Customizable Virtual Private Network Service with Qos L
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Cryptography
Pattern Recognition and Applications Lab CRYPTOGRAPHY Giorgio Giacinto [email protected] University of Cagliari, Italy Spring Semester 2019-2020 Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Cryptography and Security • Used to hide the content of a message • Goals – Confidentiality – Authenticity – Integrity • The text is modified by an encryption function – An interceptor should not be able to understand all or part of the message content http://pralab.diee.unica.it 2 Encryption/Decryption Process Key Key (Optional) (Optional) Original Plaintext Encryption Ciphertext Decryption Plaintext http://pralab.diee.unica.it 3 Keys and Locks http://pralab.diee.unica.it 4 Keys L F A Y B D E T C A R C S E E T Y H G S O U S U D H R D F C E I D B T E M E P Q X N R C I D S F T U A E T C A U R M F N P E C J N A C R D B E M K C I O P F B E W U X I Y M C R E P F N O G I D C N T M http://pralab.diee.unica.it 5 Keys L F A Y B D E T C A R C S E E T Y H G S O U S U D H R D F C E I D B T E M E P Q X N R C I D S F T U A E T C A U R M F N P E C J N A C R D B E M K C I O P F B E W U X I Y M C R E P F N O G I D C N T M http://pralab.diee.unica.it 6 Steganography - = http://pralab.diee.unica.it https://towardsdatascience.com/steganography-hiding-an-image-inside-another-77ca66b2acb1 7 Definitions • Cryptography algorithm C = E(K,M) A function E with two inputs – a message M – a key K that outputs – the encrypted message C The algorithm is based on a shared secret between the sender and the receiver K The Encryption Key http://pralab.diee.unica.it 8 Symmetric -
N2N: a Layer Two Peer-To-Peer VPN
N2N: A Layer Two Peer-to-Peer VPN Luca Deri1, Richard Andrews2 ntop.org, Pisa, Italy1 Symstream Technologies, Melbourne, Australia2 {deri, andrews}@ntop.org Abstract. The Internet was originally designed as a flat data network delivering a multitude of protocols and services between equal peers. Currently, after an explosive growth fostered by enormous and heterogeneous economic interests, it has become a constrained network severely enforcing client-server communication where addressing plans, packet routing, security policies and users’ reachability are almost entirely managed and limited by access providers. From the user’s perspective, the Internet is not an open transport system, but rather a telephony-like communication medium for content consumption. This paper describes the design and implementation of a new type of peer-to- peer virtual private network that can allow users to overcome some of these limitations. N2N users can create and manage their own secure and geographically distributed overlay network without the need for central administration, typical of most virtual private network systems. Keywords: Virtual private network, peer-to-peer, network overlay. 1. Motivation and Scope of Work Irony pervades many pages of history, and computing history is no exception. Once personal computing had won the market battle against mainframe-based computing, the commercial evolution of the Internet in the nineties stepped the computing world back to a substantially rigid client-server scheme. While it is true that the today’s Internet serves as a good transport system for supplying a plethora of data interchange services, virtually all of them are delivered by a client-server model, whether they are centralised or distributed, pay-per-use or virtually free [1]. -
Security & Savings with Virtual Private Networks
Everybody’s connecting. Security & Savings with Virtual Private Networks In today’s New Economy, small businesses that might have dealt with just local or regional concerns now have to consider global markets and logistics. Many companies even have facilities spread across the country or throughout the world. At the same time security concerns of their network from hackers, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and sending data over the Internet have become more widespread. Whether companies have a local, national, or global presence, they all need one thing: a way to maintain fast, secure, and reliable communications wherever their offices and workers are located. Until recently, such communications were only available by using leased telephone lines to maintain a Wide Area Network (WAN). Leased lines enabled companies to expand their private network beyond their immediate geographic area. Moreover, a WAN provided advantages over a public network like the Internet when it came to reliability, performance, and security. Unfortunately, leased lines are expensive to maintain, with costs rising as the distance between the offices increases. As the popularity of the Internet grew, businesses turned to it as a cost-effective way to extend their networks. The continuing popularity with the Internet has led to the evolution of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). A VPN is a connection that allows private data to be sent securely over a shared or public network, such as the Internet. In fact, one of the driving forces behind VPNs is the Internet and its global presence. With VPNs, communication links between users and sites can be achieved quickly, inexpensively, and safely across the world. -
The Internet in Transition: the State of the Transition to Ipv6 in Today's
Please cite this paper as: OECD (2014-04-03), “The Internet in Transition: The State of the Transition to IPv6 in Today's Internet and Measures to Support the Continued Use of IPv4”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 234, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jz5sq5d7cq2-en OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 234 The Internet in Transition: The State of the Transition to IPv6 in Today's Internet and Measures to Support the Continued Use of IPv4 OECD FOREWORD This report was presented to the OECD Working Party on Communication, Infrastructures and Services Policy (CISP) in June 2013. The Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy (ICCP) approved this report in December 2013 and recommended that it be made available to the general public. It was prepared by Geoff Huston, Chief Scientist at the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC). The report is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. Note to Delegations: This document is also available on OLIS under reference code: DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2012)8/FINAL © OECD 2014 THE INTERNET IN TRANSITION: THE STATE OF THE TRANSITION TO IPV6 IN TODAY'S INTERNET AND MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUED USE OF IPV4 TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ................................................................................................................................................... 2 THE INTERNET IN TRANSITION: THE STATE OF THE TRANSITION TO IPV6 IN TODAY'S INTERNET AND MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUED USE OF IPV4 .......................... 4 -
Analysis of Recent Attacks on Ssl/Tls Protocols A
ANALYSIS OF RECENT ATTACKS ON SSL/TLS PROTOCOLS A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY DUYGU OZDEN¨ IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN CRYPTOGRAPHY SEPTEMBER 2016 Approval of the thesis: ANALYSIS OF RECENT ATTACKS ON SSL/TLS PROTOCOLS submitted by DUYGU OZDEN¨ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the de- gree of Master of Science in Department of Cryptography, Middle East Technical University by, Prof. Dr. Bulent¨ Karasozen¨ Director, Graduate School of Applied Mathematics Prof. Dr. Ferruh Ozbudak¨ Head of Department, Cryptography Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Cenk Supervisor, Cryptography, METU Examining Committee Members: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Cenk Cryptography, METU Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Doganaksoy˘ Mathematics, METU Asst. Prof. Dr. Fatih Sulak Mathematics, ATILIM UNIVERSITY Date: I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last Name: DUYGU OZDEN¨ Signature : v vi ABSTRACT ANALYSIS OF RECENT ATTACKS ON SSL/TLS PROTOCOLS Ozden,¨ Duygu M.S., Department of Cryptography Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Dr. Murat Cenk September 2016, 46 pages Transport Layer Security(TLS) and its predecessor Secure Socket Layer(SSL) are two important cryptographic, certificate based protocols that satisfy secure communication in a network channel. They are widely used in many areas such as online banking systems, online shopping, e-mailing, military systems or governmental systems. -
Cryptographic Control Standard, Version
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Chief Information Officer Computer Security Standard Office Instruction: OCIO-CS-STD-2009 Office Instruction Title: Cryptographic Control Standard Revision Number: 2.0 Issuance: Date of last signature below Effective Date: October 1, 2017 Primary Contacts: Kathy Lyons-Burke, Senior Level Advisor for Information Security Responsible Organization: OCIO Summary of Changes: OCIO-CS-STD-2009, “Cryptographic Control Standard,” provides the minimum security requirements that must be applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) systems which utilize cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and cryptographic modules to provide secure communication services. This update is based on the latest versions of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guidance and Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publications, Committee on National Security System (CNSS) issuances, and National Security Agency (NSA) requirements. Training: Upon request ADAMS Accession No.: ML17024A095 Approvals Primary Office Owner Office of the Chief Information Officer Signature Date Enterprise Security Kathy Lyons-Burke 09/26/17 Architecture Working Group Chair CIO David Nelson /RA/ 09/26/17 CISO Jonathan Feibus 09/26/17 OCIO-CS-STD-2009 Page i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 1 2 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. -
Empirical Analysis of the Effects and the Mitigation of Ipv4 Address Exhaustion
TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN FAKULTÄT FÜR ELEKTROTECHNIK UND INFORMATIK LEHRSTUHL FÜR INTELLIGENTE NETZE UND MANAGEMENT VERTEILTER SYSTEME Empirical Analysis of the Effects and the Mitigation of IPv4 Address Exhaustion vorgelegt von M.Sc. Philipp Richter geboren in Berlin von der Fakultät IV – Elektrotechnik und Informatik der Technischen Universität Berlin zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades DOKTOR DER NATURWISSENSCHAFTEN -DR. RER. NAT.- genehmigte Dissertation Promotionsausschuss: Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Sebastian Möller, Technische Universität Berlin Gutachterin: Prof. Anja Feldmann, Ph.D., Technische Universität Berlin Gutachter: Prof. Vern Paxson, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley Gutachter: Prof. Steve Uhlig, Ph.D., Queen Mary University of London Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 2. August 2017 Berlin 2017 Abstract IP addresses are essential resources for communication over the Internet. In IP version 4, an address is represented by 32 bits in the IPv4 header; hence there is a finite pool of roughly 4B addresses available. The Internet now faces a fundamental resource scarcity problem: The exhaustion of the available IPv4 address space. In 2011, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) depleted its pool of available IPv4 addresses. IPv4 scarcity is now reality. In the subsequent years, IPv4 address scarcity has started to put substantial economic pressure on the networks that form the Internet. The pools of available IPv4 addresses are mostly depleted and today network operators have to find new ways to satisfy their ongoing demand for IPv4 addresses. Mitigating IPv4 scarcity is not optional, but mandatory: Networks facing address shortage have to take action in order to be able to accommodate additional subscribers and customers. Thus, if not confronted, IPv4 scarcity has the potential to hinder further growth of the Internet. -
Fireware Configuration Example
Configuration Example Use a Branch Office VPN for Failover From a Private Network Link Example configuration files created with — WSM v11.10.1 Revised — 7/22/2015 Use Case In this configuration example, an organization has networks at two sites and uses a private network link to send traffic between the two networks. To make their network configuration more fault-tolerant, they want to set up a secondary route between the networks to use as a backup if the private network link fails, but they do not want to spend money on a second private network connection. To solve this problem, they can use a branch office VPN with dynamic routing. This configuration example provides a model of how you could set up your network to automatically fail over to a branch office VPN if a primary private network connection between two sites becomes unavailable. To use the branch office VPN connection for automatic failover, you must enable dynamic routing on the Firebox at each site. You can use any supported dynamic routing protocol (RIP v1, RIP v2, OSPF, or BGP v4). This configuration example is provided as a guide. Additional configuration settings could be necessary, or more appropriate, for your network environment. Solution Overview A routing protocol is the method routers use to communicate with each other and share information about the status of network routing tables. On the Firebox, static routes are persistent and do not change, even if the link to the next hop goes down. When you enable dynamic routing, the Firebox automatically updates the routing table based on the status of the connection. -
New Techniques to Enhance the Capabilities of the Socks Network Security Protocol
NEW TECHNIQUES TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOCKS NETWORK SECURITY PROTOCOL Mukund Sundararajan and Mohammad S. Obaidat Computer Science Department, Monmouth University, West Long Branch, NJ, U.S.A. Keywords: Security protocols for computer networks, SOCKS, telecommunications, multicast, UDP tunneling. Abstract: SOCKS is an industry standard network security protocol used in private networks to allow secure traversal of application layer traffic through the boundaries of the network. Standardized by IETF in Request for Comments (RFC) 1928 (Leech et al., 1996) as SOCKS Version 5, this protocol has found widespread use in various security frameworks to allow a variety of application layer protocols to securely traverse a firewall. This paper is the result of research performed on the usability of the protocol in application domains such as multicast. We discuss some of the shortcomings of the SOCKS protocol and provide a framework and the methods for enhancing the capabilities of the protocol in areas such as multicast and advanced TCP and UDP capabilities not addressed by the current standard of the protocol. The methods proposed are being implemented in a reference implementation by the authors. 1 INTRODUCTION Operating in a client server mode, application nodes or computers within a SOCKS protected In today’s global and geographically dispersed network are ‘socksified’ by a socks client library that organizational world, network security is a key provides a transparent abstraction layer between the concern to organizations and individuals. With application and the kernel socket library and hides advances in technology, most of today’s the implementation details of the socks protocol from organizations have their key resources and data the application. -
Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of Ipv6
Special Publication 800-119 Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Sheila Frankel Richard Graveman John Pearce Mark Rooks NIST Special Publication 800-119 Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Sheila Frankel Richard Graveman John Pearce Mark Rooks C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 December 2010 U.S. Department of Commerce Gary Locke, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Dr. Patrick D. Gallagher, Director GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURE DEPLOYMENT OF IPV6 Reports on Computer Systems Technology The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analysis to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer systems. This Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidance, and outreach efforts in computer security and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-119 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-119, 188 pages (Dec. 2010) Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. -
Deploy CGN to Retain Ipv4 Addressing While Transitioning to Ipv6
White Paper Deploy CGN to Retain IPv4 Addressing While Transitioning to IPv6 The IANA ran out of IPv4 addresses to allocate in February 2011, and the Regional Internet Registries (RIR) will have assigned most of their addresses by the end of 2011. The world is faced with the fundamental problem of IPv4 address space exhaustion. There is a huge demand for IP addresses resulting from the explosive growth of mobile devices, including smartphones, portable gaming consoles, tablets, laptops and netbooks, and machine-to- machine modules. Figure 1 shows the expected growth in mobile phones alone. The number of mobile subscribers is expected to be 4.5 billion by 2014. Figure 1. Expected Mobile Phone Growth (in Millions) (Source: IDC) Preserve IPv4 Addressing with CGN Service providers are looking for ways to extend the use of the IPv4 addresses they have during their transition to IPv6. IPv4 addresses are still valid and ubiquitous, and not everyone is using IPv6 yet, so the two addressing schemes will coexist for a long time. Although new IPv4 addresses are not available, there is a short-term alternative that ensures your business continuity. That alternative is Carrier Grade NAT (CGN), a solution that service providers can employ today to extend their use of IPv4 addresses. The extension is achieved in two ways: IPv4 addresses are extended because they are translated from many private addresses to one public address. The extension is also a time extension–-service providers can continue using IPv4-only networks for a while. Cisco’s approach to help customers as they transition to IPv6 is to “Preserve, Prepare and Prosper.” CGN helps customers “Preserve” the present mode of operation. -
What Is a Virtual Private Network?
C H A P T E R 1 What Is a Virtual Private Network? A virtual private network (VPN) allows the provisioning of private network services for an organization or organizations over a public or shared infrastructure such as the Internet or service provider backbone network. The shared service provider backbone network is known as the VPN backbone and is used to transport traffic for multiple VPNs, as well as possibly non-VPN traffic. VPNs provisioned using technologies such as Frame Relay and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) virtual circuits (VC) have been available for a long time, but over the past few years IP and IP/Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)-based VPNs have become more and more popular. This book focuses on describing the deployment of IP- and IP/MPLS-based VPNs. The large number of terms used to categorize and describe the functionality of VPNs has led to a great deal of confusion about what exactly VPNs are and what they can do. The sections that follow cover VPN devices, protocols, technologies, as well as VPN categories and models. VPN Devices Before describing the various VPN technologies and models, it is useful to first describe the various customer and provider network devices that are relevant to the discussion. Devices in the customer network fall into one of two categories: • Customer (C) devices—C devices are simply devices such as routers and switches located within the customer network. These devices do not have direct connectivity to the service provider network. C devices are not aware of the VPN. • Customer Edge (CE) devices—CE devices, as the name suggests, are located at the edge of the customer network and connect to the provider network (via Provider Edge [PE] devices).