume). In 1992 and 1997, interethnic violence and militia-driven persecution of opposition supporters in the run-up to the elections killed several hundreds of people (Kagwanja 2001). The 2007 December elections erupted into interethnic and militant violence that killed 1,500 people and displaced more than half a million (Kagwanja and Southall 2010). Even the supposedly peaceful elections of 2002 and 2013, where a lot of resources were put into preventing and containing violence, saw hundreds of people killed in the months leading up to the elections (Merino 2014; Mutahi 2005). The dynamics and expressions of violence might have differed from one election to the next, and some of the violent actors have also changed over time, but the politicisation of ethnic identities, the instrumentalisation of youth militias, and the excessive use of force by the state security services have been central components of the violence that has surrounded and affected democratic elections in Kenya (Mueller 2008; Thibon 2014). As shown in the introduction to this volume, these elements are far from unique to Kenya; on the contrary, they are driving factors in much electoral violence across the world. This chapter approaches electoral participation as anything from voting to violent action (Laakso 2007). The chapter investigates the Mungiki movement, one of the most dominant violent non-state actors in Kenyan electoral politics since the late 1990s. Looking at Mungiki’s shifting roles as youth grassroots organisation, violent ethnic militia, political party and religious organisation across the last three elections (2002, 2007 and 2013), the chapter approaches electoral violence – in line with the ambitions of this volume – as violent acts or threats of violence affecting the electoral results or the electoral process prior to or after the actual vote. As such, the analysis of Mungiki’s role in

176 8 | Rasmussen - - The This 3 2 ’. Politics Politics ’. za kumalizana Siasa 177 Politics in Kenya is often described as a politics of deception or a politics of of a or politics described deception of often as a is politics Kenya in Politics Through the notion of ‘parasitic politics’, the chapter explores how the the how explores chapter the politics’, ‘parasitic of notion the Through onthe Kenya in fieldwork ethnographic is on long-term based chapter The ethnographic material on Mungiki’s practices and political engagements is set is political engagements practices and Mungiki’s on material ethnographic in this perception is a game concerned with outsmarting the opponent by all by the opponent outsmarting with concerned a game is in this perception of ethnicthe community. or gains the gain personal for often means, ment’s relation to the Kenyan state and Kenyan politics, which has strong strong which has politics, Kenyan and state the Kenyan to relation ment’s van and Bratton (cf. politics patronage and ethnic politicisation of elements 2012). Utas 1997; Walle de ‘ as Kiswahili franca the in lingua known intrigue, electoral violence is not necessarily limited to periods of close proximity to to periods to close proximity limited of necessarily not is violence electoral transformative and emerging in an violence electoral rather, the elections; the elections from isolation occur can in temporal democracy Kenya as such Bekoe (cf. process the electoral by beinformed or impact huge a have yet peculiar Mungiki’s of add perspective the analysis to To 2015). Burchard 2012; Kenyan of the wider with parallels characteristics draws thepractices, chapter recent in Kenya’s actor a central as Mungiki of the analysis Hence, politics. the move of analysis a contextual also violence provides electoral history of aspect of Kenyan politics and political practice is often emphasised during during emphasised often politicalis practice and politics Kenyan aspect of characterising phrase recurrent another to relates it and elections national our is ‘It winning: of the hopes and politics electoral of the ethnic dimension and of ethnic identities to the politicisation refers expression This eat.’ to turn a particular with take care to ethnic politicians association the expectation of and Cheeseman electoral victory after (Branch their ethnic constituencies of witha winner game as a zero-sum politics captures effectively This 1). 2010: As the loser. the equal winner the losses of of the gains where a loser, and in the literature repeated and this volume to in the introduction emphasised likely more higherstakeselections, in the conflicts, the the electoral the on (Collier violence 2010). of the risk politics Kenyan of characterisations the noted into buys movement Mungiki ethnic for the hope and power for appetite an by driven and deceptive as a particular explain used is diagnose politics to and Parasitic redistribution. prac violent and participation political practice in which democratic kind of ‘other’ one’s of live and deceive transform, to the ability through tices merge the Kikuyu state, the Kenyan either is the ‘other’ Mungiki, (in the case of of merger The a whole). as the population or elite, economic political and does concept in the same violence for the potential and politics democratic help can the concept but default, by violent is politics Kenyan that mean not actors. the central of some of rationale and behaviour the situated unpack us in 2008, of violence the post-electoral in the aftermath movement Mungiki in 2009, during Mungiki the police of the extra-judicial persecution by during elections. 2013 the during and 2010, of referendum constitutional the in relation to existing literature on the movement and to the bulk of literature on Kenyan elections and the country’s continued struggle for democracy. The chapter continues by setting out the analytical foundation before going into three empirically founded sections: the first focuses on Mungiki’s mass actions and mobilisation, the second on the movement’s ideological baggage from the Mau Mau and its ability to transform, and thirdly on the parasitic nature of politics and violent action. Each section is organised in subsections providing analyses of Mungiki’s involvement across the three general elections from 2002 until 2013 and the role of violence or the struggle to contain it in these elections. In the conclusion, the chapter argues that electoral violence, as we can understand it through the notion of parasitic politics, reveals itself as relational, fuelled by competing claims and counter-claims, and groomed by the actualisation of historical misrecognitions and the instrumentalisation of collective identities, rather than being driven by a lack of civility and a lack of trust in the democratic aspect of elections.

Deception and violence as political participation Cheeseman (2015) and Collier (2010) have investigated the political economy of the dynamics of democracy and violence in Africa from a cross-country comparative perspective. They both depart from the positive potential for legitimacy and accountability inherent in democratisation, and the possibility for changing the course of events through the electoral process. Both authors point out that political participation – and maybe even the idea of democracy itself – is often boiled down to the electoral process of casting the vote, and the dynamics of contestation and violent conflict are often linked to the possibility for change. The fact that all Kenyan elections since the introduction of multiparty democracy have been violent in one form or another testifies to the increased stakes for politicians in maintaining power; violence thus becomes a means to that end, even if the stakes and therefore the level of violence seem to drop at elections where the incumbent’s term comes to an end, like the 2002 and 2013 elections in Kenya (Cheeseman 2015). Kenya’s history of ethnic voter mobilisation, which has created identity-based loyalties between politicians and their support bases, has also limited voters’ mobility to other political camps and has increased the risk of ethnic violence (cf. Collier 2010; Fjelde and Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume). In addition, sub-Saharan Africa is facing a demographic challenge due to the enormous increase in the youth population, which casts poor and young first-time voters as the central actors of electoral democracy. On the one hand, the youth have the numbers to gain influence through the vote; on the other, they often constitute a marginalised group due to their lack of jobs and education and their limited possibilities for political participation.

178 8 | Rasmussen - 179 The Mungiki movement embodies what I call ‘parasitic politics’ through its its through politics’ ‘parasitic I call embodies what Mungikimovement The French relations, human for metaphor a grand as the parasite on work his In tion in which the youths voice their dissatisfaction with the existing order and and order the existing with their dissatisfaction voice whichthein youths tion (Laakso societal and 2007: inclusion political participation for theirchances to claims movement Mungiki the where Kenya, in no different is 227). This has political mobilisation its where and poor youth, of the masses represent violence. of fears public immediate evoke to come and participation democratic combine to and deceive, and transform to ability use Mungiki’s from derived is politics parasitic practices. Empirically, violent the Mugumo and mythology: Kikuyu the chameleon from metaphors two of of life the tree is considered latter the Mythologically, fig tree). (a parasitic tree the ability inhibit Both death. metaphors of the harbinger as the former and colour change continuously to ability its through the chameleon transform: to tree Mugumo the parasitic and surroundings, immediate its in with blend and two The a new form. take on and tree the host consume to ability its through also and potential violent and transformative Mungiki’s to point metaphors such, As surface. deceptive a potentially and core a hidden ideasof to allude in violence and deception secrecy, of notions embrace metaphors Mungiki’s and mythology reintroducing as well as societal to transformations, relation politics. Kenyan parts of integral as traditions ancestral to mythology and politics of notions merges Serres (1982) Michel philosopher 1). At 2002: (Brown re-worked and challenged are orders existing describe how the asymmetrical is relation. the parasite of characteristic Serres’ of the core their each other, depend on might the host and parasite if the preying Even (Serres 1982: the other on feeding is asymmetrical: one always is relationship different a new and into merge the host and the parasite together, 55). Yet, – existing the of things flow normal the process this parasitic Through whole. is It (ibid.). appear new to something for order in interrupted – is order the and takeover, violent inherently the interruption, of characteristics the intriguing an the parasite make that asymmetry interdependence and relational infused political mythologically practice Mungiki’s describing for metaphor the chameleon unpacking While in Kenya. violence in electoral role its and potential the productive investigates the chapter metaphors, tree Mugumo and electoral of in the dynamics role Mungiki’s understanding for deception of Kenya. in violence This is problematic in countries such as Kenya where voter registration and and registration voter where Kenya as such countries in problematic is This youths Often, poor the poor. for costly and time consuming are actual voting the continent on instances in many and democracy, to a threat considered are 2002; (Anderson violence electoral of perpetrators the main they constitute violence of thethreat Paradoxically, 2011). 2008; Strauss Utas and Christensen be participa can act electoral seen itself a particular of as the violent form or ‘The born-again Mau Mau’: Mungiki’s economic and cultural background Mungiki is a movement dominated by youth from the Kikuyu tribe. Mungiki was founded in the rural parts of central Kenya in the late 1980s based on a revival of Kikuyu traditional religious beliefs (Wamue 2001). While formed in opposition to President Moi’s oppressive regime, Mungiki also had grudges against the Kikuyu political elite (Gecaga 2007). The movement claimed to be the biological and ideological grandchild of the Mau Mau movement that had fought for land and freedom during the struggle for independence in the 1950s. Ideologically, Mungiki is fighting against poverty, political and social exclusion, and for a correction of what their members perceive as historical injustices committed against the poor Kikuyu population. Mungiki adopted a range of secret rituals and operational structures from the Mau Mau. As such, Mungiki is founded on and guarded by a combination of revolutionary ideals and ritually sanctioned secrecy (Rasmussen forthcoming). In Kenya, any reference to Mau Mau oathing raises concern, as the oaths are widely associated with violent religiosity and obscenity (Blunt 2013: 168). Further- more, Jomo Kenyatta used mass oathing in a deliberate attempt at secretly mobilising the Kikuyu population behind his presidency in 1968 (Knighton 2010), which also associates oathing with the politicisation of ethnic identities and patronage politics. Over the years, Mungiki has increased in numbers and gained strongholds in the Kikuyu-dominated areas of the poor neighbourhoods in Kenya’s major cities, where it has become involved in economic activities in the flourishing informal economy (Rasmussen 2012; Servant 2007). Through the involvement in the security sector and the public transport industry, Mungiki became involved in criminal and violent activities. It also became increasingly politicised (Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2005a). Due to the movement’s involvement in crime and violence, as well as its problematic relationship to some Kikuyu politicians, Mungiki was subjected to systematic police persecution in 2002 and 2003 and most severely between 2007 and 2009 (Alston 2009; KNCHR 2008; Oscar Foundation 2007; 2008). These events cast Mungiki members as not only perpetrators of violence but also victims of political violence, thus entering into a larger cycle of Kenyan electoral violence which is about settling old scores. Since Mungiki’s foundation, the members’ public appearance has changed from dreadlocked young men flagging the movement’s colours of green, white, black and red, through snuff-taking lumpen youth in the matatu industry (Kenya’s informal means of public transportation), to Sunday church-goers wearing shirts and jackets. In terms of their public declaration of faith, members have moved from being Kikuyu traditionalists, through a brief flirtation with Islam in 2002 that saw them move back to the Kikuyu base, before converting

180 8 | Rasmussen Similarly, Similarly, 4 On the one hand, the the hand, On the one 5 181 means multitude in the Kikuyu language, language, in the Kikuyu multitude means Mungiki While the ability to change while staying true to the core ideals of the the ideals of true the while core to staying change to the ability While This doubt was only fuelled by the organisation’s initial choice of joining of joining choice initial organisation’s by the only fuelled was doubt This Mobilising the masses to Pentecostalism in 2009. Mungiki simultaneously presents itself as a religious religious a as itself presents simultaneously 2009. Mungiki in Pentecostalism to a with and activities economic politicala party widespread with movement, activities and socialin engaged development a movement and wing, militant to potential local a Allon these level. farming aspects testify Mungiki’s to the However, time. the same and one at multiple and transformative appear poverty, fighting of true the ideological to core remain to claims leadership injustices. historical and inequality Mugumo and the chameleon to especially in relation important, is movement persecution violent with the coincided often have the changes metaphors, tree has largely in 2002 Islam to briefconversion The leadership. the Mungiki of from seeking was shelter when the movement a diversion been considered local later, Years religion. a minority of police persecution the banner under cards, registration Islamic off showed playfully in Kayole members Mungiki identities. different of in a range they appear could that claiming dual meaning captured in this sentence describes a resurrection of the Mau the Mau of describes resurrection a thisin sentence captured meaning dual sympathisers Mau Mau the former captures it the other, on movement; Mau conversion. and rebirth a ritual through Pentecostalism to converted who have with associated is level, at symbolic the even Mau, Mau of the rebirth The political strugglechange. and violence for and there is an inherent claim and ambition of both being and representing the the representing both being and of ambition and claim inherent an is there and theyouth poor urban base been has among recruitment core Mungiki’s masses. of The power population. Kikuyu disenfranchisedyoung and the landless and - a demo of that expressions: potential two has ultimately multitude Mungiki’s when in October 2009 Maina Njenga and his followers publicly dissolved dissolved publicly followers his and Njenga October Maina when in 2009 prison, release from Njenga’s after Pentecostalism to converted and Mungiki its of free Mungiki to intended sham another yet as perceived widely was it violence. theelectoral 2008 of the perpetrator as reputation ‘Jesus church, Wanjiru’s Margaret Bishop opportunistic and the controversial political ambitions her pursued had Wanjiru (JIAM). Ministries’ Alive Is a become to congregation her of the support mobilised and via the church the benefit from to hoping was She 2008). (Kavulla parliament of member these ambitions electoral However, members. the Mungiki of support electoral Mungiki’s For agenda. own its had Mungiki as Wanjiru for materialised never well resonated politics and religion of combination the explicit members, not were politics and religion beliefs, where traditionalist their former with Maina for way the paved conversion the Thus, domains. separate considered members the Mungiki for and a politician and a bishop as ‘rebirth’ Njenga’s Mau’. Mau the ‘born as again themselves present to cratic threat to the established political elite through the vote; and as a threat to democracy through violent outbursts and rioting by the dissatisfied and unruly youth population. The latest census on the demographic development in Kenya reveals that 50 per cent of the population is below twenty-five years of age (KNBS 2009). Mungiki’s main recruitment base among the rapidly increasing youth population – many of them first-time voters – has only added to the uncertainty about the movement’s potential impact, as this group is perceived to be easily influenced by their patrons. The potency of this indeterminable base of young Kikuyu voters is evident in the recurrent attempts by established politicians to mobilise Mungiki’s youth support. Being the largest ethnic group in Kenya, the Kikuyu make up an attractive constituency and the Kikuyu heartlands are traditionally among the most contested electoral constituencies as politicians strategise on how to either unify or divide the Kikuyu votes (Cheeseman 2008: 168; Fjelde and Höglund, Chapter 1 in this volume; Mulli 1999). Over the years, Mungiki spokespersons and commentators on the movement have differed over the size of the movement and the level of commitment of the members; the estimated numbers have ranged from several million supporters down to 30,000 core members (Rasmussen 2013; Ruteere 2008). The uncertainty about Mungiki’s size has itself been part of the movement’s political leverage, and the leadership has deliberately used this uncertainty to argue for their potential in influencing electoral results. By mobilising several thousand rowdy young men and creating visibility around their political gatherings, the movement has continuously managed to present the uncertainty of numbers as a potential voter base that should be taken seriously. The threat of violence through mass action prior to elections has been a central element of Mungiki’s force. We can situate this practice somewhere between voting and actual violence, as it is an act that potentially influences the turnout of opposition voters at the polling stations, yet it may not involve casting a vote nor the shedding of blood. In 2002, departing president Daniel arap Moi (from the Kalenjin tribe) and his chosen successor Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) – posing as the youthful candidate to bring about the long-sought-for generational change of power – reached out to Mungiki. The relationship between the politicians and Mungiki was then described as a patron–client relation (Kagwanja 2005a: 64). A similar characterisation would suffice for Uhuru Kenyatta’s alleged use of Mungiki as a youth militia in the 2008 post-election violence. In 2003, President Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu) – after winning a landslide victory against Uhuru Kenyatta in the 2002 elections – tried to counter Mungiki’s opposition and reach out to their members by commemorating and restoring their idol – the Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi (Kikuyu) – to national hero (Branch 2010: 316). And in 2013, Raila Odinga (from the Luo tribe) posed alongside Mungiki’s leader

182 8 | Rasmussen

- - Over the years, Mungiki has proven its its proven has Mungiki Over theyears, ’ (the Swahili word for a blunt wooden wooden a blunt for word ’ (the Swahili 183 2012b). These attempts by successive politicians to reach out to to out reach to politicians successive by attempts These 2012b). In April 2008, thousands of Mungiki members rioted in Nairobi, bringing bringing Nairobi, in rioted members Mungiki of thousands 2008, April In Daily Nation Mobilising the youth for change for change Mobilising the youth mental approach politicians often have towards the youth constituency. While While constituency. youth the towards have often politicians approach mental the youths, violent with be to associated directly want politicians any hardly electoral with association of the fear outweigh seemsto numbers of potential it. of the threat or violence Maina Njenga at the family home of Dedan Kimathi in a similar attempt to to attempt in a similar Dedan Kimathi of home the family at Njenga Maina an Centralin Province, voters Kikuyu young base of support Njenga’s into tap support little have traditionally politicians Raila Luo where and Odinga area ( Mungiki for electoral support testify to the importance of the Kikuyu youth as as youth theKikuyu of testify theimportance to support electoral for Mungiki instru also thesomewhat reveals it recognised, but is that force electoral an the elections. theelections. ability to mobilise in large numbers, thus putting action behind its claims of of claims action behind its putting thus numbers, in large mobilise to ability for the ability underlying But the masses. representing and being indeterminate In social for change. mobilising of ambition alsois strong a mobilisation mass in strength its displayed Mungiki elections, the 2002 to prior the campaigns several thousand gathering political direct action by for members its mobilising Mungiki’s 63). 2005a: (Kagwanja Kenyatta Uhuru of in support in Nairobi people ideological an was Kenyatta Uhuru for their support that argued leadership of issue an not revolution, a youth for and change generational for support members Mungiki During 2005b). the demonstrations, ethnic (Kagwanja politics so-called and ‘rungus machetes waved (ibid.; violence for with their potential press the alarming fighting), used for club members’ Mungiki to the eye blind turneda apparently The police 2003). Maupeu criticism which heavy led to weapons, of their display and unruly behaviour the the opposition dispersed a political rally and by down when the police shut double using criticisedfor was The police 63). 2005a: (Kagwanja week following between the Moi–Uhuru the relation concerning questions raising standards, close relations keeping for known was Moi the securityalliance and forces. 2013), special the police within (Katumanga and units the securitywith forces Collier (cf. in Kenya only not political power, in maintaining element a central to occurred prior mainly in 2002 potential violent its of display Mungiki’s 2010). traffic and businesses to a standstill; this followed months of violent ethnic ethnic of violent months followed to a standstill; this businesses and traffic elections, 2007 the disputed to a reaction as clashes politically motivated and Raila from The Odinga. rioters the presidency Kibaki claim Mwai which saw and their figures leading of two the extra-judicial killing of against protested secret police by allegedly carried out Njenga, Maina their chairman, of the wife perpetra as role members’ Mungiki Despite 2009). (KNCHR squads death mass sudden the movement’s post-election violence, in the preceding tors The Kenyans. many to a shock was the capital of in the centre appearance fact that Mungiki members were able to enter the city in large numbers and cause havoc despite police awareness of the movement and in spite of the re-emerging violent persecution of Mungiki members was a boost for the movement’s recruitment.6 In important ways, the riots also marked a shift in Mungiki’s violent mass appearance, as they were driven by the movement’s grievances against the current political regime (led by the Kikuyu Mwai Kibaki), whereas previous mass appearances had been mobilised by changing political patrons for voter support or violent intimidation, or had been centred around religious initiation rituals, or were turf wars with other youth groupings. The April 2008 Nairobi riots showed Mungiki members taking charge of their own agenda and directing their violent potential against the state that had allegedly mobilised them and called for their persecution. In March 2010, hundreds of Mungiki members participated in a peace rally in Eldoret in the heartlands of the Kalenjin parts of Rift Valley. The rally saw Mungiki’s leadership appear on stage alongside former President Moi, both preaching peace and unity between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups and bringing together the most violent sections of their respective communities in the post-electoral violence of 2008. Interestingly, while Maina Njenga appeared on stage, Mungiki members dressed in suits and sunglasses were lined up in front of the crowd to provide security, whereas armed officers from the Administration Police stepped up when Moi entered the stage.7 Mungiki’s appearance at the Eldoret peace rally reveals its ability to strike deals with politicians controlling local segments of the security forces. Suddenly, Mungiki appeared as an advocate of peace. Simultaneously, the police persecution of Mungiki members saw them rebrand themselves as nationalist, in support of the progressive and rights-based constitution. In the period between the 2008 post-electoral violence and the 2010 constitutional referendum, secret police units had systematically persecuted Mungiki and the International Criminal Court (ICC) had opened cases against Uhuru Kenyatta for mobilising Mungiki for retaliatory attacks during the 2008 elections. Central Mungiki members were among the proposed ICC witnesses and Mungiki saw the violent persecution as a politically led attempt at silencing witnesses. In these circumstances, Mungiki could pursue its ambitions for societal change and the correction of historical injustices through a change to a pro-constitutional rights-based agenda. Mungiki’s violent post-electoral engagements now saw the movement drawn into a cycle of state persecution, where the police were killing its members in order to cover up previous violent deeds in the fear of legal persecution from the ICC. Söderberg Kovacs’ example from Burundi in the introduction to this volume accounts for similar dynamics of cyclical electoral violence instated to secure impunity. The 2013 elections took place in the dark and gloomy shadows of the post- electoral violence of 2008, and enormous resources were invested in preaching

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- - 10 When the police the police When 8 2012). Similarly, at at Similarly, 2012). 185

9 In the early stages of the 2013 electoral campaigns, Mungiki participated participated Mungiki campaigns, electoral the 2013 of stages the early In The 2013 elections were largely non-violent. A lot of resources had been put had put been resources of A lot non-violent. largely were elections 2013 The interrupted and cancelled the political meeting in Limuru, the Mungiki crowd crowd the Mungiki the political in Limuru, cancelled meeting and interrupted whenmeetings years, previous with peacefully compared relatively behaved (The the with police ended in battles running Star often a political gathering at Kamukunji Grounds in Nairobi in June 2012, where where 2012, June in Nairobi in Grounds Kamukunji at politicala gathering of the party political theirtakeover effective announced leadership Mungiki’s various at seats running for of their ambitions launched and Solidarity Mkenya the police with security seemed cooperate team to Mungiki’s levels, electoral the masses. controlling in In Nakuru, members posed as bodyguards for opposing political candidates, politicalcandidates, opposing posed for members bodyguards as Nakuru, In logic of the pragmatic to and Mungiki in split testifyingthe internal both to patron. the best-paying to muscle one’s lending peace and preventing a recurrence of electoral violence (Long et al. 2013). 2013). al. et (Long violence electoral of a recurrence peace preventing and William Kalenjin and the Kenyatta Uhuru Kikuyu the ICC caseagainst The they in a politicalwhere alliance together candidates the two brought Ruto election, general in the 2013 vice president and president for ran respectively (Lynch the accused’ of the ‘alliance as became known quickly alliance that an thispolitical climate on succeeded in capitalising Ruto and 2014). Kenyatta national of a question theminto case the ICC turn against to managed and Kikuyu the entire scapegoating at attempts international of and sovereignty 2014). (Mueller few a deeds of thesocieties violent for Kalenjin and usual tactics its rallies of political using mass and in a series religious of made this time it only men, young of hordes mobilise to ability its displaying However, unruliness.their to contain ability its to communicate effort an line In the surface. under shimmering constantly was potential violent its took deliberately Mungiki referendum, thein constitutional stance its with the Limuru instance, ethnically infused For against politics. a position up the of critique a direct as a peace was 2012 arranged meeting rally in April in Association) Meru Embu, (Gikuyu, GEMA associations ethno-cultural Samburu) Turkana, Maasai, (Kalenjin, KAMATUSA and Province Central ethnictribalismand division. advocating Valleyfor in Rift into advocating peace and preventing hate speech. The political leaders of the of speech.the leaders The political hate peace preventing and advocating into Mungiki’s in a political alliance. up teamed 2008 had of factions warring two encour and their political candidatures withdrawing ended up leadership aged their members to support the Luo candidate Raila Odinga. Mungiki’s Raila Mungiki’s Odinga. candidate the Luo support to their members aged on impact a limited seemed have to however, the actual vote, during role as strongholds, Mungiki’s covering thein constituencies result RailaOdinga’s (IEBC areas 2013). in the victories Kikuyu-dominated landslide won Uhuru uncon go not did candidate non-Kikuyu a for support public Njenga’s Maina the against decided go to members some and Mungiki, of in the ranks tested Kenyatta. Uhuru for voted and their chairman of recommendations public The highest stake in the 2013 elections was legal persecution for instigating human rights abuses carried out by Mungiki. The dominant narrative of peace in the 2013 elections was a constant reminder of the violence of 2008, and the campaigns effectively turned the elections into a fight against foreign legal intervention (meaning the ICC). The elections might have been peaceful, but the violence was omnipresent. Mungiki’s members again proved their ability to mobilise and contain huge crowds in the run-up to the elections, but they did not influence the vote. Their ability to initiate change seemed to be reduced to their violent capacity or the threat of violence.

Harbingers of death: religious appearances, mythological references and violent potential When members of Mungiki refer to their transformations they often use metaphors, especially the chameleon and the Mugumo tree. As noted earlier, metaphorically the chameleon refers to the ability to adapt to changing situations, and to appear as something different from and other than what it seems to be. Analytically, it concerns the ability to transform, and opens up for discussion the question of whether the chameleon’s true character is its ability to change colour and surface appearance or whether its true character is to be found in its shape or behaviour. The Mungiki members’ use of the chameleon metaphor accentuates this problem, as the metaphor constantly teases out questions of whether their façade shrouds a concealed truth or whether it is solely a surface appearance or a diversion. In this sense, the chameleon metaphor diverts attention from the movement’s religious and political project. This is also where the power of the chameleon lies, as it assumes that there is a depth or a truth that is hidden; that underneath the façade there is something politically important and potent yet hidden from public view and knowledge. However, the chameleon can refer to more than unpredictability and the ability to transform itself and appear in multiple forms. In Kikuyu mythology, the chameleon is presented as the harbinger of death. To summarise briefly, the chameleon was sent by God to tell the Kikuyu people that they should never die, but he failed to deliver the message properly and ended up being humiliated by the Kikuyu people who chased him away. Soon afterwards, the Kikuyu started dying. Mungiki was made illegal prior to the 2002 general elections following a turf war with a rival Luo gang in the Nairobi estate of Kariobangi, where the intergroup fighting resulted in running battles in the streets and targeted killings with machetes (Maupeu 2002). The fighting became known as the Kariobangi massacre. The rival gangs competed over the right to provide informal security in the neighbourhoods of Nairobi’s Eastlands and over control of lucrative matatu routes. Politicians saw the potential in linking up with

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- Mungiki’s Mungiki’s 11 187 Mungiki’s involvement in the post-electoral violence and the brutality of the the of the brutality and violence the in post-electoral involvement Mungiki’s Despite the ban, which was still in force, and the erratic persecution of persecution of the erratic and still which was the ban, in force, Despite violence killed several hundred people and displaced thousands. All human All human thousands. displaced and killed people violence several hundred the post-election violence into looking reports commission and briefs rights these to addition In perpetrators. the the police main as and Mungiki present was a the furtherof gruesome violence, consequence the effectspost-electoral already As Kenyatta. Uhuru against violations rights human of charge ICC in resulted and elections 2013 the affected case theICC greatly mentioned, cast to continues it and members, Mungiki the extra-judicial persecution of against the charges dropping the ICC despite politics Kenyan on shadows the claimed court what evidence and of a lack to in 2014, due Kenyatta Uhuru (ibid.). intimidation witness was hire for militants youth of image an earned the movement massacre Kariobangi menace as a them presented media similarly The democracy. to a threat and cially skilled in capitalising on the political interest of violent youth militias, militias, youth violent of thepolitical interest on cially skilled in capitalising the police a deal whereby stuck persecution, Mungiki facing of instead and, matatu lucrative the most of takeover forceful Mungiki’s eye to a blind turned made leaders even Mungiki political support. for in return in Eastlands routes 2002: (Anderson the government by being protected about declarations public instilleda only not massacre Kariobangi The 64). 2005a: Kagwanja 538–40; direct in elections also 2002 the affected it the public, among Mungiki of fear political and for platform economic an carve out Mungiki helped it as ways, Kenyatta Uhuru violence, of thelevel to due However, engagements. violent the unruly youth from themselves disassociate also publicly to had Moi and in this element Mungiki central a was of ban The to. out theyreached had candidature parliamentary Njenga’s Maina so the of barring was and process, thein year. later prior a new non-persecution deal make to of managed the movement Mungiki, called was potential on violent and their numerical as elections, the 2007 to Commission Waki 2013; TJRC 2015; (ICC political elite the Kikuyu by again once the granting result electoral of the announcement December late 2008). The disputed Kibaki Raila victory immediately was Odinga over Mwai incumbent many Valley in particular, Rift In riots. and countrywide protests sparked and once attacks, ethnicallyand motivated politically suffered Kikuyus ordinary Höglund, and (seeFjelde thefore to land grievancesover old bringing again briefs, pre-trial prosecutor’s the ICC to According 1 in this volume). Chapter its paying Mungiki, with meetings held politicians other and Kenyatta Uhuru and weapons, of hold them get helping attacks, retaliatory conduct to members 18–21). 2015: (ICC roadblocks police through passage them granting the disaffected youth in charge of the provision of everyday services as such provision of the charge in youth the disaffected they collection, as serve could rubbish and the purposes transport security, espe proved Mungiki intimidation. violent to fodder voting from anything of to society, associated with crime, ritualised obscenity, and brutal violence. If we think of the mythological meaning of the chameleon, the members’ use of the chameleon metaphor takes on an ironic (and perhaps unintended) twist, because Mungiki literally is perceived as the harbinger of death. But the metaphor allows for additional interpretative twists. Recall Mungiki’s experience as being marginalised and excluded, then think of it as analogous to the fate of the vanishing and humiliated chameleon being chased away by the (now deadly) Kikuyu people who hoped to grow fat from the land. In this rendition, the chameleon metaphor captures the continuous tension between Mungiki and the Kikuyu political elite, a tension that unfolds around perceptions of betrayal, failure and exclusion – which, as we have seen, is particularly prominent around elections. The persecution and the extra-judicial killings of Mungiki by the police and the trade-offs guaranteeing safety in exchange for violence and votes can be understood as outcomes of interrupted and failed communication, resulting in a troubled and conflictual relationship causing death and grievance. And there is yet another twist to the mythological prophecy of the chameleon bringing death to the fat Kikuyu people. Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first independent president, Jomo Kenyatta, and heir to the Kenyatta family’s wealth, was accused by the ICC of planning and instigating part of the post-election violence of 2008. Key witnesses against Uhuru Kenyatta at the ICC were former Mungiki members. Prior to the 2013 elections, there was still a possibility of Mungiki witnesses exposing Uhuru Kenyatta and bringing political death to Kenya’s most celebrated political family. At that time, and before the ICC dropped the charges, the chameleon was still shimmering in its skin. The numerous possibilities of interpretation and for merging mythological meaning with politically and violently infused action provide the chameleon metaphor with its explanatory strength. One can choose to focus either on the chameleon’s changing colour or on its interior character, but, either way, the metaphor will always reveal the possibility of the other – and thus it is strategically incomplete. This is an important element in understanding Mungiki’s shifting political alliances and its constant potential.

Parasitic politics: forceful takeovers from the inside In Kenyan politics there is a long tradition of using violent youth militias for support and to intimidate opponents (Kagwanja 2001; 2009; Mueller 2008: 189), and Mungiki members have acted in this capacity in the past. Even if the Mungiki members have reformed and abandoned their criminal and violent ways, their violent activities of the past still maintain political power. On several occasions, the movement has hinted at the possibility of using inside knowledge of past alliances to discredit former political patrons. In May 2012, Maina Njenga claimed that almost all politicians from the Kikuyu

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12 industry industry, 2009). By bringing in numerous in numerous bringing 2009). By 189 routes and its continuous forceful control have have control forceful continuous its and routes 2012a), indicating that no one has clean hands and and hands clean has one no that indicating 2012a), The symbiotic relationship between the parasite and the host as described host by and the between the parasite relationship symbiotic The In a blunt statement, Maina Njenga admitted a similar parasitic approach approach parasitic a similar admitted Njenga Maina statement, a blunt In The idea of gaining political leverage from secret knowledge of others recalls others of knowledge secret from leverage political of gaining idea The ambiguous and powerful a is tree the Mugumo members, Mungiki For These registrations to Mkenya Solidarity continued until June 2012, when Maina Maina 2012, when June until continued Solidarity to Mkenya registrations These Kamukunji a rally on the party at of leadership his declared publicly Njenga G. G. founder, original the of surprise the to much Nairobi, in Grounds within. from the host of swallowing a reveal Both examples Kariuki. free does not aspect parasitism of the transformative that reveals Serres (1982) subsumed is the host Rather, it. entangled has when it the host of the parasite through Mungiki Understanding the new part collective body. becomes of and still is perspective inside that an for allows thus metaphor tree the Mugumo open. contextually on Margaret Wanjiru’s JIAM church, on the Mkenya Solidarity party and party Solidarity and the Mkenya on church, JIAM Wanjiru’s Margaret on gain to managed Mungiki been has shown, As political elite. the Kikuyu on violent its and massacre, the Kariobangi politically from and economically matatu lucrative of takeover that In members. its jobs for create and money raise to the movement allowed on – matatuthe or actingas parasites – off living sense, they are 2012). Rasmussen 2005; (Katumanga him telling quoted a newspaper as conversion, Pentecostal the movement’s to no is ‘Thischurch congregation: her of front in Wanjiru Margaret Bishop (Daily ours!’ is it Now yours. Nationlonger take over they would that implied he the congregation, to members Mungiki over took effectively when Mungiki place took process A similar church. her 2008, individual as early As in 2012. Solidarity the political party Mkenya the Mkenya of members ordinary as began registering members Mungiki Mungiki’s turned down had government the after partySolidarity immediately Alliance. Youth National political the wing, Kenya own its of registration heartlands in Central Kenya have used Mungiki for their political survival for at usedMungiki have Central in heartlands Kenya (Daily point some Nation exposure. from safe feel should one no that on grows that parasite the – tree Mugumo the metaphor, other Mungiki’s entangle and to the ground stretch aerialroots has that The tree trees. other and strength of images evokes it Metaphorically tree. the host subsume and aspects relational to also points it but nature, parasitic in its inherent power process symbiotic yet antagonistic and violent a parasite, and betweenhost process and the parasitic Mugumo tree The which a new emerges. tree through political its with relationship ever-changing Mungiki’s to attention our direct persecute the movement. the policewho violently to and patrons a part as of themselves think to of members Mungiki allows It metaphor. the matatu on act parasites to as the capacity collective with potent Through Mungiki’s violent activities in relation to electoral and political events, we can see how the movement acted as a parasite on its political patrons by accepting money or negotiating a truce with the police. At the same time, it acted as a parasite on the local Kikuyu communities by extorting money from the matatu industry or by inserting its members as dreaded security providers. Through some of its actions, Mungiki effectively acted in a state-like manner or claimed a state-like authority; by doing so, Mungiki acted as a parasite on the state while embodying its character.

The Mugumo tree The explanatory qualities of the Mugumo tree metaphor go beyond its parasitic capacity revealed through the ambiguous and transformative aspects that characterise the relationship between host and parasite. Like the chameleon, the Mugumo tree also features in Kikuyu mythology. It is perceived as sacred and as the tree of life under which the Kikuyu tribe came into being. Furthermore, it serves a range of ritual purposes, and a legend reveals how the Mugumo tree is a medium through which the Kikuyu people communicate with their god through sacrifice and daily prayers (Beech 1913: 4; Karangi 2008: 122). Traditionally, some of the initiation rituals for the transition to adulthood were performed under the Mugumo tree, and the Kikuyu council of elders would hold its meetings there (Kenyatta 1938). In reference to these rituals and meetings, the Mau Mau took some of their oaths under the Mugumo tree. Karangi (2008) has argued that the Mugumo tree has been neglected in attempts at understanding the cosmology of the Kikuyu. He sees the Mugumo tree as a reference point for the continuity of the social, religious and political world of the Kikuyu, with the tree symbolising fertility, survival, protection, belonging, religious access and political power (ibid. 117, 127–8). Therefore, when Mungiki members describe their movement as being like the Mugumo tree they not only refer to the immediate parasitic qualities of the tree; they also symbolically refer to themselves as having access to a vast register of past cultural, social, religious and political knowledge in the present and for the future. Mungiki’s metaphorical references to the mythology invest the movement with the power of the Mugumo tree and fill it with parasitic agency, and its members become agents of change. Their parasitic behaviour is legitimised not only through notions of fairness and due to experiences of historical and structural injustice. More importantly, it is legitimised by reference to the mythology. As such, Mungiki advocates and practises a different form of politics, even if it sometimes mirrors the wider perception of Kenyan politics as deceptive. However, former Mungiki members do not have exclusive ownership of the symbolic power of the Mugumo tree, nor of Kikuyu rituals such as oathing. In the spring of 2012, there were widespread rumours of secret oathing ceremonies

190 8 | Rasmussen - 191 These examples show that other parts of the Kikuyu Kikuyu of other the parts that show These examples 13 If we return to the idea of parasitic practices and the question of who is who is of the question practices and parasitic the idea to of return we If This chapter has shown how narratives (traditional and ritually infused) as and ritually (traditional narratives how shown has chapter This Conclusion in support of Uhuru Kenyatta taking place at night, allegedly initiated by by initiated allegedly night, at taking place Kenyatta Uhuru of support in presidential behind a Kikuyu voters the Kikuyu unite to in order elders Kikuyu a Mugumo 2013, February In intervention. the ICC oppose to and candidate of change signals generational a legend, to this, according Nyeri; in fell tree the departing President words, other In community. theKikuyu within guard which in this case only could Kikuyu, be a younger succeededKibaki would by Kenyatta. Uhuru mean community are also influenced by secret ritualistic, prophetic and mythical and prophetic by ritualistic, secret also influenced are community their politicalin practices. knowledge and state the Kenyan also can that be it argued whom, on acting a parasite as and movement the Mungiki on been parasites have political elite the Kikuyu numerical and violent services.used movement’s militant the Theyhave its discarded been has violently services Mungiki they needed but whenever them, for posed Mungiki, extra-judicial persecution it whenever through a threat. its from itself disentangle to a weapon as bad part, used reputation has its its and transform continuously to ability its Through networks. patronage previous Kenyan in take a position to managed has Mungiki politicallyrelevant, appear members Mungiki granted. be taken for cannot patronage its where politics uses this. Mungiki of the best is the illustration ICC at witnesses key posing as the ability yet important, sect remain to militant a dreaded as reputation its to ethnic traditionalists anti-Christian from transform to the movement of is nothing that reveals movement rights-based pro-constitution a nationalist Mungiki by whether conducted violent, inherently is politics Parasitic static. general. in politics Kenyan of used characteristic a as or ment that a historical analysis of conflict patterns reveals how contemporary contemporary revealshow conflict patterns of analysis a historical that ment and of differentiation by the past politics informed often is violence electoral Mungiki, how shown has chapter The conflicts. identity past of the politicisation electoral in role central a played has practices, parasitic and violent its through violent Mungiki’s elections, the 2007 decades. In of couple the last over violence definedthe and – headlinesgrabbed the 2002 in displayed first – potential peaceful in the supposedly when the elections, 2013 Even chaos. post-electoral was the process violence, peace containing and maintaining was concern central ICC ofthe by influence the this best is exemplified violence; past by tainted violence for the potential how shown has chapter The theme. case a decisive as if the even agenda, the political influencing for a powerfulbecomes resource of violence, of the threat skilful the actualised.play Through not is potential a source for violent political mobilisation draw on a vast register of perceived perceived of register a vast on draw political mobilisation violent for a source argu 1) convincing (Chapter Höglund’s and Fjelde to this similar is injustices; secret knowledge and mythological power, the Mungiki movement practises politics in a different way from that of the established political elite – though it is far from unfamiliar. By focusing on the role of deception and on parasitic feeding on one another, the chapter has revealed how we can understand the former Mungiki movement’s quest for political inclusion, influence and power. Furthermore, informal institutions such as youth militias that were established for political ends during authoritarian rule in Kenya have lived on after the turn to multiparty democracy; these informal political actors, like Mungiki, are used by the formal state as well as acting on their own. The chapter has shown how the continued existence and influence of informal political and violent organisations in the democratic era threatens the establishment of formal institutions and easily informs electoral conflicts (cf. Söderberg Kovacs, Introduction in this volume). The chapter has revealed that similar methods of secrecy and deception are at play at the centre of Kenyan politics. The aim here is not to argue that Kenyan politics is inherently immoral or by default corrupt. Rather, the aim has been to investigate the workings of violence and deception in relation to the electoral process. The tension between politicians and Mungiki in the ICC case presents itself as an extreme case for unfolding the deceptive work going on in the quest for power because it plays out across several electoral periods, drawing from the first engagements between Mungiki and the Kikuyu political elite, covering the 2007 post-electoral violence, and continuing until the abandoned ICC court case. Youth militias such as Mungiki and their influence on elections have historical roots, and they are intimately linked to politicians and remain influential in formal politics and on the ability of formal and legal institutions to function. Mungiki’s ability to change and constantly transform has been an essential part of the movement’s power, as it is constantly transgressing the boundaries between the formal and the informal, the legal and the illegal. This is captured in the chameleon metaphor, where the true appearance of the movement – whether there is a true appearance at all – is constantly questioned. As such, Mungiki has not been stabilised and it presents a constant potential for violence to outsiders. This has provided the movement with influence on politics, and not only at election time. Mungiki’s role in Kenyan politics as an institutionalised political, religious and violent movement is best explored by looking at the relation between violence and elections, as elections have become critical encounters for Mungiki’s parasitic practices. Through its metaphorical reference to Kikuyu mythology, Mungiki merges not only politics and violence but also politics and mythology, which allows for an analytical understanding of electoral violence in Kenya as more than merely anti-democratic and uncivil. Electoral violence must be understood as a form of participation that draws on other registers of knowledge that we usually associate with democratic practice and politics.

192 8 | Rasmussen 101: 101: 2013). Interviews and observations with with observations and Interviews Author’s fieldnotes and interviews,and fieldnotes Author’s According to an old prophecy by by prophecy old an to According The former spokesperson of of spokesperson former The Kamukunji observations conducted conducted observations Kamukunji

12 11 10 9 on Extra-judicial, Arbitrary or or Arbitrary Extra-judicial, on Kenya to Mission Executions: Summary 2009. Geneva: United 16–25 February Nations. Public of the Politics and Violence African Affairs in Kenya’, Order 531–55. 13 November 2008. November Mungiki, Nguguna Githau, accounted for for accounted Githau, Nguguna Mungiki, with in a conversation process the same shot was 2009. He in February this author 2009. dead in April Mungiki members in Kayole and Nakuru, Nakuru, and in Kayole members Mungiki 2013. February December and 2012 for the author by Armstrong Obissa, a a Obissa, Armstrong by the author for 2012. sociologist, 9 June Kenyan the former Mungiki movement with the the with movement Mungiki the former the old from itself distancing of chance it allowed instead and ethnic organisations agenda. nationalist a pro-peace claim to References References Rapporteur (2009) UN Special P. Alston, ‘Vigilantes, M. (2002) D. Anderson, the Kikuyu prophet Mugo wa Kibero, wa Kibero, Mugo prophet the Kikuyu would in Thika tree a fallen Mugumo rule, which colonial of symbolise the end the fallen and 1963, in actually happened interpreted was in Nyeri tree Mugumo (The lines similar along Standard 193 In interviews with Mungiki members members interviews Mungiki with In Author’s fieldnotes, December 2008. fieldnotes, Author’s GEMA and KAMATUSA respectively respectively KAMATUSA GEMA and The 1992 general elections in Kenya Kenya in elections general 1992 The Author observations from the Eldoret the Eldoret from observations Author Author interview with Mungiki interview Mungiki with Author I appreciate the financial support support the financial I appreciate This was a recurrent phrase used by by phraseused recurrent a was This

8 7 6 4 5 3 2 The existence of informal institutions with the potential for violence close to to close violence for the potential with institutions informal of existence The 1 supported the Kikuyu candidate Uhuru Uhuru candidate the Kikuyu supported candidate the Kalenjin and Kenyatta a peace as Promoted Ruto. William presented meeting, meeting the Limuru peace rally, March 2010. March peace rally, carried out between August 2008 and May May 2008 and between August carried out mentioned were riots 2009, the Nairobi different times by twenty than more the movement’s to referring members, especially but mobilisation, mass for ability the capital bring and disrupt to ability its to a halt. to city Mungiki members in the months after the the after in the months members Mungiki conversion. Pentecostal for fieldwork from the Danish Research Research the Danish from fieldwork for Communication and Culture Council for the from and 2010, between 2008 and Office Commonwealth and Foreign UK’s during 2013 the fieldwork funding for elections. are a good example of how ethnic interests ethnic interests how of a good example are the through protected strategically were and (see violence Fjelde of orchestration 1 in this volume). Chapter Höglund, Notes In doing so, the relational aspect of electoral violence as it has taken place taken place has it as violence aspect electoral of the relational so, doing In notions broader with resonates it and itself, reveals years recent in in Kenya politics. Kenyan characterise that patronage and deception of enormous has politics electoral and making political decision formal of the core When simultaneously. play at are logics different as policy, for implications peaceful for electoral planning denied, hidden or yet present, logics are such levels, various at interests the vested only not overlooking risks processes and interlinked are these interests – how importantly as just also – and but ways. intricate in connected leader from Nakuru commenting on the the on commenting Nakuru leader from in the 2008 post-electoral role movement’s 2009. March violence, Beech, M. W. H. (1913) ‘The Sacred Fig- Democracy in Dangerous Places. tree of the A-kikuyu of East Africa’, London: Vintage Books. Man 13: 4–6. Daily Nation (2009) ‘Is This the End of Bekoe, D. A. (ed.) (2012) Voting in Fear: Mungiki?’, Daily Nation, 25 October. Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Daily Nation (2012a) ‘MPs Used Mungiki, Africa. Washington DC: United States Says Njenga’, Daily Nation, 27 May. Institute for Peace Press. Daily Nation (2012b) ‘Plan to Honour J. Blunt, R. (2013) ‘Kenyatta’s Lament: Oaths M. Kariuki’, Daily Nation, 2 August. and the Transformation of Ritual Gecaga, M. G. (2007) ‘Religious Ideologies in Colonial Kenya’, HAU Movements and Democratisation Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3 (3): in Kenya: Between the Sacred and 167–93. the Profane’ in G. Murunga and S. Branch, D. (2010) ‘The Search for the Nasong’o (eds), Kenya: The Struggle for Remains of Dedan Kimathi: The Democracy. London: Zed Books. Politics of Death and Memorialization ICC (2015) ‘The Situation in the in Post-colonial Kenya’, Past and Republic of Kenya: In the Case of Present 206 (5): 301–20. the Prosecutor vs. Uhuru Muigai Branch, D. and N. Cheeseman (2010) Kenyatta’. The Hague: Office of the ‘Introduction: Our Turn to Eat’ in D. Prosecutor, International Criminal Branch, N. Cheeseman and L. Gardner Court (ICC). 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196 9 | Eclectic ties and election touts: Chipangano’s cyclic governance agenda in Mbare, Zimbabwe

Tariro Mutongwizo

Introduction Elections in Zimbabwe since independence in 19801 have been accompanied or controlled by coercion (Hove 2013). These have been events where violence has come to be expected; it is only the form of such violence that has shifted over time, and the means through which violence and intimation are dispensed. It has been suggested that places where state institutions are controlled by patronage networks present the most complex conflicts (de Waal 2009). This is because the eradication of such conflicts requires the intervention of the state, and the state is incapable of intervening when it too is embroiled in the conflict. The prevalence of informal networks of patron–client relations is a constant and prominent feature of politics in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). These relations may take varied forms and violence can be deployed or occur as a consequence of these ties. Elections in Zimbabwe are no exception. In the 2008 and 2013 general elections in Zimbabwe, electoral violence was meted out by a group known as ‘Chipangano’, which despite garnering various definitions,2 will be referred to in this chapter as a criminal network. Chipangano mainly operates within the low-income township of Mbare and the surrounding areas in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. It is a site where, for many years, patronage networks have caused havoc in people’s day-to-day lives – and even more so before, during and even shortly after elections (LeBas 2014; Moore 2014; Mutongwizo 2014). The activities of Chipangano reflect the fact that the city and the state can be used for different purposes than those intended, by ‘keeping the official structure operative’ while ‘using official space for private entrepreneuring’ (Simone 2004a: 409). This chapter intends to explore these patronage networks between Chipan- gano and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government and how they appear and diminish during and outside election periods. The chapter analyses how the ties between Big Men in the ZANU-PF party and unemployed youth and touts (individuals who are part of Chipan- gano’s day-to-day activities) are strengthened closer to elections, leading to different types of profiteering in which Big Men and Chipangano indulge by 197 meting out violence in order to control Mbare. This chapter examines the alternating activities of Chipangano in Mbare, with a particular focus on its activities during election periods. The chapter responds to questions relating to the micro-level processes in Mbare that prompt Chipangano, its identity and its activities around election time. An investigation of Chipangano’s leadership is essential to respond to these questions, as is an analysis of the mechanisms the group exploits and what it stands to lose from a loss of control of the Mbare area in an election. Of similar importance is an analysis of how, in this instance, Big Men enlist criminal networks and vice versa; this is particularly relevant when considering the nature of the relationship between ZANU-PF and Chipangano, as well as the allegiance that Chipangano shows to ZANU- PF. The key argument made is that Chipangano’s ties to specific ZANU-PF individuals in power bolster the network and allow it to exert violent control over Mbare’s businesses. In exchange, the network is used to mobilise voters at the time of elections. Such links, supported by outright violence, may in fact be the predominant manner in which electioneering is conducted in Zimbabwe. Through an examination of Chipangano, this chapter contributes to this volume and more broadly to the literature on electoral violence by pointing to evidence that Big Men enlist groups to dispense violence in order to secure support garnered through coercion. The shifts in the strength of ties between Big Men and violent groups over time illustrate how both parties exploit these ties at varying points to each party’s benefit. Médard’s (1992) use of Sahlins’ (1963) ‘Big Man’ model in exploring African politics points out how African Big Men alter economic resources and turn them into political authority. This chapter also demonstrates the converse relationship: how political authority is converted into economic profits. In order to gain insight into the issue, data has been triangulated from three sources. The primary source is data from a household survey conducted in 2010 among 200 residents of Mbare, Harare.3 In addition, interviews with representatives from local governance organisations, the Combined Harare Residents’ Association (CHRA) and the Harare Residents’ Trust (HRT) were conducted in 2011 and 2012. These organisations are non-state entities that aim to ensure reliable and equitable service delivery to Harare’s residents and represent residents in matters pertaining to local governance. When reporting the statements from participants, pseudonyms are used in order to honour anonymity and protect the identity of these individuals. Finally, and of great value, media accounts were followed in order to establish a clearer picture of the nature and activities of Chipangano. Each of these three methods complemented each other in broadening an understanding of a topic that has long remained underexplored. The chapter begins by briefly discussing the history of electoral violence in Zimbabwe. The background of Chipangano is then outlined: how it came into

198 9 | Mutongwizo the informal delegation of violence to to violence of delegation the informal 199 Daloz (1999: 80) point out that: out point 80) Daloz (1999: local order can be ‘disrupted in order to intensify authoritarian authoritarian intensify to in order be can ‘disrupted local order links with ZANU-PF office holders. The chapter argues that the that argues chapter The holders. ZANU-PFlinks with office and supposed The links between states and criminal networks where state officials with Big officials with state where criminaland networks linksThe states between Such politicians act as Big Men when licensing violence that may benefit benefit may that violence when licensing Men act Big as politicians Such There is an overlap between the world of politics and business and this is is and this business and of politics world between the overlap an is There or they access violence; can of ‘licensees’ are in Africa.salient Politicians inthe informal sector players arekey the Politicians force. official restrain can transactions the ease which depends economic on with success where or hindrance. control evade official Chabal Chabal these groups can assist some states in avoiding taking responsibility for the the for taking responsibility in avoiding states some assist can these groups refer (2013) Lowe and Mitchell these perpetrated militia.Carey, violence by violence for responsibility The militias. pro-government as these to groups to and criminal networks on militia relying officials state shifted through is the this a ‘disguise’ as to refers (1985) Fiorina violence. through control gain been possible have otherwise not that would aims accomplish uses to state sponsors government national The or local identity. official the state’s using Man status co-opt individuals to mete out terror have been glob- documented have terror out mete to individuals co-opt status Man 200 informal over of analysis valuable (2015) Mitchell’s and Colaresi Carey, ally. is Chipangano) (including worldwide criminal networks violent militia and state in which the ways uncovering useful for them, or those who conduct violent acts on their behalf. Simone (2004b: 145) (2004b: their behalf. Simone acts on violent thosethem, who or conduct observes that The background to violent electioneering in Zimbabwe to violent electioneering The background being, its activities and ties, and how it has operated since it first appeared appeared first it since operated has it how ties, and activities and being, its is a localised, specificand Chipangano that illustrates chapter The in 2001. in Zimbabwean novel means no by is that phenomenon a of example recent ethnic even tensions militia and youth veterans, war the past, In politics. them push and voters theZANU-PF intimidate to by been on relied have an by followed is This background 2013). (Hove favour thein party’s vote to between relationship The endurance. and lifespan Chipangano’s of assessment in a ZANU-PF stronghold maintain to aim its activities and Chipangano’s is this criminal network of element key One then unpacked. is areas urban its control, with the effect of loosening the population from its former socialformer and its from of loosening the effect with the population control, voting and their individuals usedis to control violence Thus, political ties’. commercial as more operating systems man” rise “big to ‘giving behaviour, 145). (ibid. states’ as firms than alleged ambiguity of these ties is the main reason why Chipangano thrives thrives Chipangano why these reason ties the of main is alleged ambiguity the through ZANU-PF in Mbare for hegemony maintain to manages and with some ends chapter election times. The particularly around force, useof remarks. concluding such pro-government militias, but they are not part of the official security forces such as the police or army. In most cases, the militias are armed and have some level of organisation and links to the government, but those links are clandestine or not officially recognised. While Chipangano has not been documented as being armed, in some respects the description proffered by Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013) describes Chipangano, particularly its covert links with the state. Relying on criminal networks and militias to enforce control ensures that the state can deny involvement in these activities. Staniland (2012) observes that governments avoid accountability in this way. In Zimbabwe, politicians have long relied on violence to achieve their ends. Tracing the history of maintaining hegemony and order in Zimbabwe, Sachikonye (2011) notes that the colonial and postcolonial state used violence as a tool to control citizens, and that this has also protected perpetrators of violence. This can be noted in inter- and intraparty violence between liberation movements, violence by state institutions in the independent state, ethnic violence, electoral violence, violence in the land reform process and the violence used in Operation Murambatsvina.4 Mungure (2014) points out that violent groups have often been sanctioned by the Zimbabwean state as a means of preserving power. Unlike the pro- government militias discussed earlier, Operation Murambatsvina and the land reform process actually involved the state’s security apparatus. Further, these instances also coincided with elections. This evidence illustrates that accumulation through violence and the control of voters is not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. Such methods arise from a long history of conquest. Violence is the means through which power is sought and maintained (Moore 2012). In some instances, the state’s use and condoning of violence in Zimbabwe was legislated. Sachikonye (2011) uncovers some of the laws passed to license the use of violence by the state: these included the Amnesty Ordinance 3 of 1979, the General Pardon Ordinance 12 of 1980 and the Clemency Order of 2000. The legitimising of violence by the state has led to the development of an ‘informal economy of violence’ (Ibeanu and Luckham 2007) in Zimbabwe, where force and intimidation are tools used in day-to-day governance and political processes. The violence dispensed by Chipangano differs slightly from previous instances in that its existence and scope were more localised to Mbare and the surrounding high-density areas. Additionally, this criminal network’s relationship with Big Men who mobilise violence is more loosely characterised; here, ties are resorted to and disregarded at specific times. Chipangano is enlisted by Big Men when necessary, and, in this case, when votes are being violently canvassed. It is important to note that Chipangano’s loose and changeable relationship with Big Men is characteristic of these patron–client relationships. Utas (2012: 8) points out that ‘bigmanity’ involves ‘fluid and ever-changeable

200 9 | Mutongwizo

5 - - - - .

7 201 While the association between Chipangano and and between Chipangano the association While 6 2012). TheZimbabwean The continuation of instances when violence is used as a tool for governance governance for usedtool is as a violence when of instances continuation The Isolating all Chipangano allegiances to ZANU-PF to these two individuals ZANU-PF these allegiances to individuals to two all Chipangano Isolating re-emergence and fading subsequent its and of Chipangano emergence The Chipangano means pact in Shona, the most widely spoken language in in language spoken widely the most pact in Shona, means Chipangano gano has assisted with the mobilisation for support of these individuals and and these individuals of support for the mobilisation with assisted has gano have there election time, particularly during members, ZANU-PF youth other these and the links between where Chipangano also instances been various News2012). been denied (The Daily have individuals Whether or not this pact extends to government officials is unclear. Chipan unclear. is officials government this to pact not extends or Whether ering the alleged leadership of Chipangano and how it has shifted over time, time, over shifted has it how and Chipangano of thealleged ering leadership existence. Chipangano’s affecting consequently Zimbabwe plagued therefore has endorsement tacit or overt the state’s with used in violence have Men Big focuseshow on chapter This time. a long for partnering with by businesses control and support garner to area the Mbare specific times. at Chipangano of violence informal economy Chipangano’s Introducing ZANU-PF Harare the former by the outset at managed led was and gano in position his lost however, Kunaka, Kunaka. leader Jim Youth Province ZANU-PFthe party in 2014 after alleged from that ousted later was and 2013, Zimbabwe Mujuru’s Joice vice president former for support showing was he MP ZANU-PF shadow Savanhu, Tendai Allegedly, (ZimPF) party. First People Chipangano supported initially the politburo, of a member and Mbare for criminal the paid from were members establishment, its Following financially. (Shumba resources plunder to immunity it was granted after spoils network’s 2011; webs of relations’. This flexibility will be illustrated in this chapter when consid when chapter in this willbe illustrated flexibility This relations’. of webs would be inaccurate, however, although it has been established that they they that been has established it although however, be inaccurate, would Coalition 2012). (Crisis in Zimbabwe Chipangano ties to the strongest have links ZANU-PF this with criminal being discernible, network strong Despite far as the state by ignored conveniently remaining by evaded has prosecution the individuals as such concerned, are existence pertinentaspects its as of impunity outright with operates therefore Chipangano sponsorship. behind its political office. who hold Men Big with association its through in the media. Chipan attention much garnered has that a topic is 2001 since gano has caused immense strife in many of Harare’s merchandising hubs. It is is It hubs. merchandising Harare’s of in many strife immense caused has gano and areas, business informal Harare’s across forms in various present notably and Highfield of areas the high-density and 2013) (Kibble Norton as such towns another. or form in one dominance experienced Chipangano’s have Mufakose Zimbabwe. Nyasha from the HRT described Chipangano as a pact among a pact as described among Chipangano the HRT from Nyasha Zimbabwe. of criminalthe network the benefit for resources public plunder criminals to these individuals has been established, and it is widely believed that Chipan believed widely that is it and been has these established, individuals However, this criminal network primarily operates in Mbare, a site close to the city centre and a place where informal businesses thrive. Chipangano’s main activities include, but are not limited to, seeking to mobilise support for ZANU-PF candidates in the area, preventing the penetration of the political opposition, and aiming to maintain control of Harare municipality properties (see Shumba 2011; The Zimbabwean 2012; Chirau and Chamuka 2013; McGregor 2013; LeBas 2014; Moore 2014; Mutongwizo 2014).8 There is very little known about the members of Chipangano – who they are and how many there are – but the HRT has generally characterised them as ‘youth’. In 2011, the HRT asserted that, in many cases, people travel to Mbare and work with ZANU-PF members in order to exploit the available opportunities to make money by terrorising informal business people.9 The HRT notes that many individuals are only loosely and occasionally connected to Chipangano in Mbare; when they return to their communities – which tend to be other high-density areas such as Epworth, Chitungwiza, Mabvuku, Highfield and Budiriro – they are apolitical and in some cases may even be supporters of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the opposition party. In their communities, the fact that they are Chipangano members remains unknown. Patrick, a member of the CHRA, argued in 2011 that anyone who is unemployed might be tempted to join Chipangano as it provides a sure way to make a living.10 Those without access to alternative modes of survival may in fact be easily drafted into Chipangano (Moore 2012). As such, the activities of Chipangano are not limited to election- related violence.

Chipangano’s governance agenda: controlling elections and earnings Chipangano’s pursuits range from relying on violence to control economic activity in Mbare and the surrounding areas to mobilising support for the ZANU-PF ruling party before and during elections. The shifts in Chipangano’s undertakings are discussed below.

Violent electioneering While the existence of Chipangano was not formally documented until 2001, it was the establishment of the opposition in the form of the MDC in 2000 that prompted its emergence. According to LeBas (2014), voters in Harare, particularly those supporting the MDC, began to experience fear and intimidation in 2000. Until then, such terrorisation of voters had occurred only in Zimbabwe’s rural areas. Various scholars describe the manner in which Chipangano mobilised urban residents to support ZANU-PF as violent and coercive. Chipangano also held campaigns for ZANU-PF in Mbare, where they coerced residents into attending during the 2008 and 2013 elections (Mutongwizo 2014). Chirau and Chamuka (2013) note that vendors in the Magaba area held deep concerns

202 9 | Mutongwizo - - 11 203 (‘Who did you vote for?’) being introduced to to being introduced for?’) vote did you (‘Who

12 member (Dube and Chirisa 2012; Chirau and Chamuka 2013: 22). 2013: Chamuka and Chirisa (Dube Chirau member 2012; and

In a 2011 interview, participants from the CHRA raised the issue that that the CHRA raised the issue from participants interview, a 2011 In Moore (2014) observes that Chipangano coerced urbanites to cast votes in in votes cast to coercedurbanites (2014) observes Chipangano that Moore Mbare residents highlight that Chipangano’s terror was not unique to elec to unique not was terror Chipangano’s highlight that residents Mbare Victor, also from the CHRA, said: also from Victor, a just was . It Resident Mbare The as known newsletter a monthly had We also give and in the community events talk would about that paper little community if they with go needed to help where on information people water access to where like in there information harmless had We problems. them [Chipangano] to threat a was that but facilities, community other and it. they abolished and Our satellite office in Mbare was very popular, it became a hub for many many for hub it a became verywas popular, in Mbare office Our satellite been had very Mbare penetrating difficult. up, set it we before activities and force. By 2010. in earlier by Chipangano down closedwas then, the office But Mbare over and taking existence their threatening were we that felt They ofthe MDC. be affiliate to us an perceive began to theysince somehow Terror has been noted as continuing even after elections, with violence such such violence elections, with even after continuing as been has noted Terror lance tactics involved following the movements of MDC activists, keeping MDC of keeping activists, the movements following tacticslance involved checking rallies, ZANU-PF and and meetings at attendees note to registers that adds (ibid.) McGregor ZANU-PF cards. for public the of members Mbare. expelled from activists were and MDC councillors prominent some other in losing MDC resulted activity it as greatly, This ZANU-PF benefited the weakening to leading thereby discreetly, more operating and momentum party. the opposition of equitable providing at activities aimed and meetings disrupted had Chipangano added CHRA participants occasions. many on services residents urban for in their rights on citizens designed enlighten was to that activity any that by stated As Chipangano. by another or way in one targeted was way any the CHRA: of Rufaro and fears about elections, as they led to violence and an interruption of their their of interruption an they and as violence led elections, to about fears and Mbare. in livelihoods engaging from aside that, out points (2013) McGregor ZANU-PF. of favour to used the surveillance voters of Chipangano violence, in pervasive physical the surveil of Some ZANU-PF. for vote to directives with compliance ensure tion periods. For example, people were also coerced into attending the funerals attending also coerced into were people example, periods.tion For residents forced Chipangano occasion, On one heroes. national declared of a departed for support show to Acre Heroes the National as far as travel to ZANU-PF as Operation Makavhotera Operation as Papi are 2014). These actions (Mungure dispense violence and citizens intimidate by appropriated is election process the entire since the state legitimised by ZANU-PF; even after the election, violence is used to punish those known to have voted against the party or suspected of having done so. In such instances, Big Men who are office holders abuse their public positions and also legitimise practices in which ‘the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or ambition but concurrently the satisfaction of the short-term objectives of a subset of the general population’ (Joseph 1987: 67).

Downsizing and sizing up Big Men: Chipangano’s leadership The exploitation of public resources and offices by Big Men in association with criminal networks such as Chipangano in order to meet specific goals at clearly defined times is evident in Chipangano’s former leader Jim Kunaka’s changeable status within ZANU-PF. Much like Chipangano’s foot soldiers, his status as a Big Man is also flexible and dependent on the time period. This can be observed in Kunaka’s actions of October 2015, when, in an interview with South African News Channel ANN7, he referred to ZANU-PF as a ‘cult’ and apologised for his role in Chipangano (Ndlovu 2015). However, months later, Kunaka re-joined ZANU-PF after being forced to leave the party in 2014 and later joining ZimPF. In an interview (Dlamini 2016), when asked about whether he would revive Chipangano, Kunaka responded by laughing at first and then vehemently saying:

I can’t continue using old systems, something that is no longer in fashion. We are coming on board with new strategies on how to win an election. I have said it before that, that was a time of madness and I was doing it because I was still young and now I am a matured politician. I know what is needed by the people of this country, it’s not violence, it’s not taking them to meetings by force and so forth. What they want to see is food on the table, so I will try by all means to encourage other young people to desist from violence. So I don’t think that Chipangano would be revived. No, no, no we have got new systems of mobilising people, engaging people, one-on- one, in a peaceful manner.

While these are the most recent utterances from Kunaka, his return to ZANU-PF has nonetheless raised fears among people. Mbare residents in particular are gravely worried about the possible return of Chipangano to mobilise for ZANU-PF support in future elections (Dewa 2016). Kunaka’s return to ZANU-PF prompted the MDC’s Secretary for Information, Obert Gutu, to express the fears associated with such a move. Nehanda Radio (ibid.) quotes Gutu as saying:

We are naturally disappointed that Kunaka is going to ZANU-PF after claiming to have repented. Our members in Mbare and its immediate environs have suffered at the hands of that group [Chipangano] and the

204 9 | Mutongwizo This second This second Outside election periods, the election periods,Outside the . 205 order to ensure a victory. The departure and return of Kunaka Kunaka of return and departure The a victory. ensure to order in The decline and revival of Chipangano, and the criminal network’s different different criminaland the network’s of revivalChipangano, and decline The been to limited not have Chipangano the activities of that clear is It fact that its lynchpin, Kunaka, has re-joined the violent party is a cause for for party a cause is the violent re-joined has Kunaka, lynchpin, its fact that concern. great the through cycle return illustrates Kunaka’s by here represented The pattern ZANU-PF youth identity is retained by members of Chipangano for their benefit their benefit for Chipangano of members by retained is identity ZANU-PF youth as fluid identities and dual their Through resources. public plunder to in order reflects that the endurance of ‘bigmanity’ is not definitive. While some Big Big Whilesome definitive. not is of ‘bigmanity’ endurance the reflects that – ‘come Kunaka – like others things’, of the centre at a lifetime ‘spend Men in Chipangano by displayed the pattern 8). Examining 2012: (Utas go’ and operates. in which it way a detectable is there 2013, 2008 and of the elections day-to-day on a businesses Mbare’s from profiteering focuson a involves This their positions have who turn in Men Big by beingprotected through basis are when citizens election time, during Chipangano preserved by power of a reciprocal this way, In these Men. Big for support for mobilised violently there While maintained. is Men Big and between Chipangano system support ZANU-PF – it from departure in the seen cycle – as breaks in Kunaka’s are this form be and to seen whether this the very is Chipangano remains of end been have arrangements seeing such as electioneering in Mbare, violent of elections. Zimbabwe’s of each partof a cycle demonstrate elections, of the proximity on depending focal points of the ties between strength The Mbare. within pattern governance in its during approach, elections as be to also greater tends Men Big and Chipangano these but by-elections, and general throughout and elections to the build-up periods. loosened non-election during tiesare ZANU-PF. promote activitiesseeking to to only or violence election-related governance its on item an have to constantly manages criminalThis network canvass to Chipangano Employing existence. its for reason a creates that agenda these because also government violence the benefits ZANU-PF through votes Crisis The 2013). verify to (Kibble challenging beare can denied and actions a localised as simply not Coalition Chipangano characterises in Zimbabwe logistical support receives that security parallel rogue force’ ‘a as militia but been has the criminal network roles: dual has thus Chipangano the state. from a as and supporters non-ZANU-PF of the repression for a tool as employed Coalition 2012). (Crisis in Zimbabwe revenue generate to force role will be discussedrole section thein next Controlling informal sector earnings Controlling which violence is meted out in Zimbabwe’s elections, where Chipangano has has Chipangano where elections, in Zimbabwe’s out meted is which violence been has whichdispensed violence in the and 2008 through been the vehicle elections 2013 Chipangano and members of ZANU-PF’s youth wing, they have been involved in the widespread terrorisation of urban dwellers, particularly those making a living in the informal sector. Chipangano uses violence to intimidate informal business owners, and to loot and control livelihoods by demanding a share of these business people’s earnings as a form of tax (Chirau and Chamuka 2013: 21). Chipangano is aware of the lucrative opportunities that exist in Mbare. There are wholesale markets known as Mupedzanhamo and Mbare Musika as well as retail and manufacturing industries in the Siya-so and Magaba areas. There is a strong presence of small businesses, and hence the opportunity to exploit individual business owners who need stalls and daily transportation. Chipangano’s ability to plunder in such an environment is increased by the fact that there is little law enforcement and regulation in Mbare, thereby creating the opportunity for Chipangano to operate with impunity. Further, ZANU-PF’s denial of the existence of Chipangano has led to the police being unable to intervene in any way (Moyo 2011). In an interview with the HRT in 2011, participants argued that the police in Mbare are fearful of being victimised. This leads to Chipangano operating with impunity since there is no opposition from the police. If challenged by the police, members of Chipangano rely on their ZANU-PF allegiance to escape prosecution. The police remain partisan in terms of who is arrested, with perpetrators who support the government enjoying almost total immunity and individuals, especially opposition supporters and civil society figures, being subject to arbitrary arrest (Kibble 2013). The Harare City Council also lacks the capacity to confront Chipangano because members of the network use their ZANU-PF identity to hide behind political victimisation (Mutongwizo 2014). Scholars who have had the opportunity to interview those affected by Chipangano’s existence in Mbare have pointed out that the Chipangano network wholly controls business in the area. For instance, the majority of vendors operating in the Magaba area claimed that Chipangano has taken the law into its own hands. There is a constant atmosphere of fear, particularly during and after elections (Dube and Chirisa 2012). ‘Bigmanity’ is a response to a lack of formal structures (Utas 2012: 8), and, in this case, a lack of strong official control of public space and resources. Chipangano benefits from the Harare municipality’s lack of influence in controlling public space and informally employs the known autocracy of the ZANU-PF government to achieve its ends – and, in the process, it garners support for ZANU-PF in Mbare and the surrounding areas by intimidating the public. The media has noted that Chipangano halted the US$5 million Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation construction project of residential flats in Mbare in 2011. Chipangano threatened construction workers with violence, and demanded 51 per cent ownership of the project. The housing project was

206 9 | Mutongwizo - 2012; 2012; Chipangano managed to take advan to managed Chipangano 13 207 The control of market stalls and space allocated for trading in Mbare, as well well as in Mbare, trading for space stalls and allocated market of control The in the 2012, participants and between 2010 conducted research During field political ‘allowed has the government that stressed the HRT from Nyasha The Daily News2012). The Daily creates Mbare, around and in operating all to transport toll a of the charging as approach. when elections dominance Chipangano’s bolsters that platform a are and of Chipangano sustainability day-to-day the These activities ensures Men Big of the protection under the network for income used generate to since 2013), (McGregor political power who hold Savanhu, and Kunaka as such action (Sahlins mass prompt and command to the capacity have these Men Big the controlled Chipangano where example clear a are elections 2013 The 1963). 2012). (Moore Mbare in voters and vendors informal unregulated the CHRA and the HRT from informants survey and in Mbare household intimidate to rape and torture violence, on relies Chipangano that out pointed how on information provided HRT The civil society the people, opposition. and determined the allocation it that stating space, public controlled Chipangano to fee a Those allegiance. paying one’s to according stalls in Mbare market of received credentials or ZANU-PF cards holding stalls or market for Chipangano further Chipangano stalls subdivided by were Market treatment. preferential allocating more space by the limited for more charge to members allow to the from a licence have to supposed were traders pertraders stall. Market out points Muleya Paul councillor Mbare but municipality, Harare of City Chipangano Additionally, 2013). (McGregor need a ZANU card’ you ‘now that in operating for taxis fee a minibus all theand termini within traders charged therefore had Chipangano sector. the transport of the control usurping Mbare, using people business informal of the livelihoods of takensuccessfully control infrastructure. council’s thecity businessmen’. as masquerade to thugs moved to Dzivarasekwa, another high-density area, south-west of the city the city of south-west area, high-density another Dzivarasekwa, to moved does not this area as in Dzivarasekwa active less is Chipangano Harare. of the project’s Despite Mbare. as opportunities business informal many as have million US$1.2 a proposed of the site Harare, of the City by approval formal in harassed was station police Matapi near food court and servicestation space public over their control of example a third as Finally, way. a similar in boreholes the foreign-funded destroyed members Chipangano in Mbare, The 2011; Zimbabwean (Shumba funded’ calling them ‘enemy Mbare, tage of the state by usurping public resources and benefiting financially while while financially benefiting and resources public usurping by the state of tage Chipangano do, doing By ZANU-PF. behalf of on working entity an posingas existence, Chipangano’s denial of the state’s Due to escapeconviction. members In operate. to permission tacit it given has and the group endorsed has it of a form is engages in which Chipangano the criminal creativity this way, wealth. accumulate even to survive, to and in order security adaptation and The view that the state is preying on individuals (Buchanan 1999; Chabal 2007; Englebert 1997; Frimpong-Ansah 1991; Harsch 1997; Lund 2007; Shleifer and Vishny 1998) is demonstrated through Chipangano’s existence in Mbare. Big Men such as Kunaka have outsourced criminality to Chipangano, which works to sustain both Chipangano and ZANU-PF.

Chipangano within the Big Man agenda: spillages for pillaging Chipangano survived and perhaps proliferated between 2001 and 2014 because of its adaptation to the various economic environments in Zimbabwe. Chipangano altered its activities with each season that presented an opportunity for resources to be usurped or dominance to be used for securing resources and space. Success mainly rests on Chipangano’s association with Big Men, who, in the form of Kunaka and Savanhu, provided a reprieve from the law, and in return worked as a network outsourced by ZANU-PF when necessary. The re-emergence of Chipangano before and during election periods and its re-focusing of energies towards controlling public space and resources during breaks from elections display the manner in which Chipangano undergoes various spillages from one identity and activity to another at different times. Chipangano possesses a fluid nature and undergoes numerous transformations in its bid to secure hegemony. In this way, Chipangano may be seen primarily as a business entity, driven mainly by greed and not necessarily by an allegiance to ZANU-PF. In condoning Chipangano’s activities, the state can, in Cohen’s (2001) terms, be identified as a bystander to atrocities. In many respects, the state acts as an enabler of Chipangano’s activity. Alluding to Chabal and Daloz (1999: 80), politicians are often the facilitators and licensees of the business of violence. It is clear that the success of networks such as Chipangano is not determined by their autonomy from the state, but is shaped more by their relationship with the state (Meagher 2010). In such instances, Big Men such as Kunaka emerge and use their positions to mobilise criminal networks for a mutually beneficial relationship based on plundering public resources. This case demonstrates that there are various sizes of Big Men in a hierarchy of control, assigning positions to each other in their plundering. It will be worth noting how Chipangano evolves, if at all, in future elections.

Elections and control in Mbare: elevating and relegating Big Men Individuals are made into Big Men by small men. If anything, Chipan- gano’s inestimable members benefited more from their activities in Mbare, since these individuals remain nameless and ousted Kunaka, whom they had made a Big Man within their sphere. Diamond (2008) notes that as more democratic processes and election observations are being encouraged and put in place, it has become more common for a ruling party or Big Man to lose

208 9 | Mutongwizo 209 - rela in the client is and the who is the who patron is debatable it Therefore, when a threat emerge Chipangano as such criminal networks seems that It the of locality been has the a consequence Mbare within Electoral violence an election. This may be one of the key reasons why criminal networks such such criminalnetworks why reasons keyof the one be may election. This an this reason. be for to dual tend aims Chipangano’s and exist, Chipangano as base support a create to above, may asbe, discussions seen inthe first The case, may seen as the second, in Kunaka’s Men; Big create or up build and the label Hence, it. demands when the situation these Men Big be relegate to day-to- Chipangano’s part describes of who both are these individuals ‘touts’ also their and in Mbare, opportunities business activities in the various day power taking that and power, of positions up building of activities in terms Men. Big potential from away Sahlins observes reversed. the somewhat fragility are the roles since tionship, be continuously must loyalty ‘as power, Man Big of nature the transient and consequences grave have may followers among dissatisfaction and reinforced raises the point therefore chapter The 292). (Sahlins 1963: authority’ his for their exercise and of aware are Chipangano as such criminal networks that the as the relationship of in control much as are in theiragency activities and in times when authority dispense violence them to who subcontract Men Big support of withdrawal Chipangano’s legal means. through unachievable appears This case also in Mbare. terror Chipangano’s endedboth and his Kunaka for times, different at wielded power Chipangano and Men both Big that displays used the tool was violence and being sought, were ends what on depending their agendas. achieve to 2014, when thecase the was as between and 2001 such exists, hegemony to between were years prominent most Chipangano’s ZANU-PF. MDC threatened the which period was 2013, (GPA) 2008 and when a global political agreement between the MDC. ZANU-PF and shared was power and in Zimbabwe existed the took opposition the of burgeoning the to alleged reaction ZANU-PF’s such in places Chipangano the use of through control appropriating of form favour. widespread gaining was the opposition where Mbare as by being could be guaranteed spaceof in Mbare control The regulation. of lack violence the Therefore, the locality. representing holders office with associated control and be struggle a direct power can as understood in this for instance to stallholders to touts from ranging individuals why which is the area, over is This in Chipangano. involvement sought in Mbare operating people business eye can a blind where space, the neglect public and of lawlessness by spurred means vote urban the controlling Thus, power. for be these to turned battles the that notes (2013) Kibble Mbare. as such suburbs high-density controlling of a stronghold is poses it ZANU-PF since immense Mbare to is that threat both essential because is it Mbare over control ZANU-PF, To the opposition. Mbare over control of because a loss and the opposition, of a stronghold is would mean losing control over profitable business opportunities within the area’s economic space.

Conclusion: the timely emergence of Big Men with specific agendas This chapter has provided the basis for understanding the links that have been exploited by Chipangano and government officials acting as Big Men and how this association has benefited each party in different time periods. The government has condoned Chipangano because its existence is mutually beneficial for each actor. By observing Kunaka’s rise in Chipangano, his exit from ZANU-PF and his subsequent return, it can be detected that individuals are elevated at distinct times and under specific circumstances, elections being the most crucial times. Chipangano was free to control and plunder public resources and space on a day-to-day basis, and the state relied on this criminal network’s power in intimidating the public during election time in order to guarantee votes. Therefore, Chipangano did not necessarily exploit the state by claiming allegiance to Big Men who hold political office; rather, it was a reciprocal relationship that was nurtured and flourished because of mutual benefits for Big Men and criminals, each supporting its proliferation at specific times. This indicates a ‘pact’ between prospective Big Men and the unemployed, youth and touts taking advantage of Mbare’s opportunities, which thereby gave birth to Chipangano. This chapter contributes to an understanding of the interplay between the links of this criminal network and ZANU-PF. The chapter has been useful for investigating how these networks are used, in this case through outright violence to support both the political interests of ZANU-PF and Chipangano’s business agenda. Through examining Chipangano in Mbare, the chapter has shed some light on election-related violence and how it manifests within this locality. Furthermore, the chapter is useful as a lens through which to view the manner in which Big Men outsource services from criminal networks and how such links further guarantee the achievement of both parties’ agendas and their impunity because of existing yet opaque ties. What remains to be seen is whether Chipangano will yet again be revived in future elections, and if Chipangano – or similar criminal networks – will (re-)emerge in the same or a different form, supported by prospective Big Men who desire political power. The possibility of resurgence exists since Mbare remains an economic hub and a fertile breeding ground for various opportunities and opportunists. If Jim Kunaka does not take the position of the Big Man behind Chipangano in future elections, it will be worth noting whether another individual will be elevated to fill that void and mobilise citizens, as well as to control space and earnings in Mbare and the surrounding areas. The use of violence to maintain power when threatened by opposition

210 9 | Mutongwizo

106 (422): 106 (422): African Affairs Washington DC: International DC: International Washington Zimbabwe: Report on the 1985 1985 the on Report Zimbabwe:

104 (414): 104 1–34. . Author interview with Patrick, interview Patrick, with Author Author interview with Victor, interview Victor, with Author Author interview with Nyasha, interview Nyasha, with Author Author interview Rufaro, with Author Author interview with Brenda, interview Brenda, with Author Author interview with Rufaro, interview Rufaro, with Author Author interview with Nyasha, interview Nyasha, with Author Ibid. Author interview with Nyasha, HRT, HRT, interview Nyasha, with Author

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4 3 2 1 best be described as a project of urban best urban be described of a project as government, the Zimbabwe by cleansing 2005 began in May It the poor. targeting it thereafter several months for and sector activities (Coltart razed informal estimated is 2008). Murambatsvina household survey would be sufficient to survey be sufficient would household the various of the nuances on light shed in Mbare. mechanisms governance extremely were residents However, discussing reserved to came when it very Only participants few Chipangano. discussed openly (3 per the cent) interestingly, Chipangano; of existence ZANU-PF them as to youth they referred reservists. this group They that said in crime and particularlywas involved election time. during violence in the literature as an ‘informal state- ‘informal an as in the literature Mitchell and Colaresi (Carey, militia’ 2013) (Kibble militia’ a ‘stand-by as 2015), The (cf. 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8 (1): 79–83. 42: 167–92. Journal of SouthernJournal African 25 (2): 25 (2): Democracy of Journal . London: Pluto Press. Pluto . London: 39 (4): 783–805. 39 (1): 1–9. 30 104 (414): 104 1–34. . Oxford: Blackwell. Blackwell. . Oxford: ‘Nigeria: Political Violence, Violence, Political ‘Nigeria: Corporate and Governance in M. in a Petro-state’ Responsibility (eds), Said Y. and L. Karl T. Kaldor, Future Elections: Moving Towards an an Towards Elections: Moving Future Zimbabwe’, for System Warning Early Journal of Peacebuilding and Development Oil Wars Studies in Zimbabwe’, Accumulation Violent Journal of Contemporary African Studies Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The The Nigeria: in Politics Prebendal . Republic Second the of Fall and Rise University Cambridge Cambridge: Press. the Elections’, and the Referendum 35 Africa Southern Review for Strategic (1): 93–117. in General Elections, 1980–2000: African Coercion’, and Discourse Affairs Sharing’, Power-sharing the City: Patronage, in Control Urban of the Politics and Zimbabwe’, Informal the and Networks Social Oxford and Nigeria. in Economy HEBN and Currey James Ibadan: Publishers. du en Afrique: d’analyse esquisse L’Année entrepreneur’, politician Sociologique Election: the 2013 of in the Wake Historical and Contemporary 52–66. in Politics Local and Authority Public Africa Ibeanu, O. and R. Luckham (2007) (2007) R. and Luckham O. Ibeanu, Hove, S. (2013) ‘Preventing Violence in in Violence ‘Preventing (2013) S. Hove, and Power, ‘Progress, (2012) D. Moore, Joseph, R. Democracy A. (1987) Joseph, and between ‘Zimbabwe S. (2013) Kibble, Strategies (PF) ‘ZANU N. (2005) Kriger, Power LeBas,of Perils A. (2014) ‘The and ‘Surveillance (2013) J. McGregor, Economics: Identity K. (2010) Meagher, man” “big ‘Le (1992) J.-F. Médard, Democracy (2014) ‘Zimbabwe’s D. Moore, Twilight Institutions: Institutions: Twilight (2007) C. (ed.) Lund, Staniland, P. (2012) ‘Between a Rock and gang-campaigning-for/ (accessed 13 a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, December 2017). Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro- Tibaijuka, A. J. (2005) Report of the Fact- state Paramilitaries’, Journal of Conflict finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess Resolution 56 (1): 16–40. the Scope and Impact of Operation The Daily News (2012) ‘How Chipangano Murambatsvina. Nairobi: UN Special Stalled Fuel Project’, The Daily News, Envoy on Human Settlements Issues 26 February. Available at www. in Zimbabwe. Available at www. dailynews.co.zw/index.php/news/34- un.org/News/dh/infocus/zimbabwe/ news/7563-how-chipangano-stalled- zimbabwe_rpt.pdf (accessed 10 fuel-project.html (accessed 18 March October 2010). 2012). Utas, M. (2012) ‘Introduction: Bigmanity The Zimbabwean (2012) ‘Violent and Network Governance in African Chipangano Gang Campaigning for Conflicts’ in M. Utas (ed.), African ZANU PF’, The Zimbabwean, 14 April. Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men Available at www.thezimbabwean. and Networks. London and New York co/2012/04/violent-chipangano- NY: Zed Books.

214 10 | Patronage politics and electoral violence in Lagos, Nigeria: understanding the micro-level dynamics

Daniel E. Agbiboa

Introduction The patron–client framework in Africa is usually cast in absolute binaries that pay attention to the patron while relegating the client to residual status. A large corpus of work has shown that it is in the interest of ordinary citizens to seek attachment to so-called ‘Big Men’ for economic possibilities, social security and upward mobility (Utas 2012). What is regularly overlooked, however, are the tactical ways in which such attachment is sought, and the fact that it is also in the interests of Big Men to maintain political loyalists who will win them elections. The implication is that both the Big Man and his loyal supporters find themselves in a precarious position where they both need each other to survive and fulfil their aspirations. Faced with this manifest ‘incompleteness’ (Nyamnjoh 2015), conviviality is negotiated on the edge of conflict, imposed by necessity. This resonates with Francis Nyamnjoh’s (ibid. 9) point that ‘achievement is devoid of meaning if not pursued within, as part of, and on behalf of a group of people who recognize and endorse that achievement’. Thus, Big Men consolidate their interests best when these are pursued in acknowledgement of and respect for incomplete others. Elections anywhere are times of radical uncertainties that lay bare the precarious positionality and incompleteness of a multiplicity of local actors who struggle to remain relevant and influential. Loyalties shift and mutate and insecurity increases. How does this particular uncertainty affect the behaviour of the actors involved? How do they cope with this specific insecurity around elections? What are the consequences in terms of violence? Drawing on primary data obtained from ethnographic fieldwork in Lagos, this chapter interrogates the micro-politics of election-related violence in Lagos, Nigeria, with a focus on the post-1999 electoral context and the urban transport sector. The chapter provides micro-level insights into why we see instances of election-related violence in transit spaces (i.e. motor parks), where practices of governance are exercised and contested daily. Along the way, the chapter foregrounds the interdependence between Big Men and their loyal foot soldiers, and provides some explanation for the rationale behind the latter’s engagement in violent 215 extortion with impunity. By focusing analytic attention on the ways in which the deeply local exigencies of insecurity and patrimonialism intersect with the manifestations of election-related violence in urban transport in Lagos, this chapter contributes to this volume’s overriding focus on explaining the intricate causal mechanisms at work that link macro-level factors at the national level with the occurrence of election-related violence at the everyday level. In other words, the chapter demonstrates how insecurity surrounding elections leads to ‘prebendal logics’ (Pratten 2013) that underscore the precarious agency of both patrons and clients. In terms of structure, the chapter begins with an analysis of the politics of transportation in Lagos, especially its structures and dynamics. This then forms a background for understanding electoral politics and related violence.

The politics of transportation Various concepts have been used to capture the inherent contradictions and contingencies of everyday life, including Taussig’s (1992) ‘nervous system’ or ‘siege’, Giddens’ (1991) ‘ontological uncertainty’, Lubkemann’s (2008) ‘social condition of war’, and Mbembe’s (2003) ‘state of war’. What these frameworks all have in common is the sense of uncertainty, mistrust and insecurity that speckles everyday life and ordinary forms of sociality. According to Mbembe and Roitman (2005: 324), insecurity in urban Africa may be framed in terms of ‘the crisis’ (la crise), or, in other words, the incoherence, uncertainty, instability and discontinuity caused by the mix of economic depression, instabilities, fluctuations and ruptures. For many transport operators whom I spoke to during fieldwork in Lagos, the struggle for survival and socio-physical security remains the overriding worry. As one danfo (minibus taxi) driver said to me, ‘Man must chop [eat] because stomach does not take holiday.’1 Given the relatively few full-time jobs that are available in the growing megacity, it is hardly surprising that public transport tends to attract plenty of labour in the form of unwaged youth, predominantly male. In fact, some danfo drivers and conductors in Lagos seem to constitute a reserve army of workers who are capable of relapsing into full-time touting should the need arise (Okpara 1988: 331). To my casual question ‘How is life?’, many transport operators in Lagos often responded: ‘Aiye e le’ (this life is hard). The hard life of many operators is further complicated by the ubiquitous presence of agberos (motor park touts) on the road, acting as foot soldiers and tax collectors for the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), the most politicised and violent trade union in Nigeria (Albert 2007). The term agbero itself is a euphemism for an army of antisocial and hard- boiled street youth who earn a living through their parasitic dependence on the control of passenger transport in Lagos. Largely a male youth affair, agberos use power and appropriate authority by redefining and inserting themselves

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driver conduct ?’ (Where ?’ (Where conductor Owo da operators. Yet the the Yet operators. ? in Lagos: Lagos: in agberos operators. When a danfo When operators. drivers referring to them as omo them as to ijoba referring drivers 217 (rock). Other operators believe that local believe that Other operators (rock). are usually under immense pressure from the the from pressure immense under usually are – they are the ones dying for the ones up. The The up. theones for dying the ones they– are

2 A recurrent view among my interviewees was that senior senior interviewees that was my view among A recurrent 3 at the top they are somehow closer to the government. And the the And the government. closer to somehow they are the top at operators, I learned that the intensity of violence increases during during increases violence of the intensity learnedI that operators, agberos agberos who lurk around motor motor around who lurk agberos of a group by conductors and drivers have their Big Men who position them at various bus stops and and stops bus various them at who position Men their Big have agberos danfo are held in great contempt contempt great in held are agberos to, I spoke Lagosians many Among During fieldwork, I observed that every bus stop between Oshodi and observed I and Oshodi between everystop bus Duringthat fieldwork, The ones below they are the erukuthey are below ones them for dying the one but investment, have abroad, they travel can up ones much. have they don’t conductor in Oshodi said to me: ‘Our case is like that of monkey dey work, dey work, monkey of case that like is ‘Our me: to said in Oshodi conductor baboon dey chop.’ agberos election when seasons, agberos union to raise enough money to fund the expensive electoral campaigns of of campaigns electoral fund the expensive to money enough raise to union theruling political party. where reap theybecause is largely This avoidance. of objects represent and danfo one the weak. As the of backs rich on growing sown, not they have is the money? Where is the money?), windscreens are smashed, side mirrors side mirrors smashed, are windscreens the money?), is Where the money? is broken seats fuel tanks removed, and wipers pulled out, forcibly or broken of the also toll can leadto a beating refusalthe severe to or pay A delay off. danfo interviews my taxcollection. From a closeon eye keep to stops bus and parks with officials in the union and local governments in Lagos share in the ‘transport ‘transport inthe share inLagos governments and local in union the officials agberos why this explains many, . For agberos collected by daily cake’ their affairs with impunity, with danfo with impunity, with their affairs apata or the government) of (a child cover to use these agberos unlawful collected politicians taxes by government the popular to According campaigns. their electoral expenses of the huge view, appropriation of these transit spaces for private gain constitutes a usurpation a usurpation constitutes gain private for spaces these transit of appropriation Nigerian specified as in the local function of governments the constitutional of a danfo interview Olawale, Akeem with My 1999. of Constitution types revealed two of area, local Oshodi in government into the interstices of state–society relations in the definition and maintenance maintenance and in the definition relations state–society of the interstices into parks, motor of spaces public the usurping by They do this everyday order. of base to Lagos, which they operational use an as across roads and stops bus danfo hapless from collect money extort illegal and taxes hesitates in responding to their raucous demands of ‘Owo of da demands their raucous to in responding hesitates Alimosho local government areas, where I conducted my fieldwork, has its its has fieldwork, my I conducted where areas, localAlimosho government and/ whips sticks, wooden with armed clubs, , who are agberos of unit own who do conductors and drivers attack they brutally so can rods that iron or naira 50 from at thesethe time, ranged tributes; financial pay to stop not traffic with conspire usually These agberos (US$2.50). naira 500 (US$0.25) to danfo moneyfrom to extort police officers junctions across the state and expect returns later in the day. They are given high targets to meet and any failure to deliver the set amount spells trouble that could lead to the loss of their jobs. This view emerged in my interviews with agberos in Oshodi and Alimosho local government areas, at a time when Nigeria was preparing for its general elections in 2015 and when stakes and tensions ran very high. One agbero in a motor park in Oshodi told me that Oshodi has sixteen units that remit roughly 700,000 naira daily to the oga agbero (the head agbero) in charge of that area.4 In Iyana Ipaja, another area, there are seven units that deliver around 200,000 naira daily to the oga agbero. In Alimosho area, the largest local government area in Lagos, agberos remit a daily sum of around 1 million naira to the oga agbero. Champion, a danfo driver in Oshodi, hinted at the strong connection between agberos and local politicians in Lagos when he said:

If ogas [patrons] at the top were not supporting agberos, then they would be long gone from the motor parks because they are nothing but nuisance, making our jobs hell for us. They reap where they have not sown and scatter where they have not gathered. Let me tell you, in our business agberos are kings; they are untouchables. And many of these are just young men. They enjoy plenty support from top politicians up to the state governor and local government chairman. Now they even have uniform because oga Tinubu [the former governor of Lagos state] and oga Fashola [Tinubu’s successor] installed them there to extort money for him and to harass people during elections. That is why they can do and undo. They are like gods here. Some of them now call themselves members of the NURTW. But these are all thieves and rogues. This is daylight robbery. But what can we do?5

Champion’s statement calls for a rethink of the tendency to put urban or street youth on the Procrustean bed of the vulnerable and marginalised. The majority of agberos whom I encountered in Lagos were not marginalised, vulnerable or excluded in the strict sense of the words. If anything, these agberos were the dreaded and influential youth who have perfected the art of getting by or making do. Addressing the economic lack that underpins the political instrumentality of the agberos, an established editorial in Lagos writes:

Our youths, for a good part of the life of a government, are starved of genuine opportunities; no employment, no education or training. And then come campaign time; the politicians sprinkle slush money and they unleash the beasts; rent a thug. These people are given money and small weapons to intimidate the opposition and ordinary citizens. They create fear and fan terror so that people are prevented from performing their constitutional obligations. (Vanguard 2015b)

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- By this, they mean gaining a source of of a source this, they gaining By mean 6 219 mirror the behaviour of political leaders in in leaders political of the behaviour mirror 2015). With this statement, Jonathan implies implies Jonathan this statement, With 2015). I encountered in Lagos) are not merely merely not Lagos)in are encountered I agberos and the NURTW illumi the NURTW and between agberos relations of layers entangled The agberos agberos a is in sense which There The continual re-enactment by the Nigerian ruling elites of practices of in elites Nigerian ruling by the re-enactment continual The Transportation and the dynamics of patronage and the dynamics Transportation nate a model of urban youth clientelism. By this I mean ‘the social production social production ‘the this I mean By clientelism. youth urban a modelof nate provide to fail structures when local national and dependency patronage of on agberos Many 62). 2003: (Murphy youth’ needs of the social economic for and they became that me told areas Alimosho and in Oshodi I spoke whom to above rising of a way as elites NURTW of patronage the generous on dependent ‘becomesomebody in to despair economic and vulnerability physical their own me. told in Oshodi agbero one as life’, Nigeria who often resort to devious ways to translate declining law and and social law declining to translate ways devious resortto who often Nigeria In networks. theirclient of the loyalty oil that resources patronage into order Nigerian criticised Goodluck Jonathan president former example, for 2015, early theiractions by whereas, statesmen, elder as themselves parading politicians who are touts’ motor-park ‘ordinary but nothing they are utterances, and particular that get set because [they]to the country ablaze did not ‘planning (The [they]thing Nation want’ who agberos from no different are Nigerian politicians some first, things: two those goals. And realise second, their selfish to violence of usethe instrument countryis in when the interests their selfish achieve to likely are politicians as a political works social that disorder feedsargument the This point disarray. Daloz 1999). (Chabal and elites Africa’s for instrument vested protect to and accumulation used for are power of which the privileges the police officer of the level the to social permeated has down fabric interests ‘people 26) notes, (1991: Marshall As taxi operators. from bribes who demands survival’. of matter as a theyhave influence and power the wield little must of patronage, by the politics relief stark into is thrown dynamics This power it. from follows that the violence and income and respectability in the society in which they live. This view supports in the society This viewsupports respectability in which they and live. income as whichsees model, patronage clientelism youth (ibid.) Murphy’s Patrick economic and the political marginalisation to a response with youth providing Lagos, the In state. the nation of regimes the corrupt by enforced destitution national a larger of symptomatic been as has explained agberos of menace as view politicians opportunities few with youth crisis, where unemployment young too many [are] ‘there argues: Maja-Pearce Adewale As ticket’. ‘meal a and go do is to have action. All you some for waiting around, hanging men blame can’t you … want they you will them and what do pay meetthem and the fact omits Maja-Pearce Yet, (AFP 2015). eat’ to … they want the youths the least (at youth urban that of capable tactical but agents chess, of in a political game pawns passive manipulating just as they are able to be manipulated. In other words, agberos can see opportunities and seize them (de Certeau 1984: xix). For example, during fieldwork I interviewed a group of agberos who bragged about how they would organise themselves and meet with local politicians on their own turf to broker a deal, which involved eliminating or threatening a political rival running for a position in the NURTW. As one agbero in Oshodi told me:

When election is approaching, sometimes if we suspect that the politician is worried about someone taking over, we go to meet him and ask him if he wants us to ‘sort that person out’ [this can mean killing the person, beating him up, or threatening him]. Then we negotiate pay and job done! If he is reluctant or slow, we go to his rival and present him with the same offer. If he accepts or if his ‘settlement’ [payment] is better, the first one is in trouble.7

In this respect, the relationship of interdependence between agberos and the NURTW is best understood according to Anthony Giddens’ (1979: 76, 93) association of autonomy and dependence in his ‘dialectic of control’, or Bayart’s (1989: xiii) view that ‘subjection can constitute a form of action’. A further interrogation of the micro-politics of relations between the agberos and the NURTW is thus expedient. The NURTW was founded in 1978 with the goal of promoting the economic welfare of its members, who were professional taxi drivers in intra-city and inter-city transport. Since its establishment, the NURTW has grown rapidly to more than 1.5 million members throughout Nigeria. The NURTW controls 1,240 motor parks and 225 town service parking spaces, covering over 95 per cent of all motor parks in the 774 local government areas of Nigeria. This is in addition to private, federal and state government transport companies and other designated loading points (Agbiboa 2016). The union generates its funds through the dues it collects each day from transport operators through the agberos. The law establishing the NURTW assigned it the role of collecting check-off dues, such as deductions at source from the pay of each employee, with the employer’s accounting office serving as collecting agent. However, these dues have now been multiplied by the NURTW in such a way that ‘they are now used to oppress us’, as one danfo driver told me.8 The lucrative economy of motor park rackets is responsible for the explosion of motor parks across Lagos. While it is difficult to estimate the number of danfos plying Lagos roads, one danfo driver in Oshodi claims that: ‘The NURTW chairman for Lagos pockets up to 5 million naira [about US$31,250] daily from the different units under him.’9 However, the chairman does not pocket all the funds but distributes them among other union executives, police inspectors (for protection), local council chairmen and party officials. I learned that this system of distribution is in tune with the NURTW’s guiding slogan ‘Eat Alone, Die Alone’. In distributing the funds – or ‘declaring surplus’, as they say in

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- 10 are driver in in driver ) and casual sex pros with ) and driver told me: ‘If you’re in in you’re ‘If me: told driver . You’re born to kill.’ born to You’re . agbero are offered cash rewards, which they rewards, cash offered are 221 ) where no cost is spared and people in in people and spared is cost no ) where are so feared, Boniface, a danfo so feared, are ), alcohol (paraga), alcohol

(eat for free). The wife of one of the NURTW of NURTW the one of free).wife The for (eat 11 regularly are perceived as corrupt and self-centred, self-centred, and corrupt as perceived are regularly ). Fourchard (2010: 51) argues that the ‘NURTW chairmen [in [in chairmen the ‘NURTW that 51) (2010: argues ). Fourchard ashewo Among Lagosians, there is a popular perception that the NURTW is home to to home is NURTW the that perception popular a is there Lagosians, Among agberos their services, for return agberos In It is not about them, it is the chairman that protects them, so they must them, so they must protects that the chairman is them, it about not is It you , before the agbero arrest if you all Even cost. him at to loyalty show duty post, to their back are they you, theyon inflicted the wound treat system the how is freed. That they are ensures chairman unit the NURTW mafias. all like They’re works. are responsible for collecting and collecting and for responsible are agberos that I gathered During fieldwork, Ikotun, replied: replied: Ikotun, your street and you can create a scene, cut somebody’s head, do whatever, they do whatever, head, somebody’s cut a scene, create can you and street your an as you for will [theNURTW] garage a find Lagos – the union chairman secures his Big Man status within the NURTW the NURTW within status Man secures Big his chairman Lagos – the union political network. thestate and structure transport collect illegal from only tolls who not agberos battle-ready of army an also the country, political parties serve across but for political as thugs operators been recruited have these agberos of especially election times. Most during 1999) (Momoh boys’ so-called jobless pool of ‘area ready a large, among from to enough not is , it agbero an become to Lagos. But of the streets who roam danfo one As also be feared. must you be jobless; often lavish on hard drugs (igbohard on lavish often Lagos] act as providers of thugs recruited among the union to assist the state the state assist to the union among recruited thugs of Lagos] act providers as titutes ( making returns to their respective unit chairman in their local government. in their local government. chairman unit their respective to returns making reportsto local the who chairman, reportsto zonal the chairman unit This who the link direct is chairman, the state to reports who in turn chairman, remitted must be returns financial this chain, Along chairman. the national to union the after that, a resident I learned from Alimosho, In basis. a daily on them for is , the ritual agberos their from returns daily their receive chieftains party (faji roadside a huge throw to awoof the neighbourhood chop chairmen Unit meat. and alcohol supplies that the shop owns chairmen unit faji throw to who fail see their in Nigeria citizens ordinary that point (2007) Smith’s reinforcing clientelism with associated sharing of the obligations forsaken having as leaders in Lagos Agberos venality. unabashed and personal enrichment of in favour rackets in extortion engage and superiors their powerful union by backed are These agberos in circulation. cake’ partaking the ‘transport of of a way as in one agberos as started out chairmen unit most the fact that by encouraged grace’ to ‘grass many were fact,there in Lagos. In parks motor the many of To fieldwork. my of the course during parks in motor in circulation stories agberos most why of question my governor during his electoral campaigns’ in exchange for ‘large autonomy for levying taxes in the motor parks of the state’. Lagos is not unique in this regard. In Gombe State, for example, a group of touts known as Kalare boys have proven ‘easy prey for politicians who offer them small amounts of money, drugs, alcohol and weapons in exchange for engaging in acts of intimidation and assaults or simply to accompany their campaigns in a demonstration of muscle’ (Aniekwe and Agbiboa 2014: 12). The activities of the Kalare boys have included assault, rape, harassment, and extortion of ordinary civilians. Many of the Kalare boys worked for the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) as political loyalists during the 2003 and 2007 elections. As Ma’azu, the PDP youth leader in Gombe State put it, ‘thank God we have more boys than the opposition’ (Human Rights Watch 2007: 94). Gombe aside, in the 2003 elections in the Niger Delta, Gaskia noted that:

Politicians from the major political parties mobilized and surreptitiously armed groups of unemployed and disenchanted youths, and deployed them to cause mayhem and manipulate the electoral process. In this contestation and competitive arming of young groups, the party, which controlled the state government, got the upper hand. These political elite rivalries, coupled with a struggle for turf, contributed immensely to the rise of armed militancy and inter-militant armed violence, which preceded the 2003 elections and became consolidated in the period between the 2003 and 2007 general elections in the Niger Delta. (Cited in Ayoade and Akinsanya 2011: 295)

The above supports Pratten’s (2013) argument that the need for ‘hard men’ who can deliver votes during elections fosters the patron–client relationship between political godfathers, office holders and candidates in Nigeria.

Politicised spaces No study of the patronage dynamics of the NURTW in Lagos would be complete without a look at the violent battles for control of motor parks in the city, as well as the factionalism that undermines the NURTW from within. Motor parks are politically contested spaces. Since the 1950s, local government councils have been statutorily charged with responsibility for maintaining and collecting rates at motor parks. During the Nigerian Second Republic (1979–83), which ushered in the first elected civilian government under the 1979 constitution, however, motor parks, especially in Lagos, became a primary space of political antagonism when transport unions usurped their management and control. As Fourchard (2010: 50) recounts:

The politicization of the management of motor parks started in Lagos as the capital was the site of two concurrent powers: the Federal government,

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Some operators were even even were operators Some 12 Given the lucrative nature of of nature the lucrative Given 13 223 (commercial motorcycle taxi) rider in Alimosho told me: me: taxi) told rider in Alimosho motorcycle (commercial A discussion of the NURTW chairmanship elections and related violence violence related and elections chairmanship the NURTW of A discussion The huge revenue collected by NURTW leaders, and highand the leaders, socialby NURTW collected revenue huge The every aspires the union why of member explains this facilitates, mobility national or zonal state, city, branch, – whether at a chairman become to another one engage regularly members the why This partly explains level. of members and members NURTW why explains It in bloody skirmishes. in most their position of kill in defense each other unions transport other cities. Nigerian Many transport operators believe that the impunity enjoyed by agberos by enjoyed the impunity believe that operators transport Many President Shehu Shagari and his party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) (NPN) Nigeria of Party the National party, his and Shagari Shehu President the and Jakande Lateef Lagos State, of the governor and hand, the one on decided enlist NPN to hand. theother on Nigeria] of Party [Unity UPN [of] Union Road the Nigerian a new union, of members of the support the in 1978 under before a year created (NURTW), Workers Transport who given was Success, Bayo as known Ogundare, Adebayo of leadership the UPN to in Lagos over parks all winning the motor of the assignment the 1979 during drivers of clientele large his mobilizing did so by … He killing potential his and violence to resorting by and campaign electoral in Lagos. parks motor of in most opponents motor parks, they have become unsafe, factional and politicised spaces, and politicised spaces, and factional and unsafe, become they parks, have motor Albert 134) argues: As (2007: matter. do-or-die a become has theircontrol briefly illustrates the internal factionalisation of the union, and the means means and the of union, the factionalisation internal the illustrates briefly chair Saka Saula, 2008, Alhaji In struggles contended. which power are by outside gunmen masked dead by shot was (Lagos Chapter), the NURTW of Baruwa, Alhaji from taken over had Saula Alhaji Ipaja. in Iyana house his Zonal West the South and Chairman the Ogun State positions: two who held The on all fronts. dissensions and divisions palpable were There Chairman. have to seemed not Ekiti State Lagos to Baruwa from Alhaji of redeployment who the people of three Notably, loyalists. his him and with well down gone the NURTW of president national for candidature Baruwa’s opposed Alhaji All suspects died mysteriously. in Jos conference quadrennial the 2007 at the on released eventually were death Saula’s Alhaji to accused in relation in spaces such as motor parks is related to the close rapport between the betweenthe rapport close the to related is parks motor as such spaces in (APC) Congress the ruling All and Progressives elites Lagos state NURTW, okada one As party. of Egbe Lagos. with the dine Governor and ‘The wine of NURTW leaders party].’ same [they to all wan belong ni no ko more emphatic in their view that successive state governors have backed the the backed have governors state successive in their view that emphatic more them the giving their candidature, supported which has leadership, NURTW parks. motor within undo’ do and ‘to free hand grounds of insufficient evidence. In 2012, members of the NURTW (Lagos Chapter) clashed over the chairmanship of the union. The clash culminated in the killing of popular businessman Alhaji Ola Shehu Ekeniojuoti by gunmen suspected to be loyal to one of the chairmanship candidates. The deceased’s brother, Abu Ekeniojuoti (aka Abu Stainless), was the former chairman of the NURTW on Lagos Island and a public supporter of the NURTW treasurer in Oshodi, Alhaji Musiliu Akinsanya, best known as MC Oluomo. Violence broke out after the NURTW national president, Alhaji Nasiru Yasiu, had a meeting behind closed doors with the five contestants at the union’s office, with the outcome that an election would be held since the contestants could not present a consensus candidate. The followers of the former chairman, Alhaji Rafiu Olohunwa, were incensed by the outcome, as their expectation going into the meeting was that the union president would endorse their candidate for the position (Vanguard 2012). On 30 September 2015, gunmen suspected to be members of a rival NURTW faction killed Olayinka Mamowora (aka Mamok), a close ally of MC Oluomo. Mamok was MC Oluomo’s point man and allegedly led the unnamed gang that killed Baba Esi, a popular agbero in Oshodi, in April 2015 (Vanguard 2015a). In March 2015, Babajide Dosunmu (aka Mandos), NURTW chairman for Yaba Unit and vice chairman for the Lagos Mainland NURTW branch, was shot dead outside his house by gunmen. I had returned from fieldwork when the news of Mandos’ violent death reached me. To glean more information surrounding the killing, I called Egungun (Masquerade) over the phone, an agbero in Oshodi whom I had interviewed and who had described how he benefited from the patronage of Mandos while he was still an eruku. Egungun told me that Mandos was killed by a rival NURTW gang in a bid to seize control of motor parks in the Tarmac area in Oyingbo, which was controlled by Mandos. Although he declined to name the rival group, he insisted that Mandos’ death would be avenged. When the constant presence of lethal rival groups combines with the loss of murdered patrons, existence conforms with what Zygmunt Bauman describes as the postmodern tactic for warding off death: ‘daily life becomes a perpetual dress rehearsal of death. What is being rehearsed … is ephemerality and evanescence of things that humans may acquire and bonds that humans may weave’ (Bauman 1992: 186). Within this context, agberos and their political patrons in Lagos are left not with death, but with ‘the end of living’ (ibid. 321): that is, death lived over and over again. No wonder, then, that ‘anxieties about betrayal, loyalty, and envy should be high and that trust becomes something to be carefully constructed and difficult to obtain’ (Caldeira 2006: 135–6). My interactions with danfo drivers and conductors in Oshodi showed that one of the primary causes of factionalism in the NURTW relates to leadership tussles because of the ‘winner-takes-all’ syndrome, which seems to contradict

224 10 | Agbiboa

(wicked (wicked ), others may not. not. may others ), 225 is conveyed in an interview in an a danfo with conveyed is 2015b). Since the majority of motor parks parks motor of the majority Since 2015b). ] is an enemy of progress, the world is jealous of jealous of is the world progress, of enemy an ] is sellers in and around motor parks often accentuates violence violence accentuates often parks motor around sellers in and ’ (‘The benefits of my Big Big my ’ (‘The of mi oga benefits ‘Ere Man?’), Big your is ?’ (‘Where success. They want you to remain on one spot and not move upwards. upwards. move not and spot one on remain to you They want success. they want Instead, to successfulas are. as be they you want They don’t really can’t you and you to give they always where a point at you keep to awon aiye [awon world The Big Men who have the resources to help and actually do provide help are are help actually provide do and help to the resources who have Men Big Faced with such everyday violence and radical uncertainty, how do operators do operators how radical uncertainty, and everyday violence such with Faced Tactical agency from below from agency Tactical the NURTW’s constitutional provisions. I found that election, as a democratic a democratic election, as that I found provisions. constitutional the NURTW’s Frequently, chapter. the NURTW used by hardly was change, regime of tool while I 2015, early In seized control. that group militant more the was it ofthe union clash between factions renewed a fieldwork, my finalising was a as reported was The fight left in Oshodi criticallyor several injured. dead Oshodi in of parks control over fight ‘supremacy a previous from ‘spillover’ (Vanguard members’ NURTW by in Lagos do not have defined boundaries (for instance, it is difficult to know know to difficult is it instance, (for defined boundaries have not Lagosin do of begins), the presence a market and in Lagos ends park a motor where paraga and touts and other antisocial practices. Indeed, many motor parks are hiding places places hiding are parks motor many practices. Indeed, antisocial other and many then, that surprise, no is criminals. It drug hardened dealers and for begun their ‘careers’ criminalsdetained interviewed Lagos TV have on to claim (Albert parks 2007). motor in awon aiye of awon meaning The world). Oshodi: in driver affectionately celebrated in vehicle slogans such as ‘Givers never lack’, ‘Ola never lack’, ‘Givers as such slogans vehicle in celebrated affectionately (‘Big fans’ ‘ Oga nla in Man Lagos’), Big my ’ (‘Theof benevolence l’eko oga mi ‘Oga Man’), Big ’ (‘My ‘Oga mi Man’), Big Man, ‘Oga oga’ (‘Big fans’), Man da tie Men Big helper’). kill my do not ’ (‘God mi alanu pa ma ‘Oluwa and Man’) aiye labelled awon do so to are fail but help to the means who have carve out meaningful temporalities? During fieldwork, I observed I danfo During fieldwork, that meaningful temporalities? carve out they that extortion the violent devised tactics avoid to constantly operators i.e. – authority of tactic One carry to was officers uniformed facedroutinely. in seat police – in the front mobile or force the air of members or soldiers lessen the usual this may . While agberos rampaging them from shield to order a taken on which has extortion, prevent completely does not it assault, of level with align to themselves wont are operators Also, facto de legitimacy. kind of security shields material them with and ) who provides (oga nla Man a Big political for , in exchange agberos of violence and the extortion them from Men Big some While elections. the time of at votes into transferred loyalty (wahala trouble timesof in poor operators assist may become independent enough to take care of yourself and your family but continue to depend on them. This world is wicked and don’t wish for good of others!14

When Big Men disappoint, it is time for operators to console themselves, and to ponder on human frailty. This mood is best rendered in slogans such as ‘Such is life’, ‘No condition is permanent’, ‘If men were God’, ‘Delay is not denial’, ‘No more person’ and ‘Who knows tomorrow’. However, the Yoruba believe that ti ona kan ko ba di, ona mi ko le la (if one door is not closed, another one will not be opened). To reduce the chances of disappointment in the hands of awon aiye, many operators tend to keep many Big Men simultaneously. The logic is simple: the more Big Men you have, the lesser your chances of disappointment (Utas 2012). However, the ultimate lesson of disappointment for danfo operators is that igbekale omo araye, asan ni (reliance on people in this world amounts to disappointment), because olowo kin se olorun (the Big Man is not God). The turn to God or the supernatural reinforces Gavin Williams’ (1980: 114) point that in a context of everyday precarity, where fortunes are seen to be made and lost and one’s own fortune frequently appears to be beyond one’s control, ‘God, fate and luck are common (and not unwarranted) categories for the explanation of success or lack of it’. Having discussed the politics of transportation in Lagos, with particular focus on the notions of interdependency and precarity between patrons and clients, the next section engages with how this context influences the politics of electoral processes.

Elections and ‘stomach infrastructure’ In 2012, the Lagos state government enacted a new road traffic law that restricted the activities of okada riders on 475 major routes across the city. Avowedly, the law was created to safeguard the lives and properties of Lago- sians and to ‘restore sanity’ back to extremely congested Lagos roads. The state government went a step further and produced a documentary film titled Aye Olokada (Life of an Okadaman), aimed at educating Lagosians about the menace of okadas. To all intents and purposes, Aye Olokada was part of state propaganda to demonise okada riding and to discourage millions of Lagosians from using okadas as a means of transport. However, despite their legal restriction, okada riders have remained adamant by carrying out their activities on the prohibited routes. They argue that the government has not provided them with any alternative employment and that their restricted movement would ‘further pauperise us and send members of our families to untimely graves’.15 Such resistance has intensified a heavy clampdown by officers of authority (such as the police force and members of Kick Against Indiscipline (KAI)), including the confiscation ofokadas and indiscriminate arrest of riders

226 10 | Agbiboa - rider rider riders riders riders. riders. okada 16 Such a political stratagem, a political stratagem, Such 18 rider held a banner that read: read: that a banner rider held 2014). In offering okada offering 2014). In 227 ) unions and the government to shore up their their up shore to the government and ) unions riders (Vanguard activities as they had done in Lagos. Instead, Fayose Fayose in Lagos. Instead, they activities as done had The import of both banners emerged in an interview in emerged of both banners import The 17 2014) riders whom I spoke to during fieldwork felt betrayed by the by the betrayed felt fieldwork during to I spoke riders whom riders whom I interviewed in Lagos claimed that they received they received I interviewed that riders whom in Lagos claimed from Governor Fashola’s aides in the run-up to the 2011 elections, elections, the 2011 in the to run-up aides Fashola’s Governor from okada okada riders in his state with new motorbike taxis on credit (Smith 2007: 198). 198). 2007: (Smith credit taxis on new with motorbike state riders in his okadas is usually used to illustrate how actors in structurally weak positions deploy deploy in structurally weak positions actors how used usually illustrate is to Another point relates to the tactical ways in which political leaders from the tactical to in which political leaders from ways relates point Another Many Lagos citizens must remember that this [APC] party used and dumped this [APC] party dumped used that and remember must Lagos citizens and services support elections their in the harnessing riders after okada those polls, APC for During campaigns 2011. and 2007 2003, 1999, of motorcycles helmets, riders, branded okada to donated even politicians Nigeria of Action Congress no did the sooner But jackets. reflective and bite to they than around turned power into the APC] come a part of [now on (Comment over okada Lagos. all by banning fed them, that the finger Premium Times Many with Fredrick Fasheun, chairman of the UPN: theUPN: of chairman Fasheun, Fredrick with found on prohibited routes. Irked by the escalating situation, the All Nigerians theAll Nigerians situation, the escalating by Irked routes. prohibited on found dragged (ANACOWA) Association Workers Owners Commercial and Autobike to their right of violation the perceived over court to government the state against. discriminated be to expressly not and freely move neighbouring states cashed in on the opportunity offered by the sour rela by the sour offered the opportunity on in cashed states neighbouring tions between transport (okada between transport tions a period elections, the 2015 in which I conducted to in the build-up patronage Fayose Ayodele Governor State, Ekiti neighbouring in Notably, fieldwork. my okada ban to not pledged held a banner with the bold inscription: ‘Fashola distributed helmets in 2011. in 2011. helmets distributed ‘Fashola the bold with inscription: a banner held okada Another bikes.’ OUR destroying NOW Dumped.’ and ‘Used government led by Governor Babatunde Fashola (2007–15) and his ruling his APC and (2007–15) Fashola Babatunde Governor led by government okada one example, for the law, against protest During the mass party. In the run-up to the 2015 elections in Nigeria, the enforcement of the law was was the law of the enforcement in Nigeria, elections the 2015 the to run-up In at aimed strategy deliberate a was what in Lagos across relaxed appreciably okada of securing the votes of course, is not a new development in Nigerian pre-electoral politics. We would would We politics. pre-electoral in Nigerian a new development not is course, of great won (1999–2007), Abia of governor former Kalo, Orji Uzo recall that provide to a programme then creating and pledging by state his in support okada an instant reprieve, Lagos political elites have perfected tactically the art of have Lagos political elites reprieve, instant an in them only to conform[ing] and discipline of the mechanisms ‘manipulat[ing] Everyday of The Practice De Certeau’s xiv). (de Certeau 1984: evade to them’ order Life Here, strategising. enduring more for tactics the possibility of in the absence the to ascribeI not these tactics political elites, to however, their in exchange for their votes and loyalty to the APC. to loyalty and their votes for in exchange required okada unions to partner with the government of Ekiti in registering all their members in view of the incessant robbery operations in the state through the efficient means of okadas. Addressing okada riders and owners in Ado Ekiti, Governor Fayose, the number one patron of Ekiti, said:

If they cancel okada in every other state, that won’t happen in Ekiti. But what I want is disciplined and responsible motorcyclists’ association that can partner with government for meaningful development. Government alone cannot maintain security; I have to partner with an organisation like you. But I won’t tolerate unruly behaviour. (The Sun 2014)

Certainly, since the Second Republic, political actors in Nigeria have intensified the patterns of prebendalism, which rests on the justifying principle that state power should be treated as ‘congeries of offices which can be competed for, appropriated and then administered for the benefit of individual occupants and their supporters’ (Joseph 1987: 8). The huge monetary premiums that can be gained by playing politics in Nigeria often give elections the stamp of a do-or-die affair. This is complicated by the fact that, in Nigeria, the winners in the competition for power win everything, and the losers lose everything. As a result, nearly everyone seeks power by every means, legal or otherwise, and those who already control state power try to keep it by every means. What emerges from this is a ‘politics that does not know legitimacy, only expedi- ency. This politics is not conducive to political stability, the rule of law or to democracy because it is constituted as warfare’ (Ake 1976: 7, cited in Akinsanya and Ayoade 2013: 176). Today, Nigerian politicians attain a constituency by promising a piece of the national cake to their loyal supporters, in the process boosting their chances of regime survival. In the run-up to 2015 elections in Nigeria, seen by many as particularly competitive (both substantially and symbolically), I was struck by the number of political parties that placed huge emphasis on distributing ‘stomach’ items such as rice, milk, kerosene, chicken and staple foods to their supporters. The governor of Ekiti State, Ayo Fayose, notably distributed 80,000 chickens, 100,000 bags of rice and cash gifts to the people of Ekiti under the so-called ‘stomach infrastructure’ programme of his administration. Other states, such as Osun, Cross River and Lagos, followed suit (Vanguard 2014). In Oyo State, it is well documented that the political influence of the chief patron Lamidi Adedibu, aka the ‘Godfather of Ibadan’,19 flowed primarily from his ability to mobilise money and violence in support of the politicians he sponsored (Agbiboa 2016; Albert 2007). Adedibu distributed cash and food to numerous supplicants on a daily basis from his Ibadan home, a brand of patronage known as amala politics, after a traditional dish common in Nigeria’s south-western region. In the face of severe hardship, it is not difficult to see why many lowly Nigerians seek instant gratification in exchange for their votes. In this respect,

228 10 | Agbiboa riders) see their leaders as having riders) see having their leaders as 229 The masterminds of such violence – the – the violence such of masterminds The 20 ) in Lagos, ‘to acquire wealth, to dispose of dispose to wealth, of acquire ) in Lagos, ‘to in motor parks in Oshodi who admitted that they had they had that who admitted in Oshodi parks in motor This chapter has engaged with the dynamics of patronage politics in Lagos’ in politics Lagos’ of patronage dynamics with the engaged has chapter This Conclusion the practice of stomach infrastructure reclaims the ‘wealth-in-people’ that that the ‘wealth-in-people’ infrastructure reclaims stomach the of practice 2012). African societies (Utas many in ‘bigmanity’ of the politics characterises for’ to ‘being linked in literature has the become bigmanity of ideaThe ‘A it: in Lagos puts slogan vehicle one As 2012). (Bledsoe Utas 1990; someone (1979: Peace’s Adrian echoes slogan This Man.’ Still a Poor is Stingy Man Rich the combine must he prestige, enjoy to is Man Big if a that contention 30) of sentiments and the interests of ‘recognition with gains own his of pursuit wherever must others of the interests and ‘self-interest words, other In others’. argues 30) (ibid. Peace Furthermore, (ibid.). be complementary’ possible made thepoor (mekunu among that it, and to exercise power in these ideal ways is considered right and proper proper and right in these considered is ideal power ways exercise to and it, Gavin with resonates This point do so’. to custom and tradition is because it which the of in terms goals and the values that 112) point (1980: Williams’ In by the poor. shared extent to a large are defined the rich is of success this respect, corruption the rich. In of the poor legitimiseshort, the rewards moral a ‘traditional’ of breakdown a perceived as this in chapter approached is Thus, the have-nots. support to obliged were which in the haves economy the okada (i.e. Lagosians ordinary many of in favour clientelism with associated sharing of the obligations forsaken outcome The 86). 2007: (Smith venality unabashed and personal enrichment everyday life. bankruptcy of and the radical is uncertainty union heads, politicians and party officials – often enjoy impunity due to due impunity enjoy often party – officials and politicians heads, union Although officials. state police and by their conduct of acceptance the tacit transport of the collective interests represent to founded was the NURTW local for thugs of ‘reservoirs into been has converted the union workers, - percep public During fieldwork, 2007). Watch Rights (Human politicians’ call(and to the union the gravitas lacked the government that was tion been hired by members of the ruling party to disrupt the 2015 elections by by elections the 2015 the ruling party of disrupt to members been by hired voters. opposition intimidating transportation sector and how they intersect with electoral processes and and processes electoral with they intersect how sector and transportation aspect a fundamental become has violence Such violence. election-related occurring often Nigeria), of much in Lagos (and political competition of politicians. rival by rewarded and whose services employed between gangs are to agberos the NURTW’s among from recruited typically are gangs Street rig elections, the public, of members coerce opponents, sponsors’ their attack this uncertain context, In attacks. similar from their patrons protect and the precariousness – and clients and between patrons the interdependence a to spoke I During fieldwork, bare. laid – is position Man the Big of group of agberos its agberos) to order because of the latter’s strategic power structure in the electoral process in Lagos politics. While the pas de deux between union and state undermines formal state capacity, it emboldens the union to gain a stronger foothold and legitimacy over the control of lucrative motor parks across Lagos, which, constitutionally, should be the domain of local government. This, in turn, leads to more preda- tory patterns of interaction between transport unions and the local community, destroying the moral certainties of ordinary citizens who are no longer sure who stands for what. Indeed, there is a sense in which both violence and order result from the shifting relations between the union and the state. For example, efforts by local governments in Lagos to reclaim their authority over the control of motor parks have often led to violent resistance from agberos. In a recent case, Oshodi witnessed a violent outburst when the local council’s secretary ordered the immediate cessation of ‘illegal’ tax collection in motor parks in the area. Predictably, the decision did not go down well with agberos and their unit chairman. In a matter of days, agberos brutally attacked motor parks en masse, burning any danfo in sight. Worried about the growing threat to lives and properties, the secretary was forced to revoke his order within the same week of its announcement.21 Normality in this context resembles what Paul Brass (1997) describes as a pre-Leviathan Hobbesian state of war in which there is a set of formal rules obeyed by a few people, a set of informal rules followed by most people, and a lack of legitimacy attached to both.

Notes 1 Author interview with danfo driver, 12 Author interview, December 2015. Ikotun Egbe, November 2014. 13 Author interview with danfo 2 Author interview, 22 October 2014. drivers, Oshodi, December 2014. 3 Author interview with danfo 14 Author interview, December 2014. conductor, Oshodi, October 2014. 15 Mr Aliyu Wamba, Chairman of 4 Author interview with agbero, the All Nigerians Autobike Commercial Oshodi, October 2014. Owners and Workers Association 5 Author interview with danfo driver, (ANACOWA). Court affidavit deposed in Oshodi, December 2014. Ikeja, 2012. 6 Author interview, 13 November 16 For a detailed study of this case, 2014. see Agbiboa (2016). 7 Author interview with agberos, 17 Author fieldwork observation, Oshodi, December 2014. Alimosho, August 2014. 8 Author interview with danfo driver, 18 Interview with okada riders, Alimosho, November 2014. Oshodi and Alimosho, December 2015. 9 Author interview with danfo driver, 19 ‘Godfatherism’ refers to the Oshodi, January 2015. process by which an individual 10 Author interview, Oshodi, establishes links with a senior within December 2014. a given institutional hierarchy in the 11 Author fieldwork, Oshodi, October expectation of favoured treatment 2014. (Joseph 1987: 207). 230 10 | Agbiboa 35 (1): 40–56. (1): 40–56. 35 . Chicago IL: University IL: University . Chicago . Berkeley CA: University . Berkeley CA: University 52: 21–37. 21–37. 52: 15 (1): 11–40. (1): 15 . Chicago IL: Chicago University University IL: Chicago . Chicago the Postcolony Press. Chicago of as Political Disorder Works: Africa Bloomington and . Oxford Instrument Indiana and Currey IN: James Press. University Life Everyday California Press. of in Nigeria’, Politics Partisan and and of Urban Journal International Research Regional and Structure, Action, Theory:Social . Los Analysis Social in Contradiction California of CA: University Angeles Press. Late the in Society and Self Identity: Press. Polity . Oxford: Age Modern and “Godfathers” Violence, Politics: York New in Nigeria’. Corruption Available Watch. Rights Human NY: www.hrw.org/reports/2007/ at (accessed 20 nigeria1007/4.htm 2017). January The Nigeria: in Politics Prebendal . Republic Second the of Fall and Rise University Cambridge Cambridge: Press. the Social of Anthropology Condition 21 Studies Refugee of Journal in War’, (3): 407–8. Review of African Political Jesus’, of Economy Culture of Times in Subject the of Figures Crisis Press. the Understanding in Nigeria: Boys the Area of Phenomena the to presented Paper Girls’. and Chabal, P. and J.-P. Daloz (1999) Daloz (1999) J.-P. and P. Chabal, The Practicede Certeau, M. (1984) of Koolhaas ‘Lagos, L. (2010) Fourchard, in Problems Central (1979) A. Giddens, Self- and Modernity A. (1991) Giddens, ‘Criminal (2007) Watch Rights Human R. Democracy A. (1987) Joseph, and S. C. (2008) ‘An Lubkemann, in the Name R. ‘Power (1991) Marshall, Public ‘Necropolitics’, Mbembe, A. (2003) (2005) Roitman J. Mbembe, A. and Crisis Youth ‘The A. (1999) Momoh, 231

. Princeton NJ: NJ: . Princeton 25 (1): 70–88. Man An Introduction to Political Political to Introduction An Nigeria’s Critical Election: 2011 . Election: Critical Nigeria’s , interview agberos with Author

and Context in the Representation Representation the in Context and Violence Collective of Press. University Princeton Violence Reasoning!”: your Sabotage in Justice of Resignifications and J. L. and Comaroff in J. Brazil’ in Disorder and (eds), Law Comaroff . New York NY: NY: York . New Nigeria in Science America. of Press University in Lagos Parks Motor of Politics (ed.), in L. Fourchard Ibadan’ and Peace in Nigeria’s Key City’, Agence Agence City’, Key in Nigeria’s Peace March. (AFP), 19 Presse France and Corruption Survival: Everyday DPhil in Lagos’. Existence Precarious Oxford. of University thesis, (2013) Etat, d’Afrique. villes les Gouverner . privés acteurs et local gouvernement Karthala. Paris: in Role its and Engagement ‘Civic in Electoral Violence Mitigating the 2015 for Implications Nigeria: 21 Paper, Working General Elections’. Social Science Research December. https://papers. at Available Network. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2541330. (2011) Books. Lexington NY: York New . Cambridge: Strategies Life Other and Press. Polity Longman. . London: Belly the of Politics and Social Mobility Struggle”: in Sierra Children Foster Hardship L e o n e’, 20 Theft of an Idol: Text Text Idol: an of Theft (1997) P. Brass, to Come R. (2006) ‘“I P. Caldeira, T. Albert, I. O. (2007) ‘NURTW and the the and ‘NURTW (2007) Albert, I. O. References References Election Threaten ‘Gangs AFP (2015) Urban of ‘Frontiers E. (2016) D. Agbiboa, (eds) A. Ayoade J. A. A. and Akinsanya, (2014) E. Agbiboa D. C. C. and Aniekwe, (eds) A. A. Akinsanya A. and J. Ayoade, Immorality Morality, Z. (1992) Bauman, The Africa: in State The (1989) J.-F. Bayart, Without Success Bledsoe, ‘“No C. (1990) Oshodi, December 2014.Oshodi, Conference on Children and Youth The Nation (2015) ‘When Jonathan Gets as Emerging Categories in Africa, Angry’, The Nation, 13 January. Leuven, Belgium. The Sun (2014) ‘I Won’t Ban Okada Murphy, W. (2003) ‘Military – Fayose’, The Sun, 27 November. Patrimonialism and Child Soldier Available at http://jesconaija.blogspot. Clientalism in the Liberian and Sierra com/2014/11/i-wont-ban-okada-in- Leonean Civil Wars’, African Studies ekiti-fayose.html (accessed 15 January Review 46 (2): 61–87. 2017). Nyamnjoh, F. (2015) ‘Incompleteness: Utas, M. (ed.) (2012) African Conflicts Frontier Africa and the Currency of and Informal Power: Big Men and Conviviality’, Journal of Asian and Networks. London and New York NY: African Studies 52 (3): 253–70. Zed Books. Okpara, E. E. (1988) ‘The Role of Touts Vanguard (2012) ‘Lagos Wades into in Passenger Transport in Nigeria’, Bloody NURTW Fracas’, Vanguard, Journal of Modern African Studies 26 1 February. Available at www. (2): 327–35. vanguardngr.com/2012/02/lagos- Peace, A. (1979) Choice, Class and wades-into-bloody-nurtw-fracas/ Conflict: A Study of Southern Nigeria (accessed 6 March 2015). Factory Workers. Hassocks: Harvester Vanguard (2014) ‘Fayose and Stomach Press. Infrastructure’, Vanguard, 8 July. Pratten, D. (2013) ‘The Precariousness Available at www.vanguardngr. of Prebendalism’ in W. Adebanwi com/2014/07/fayose-stomach- and E. Obadare (eds), Democracy infrastructure/ (accessed 12 August and Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical 2014). Interpretations. New York NY: Palgrave Vanguard (2015a) ‘Police Yet to Arrest Macmillan. Killers of MC Oluomo’s Aide’, Premium Times (2014) ‘Akinwunmi Vanguard, 2 October. Available at Ambode Wins Lagos APC www.vanguardngr.com/2015/10/police- Governorship Primaries’, Premium yet-to-arrest-killers-of-mc-oluomos- Times, 5 December. Available at www. aide/ (accessed 18 August 2015). premiumtimesng.com/news/172484- Vanguard (2015b) ‘Nigeria: Time we breaking-akinwunmi-ambode-wins- Moved the Dogma’, Vanguard, 22 lagos-apc-governorship-primaries. March. Available at http://allafrica. html. com/stories/201503232026.html Smith, D. J. (2007) A Culture of (accessed 18 November 2015). Corruption: Everyday Deception Williams, G. (1980) ‘Political and Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Consciousness among the Ibadan Princeton NJ: Princeton University Poor’ in G. Williams (ed.), State and Press. Society in Nigeria. Idanre: Afrografika Taussig, M. (1992) The Nervous System. Publishers. New York NY and London: Routledge.

232 11 | ‘Once they all pick their guns you can have your way’: campaigning and talking about violence in northern Ghana

Afra Schmitz

Introduction During a campaign trail in the Upper West Region shortly before Ghana’s 2012 elections, the general secretary of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) mockingly revealed the opposition’s campaign strategy for the north: according to Johnson Asiedu Nketia, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) planned to instigate violence between various ethnic groups so that ‘once they all pick their guns you can have your way’.1 By drawing on past interethnic violent encounters (e.g. between the Dagaba and the Wala), the opposition party allegedly believed that it would cause tensions, insecurity and confusion in order to destabilise the region as an NDC support base and manoeuvre its way into taking over their stronghold. Usually, violent encounters are associated with the northern part of the country. Over time, chieftaincy disputes, ethnic clashes and disagreements over land gave rise to a stereotype depicting ‘northerners’ as a primitive and violent people. Only at a second glance does it become apparent that these local conflict dynamics are closely intertwined with local and national politics and thus become efficacious during election times. In Ghana, outbreaks of electoral violence are comparatively rare and can be categorised as small- scale or low-intensity violence (Bob-Milliar 2014). Consequently, in an African context, Ghana serves as a role model for successful democratisation, based on peaceful, free and fair elections (Whitfield 2009). Since the country’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992, however, no election has been entirely free from political turmoil and outbreaks of micro-level violence. Taking a closer look, the escalation of these conflicts can often be traced back to political key actors who use their local position as Big Men to politicise social tensions in their favour. As their clients, the youth become yet another target of prejudice: entangled in patronage relations, deeply entrenched in Ghanaian politics, they are identified as the driving force of electoral violence (Bob-Milliar 2014; Lamptey and Salihu 2012). Allegedly, they are ever ready to cause mayhem on command for their personal benefit while neglecting their own agency. However, in the Upper West Region, one of Ghana’s poorest areas with a 233 high unemployment rate, physical violence during elections is remarkably rare (NPC n.d.). Drawing on various campaign strategies deployed by national and local political actors, this chapter addresses the ways in which talking about violence is strategically used in election campaigning in Ghana’s Upper West Region, an environment shaped by powerful stereotypes, structural challenges, and local conflict dynamics. Thus, it makes the multi-layered reality of violence (Söderberg Kovacs, Introduction in this volume) tangible and at the same time carves out expressions of local democratic culture. The campaign speech of a high-profile politician during the 2012 presidential elections addresses strategies of integration and exclusion linked to identity politics, whereas the political mobilisation tactics of a youth group during the run-up to the local-level district elections in 2014 address patronage networks, political protest and agency. By analysing stereotypes of violence that evolve around ethno-regional diversity and clientelism, the interlinkages of elections, violence and campaign communication, as well as their consequences, become the subject of this chapter. The case studies show that countries praised for their peaceful use of democratic structures such as elections are still influenced by underlying patterns of structural violence. An analysis of talking about violence as a strategy, therefore, makes the links between verbal and physical violence approachable, while the choice of discourse connects national party politics with the local level. The chapter is based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the Upper West Region, which I have conducted biannually since Ghana’s 2008 legislative and presidential elections.2 Thus, it covers the 2008 and 2012 general elections as well as the 2014 run-up to the elections of the district’s administrative body, the District Assembly. The events and examples referred to are situations I experienced as a participant observer, supplemented by semi-structured in-depth interviews with politicians, party activists, the media and the electorate. The most important sources, however, are informal, cordial conversations with members of these groups. The chapter discusses talking about violence as a political strategy and addresses the nexus between electoral violence and campaign communication. Subsequently, it provides an overview of Ghanaian elections by challenging the country’s image as a role model for successful democratisation. Two case studies highlight the role that verbal violence plays in electoral campaigning locally and analyse common stereotypes of violence, their implications and their effects on the electorate, thereby covering questions of ethno-regional diversity, patronage and agency. The conclusion emphasises the entanglements of verbal violence and electoral campaigning in both national and local politics and ends with policy implications for Ghana and the region.

234 11 | Schmitz - - - 235 Politicians use interpretations of reality reality of use interpretations Politicians 3 In this context, anthropological research offers a meaningful a perspective offers research anthropological this context, In The following analysis goes a little furthergoesthe political a little examining analysis when following The In Ghana, violence as a socially and culturally constructed phenomenon phenomenon a socially constructed as culturally violence and Ghana, In Talking about violence in electoral campaigns campaigns in electoral violence about Talking that the electorate can easily relate to, and in doing so they shape political so political they shape in doing and to, easily relate can the electorate that casestudies The in their favour. peace politics violence, and on discourses tangible become that discourses public dominant discussed examine below electioncampaigning. during into insights gain to us enables and election communication micro-level on poten that election campaigns during manipulated and addressed the topics the African on violence election-related understand To tially lead violence. to a multifaceted as violence electoral approach (2012) al. et Adolfo continent, an by including This can be enhanced studies. in comparative phenomenon toral violence are highly visible and concrete, opening a ‘very efficient way of way a ‘very opening efficient concrete, and highly visible are violence toral before ideological an message staging and the social environment transforming simply not is 3–4). Violence Schröder 2001: and (Schmidt audience’ a public used as are anger and fear hatred, instead, emotions; of outburst arbitrary an in Gabbert Riches (Elwert 1995; further to aims individual elements strategic election times when the of atmosphere charged the emotionally 98). In 2004: by the accompanied resource, is a political violence means, the justifies end social in the Ghanaian Yet, loyalty. of feelings strong and fear of evocation ignited are conflicts deemed is illegitimate, violence physical where setting, communication. of means timedefused the same by at and setting. micro-level a in violence of stereotypes talking about of strategy collective identi and individual shape essentially other’ ‘the about Notions the other of images and prejudices stereotypes, negative this context, ties. In and attitudes negative ‘[s]uch Consequently, support. gain to exploited are in fact ethnocentric, are simply as consider may which some perceptions, 25). 2007: Considering (Amentewee relations’ in conflict weapons psychological element an as of violence stereotypes I define about talking these consequences, hate harassment, exceeds that verbal violence of understanding nuanced a of even though that, 8). I argue 2002: (Fischer threat or speech, intimidation – groups or localyouth be – politicians theypolitical actors high-profile violence support, mobilise to political resource a as violence verbal apply is violence Communicated talked about. rather enacted but hardly is itself of memories and images evokes it as violence physical with entangled closely be effective, To events. future possible of a fear and encounters violent past in campaign violence to references need be to does physical: violence not realities. change can speeches alone constitutes an intrinsic part of social relations. Therefore, it needs to be needsto it be Therefore, social part of intrinsic relations. an constitutes occurs whether in it strategies, campaign of in the examination incorporated elecof the effects easily, comparatively Performed form. physical verbal or anthropological view of the interconnectedness of campaigns, communication and violence. Political communication studies offer interesting perspectives on violent forms of electoral communication from a different angle. Notably, however, the scientific discussion on political communication is dominated by scholars from the United States and Europe (Klingemann and Voltmer 2002). This trend leads to a neglect of interpersonal communication processes that largely form election communication outside the North Atlantic realm. Case studies of countries in this wider area are rare, as is a focus on local-level democracy implemented through or based on direct communication (Lang 2003). A nuanced understanding of verbal violence in a micro-level setting of an African country such as Ghana, therefore, expands contemporary concepts of political communication by providing access to local political culture. This is of particular relevance in the Ghanaian electoral context, as the use of unrestrained language and verbal abuse in election campaigns can be observed as increasing over past elections (Danso and Afful 2012).

Challenging the model: elections and verbal violence in Ghana Both scholars and the international community hail Ghana as an ‘encouraging success story’ and a ‘beacon of hope’ for democracy in Africa (Sithole 2012; Whitfield 2009). Elections since the re-establishment of multiparty democracy in 1992 have been declared peaceful, free and fair overall. Occasional outbreaks of electoral violence, such as the 2008 Gushiegu conflict in the Northern Region, in which clashes between NDC and NPP supporters prior to elections resulted in the destruction of forty-one houses by fire and the death of three people, are considered to be of low intensity (NPC n.d.: 63–4). In this regard, this case study differs from contemporary electoral violence studies: studies on countries perceived as peaceful and democratic are as rare as the research on electoral violence in war-torn or post-conflict African countries is elaborate (de Smedt 2009; Höglund, Jarstad and Söderberg Kovacs 2009; Laakso 2007; Nordstrom 1997). Laakso (2007: 225) states that ‘elections in essence should be part of the democratic rules to solve political conflicts without force and violence’. Accordingly, violence is often seen as a hindrance to a successful democratic transition. Once overcome, as seems to be the case in Ghana, the scholarly focus remains on the macro-level but turns to the performance of (state) institutions, voting behaviour, or the role of political parties. Like its neighbouring countries, Ghana as a nation evolved from a volatile history of military regimes that forcefully interchanged with civilian governments (Amankwaah 2013: 5). Still today, parallel structures such as patronage networks and neopatrimonialism remain firmly rooted and influential in Ghanaian politics (Gyimah-Boadi 2007: 28). After emerging from an authoritarian regime under Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings through multiparty elections in 1992, Ghana successfully transformed into a democracy.

236 11 | Schmitz - 237 Over the following years, the NDC and the NPP (the strongest theNDC (the strongest the NPP years, and Over the following 4 Since 1992, the two parties have alternated power every eight years through every through power years eight alternated parties the two have 1992, Since sudden by the overshadowed was elections general to 2012 the The run-up opposition party) evolved as the main political forces. In the process, the the process, the In forces. political main the as party) evolved opposition Ashanti, by dominated mainly party, Akan exclusive an as perceived was NPP itself as the established hand, other NDC, The on the elites. and southerners 296). 1999: (Nugent socially ethnicallyand inclusive man’, the ‘small party of of NDCto the due the stronghold as a emerged regions northern The three to the 1980s during policies initiated Rawlings administrative and economic (Bob-Milliar 2011). state thethein nation north of theposition strengthen 2008, when the to 2000 from in government was the NPP elections; general to and led contested fiercely were elections 2008 The power. NDC recaptured by a peaceful followed system, electoral ‘winner-takes-all’ Ghana’s in a run-off higher these were elections during the NDC. to back Tensions power of transfer main the two of campaigns the presidential and years thepreceding in than language inflammatory campaigning, negative by characterised were candidates candi NPP’s the NDC The presented speech extent. a similar to hate and a drug as addict. cocaine dealer and Akufo-Addo, Dankwa Addo Nana date, candidate, the NDC’s stigmatising by back fought NPP his and Akufo-Addo politicallypowerless a walking Mills, as corpse, weak and Atta Evans John violence, low-intensity of outbreaks Lartey and 45–6). Despite (Danso 2012: (Lindberg citizens’ democratic ‘mature of the status awarded were Ghanaians aware consciously they time, remained the same At 96). 2008: Morrison and Localised violence. electoral small-scale of acts of the possibilities violence of atmosphere the political charging by effect psychological immense an maintain Ghanaians’ many insecurity of sense in the minds of urgent an ‘creat[ing] and 26). 2012: Danso and (Aning well-hidden but a long after 2012 Mills (NDC) in July President of death from a Gonja Mahama, Dramani John president, illness, which left his vice a presidential as Continuing the country. of in charge Region, the Northern from Akan an Akufo-Addo, candidate, the opposed NPP’s Mahama candidate, the of On the day campaign. contested intensely the Eastern in an Region, Election Domestic Observerselection, the Coalition the of reported (CODEO) in Region Northern and Accra Greater Ashanti, from criticalhighest incidents the as well as intimidation and harassment voting, of suspension of the areas campaigns, the 108). Throughout 2012: (CODEO procedures voting of violation example the infamous by shown was as role, a decisive played verbal violence (all death is death die be die’ ‘all call for candidate’s presidential the NPP of this a wake-up as interpreted supporters his While happens). what matter no (Danso violence of instigation an as it saw call opponents his be to vigilant, Afful 110–12). 2012: and Unsurprisingly, Rawlings and his NDC won the 1992 general elections with with elections general the1992 NDChis and Rawlings won Unsurprisingly, a landslide. When looking into verbal violence on a local stage, Ghana’s Upper West Region serves as a meaningful unit of analysis. Even though the region is part of ‘the north’,5 which is considered the most primitive and volatile area of the country, actual outbreaks of electoral violence have been rare. The National Peace Council (NPC) identifies the Upper West Region as the most peaceful region in the country (NPC n.d.). Politicians in north-western Ghana act within a framework where claims of land ownership and questions of autochthony, belonging and ethnic diversity play an important role in the web of social relations. As the following case studies show, these local conflict lines are intertwined with patronage networks that engage the youth and are easily exploited during election times to further individuals’ political ambitions.

Presidential campaigning and the ‘violent north’

Oh, as for the north, all that you need to do is go and incite the Dagabas against the Walas. Go and incite the Konkombas against the Nanumbas. Go and incite the Dagombas against the Gonjas and once they all pick their guns you can have your way. They will feel that they shouldn’t allow anybody from one tribe to be an overlord over all of them.6

Quoting insider information given to him by NPP acquaintances, the general secretary of the NDC, Johnson Asiedu Nketia, campaigned vigorously for his presidential candidate on the campaign trail in the Upper West Region in 2012. When speaking of the north, Ghanaian politicians and scholars all draw on its image as the remotest part of Ghana, underprivileged and marginalised in terms of infrastructure, education, employment and political relevance (Lund 2003; Tonah 2007). This impression is shared nationwide. Its origins date back to the neglecting politics of the British as the former colonial power (Bob- Milliar 2011; Ladouceur 1979). On the route to independence and beyond, the northern political elite felt the urge to further a distinct political representation of their interests within the national arena. Their common aim was to prevent a regime dominated by ‘southerners’ (Lentz 2006: 176–80). These dynamics led to a perception of the north as one single administrative unit7 instead of the three regions it consists of in present-day Ghana – and this perception still persists today (Nugent 2001). Over time, supra-ethnic cleavages developed around the binary opposition of ‘northerners’ and ‘southerners’. Nugent (ibid.) correctly argues that, in order to be effective, the category of ‘the north’ needs to distinguish itself from a category of ‘the south’. The latter, however, does not constitute the focal point of identification for people living in the southern parts of the country (ibid. 7). People from the north, however, are constantly confronted with a stereotype degrading them as a remote and primitive people with a violent nature. ‘Northernness’ therefore constitutes a key element of their self-perception and forms the basis of a supra-ethnic identity.

238 11 | Schmitz - - - Subsequently, Subsequently, 9 239 Marking northerners as marginalised, Asiedu Nketia Nketia Asiedu marginalised, as northerners Marking 10 But especially during elections, when one would expect a expect a would one when elections, especially during But 8 Contrary to this assumption, the candidature of John Dramani Mahama, a a Mahama, Dramani John of the candidature Contrary this assumption, to By drawing on a stereotype circulating in the southern part of the country the country partin the of southern circulating a stereotype on drawing By That an overall northern political consciousness exists is challenged by by challenged is exists northernoverall consciousness political an That natural solidarity of the northern electorate towards candidates of northern northern of candidates towards the northern electorate of solidarity natural growing of are self-interests and because ‘individual prevails clientelism origin, 181). (ibid. the area’ on impact changes social as economic importance and materialise. not expected do to be on basedbelonging patterns voting Thus, the for candidate presidential the 2012 as Region, the Northern from Gonja lines. ethno-regional along votes of themobilisation in successful NDCresulted of NDCelections, to the the decided favour in fewmonths a only Left with northern origin. his despite candidate presidential its as Mahama ences. The passage quoted above reveals a skilful combination of stereotypes stereotypes of revealsskilful a combination above quoted The passage ences. lines. conflict local and interethnic there and people backward and a primitive are northerners that claimed that Nketia Asiedu violence, to prone ethniccompositions, theirin various fore, At approachable. violence and between the ethnic connection made diversity the to referring party by own his of the image enhanced he time, the same was that in a way argued having After the opposition. by played politics cheap have to Nketia claimed the north, Asiedu from people to familiar unpleasantly the against their war and the Dagomba the history of on document NPP an being Mahama, President that the conclusion to which came hand, to Gonja of history The a political as leader. dangerous and inadequate was a Gonja, precolonial to back dates other ethnic groups and conflict between the Gonja of area the into migrating the groups 100–3) identifies (2007: times: Brukum their introduced usurpers as who forcefully the Gonja) as (such Volta the Black groups. acephalous in mainly beenwho had people to organised chiefdoms – whom the Dagara of histories settlement the various of one to According the Dagomba part of speech formed Nketia in his addressed – they once Asiedu “dictator too was much there that they these ‘felt to stories, According people. decided break to therefore and “dignity”, and “autonomy” too little and ship” frames narrative 458). This 1994: (Lentz kingdom’ the Dagomba from away drew a clear territorial boundary and set the stage for his speech on differ speech his on for boundary set thestage territorial and clear a drew the NDC’s general secretary, Asiedu Nketia, campaigned vigorously in the in the vigorously Nketia, campaigned Asiedu secretary, general the NDC’s northerndescent Mahama’s on drawing Ghana, in north-western constituencies speeches his constructed He the people. among loyalty and solidarity evoke to northerners role the marginalised to pointed and ‘equity’ of the pillar around aspect participation beenhad in every independence of since assigned relevant state. thein Ghanaian Bening and Kelly (2007); however, they do agree that a common identity identity a common they that do agree however, (2007); Kelly Beningand party elite the within political influence considerable has ‘northerners’ as a southern the NPP, the NDCthan rather supporting as such alignments, Ashantiparty. the migration process as a ‘Dagara rebellion against Dagomba rule’ (ibid.) and reflects the complex interethnic tensions in the area. Listening to the general secretary, many people were confirmed in their perception of the NPP as an Akan party. As a consequence, the audience felt more connected to Mahama as ‘one of them’, adopting the stereotype as a basis for a defensive stance.11 It is noteworthy that, within Asiedu Nketia’s deployment of the stereotype of ‘the violent north’, a phenomenon characteristic of the Ghanaian way of handling ethnic diversity becomes apparent. In the heterogeneous Ghanaian society, there is a strong feeling of illegitimacy with regard to the evocation of ethnic differences, because, if exploited, the potential for conflict would be explosive. This can be seen in the highly contentious statements made by various politicians from both the NDC and NPP that led to an outcry from wide sections of the population. Mahama allegedly campaigned on ethnic lines in 2012, an accusation that is supported by his speech in Nandom, Upper West Region. Being of northern origin, he presented himself as a ‘son of the soil’, thus aiming to mobilise an essential form of belonging to automatically generate support: ‘And with your son leading the NDC, I am sure that my vote in this constituency … is going to be massive!’12 Within the opposition, a high-profile NPP politician linked the possession of the largest amount of resources to claims of political power; according to his line of argument, resources/power would without doubt belong to the Akan, represented by the NPP (The Republic 2015). Even though it is ‘un-Ghanaian’ to openly attribute negative characteristics to any ethnic group or to condemn people on the basis of their ethnic background (Lentz and Nugent 2000: 24), ethnicity plays an important role in election campaigning as ‘ethnic discourse in Ghana is deeply encoded rather than explicit: Often a choice proverb thrown into a speech is more effective than a lengthy diatribe’ (Nugent 2001: 4). Asiedu Nketia takes a different turn to circumvent the ‘diversity taboo’: during his speech, different layers of ethnicity and regionalism are intertwined and the distinctions between territorial units and ethnic belonging dissolve completely. He draws on the ‘northern stereotype’ and, to underline his argument, he lists different interethnic conflicts. In my understanding, the term ‘ethno-regionalism’ captures the mobilisation of various elements constituting ethnicity that are included and adapted by a regionalist discourse. Articulated as a stereotype that is ascribed to a group of people and that draws distinct boundaries by marking them as different (backward, primitive, violent), the people concerned tend to build up a collective defence. By defining themselves intentionally as members of this group, they deprive others of the opportunity to use their place of origin as an insult. They reinterpret the stereotype and form an ‘identity of defence’ that binds them closely together in distinction to others. Through this process, just as the NDC general secretary intended, Mahama as the presidential candidate

240 11 | Schmitz

- - 13 In informal informal In 14 241 It thus becomes apparent that, in the absence of actual outbreaks of violence violence of actual outbreaks of in the absence that, apparent becomes thus It When analysing outbreaks of violence during elections, a high potential for for higha potential elections, during violence of outbreaks analysing When In 2014, some months ahead of the local elections for a new district newa district thelocal ahead for of elections months 2014, some In However, during election times, stereotypes that become potent are not only only not are potent become that election times, stereotypes during However, a the case of by shown is as discourses, ethno-regional focus on those that them as denounces that the cliché with confronted is that group party youth troublemakers. Big Men politics, rumours and the youth rumours Big Men politics, from the north was no longer a threat but became the inclusive candidate candidate became the inclusive but a threat longer no the north was from all northerners. for the has violence talking about enemy, a common unify against that people of them’. ‘one as Mahama for base support a solid generates and effect same conversations with the district’s former MP, who lost the 2012 elections and and elections the 2012 who lost MP, former the district’s with conversations group the youth between him and connections in 2016, return his planned in the role influential his of rumours which supported became apparent, the the NDC against primaries won he the DCE. of Subsequently, removal 2016. for DCE, candidate thehim parliamentary making former youth The Men. Big to relations in their youth to the attributed is conflict personal benefits: for in exchange support violent) (sometimes their offer funded extent to used some and encouraged, are ‘Those to violence inclined use and their Men Big act as Politicians 66). 2011: (MacGaffey politicians’ by assembly, young men and women took to the streets in a peaceful the streets to took demon women and men young assembly, stration against the current NDC District Chief Executive (DCE). The DCE’s NDC the District current (DCE). Chief Executive The against DCE’s stration a 10 per cent for selling contracts her of rumours by dented was reputation a the district, who of constitute neglecting the youth in the process and share a local uprising, group, NDCof youth the leaders The political force. strong to due but merit on not Mahama President by being appointed as her saw her was all, they of felt, Worst Lady. the First with close relationship her preg her who got a married with man relationship ‘abominable’ traditionally embody everything to to supposed contradictory was she behaviour a nant, leadto desired the however, not, did demonstration The model. a role as group youth The Mahama. President by office from removal her outcome: paint redwith office her defacing measures, drastic to resorted subsequently their make to enough’ is Enough President. Mr. this whore ‘Remove reading the were if that arms take up to they threatened Additionally, heard. voice group the youth by All actions attention. the president’s get to way only by the the district, as NDC well as of by party executives supported were people the story and Local news media covered radio and MP. the former step as final the of violence announcement The quickly. aligned themselves which attention, the intended the group discussed gained and publicly was the DCE of in December 2014. the led removal to conclusively patronage networks to engage young party faithful for their political aims, or, as Bob-Milliar (2012: 195) puts it, foot-soldiers’ activism ‘is tied to the apron string of a “Big Man”’. The fairly recent term ‘foot soldiers’, established during the 1996 elections, refers to young Ghanaians, mostly men, with a poor educational background, who claim to act in the name of their parties or party patrons and often trigger violence. Their interactions with the party are mostly informal and personalised. Socially unacceptable behaviour and actions can thus be legitimised in the name of party interests (Bob-Milliar 2014). Critics often reduce the task of the foot soldiers to a simplified role: all they do is ‘put their lives on a line, compromise the truth, and perpetuate lies’ (Issakah 2010). Bob-Milliar (2012: 12) less judgementally notes that the youth form the pillar of the party and use their ‘resources (time, money and civic skills)’ to promote their party’s policy goals, thus being central in mobilising support. In return, they expect to be rewarded with jobs, contracts or material gains to enable a better standard of living. Violent behaviour and illegal actions often derive from foot soldiers’ frustration over risking their lives and reputation without receiving appropriate rewards as the system of reciprocity would suggest (Bob-Milliar 2014: 133). Besides their own individual motivation, physical assaults on the supporters of other parties are allegedly carried out on the orders of politicians. In public discourse in Ghana, as well as in the scholarly literature (for an overview see Resnick and Casale 2011), youth who engage in politics are often reduced to the position of hired troublemakers. For instance, Bangura and Söderberg Kovacs (Chapter 5 in this volume) address a characteristic example of youth groups being engaged in electoral violence on command or autonomously, with a view to obtain personal benefits to counter hardship. In the last decades, northern Ghana has become infamous for an increasing number of interethnic as well as intra-ethnic clashes evolving around chieftaincy conflicts. Due to their links to national party politics, they have frequently erupted during general elections.15 Youth were identified as the key actors involved in these clashes, as they have also been in the chieftaincy conflicts in Bawku in the Upper East Region and Yendi in the Northern Region (Amankwaah 2013; Lund 2003; MacGaffey 2011).16 During the 2008 elections, unemployed youth and so-called ‘macho men’ were identified as the main driving forces behind violent encounters between political parties (Lamptey and Salihu 2012: 196–7). The macho men play a prominent role in the Ghanaian public discourse on electoral violence. These young men capitalise on their well-built bodies for a living, often as security personnel or hired by politicians for ‘dirty jobs’. Macho men are often used to cause chaos on the day of elections and to frighten the voters, stealing ballot boxes or rigging the polls. They are often said to be of northern origin (Amankwaah 2013: 13, 21). In the Upper East Region, for example, the Talensi

242 11 | Schmitz

- - 17 However, However, 19 Nevertheless, the the Nevertheless, 18 243 Equating politically active youth with electoral violence is a gross oversim gross a is violence electoral with youth active politically Equating The example of the involvement of young party supporters and their and their supporters party young of of involvement the example The group leaders would not decline money offered to them by their parliamentary by their parliamentary to them offered money decline not leaders would group performed in campaigning. duties for a reward was it if they felt candidate discussedand a as offered was money in 2016, the election campaign to Prior grounds. moral rejected on collectively but their support for bribe The constituency witnessed clashes between groups of macho men (Azorka men (Azorka macho of clashes between groups witnessed constituency The political main the two by instigated Bolga were Bull Dogs)Boys that versus as the by-elections who interpreted parties,respectively, theNDC NPP and strategic The 2015). (Tornyi elections 2016 the upcoming for test a litmus headstart a in make to the in-between elections influencing of importance Söderberg and Bangura Kovacs by out pointed as elections, general upcoming as particularelectiona importance, the district assembly gives 5), (Chapter below. shown constantly people young that prejudice is a it powerful however, plification; election times. As at politicians with deal to in their involvement with have Region West in the Upper in a town group the NDC of youth the example would they that by the allegation confronted often are men young shows, violence cause and the bidder highest to their morals and sell themselves peers who well-educated by is led The group personal gains. for in return politicians by ‘being bought those who are from themselves distance explicitly so’. do to told because they violence in are who… engage by-election in 2015 was overshadowed by violent clashes between groups of of between groups clashes violent by overshadowed was in 2015 by-election seat. the parliamentary for aligned men political parties to macho fighting they admit to strategically using their image as troublemakers to further to their troublemakers as their image using strategically to they admit shows. removal the DCE’s of the incident as political aims, own the prejudices of their awareness that shows (suspected) party links to patrons supports elections and violence youth, on discourse the Ghanaian dominating Theyskilfully use to agency further their their this chapter. of the argument talking about violence, physical to resorting of instead and, political aims, own in political discus them so a powerful standing gives doing of the option the district.of vandalism, acts of Their the party executives by backed sions, the underline and the performance complete language, abusive by supported – and, actions their intended surrounding Rumours their claims. severity of in role a decisive MP – play the former of in this case, the involvement becomes it whom for the public, to relevant more theirmaking demands are purposely grievances groups’ The fiction. factsfrom distinguish to difficult easily relatable are thus and tradition and morality of encoded in a language to prior political tension and uncertainty of atmosphere an In the public. for as knowledge perceived often is that information provide rumours elections, a shape to manufactured are They sources. credible more of thein absence one so that interpretation, to subject is itself which ‘truth’ or certainreality might be led by their persuasiveness to act in a way that violates common rules of society, for example by engaging in violent encounters (Simons 1995: 43). The case study shows that rumours hovering around the connection of party politics and violence become increasingly powerful in the run-up to elections. Suddenly, the risk of a simmering social conflict erupting becomes real (Stewart and Strathern 2004: 184–5). Yet, as the example shows, for the threat of violence to be effective, no physical violence was necessary.

Conclusion Electoral violence in Ghana is often traced back to ethnic diversity and regionalism, chieftaincy disputes, patronage networks and social and economic marginalisation. These factors are politicised and strategically manipulated by political elites to gain loyalty and support. In the last decades, the northern part of the country has become infamous for its outbreaks of violence during election periods in relation to interethnic conflicts, chieftaincy succession disputes and Big Man politics. At second glance, the interlinkages between long-standing local conflicts and national politics become apparent. The close links between party politics and local conflicts are strengthened by the main actors’ involvement in patronage networks with the youth, who allegedly exchange services (at times of a violent nature) for personal gains. These conflicts and the marginalised role the north has played in the nation state since colonial times serve as the basis for the stereotype of ‘the primitive and violent northerner’, supplemented by the cliché of politically active, violent youth, framed in militant terms as ‘foot soldiers’ or ‘macho men’. By nominating a presidential candidate of northern origin in the 2012 elections, the NDC strategically used the stereotype of the ‘violent northerner’ and capitalised on the diversity factor that materialised and became tangible through talks about violence. The stereotype served as an enforcing, politically effective mechanism of integration and exclusion that resulted in a group identity of defence that subsequently manifested in loyalty to President Mahama as the overall candidate for the north. Thus, talking about the stereotype of violence contributed to a clear victory of the NDC in the three northern regions. Being engaged in party politics, youth are similarly confronted with prejudices denouncing them as troublemakers who sell themselves to the highest political bidder for personal gain. The stereotype portrays them as closely tied to Big Men at the cost of their own agency. However, as the case study of a political youth group in the Upper West Region shows, the young party faithful actively engage with the allegation and skilfully use the stereotype to their advantage. Thus, talking about violence as the ultimate means to achieve their political aims gained them public attention and, backed by the party executives of the district, the necessary pressure to enforce their demands. As with the ‘northerner’ stereotype, physical violence during election times was

244 11 | Schmitz The overwhelming victory The was

4 partly the result of the opposition’s the opposition’s of partly the result elections the parliamentary of boycott after December 1992 scheduled for the presidential from emerged Rawlings the clear as in November elections rigging the allegedly polls by winner, 419). NDC The 2004: was (Nugent formed without major changes of the military of Provisional out personnel Council (PNDC), Defence National it until 1981 which ruledfrom Ghana party in successor its to over handed the polls to went Ghanaians When 1993. to were elections general in 1996, again 7 December everybe on years held four a critical For boycotts. future avoid to charges the manipulation of analysis in their official the NPP by summarised see Verdict’, ‘TheStolen publication (1993). Thomas and Jeffries ‘language is inadvertently used to used to inadvertently is ‘language issue An 102–4). (2012: action’ stimulate in the labelledis and a security as threat Akufo-Addo’s as one, becomes process shows. die be die’ ‘all statement 245 The findings of this chapter form form chapter of this findings The Danso and Adu Afful adduce Afful adduce Adu and Danso Author’s recording of a campaign a campaign of recording Author’s

The findings of this case study emphasise the need for scholars andpolicy forscholars the need emphasise study ofcase this findings The 3 2 1 speech by Johnson Asiedu Nketia in Nketia in Asiedu Johnson speech by October 13 Region, West Upper Nadowli, 2012. securitisation theory to analyse hate theorysecuritisation hate analyse to that language the abusive speech and in which elections, Ghanaian mark part of my PhD project on electoral electoral on project PhD my part of political communication and campaigning to like I would Ghana. in north-western Exchange thethank German Academic in 2008 research Service my funding for the Sulzmann as well as 2014–15, and in support the generous for Foundation special to go thanks My 2012. and 2010 advice her for Lentz Carola Professor Many the years. throughout support and counterparts Ghanaian my to go thanks in a grounding gain me who helped local of politics the depths understanding this turning for Cornelia Günauer to and the to grateful I am down. upside chapter organised a fruitful for workshop editors in 2015. Notes not enacted but rather talked about, and yet it still took its full effect. In a fullIn still its effect. took it yet and talked about, rather enacted but not of theimplications deemed is illegitimate, social itself violence where setting consciously were violence of possibilities and allegations the communicated channelling and by containing defused Conflictswere discussed in public. peace politics. violence, and on discourse in a public emotions and tensions a powerful as works therefore violence of notions various about Talking realities without changes and affects it as in election communication strategy violence. physical of theoutbreak links between and elections the macro-level look beyond alike to advisers enables micro-level on a communication of campaign analysis The violence. in violence electoral localised low-intensity understand and identify to us Structural violence seemingly in the region. peaceful countries democratic a high has it nevertheless but physically itself express necessarily not might the prevent To verbal in violence. its expression finds which conflict potential, in and in Ghana defuse to tensions and violence communicated of enactment implications its and strategy a campaign as violence talking about the region, account. be takeninto should the electorate for 5 In the following, the concept of ‘the overthrown by him in 1981. north’ is understood as an imagined and 11 Field notes and author recordings, thus constructed entity covering the three 13 October 2012. northern regions. This category reflects a 12 Author recording of a campaign perception widely held by Ghanaians. speech by John Dramani Mahama 6 Author recording of a campaign in Nandom, Upper West Region, 5 speech by Johnson Asiedu Nketia in November 2012. Nadowli, Upper West Region, 13 October 13 Danso and Lartey (2012: 43) 2012. In mentioning the conflict between highlight the same behaviour by former the Nanumba and Konkomba, Asiedu president John Evans Atta Mills during Nketia refers to a long-standing dispute his 2008 election campaign and thus that originated in the establishment confirm that strategically playing the of power relations and the Nanumba’s ethnic card during elections is deeply control over the Konkomba in colonial rooted in Ghanaian politics. times. The most prominent outbreak 14 Group discussion with the youth of violence between the two ethnic group and NDC party executives, 21 groups, which had a spillover effect in November 2014; author field notes, surrounding ethnic groups, was the September to December 2014. so-called Guinea Fowl War in 1994. This 15 Brukum (2007) gives detailed conflict had major implications in the insights into various chieftaincy disputes area as about 2,000 people lost their in the northern regions since the 1980s. lives and many more were displaced (Pul 16 For a detailed view of electoral 2003). violence within the Northern Region 7 Bening and Kelly (2007: 182–3) evolving around the Yendi chieftaincy describe in detail the ‘boundary changes’ dispute in connection with the 2008 northern Ghana has undergone since elections, see NPC (n.d.: 46). colonial times and that have led to today’s 17 That some ‘macho men’ attempt to division into Northern Region, Upper change their image by actively promoting East Region and Upper West Region. peace during elections is easily forgotten 8 See Lentz (2002) for a detailed (Daily Guide 2012). analysis of local elites’ party affiliations 18 Author field notes and informal in the Upper West Region, which mainly conversations, February and August 2015. reflect competition and rivalry among 19 Ibid. themselves. 9 Both major parties tend to field References candidates from northern Ghana as Adolfo, E. V., M. Söderberg Kovacs, running mates to their presidential D. Nyström and M. Utas (2012) candidates (Amoah 2003). In doing ‘Electoral Violence in Africa’. Policy so, they believe that they cover the key Notes 2012/3. Uppsala: Nordic Africa parts of the electorate by promoting a Institute. presidential candidate from the south Amankwaah, C. (2013) Election-related while having a representative from one Violence: The Case of Ghana. Current of the minority groups (for example, a African Issues 56. Uppsala: Nordic Muslim from the north) as the running Africa Institute. mate in order to capture votes from the Amentewee, V. K. (2007) ‘Ethnicity periphery. and Ethnic Relations in Ghana’ in S. 10 Since independence, Ghanaian Tonah (ed.), Ethnicity, Conflicts and citizens have seen only one president Consensus in Ghana. Accra: Woeli from the north: Dr Hilla Limann was Publishing Services. elected to power following Rawlings’ first Amoah, M. (2003) ‘Nationalism in Africa: coup d’état in 1979 and subsequently was Ghana’s Presidential Elections’, Review 246 11 | Schmitz Accra: Accra: Accra:

108 (433): 581–98. . Uppsala: Nordic Africa Nordic . Uppsala: Anthropologie der Konflikte. Konflikte. der Anthropologie Georg Elwerts konflikttheoretische . Bielefeld: der Diskussion in Thesen Transcript. Patronage: Elections and Parties, Neo- on Thoughts Random African and patrimonialism in M. Basedau, Democratization’ (eds), A. Mehler and G. Erdmann Political Violence: and Money Votes, Sub-Saharan in Elections and Parties Africa Institute. ‘“Fruitcake”, “Madmen”, “All-die- “Madmen”, ‘“Fruitcake”, Deconstructing Political be-die”: in Ghana’ Rhetoric and Discourse (eds), Danso K. and in K. Aning for Violence Election-related Managing . Ghana in Stability Democratic EbertFriedrich Foundation. Edge: ‘Democracy a Knife’s on Processes, Democratization Ghana’s the and Malaise Institutional Electoral Violence’ of Challenge (eds), K. Danso and in K. Aning for Violence Election-related Managing . Ghana in Stability Democratic EbertFriedrich Foundation. Election and Politics Man Big Peace!” the Grassroots’, Kibera at Violence African Affairs (eds), Pasero U. and Dombrowski W. . Katastrophe Literatur, Wissenschaft, . Opladen: Clausen Lars für Festschrift Verlag. Westdeutscher Study for Strategy A Violence: and Paper IFES White Prevention’. and International VA: Arlington 2002-01. Electoral Systems for Foundation www.ciaonet.org/ at (IFES). Available (accessed attachments/10188/uploads 2017). September 15 eines zur Bestimmung Anmerkungen J. Eckert in Begriffs’ umstrittenen (ed.), Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2007) ‘Political Gyimah-Boadi, ‘Political E. (2007) Danso, S. O. and F. A. Afful (2012) A. Afful (2012) F. and O. S. Danso, E. Lartey K. and (2012) Danso, Raila, No (2009) ‘“No J. de Smedt, in Märkte’ und ‘Gewalt Elwert, G. (1995) Studies ‘Electoral (2002) J. Fischer, Gewalt? ist ‘Was (2004) Gabbert, W. 247 30 (95): (95): 30

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Jesper Bjarnesen and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs

Introduction The holding of democratic elections has established itself as the most legitimate route to political office on the African continent. Yet, recent years have witnessed an increase in violence in African elections. How can this seeming paradox be explained? The scholarly debate in recent years has illuminated several critical findings that come a long way in shaping our understanding of electoral violence, but it has also generated new research questions beyond existing macro-level explanations. Primarily, we have yet to understand important variations across space and time within countries, and the relationship between national dynamics and incidents of electoral violence at the local level. Beyond the national political dynamics and the contentious politics at the elite level, we also need to better understand why and how other actors and groups are drawn into these processes and the effect this involvement has on the dynamics of violence. With this purpose in mind, we urged the contributors to this book to open up the many small black boxes we saw in current explanations of electoral violence in Africa’s emerging democracies, and empirically study these processes from either a local perspective or with a focus on the causal mechanisms at work across space and time. In this concluding chapter, we offer our reflections on some of the most significant themes that run across the empirical case studies, thereby outlining a set of theoretical avenues for understanding the micro-politics of electoral violence in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. We first consider the volume’s insights for refining the conceptualisation of electoral violence, raising issues of the different and multiple expressions of such violent acts. Second, we discuss the roles that such acts play within the broader political structure, questioning the overall rationale of interpreting all acts of electoral violence as always inherently anti-democratic. We then highlight the volume’s contribution to the turn beyond macro-level analyses and the theorisation of the variations and continuities in the spatial and temporal distribution of electoral violence on national and subnational scales. Subsequently, we discuss one of the lead themes of the anthology: the relationship between formal democratic structures and the politics of patronage, particularly the complex relationships and power

250 Conclusion - 251 violent or coercive acts carried out for the purpose of affecting the process or or process the affecting of purpose the for out carried acts coercive or violent This volume took as its point of departure a definition of electoral violence electoral violence of a definition of departure its point as took volume This been has highlight the to this volume by made the contributions of One evoking gestures or words as forms subtle take such may Electoral violence Between and below: other expressions of electoral violence of electoral other expressions and below: Between dynamics between Big Men and foot soldiers of violence. Spurred by implicit implicit by Spurred violence. of soldiers foot and between Men Big dynamics a that also we suggest several chapters, across insights analytical explicit and future inform might historicity and temporality of consideration careful more section the last In violence. electoral of the concept theoryaround building policy practice in the and for implications some consider we the chapter, of new Africa’s in democracyand support assistance electoral of field broader democracies. emerging and as violence electoral on literature the growing on , building election an of results must approach research qualitative A specificphenomenon. and a separate as the case and conceptualisation, overarching an such on elaborate necessarily the scale, character regarding variation and nuance added important have studies elections. of the holding to relate acts that coercive and violent of form and chapters Severalelectoral violence. of expressions elusive and subtle often important an play practices that as violence of narratives and threats explore remarkable Ghana’s right. in their own outcomes electoral part in shaping in the early politics multiparty of the reintroduction since political stability in a book to include casestudy to be a counterintuitive first seem at may 1990s in which the ways of discussion Schmitz’s However, violence. electoral about threats speech and hate including north’, the so-called of ‘violent narratives Region West Upper Ghana’s in electoral campaigning influence violence, of forms subtler and between force lines the use the of dividing that suggests electoral of conceptualisations current than blurred more are aggression of for room is there this observation that is of implication One allow. violence violence, electoral theorieson the dominant of many in expansion conceptual the analysis limit or granted for violence of take the forms either to which tend the destruction of and intimidation voter aggression, physical of instances to electionmaterial. field conducting were thisvolume of theeditors 2015, April In violence. past the to up leading in the days Bujumbura of capital in the Burundian work post- in the country’s regression a dramatic which marked protests, public Imbonerakure of the stories told were We consolidation. democratic conflict Africaine) (Radio radio station, Publique the RPA past militia marching youth during heard so frequently gunshots, of mimic the balloons sound to popping articulated was aggression future of the threat Here, civil war. the country’s hardly which would ways, in eerily past subtle a troubled to reference with Rasmussen’s violence. of delimitation analytical restrictive in a more register chapter on the Mungiki movement in Kenya also shows how this movement’s violent past (and potential) persists as a central factor in its claim to power and influence in Kenyan politics, despite its transformation in recent years into a less confrontational movement, redefined as vested in the ideology of Pentecostalism. Both Rasmussen and Fjelde and Höglund demonstrate that Kenya’s relatively peaceful elections of 2002 and 2013 were still undercut by the ethno-political cleavages and accompanying patronage dynamics that incited the alarming levels of violence during the 1992 and 2007 elections. These ominous continuities are also present in Sjögren’s analysis of the systemic oppression underlying Uganda’s ebbs and flows in electoral violence across successive presidential elections during the past three decades. Further, the chapters by Ebiede and Bjarnesen also illustrate how the instrumental remobilisation of and association with ex-militants by the political elite are not only a matter of sheer use of force, but also a compelling demonstration of latent power that may be sufficient to shape electoral processes and voting behaviour without actually engaging in physical violence. As Schmitz suggests, subtle communications of the threat of violence may thus provide an analytical entry point to studying the underlying forms of structural violence that may otherwise be overlooked or underestimated in the face of more visible and overt forms of aggression. Another finding that relates to the conceptualisation of electoral violence and is noted in several chapters has been the benefit of removing the existing, often relatively arbitrary, temporal delimitations when studying electoral violence. Precisely because of the importance of electoral politics and its all- encompassing nature in many of Africa’s electoral democracies, many important alliances and strategic moves occur outside the formal election period, including different forms of electoral violence. Bangura and Söderberg Kovacs highlight the many violent by-elections that have taken place in Sierra Leone in between general elections. They also illustrate how intra-party violence within the major political parties has far exceeded inter-party violence at times, as different political contenders are positioning themselves for the next elections. These are significant expressions of electoral violence that have previously gone largely unnoticed in the literature. In this book, we view these acts as indicators of everyday electoral violence. This by no means diminishes the relevance of a continued focus on the high-intensity violence often connected to the holding of general elections. In fact, the findings in this book point to the unequivocal connections between such large-scale events and the myriad of smaller stories that take place behind the scenes and beyond the limelight of international attention.

Electoral violence as contentious politics? While the chapters of this volume thereby point to new and promising avenues in research regarding both subtler and additional expressions of

252 Conclusion - from in such practices practices in such 253 traffic tax collectors in the streets of Lagos? What, What, ofLagos? in the streets collectors traffic tax On this basis, while state-sanctioned violence may be seen to revolve around around be seen revolve may to violence On this while basis, state-sanctioned violence, as much as being driven by reasons for engaging for reasons by being driven as much as violence, Museveni’s Yoweri that suggests analysis Sjögren’s force. use of excessive of be decades three may of the course over politics in Ugandan dominance actors international and regional of the lenience of ascribed a combination to whichthe in political space a of the lack and governance autocratic his towards electoral terms, quantitative In resistance. effective mobilise can opposition a consider by state-sanctioned Africa predominantly is in sub-Saharan violence also be should considered, in thepolitical opposition actors but margin, able be from far may whose the political class loyalties outside actors with along scale perspective, electoral the frequency or of a qualitative From obvious. the of analysis in-depth an for context, or entry an point, provides violence to condone have acts. does One not of these effects violent and incentives small-scale or acts mobilisation mass aggressive that acts appreciate to violent electoral violence, the contributions also offer nuanced understandings of the of the understandings nuanced also offer the contributions violence, electoral political a broader in play may violence such that roles ambivalent and multiple perpetrated practices, acts and of a multitude term for a catch-all As structure. the political spectrum, all of of levels by all the concept and sides on actors by of significantly incentives and acts conflating runs the of risk violence electoral parallelsand between, differences the are What and scales. scopes different day-to-day the and Burundi in politicians opposition of assassinations say, agbero of intimidation indeed, are the differences and parallels between violent acts committed by by acts committed and parallels between violent the differences indeed, are by acts similar committed and regime the incumbent by empowered actors not who may actors or the political opposition by, sustained or to, loyal actors the Should class? to the political as belonging strictly, or beclearly, defined in Zimbabwe, Chipangano or in Kenya Mungiki as such movements of actions be crime, seen civil society a shadow part as as their organised ties of with to or with tinged are these All politics? questions of formal outside political class than productive and proper more as see politics to formal urge a normative understanding social activism. But of political action and and forms subversive violence, state-sanctioned of exercise and the definitions of thenegotiability party does politics, not formal outside actors violent of the incentives of or The perspectives in taken the their legitimacy. of judgement value a imply that analysis contextual in qualitative grounded are this volume of chapters specific at specific actors of spaces manoeuvring and the incentives foregrounds in specific a within landscape. political and socio-political locations moments and depth lend that spectrumdynamics the of micro-level These constitute violence. electoral of the study to approach this volume’s to complexity attitude lenient sense, the generally survivalregime Weberian in a classical the that African rulers implies towards community the international takenby refrain to be seen incentives should lacking political as class incumbent of coercion and intimidation by actors outside the formal political spectrum may be understood as a form of political participation in their own right, as Rasmussen suggests in the case of the Mungiki movement. The violent demonstrations that broke out in Bujumbura in the run-up to the 2015 elections and following President Pierre Nkurunziza’s announcement of his candidacy for a third term, as discussed by Nindorera and Bjarnesen, provide an interesting case study in that they challenge much of our conventional understandings of electoral violence as inherently anti-democratic. In so many ways, it could be argued that the strong reactions among parts of the population in the capital were indicators of democratic progress and a widespread acceptance that the holding of democratic elections is the key mechanism for the distribution of power. People took to the streets in organised, and originally largely peaceful, protests precisely because Nkurunziza’s move was considered a violation of the democratic advances made since the Arusha peace accords. Large-scale and organised violence broke out only when these protests were met with repression and force by the government in power, at which point the resistance went underground and became increasingly militarised. The Burundi example thus illustrates the potential usefulness of studying electoral violence as one expression among many in a larger dynamics of contentious politics.1

The micro-level turn in studies of electoral violence The micro-level variations within and across cases are perhaps the most valuable contribution of the volume to the study of electoral violence. Despite the significant contextual variations, the case studies included in this volume are all examples of how going beyond the macro-level has enabled the authors to tease out significant variations on different subnational levels. Rather than suggesting a clear divide between national and subnational political arenas, several chapters demonstrate the intricate interlinkages across these levels of governance. In doing so, they illustrate how local actors interact with national-level political dynamics to produce violence in the context of electoral processes. The overarching narratives that dominate political rhetoric at the national level are shaped from below by a multitude of local conflicts, grievances and alliances. These multi-layered competitions and collaborations combine to produce the particular trends and patterns of electoral violence that emerge across time and space. In Nindorera and Bjarnesen’s contribution, Burundi’s recent political conflict is shown to have displayed a specific geography of violence in which the capital, Bujumbura, became the central battleground in the clashes between protestors and security forces. But their analysis also shows that the demographic variation within the capital city posited some neighbourhoods as central to the confrontations because of their status as historical strongholds of the main opponents to the incumbent government. In this account, the political

254 Conclusion - - 255 Bangura and Söderberg Kovacs explain why the Kono District of Sierra Sierra District of the Kono why explain Söderbergand Bangura Kovacs in collusion localand elite central of benefits the mutual reduce to But The complex and ambivalent roles that electoral violence plays in different in different plays electoral violence that roles ambivalent and complex The to cases relation in particularly valuable becomes analytical This sensibility Reciprocal relations and mutually reinforced dependencies reinforced and mutually relations Reciprocal standing of patronage politics in Africa’s electoral democracies and beyond. beyond. democracies and electoral Africa’s in politics patronage of standing legacies from Burundi’s civil war can be traced through a cartography of the the of be can cartography a traced civil war through Burundi’s from legacies based violence of exposing geography a the city, within voting of distribution inequalities. socio-economic and ethno-political loyalties of the combination on of violence a specificgeography of the notion also evoke Höglund and Fjelde to due the Valley electoral in politics, Rift Kenya’s of the centrality explain to land. of distribution theunequal locus a history as of region’s the over violence electoral of high rates such been has Leone the scene for in critical a area as swing role the district’s to pointing decades few last by regional predictable and sharp a country otherwise a relatively by driven political intense of situations In patterns. voting of ethnic logic terms in and to incentives have the political elite close races in particular, and competition outcome the influence to – others many among strategy one as – useviolence conceptualisation, influential (2003) Kalyvas’s evoking Similarly, the vote. of d’Ivoire Côte in south-western dynamics conflict land of analysis Mitchell’s local land into scene tap the national on political actors central how shows local actors provides that action’ of production a ‘joint generate to conflicts the needed swing to support the electoral for exchange in patronage elite with intimately are politics both these cases, In national-level elections. national or districts, whose in regions particular actors specificsubnational linked to peaceful either for supporters mobilise to based is their power on leverage process. thein electoral participation violent or our simplifies clearly patronage of a question to politics electoral to relation financial political and of interplay the complex obfuscates and understanding under specificto countries the not obviously which are stake, at interests discuss in the following we As large. African writ to politics nor consideration, under our of refinement a to contribute thus findings section,the volume’s political contexts cut to the core of the relationship between formal democratic democratic between formal the relationship of the core to cut political contexts political logic the underlying and elections, including institutions, and politics this book, to thein introduction and this volume of the title In patronage. of democracy between Big formal and tension the inherent as this expressed is served has a useful as this juxtaposition Although conceptual politics. Man sense much make does really not it that show the contributions entry point, diametrically as opposed. these thinknotions two to of neopatri dogmas about well-established to classified according often are that involved are when ex-combatants example African for politics, and monialism in electoral politics. Here, conventional views would most likely posit the influence of post-conflict networks of former fighters as a symptom of a failed demobilisation and reintegration process, and perceive ex-combatants unequivocally as a threat to the post-conflict consolidation of political stability and democratic integrity. In Bjarnesen’s analysis of Liberian post-war rebel networks, however, the multiple roles played by ex-combatants in electoral politics demonstrate that these actors are adept at adjusting their skills to a non-violent political context. The real source of potential electoral violence is the ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of Liberia’s political system, where the losing candidate and his or her supporters are left with nothing while the winning side virtually takes over the entire state bureaucracy. In this political structure, the privilege of engaging in patronage relations is almost exclusively reserved for the ruling party or coalition, a combination that greatly raises the stakes of elections. Elaborating on the more nuanced view of the politics of patronage considered above, several chapters explore the reciprocal relations between so-called Big Men and their dependants in the context of electoral politics. Ebiede argues that former combatants in Nigeria’s Niger Delta are more than mere clients in an asymmetrical relationship with the region’s political elite. He demonstrates how former commanders within non-state armed groups have risen to claim a place in the political elite, thereby renegotiating their place in the patronage hierarchy. He further suggests that even the less influential actors in these post-war networks are able to enact considerable agency over their own position in the local political context. Agbiboa, through his case study of urban transportation workers in Lagos, affirms the observation that the dynamics between Big Men and their dependants are less straightforward than commonly assumed. He emphasises that dependency in these relationships runs both ways, with Big Men equally dependent on the support of their so-called clients as vice versa. The Lagos agberos thereby claim a central place in the region’s electoral politics, as their drivers’ unions become attractive for political actors intent on harnessing their support during election season. Similar reciprocal relationships underscore both Rasmussen’s chapter on the Mungiki movement and Mutongwizo’s analysis of Zimbabwe’s Chipangano network. Both cases portray a political elite acutely aware of the potential benefits of involving violent actors in their electoral campaigns, but also the debts they owe their dependants if they are to sustain their support. One factor favouring the elite, of course, is the large number of young people without employment, who provide a replaceable workforce with limited bargaining power. But through their subnational anchorage and diversified resource base, these non-state actors provide links between central political actors and their electorates, thereby merging a grassroots anchoring of electoral politics with coercive practices. Inspired by the Mungiki movement’s symbolic evocation

256 Conclusion 257 This parasitic dynamic is also evident in the two chapters on ex-combatant on ex-combatant chapters is in alsotwo the dynamic evident This parasitic of the fig tree, which enters into a symbiotic relationship with a host tree tree host a with relationship a symbiotic into enters which thefig tree, of the mutual conceptualises Rasmussen extracts which nourishment, it from politics’. a ‘parasitic as dependants its and the political elite of interdependence nor thepatron neither ecology, plant in relationship theparasite–host to Similar rather, their autonomy; retain to able is relationship patronage in a the client its constituent from entity a different produces that symbiosis a into they enter as well, as actors elite on place limits dynamics parts. These micro-political their possibilities and theiroutlook alters dependants with theirsymbiosis prove the relationship should another, for clients set of one substituting for be advantageous. to less of Liberian nature ‘winner-takes-all’ The politics. in electoral involvement and both cast, are votes the after long endure that loyalties structures politics thebasis forms that symbiosis a in locked are their patrons and ex-combatants the blurring By power. state from their abjection or to their access either of Niger in Nigeria’s the ex-militants actors, non-state and betweenlines state movement secessionist the former as this symbiosis furtherDelta underscore the political and political competition, the regional into integrated become has soldiering foot militarised. But increasingly become has in turn competition Leone Sierra and Ghana on the chapters as ex-combatants, to limited not is from often and men mostly youths, unemployed both countries In illustrate. of in acts key been as culprits identified have backgrounds, underprivileged in ‘cliques’ or ‘gangs’ as such labels with associated While violence. electoral their patrons behalf of act on to theyclaim Ghana, in men’ ‘macho and Kono their political aims. achieve to local their muscle or political leaders who hire theyhope activities that willingly in violent engage youth the often, as just But demonstrates convincingly Schmitz rewarded. will be eventually recognised and in the role a prominent gained has soldiering foot of the phenomenon how young about stereotypes where violence, electoral on discourse public Ghanaian and narratives these simplistic But widespread. are hire for troublemakers skilfully use youths many and also double-edged, are discourses derogatory benefits private negotiate to in order this picture reinforce their to agency the that case also demonstrates Kenyan The actualviolence. to resorting without patronage the of basis be can on understood ethnic voting block tendency for the anticipation on be tolerated may ethnic favouritism whereby dynamics, elections. in subsequent advantages the implied of redistribution a future of electorates their ethnically and homogeneous political locking candidates By is these loyalties break to the incentive relationship, interdependent in an inthepolitics rupture a fundamental imply would it as overcome, to difficult redistribution. of Towards a ‘historical turn’ in the study of electoral violence Running counter to an analytical strategy that approaches instances of electoral violence in relative isolation, several chapters in this volume emphasise a deeper temporal dimension of electoral politics. Fjelde and Höglund propose a ‘historical turn’ in the literature on electoral violence on the basis of their analysis of Kenya’s transition into multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, and the enduring structures of ethno-political redistribution underlying the varying levels of electoral violence in subsequent decades. Rasmussen’s discussion of the Mungiki movement’s violent legacy, which lends its bargaining power to contemporary politics, adds a micro-level perspective to these complex dynamics. Fjelde and Höglund suggest that, in addition to the changing national and international standards of electoral governance, the elite’s capacity to learn from and adapt to the effects of violent electoral strategies in the past plays a crucial role in either retaining or discouraging electoral violence. These insights are theorised in Sjögren’s contribution, which emphasises the sequential aspects of elections as a backdrop for understanding contemporary and future configurations of elite strategies and opposition responses. All three chapters thereby argue against the tendency to view particular instances of violence, or a specific electoral cycle, in isolation. Sjögren’s case study, however, is more oriented towards explaining the significant variations in the forms and scale of electoral violence in Uganda during the long reign of Yoweri Museveni, while both Kenyan case studies illustrate the underlying continuities in political institutions – state as well as non-state – that sustain electoral violence as a viable strategy. Seen in conjunction, these theoretical insights articulate the volume’s overall contribution to a heightened conceptual sensibility to the historical legacies that lie behind contemporary instances of violent electoral strategies. This longitudinal view of factors that contribute to electoral violence also sheds light on another shortcoming in framing the analytical core of electoral violence as the tension between democracy and Big Man politics. Although elections as an institutional mechanism are intimately linked to the idea of democracy as a political system, elections are regularly held in many countries that score low in almost all democracy indexes, display very few features normally associated with liberal and consolidated democracies, and, perhaps most importantly, show no signs of moving towards increased democratisation.2 Previous research has suggested that these illiberal democracies are more likely than others to see election-related violence (Salehyan and Linebarger 2015). This suggests that the core of the problem may not be so much the clash between democracy and Big Men politics as the illiberal nature of current electoral processes.

258 Conclusion 259 The findings from this book support the claim that it may be precisely precisely may be it that claim the support this from book findings The One of the key messages reinforced in this volume is that we cannot cannot we that is in this volume reinforced the messages key of One How are these findings relevant for policy and practice when it comes comes practiceit when policyand for relevant these findings are How because multiparty elections are gaining ground that we see we rise a that in election- ground gaining are elections because multiparty an becomes and emerges political competition genuine As violence. related Kenya, as such in countries done has it – as the political system part of integral than more matters elections of – the Sierra Leone outcome and Nigeria Ghana, and processes electoral manipulating and controlling of means Traditional ever. challenges facedincreasing have ballot stuffing and fraud through outcomes are election observation techniques and election technology improved as has Support the broader process of democratisation beyond election election beyond of democratisation process the broader Support support Encourage processes and reforms that lower the stakes of elec- stakes the lower that and reforms processes Encourage tions Policy implications Policy understand election-induced violence in these contexts, whether at macro- or or macro- whether at in these violence contexts, election-induced understand the of structures the incentive consideration takinginto without micro-level, support plan, parties deliberately opposition as well as Governments politicalelite. of result or process the affect activities to coercive and in violent engage and as long so high. As are outcomes electoral election because of the stakes an this is the centre, at concentred remain resources economic political and most to remedies this of sets related, yet two separate, are There change. to unlikely and economic Political reduced. must be of winning the benefits First, problem. in a meaningful redistributed decentralised and befundamentally must power need power the executive serve balances on and that checks as Institutions way. to route not be a guaranteed should political office Holding beto strengthened. electoral of choice The abuses. rights human and violence for life for impunity key a play can reform electoral thisin respect, and also is important systems broad-based more encourage logics and winner-takes-all in circumventing role political losers in the system. for be a role must there Second, political solutions. have must opposition political strengthened; must be of parliaments role The structures localand governance resources; and influence expression, to access patronage not is problem The self-sufficient. and independent more become must they that a manner in such organised are all networks that is perpolitics se. It office. tied the top to ultimately are to supporting electoral processes in new and emerging democracies on the the democracies on emerging in newand processes electoral supporting to that statements broad five offer this final we section, In African continent? in this presented findings the research translating for relevant believeare we election of in the fields practitioners for advice tangible more into volume in democracy election observation, and promotion support, and assistance democracies. emerging new and Africa’s becoming more sophisticated and advanced. Yet, while elections may have emerged as the only game in town, democracy has not (Linz and Stephan 1996). Most of the states discussed in this book display few of the signs normally associated with consolidated democracies (e.g. Diamond 1999; Linz and Stephan 1996; Przeworski 1991). Political tolerance for divergence of opinion is generally low; institutions are often weak or manipulated; the rule of law is largely absent; and large parts of civil society are politicised. Importantly, impunity for political violence is widespread. Hence, one of the most important and fundamental remedies for addressing electoral violence may not be to strengthen the credibility of electoral processes, institutions and systems, but to support the continued democratisation of the political landscape beyond elections.

Expand the concept and practice of election observation and monitoring Several chapters also enhance our understanding of the character, form and timing of electoral violence. Previous research has primarily focused on general elections, the time period immediately before and after the elections, and high-intensity outbreaks of violence, riots and large-scale killings. This narrow focus is reflected in most policy documents and has dominated international practice on election monitoring. While we believe that the growing attention to electoral violence has contributed to improving the work of many international organisations that engage with these issues at headquarters level and in the field, not least in terms of conflict prevention and management, it has also led to a concentration of resources and activities that do not necessarily reflect realities on the ground. This book has highlighted the many instances of everyday electoral violence that take place long before election day, in between general elections, and within political parties. It has also suggested that we should pay more attention to subtler forms of election-related aggression. Verbal threat constructions and belligerent narratives may play an instrumental role in de-securitising social processes, especially in the context of elections in new and fragile democracies and post-conflict societies (e.g. Sjöstedt, Söderberg Kovacs and Themnér 2017). Previous research in the field of social psychology has established the critical role played by processes of de-humanisation and de-individuation in the escalation of violent conflict (e.g. Pruitt and Kim 2003). This suggests that more time and resources should be devoted to the period between general elections, not least the holding of strategic and contentious by-elections, and to domestic election observation that has the capacity to remain in place for much longer and ensure a presence in remote locations. It also suggests that more support should be given to programmes and processes that aim to strengthen intra-party democracy, such as codes of conduct for political parties and intra-party mediation, not only at the time of general elections but as permanent institutions. Considering the large number of armed groups that converge on political parties and the multitude of individuals in

260 Conclusion - Another important finding finding important Another 261 Related to the point made above, we believe that believe that we above, made the point to Related emerging from this book with direct implications for policy the critical is for link this book implications direct with from emerging and grievances conflicts unresolved and dynamics electoral between national issues lingering such how illustrated have the local Several level. at chapters the local at level. violence electoral of processes reinforce and feed into may recurring chieftaincy Ghana, on chapter focus in Schmitz’s the main not Although in the violence electoral of in the production role a major played have disputes the to also point Söderberg and Bangura Kovacs the country. northern parts of in grievances post-war in the Kono district of lingering and underlying many mobilise and recruit to the elites for the possibilities which amplify Sierra Leone, in Côte violence electoral of discussion Mitchell’s violence. electoral for people are Because local disputes land example. apparent the most perhaps is d’Ivoire of are findings his the African continent, throughout frequent and so widespread electoral of in the prevention elements important the most of One concern. great Address unresolved conflicts at the local level local level at the conflicts unresolved Address tive processes in a peaceful and democratic direction. peacefuldirection. a in democratic processes and tive many African post-war settings who lay down their arms to pursue electoral electoral pursue to their arms down who lay African settings post-war many transforma such supporting into go also probably should effort more politics, security electoral Rethink more effort should be put into ensuring that international actors do not collude collude not do actors international that ensuring into put be should effort more non-critically securitising and too swiftly by power to clinging incumbents with established has research previous in the Introduction, noted As processes. electoral election-related of key the perpetrators often are in power governments that Several 2012). the of Taylor and (Straus the African continent on incidents violent intricate many to the and point picture confirm this in this volume contributions and both around occur, that mobilisation and intimidation violent of processes to order in play often incumbents the cards of One between elections. general securitise deliberately to is their advantage to process the electoral manipulate security increased justify the need to measures for in order process the electoral Sierra in elections general the 2012 to the in run-up example, For 2017). (Jenkins (APC) Congress this book, to the All People’s discussedLeone in the Introduction only normally weaponry advanced with police officers equipped government the at known the legal regulation military Furthermore, carried by personnel. the president allowing revoked, was (MAC-P) Militarytime as Civil Power to Aid the the military Security assist to order Council to the National of Head as is order and law While security situations. managing and police in mitigating also carry measures such critical in risks power, in the government of theduty partythewith the accusedof conflating often is the government where countries need be to support and assistance in electoral involved actors International state. not civil liberties are rights that and ensure and work at this dynamic of aware security the guise too of easilyunder measures. circumvented violence may therefore be to support and strengthen land reforms. This finding is in line with recent research that suggests that questions concerning origin are among the most crucial and contested issues in political life on the African continent (Bøås and Dunn 2013). However, as noted by Fjelde and Höglund in their study of elite incentives for instigating or mitigating ethnic distinctions in Kenya during election time, such unresolved land disputes are often an integral component of a greater pattern of political, social and economic inequalities, and may be difficult to address in isolation.

Notes 1 We owe this point to one of the Pruitt, D. G. and S. H. Kim (2003) Social anonymous reviewers of this book. Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and 2 We owe this point to one of the Settlement. New York NY: McGraw anonymous reviewers of this book. Hill. Przeworski, A. (1991) Democracy and References the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin Bøås, M. and K. Dunn (2013) Politics America. New York NY: Cambridge of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, University Press. Citizenship and Conflict. London: Zed Salehyan, I. and C. Linebarger (2015) Books. ‘Elections and Social Conflict Diamond, L. (1999) Developing in Africa, 1990–2009’, Studies Democracy: Toward Consolidation. in Comparative International Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Development 50 (1): 23–49. University Press. Sjöstedt, R., M. Söderberg Kovacs and A. Jenkins, S. (2017) ‘The Politics of Fear and Themnér (2017) ‘Demagogues of Hate the Securitisation of African Elections: or Shepherds of Peace? Examining Evidence from Tanzania 2015’. Paper the Threat Construction Processes of presented at the 7th European Warlord Democrats in Sierra Leone Conference on African Studies and Liberia’, Journal of International (ECAS), Basel, 29 June–1 July. Relations and Development. Available Kalyvas, S. N. (2003) The Logic of at https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017- Violence in Civil Wars. Cambridge: 0111-3. Cambridge University Press. Straus, S. and C. Taylor (2012) Linz, J. J. and A. Stephan (1996) Problems ‘Democratization and Electoral of Democratic Transition and Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa 1990– Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 2008’ in D. A. Bekoe (ed.), Voting in America, and Post-Communist Europe. Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Baltimore MD and London: Johns Africa. Washington DC: United States Hopkins University Press. Institute for Peace Press.

262 About the contributors

Daniel E. Agbiboa is Assistant Professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia.

Ibrahim Bangura holds a PhD in Economics from the Leipzig Graduate School of Management in Germany. He works as a consultant and as a lecturer at the Peace and Conflict Studies Programme at the University of Sierra Leone.

Mariam Bjarnesen is Assistant Professor at the Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership at the Swedish Defence University.

Tarila Marclint Ebiede is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Research on Peace and Development, University of Leuven, Belgium.

Hanne Fjelde is Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.

Kristine Höglund is Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.

Matthew I. Mitchell is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Studies at University of Saskatchewan.

Tariro Mutongwizo is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of New South Wales Law School.

Willy Nindorera works as a consultant and independent political analyst in Bujumbura, Burundi.

Jacob Rasmussen is Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences and Business at Roskilde University.

Afra Schmitz is a PhD candidate in the Department of Anthropology and African Studies at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz.

Anders Sjögren is Associate Professor in Political Science and Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.

263 Index

Abidan, 79 Asunka, J.S., 16, 117 Acholi people, 55 Atta Mills, John Evans, 237 Adamou, Kono ‘gang’ leader, 129 authoritarian rule: politicised ethnicity, Adedibu, Lamidi, 228 29; popular mobilisation, 88; Adolfo, E.V., 235 violence(s) legacy, 28 Africa: multi-party democracy. 1; third wave democratisation, 11 Bai Koroma, Ernest, 114, 119 agberos, 20, 216; agency of, 253; hierarchy Balai Citoyen, Burkina Faso, 99 of, 218; -NURTW relations, 219 Balcells, L., 9, 10, 82 Agbiboa, Daniel, 10, 13, 20, 256 Baloué ethnic group, 72 Ahmed, Abdulfatah (Kwara), 144 Banégas, R., 71 Ake, C., 139 Bangura, I., 7, 19, 242-3, 252, 255, 261 Akufo-Addo, Nana Addo Dankwa, 237 Baruwa, Alhaji, 223 Albert, I.O., 223 Bassett, T.J., 78 Alex, ex-combatant Liberia, 160, 165-6 Bauman, Zygmunt, 224 Ali (‘Gun Point’), 129 Bayart, J-F., 220 All Nigerians Autobike Commercial Bayelsa state, Niger Delta, 142, 145, 147; Owners and Workers, 227 election clashes, 146; ex-militant All People’s Congress (APC) Sierra Leone, factionalism, 151; Peace Committee, 1, 114, 117-18, 120, 123, 125, 127-8, 261; 144 intra-party split, 126; reorganisation Bédié, Henri Konan, 70 of, 119; regime of, 3 Beté ethnic group Côte d’Ivoire, 70 All Progressives Congress(APC), Nigeria, Bekoe, D.A., 8 146-7, 150, 223; campaign materials Bening, R.B., 239 destroyed, 148; defections to, 144, 149; Berewa, Solomon Ekuma, 119, 121-2 okada riders use, 227; patronage loss Besigye, Kizza, 47, 53, 55, 56, 58; brutal fears, 149; -PDP clashes Bayelsa State, treatment of, 57; rallies disrupted, 59; 146 Uganda electoral challenge, 54 Amaechi, Rotimi, 144-5; APC defection, Big Man/Men politics, 6, 20, 197, 225; 149 Chipanango use, 200; criminal Arap Moi, Daniel, 27, 31-32, 36, 38-9, 180, networks enlisting, 198; definitions, 182, 184, 187; diminishing power base, 205; development of, 208; 37; Rift Valley dominance, 35; -Uhuru ex-combatant links, 9; -‘foot soldiers’ Kenyatta alliance, 183 reciprocity, 242, 251, 257; Liberia, ‘area boys’, NURTW recruited, 221 157; logic of, 13; patronage networks, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, 11-12, 125, 128-30, 215; power fragility, Sierra Leone, 129 209; social tensions use, 233; violence Arowosegbe, J., 139 licensing, 199; violent to electoral Arusha Accords/Agreement, Burundi, 93, progression, 159; -youth relations, 241 95, 101, 254 Bihari, Muhammadu, 143 Asiedu Nketia, Johnson, 233 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 206 Asuni, J.B., 140 Bjarnesen, Jesper, 18, 254

264 Index Act Sierra Leone, 126; conflicts conflicts 126; Sierra Leone, Act 242;northern Ghana, households 121marginalised, reciprocity, Men -Big 253, 256; 202-4, violence electoral 205; 210; roles, dual 201; of, 208; establishment 197, role, 198, localised, presence, Mbarre 199; 209 207, 7 violence, 219 model, youth Democracy), of Defence 91, Burundi, 106-7; party congress 100-1, 104, 93, 94; origins, movement 96; rebel 2015, crisis, elections 18; 2010-11 conflicts, 67-8 61, 56, 41 Kenya, 237 (CODEO), 207 202-3, (CHRA), 198, 98 (CENAP), 162-3; Cry’, ‘Battle 165; 162, (CDC), 157, Liberia, 162 crisis 73, 69-70, 79; economic regions, 18; conflicts, land 74; consequences, Cheeseman, N., 178 121 Chief Brewaha, 126-7; Chieftaincy established, colonial 198 presence, Mbarre Chioanango, 20, 200, Zimbabwe, network Chipanango 202 T.J., Chirau, 167 M., 12, 129, Christensen, local 9; logic of civil wars: dynamics, Edwin, 143Clark, 229; obligations, 116, 239; clientelism, the Council for CNDD-FDD(National land 2, 60, 255, 262; d’Ivoire, Côte Democracy, and Reforms Coalition for Election Domestic ObserversCoalition of Cohen, S., 208 199 M.P., Colaresi, 72, 75 Colin, J-P., 131 collective punishments, 178 14, 117, P., Collier, Association Residents Harare Combined Centre ConflictPrevention Alertand -chieftaincy link, 76 resolution, conflict Liberia Change, Democratic of Congress 159 (LURD), Aosha Conneh, 159 (LURD), Sekou Conneh, 61 in, shifts factors, constraining 168 F.M., Conteh, cocoa 60, 255, 262; 2, d’Ivoire, Côte 265 ; Bujumbura see also see 104 124 99 concentration, Kenya, 33 Kenya, 88, 2015, violence and protests 254; violence, of 96-88; geography 99; concentration, higher education 101; neighbourhoods, income low 100, 108; Radio stronghold, opposition 251; voting Africaine station, Publique 255 geography, 105 see below 3, 255; CNDD-FDD, war, 91; cycles of 2005, constitution ethno- 90, 184; violence, electoral monarchy 19; political divisions, university 90; official overthrow, exile, leaders’ opposition 107; closure, political 97-8; 108; police violence, 93, 107; 253; prisons, assassinations, the Third 106; ‘Stop protests, regional 18, elections, 95; 2015 protests, Term’ 87-8; Buyoya, Pierre, 90 Pierre, Buyoya, 98, neighbourhood, Bujumbura Bwiza, opportunities, 260; as 252, by-elections, 2 violence, electoral Cameroon, 72 system, campements knowledge and wealth cities, capital S.C., 199-200 Carey, Chabal 208 11, 199, P., 188 of, meaning myhological chamaeleon, 202 P., Chamuka, 72, 75 J-P,, Chauveau, Bjarnesen Mariam, 12, 19, 256 12, 19, Mariam, Bjarnesen Liberia 165 2011, Monday’, ‘Bloody Bøås, M., 5, 109, 172 G.M., 242 Bob-Milliar, Liberia, 167 Bomi County, 230 Paul, Brass, M., 11 Bratton, 238; impact, Ghana colonialism, British 239 N.J.K., Brukum, 51, 56 kingdom, Buganda 149 Muhammadu, Buhairi, electoral 95, 107; City, Bujumbura S.M., 1, 6 Burchard, successful mobilisations, Faso, Burkina 10; civil Bururi province, 15; Burundi, land law 1998, 75, 81; regions nativist to eat’, 177; party rally interruptions, discourse, 71, 73; 2010-11 electoral 15; resources imbalance, 12; sequential crisis, 56, 61, 67-8; 2015 election, 80 aspect, 48; stakes-violence relations, Crook, R.C., 76 28, 259; strategic violence, 5; sub-national level analysis, 4, 245; Dagomba, -Gonja conflict, 239 uncertainty moments, 215; winner- Dahl, Titus, 50 takes all dynamic, 10, 38, 166, 172, 224, Daloz, J-P., 11, 199, 208 237, 256-7 danfo drivers, 220-1; defence tactics, elections monitoring, 38; limited 225-6; operators money extortion, 217 parameters of, 260-1; violence Daxecker, U.E., 16 contribution, 16 DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and electoral violence, Africa: absence reintegration) programmes, 137, 148, significance, 158; act of participation, 150-1, 160; employment expectation, 192; Burundi history and geography, 170; Liberia, 171; Niger Delta, 140-2; 87-90, 107; by-elections, 120; chronic, De Certeau, M., 227 2; competiveness- link, 14, 49, 51, 54, de-humanisation, processes of, 260 59, 81, 117, 119, 255; cycles of revenge, Democratic Alliance, Uganda, 59 8; everyday, 260; ex-militants, Democratic Party (DP), Kenya, 32 136; geographical control, 130; Democratic Party, Uganda, 53 governmental, 147, 200; historically Democratic Republic of Congo, electoral created patterns, 52; increase in, 250; violence, 2, 67 institutionalised constraints, 49; Kenya democratic transition, heightened history, 176; land-related, 68, 78; local violence, 29 grievances geography, 109; multi- Diamond, L., 208 layered, 6, 9; Mungiki reputation, diamonds, 120-1, 127-8, 131 181, 200; neopatrimonialism, 135; ‘diversity taboo’, Ghana, 240 Niger Delta, 137; Nigeria 2015, 141; Doe, Samuel, 162 past politics fed, 191; political conflict Dokubo, Asari, 140 context, 254; Rivers State, 150; spatial Dolo, Adolphus, 159 variations, 28; temporal factor, 18, 251; Dosunmu, Babajide (Mandos), killing of, Ugandan state, 47-8; variations, 258; 224 Zimbabwe, 198 Dunn, K., 5 elites, political: chieftain alliances, 127; election lessons learning, 51, 258; Ebiede, Tarila Marclint, 19, 252 electoral violence instrumentalised, 6; economic resources, political authority ethnicity, 41; ex-combatant use, 168-9; creating, 198 exclusionary rhetoric, 71; Kikuyu, Egypt, military takeover, 60 34; land question manipulation, 72, Ekeniojuoti, Abu (‘Abu Stainless’), 76; national-local link, 10, 115, 255; 224 Nigeria, 135, 143; northern Ghana, 238; Ekiti State, Nigeria elecions, 13, 227 violence temptation, 14 elites-local Ekiti, Ado, 228 actors relation, 115 Ekpompolo (Tompolo), 145-6 employment, informal sector Liberia, 171 Eldoret peace rally 2010, 184 Equatorial Guinea, electoral violence, 2 elections: Burundi 2010, 106; coercive Eriksson Baaz, M., 6 intimidation, 8; -democracy Esi, Baba, killing of, 224 distinction, 260; do-or-die, 228; Ethiopia, electoral violence, 67 electoral commissions, 16; fraud ethnic identities: colonial formation accusations, 1; international legacy, 37; elite strategic use, 27-8, 38; prioritised, 157; loss costs, 15; exclusionary politics, 17, 36; loyalty majoritarian systems, 116; ‘our turn strategy, 96; politicization, 177

266 Index

; municipality ; municipality 172 occupation of, 163-4 of, occupation district, seeMbare below Trust 206; Residents lack, control 206-7 201-2, 198, (HRT), 255, 258 206 terror, economy 251; creating fear 104-7, 101, 97, 93, 87, targeted, families 95-7; opposition role, 97 of, excesses 108, violent Liberia 159 (INPFL), 188 187, 184, Johnson, Prince, 159, 165 159, Prince, Johnson, Goodluck, 143-5, 219 Jonathan, 40 Alliance, Jubilee 10, 82 P. Justino, government marketing boards, 139 boards, marketing government 236 2008, Ghana conflict, Gushiegu plantation, Darby Guthrie/Sime Robert, 204 Gutu, E.M., 16, 49-50 Hafner-Burton, 201-2; areas, business informal Harare: 222 delivery, vote men’, ‘hard 168 158-9, D., Harris, 191, 48, 182, 14-17, K., 7-8, 10, Höglund, D., 168 Hoffman, function, 123 violence ground’, ‘holding informal 69-70, Félix, Houphouét-Boigny, 105 Watch, Rights Human 101 90; ex-refugees, Burundi, Hutus, 16, 49-50 S.D., Hyde, 143 ethnic group, Ijaw, militia, youth Burundi Imbonerakure, 259 216-17, 50, impunity, of Front Patriotic National Independent ethnic 14, riots, 117 India, 99 media, radio, independent Criminal Court, 59-61, 56, International election observers, 16 international 181 Islam, A., 135 Iwilade, R., 16, 49-50 Jablonski, 223 Lateef, Jakande, A.K., 15 Jarstad, K.M., 170 Jennings, 181 Ministries’(JIAM), Alive is ‘Jesus 167, 162-5, Ellen, 157, Sirleaf, Johnson 267 APC recruited, 123; electoral stakes, stakes, 123; electoral APC recruited, 121, 128; Liberia, role, 138, 171; Kpno 170, 168, 172-3; local 164, political 156, non-violent 135; Delta, Niger 139; role, symbiosis, -patrons 256; context, 257; post conflict societies, 137; security 19; providers, remobilisation, 162 141-2; Delta, Niger leader256; loyalty, 252 remobilisation, 136; 68 of, 14; narratives identity, 29; 255, 258 97; 106; ex-combatants, 104, Burundi), 107 loyalists, Hutu 54, 58-9 Uganda, 31-2 Kenya, (FORD), 78; violence Front, Popular Ivorian 79 use, cloaked 261; chieftaincy disputes, model, role 8; democratic threats, 234; encoded, ethnic deeply discourse speech, 251;240; elections, 2012 hate 16, 233, 237; two-party alignment, 257; verbal youths, 116; unemployed 21, use, 238;violence 236, ‘violent 240; ‘youth’ stereotype, north’ 243discourse, ethnic massacres, Burundi 1965, 90 1965, Burundi ethnic massacres, 2 peace’, ‘everyday 151; of, agency 255; 157, 131, ex-combatants, 148, agency, with clients 135; ex-militants, for, incentives elite politics: exclusionary 151 147, ex-militants, factionalism: 227 Fredrick, Fasheun, 227 Babatunde, Fashola, 227-8 13, Ayodele, Fayose, 199 M.P., Fiorina, 8 J., Fischer, 252, 191, 182, 100, 14, 16-17, Hanne, Fjelde, Liberation, of Forces FNL (National Change(FDC), Democratic for Forum Democracy of the Restoration for Forum L., 221-2 Fourchard, 115 Sierra Leone, Freetown, 2 violence, electoral the, Gambia, 71; of, arrest 60, 70; Laurent, Gbagbo, 236; use, hope’ ‘beacon of Ghana: A., 216, 220 Giddens, 104 Bujumbura, neighbourhood, Gihosha Kabbah, Ahmed Tejan, 118; post-war Kolleh Yumkella, Kandeh, 125 regime, 121 Kono: ‘cliques’ (youth gangs), 129, 257; Kalenjin ethnic group, Kenya, 32, 35, 37, chiefs’ role, 126-7; cosmopolitan nature 39; -Kikuyu clashes, Kenya, 32 of, 120; election officials intimidated, Kallay, diamond miner, 129 130; election ‘swing’ district, 19, Kalo, Orji Uzo, 227 115, 124; ex-combatants, 128; post Kalyvas, S.N., 6, 9, 67, 69, 78-80, 255 war grievances, 261; Sierra Leone Kamenge neighbourhood, Bujumbura, Progressive Movement, 121; 2015 by- 96, 104 election, 114 KANU (Kenya African National Union), Koroma, Ernest, Bai, 1, 121; re-election, 32, 35-8; -intra violence, 39; leaders, 125 40; one-party rule, 31; opposition co- Kuhn, P.M., 41 opting, 34; state-sponsored violence, 33 Kunaka, Jim, 201, 204, 207-9; departure Karangi, M.M., 190 and return, 205; ZANU-PF exit, 210 Kariobangi estate, Nairobi, massacre, 186-7, 189 Laakso, I., 5, 236 Kariuki, G.G., 189 Lagos, Nigeria: danfu (minibus taxis), Kelly, B., 239 216; election-related violence, 215; Kenya: ‘alliance of the accused’, 185; motor-parks contested, 223-5; authoritarian rule, 28; demographic patronage politics, 20, 229; political development, 182; elections, see below; elites, 227; transport public space ethnic exclusionary politicised, 14, usurped, 217-18; urban transport, 10, 33; Independent Electoral Boundaries 13, 216, 256 Commission, 40; land grievances, 38; land: chieftaincy weakness, 76; conflicts Mungiki movement, see below; rule election role, 67, 262; Kenyan of law absence, 17; single party ethnic grievances, 27, 38; leasing-selling rule period, 30 ambiguity, 75; local grievances Kenya elections: stakes increase, 178; instrumentalised, 79; sales disputes, 1992 elections, 27, 29-30; post-2008 74; tenure policy Cote d’Ivoire, 69; violence, 61, 177; 2003 elections, unequal distribution, 255; urban grab, 40; 2007 violence, 39; 2007 lessons 100; Zimbabwe reform violence, 200 from, 56; 2017 elections, results court language, cloaked threats, 8; encoded challenged, 40; violence, 2, 18, 67 grievances, 243; politically violent, 21, Kenya National Youth Alliance, 189 236, 238, 251 Kenya People’s Union (KPU), banned, 35 Lewis, T., 158 Kenyan National Democratic Liberia: Americo-Liberian elite, 162; Union(KADU), ethnic base, 34 democracy-violence interplay, 158; Kenyatta, Jomo, 31, 34, 38, 180, 188; KADY electoral violence, see above; ex- co-opting, 35; single-party rule, 34 combatants networks, 138, 168, 256; Kenyatta, Uhuru, 40, 60, 182-5, 187-8, 190 National Police, 160-1, 164; past wars, Kibaki, Mwai, 39-40, 182-3, 187 173 ; ruling elite, 166; 2005 elections, Kibble, S., 208-9 159, 168; 2011 elections, 19, 156, 158, Kikuyu ethnic group, Kenya, 36; civil 171-2; winner-takes-all elections, 256-7; service dominance, 35; Kenya youth unemployment, 170 heartlands, 182; mythology of, 179, 181, Limbas people, Sierra Leone, 118 186; political elite, 187, 189; political Limuru rally, 2012, 185 elite-Mungiki tensions, 191-2; Rift Lindberg, S.I., 50, 116 Valley, 33 local elections, importance of, 122 Kimathi, Dedan, 183 local-national actor dynamics, 9, 77, 254 Kinama, Bujumbura neighbourhood, 104 Lubkemann, S.C., 216 Knomnanyi, Diana, 129 Luo people, delegitimised, 35

268 Index Liberia), 159 122 activists, 203 202; (MDC), Zimbabwe, 99-101, Burundi, (MSD), Development 106 140 Delta, Niger extra-judicial persecution,252-4; 177; violence, informal 186; of, illegalisation 188; tension, elite -Kikuyu 40; mythological 180, 183; youth, Kikuyu 190;’parasitic 179, 186, metaphors, turn, 20; Pentecostalist politics’, self- 184; 181; police persecution of, symbolism 192; ability, transformation legacy, violent 256; evocation, youth 185; potential, 258; violent base, 182 recruitment 224 61; to, attitudes 258; international 51 Army, Resistance National 188-9 100; Hutu (CNTB), Burundi, Assets 101 favoured, refugees 243 239-40, 233, 236-7, Ghana, MODEL (Movement for Democracy for in (Movement MODEL importance, electioncampaigns money, M., 70 Montemurro, 203 D., Moore, M.H., 158 Moran, M.C.K., 116 Morrison, Change Democratic for Movement and Solidarity for Movement the of the Emancipation for Movement 17 S.D., Mueller, 201 Joice, Mujuru, 207 Paul, Muleya, 176, 178, Kenya, movement, Mungiki S., 200 Mungure, 170 J., Munive, 58 Mugisha, Munti, 219 Patrick, Murphy, 144 (Kano), Rabiu Kwankwaso, Musa Oluomo), (MC Alhaji Akinsanya, Musiliu 60, 253, 52-8, 18, 47, Yoweri, Musuveni, 20 Tariro, Mutongwize, 181, Kikuyu, metaphors, mythological 183-4 2008 riots, Mungiki Nairobi, 224 Alhaji, Yasiu, Nasiru Other Land and on Commission National Congress(NDC), Democratic National 269 analysis, 10 analysis, Kenya concept, 36 concept, Kenya (Kenya informal transport), 180; 180; transport), informal (Kenya Reconciliation and Democracy), and 159- Reconciliation 60, 163 187 control, routes 181 201; use, violence Men Big 205; 202-3, ZANU-PF 207; control, Chipanango need, 210 control 169; ex-combatants-elite negotiator, negotiator, 169; ex-combatants-elite 167; 164, 73; rights land perception, lack 75undermined, 261 Sierra Leone, LURD (Liberians United for for (Liberians United LURD 169 158, 137, T., Lyons, 125 3, 119, 1, Julius, Bio, Maada R., 2 MacGinty, 242-3, Ghana, 257 man’, ‘Macho 147-8 Joshua, Mackiver, C., 138 Maclay, 2, 67 violence, electoral Madagascar, 58 Nandala, Mafabi, 240 237, Dramani, John Mahami, 219 Adewale, Maja-Pearce, majimbo, 224 (Mamok), Olayinka Mamowora, 122 119, Charles, Margai, Marshall, R., 219 R., 71 Marshall-Fratani, matutu 34, 178, ‘resurrection’, 180, 190; Mau, Mau 116 W.G., Mayer, 58-9 Amama, Mbabazi, 200, 20, 197-8, Harare, township, Mbare Mbembe, A., 216 70 B., McCallin, M., 73, 77 McGovern, 203 J., McGregor, 171 J., McMullin, 2 to, media, access 146 Delta, Niger MEND, 118 ethnic group, Mende meso-level Michael (ex-LURD General), 163, 165, 165, General), 163, (ex-LURD Michael integration populations: migrant (MAC-P), Military Civil Power to Aid 118-19 Sierra Leone, military junta, I., 18, 255, 261 Matthew, Mitchell, 199-200 N.J., Mitchell, K., 172 Mitton, 189 185, Solidarity, Mkenya National Democratic Party of Liberia North Africa popular protests impact, (NDPL), 162 56-7 National Forces of Liberation(FNL), National Transitional Government of Burundi, 91, 93, Burundi, 91 Liberia (NTGL), 159, 164 National Patriotic Front of Liberia Nugent, P., 11 (NPFL), 158-9 Nyakabeto, Justin, case of, 100 National Patriotic Party (NPP), Liberia, Nyako, Murtalo (Adamawa), 144 158, 236-7, 239-40, 243 Nyamnjoh, Francis, 215 National Peace Council, Ghana, 238 National Provisional Ruling Council Obasanjo, Olesegun, 143 (NPRC), 118, 125 Obote, Milton, 51 National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), Odinga, Raila, 35, 39-41, 183, 185, 187 Kenya, 40 Office of National Security, Sierra Leone, National Resistance Movement(NRM), 126 Uganda, 47-8, 50, 52-3, 55-6, 59-60 Ogun Boss, 147 National Union for Democratic Progress Ogundare, Adebayo (‘Bayo Sucess’), 223 (NUDP), 165 Ohlson, T., 11 National Union of Road Transport oil companies: international, 139; Workers(NURTW), 21, 219, 225; militants patronage, 140, 143, 150; -agberos interdependence, 220-1, 229; security contracts, 147 dynamics of, 222; violent factionalism, okada riders, 227; demonised, 226; 223-4 unions, 228 nativist discourses: electoral strategy, 68, Okrika, APC rallies, 148 80 Olawale, Akeem, 217 Ndadaye, Melchior, assassination of, 95 Olohunwa, Alhaji Rafiu, 224 ‘neopatrimonial’ regimes, 11 Operation Makavhotera Papi, 203 New Patriotic Party (NPP), Ghana, 233 Operation Murambatsvina, 200 Ngagara neighbourhood, Bujumbara, 100 Orunimighe, Tiwei Timipa, 144 Niger Delta, 135: amnesty, 140-1; armed Oshodi, Lagos, motor parks uncontrolled, militancy, 139; DDR, 150; elite 230 functionalism, 144; ex-combatants Otunnu, Olara, 56 agency, 256; former militia, 19; Ouattara, Alassane, 70-2, 78-82 People’s Volunteer Force, 140; political Oyo State, Nigeria, 228 campaign disruptions, 142, 146; 2015 Özerdem, A., 138 elections, 136, 143; Vigilante (NDV), 140, 149 Nigeria: Constitution 1999, 217; ‘parasitic politics’, 177, 179, 257; metaphor, electoral violence, 67, 135; Maritime 189 Safety Agency (NIMASA), 143, 145; parliaments, role strengthening need, National Petroleum Company, 145; 259 oil patronage, 150; ruling elites, 219; Partners for Peace project, 136, 148 Second Republic, 222; transport Party of National Unity (PNU), Kenya, unions, 7; 2015 elections, 19, 228; youth 39 unemployment crisis, 219 patronage politics, 138; competitive, 2; Nindorera, Willy, 18, 254 -democratic structure relation, 250; Njenga, Maina, 181, 183-5, 187-9 informal networks, 11; ex-militant Nketia, Johnson Asiedu, 238-40 networks, 19, 136, 142; Ghana, 236; Nkurunziza, Pierre, 18, 15, 19, 93, 95, 101, hierarchies of, 256, Zimbabwe 108-9, 254; mobilisation against, 104; networks, 197 third term candidacy protests, 87, 96, Peace, Adrian, 229 98, 107 pentecostalism, 181, 252

270 Index ; patronage networks, 126 networks, patronage 176 violence, 91; electoral reform 169 105 successful mobilisation, 224 126; 127; Constitution, ends, war election 131; democracy strengthened, 2; ex- violence, 1; electoral fraud, see above Kono, 167; combatants, Electoral Commission, National 3; party politics civil war, 1; 1992 (SLPP), Party 118; People’s introduced, 114, 117-20, 122-5, 128; political authorities, traditional 115; dynamics, election, 121;7; 2007 elections, 2012 144; elections, 2015 2, 125, 168, 261; 257; violence youth, unemployed 117 elections, 161 242-3,184, 255, 261 252, 219 instrumentalised, 146-8 Rwanda, 108 Rwanda, 104 Agathon, Rwasa, L.M., 200 Sachikonye, 209 Sahlins, M.D., 223 killing of, Alhaji, Saka Saula, 121-2, 129; 125, Samuel, Sumana, Sam 207-8 201, Tendai, Savanhu, A., 159 Sawyer, A., 93 Schedler, 261 Afra,Schmitz, 21, 251-2, 257, 180, 190 Kenya, secret oathing, promise, CNDD-FDD security forces: 170; political parties, selective incentives, 2, 67; Senegal: violence, electoral 144, 146, 148 Seriake Henry, Dickson, 179, 189 Serres, Michel, 6, 96, 105 strategic, sexual abuse, 223 Shehu, Shagari, killing Ola, Alhai of, Ekeniojuoti, Shehu civil 252; elections, by Sierra Leone: A., 199 Simone, group, 160; vigilante Monrovia, Sinkor, 10, 14, 258 18, 252-3, Anders, Sjögren, 221 D.J., Smith, 29 J., Snyder, 19, 11, 15, 7, Mimmi, Söderberg Kovacs, African elites social disorder, Area, Local Government Ijaw Southern 271 149-50, 222; defections from, 144; from, 149-50, ex- 222; defections 143 for, campaigning militants (PMDC), 119, Sierra Leone, Change 121 138 groups, armed Sierra Le, 126 resentment, 3; of language, 159; claims, 7; 168 141Nigeria, 58-9 72 d’Ivoire, 173 post war, 159; disappearance, Kalenjin 32; 255; ethnic cleansing, 34; camps, squatter 39; militias, 28, 38, 185 epicentre, violence leaders, 149, 151; ex-militant attacked, 148 violence, youth 150; focus, 105 protests 104; People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 146-7, 146-7, (PDP), Party Democratic People’s Democratic for Movement People’s A., 8 Piyarathne, 106 Burundi, police violence, ex- 3; political parties: revenge, cycles of Commission, Registration Party Political 12; defence game, zero-sum as politics, 123 secret society, Poro 148 Harcourt, Port Liberia, 156-7, networks’, rebel ‘post-war 222 D., Pratten, Programme, Amnesty Presidential 81 M.F., Pritchard, 105 visibility, protest Uganda, Act, Management Order Public 204 of, exploitation resources, public 99 (RFI), Internationale Radio France 251-2, 19, 254 Jacob, Rasmussen, Côte des Républicains, Rassemblement 236-7 JerryRawlings, John, Liberia election 2005 groups:, rebel 53 Uganda, Agenda, Reform 159 B., Reilly, 170 of, vagueness concept, reintegration 129 Front, United Revolutionary electoral 35-7; politics, Kenya, Valley, Rift APC members Nigeria: State, Rivers 98, Bujumbura, neighbourhood, Rohero 216 J., Roitman, 164 generated, resources rubber industry, 185 40, William, Ruto, squatter camps, Kenya colonial made, operation, 81; High Commissioner for 33-4 Human Rights, 97; Mission in Liberia Ssemogerere, Paul, 53 (UNMIL), 156; Special Representative Staniland, P., 48, 200 on Somalia, 162 State, the: enabler role, 208; post-colonial unemployment, urban youth, 101, 108, domination, 138-9; sponsored violence, 170, 256 31-3, 47-8, 57 Union for National Progress (UPRONA), Stern, M., 6 Burundi, 90, 106 Stevens, Siaka Probyn, 118, 121 Unity Party, Liberia, 157, 165 ‘stomach infrastructure’, Nigeria, 13 Upper West Region, Ghana, 233-4 ‘Stop the Third Term’ campaign, Burundi, urban populations, education levels, 99 106, 108 urban public spaces, municipality control Straus, S, 7-8, 48 lack, 206 Sub-Saharan Africa, youth populations, urban-transport sector, Lagos, 215 178 USA (United States of America), Egypt Sylva, Timipre, 144-5 coup acceptance, 60 Utas, M., 11-13, 109, 129, 167, 172, 200 Tanzania, 108 Taussig, M., 216 Van de Walle, N., 11 Taylor Charles, 7-8, 48, 158-9 Vicente, P., 117 Temnes people, Sierra Leone, 118; vigilante groups: community language, 1 ambivalence, 161; 2015 Uganda state Themnér, Anders, 94, 159-60 sponsored, 58 Timbo, Alpha, 125 violence: elite bargaining routinised, Tom, Ateke, 140, 149-50 39; entrepreneurs of, 148; incentive ‘top-up’ strategy, Sierra Leone, 125 structures, 61; intra-party, 125, 130; ‘touts’, 209; Chipanango, 197; Gombe Kono strategic pattern, 120; Mungiki State, Nigeria, 222 potential image, 183; pro-democracy, traditional authorities, Sierra Leone, 7 254; refrain from incentive lack, 253; transport unions, Lagos patronage regime survival, 87; state-sanctioned, politics, 20 253; threat of future, 251; verbal Tubman, Winston, 157, 160, 165-7, 169; strategy, 234-6, 243, 252; youth informal security group, 162-3 orchestrated, 123, 128-9 Tutsi community, Burundi, 101, 106 voters: ‘delivery’ of, 127; ethnic block, 18, 257; hand-outs to, 13 intimidation, Uduaghan, Emmanuel, 145 3; Kikuyu youth, 183; registration; Uganda: accountability mechanisms, manipulation, 32, 51; ‘swing’, 115, 116 50; dissent victimised, 50; Electoral Commission, 55, 58; electoral politics, Wamakko, Magatakarda, (Sokoto), 144 18; electoral violence, 2, 67; 1995 Wanjiru, Margaret, 181, 189 constitution, 52; Peoples Defence war time structure, Liberia 1997 election, Forces (UPDF), 53-4; People’s 158 Congress (UPC), 51; state-sanctioned ‘warlord democrats’, 3, 94, 160 electoral violence, 47-8, 57; systemic Weah, George, informal security force, oppression, 252; 2001 election 162 challenge, 53; 2005 referendum, 52l Whitfield, L., 116 2011 elections, 55-6; 2015 election Wike, Nyesom, 145 campaigns, 59-60; violence impunity, Wilkinson, S.I., 14, 117 50; ‘walk to work’ protest, 57 Williams, Gavin, 226, 229 Ukparasia, 142, 144-7 winner-takes-all, election structures, 166, United Nations, 79; Côte d’Ivoire 172, 224, 256-7; change needed 259

272 Index

outsourced, 208; Harare Province, Province, Harare 208; outsourced, 209; voter threat, electoral Mbare 201; use, veterans war surveillance, 203; 205 identity, youth 199; network, criminal business see above; People 197; 2, 67, coercion, 7; elections 56; elections, 2008 201; party, First 200; ZANU-PF, use laws, violence see above zero-sum games, elections as, 177 as, elections games, zero-sum movement, Chipangano 20; Zimbabwe, 273 times stereotyped, 243; gangs, 131; 131; 243; gangs, times stereotyped, 176, 100; militias, 188; marginalised, 108, 101, 179; unemployment, poor, 170, 256 criminality 206; 197-8, relations, xenophobic nationalism, Côte d’Ivoire, 70 d’Ivoire, Côte nationalism, xenophobic 140 Musa, Yar’Adua, election 135; of, agency youth(s): -Chipanango 207; 204, 202, ZANU-PF, Also available in the Africa Now series

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