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American American Negro Leadership AMERICAN AMERICAN NEGRO LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AFRICA PSPECTEV GT THE CC19GO PREPARED BY HUMH H, SMTHE ARDEN HOUSE CAMPUS COLtI4BI UNIVMSavr HARRIMfAN, XWJ YORK NOVMMBE 23-24-25 1962 P SPEGTIVE ON THE CONGO Hugh H. Smythe "Down with the Kennedy-Adoula-Nehru clique," shouted thousands of rioting Ongolese women as they attacked soldiers of the United Nations force in Elizabethville on July 17, 1962. This incident serves to help illustrate the complexity of hat-has become known as the Congo Problem, an issue -which continues to occupy more inches of-newpaper -space than the reporting on all the rest of Africa combined over the past few months. The background to this situation is to be found in the long chain of developments that have occurred in what was formerly the Belgian Congo, once the latter was fbrced by momentous historical happenings into the mainstream of world affairs from its long period of splendid isolation. For a long time the Congo appeared to the outward world a peaceful island untouched by African nationalist developments and the anti-colonial fever that enveloped the continent. Theoretically the evolution of the Congo, accordi-ag to Belgian plans, was to have taken place in a logical succession of slew and easystages: MIgss education was eventually to provide a literate population before the education of an upperclass or elite sagment was considered nerceseary. Next, a long apprenticeship in consultative councils was to prepare the -way for democratic insti-tutions in some remote future. At the same time a -system of social welfare and the jradual creation of an African middle class provided satisfactien for the immediate future, and it, wasbelieved that a calm and Iwaefu.l discussien of economic and political, easnipation could Oafely be relegated to -me distant period. C The stiate of-affairs -went oni,.jkict interup.tion for aome three decades; international apiaion was indifferent, while African opinIon within the COAGo w-as a negligible factor, -uninflened by -2 - African thought and opinion eleewhere. Undisturbed by either, Belgium continued to follow a path of economic Aevelopment and widening -social prosperity. In 1939 the threefold foundation of Belgian authority in the territory-.State, Companies and Church-was seemingly impregnable. To tiheBelgian rulers, the civilization of her African colony, seen mainly in terms of technical progress, African welfare, and the introduction of Christianity, h~d been put forward as the conscious aim and ideal of Belgium ever since-she took over control of the Congo from King Leopold II in 1908.2 Those in authority in Brussels rested on their lsurels that, in contrast to the earlier period of outright brutal exploitation of the Congolese indigenous population, there -were, between annexation and the start of ,World War II in 1939, thirty years of benevolent paternalism. In prewar Congo paternalism had paid and produced practical results really remarkable in Africa. When the great concessionary companies-- Union Minilre du Haut-Katanga, Forminilre, Huileries du Congo Belge among the most important--found it necesaary to concntrate thousands of men around the mines, tearing them away from their traditional backgrounds, it wasgood business to provide them with accommodations for their families, give them food, clothing, medical care and social amenities, the pastoral solicitude of a Catholic mission, and an educational system for their offspring. The big companies were of the opinion that such a practice was the best' way to ensure a contented labor supply, keep it healthy, avoi4 industrial disputes, and encourage labor -tability. Further., 4overn(. ment paternalism followed t-he same practical pattern as that of the business community. It had concentrated on the material well-being of the masses and the provision of primary education, in the belief -3- tkat e a policy would be more likely to ensure a satisfied ppulation than would come from the granting of political rights aiYd the development of an elite leadership group. What secondary education e:i ted -vas geared to meet the immediate needs of the Congo, to produce nurses, clerks, end so on, mhile Africane were denied u4iversity education and admission to the liberal professions. Within the context of this private sector-government social welf~re pattern there - merged what can be loosely defined as an African m4ddle class, compoeed of clerks, railroad workers, medical aids, meohanics, chauffeurs, and the like. These Congolese had regular jobe, were relatively well paid, (though their salaries were below t~ose for Europeans in comparable jobs) and were satisfied with t1 eir situation. The Africans, 4*ewever, had not been asked to express their opinions on the matter of this introduction of Western civilization. It was simply taken for granted that they would "be glad enough of te ehange, once they discovered they ere to be compensated for the i~eenvenience--such as forced labor--by an improvement in their material conditions of life. Thus nothing was left to the initiative of the African, and the Belgian overlords did not see that this allb~eineee-like attitude -carried the seeds of inherent Aanger. It did not understand that this overtly successful materialistic paternalism risked treating the African workers as something less than men. This '-paternalistic program, however, did not provide everything. Africans had not been given any political responsibilities--neither the African nor European could vote-no elite capable of leadership hAd been formed, no African had been sent overseas to study, potential P litical agitators were quiokly transferred far from-home, free expression of opinion was stymied by a strictly eeasored press, and no African had been admitted to higher- .gvernment positions. lere was, 4 in addition, very real racial discrimination: In education, medical ( services, and housing Africans -and Europeans were treated as two totally ee~parated communities. The Whole idea was imbedded in a plan to develop the Congo as a black country supervised by a restricted group of whites acting upon instructions from Brussels. The feeling was strongly held up by the ruling authority that within this framework of concern for the material welfare of the African he would be content for the colonial regime to continue indefinitely, and this attitude remained unchanged even after the end of World War II. At the close of the war the Congo was just beginning to be less isolated from the rest of Africa, but the old paternalist pattern of things seemed unshaken. And when change began to come, it came only gradually. The first awakening occurred in the economic and social fields with the evolugs3 demanding assimilation to full and equal European status. They wanted protection against the widespread racial discrimination practiced by Europeans and asked for real Belgian 6itizenshipo At the same time they were becoming increasingly aware of outside events. The independence of the Sudan and Ghana, the rising tide of African nationalism sweeping the continent, the Accra conference of independence movements in 1958, and the increasing attainment of political autonomy by practically all West African and French Equatorial-states by 1960, all had their effect. Thus the original desire for assimilation was transformed into a demand for irdependence, and Congolese aspirations had, like in the rest of Africa, moved on to the political level. In July, 1956, taking up an idea advanced by a Belgian lectuxer,4 the first Congolese manifesto appeared in a journal called Conscience Africaine, asking for a thirty-year timetable for political, social, and economic emancipation with the final goal to be a Congolese nation composed of Africans and Europeans. Not long afterwards a second mani- - 5 festo, far more angry and impatient in tone, appeared, taking the form of a reply to the first declaration. Thip was put forward by the Abako, a society that was originally a cultural association of the Bakongo people but which began to evolve as a political entity. The Abako manifesto urged the mecesity for the eergenoe of several political parties in the Congo (Conrscience Africaine thought one strong national party was sufficient for the times). Although these two manifestos aroused what was only short-lived excitement, covertly the evolution of ideas proceeded rapidly. Thus where in 1956 evoluees were asking for planned emancipation through gradual stages, by 1959 they were demanding complete independence in 1961. The policy of the government in the postwar years changed and an attempt was- made to take account of African feelings and demands. But the efforts were too little and too late. All it managed to achieve was a series of piecemeal concessions to the evoli's. It failed to work out any concerted program. Adhering to ouetomary colonial mentality, it sought answers to already existing prollems, instead of anticipating those likely to arise -and making provision to forestall"theli. The situation was made additionally difficult by the Belgian elections of 1954, which had repercussions that reached deep into the political, social, and economic fabric of the Congo. In that year a Catholic government was replaced in Brussels by a Liberal-Socialist coalition, and this awakened the Africans to a realization of the divisions which existed among the Belgians themselves. These elections saw the dissolution of the old front of white solidarity in the Congo--of adminitration, Catholic missions, and the companies0 The Catholic missions became Qpenly hostile to the new government's educational policy. The companies did not appreciate the government's decision to call in American capital to help in the development of hydroelectric resources in the lower Congo by the Inga scheme. Event began to crowd upon event and the pace of change quickened. Further political developments in Belgium during the elections of 1958 only aggravated an already churning situation in the Congo. In December of that year the Accra conference of independence movements was held, and it was of immense importance in increasing Congolese consciousness of being a part of the rest of Africa.
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