Vietnamization: an Interdisciplinary Study Of

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VIETNAMIZATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF

NIXON ADMINISTRATION DECISION MAKING

William E. Haldeman

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of

American University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

History

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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED To my wife, Erin Haldeman, for all her patience and support; and to my parents, Noel and Mary Haldeman, for the inspiration VIETNAMIZATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF NIXON ADMINSTRA TION DECISION MAKING

William E. Haldeman

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the decision and policy-making processes that led to the implementation of Vietnamization in Richard Nixon's first presidential term. By addressing interdisciplinary scholarly issues that stand at the forefront of academic and historiographical debate, this study, using Vietnamization as a catalyst, carefully reviews • the principles behind the policy, the role of each decision maker, the timing of the decision, the process that led to Vietnamization's implementation, and the impact of the policy on the 1968 and 1972 U.S. presidential elections.

This dissertation concludes that Vietnamization was a political decision. It was born in the campaign of 1968; was largely formulated by politicians; was actuated by intense domestic pressure; failed to endorse military considerations; was decided within an isolated, domestic, politically influenced decision-making structure; was utilized as a forward-looking political tool aimed at augmenting public opinion; and was arguably as important as any other factor in ensuring Nixon's reelection in 1972.

11 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

LIST OF TABLES ...... vi

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

A Historiography Vietnamization ...... 9

A Review of the Political Science Literature ...... 34

Challenging the Historiography ...... 55

Challenging Political Science Theory ...... 63

Documentary Source Material Overview ...... 74

Chapter Summaries ...... 80

2. THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ...... 83

The Mainsprings of the 1968 Campaign ...... 83

Campaigning for the White House ...... 86

Statistical Analysis of the 1968 Campaign ...... 93

The Mainsprings ofVietnamization ...... 98

Impact of President Johnson's October Surprise ...... 101

3. THE STRUCTURING OF NIXON ADMINSTRATION FOREIGN POLICY ...... 106

From Formulation to Implementation ...... 106

White House Centered Control of U.S. Foreign Policy ...... 108

11l Influence of Public Opinion Polling ...... 116

Nixon's Foreign Policy Establishment ...... 120

Review of Political Science Distinctions ...... 130

4. THE DEBATE OVER VIETNAMIZATION ...... 133

What Nixon Faced ...... 133

Military Victory ...... 135

Unilateral Withdrawal...... 142

Negotiated Mutual Withdrawal...... 14 7

Negotiated Political Accommodation ...... 152

Vietnamization ...... 157

The Decision to Implement...... 175

The Implementation of the Decision ...... 187

Review of Political Science Distinctions ...... 189

5. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VIETNAMIZATION ...... 190

The Forward-Looking Political Tool...... 190

The Pressure for Action Builds ...... 191

Building on the First Withdrawal Announcement ...... 204

The Silent Majority ...... 214

Continued Pressure for Withdrawals ...... 223

The 1970 and 1972 Elections ...... 231

Review of Political Science Distinctions ...... 244

Post-Election Peace ...... 245

6. CONCLUSION ...... 246 lV BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 260

v LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1.1. Timetable of Vietnamization Reductions ...... 8

2.1. Importance of Keys in an Incumbent/Challenger Victory ...... 95

2.2. Key Analysis for Incumbent/Challenge ...... 96

2.3. Regression Analysis ...... 97

2.4. Regression Analysis ...... 98

Vl CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout American history, U.S. presidents have made critical decisions that have shaped the destiny of the nation and the world. In November 1968, Richard Nixon, who was elected the thirty-seventh President of the United States based largely on his campaign promise to end the war, faced the critical decision of what course his new administration should pursue in Vietnam. As the fifth President to deal with the Vietnam quandary, Nixon inherited from his predecessors "the most pressing foreign problem I would ha:ve to deal with as soon as I became President."1

At the time of Nixon's election, the American government's commitment to

Vietnam encompassed over five-hundred thousand deployed troops and about thirty billion dollars per year. American servicemen were being killed at a rate of two hundred a week, and the cumulative number of deaths exceeded thirty thousand. Also, America's involvement in the war did not seem likely to end any time soon. In early December

1968, outgoing Defense Secretary Clark Clifford said, "There is no plan for any reduction in our troop level," adding later that month, "The level of combat is such that we are building up our troops, not cutting them down. "2

1 Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978. 347.

2 Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. 159; Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. 271.

1 2

Meanwhile, the war at home accelerated, with massive anti-war marches, protests, and social upheaval. The political assassinations of President John Kennedy in 1963 and civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. and presidential candidate Robert Kennedy inl 968 sent shock waves through the nation and the world. As a result of this violence, the idealism of the Camelot era gave way to disenchantment and cynicism, which threatened the bonds that held the nation together. The culmination of events, as Robert

Dallek noted, "exasperated the country and turned it against Johnson, Humphrey, and the

Democrats, who it identified with all the difficulties. "3

After narrowly winning the 1968 U.S. presidential election, during a time of great foreign and domestic strife, Nixon pledged to unify the country. According to the

President-elect, "That will be the great objective of this Administration at the outset: to bring the American people together. This will be an open Administration, open to new ideas .... We want to bring America together."4 To bring America together, Nixon needed to develop a policy to conclude the Vietnam War, a struggle in which America had been involved for a generation. On July 26, 1950, President Harry Truman signed legislation granting $15 million in military aid to the French for the war in Indochina. On that same day, Truman, without consulting the U.S. Congress, committed over a hundred military advisors to the war in Indochina under United Nations' auspices. Beginning in

September 1950 and serving under the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), the

American military advisors supervised the use of military aid and equipment legislated to

3 Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. 77.

4 Satire, William. Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House. Garden City.: Doubleday, 1975. 93-4. 3 support the French. Beyond the commitment of troops, over the next four years

American military advisors would oversee the transfer of three billion dollars' worth of weaponry and supplies, which, by 1954, constituted 80 percent of all war supplies used by the French.

During the Eisenhower administration, U.S. military aid to the French in Vietnam greatly increased. President Eisenhower justified this financial commitment at an April 7,

1954 news conference, in which he stated his famous "falling domino principle."

According to Eisenhower, "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly.

So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences."5 In January of 1955, the United States, in a prelude to Vietnamization, began to funnel aid directly to the Saigon government in an effort to train the South

Vietnamese army; however, Eisenhower resisted pressure to help the French with a major commitment of American forces or the deployment of nuclear weapons.

Subsequent American presidents and their advisors used the domino theory to justify an ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam. John F. Kennedy, at his inauguration on January 20, 1961, gave teeth to the theory by declaring, "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."6 Under the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara,

5 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower: Containing the Public Messages. Speeches and Statements of the President. Volume II, 1954, #73 "The President's News Conference of April 7, 1954." Washington: GPO., 1960. 4

Kennedy's Defense Department played a crucial role in deciding White House strategy for Vietnam. Kennedy steadily increased the number of military advisors in Vietnam, eventually surpassing 16,000; he also added American helicopter units to transport and direct South Vietnamese troops in battle, thus involving Americans in combat operations.

Kennedy justified the expanding military role of the United States as a "means to prevent a Communist takeover of Viet-Nam, which is in accordance with a policy which our

Government has followed ... since 1954. "7 As a result of Kennedy's leadership, the

United States began waging limited war to force a political settlement. This development was largely the result of the President's defense strategy of flexible response.

Implemented in 1961, this initiative addressed Kennedy's skepticism of President

Eisenhower's New Look and its reliance upon a policy of massive retaliation. Instead,

Kennedy's strategy called for mutual deterrence, giving the U.S. a range of options to respond to worldwide communist aggression.

With the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, Lyndon B.

Johnson became the fourth President to face the Vietnam dilemma. Utilizing many of the same policy advisors who served President Kennedy, Johnson presided over a massive escalation of the ground and air wars in Vietnam. For example, from 1965 to 1968, U.S. troop presence increased steadily to a staggering 495,000. In addition, Operation Rolling

Thunder, an American aerial bombardment campaign conducted against the North

6 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume I. 1961, #1 "Inaugural Address January, 20 1961." Washington: GPO., 1962.

7 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume II, 1962, #50 "The President's News Conference of February 14th, 1962." Washington: GPO., 1963. 5

Vietnamese, unleashed 864,000 tons of bombs on the enemy, compared with 653,000 tons dropped during the entire Korean War and 503,000 tons in the Pacific theater during

World War II. 8 Moreover, in 1968, an average of over a thousand American soldiers died per month, pushing the total U.S. deaths for the war to an estimated 30,000.

During the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon campaigned on a platform that there was "no magic formula, no gimmick," in resolving the Vietnam conflict, and if he had a gimmick he "would tell Lyndon Johnson. "9 While publicly remaining aloof,

Nixon privately began the internal debate to achieve "peace with honor" in Vietnam. 10

As the fifth President to deal with the Vietnam quandary, Nixon was aware that the critics of the war, their supporters in Congress, and the media had flexed their muscles enough to convince him that peace through escalation was not a viable option. As a result, he needed to implement a strategy to reverse the Americanization of the war that had occurred from 1965 to 1968 under President Johnson. In January 1969, at the peak of

American involvement in the war, the Nixon administration began debating the merits of

"Vietnamization," the centerpiece of a new strategy for Vietnam that, according to

Richard Nixon, was intended to expand, equip, and train South Vietnamese forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role "capable of holding its own" against the

8 Berger, Carl, ed. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1977. 366.

9 Nixon, Memoirs, 298.

10 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume V, 1973, #12 "Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, January 23, 1973." Washington: GPO., 1974. 6

North Vietnamese; it would also enable the United States to steadily reduce the number of its combat troops in Vietnam. 11

The term "Vietnamization" was first coined by Nixon administration Defense

Secretary Melvin Laird at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 28, 1969.

Taking exception to the phrase "de-Americanizing," a term used by Nixon since the mainsprings of the 1968 campaign, Laird contended, "what we need is a term like

Vietnamizing to put the emphasis on the right issue." 12

Between 1969 and 1973, the Nixon administration, through military aid and advisory systems, sought to improve the capacity of the South Vietnamese to support and defend their borders. As these efforts developed, Nixon pursued secret negotiations with

North Vietnamese representatives to forge a peace agreement.

With little progress at the peace table, the Vietnamization program was tested on the battlefield, most especially during the 1970 Cambodian incursion, the 1971 Operation

LAM SON 719 into Laos, and the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972. The latter test, in particular, almost led to South Vietnam's defeat, but with U.S. support, the

South Vietnamese overcame this adversity to eventually establish a peace agreement, which led the U.S. to withdraw its last remaining troops from Vietnam.

Three phases defined the implementation of the Nixon administration's

Vietnamization program and the subsequent withdrawal of American troops from

Vietnam. In the initial phase, the South Vietnamese bore the responsibility for the

11 Nixon, Richard M. The Real War. New York: Warner Books, 1980. 106-7.

12 Meeting: March 28, 1969, 17; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan-Mar 1969, 13. 7 majority of ground operations against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. The U.S. continued to support the South Vietnamese through logistical support in the air and on the seas. During the second phase, which was concurrent with the first, the U.S. assisted the

South Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) in developing their capacity to support and defend their borders. In particular, the U.S. actively sought to modernize and develop the

RVNAF through an increase in mobility and firepower. As a result of expanded RVNAF capacity, the final phase called for the U.S. to remove its combat troops from the battlefield and to assume a primarily advisory role in the war.

Despite providing no definitive timetable for the withdrawal of a half million

American troops from Vietnam, President Nixon argued that the ultimate goal of

Vietnamization was to withdraw U.S. troops in a way that would "enable the South

Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam," 13 negotiate a cease-fire and peace accord, 14 and according to Richard Nixon, "make the

American people feel better on this issue."15 In this respect, Vietnamization achieved its intention; over the course of Nixon's first term, U.S. troops withdrew, an accord was signed and a cease-fire, however brief, was implemented, and the South Vietnamese government survived on its own for an additional two years. Moreover, Nixon won the landslide reelection he so desperately sought. On the other hand, Vietnamization was

13 Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999. 296.

14 Stanton, Shelby, L. The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. Novato: Presidio Press, 1985. 285.

15 Meeting; National Security Council, March 28, 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box 121, National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 18. 8 handicapped from the start; the policy changed from an election strategy that aimed to achieve a quick end to the conflict to one that prolonged the war in an attempt to check rising domestic pressure for total withdrawal, augment the RVNAF's capacity, and seek a negotiated settlement.

Unfortunately, U.S. troops withdrew faster than the South Vietnamese could or would improve. Thus, Vietnamization failed to provide the RVNAF enough time to build the capacity to hold off North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters. As part of the terms of the Paris accords, the South Vietnamese confronted North Vietnamese combat forces left in place by terms of the agreement. Despite the cease-fire, an undeclared war continued.

Table 1.1. Timetable of Vietnamization Reductions

Increment/Date Total Reduction Remaining July-Aug 69 25,000 524,500 Sept-Dec 69 40,500 484,000 Feb-April 70 50,000 434,000 July-Oct 70 50,000 384,000 Oct-Dec 70 40,000 344,000 Jan-April 71 60,000 284,000 May-June 71 29,300 254,000 July-Sept 71 28,700 226,000 Sept-Nov 71 42,000 184,000 Dec 71-Jan 72 45,000 139,000 Feb-April 72 70,000 69,000 May-June 72 20,000 49,000 July-Aug 72 10,000 39,000 Sep-Nov 72 12,000 27,000 9

By 1974, with Nixon embroiled in Watergate and U.S. interest in the events in

South Vietnam waning, American military aid declined. Late in the same year, the North

Vietnamese launched an attack into the Phuoc Long Province to test U.S. and South

Vietnamese resolve. When the U.S. and RVNAF responded weakly, the North

Vietnamese launched a major offensive that led to the complete collapse of South

Vietnam.

A Historiography of Vietnamization

In the period examined by this dissertation, from Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign, to his reelection on November 7, 1972, the decision-making process that led to the implementation of Vietnamization is canvassed. Advancing a case study methodology, this dissertation will be the first academic scholarship to present a focused analysis of the Nixon administration's decision to pursue Vietnamization, the impact of the advisory system and bureaucratic politics on the final decision, and the implications of the decision for President Nixon's reelection in 1972. It moves beyond the traditional historical approach by addressing interdisciplinary scholarly issues that stand at the forefront of academic and historiographical debate. These debates have driven the literature on Vietnamization, presidential advisory systems, bureaucratic politics, presidential leadership, institutional structure, and electoral forecasting for over forty years. This dissertation, using Vietnamization as a catalyst, will serve to reinforce, challenge, and synthesize the works of historians and political science theorists, bridging the existing gap in the scholarly literature. 10

Within the historiography on Vietnamization, one finds many different interpretations of the origins and outcomes of the policy, the options and alternatives defining the decision-making process, the viewpoints of decision makers, and the timing of the decision. Some scholars have argued that Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign foreshadowed Vietnamization. Walter Isaacson, for example, cites Nixon's off-the-record talk to southern convention delegates in 1968, in which he said, "We need a massive training program; so that the South Vietnamese can be trained to take over the fighting, that they can be phased in as we phase out." 16 Herbert Parmet, author of

Richard Nixon and His America, argues that a memorandum in the files of the

Republican National Committee acknowledges that by the summer of 1968 Nixon had definite ideas about what was needed to end the war, namely Vietnamization. 17 In

Nixon's Vietnam War, author Jeffrey Kimball contends that, "Nixon had been pondering the matter of troop reductions for a long time-ever since the campaign and especially during the transition period." 18

Although he notes Nixon's consideration of the policy in 1968, Kimball contends that the concept of Vietnamization dated to the French-Vietminh War, but like most scholars within the historiography, he argues that Vietnamization originated during the

Lyndon Johnson administration. According to Kimball, in October 1967 Defense

Secretary Robert McNamara "revived it as a step toward disengagement and a substitute

16 Isaacson, Kissinger, 235.

17 Parmet, Herbert S. Richard Nixon and His America. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990. 506.

18 Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon's Vietnam War. Lawrence.: University Press of Kansas, 1998. 138. 11 for American escalation."19 Kimball adds that McNamara "urged Johnson to impose a partial bombing halt, establish a ceiling on American troop levels, stabilize the ground war, and turn more responsibility over to the South Vietnamese. "20 As a result, Kimball concludes that Vietnamization was both "Johnson's and Nixon's policy by the time of the fall presidential campaign."21

This interpretation is reinforced by Larry H. Addington in his 2000 book,

America's War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History. According to Addington,

Vietnamization was not very different from Robert McNamara's proposal, repeated by his successor, Clark Clifford, to President Johnson, that the main burden of the war should be shifted to an expanded and more capable Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN) while the American combat forces in South Vietnam were gradually withdrawn. 22

Also, in line with Kimball, James Olson and Randy Roberts, authors of the 1991 work, Where the Domino Fell: America in Vietnam, 1945-1990, argue that in 1968 Alain

Enthoven, a senior assistant and systems analyst in the Defense Department, proposed what became known as Vietnamization as a policy that actually was "little different from what the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations had tried to accomplish years before," and one that the French and Americans had been utilizing for twenty years.',23 Olson and

19 Ibid., 73.

20 Ibid., 73.

21 Ibid., 73.

22 Addington, Larry H. America's War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History. Bloomington.: lndianaUniversity Press, 2000. 12

Roberts add that as long as the situation in Vietnam enjoyed at least neutral American support domestically, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were able to escalate commitment, "always with the intention of turning the war over to the South

Vietnamese. "24

More specifically within the Johnson Administration, Joseph Fry, author of

Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings, argues that Johnson's rejection of Westmoreland' s 1968 request for two hundred and six thousand additional troops began a process of de-escalation that continued under Nixon.25 On the other hand,

Robert Buzzanca, in his 1996 work, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the

Vietnam Era, stresses that in 1967, General William Westmoreland, "citing enemy losses and RVNAF improvements, anticipated that the 'Vietnamese themselves would increasingly take responsibility for the war, and, within two years, some U.S. troops would begin to withdraw."'26 Although he expected tough times ahead, Westmoreland, according to Buzzanca, could see "some light at the end of the tunnel."27 Similar to

Buzzanca, James Willbanks, author of Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and

South Vietnam Lost Its War, argues that the concept for Vietnamization was "first

23 Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America in Vietnam, 1945-1990. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991. 220.

24 Ibid., 220.

25 Fry, Joseph A. Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and Their Senate Hearings. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 152.

26 Buzzanco, Robert. Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 305.

27 Ibid., 305. 13 discussed in 1967 ... after nearly three years of full-scale U.S. combat involvement in

South Vietnam."28

Similarly, Jeffrey Clarke, author of Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-

1973, contends that American and South Vietnamese leaders in Saigon had considered the matter of unilateral American troop withdrawal for some time: "Westmoreland had suggested the possibility in his November 1967 press briefing ... [and] in April and July

I 968 Thieu had publicly voiced the possibility of withdrawing substantial American forces in late 1968 and 1969."29 Moreover, and contrary to Buzzanco, Dave Richard

Palmer, author of Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective, argues that the idea for Vietnamization was not new; General Matthew Ridgway, the renowned field commander in the Korean War, recommended such an approach in March 1968.30

Another important historiographical issue is the determination of decision-maker viewpoints and the process leading to Vietnamization. Of the most current historiography, Jeffrey Kimball's 2004 book, The Vietnam War Files, as well as his 1998 book, Nixon's Vietnam War, delve most deeply into the development of the decision- making structure and process that led to the implementation of Vietnamization.

According to Kimball, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William

Rogers favored military de-escalation and the acceleration of American troop withdrawals, but Kissinger advocated military escalation coupled with decelerated de-

28 Willbanks, James H. Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004. 19.

29 Clarke, Jeffrey J. Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973. Washington: Center for Military History, 1988. 346.

30 Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. Novato: Presidio Press, 1978. 279. 14

Americanization. Kimball adds that Nixon, "although wanting to be decisive in favor of the latter, was not always so, and he steered a zigzag course between the two approaches."31 For example, Nixon ordered a covert aerial military bombing campaign over Cambodia from March 1969 to May 1970 while simultaneously implementing a withdrawal of over 100,000 U.S. troops by the end of 1969, and an additional 150,000 troops over the course of 1970.32

Kimball also demonstrates the importance of public opinion polling in influencing

"policy makers and politicians, who studied them carefully, comparing their data with their own personal soundings of friends, colleagues, family members, and the press. "33

According to Kimball, in early 1968 polls provided persuasive evidence to policymakers of a citizenry that was uneasy and weary of the war and that favored "gradual withdrawal,

Vietnamization, negotiations with the enemy, and a bombing pause."34 Sensitive to political winds and with opinion shifting toward a phased withdrawal that included

Vietnamization and negotiations, Nixon moved toward this "middle of the road strategy"35 as part of the "home-front battle to win support for his Vietnam policies."36

31 Kimball, Jeffrey. The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy. Lawrence.: University Press of Kansas, 2006. 12.

32 Melvin Small, in his work Democracy & Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy. 1789-1994, contends that Nixon's decision to pursue covert escalation in Cambodia was a case of"major Vietnam policy decision making have been influenced by the powerful anti-war movement" (see p.124).

33 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 42-3.

34 Ibid., 42-3.

35 Ibid., 43.

36 Ibid., 139. 15

Much like Kimball, Stephen Ambrose, another Nixon scholar, examines the viewpoints of Vietnamization decision makers in Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician

1962-1972. Ambrose contends that "Thieu was opposed; General Abrams was opposed;

Kissinger was opposed; Johnson resisted the move; Nixon hated doing it; but the

American political system imposed it on the President ... withdrawal was the only choice."37 Similarly, Kissinger scholar Walter Isaacson, in his 1992 work, Kissinger, argues that "Vietnamization was a policy that Laird pushed, Nixon accepted, and

Kissinger disparaged." In addition, Isaacson argues that despite Laird's backing, the

American military was "appalled by the notion of Vietnamization because they considered it tantamount to a slow surrender."38 Likewise, journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, in their 1972 work, Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of

Power, argue that on the issue of withdrawal, Laird and Rogers were advocates, Kissinger was "scrupulously neutral," Abrams reluctantly acquiesced, and as a result, Nixon made the "first and most difficult of his foreign policy decisions; he would withdraw, gradually but unilaterally. "39

Most recently, historian Robert Dallek, author of Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in

Power, contends that "Nixon's design for Vietnam was self-evident. Like Johnson before him, he wanted to ensure that the war ended with guarantees of South Vietnam's autonomy. To achieve this, Hanoi would have to agree to mutual withdrawals, and

37 Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon: The Triumph ofa Politician 1962-1972. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989. 278.

38 Isaacson, Kissinger, 237.

39 Evans, Rowland, Jr., and Robert D. Novak. Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power. New York: Vintage Books, 1972. 80-1. 16

Vietnamization would have to be the result not of American determination to withdraw from Vietnam but of Saigon's genuine ability to defend itself."40 According to Dallek, in light of these challenges, "Nixon believed that it would take at least a year to get a settlement."41 With respect to Vietnamization, Dallek, like Kimball, maintains that U.S. public opinion "encouraged Nixon's attraction to the idea."42 Melvin Small, author of

Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, also notes the importance of Nixon's use of polling in foreign-policy decision making.43 According to Small, the contest for the public's support between the government and its opponents was an important element in the making of Vietnam policy. For example, Small argues, "when Richard Nixon committed

Washington to a Vietnamization program, domestic opinion was one crucial variable .... Vietnamization would convince the public that the war was not endless; the

American commitment would decrease gradually."44 In fact, Small concludes, the anti- war movement and anti-war criticism in the media and Congress "had a significant impact on the Vietnam policies of both Johnson and Nixon."45

In addition to such overviews, a select number of secondary works have offered insights into individual decision makers. In particular, several scholars point to the importance of Laird as an advocate ofVietnamization. Robert Dallek, for example,

40 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 126.

41 Ibid., 106.

42 Ibid., 125.

43 Small, Melvin. Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988. 168.

44 Ibid., 230.

45 Ibid., 225. 17 describes the decision-making process leading to the implementation of Vietnamization in relation to Laird's trip to Vietnam in March 1969. According to Dallek, Nixon's public and private optimism about bringing the war to a satisfactory conclusion during the first four months of the administration partly rested on a report from Laird describing what he had found during an early March visit to Vietnam.46

Further, James Olson and Randy Roberts maintain that within the administration,

"Laird became the voice for de-escalation."47 Arguing similarly, Walter Isaacson noted that Laird "continued to be the strongest advocate of Vietnamization,"48 Seymour M.

Hersh, in his 1983 book, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, argues more specifically that "Vietnamization was Laird's policy, not Nixon's."49

Stanley Karnow, in Vietnam: A History, contends that "looking back, I believe that

Laird's contribution to America's departure from Vietnam has been underestimated."50

James Willbanks concludes that Laird had a "dogged promotion" ofVietnamization, becommg . its . ch' 1e f proponent. 51

Literature on Henry Kissinger, mostly in the form of biography, delves more deeply into the source material and begins to reveal the thought processes of the National

Security Advisor. For example, Marvin and Bernard Kalb, in their 1974 book, Kissinger,

46 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 124-5.

47 Olson and Roberts, Where the Domino Fell, 218.

48 Isaacson, Kissinger, 237.

49 Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. New York: Summit Books, 1983. 119.

5° Kamow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983. 595.

51 Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 15 18 argue that Kissinger believed that "the right combination of force and diplomacy could produce the miracle that had evaded Lyndon Johnson's grasp for years."52 According to the authors, Kissinger's plan for American disengagement from Vietnam appeared in the

January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, in which he proposed a "two track" formula. On one track, Hanoi and Washington would focus exclusively on a military settlement of their conflict; on the second track, Saigon and the National Liberation Front (NLF) would concentrate on a political solution for South Vietnam. The book contends that Kissinger had little faith in Saigon's military capacity and political stability, and ultimately regarded Vietnamization as unrealistic. 53 Similarly, Walter Isaacson contends that for

Kissinger, "Vietnarnization violated his cardinal rule of realism; military force and diplomacy must work together."54

Although most scholars argue that Kissinger was unsure of Vietnamization as a policy, Jussi Hanhimaki offers a competing perspective in his 2004 book, The Flawed

Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Hanhimaki suggests that the secret bombing of Cambodia and Vietnamization dominated Kissinger's thought and time more than any other issue. Hanhimaki concludes that Vietnamization was a disaster from

Kissinger's point of view because it "would inevitably weaken the U.S. bargaining position."55 Moreover, despite Kissinger's aversion to Vietnamization, Melvin Small describes "Kissinger as the most important Vietnam policymaker."56

52 Kalb, Marvin, and Bernard Kalb. Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974. 120.

53 Ibid., 128.

54 Isaacson, Kissinger, 237. 19

The secondary literature offers insights into Laird's and Kissinger's rationales for

Vietnamization, but provides only scattered coverage of Nixon's perspective. Most impressive is Jeffrey Kimball's work, which, as previously noted, describes Nixon's decision making as a "zigzag course. "57 Since the publication of Kimball's 2004 work, more documents, especially those pertaining to Nixon and Kissinger, have been declassified and provide new insight into decision making in the Nixon administration.

Like Kimball, Melvin Small argues that foreign policy aides generally "left political judgments to the president ... due to Nixon's celebrated political acumen when it came to the opinion variable."58 Similar to Small, Stanley Kamow maintains that in order to placate public opinion at home, Nixon wanted an agreement that would gain the release of some four hundred American prisoners, remove more than five hundred thousand soldiers from South Vietnam, and all the while support the South Vietnamese army with advisors, equipment, and aircraft to prevent a Communist takeover.

According to Kamow, Nixon believed that by assuring South Vietnam's security, he would not be branded as the first American president to lose a war. 59

Among the military accounts, the most exhaustive works are Public Affairs: The

Military and the Media, 1968-1973, written by William M. Hammond in 1996, and

55 Hanhimaki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 43.

56 Small, Melvin. Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988. 172.

57 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 12.

58 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 167.

59 Kamow, Vietnam: A History, 593-4. 20

Abandoning Vietnam, by James Willbanks. According to Hammond, General Abrams, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and commanders in the field all greeted the prospect of troop withdrawals with misgivings. Hammond agrees that, military reservations notwithstanding, "political considerations made withdrawals some sort of imperative to the Nixon administration."60 Willbanks' study, although the most comprehensive work on Vietnamization, largely skims the policy and decision-making processes that led to implementation. Ultimately, according to Willbanks, "Vietnamization was a failed policy" largely because it was started too late. 61

Within the historiography, only a handful of scholars address Nixon's decision- making and organizational styles. One in particular, Melvin Small, contends that Nixon's

"inner circle was very small, involving fewer people than the previous administration.

Foreign policies were devised by Nixon, Kissinger, and one or two others, with

Alexander Haig and Brent Scowcroft playing some part in the last two years of Nixon's tenure."62 Moreover, according to William Bundy, author of A Tangled Web: The

Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, Nixon preferred an organizational structure that centralized foreign policy in the White House. 63

Essential to the historiographical review of Vietnamization are the options and alternatives Nixon considered in determining his administration's strategy for the war.

60 Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973. Washington.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1996. 83-4.

61 Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 278

62 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 167-8.

63 Bundy, William P. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. New York: Hill & Wang, 1999. 21

An important historiographical argument is whether Nixon actually had a "secret plan" to end the war. Most leading scholars in the field challenge this presumption. According to

Melvin Small, "the secret plan to end the war did not exist."64 Moreover, Jeffrey Clarke argues that "Nixon had suggested the existence of a "secret plan" to end the war during his presidential campaign, but had yet to come up with any alternatives to the application of greater military force, and the secretary [Laird] felt that he had a better idea."65 Most recently, Robert Dallek contends that "Although Nixon had implied during the presidential campaign that he had a plan for ending the war, it was nothing more than an election ploy. Once he was elected, however, he began trying to find a formula to end the conflict. "66

On the other hand, another leading scholar, Jeffrey Kimball, argues that the five parts of Nixon's "secret plan" for Vietnam that would be followed in 1969 -

Vietnamization of the war, pacification of the South Vietnamese countryside, diplomatic isolation of North Vietnam, gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops, and peace negotiations - had actually been outlined by Nixon at least as early as August 1968, and its basic elements were set in place by the time of the post-Christmas meetings at the Pierre Hotel between Kissinger, Ellsberg, and Ikle, weeks before NS SM I ."67 What remained to be

64 Ibid., 166.

65 Clarke, Advice and Support, 347.

66 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 105.

67 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 98-99. 22 completed after the inauguration, according to Kimball, "were the details of implementation and the issuing of orders to commence the implementation. "68

In fact, leading scholars not only largely maintain that Nixon did not have a

"secret plan" to end the war, but suggest that withdrawal was the only option open to

Nixon at the onset of his presidency. For example, according to William Bundy,

Vietnamization was a policy that "almost certainly would have been pursued by any

American Administration in 1969," and "given the contradictory thrust of American congressional and public opinion - the measured withdrawal program was inevitable."69

Moreover, Melvin Small argues that Vietnamization represented for Nixon the "only strategy acceptable to the American public,"70 Jeffrey Record, in his 1988 book, The

Wrong War: Why We Lost Vietnam, argues that the "United States withdrew because it had no other choice."71 In her book, Nixon in Winter, Monica Crowley contends that

Nixon stated to her, "Arming and training the South Vietnamese seems like it was the only way for us to ... Get the hell out."72 Larry Berman, author of No Peace, No Honor:

Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, maintains that "Vietnamization was Nixon's only option, given his domestic critics."73

68 Ibid., 98-99.

69 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 64, 66.

70 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 197.

71 Record, Jeffrey. The Wrong War: Why We Lost Vietnam. Annapolis.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 57-8.

72 Crowley, Monica. Nixon in Winter. New York: Random House, 1998. 256.

73 Berman, Larry. No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 2001. 52. 23

Robert Buzzanca, in his examination of the Johnson administration's handling of the war, argues that as a result of the Tet Offensive in 1968, U.S. hopes for success in

Vietnam were dashed and de-escalation was inevitable because "the American people were no longer willing to support a war without measurable success or without an end in sight"; "escalation, never terribly effective as a military strategy, had finally become politically impossible"; and "American forces, no matter the number deployed or tactics used, could not stop the enemy."74

Some scholars highlight the Nixon administration's vision and options for

Vietnam. One of the most balanced in approaching the mainsprings of Nixon's blueprint for Vietnam is Jeffrey Kimball's book, Nixon's Vietnam War. Kimball demonstrates how a RAND study commissioned by Kissinger during the presidential transition period largely championed Nixon's and Kissinger's strategy for the war. Kimball contends that

NSSM 1, a directive of twenty-eight questions delivered to the top echelons of the foreign policy establishment on Inauguration Day 1969, was intended to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in South Vietnam central to arriving at a workable strategy. Kimball argues that by the time agency responses were received in early to mid-February 1969 and a summary was prepared and circulated in preparation for a March 28, 1969 meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), a strategy for the war had been determined. According to Kimball, "IfNSSMl served any purpose, it was to provide Nixon and Kissinger by February and March with information about bureaucratic opinion - a map of the bureaucratic terrain, so to speak - and to move the

74 Buzzanco, Robert. Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 311, 339-41. 24 bureaucracy somewhat in the direction of their preexisting covert strategy, or at least to keep them busy while it was being implemented .... The RAND study, therefore, was probably more important to the development of their plan than NSSMl, for it provided

Nixon and Kissinger during the transition period with an early and more timely assessment of the difficulties they faced in Vietnam, and also of the range of options available." 75 A more detailed assessment of these studies and other strategic options is provided in chapters 3 and 4.

With respect to de-Americanizing the war, Kimball argues, "Nixon was not too foolish to think that Vietnamization alone could win the war, but because of domestic political pressures upon him to withdraw American troops, he needed Vietnamization to succeed, and because he did, he wanted to believe it could."76 For Nixon, according to

Kimball, Vietnamization was a response to sagging home-front support for the war,

"designed to win victories on the political home front,"77 and "a stopgap measure to hold the line as American troops withdrew."78

Contrary to Kimball, James Willbanks emphasizes the importance ofNSSMl in providing Nixon with critical viewpoints for the war. According to Willbanks, by the time of the presidential inauguration, "the wheels had been set in motion to remove the

United States from Vietnam once and for all. What remained was to devise a means by

75 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 97.

76 Ibid., 182.

77 Ibid., 98-9.

78 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 74. 25 which the United States did not appear to be abandoning South Vietnam to the

Communists."79

Another work, Robert Dallek's Nixon and Kissinger, illustrates the development of the NSC under Kissinger, White House control of foreign policy, and the range of options and alternatives for the war. According to Dallek, "Although Nixon said later that they considered and summarily rejected 'knock-out blows' destroying North

Vietnam's dikes or using tactical nuclear weapons - there is no documentary evidence that such extreme action was ever discussed. Nixon and Kissinger knew that any substantial escalation of the conflict would touch off an explosion of domestic opposition that would undermine the administration's ability to govern and its prospects for a second term. "80 Ultimately, according to Dallek, "The truth is that Nixon and Kissinger had no good alternative for ending the war except the application of more force. It was no different from what LBJ had tried before accepting in 1968 that a combination of Hanoi's resilience and American public opposition made military escalation an unproductive alternative."81 Like Dallek, Melvin Small argues that "as long as the President continued the peace talks and the troop withdrawals, he could count on the support of most

Americans. "82

Jeffrey Clarke, similar to both Kimball and Dallek, breaks down the development of Nixon's Vietnam policy. Although he does not go into great detail, Clarke argues that

79 Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 10, 13

80 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 107.

81 Ibid, 107.

82 Small, Johnson, Nix on, and the Doves, 197. 26

Nixon did have options, but he emphasizes Laird's trip to South Vietnam in March

1969and contends that, despite the critical responses of Laird's own staff to NSSMl,

Nixon's Defense Secretary was convinced that the South Vietnamese could eventually defend themselves without American ground troops. 83 According to Clarke, "Political leaders in Washington clearly made the decision to Vietnamize the war .... Vietnamization was not a strategy for fighting or winning the war, or even for achieving America's limited objectives in South Vietnam. At best, it was a political strategy for continuing

U.S. support for a domestically unpopular conflict and, at worst, a face-saving abandonment of a commitment that American leaders felt they could or should no longer honor."84

Likewise, Bruce Kuklick, in his 2007 work, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger, argues that Johnson and Nixon, in attempting to avoid defeat, aimed "not to win, but to stay in power. "85 According to Kuklick, "domestic politics explained the irrationality of Vietnam."86

Similar to debate over the mainsprings of the policy, the timing of the decision on

Vietnamization generates diverse historiographical interpretations. For example, Evans and Novak argue that by the end of the first meeting of the NSC on January 25, 1969, views on Vietnam strategy came into focus. 87 On the other hand, Marvin and Bernard

83 Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973, 347.

84 Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973, 498.

85 Kuklick, Bruce. Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 178.

86 Ibid., 178. 27

Kalb argue that the decision to implement the Vietnamization program was made prior to the first meeting of the NSC. At the direction of President-elect Nixon, Kissinger prepared and delivered a memorandum to NSC members that consisted of four Vietnam policy alternatives to be reviewed and discussed at the first NSC meeting on January 25.

According to Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger's pre-inauguration memorandum was a charade because "the NSC was not called into session to debate and help decide a broad range of policy choices; it was there basically to confirm the President's earlier decision to withdrawal from South Vietnam," a decision that was made prior to the inauguration.88

Furthermore, Jeffrey Kimball determines that Vietnamization, as one component of a comprehensive Vietnam solution that included the threat of escalation, opening a secret, back channel contact with the Soviets, establishing the U.S. negotiating position, and attempting approaches to China, was outlined by Nixon as early as August 1968 and honed into a concise plan, so that by Inauguration Day 1969, only the details of implementation were still to be determined. 89 While noting the importance of a March

13, 1969 meeting in which Laird briefed Nixon on his recent trip to South Vietnam,

Kimball argues that Nixon did not immediately approve Laird's recommended withdrawals of 50,000 to 70,000 troops. According to Kimball, it is unclear whether this meant Nixon was uncertain about the matter or simply biding his time before ordering its execution. Although not specifying an exact time or date for Nixon's decision to

87 Evans, Rowland, Jr., and Robert D. Novak. Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power. New York, Vintage Books, 1972. 80.

88 Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 129, 135.

89 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 98, 137-8. 28 implement Vietnamization, Kimball argues that two weeks after receiving Laird's report,

Nixon discussed Vietnamization at an NSC meeting on March 28, 1969 in which the policy seemed a foregone conclusion. 90

Jeffrey Clarke also notes the meeting between Nixon and Laird on March 13 and contends that the Defense Secretary, determined to effect a major change in American policy toward the war, pursued Vietnamization vigorously, and in post-March 13 discussions with Nixon, Kissinger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally persuaded the

President to embark on the policy. 91 Like Clarke, Larry Berman, while noting the importance of Laird's March 13 meeting with Nixon, particularly Termination-Day planning,92 does not determine the time and date of Nixon's final decision to pursue

Vietnamization. On the other hand, Berman notes, "The United States would start winding down its role, seeking terms for a negotiated settlement premised in the idea of mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam ... " and "When peace came, both the United States and North Vietnam would have withdrawn their troops from the South."93

In addition, William Bundy and Jussi Hanhimaki contend that at a meeting of the

NSC on March 15, 1969, Nixon decided in principle to pursue

Vietnamization.94Furthermore, James Willbanks argues that the possibility of

9°Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 138-9.

91 Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years. 1965-1973, 348.

92 Termination-Day (T-Day) was a detailed program for withdrawal of U.S. troops and the transfer of equipment to the South Vietnamese.

93 Berman, No Peace. No Honor: Nixon. Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, 49. 29 implementing Vietnamization was still being debated at a meeting of the NSC on March

28, 1969.95

In the secondary literature on Vietnamization, the majority of studies focus on the effects of the policy after implementation. Within these scholarly works, historians are largely divided over the outcomes of the policy. For example, James Willbanks argues that as Nixon prepared for his reelection campaign, "the key issue of which proved to be the continuing war."96 Robert Dallek argues that Nixon viewed Vietnam as a critical component in securing reelection in 1972. According to Dallek, "it was increasingly clear to Nixon and Kissinger that the president's reelection depended on withdrawing from Vietnam. "97

To achieve this outcome, Nixon, according to Dallek, faced a number of significant challenges. For example, after one year in office, "nonexistent foreign policy gains in the year principally devoted to foreign affairs seemed like a prescription for domestic political disaster, especially when overseas initiatives were expected to be his strongest talking point in a 1972 reelection campaign."98 Dallek adds that by the time of the 1970 off-year elections, the wildcard for Nixon remained Vietnam. He states that

94 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 63; Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, 42.

95 Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam, 15.

96 Ibid., 163.

97 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 183.

98 Ibid., 179-80. 30

"unless Nixon could convince voters that he was ending U.S. involvement in the war, as he repeatedly promised, his reelection in 1972 would remain in substantial doubt."99

Additionally, Dallek maintains that by 1972 Nixon considered the war through the lens ofreelection. According to Dallek, the real issue was Nixon's reelection, not world peace; they could not let South Vietnam "unravel before November" because it would undermine Nixon's election bid. Foreign policy actions were closely linked to election- year politics; and Nixon and Kissinger even delayed the final peace agreement because it could be viewed as a ploy, which could potentially create domestic political backlash. 100

Ultimately, Dallek argues that Nixon's victory in 1972 was largely the consequence of the voters' inclination to back an incumbent against someone who seemed too "liberal" on domestic policy and too soft on foreign affairs. Also important, according to Dallek, was the fact that Nixon had all but ended the war and a settlement seemed within reach. Dallek concludes, "To a majority of voters, he had earned another four years." 101 With such results, Joseph Fry labeled Vietnamization a "brilliant domestic political strategy. " 102

Similar to Dallek, Larry Berman notes that although there were many reasons for

Nixon's lopsided electoral victory, Vietnam was important because, even if peace was

99 Ibid., 244.

100 Ibid., 355-356, 372, 425; Like Dallek, Jeffrey Clarke also argues that even the cease-fire agreement reached at the end of 1972 was a political decision made by America's political leaders over the objections of their military subordinates, who, nonetheless, expected it at the same time (Clarke, Advice and Support, 499).

101 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 433.

102 Fry, Joseph A. Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis. and their Senate Hearings. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 153. 31 not yet at hand, American involvement in the war certainly seemed to be winding down at last. 103 Moving beyond Dallek, Berman argues that halfway through his first term,

Nixon "had come to rely on Vietnamization as the means to achieve his goal of an

American withdrawal from Vietnam," and "was feeling the pressure to accelerate troop withdrawal from Vietnam, because he was getting desperate for a solution."104 In fact,

Jeffrey Clarke adds to Berman by suggesting that "although in theory the subsequent withdrawal of American troops depended on improvements in South Vietnamese military capabilities and the level of combat activity, the timing and size of the withdrawals were highly political decisions made in the United States."105 According to Clarke, this clearly demonstrated that the Washington civilian leadership had taken control of the Vietnam issue. 106

In forecasting the 1972 election, Berman argues that by May 15, 1972, when

George Wallace was shot at a Maryland election rally, Nixon was no longer concerned with electoral constraint. 107 Contrary to Berman, William Bundy contends that after the conclusion of the Republican convention and the beginning of September 1972, "Nixon can never have had a serious worry about winning the election."108 Bundy further maintains that Nixon felt a constant need to satisfy Americans that he was working hard

103 Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 180.

104 Ibid., 80· I.

105 Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973, 341.

106 Ibid., 357.

107 Berman, No Peace. No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, 134.

108 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 333. 32 for peace, so that he would have support if stronger measures became necessary. 109

Furthermore, according to Melvin Small, Nixon believed that in an important election year, he enjoyed the support of most Americans for his Vietnam initiatives, and, as long as he made progress toward bringing home the last American boys from combat, he could expect reelection. 110

Beyond the domestic political implications of the policy, other leading historians challenge Nixon's decision to pursue Vietnamization. Leading Nixon scholar Stephen

Ambrose, for example, contends that the "phased, slow-motion retreat was the worst mistake of [Nixon's] Presidency. Because the war went on, tension and division filled the land, and the Nixon haters went into a frenzy." 111 Ultimately, according to Ambrose,

"it was the continuation of the Vietnam War that prepared the ground and provided the nourishment for the Watergate seed, which without the Vietnam War would never have sprouted."112

Preeminent Vietnam War scholar Stanley Kamow challenges Vietnamization by asking, "Why should the Communists conciliate ifthe U.S. forces were being withdrawn?" 113 Kamow contends that the Communists had time on their side, so they had only to "wait until the Americans departed, then overwhelm the South

109 Ibid., 309.

110 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 225.

111 Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 278.

112 Ibid., 278.

113 Kamow, Vietnam, 593. 33

Vietnamese." 114 Despite Nixon's contention in a televised speech on April 7, 1971 that

"Vietnamization has succeeded," Kamow argues that the flawed strategy of

Vietnamization served to "cloud the period ahead with grave uncertainties."115

Moreover, other scholars interpret the policy of Vietnamization as a "half-way house between the narcotic of full military commitment and the trauma of total withdrawal, 116 and "a 'cut and run' strategy ... dictated ... by the collapse of will to support the war among the decision making elite of the United States."117

Another important historiographical argument centers on whether the Nixon administration pursued Vietnamization as part of a "decent interval" exit strategy designed to delay South Vietnam's collapse for a long enough period after Nixon withdrew so that he could escape blame for its defeat. Both Nixon and Kissinger denied implementing this alternative, but it was considered amongst a number of options. 118

William Berman, in No Peace, No Honor, denies that Nixon and Kissinger deliberately pursued a decent-interval solution, even though a decent interval came about. However,

Jeffrey Kimball, in a 2001 article, "The Case of the 'Decent Interval: Do We Now Have a

Smoking Gun?," argues that "since 1998, audio tapes of Oval Office conversations for the year 1971 have been released, additional NSC documents have been declassified, and

114 Ibid., 593.

115 Ibid., 630, 643.

116 Palmer, Dave Richard. Summons ofthe Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective. Novato.: Presidio Press, 1978. 278.

117 Record, The Wrong War, 56.

118 Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park. 34 virtually the full record of negotiations has been made available." This new material, he argues, "supports the thesis that Nixon and Kissinger adopted a decent-interval solution to their Vietnam problem in the fall of 1970,"119 but also indicates, according to Kimball,

"that the President's nascent strategy for Vietnam did not yet embrace this solution."120

Overall, despite many differences in interpretation of the mainsprings, timing, and outcomes of the Vietnamization policy, as well as the viewpoints of decision makers concerning the options and alternatives defining the policy's development, historians have provided great insight and generated much debate about how and why

Vietnamization was implemented.

A Review of the Political Science Literature

The political science scholarship on presidential decision making is broad in scope, deep in quality, and varied in texture. Within this literature, there are four particular models that serve as the backbone for this study: governmental politics, presidential management, institutional, and electoral forecasting. These models serve as a departure point from which this study builds. The first model, bureaucratic politics, developed in 1960 when Richard Neustadt produced Presidential Power, the seminal analysis of leadership in the modem American presidency. In examining the U.S. presidential decision-making process, Neustadt's book was one of the earliest works of significance to describe the governmental process as one of inherent bargaining.

Deriving influence from three related sources - the bargaining advantages inherent in the

119 http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/2001 /sep/interval.htm.

12°Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 90. 35 position, professional reputation, and public prestige - the power of the American

President, according to Neustadt, is rather weak. Accordingly, Neustadt concludes, power does not automatically exude from a President; he must work to promote his influence. 121

Building upon Neustadt, scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington, Warner

Schilling, and Roger Hilsman began describing the bargaining nature of the governmental decision-making process with a particular concern for the intricacies of foreign policy decision-making. Although these studies were important to the development of the bargaining nature of governmental policy, it was not until the publication of Graham T.

Allison's 1971 book Essence of Decision that this theory was translated into a decision- making model. 122

With the introduction of the governmental politics model, Essence of Decision changed the way scholarship analyzed bureaucracy's role in creating foreign policy.

Building upon the central tenets "implicit in Neustadt's work," 123 Allison argues that

"power is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two

121 Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: Free Press, 1960. 30.

122 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971; Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John E Kennedy. New York: Doubleday, 1967; Huntington, Samuel P. The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961; Neustadt, Presidential Power; Schilling, R. Warner. "The H-Bomb Decision: How to Decide without Actually Choosing," Political Science Ouarterly76.1(March1961).

123 Allison, Essence of Decision, 162; Allison utilized the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case study for future studies into governmental decisionmaking. Allison constructed three models through which analysts can examine events: "Rational Actor" (Model I), "Organizational Behavior" (Model II), and "Governmental Politics" (Model III). 36 ingredients." 124 According to the thesis of Allison's Model III, "the name of the game is politics;" players "make governmental decisions not by a single rational choice or maker of foreign policy but by the pulling and hauling that is politics."125

Allison's Model III thesis was further complemented by the work of Morton

Halperin, author of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy and "The Decision to

Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," who, after collaborating with Allison, formalized the bureaucratic politics paradigm.

The bureaucratic politics model is governed by three principles. Firstly, diversity and conflict permeate the policy process. According to Allison, policies are "resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to the problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government."126

Secondly, there is no single maker of foreign policy. According to Allison and

Halperin, "The maker of government policy is not a single calculating decision maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their

124 Ibid., 168.

125 Allison, Graham T., and Morton H. Halperin. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications." World Politics 24( Spring 1972): 43; Allison, Essence of Decision, 144.

126 Ibid., 162. 37 government."127 This implies that the president is only one of many chiefs, far from the most powerful, yet, in certain situations, can be the most powerful. For example, as

Morton Halperin explains in his 1972 article, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM:

Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," the decision of the

Lyndon Johnson administration to deploy an ABM system, the way in which it was announced, and the preparations for deployment that followed "illustrate the pulling and hauling of many different players with different interests that is characteristic of the foreign policy process in the United States."128 According to Halperin, "No single player's views, including those of the President, of what should be done, dominated, although the President's views played a major role in shaping the general direction in which American actions moved."129 Ultimately, as Halperin notes, although the final decision on the ABM prevented an end run around the President, "the President is qualitatively different - not simply a very powerful player among less powerful players."130

Lastly, a gap most often exists between the formulated decision and its implementation. According to Halperin, because of the lack of central direction and control, considerable slippage can occur between the formulation and the implementation of a decision: "what is done will be heavily influenced by the standard operating

127 Allison and Halperin, 1972, 42.

128 Halperin, Morton H. "The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration." World Politics 25. 1( October 1972): 62-95.

129 Ibid., 62-95.

130 Ibid., 62-95. 38 procedures and interests of the implementers." 131 Moreover, Allison and Halperin maintain that deviation occurs because "decisions are rarely tailored to facilitate monitoring. As a result, senior players have great difficulty in checking on the faithful implementation of a decision."132

Scholars continued to use the bureaucratic paradigm of Allison and Halperin well into the 1980s, when their framework was being hailed as "one of the most widely disseminated concepts in all of social science." 133 Despite the initial success of the governmental politics model, the concept did have its critics. For example, some scholars argue that the perspective underestimates the extent to which the president can dominate the bureaucracy by selecting key players and setting the rules of the game. 134 In particular, Barton Bernstein argues that when analyzing U.S. foreign policy decision making in crisis, one cannot concentrate on process at the expense of the president.

Instead, one must incorporate biography, particularly a president's personal development and past, which provides a "strong bearing on how he judges issues, defines crises, interprets dangers, perceives challenges, and chooses policy."135

The models have also been challenged for being too reliant on personal interviews rather than primary documents. As Gary Clifford argues, scholarly interpretations can be

131 Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974. 313.

132 Allison and Halperin, 1972, 53.

133 Clifford, Gary. "Bureaucratic Politics." The Journal of American History77. 1( June 1990): 162.

134 Clifford, Gary, 1990, 163; Bernstein, Barton. "Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay." International Security 25.1 (Summer 2000): 142.

135 Bernstein, Barton, 2000, 163. 39

"skewed by a research method that permits participants to put excessive spin on the past." 136 Moreover, according to Barton Bernstein, "Implicitly, but not explicitly, it

[Essence] was an oblique assault upon historians' practices with their emphasis on archives and their faith in their capacity to wring evidence and interpretation from dusty papers."137 Rather, Bernstein contends that Essence was less new than Allison argues because historians had been emphasizing bureaucratic differences in explaining policy for years.

Others have also criticized Allison's contention that "where you stand depends on where you sit," because some key participants do not 'sit' anywhere."138 This sentence, which has attracted more scholarly attention than any other in this important work, emphasizes that the viewpoints of high-level advisors are largely tied to the interests of their bureaucracies. More specifically, a Secretary of State is likely to stress diplomacy when proffering his advice in presidential decision making, whereas a Secretary of

Defense is more inclined to advance military considerations.

Other scholars have suggested that one must question Model Ill's contention that policy making necessarily involves bargaining among decision makers in the executive

136 Clifford, Gary, 1990, 164; Bernstein, Barton, 2000, 142.

137 Bernstein, Barton, 2000, 143.

138 Allison, Essence of Decision, 176; Art, Robert J. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973): 472-3; Ball, Desmond J. "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory." Australian Outlook 28 (April 1974): 77; Caldwell, Dan. "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making."' American Behavioral Scientist 21 (September./October 1977): 99; Krasner, Stephen D. "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)?" Foreign Policy. 7 (Summer 1972): 165; Nathan, James H., and James K. Oliver. "Bureaucratic Politics: Academic Windfalls and Intellectual Pitfalls." Journal of Political and Military Sociology 6 (Spring 1978): 81-91. 40 branch. 139 Barton Bernstein, for example, argues that "To focus unduly on others, to make too much of advisors, to see bureaucratic politics as the essential key to understanding presidential decision making on central matters, especially in crises, is a fundamental mistake in the development of theory and certainly in understanding U.S. foreign policy." 140 Jonathan Bender and Thomas Hammond maintain that the model is

"simply too complex with so many different assumptions, variables, and relationships that it is almost impossible to determine the role and impact of any one of them" and must be simplified considerably. 141

The second model, presidential management, largely emerged as a response to the governmental politics school of analysis, particularly on the issue of presidential strength.

For example, in contrast to the governmental politics model, which focuses on the president's weakness, the presidential management model focuses on the president's strength. Also, whereas the governmental politics model emphasizes the consistent bureaucratic and organizational pressures that presidents face, the presidential management model assumes that presidents rise above these pressures to determine and control the decision-making process.

Within the presidential management paradigm, scholars have suggested numerous ways to describe the various methods by which presidents structure their decisions.

Richard Tanner Johnson's 1974 book, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of

139 Bender, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. "Rethinking Allison's Models." The American Political Science Review 86 (June 1992): 313.

140 Bernstein, Barton. "Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay." International Security 25.l (Summer 2000): 134-164.

141 Ibid., 313. 41 the Presidency, builds upon Neustadt's insights by examining presidential advisory systems and placing them into a classification scheme. Johnson, in his examination of the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, identifies three types of advisory systems: formalistic, competitive, and collegial. His work is the most widely cited by scholars within the presidential management paradigm.

The formalistic model is characterized by an orderly policy-making structure that provides hierarchical lines of communication, well-defined procedures, and a structured staff system that conserves the decision maker's time and attention for the big decisions.

The formalistic model, while seeking to benefit from the diverse views and judgments of participants in policy-making, also discourages open conflict and bargaining among them. 142 In addition, the model has the tendency to wash out or distort political pressures and public sentiments during the screening process, and generally responds slowly or inappropriately in crisis. 143

The competitive model places a premium on encouraging a more open and uninhibited expression of diverse opinions, analysis, and advice. This model places the decision maker in the mainstream of the information network, tends to generate solutions that are politically feasible and bureaucratically doable, and generates creative ideas, particularly as a result of the "stimulus" of competition but also because this unstructured

142 George, Alexander L. Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 148.

143 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, 165; Johnson, Richard Tanner. Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. 238. 42 kind of information network is more open to ideas from the outside. 144 On the other hand, the competitive model can place a large demand on a decision maker's time and attention and exposes the decision maker to partial or biased information. In addition, the decision-making process may sacrifice optimality for doability; create wear and tear on aides, which may foster attrition and high turnover; and have the tendency to aggravate staff competition, with the risk that aides may pursue their own interests at the expense of the decision maker. 145

Under the collegial system, the president "attempts to create a team of staff members and advisers who will work together to identify, analyze, and solve policy problems in ways that will incorporate and synthesize as much as possible divergent points ofview."146 The model seeks to achieve both optimality and doability. The process involves the president in the debate but somewhat eases the demands upon him by stressing teamwork over competition. On the other hand, the model can place substantial demands on the decision maker's time and attention; it requires unusual interpersonal skill in dealing with subordinates, mediating differences, and maintaining teamwork among colleagues; and it involves a risk that teamwork will degenerate into a closed system of mutual support. 147

144 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, 165; Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency, 238.

145 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, 165; Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency, 238.

146 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, 149.

147 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, 165; Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency, 238. 43

During the modem presidency, the formalistic, competitive, and collegial models have dominated the organizational structure of the White House. Under this classification, Johnson argues that the Franklin D. Roosevelt White House illustrates a competitive system; the Kennedy administration, a collegial system; and the Truman,

Eisenhower, and Nixon administrations, a formalistic model. In particular, Johnson argues that Nixon's system emphasized order, sought the best options by analyzing them into pros and cons, centered the debate upon written memorandums rather than face-to face interaction, discouraged staff conflict, especially in working out compromise settlements among conflicting views, and, ultimately, rested with the President basing his decision on the merits. 148

The distinctions that inform Johnson's classification are central to Alexander

George's analysis of organizational structure in White House decision making. Like

Johnson, George, in his 1980 work, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The

Effective Use of Information and Advice, contends that of the three advisory systems, the

Nixon administration utilized the formalistic model. Moving beyond Johnson, George develops the term "multiple advocacy," which combines both the formalistic and collegial systems in an attempt to expose the president to a wide range of information and options. In contrast to Neustadt and Johnson, who argue that the informal advisory systems enhance the quality of information and advice a president receives, George argues that informal systems produce distortions by making advice a function of the bureaucratic skills of a presidential advisor. Instead, George contends that advisory

148 Johnson, Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of the Presidency, 4. 44 procedures that are explicitly structured to institutionalize debate and encourage the systematic presentation of alternative views are more likely to produce desirable policy.

With respect to the Nixon administration, George maintains that a formal options system was linked with a White House-centered organizational model of foreign policy decision making. According to George, the formal options system was designed not only to ensure that Nixon would retain and exercise the power of final decision, but also, as he put it, "to make certain that clear policy choices" reached the top. Moreover, Nixon was determined not to be "confronted with the bureaucratic consensus that leaves me with no options but acceptance or rejection, and that gives me no way of knowing what alternatives exist."149

Much like George, David Mitchell, in his 2005 work, Making Foreign Policy:

Presidential Management of the Decision-Making Process, maintains that Nixon used a formal options system for foreign policy decision making and that his willingness to assert his preferences influenced the kind of options that his advisers, notably Kissinger and Alexander Haig, pursued. 150 According to Mitchell, in the case of Vietnam, the task of formulating policy was mostly carried out within the National Security Council or with the assistance of individuals such as South Vietnamese Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,

General Creighton Abrams, and Colonel Alexander Haig. 151

149 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy, 177; Nixon, Richard M. U.S. Foreign Policy for the l 970's: A New Strategy for Peace. A Report to Congress, February 18, 1970. Washington, D.C., 72.

150 Mitchell, David. Making Foreign Policy: Presidential Management of the Decision-Making Process. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005. 76.

151 Ibid., 78. 45

The third model, institutional, primarily attempts to bridge the gap between the literature on presidential advising and presidential leadership by suggesting new lines of inquiry into their dynamic interaction. Critical to this school is the 1989 work by John

Burke and Fred Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965, which examines the importance of advisory groups, presidential personality, and the political environment to decisions made by Eisenhower in 1954 and Johnson in

1964 and 1965 regarding Vietnam. They seek to explain why two presidents who were faced with very similar problems responded in very different ways. Their analysis indicates that the way presidents organize advisory groups may have an important impact on the process of decision making, and that the president's style and the political climate also affect the process of decision making. They compare presidents in order to assess the importance of personality on the management of decision making. Their study reveals that Eisenhower and Johnson had very different influences on the decision- making process by virtue of their different leadership styles.

Despite utilizing the advisory and management concepts of Johnson and George,

Burke and Greenstein argue that their formalistic, collegial, and competitive categories are too simplistic because they fail to account for the informal decision processes beneath the formal model. Moreover, they argue that the effort to classify advisory structures misses the complex mix of formal and informal procedures that presidents use and often fails to provide a basis for distinguishing among different advisory models. 152

152 Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein. How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989. 21. 46

Like Burke and Greenstein, Mena Bose, author of Shaping and Signaling

Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy, argues that informal decision processes thrive in the presidency, and thus hinder attempts to categorize presidents or policies into one or the other processes. Bose also contends that multiple decision structures exist within any given administration. 153

The fourth model, electoral forecasting, offers scholars an opportunity to test specific theories of electoral behavior. As Alan Abramowitz points out in his 1996 essay,

"Bill and Al's Excellent Adventure," "if we understand the forces that influence voters' decisions, and if we can measure these forces, then we should be able to predict election outcomes accurately." 154 Despite its long and colorful history, electoral forecasting has just recently begun to engage scholars. Louis Bean blazed the forecasting trail in the

1940s, but only since the late 1970s has a significant body of research on election forecasting accumulated. 155

The recent wave of forecasting models began with Lee Sigelman's 1979 article,

"Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections," which provides analysis of the connection between presidential approval ratings and subsequent election results. 156

Since that time a number of scholars have consistently updated their models for each

153 Bose, Meena. Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998. 99-101.

154 Abramowitz, Alan. "Bill and Al's Excellent Adventure: Forecasting the 1996 Presidential Election." American Politics Quarterly 24 (1996): 434-5.

155 Campbell, James E., and James C. Garand, eds. Before the Vote: Forecasting American National Elections. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000. 5.

156 Sigelman, Lee. "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Elections." Public Opinion Quarterly 43 (1979): 532-34. 47 presidential election. For example, in over 20 years of forecasting by Michael Lewis-

Beck and Tom Rice, two variables have been at the core of all their models: presidential popularity and economic growth. 157 Their initial 1984 model was an adaptation of

Edward Tufte's approval rating and economic performance model that forecasted both congressional and presidential elections. 158 With that same lineage, Lewis-Beck and Rice developed a four-variable model that included real economic growth, presidential approval ratings, the outcome of the prior congressional election, and the incumbent' s performance in primary elections. This model correctly predicted all but one of the elections from 1948 to 1988, but in its first and only predictive test, the model forecasted a resounding Bush victory in 1992 with 56 percent of the two-party vote. 159 After their model's forecast error in the 2000 election, Lewis-Beck and Rice added incumbency and jobs-created variables. New adjustments were made to their model heading into the 2004 contest, but Lewis-Beck and Rice wrongly predicted a razor thin loss for Bush. 160 In

2008, they correctly predicted a Democratic victory. 161

Alan Abramowitz amended the Lewis-Beck and Rice approval and economy model by adding three variable criteria that included presidential approval ratings, real

157 Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom W. Rice. "Presidential Popularity and Presidential Vote." Public Opinion Quarterly 46 (1982):534-37; Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Tom W. Rice. "Forecasting Presidential Elections: A Comparison of Naive Models." Political Behavior 6 (1984): 9-21.

158 Tufte, Edward R. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

159 Lewis-Beck, Michael S. Forecasting Elections. CQ Press, 1992.

160 Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Charles Tien. "Jobs and the Job of President: A Forecast for 2004." PS: Political Science & Politics 34 (2004): 753-8.

161 Campbell, James E., and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. "US Presidential Election Forecasting: An Introduction." International Journal of Forecasting 24 (2008): 192. 48 economic growth, and incumbency. 162 Using those guidelines, the Abramowitz model missed four of the eleven elections from 1948 to 1988. This model's limited success rate prompted Abramowitz to create the time-for-change model, which uses three variables: the incumbent president's approval rating in the final Gallup Poll in June, the change in real gross domestic product during the first two quarters of the election year, and a time- for-change variable, which is based on whether the president's party has controlled the

White House for only one or more than one term. The time-for-change model has correctly predicted the winner of the popular vote in every presidential election since

1988. In 2000, the time-for-change model predicted that Al Gore would receive 53% of the major party vote, which was closer to Gore's actual vote share (50.2%) than the majority of 2000 election forecasts, many of which predicted that Gore would win in a landslide. With such results, Abramowitz made little change to his model for the 2004 election, in which he predicted a Bush victory. 163 Likewise in 2008, Abramowitz predicted a Democratic nominee would win the national popular vote by a comfortable margin based on President Bush's approval rating in June of 2007, the recent growth rate of the economy, and the fact that the Republican Party would control the White House for eight years. 164

162 Abramowitz, Alan. "An Improved Model for Prediction Presidential Election Outcomes." PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (1988): 843-7; Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Tom W. Rice. "Forecasting Presidential Elections: A Comparison of Naive Models." Political Behavior 6 (1984): 9-21.

163 Abramowitz, Alan, 1996, 434-42; Abramowitz, Alan. "The Time for Change Model and the 2000 Election." American Politics Quarterly 29 (2001): 279-82; Abramowitz, Alan. "When Good Forecasts Go Bad: The Time-for-Change Model and the 2004 Presidential Election." PS: Political Science and Politics 34 (2004): 745-6. 49

In his adaptation of the Abramowitz model, Thomas Holbrook employed a measure of presidential popularity, an aggregate measure of satisfaction with personal finances, and a time-for-a-change variable ifthe incumbent party held the White House for at least two consecutive terms. 165 Similarly, Brad Lockerbie devised a three-variable model using both objective and poll-based indicators of the economy and a time-for- change variable.

Like Abramowitz, James Campbell and Ken Wink, following the lead of Lewis-

Beck and Tom Rice, built a model around a trial-heat poll question (if the election were held today) and economic conditions. 166 In 1992, Campbell, building on Rosenstone's state-level model, constructed a model to predict the presidential vote in the individual states based on trial-heat polls, economic indicators, and a number of state-level variables. 167 Four years later, Campbell evolved his model to include just two variables, which produced a forecast of the national two-party popular vote for president two months before the election. The model's principal predictor variable is the aggregate response to a poll question (if the election were held today) asked in early September, and

164 Abramowitz, Alan. "It's About Time: Forecasting the 2008 Presidential Election with the Time for-Change Model." International Journal ofForecasting 24 (2008): 209-17.

165 Holbrook, Thomas. "Reading the Political Tea Leaves: A Forecasting Model of Contemporary Presidential Elections." American Politics Quarterly 24 {1996): 506-19; Holbrook, Thomas. Do Campaigns Matter? Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996.

166 Campbell, James E., and Kenneth A.Wink. "Trial-Heat Forecasts of the Presidential Vote." American Politics Quarterly 18 {1990): 251-69; Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Tom W. Rice. "Forecasting Presidential Elections: A Comparison of Naive Models." Political Behavior 6 {1984): 9-21.

167 Rosenstone, Steven J. Forecasting Presidential Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983. 50 the second predictor is the state of the economy just prior to the general election campaign, the second quarter rate of growth in the GDP .168

Another pair of scholars, Christopher Wlezien and Robert Erikson, contributed to our understanding of electoral forecasting by developing a two-variable model based on presidential approval ratings and a culminative index of leading economic indicators, including measures of per-capita disposable income growth during the current presidential term. The latter variable, according to Wlezien and Erikson, was a critical predictor because the "leading indicators provide an advance reading of the economy between the time of the forecast and Election Day."169 Under the criteria for this model, the results for the out-of-sample forecasts predicted 11 of 13 election winners. In their

2004 model, Wlezien and Erikson analyzed a combination of economic conditions, leading indicators, presidential approval, and the latest polls; the results suggested a close race, but one in which Bush would prevail. 170 In 2008, Wlezien and Erikson maintained that the weighted accumulation of leading economic indicators from quarter one through quarter thirteen of the presidential election cycle, as well as contemporary presidential approval or the trial-heat polls, provide an effective electoral predictor. 171

168 Campbell, James E. "Polls and Votes: The Trial Heat Presidential Election Fore-casting Model, Uncertainty, and Political Campaigns." American Politics Quarterly 24 (1996): 408-33.

169 Wlezien, Christopher, and Robert S. Erikson. "Temporal Horizons and Presidential Election Forecasts." American Politics Quarterly 24 (1996): 49-50; Wlezien, Christopher and Robert S. Erikson. "The Fundamentals, the Polls, and the Presidential Vote." PS: Political Science &Politics 34 (2004): 747-8.

170 Wlezien, Christopher, and Robert S. Erikson. "The Fundamentals, the Polls, and the Presidential Vote." PS: Political Science &Politics 34 (2004): 747-8.

171 Erikson, Robert S., and Christopher Wlezien. "The Economy and the Presidential Vote: What Leading Indicators Reveal Well in Advance." International Journal of Forecasting 24 (2008): 218-26. 51

Another scholar, Helmut Norpoth, constructed a five-variable model that included the votes in the prior two presidential elections, the candidate's primary strength, and two indicators of economic conditions. 172 Norpoth's model is significant because it covers a longer span than those of his political science counterparts. His updated 2004 model, which covers twenty-three elections from 1912 to the present, correctly predicts the results of every presidential election except the one in 1960. Also significant in his new model is the utilization of candidate vote shares in primaries, and not just the win-lose dichotomy and long-term partisanship variables established in his 2001 model. 173

Outside the traditional political science scholarship, Yale economist Ray Fair developed in the mid-1970s a national time-series model that, contrary to traditional models, did not include any measure of public opinion. 174 As a result, and much like

Helmut Norpoth's temporal scale, his model covers eight more elections than political science models (covering elections since 1916). Central to Fair's model is a two-variable set: economic conditions and incumbency. His model has been used to predict elections from 1976 to 1992, with a record of only two correct. In 1976 and 1992 he wrongly predicted that Gerald Ford and George Bush would receive 56 percent of the two-party

172 Campbell and Garand, 2000, 7; Norpoth, Helmut. "Is Clinton Doomed? An Early Forecast for 1996." PS: Political Science & Politics 28 (1995): 201-7.

173 Norpoth, Helmut. "Primary Colors: A Mixed Blessing for Al Gore." PS: Political Science & Politics 34 (2001): 45-8; Norpoth, Helmut. "On a Short Leash: Term Limits and Economic Voting." The Context of Economic Voting. Eds. Han Dorussen and Michael Taylor. London: Routledge, 2002. 121-36; Norpoth, Helmut. "From Primary to General Election: A Forecast of the Presidential Vote." PS: Political Science & Politics 34 (2004): 737-40.

174 Fair, Ray C. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President." Review of Economics and Statistics 60 (1978): 159-73; Fair, Ray C. (1982). "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1980 Results." Review of Economics and Statistics; Fair, Ray C. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1984 Update." Political Behavior 10 (1988): 168-79. 52 vote. Fair's model has been criticized by political scientists for attempting to predict election results without a reading of public opinion.

Also outside the traditional political science scholarship, historian Allan J.

Lichtman, author of The Keys to the White House, offers an incumbent performance- based model that is determined by thirteen keys (Incumbent-party Mandate, Nomination

Contest, Incumbency, Third Party, Short-term Economy, Long-term Economy, Policy

Change, Social Unrest, Scandal, Foreign or Military Failure, Foreign or Military Success,

Incumbent Charisma, Challenger Charisma) that gauge the political strength and performance of the executive party as a presidential term progresses. The keys system has accurately accounted for the popular vote outcome of every presidential election from

1860 to 1980 on the basis of historical conditions alone, without the use of candidate- preference polls or reference to the strategy, tactics, and events of campaigns. 175 The model has correctly forecasted the popular vote outcomes of all seven elections from

1984 to 2008. Although it is the bellwether in electoral forecasting in the field of history,

Lichtman's model has drawn criticism from political scientists who find his keys overly subjective. These same political scientists also argue that the keys oversimplify elections because combined they predict simply a winner or loser, rather than the candidate's portion. o f th e two-party vote. 1~6'

J. Scott Armstrong and Alfred Cuzan, in the February 2006 edition of Foresight

Magazine, argue that Lichtman's model is significant because it stands up to the

175 Lichtman, Allan. The Keys to the White House, 1996: A Surefire Guide to Predicting the Next President. New York: Madison, 1996. vii.

176 Campbell and Garand, 2000, 6. 53 regression models of political scientists by correlating the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote and the number of keys won. They find that the incumbent begins with

37.3 percent of the two-party vote, which increases 1.8 percentage points for each key won. 177

In June 2008, Lichtman altered Armstrong and Cuzan's regression analysis by arguing that the percentage of the two-party split going to the incumbent was 36.75 percent, increasing 1.84 percent for each number of keys favoring the incumbent party.

Over the course of 3 7 presidential elections, Lichtman' s theory establishes a mean error margin of 3.65 percent. This formula predicted that John McCain would receive 45.95 percent of the two-party popular vote in 2008, which came within 0.36 percent of the actual result. 178

In addition to the bureaucratic politics, presidential management, institutional structure, and electoral forecasting models, a number of works serve to enrich the literature on the presidential foreign policy decision-making process. Irving Janis, for example, in his 1982 study, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and

Fiascoes, explains performance failures, such as the American fiasco at the Bay of Pigs, by examining the internal dynamics or group processes that ultimately lead to group decisions. According to Janis, Groupthink is an "easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the

177 Armstrong, J. Scott, and Alfred G. Cuzan. "Index Methods for Forecasting: An Application to the American Presidential Elections." Foresight 3 (2006): 10-13.

178 Lichtman, Allan J. "The Keys to the White House: An Index Forecast for 2008." International Journal of Forecasting 24 (2008): 301-9. 54 member's strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. " 179

Another study, Charles Walcott and Karen Hult's 1995 work, Governing the

White House: From Hoover Through LBJ, argues that there are three different sources of decision-making structure: environmental (influences, governmental actors home and abroad, and the public); presidential choice (the nature of the president's objectives and strategy for achieving them); and organizational (the sources and precedents for establishing the administration's structure). 180 Organizing the Presidency, a 2002 study by Stephen Hess and James Pfiffner, tracks the ways that modern U.S. presidents have structured White House operations. Besides describing the organizational styles of each administration, they discuss how presidents learn from the perceived organizational mistakes of their predecessors in an effort to fine-tune the structure of policy making.

Similar to Hess and Pfiffner, William Newmann, in Managing National Security

Policy: The President and the Process, tracks the development of policy-making structures over time within the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, and argues that although each president is unique, there are patterns of evolution across administrations. 181

179 Janis, Irving Lester. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 9.

180 Walcott, Charles Eliot, and Karen Marie Hult. Governing the White House: From Hoover through LBJ. Lawrence.: University Press of Kansas, 1995. 16-19.

181 Newmann, William W. Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process. Pittsburgh.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. 24-5. 55

Overall, despite the lack of coverage on Vietnamization decision making, the political science literature serves to enhance our understanding through models that provide greater insight into how and why the Vietnamization decision was made.

Challenging the Historiography

The historiography on Vietnamization lacks consensus, has significant historical gaps despite the vast and abundant literature.on the Vietnam War, and has yet to produce a focused analysis of the Nixon administration's decision-making process leading to the implementation of the Vietnamization policy. By both reinforcing and challenging historical interpretations of the principles behind the policy, the role of each decision maker, the timing of the decision, the process that led to Vietnamization's implementation, and the impact of the policy on Nixon's 1972 reelection, this dissertation will examine more deeply than before the decision- and policy-making processes that led to the implementation of Vietnamization in Richard Nixon's first term and, in the process, fill a significant historiographical gap.

Within the historiography on Vietnamization, one finds many differences in interpretation of the mainsprings of the policy. Reinforcing important works, such as

Jeffrey Kimball's Nixon's Vietnam War, this dissertation will demonstrate that

Vietnamization was not an entirely new idea; the French had tried a similar version twenty-five years prior. Moreover, this study will demonstrate how the policy was developed over the course of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and, in particular, reinforce the works of Kimball, Willbanks, Buzzanca, and Clarke by demonstrating how, in October 1967, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reawakened the strategy as a step 56 towards disengagement and an alternative to escalation, and how a month later, on

November 21, 1967, U.S. General William Westmoreland, speaking at the National Press

Club, announced that if the revitalization of the South Vietnamese army proceeds as hoped, in two years "we will provide new military equipment to revitalize the

Vietnamese army and prepare it to take on an ever-increasing share of the war." 182

On the other hand, and contrary to the existing scholarship, this dissertation will demonstrate the differences between the plans Westmoreland initiated in 1967 and those ordered by Nixon in 1969. In particular, this study will establish that although some ingredients for de-Americanizing the war were in place, Nixon solidified these variables during his 1968 campaign into a strategy to phase out the presence of American troops and end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. As a result, this work will reinforce scholars such as Isaacson, Parmet, and Kimball by arguing that Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign for president foreshadowed Vietnamization.

Moreover, this study will move beyond the existing scholarship to demonstrate how Nixon utilized Vietnamization as a campaign response to domestic electoral imperatives to win election in 1968. It will highlight how Nixon positioned

Vietnamization as the centerpiece of his campaign platform for President, largely as a result of public opinion polling that indicated growing support for the idea. In addition, this dissertation, reinforcing Robert Dallek, but contrary to the works of Kimball and

Bundy, argues that although Nixon's actions to influence Thieu not to attend the election- eve peace talks were an important event of the 1968 U.S. presidential contest, they were

182 Farrar, Fred. "Westmoreland Sees Beginning of the End to the Vietnam Conflict." Chicago Tribune 22 November 1967: 5. 57 not, however, a critical determinant in securing the election. Rather, the incumbent party's failure either to secure a foreign or military success or to avoid a foreign or military failure during the previous presidential term was more important than any other leading policy issue.

Very few works have attempted to delve into the decision-making process that produced Vietnamization. This dissertation will attempt to fill this gap by both reinforcing and challenging the existing historiography over the viewpoints of decision makers and the process leading to Vietnamization. For example, although this study will reinforce the works of scholars such as Kimball and Dallek by demonstrating the restructuring of the National Security Council during the presidential transition, it will move beyond the existing scholarship, particularly that of Kimball and Berman, whose works lack depth on the impact of bureaucratic politics and Nixon's advisory system on the decision to implement the Vietnamization.

Moreover, this dissertation will demonstrate how Nixon's foreign policy structuring created an isolated, politically charged decision-making environment.

Exemplifying this result, this study, much like the work of Kimball, Dallek, and Small, examines Nixon's propensity to rely upon private opinion polling as a consideration in decision making. This work, much like Small's, also contends that public-opinion polls not only guided Nixon's decision but shaped the recommendations of others who understood the president's focus on domestic politics. 183 On the other hand, and contrary to the existing scholarship, this dissertation will demonstrate the extensive use and

183 Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, 167. 58 growth of Nixon's White House polling operation and its impact on Vietnamization decision making.

Additionally, this study will both reinforce and challenge historians on the viewpoints on Vietnamization of the bureaucracy at large, particularly senior administration players such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, National Security

Advisor Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, and President Richard

Nixon. Adding to the historiography, this work will demonstrate that there was very little consensus of thought amongst these players, yet alone the greater bureaucracy.

For example, reinforcing the work of scholars such as Dallek, Willbanks, Hersh, and Karnow, this dissertation will demonstrate the importance of Laird as an advocate of

Vietnamization and, to move beyond the existing literature, demonstrate that Nixon's decision to implement Vietnamization was politically motivated based largely on the advocacy of his Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Laird, after visiting South Vietnam in early March 1969, summarized his trip in memoranda form for the President. Laird's memorandum, which emphasized domestic considerations, served as the definitive factor in Nixon's decision to implement Vietnamization.

In addition, by emphasizing the critical impact of Laird's advocacy to the implementation ofVietnarnization, this work, in contrast to that of Melvin Small, who argues that Nixon's foreign policies were devised by Nixon, Kissinger, and one or two others, with Alexander Haig and Brent Scowcroft playing some part in the last two years of the Nixon's tenure," 184 will contend that Laird was more influential than Kissinger in

184 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 167-8. 59 determining the policy of Vietnamization. Moreover, because the secondary literature offers only scattered coverage of Nixon's perspective, this dissertation will go further than the existing scholarship to provide a more detailed analysis of the President's rationale for each option, most especially his advocacy of Vietnamization.

Essential to the historiographical review of Vietnamization are the options and alternatives Nixon considered in determining his administration's strategy for the war.

This dissertation will also address the important historiographical argument of whether

Nixon actually had a "secret plan" to end the war. Although leading scholars in the field such as Melvin Small, Jeffrey Clarke, and Robert Dallek largely denounce this premise, this study, in agreement with Jeffrey Kimball, will argue that Nixon's plan had been outlined at least as early as August 1968 and moving beyond Kimball, it will demonstrate

Nixon's penchant for the concept ofVietnamization during the mainsprings of his 1968 campaign.

Although many leading scholars argue, like Larry Berman, that "Vietnamization was Nixon's only option, given his domestic critics,"185 this dissertation, similar to

Kimball, contends that Nixon, after reviewing a full range of options and alternatives for the war, implemented Vietnamization, along with South Vietnamese pacification, diplomatic isolation of North Vietnam, and peace negotiations. Nixon's consolidated strategy aimed toward a successful conclusion to the war - not militarily, 186 but diplomatically and politically (through a negotiated peace settlement and at the ballot box

185 Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 52.

186 The preponderance of scholarship has demonstrated that victory in Vietnam could not be achieved militarily; it could only be prolonged. 60 in 1972). Ultimately, this dissertation will add to Kimball's work and other leading studies by presenting a more focused examination of the review of options and alternatives available and the viewpoints of senior players to detail the policy-making process that led to the Vietnamization decision.

This dissertation will challenge the existing historiography on the timing of the policy by demonstrating that Nixon decided to implement Vietnamization during an hour-long meeting with Laird on March 13, 1969, but, in keeping with his penchant for holding meetings when the outcome was determined in advance, announced his formal intention to pursue the policy two days later at a meeting of the NSC. 187 This assertion challenges the argument made by William Bundy and Jussi Hanhimaki that Nixon decided in principle to pursue Vietnamization at a meeting of the NSC on March 15,

1969; Marvin and Bernard Kalb's argument that the decision to implement

Vietnamization was made prior to the first meeting of the NSC on January 25, 1969; and

Jeffrey Kimball and Jeffrey Clarke's contention that the decision occurred during post

March 13, 1969 discussions, but, ultimately, before the meeting of the NSC on March 28,

1969, 188 the same meeting that James Willbanks argues led to the implementation of the policy.

With the secondary literature largely divided over the results of the policy, this dissertation will attempt to both reinforce and challenge the existing scholarship to determine the critical results of Vietnamization. For example, reinforcing Robert

187 Nixon met with Laird from 11:15 A.M. to 12:18 P.M. in the Oval Office.

188 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 138-9. 61

Dallek's view, this dissertation will establish that Nixon considered his Vietnam strategy a critical component in securing reelection in 1972.

Dallek argues that Nixon won largely as the result of the voters' inclination to back an incumbent against someone who seemed too "liberal" on domestic policy and too soft on foreign affairs, as well as the fact that he had all but ended the war. Larry Berman contends that although there were many reasons for Nixon's lopsided electoral victory,

Vietnam was important. 189 This work, though regression analysis, 190 will both reinforce and challenge Dallek and Berman by contending that Vietnamization was arguably as important as any other factor in securing Nixon a second term.

This dissertation will also demonstrate that as the public's hostility to the war grew throughout his first presidential term, Nixon's Vietnamization policy and subsequent troop withdrawals were increasingly driven by the demands of domestic politics, not the military ramifications of the withdrawal decision. In particular, this study, similar to Bruce Kuklick's 2007 work, Blind Oracles, will argue that Nixon, in attempting to avoid defeat, "aimed not to win the war, but to stay in power."191 This dissertation will demonstrate that although this may not have always been the case at the

189 Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years. 1965-1973, 357.

190 This dissertation utilizes linear regression to predict a value for Vietnamization given other electoral variables, such as party mandate, nomination contest, incumbency, third party, short- and long term economy, policy change, social change, foreign or military success or failure, and challenger or incumbent charisma (see Lichtman, Allan J. The Keys to the White House: A Surefire Guide to Predicting the Next President. Lanham,.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). This dissertation will also test whether and how Vietnamization is related to those variables.

191 Kuklick, Bruce. Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger. Princeton.: Princeton University Press, 2007. 17 8. 62 onset of the administration, as his first term progressed, Nixon became increasingly driven to action by his need to win a second term.

This study will also demonstrate that Nixon was aware that he would have to prove to the public that he could bring an end to the war to win reelection and that

Nixon's troop withdrawal announcements are congruent with times in which the

President was particularly constrained to influence public opinion. Accordingly, this study will move past the existing scholarship to establish that Vietnamization was implemented as a forward-looking political tool to augment public opinion, particularly regarding Nixon's overall handling of the war and job approval ratings, and to win reelection in 1972.

Berman argues that by May 15, 1972, when George Wallace was shot at a

Maryland election rally, Nixon was no longer concerned with electoral constraint. 192

William Bundy, on the other hand, contends that after the Republican convention and the beginning of September 1972, "Nixon can never have had a serious worry about winning the election."193 This dissertation asserts that Nixon's troop withdrawals over the course of the summer of 1972, as well as his caution in securing a peace agreement in Vietnam prior to the election because it might be viewed by the electorate as a "political ploy," demonstrate Nixon's concern with the outcome of the election largely into the last weeks and days of the campaign.

Another important historiographical argument centers on whether the Nixon administration pursued a "decent-interval" exit strategy designed to delay South

192 Bennan, No Peace. No Honor, 134.

193 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 333. 63

Vietnam's collapse for a long enough period after Nixon withdrew American troops so that he could escape blame for its defeat. Contrary to Jeffrey Kimball, who contends that

Nixon and Kissinger adopted a decent-interval solution to their Vietnam problem in the fall of 1970, this work, in agreement with Berman, contends that Nixon and Kissinger did not deliberately pursue a decent-interval solution, even though a decent interval came about. Moving beyond Berman, yet similar to Kimball, however, this study will also establish that in 1969 Nixon did not seek a decent interval; his primary concern was winning reelection in 1972, not delaying South Vietnam's collapse for a long enough period so that he could not be blamed for its defeat.

Ultimately, as this review of the literature demonstrates, historians find little consensus concerning the origins, timing, and result of Vietnamization, as well as the process of policy and decision development. This study, by both reinforcing and challenging this existing literature, will attempt to achieve greater consensus by augmenting the historiography of the Nixon administration, twentieth-century American foreign policy, American presidential elections, and the Vietnam War.

Challenging Political Science Theory

This dissertation, by incorporating an interdisciplinary scope, will also attempt to enhance the continuing social science research on presidential advisory systems and bureaucratic politics. Building on the works of political scientists, this dissertation determines the impact of both the advisory system and bureaucratic politics on the

Vietnamization decision. Within this literature, not one study examines the policy making process leading to the Vietnamization decision. Despite this lack of coverage, 64 four particular models serve as the backbone for this study: governmental politics, presidential management, institutional, and electoral forecasting.

This dissertation will both reinforce and challenge principles of the governmental politics model. For example, diversity and conflict permeate the policy process. In the policy-making process leading to the implementation of Vietnamization, three main outcomes directed the Nixon administration's thinking on Vietnam: military victory, unilateral withdrawal, and negotiated settlement. Within these outcomes were a wide range of alternatives and advocates. Henry Kissinger, for example, supported political accommodation; William Rogers, withdrawal and mutual de-escalation; General's Earle

Wheeler and Creighton Abrams, strong military posture; and Melvin Laird,

Vietnamization.

Despite the wide range of viewpoints within his inner circle, Nixon engaged only one formal meeting of the NSC before deciding to implement Vietnamization. The

January 25, 1969 meeting, held just five days into the administration, was an initial review of options. Nixon preferred smaller, more intimate meetings with only a handful of senior advisors. This allowed Nixon to avoid confrontations and disputes, which were natural offsprings of meetings of such a diverse group of advisers and opinions. This dissertation will demonstrate that Nixon tempered this bureaucratic principle by isolating himself from his discordant bureaucracy and constituency and minimizing the inherent

"bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government." 194

194 Allison, Essence of Decision, 162. 65

Secondly, there is no single maker of foreign policy. This bureaucratic principle implies that the president is only one of many chiefs, far from the most powerful, yet, in certain situations, can be the most powerful. Contrary to Richard Neustadt, who argued that policy-making power does not automatically exude from a President, and Allison and

Halperin, of the bureaucratic politics school, who contend that "The maker of government policy is not a single calculating decision maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors,"195 this dissertation will illustrate that Nixon, although not the sole formulator of the Vietnamization policy, was the leading power broker and not just a puller and hauler during the policy and decision-making processes.

President Nixon selected the advisers, determined their access, and, ultimately made the final decision to implement the policy.

By demonstrating the power of the President in foreign policy decision making, this study moves closer to scholars such as Barton Bernstein, who challenges the bureaucratic politics school by arguing that scholars cannot concentrate on process at the expense of the President. In particular, Bernstein argues that a fourth model, "The

President as Recognized and Self-Defined Chief," would "greatly improve understanding of the President's role in the crisis."196 This dissertation reinforces Bernstein by specifically addressing the impact of the President on Vietnamization decision making.

Building on Bernstein's critique of Allison's failure to incorporate the significance of outside interests, such as the U.S. Congress or public opinion polling, into his argument, this work demonstrates the importance of these interests on decision

195 Allison and Halperin, 1972, 42.

196 Bernstein, 2000, 159. 66 making in the Nixon administration, particularly Nixon's penchant for public opinion polling. On the other hand, and contrary to revisionists such as Bernstein, this study does not just focus on the importance and power of the president in the process but, rather, the broad process of decision.

The final governmental politics principle is the notion that a gap most often exists between the formulated decision and its implementation. As chapter 4 will demonstrate, because Nixon commanded such considerable central direction and control over the

Vietnamization policy-making process and was thoroughly and politically invested in the implementation phase of the program, the governmental politics assertion that a gap most often exists between the decision and its implementation does not apply in this case. The importance ofVietnamization to his prospects for reelection in 1972 was too critical for

Nixon to allow for gaps in the implementation of the program.

In addition, the bureaucratic politics model has been challenged for being too reliant on personal interviews rather than primary documents. Reinforcing these criticisms, this study incorporates the practices of historians, particularly making extensive use of primary documents, as well as personal interviews to augment an interdisciplinary approach.

Some scholars have criticized Allison's contention that "where you stand depends on where you sit," because some key participants do not 'sit' anywhere. 197 This sentence,

197 Allison, Essence of Decision, 176; Art, Robert J. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973): 472-3; Ball, Desmond J. "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory." Australian Outlook 28 (April 1974): 77; Caldwell, Dan. "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making."' American Behavioral Scientist 21 (September/October 1977): 99; Krasner, Stephen D. "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)." Foreign Policy 7 67 which has attracted more scholarly attention than any other in this important work, emphasizes that the viewpoints of high-level advisers are largely tied to the interests of their bureaucracies. Contrary to the bureaucratic politics school, this dissertation does not wholly endorse the statement, "where you stand depends on where you sit."198 For example, if one were to accept this contention, Melvin Laird, as Secretary of Defense, should have largely supported and defended the considerations of his senior military advisers; rather, he was the leading proponent ofVietnamization and troop withdrawals.

Similarly, although Secretary of State William Rogers should have been one of the leading proponents of diplomatic considerations, he, like Laird, stressed domestic political imperatives.

In addition, others have suggested that Model III's contention that policy making necessarily involves bargaining among decision makers in the executive branch must be questioned. 199 Barton Bernstein argues, "To focus unduly on others, to make too much of advisors, to see bureaucratic politics as the essential key to understanding presidential decision making on central matters, especially in crises, is a fundamental mistake in the development of theory and certainly in understanding U.S. foreign policy."200 In

(Summer 1972): 165; Nathan, James H. and James K. Oliver. "Bureaucratic Politics: Academic Windfalls and Intellectual Pitfalls." Journal of Political and Military Sociology 6 (Spring 1978): 81-91.

198 Allison, Essence of Decision, 176; Art, Robert J. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973): 472-3; Ball, Desmond J. "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory." Australian Outlook 28 (April 1974 ): 77; Caldwell, Dan. "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making."' American Behavioral Scientist 21 (September/October 1977): 99; Krasner, Stephen D. "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)." Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 165; Nathan, James H. and James K. Oliver. "Bureaucratic Politics: Academic Windfalls and Intellectual Pitfalls." Journal of Political and Military Sociology. 6 (Spring 1978): 8 I-91.

199 Bender and Hammond, 1992, 3 13.

200 Bernstein, 2000, 143. 68 addition, Jonathan Bender and Thomas Hammond have argued that the model is "simply too complex with so many different assumptions, variables, and relationships that it is almost impossible to determine the role and impact of any one of them" and must be simplified considerably.201 Despite these challenges, this study will reinforce the view that the decision to implement Vietnamization was largely the result of Laird's bureaucratic maneuvering after his return from South Vietnam in early March 1969.

Although the bureaucratic politics school continues to contribute to the scholarly literature, ultimately, this dissertation will demonstrate that in Vietnamization decision making and implementation, the school's three defining principles do not represent the character and nature of the Nixon administration's decision-making process. Despite acknowledging that the decision to implement Vietnamization was a result of Laird's bureaucratic maneuvering after his return from South Vietnam in early March 1969, this dissertation largely argues contrary to the guiding principles of the bureaucratic politics school.

The second model, presidential management, is defined by three types of advisory systems: formalistic, competitive, and collegial. To examine the role of advisory systems, this dissertation utilizes these three models and applies them specifically to decision making leading to Vietnamization.202 The leading advocates of this school of thought, such as Johnson and George, contend that decision making in the Nixon administration was formal in principle; this study challenges this contention by arguing that although the policy-making structure was formalistic, the decision structure was

201 Bender and Hammond, I 992, 313.

202 George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy; Johnson, Managing the White House. 69 largely informal, with Nixon creating a power structure in which only a select few could participate. This dissertation will demonstrate that labeling the Nixon advisory system as

"formal" fails to capture the complexity and diversity of presidential advising, especially the system's mixture of formal and informal procedures.

The third model, institutional, attempts to bridge the gap in the presidential advising and presidential leadership literature by suggesting new lines of inquiry into their dynamic interaction. In particular, this study reinforces the work of Burke and

Greenstein by demonstrating that the way presidents organize advisory groups has an important impact on the process of decision making, but that the style of the individual president and the political climate also affect the process of decision making.

For example, this study will contend that Nixon's organizational structure, particularly his reorganization of the NSC system, and centralization of foreign policy decision making in the White House had a significant impact on the options and alternatives produced, as well as the impact of the president and the political environment on decision making. Moreover, this dissertation will reinforce the concepts of Burke and

Greenstein, as opposed to the advisory and management concepts of Johnson and George, by arguing that the formalistic, collegial, and competitive categories are too simplistic because they fail to account for the informal decision-making processes beneath the formal model. Informal decision-making processes were critical to Vietnamization decision making and thus hinder attempts to categorize presidents or policies into one or the other processes.

The fourth model, electoral forecasting, offers scholars an opportunity to test specific theories of electoral behavior. This dissertation will both reinforce and challenge 70 leading principles of electoral forecasting in an attempt to advance the interdisciplinary scope in the field.

Most specifically, this study builds on The Keys to the White House to demonstrate that certain keys are more critical than others to an incumbent's success by comparing their impact on the percentage of the incumbent's share of the two- party vote, their triggering effect on the turning of other keys, and, most critically, their impact on the 1972 presidential election.

Through regression analysis, this dissertation will demonstrate that certain keys are more relevant than others. 203 For example, the personality keys, as represented in the regression analysis by their -2.02 loss in an incumbent's share of the two-party vote for every political key lost, is greater than the average key value for an incumbent's political

(-1.83) or performance (-1.63) categories.204

This study will also demonstrate the importance of two performance keys,

Foreign or Military Success and Failure, as critical determinants in forecasting elections, especially with regard to securing Nixon a second term. For example, in twenty-three elections in which an incumbent has won, there are only four instances (17.4%) in which

203 The use of multiple regression on the keys required combining variables in smaller groups, rather than regressing all thirteen keys individually. As a result, hundreds of scenarios were regressed; in the end, however, the best combination, given the small number of samples, required breaking the keys down into political, performance, and personality categories, which is the same grouping that Lichtman presented. To account for these scenarios, I utilized factor analysis on the keys, and while some keys, such as two (nomination contest) and five (short-term economy), were compatible (highly significant p values), almost all other groupings resulted in insignificant data. As a result, the political, performance, and personality variables were the best examples of explaining how certain keys were more relevant than others.

204 Political Keys--Party Mandate, NominationContest, Incumbency, and Third Party); Performance Keys - Short-term Economy, Long-term Economy, Policy Change, Social Unrest, Scandal, Foreign or Military Failure; Personality Keys -- Incumbent Charisma, Challenger Charisma 71 the Foreign or Military Failure key (Key 10) was turned against him. Moreover, Key 10 has one of the highest triggering effects on the turning of additional keys (8.2) against the incumbent party; when turned, it is a leading determinant in diminishing the percentage of the incumbent's share of the two- party vote. In addition, in the fifteen elections in which an elected incumbent was seeking reelection and lost to the challenging party, there are twelve cases (80%) in which the incumbent failed to secure a foreign policy success.

In highlighting the importance of Vietnamization as a foreign policy success during Nixon's first term, this study also challenges the subjective nature of The Keys to the White House, especially Lichtman's assertions that "Although progress in Vietnam did not constitute a major foreign policy success, the disengagement of American troops, combined with improved prospects for a negotiated settlement, kept it from counting as a major administration failure, preserving Key 10 for the party in power,"205 and that

Nixon's successful turning of foreign policy success Key 11 was the result of detente with the Soviet Union and the surprise opening of relations with China. Rather, this study contends that the Vietnamization program, by reducing the American ground force commitment from 550,000 to 20,000 by Election Day 1972, was one of the most critical and visible successes of the President's first term. With election-year casualties falling to under fourhundred, the American public came to believe that the war was not endless.

At the onset of 1972, Nixon's prospects for reelection were certainly tenuous.

During 1971, according to Allan Lichtman, Nixon faced the "potentially fatal deficit of

205 Lichtman, Allan. The Keys to the White House, 1996: A Surefire Guide to Predicting the Next President. New York: Madison, 1996. 137. 72 eight keys."206 Faced with a sluggish economy, rising prices, and tempered progress in

Vietnam, Nixon ventured new initiatives to expand fiscal policy, stem inflation through federal price controls, engage in detente with the Soviet Union, lead the surprise opening of relations with China, and expand Vietnamization. As a result of these efforts, Nixon witnessed the expansion of the election year economy as well as the expansion of his administration's foreign policy resume. Although all these factors were critical determinants in Nixon's successful reelection, this dissertation will highlight the importance of Vietnamization, utilized as a forward-looking political tool, as one of the most influential factors in securing President Nixon's reelection in 1972.

While highlighting the importance of Vietnamization as a factor in securing

President Nixon's reelection, this study reinforces the majority of scholars who contend that the economy and public opinion polling are two of most critical electoral forecasting indicators. Firstly, in 1972, the upswing of the election year economy was certainly a critical determinant in securing Nixon a second term. In fact, as Lichtman's model demonstrates, the incumbent party carried the Short-term Economy key in each of its twenty-three victories. In fact, every time the economy has been in recession during the campaign season the incumbent party has lost. Certainly, securing the Short-term

Economy key does not guarantee victory, but turning it over undeniably leads to defeat.

Moreover, contrary to Lichtman's contention that polls "continually simulate elections that don't take place,"207 that "no preelection poll can ever be independently

206 Lichtman, Allan. The Keys to the White House, 1996: A Surefire Guide to Predicting the Next President. New York: Madison, 1996. 137.

207 Ibid., 6. 73 replicated or confirmed because there is no reality against which results can be checked," and "Each simulation is a unique event that evaporates when the interviewing ends .... If the polls are right, they're right. If they are wrong, they're still right - at least "at the time they were taken,"208 this study will reinforce the importance of Nixon's use of public opinion polling as a forward-looking political tool designed to augment his public approval ratings and win reelection in 1972.

In addition, this dissertation, while reinforcing the regression analysis correlating the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote and the number of keys won by Allan

Lichtman and J. Scott Armstrong and Alfred Cuzan, will yield a more significant conclusion. Although they fail to demonstrate whether certain keys are more important,

Armstrong and Cuzan also argue that an incumbent begins with 37.3 percent of the two party vote and gains 1.8 percentage points for each key won. 209 Similarly, Allan

Lichtman contends that an incumbent begins with 36.75 percent of the two-party vote and gains 1.84 percentage points for each key won. In contrast, this dissertation will conclude that an incumbent begins with 37.1 percent of the two-party vote and gains 1.80 percentage points for every key won. Over the course of 38 presidential elections, the regression yields only a 3.42 variance in absolute percentage point error.

This variance is strong when compared to other models. In comparison,

Lichtman, while also producing a flawless call ratio and utilizing an identical election sample, yielded a 3.65 absolute mean percentage point error margin.210 Additionally, in

208 Ibid., 7.

209 Armstrong and Cuzan, 2006, 10-13. 74

2004, Abramowitz examined the elections from 1948 to1980 and found a variance of 1.9 but a call ratio of 67 percent.211 Also, in 1988, Ray Fair examined the elections from

1916 to 1980 and found a variance of 4.5 and a similar call ratio of 67 percent.212

Ultimately, this study's regression analysis augments the literature by highlighting that not only do certain types of keys or variables matter more than others, but that the total variance of the weight of keys over the course of 3 8 elections is relatively small, which, ultimately, holds strong among other electoral forecasting models.

Documentary Source Material Overview

Undoubtedly, ample material for this dissertation is available. Unfortunately, the secondary literature on the policy debate and implementation of Vietnamization provides little of the usual guidance, while leaving unexplored archival material. Utilizing established political, executive, and military primary source documentation, as well as unexplored archival collections and recently declassified documents, this dissertation will attempt to both reinforce and revise the existing historiography.

For example, in establishing the development of Nixon's thinking on the policy, this study will contend that Vietnamization was born in the campaign of 1968. Using

Nixon's own writings, 213 1968 campaign files, personal correspondence, newspapers documenting daily news coverage and Nixon's statements throughout 1968, and records

210 Lichtman, 2008, 301-9.

211 Abramowitz, 2004, 745-6.

212 Fair, 1988, 168-79.

213 Nixon, Richard M. "Asia After Vietnam." Foreign Affairs 46. l (1967). 75 from the Republican National Committee, this study, augmenting the primary source documentation oflsaacson, Parmet, and Kimball, will reinforce Nixon's penchant for the concept ofVietnamization during the mainsprings of his 1968 campaign. The David

Derge Collection, an overlooked resource in the historiography, is a particularly important collection that documents Nixon's approval of the concept of Vietnamization during the 1968 campaign based largely on public opinion polling.214

Utilization of the Derge Collection will also move past the existing literature to demonstrate the extensive use and growth of Nixon's White House polling operation and its impact on the Vietnamization policy, decision making, and implementation process.

For example, this study will utilize the Derge Files as well as primary source material for

President Richard Nixon, such as the White House Special Files,215 the President's Office

Files,216 the President's Personal Files,217 the White House Central Files,218 and the

National Security Council Files Series,219 to demonstrate that Nixon was aware that he would have to prove to the public that he could bring an end to the war to win reelection

214 David Derge, a political science professor at Indiana University, was recruited to serve as part time director of survey research and polling operations for Nixon's 1968 campaign.

215 Staff Members and Office Files; H. R. Haldeman Files: Personal Files (1969-1973); Boxes 2, 4, 40, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 152, and 195.

216 The President's Office Files: President's Handwriting: Boxes 1-4; President's Meeting File, 1969-1974 Boxes 77-9; President's Daily Schedule, 1969-1972 Box 101; and President's Telephone Calls, 1969-1973 Box l 04.

217 Memoranda From the President, 1969-74. Box l; Name/Subject File, 1969-74 10, 14; and Rose Mary Woods Name/Subject File, 30.

218 Staff Members and Office Files: President's Daily Diary, 55 boxes.

219 Additionally, of importance in garnering Nixon's insight, Box 1, the President's Daily Briefing: President's Daily Briefs from January 1, 1969 to February 19, 1970, provide considerable insights into war developments. 76

and that troop withdrawal announcements were congruent with times in which the

President was particularly constrained to influence public opinion.

In addition, this dissertation will demonstrate that as Vietnamization and

subsequent troop withdrawals became increasingly driven by the demands of domestic

politics, the viewpoints and considerations of senior military advisers were largely muted.

This contention is reinforced by the source material for the senior military command,

most especially Creighton Abrams' and William C. Westmoreland's Papers, found at the

U.S. Army Center for Military History in Washington, D.C.,220 and the Papers of General

Andrew Goodpaster, deputy commander of American forces in Vietnam and advisor to

four presidents, located at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. 221 In

particular, the personal correspondence, memoranda, and related documents within these

collections move beyond the existing scholarship to detail the viewpoints and

bureaucratic maneuvering of Nixon's senior military leadership during the debate and

implementation of Vietnamization.

220 Of particular importance in the Westmoreland Papers is Box 19 #35 History File [1-2] l-Jan-30 June 1969, Box 19 #35 History File [2-2] l-Jan-30 June 1969, and Box 19 #356 History File [1-1] l-Jul-31 Dec 1969; these include Vietnamization analysis.

221 General Andrew J. Goodpaster's papers comprise about 40 linear feet of correspondence, messages, and speeches for the period 1968 to 1974. There is restricted access on these files. Also, the Oral History collection at the U.S. Army Center for Military History consists of interviews collected by military historians since 1965. In particular, the Vietnam Interview (VNI) and Vietnam Interview Tape (VNIT) collections provide extensive coverage of senior military advisors viewpoints on the development, implementation, and results ofVietnamization. Examples include VNIT-579, an exit interview conducted on January 17, 1970 with Colonel Thomas Musgrave, Commander, 21st Signal group, detailing views on Vietnamization; VNIT-824 USARV Commanders Conference, a Conference on October 22, 1970with General Abrams, in which Vietnamization and cost reduction are discussed in detail; VNIT-851 USARV Commanders Conference, June 3-6, 1970, which covers the Vietnamization program; VNIT-919, an interview conducted July 25, 1971 with Major General Charles Noble, Commanding General, U.S. Army Engineer Command, which discusses the lessons learned from Vietnamization; VNIT-1006 Vietnamization-Advisory Effort; VNI-308 Notes and statistics presented before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Colonel Wheeler, Senior Advisor, 1st ARYN Division on the topic of Vietnamization; and VNIT-601, an exit interview conducted on September 20, 1969 discussing the successes and failures of the Vietnamization program. 77

Moreover, in its examination of the policy and decision-making processes that led to the implementation of Vietnamization, this dissertation utilizes the National Security

Council Files Series, containing Nixon/Kissinger MemCons, NSC draft minutes of meetings, policy papers, memoranda, and committee files such as the Vietnam Special

Studies Group (VSSG) meetings and minutes. 222 Using both historiographically established and unexplored archival documentation within this collection, this study will move beyond the existing scholarship to undertake a more focused examination of the review of options and alternatives available, establish Nixon's policy and decision- making processes, and determine how the structure led to the development and implementation ofVietnamization. Also, Henry Kissinger's telephone conversation transcripts (Telcons), which were released in 2004 and document his tenure as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1969 to 1974, have only been significantly examined within the current historiography by Robert Dallek. Moving beyond Dallek, this dissertation will utilize the Telcons collection to establish bureaucratic dialogue and maneuvering over the policy development and implementation of the Vietnamization program.223

222 The National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) provide valuable information about Vietnamization. In particular, the National Security Study and Decision memoranda and policy papers provide invaluable insight into the perspectives of decision makers; for example, Memo; Subject: NSC Meeting on January 25 on Vietnam; Henry Kissinger to President Nixon; 24 January 1969; National Security Council Meetings Schedule 2119/69-12/19170: Box 019; Vietnam Alternatives File; Bunker to President Johnson Secret Telegram: 19 December 1968; NSC Meeting Folder 1/25/69; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files. The committee files also contain meeting notes from NSC meetings, the Vietnam Special Studies Group, and senior review group meetings. A few worth noting: Meeting; National Security Council, 25 January 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box H- 019; National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974); Meeting; National Security Council, 28 March 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box 121; National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974). 78

Within the NSC Files Series, this dissertation will also move further than the existing scholarship to establish the development of policy options during the final year of the Johnson administration, the Nixon presidential transition, and the opening months of the Nixon administration. In particular, this study will examine more deeply the development of Nixon's thinking during the 1968 campaign, the policy debate over the

RAND Vietnam Options Paper, Kissinger's modifications of the report in preparation for the January 25, 1969 meeting of the NSC, the development of questions and answers for

NSSMl, and the informality of meetings with foreign policy advisors apart from the established NSC schedule. In addition, and contrary to the existing scholarship, this documentation will also demonstrate the differences between the plans Westmoreland initiated in 1967 and those ordered by Nixon in 1969.

Also, moving beyond the existing literature, this study will demonstrate that

Nixon's decision to implement Vietnamization was politically motivated and based primarily on the advocacy of his Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. Laird, after visiting

South Vietnam in early March 1969, summarized his trip in a memorandum for the

President. Laird's memorandum and subsequent meeting with Nixon on March 13, 1969 was the definitive moment in Nixon's decision to implement Vietnamization.

Moreover, to further enhance the existing Vietnamization historiographical documentation, this study will augment the importance of Laird to the implementation of the policy by detailing the Secretary's March 1969 report and utilizing the chronological files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense at the Washington National

223 Boxes 1 through 3 cover the period from January 21, 1969 to January 26, 1970. 79

Records Center, as well as the Melvin R. Laird Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Library and

Museum in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Within the latter, in particular, the Department of

Defense Papers, Baroody Subject File, 1969-1973, provides a wealth of information on

Vietnamization in the form of background papers, public speeches and statements, and memoranda. In addition, within the Subject File, 1969-1973, there are Oral History

Interviews given by Laird, as well as correspondence with policy makers over

Vietnamization. 224

Further, in addition to the material at the Ford Library, the Washington National

Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, contains a wealth of information on Laird's tenure as Secretary of Defense. In particular, the records that relate to Vietnamization include the minutes of Laird's morning staff meetings from 1969 to 1973,225 files for the assistant

Secretary ofDefense,226 and the immediate files of Laird's vault from 1969 to 1972.227

The National Archives at College Park also host the Department of State's Central

Files, which illuminate the contributions of Secretary of State William P. Rogers to

Vietnamization. Of considerable interest are the Lot Files, which include Rogers' meetings and conferences, official correspondence, statements and speeches, memoranda

224 Laird - Oral History Interviews, 1986-1988 (1)-(2) Box D8; Laird - US News and World Report Interview, 5/17/71 Box D9; Secretary of Defense Correspondence - Southeast Asia, 1969-1973 (1)-(4) Box DI I; Secretary of Defense Correspondence - White House, 1969-1972 (1)-(2) Box DI I; and Vietnamization, 1970-1971 (1)-(2) Box Dl2.

225 FRC 330 76 0028.

226 OSD Files: FRC 330 75 0089 and FRC 330 75 0103.

227 FRC 330 74 0142. 80 of conversations, personal papers, and Department of State copies of National Security

Decision Memoranda and related documents. 228

Chapter Summaries

This dissertation consists of an introduction, four succeeding chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter 2 will provide an historical narrative of events critical to the development of the Nixon administration's Vietnamization policy during the 1968 presidential campaign. It will establish the origins of Vietnamization, the principles underlying Nixon's inclination towards the policy, and Nixon's advocacy of the policy as a means to win the 1968 presidential election. Through electoral forecasting analysis, chapter 2 will also establish that the Johnson administration's record of foreign or military success and failure during the previous presidential term was more of a determining factor in securing the White House for Richard Nixon in 1968 than any other leading policy issue.

Chapter 3 determines the participants and decision-making structure that defined the Vietnamization debate. This chapter will demonstrate that although the restructuring of the NSC led to the solidification of White House control of U.S. foreign policy, it also created an isolated, politically charged decision-making environment. The chapter will

228 Conference Files, 1966-1972 (Entry No. 30518) or files of the meetings and conferences of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Under Secretary of State, 1966-1972, formerly S/S Lot Files 67 D 586, 68 D 453, 69 D 182, 70 D 387, 71D227, and 73 D 323; Office files of Secretary of State William Rogers, 1969-1973, including official correspondence, statements and speeches, memoranda of conversations, and personal papers, Rogers Files: Lot 73 D 443 (Entry No. 5439); SIS National Security Decision Memoranda Files: Lot 83 D 305 Department of State copies of National Security Decision Memoranda and related documents, NSDM 1 through NSDM 348, 1969-1977, S/S National Security Council Files: Lot 82 D 212 Department of State copies ofNational Security Study Memoranda and related documents, NSSM 1 through NSSM 248, 1969-1977; and INR/REA/SA Files: Lot 75 D 352 South Vietnam Country files, 1968-1970. 81 also demonstrate Nixon's propensity for private opinion polling as a consideration in decision-making and the role of his advisory system and personal power and influence on the policy and decision-making processes that led to Vietnamization. In particular, this chapter will establish the informal nature of Nixon's advisory system, and the President's position as the most powerful player in the policy and decision-making processes.

Chapter 4 examines the options and alternatives the Nixon administration considered and debated in determining a course for the Vietnam War. This chapter focuses on the viewpoints of the bureaucracy at large, especially Nixon's senior players, such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of State William Rogers. This chapter also considers the President's process of decision making, including his consideration of options and alternatives, and how and why he made his final decision.

Chapter 5 will demonstrate Vietnamization's impact on the 1972 election. Using political science methodology, as well as The Keys to the White House, this chapter establishes that although the 1972 election revolved around a number of significant issues, it was Nixon's policy of Vietnamization that was arguably as important as any other factor in securing President Nixon's reelection. Statistical analysis will demonstrate that securing Lichtman's Key 10, Foreign or Military Failure, and Key 11,

Foreign or Military Success, increased Nixon's share of the two-party vote, which prevented other keys from turning against his favor. In addition, this chapter will establish that because Nixon commanded such considerable central direction and control over the creation of the Vietnamization policy, and was thoroughly and politically invested in the implementation phase of the program, the assertion of the bureaucratic 82 politics school that a gap most often exists between the decision and its implementation does not apply in this case.

Chapter 6 provides a synthesis of Nixon's Vietnamization decision. It places

Nixon's decision within the context of the scholarly debate by demonstrating how this dissertation not only contributes to a broad range of scholarly issues, but also serves to further our understanding of U.S. presidential decision making. CHAPTER2

THE 1968 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

The Mainsprings of the 1968 Campaign

At the time of Nixon's announcement of his candidacy for President in February

1968, the United States was embroiled in a struggle in Vietnam that shook the entire fabric of American society. Nineteen sixty-eight was a pivotal year for the Vietnam War and for America. From idealism and hope to disorder and despair, America witnessed the best and worst of society. It was a year that produced arguably more tragedy, controversy, and excitement than any single year in the nation's history. The imagery from that year is etched in the nation's psyche. Who can forget the images of the South

Vietnamese national police chief shooting a suspected Vietcong in the head during the

Tet Offensive; or Bobby Kennedy's lifeless, bleeding body on the kitchen floor of the

Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California shortly after winning the state's

Democratic primary for president; or the sight of police clashing with anti-war demonstrators during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago.

These pictures transport one back to 1968, the struggle in Vietnam, and a presidential election largely revolving on the issue of how to bring the war in Vietnam to a successful end. During this time, Richard Nixon solidified his thinking on the war; the mainsprings of his Vietnamization policy emerged from his campaign for president.

83 84

Richard Nixon fought his way up the ladder of American politics, from a

Congressman elected in 1946 to the President of the United States in 1968. Along the way he would learn from his victories and defeats, especially his losses in a close presidential election to John F. Kennedy in 1960 and the California governor's race in

1962. As a result of those experiences, President Nixon was as seasoned in American politics and foreign affairs as anyone of his generation.

In word and action, Nixon was an original anticommunist. From his involvement in the Alger Hiss case, attacks on Helen Gahagan Douglas in 1950, and sharp-spoken support of South Vietnam prior to the 1966 elections, Nixon compiled a hawkish record whose defense of containment was undeniable. The former vice-president's international experiences and personal view of the world shaped his vision on foreign policy.

As an artful and crafty politician, Nixon was aware that by the mid-1960s, the situation in Vietnam provided him an opportunity for a return to national politics.

Accordingly; Nixon relentlessly attacked President Johnson for not doing more to win the war. In fact, according to Andrew Johns, author of the article, "A Voice from the

Wilderness: Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, 1964-1966," Nixon's actions "spurred

Johnson to greater involvement in the war. Thus, Nixon should be held at least partially responsible for the situation he confronted on his inauguration; he helped to create it. "229

But once it became clear that the 1968 Republican nomination was attainable, Nixon, as this chapter will demonstrate, was in tune with opinion polling that indicated that the

229 Johns, Andrew L. "A Voice from the Wilderness: Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, 1964- 1966." Presidential Studies Quarterly29.2 (June 1999): 317. 85 majority of the American public supported a more dovish approach to the war, and, thus, began pursuing a more moderate position on Vietnam.

With an acute focus, Nixon put all of his energy in 1967 and 1968 into winning the White House. To illuminate his foreign policy credentials and political maturity, as well as shore up support for his candidacy, Nixon authored an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Asia After Vietnam." Published in 1967, the piece offered a prescient and statesmanlike examination of the Vietnam conflict and its impact on U.S. relations with

Asia. In the article, Nixon pointed out that although the United States was a Pacific power,230 the situation in Vietnam curtailed that power and its impact in post-war Asia; he encouraged Americans to be more reluctant about becoming involved again in a similar intervention. The world must recognize, Nixon added, "that the role of the United

States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future."231 Instead, Nixon argued that machinery needed to be put in place so that a collective effort by the nations of a region could contain "communist threats in the less stable parts of the world." 232

According to Nixon, these threats could include nuclear engagement or actions aimed at challenging the popular sovereignty of non-Communist nations. 233

Nixon's Foreign Affairs article hints at his overall strategy for the war. First, it demonstrated the importance Nixon placed on China in world affairs. Second, Nixon's call for nations to contain aggression collectively in their own backyards before calling

230 Nixon, 1967, 112.

231 Ibid., 114.

232 Ibid., 114.

233 Ibid., 114. 86 America to assist, hints at his policy of Vietnamization and, later, the Nixon Doctrine, which solidified the policy as a broad U.S. strategy. These types of subtle hints in his writings and campaign statements throughout 1968 suggest that Nixon did have a plan for the war. The plan was Vietnamization, and while subtly pervading Nixon's campaign for

President, the policy was designed with limited foresight to win the White House in

November 1968.

Campaigning for the White House

Richard Nixon emerged from the Holiday Inn in Manchester into a dense New

Hampshire fog on Groundhog Day 1968 a candidate for the Republican nomination for

President. Formally announcing his candidacy in a letter sent the day before to 150,000

New Hampshire voters, Nixon suggested that his experiences in Congress, the Executive

Branch, and as a private citizen had given him the seasoning, knowledge, and perspective necessary to provide the "new" leadership the nation required. "Peace and freedom in the world, and peace and progress here at home," Nixon argued, "will depend on the decisions of the next President of the United States. For these critical years, America needs leadership."234

Nixon's approach to the Vietnam War would go far in determining his chances of winning in November. Softening his hawkish stance on the war in the second half of

1967, Nixon began to develop a more centrist position on Vietnam. With this ideology in place, Nixon entered the campaign trail in search of his key to the White House.

234 Semple, Robert B., Jr. "Nixon Joins Race for Presidency." New York Times February 2, 1968: 1, 9. 87

Speaking to a Republican gathering in Nashua, New Hampshire, in March 1968,

Nixon pledged new leadership to "end the war and win the peace."235 Five days later, in an off- the-cuff remark to reporters, Nixon said that if he were elected he would end the war in Vietnam, but he was noncommittal about what he would offer to accomplish it.

The media jumped on his statement, expanding it into an announcement that Nixon had a

"secret plan" to end the war. Nixon never said he had a secret plan, although he never officially denied having one. Even when his mentor, President Dwight Eisenhower, attempted to elicit the plan from Nixon, he told the former President that he could not be specific because he did not want to "undercut whatever diplomatic negotiations might be underway at present," and because he did not want to restrict his own negotiating flexibility when he became President.236

Nixon held the same firm line in public as he had with Eisenhower in private.

Speaking to reporters on March 10, 1968, Nixon said, "No one with this responsibility who is seeking office should give away any of his bargaining positions in advance .... Under no circumstances should a man say what he would do next January.

The military situation may change, and we may have to take an entirely different look."237 Moreover, Nixon added that it would be a disservice to the present efforts of the Johnson Administration to achieve a settlement. 238

235 Semple, Robert B., Jr. New York Times March 6, 1968: 1.

236 Letter, Nixon to Eisenhower, March 17, 1968, Dwight David Eisenhower Post Presidential Papers: Special Names Series, Box 124, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

237 Semple, Robert, Jr. "Nixon Withholds His Peace Ideas." New York Times March 11, 1968: 1.

238 Ibid., 1. 88 Instead, according to Jeffery Kimball, Nixon proposed politically appealing courses of action to disparate parts of the electorate without abandoning his own foreign policy goal and strategies.239 For example, to please the doves and moderates, Nixon emphasized nonmilitary steps towards peace; for hawks and conservatives, he talked about maintaining pressure on Hanoi and the Viet Cong (VC), and winning the peace.240

This strategy is best summed up by Nixon speechwriter Richard Whalen, who said that the candidate sought "to find the least assailable middle ground" to secure the nomination and win the White House.241

Nixon addressed the strategy on numerous occasions during the spring and summer of 1968. For example, campaigning in Marshfield, Wisconsin, in mid-March,

Nixon clarified his Vietnam position, proclaiming, "The nation's objective should be to help the South Vietnamese fight the war and not fight it for them .... If they do not assume the majority of the burden in their own defense, they cannot be saved."242 On another occasion, Nixon proclaimed, "unlike the U.S. role in Korea and then in Vietnam, we furnished the arms, we furnished the aid and most of the men; in the future, we should furnish the aid, but they must furnish most of the men."243 In May, Nixon advocated collective security arrangements that would allow the participating countries to "furnish

239 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 43.

240 Ibid., 41.

241 Whalen, Richard J. Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party. Boston.: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 135.

242 "Nixon Urges Rise in Allied Soldiers." New York Times March 15, 1968: I.

243 Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America, 507. 89 the men" and the United States to provide them with the arms and money so

"responsibility for fighting wars would be on them, not the U.S."244 Proposing a "new diplomacy for America" in Omaha, Nebraska, on May 6, Nixon said that the time had come to deal with future aggression, "so that when the freedom of friendly nations is threatened by aggression, we help them with our money and help them with our arms; but we let them fight the war and don't fight the war for them."245 These statements, like others on the campaign trail, emphasize Nixon's thinking on the direction of the war and his advocacy of Vietnamization as a tool to win election.

During much of March 1968, many close to Nixon, such as President Dwight

Eisenhower, Herbert Brownell, William Satire, and others, advised Nixon to elaborate his

Vietnam policy position in a major nationwide speech. Scheduled for March 31, Nixon never had the opportunity to deliver the speech because the day prior to the broadcast,

President Johnson requested matching airtime to address the nation. Upon hearing the news, Nixon "put his head down for a long moment," then commented, "We've got to cancel. That's all we can do."246 Ironically, Johnson's address paralleled Nixon's proposed speech by calling for a suspension of a significant portion of the bombing of

North Vietnam, while seeking to negotiate a settlement to the war. Where Johnson differed was in his shocking announcement that he would not seek reelection in

November.

244 Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace. "A Summary of Positions taken by Richard Nixon Relevant to Platform Issues." July 3, 1968 - Platform PPS 500.71.3, Research Files, Campaign, 1968.

245 Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee. Nixon on the Issues. New York, 1968, 1-2.

246 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 141. 90 As a result of those developments, Nixon issued a moratorium "of unspecified duration on any discussion of Vietnam in order to avoid undercutting any diplomatic efforts that the Johnson administration might be engaged in."247 Throughout the spring and summer of 1968, Nixon's ambiguous stance on Vietnam, along with the lack of a serious challenge by either George Romney or Nelson Rockefeller, propelled the former vice-president to the nomination.

When the 1968 Republican Convention convened on August 5 in Miami Beach,

Florida, Nixon's campaign stance on Vietnam was solidified. Over the previous month,

Nixon's advisors interviewed experts on Asia, civilian strategists, recently resigned

Pentagon analysts, and Republican politicians. According to Richard Whalen, "from this miscellany of sources a consensus emerged: it was time for the U.S. to begin extricating itself from Vietnam and time to declare the goal of eventual withdrawal to the American people. "248

In a position paper submitted to the Republican Platform Committee at the

Convention, Nixon argued, "we need far greater and more urgent attention to training the

South Vietnamese themselves, and equipping them with the best of modern weapons. As they are phased in, American troops can - and should - be phased out. This phasing out will save American lives and cut American costs."249 Nixon's strategy required the need

247 Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace. "A Summary of Positions taken by Richard Nixon Relevant to Platform Issues." July 3, 1968 - Platform PPS 500.71.3, Research Files, Campaign, 1968.

248 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, I 84.

249 "Text of Nixon Statement to GOP Platform Panel on the War." New York Times August 2, 1968: 16. 91 "to encourage assumption of responsibility by the Vietnamese. "250 The problem, the paper added, was that "the Administration has done far too little, too late, to train and equip the South Vietnamese, both in fighting their own war now and for the task of defending their own country after the war is settled."251 Ultimately, the true measure of progress was not the body count of enemy dead, but the number of South Vietnamese committed "to the building and defense of their own country."252

Taking into account the temperature of public opinion, Nixon's position paper steered a middle course between hawks and doves over the war.253 Due to its public acceptability, it is no wonder the party plank was well received by the Republican rank and file and was adopted without a single dissenting vote. Its language was flexible enough to avoid offending the broad center of political opinion in the country and left

Nixon free to adopt and pursue any course of negotiation to achieve peace. But most importantly, the plank advocated Vietnamization, Nixon's campaign response to domestic electoral imperatives.

It should surprise no one that Nixon advocated Vietnamization during the campaign of 1968. Nixon was not looking beyond Election Day. He tailored his campaign to win, and what happened after would be reevaluated at that time. 254

Consequently, Nixon chose Vietnamization as the most politically pleasing, middle-of

250 "Republican on Vietnam." Los Angeles Times August 6, 1968: A4.

251 "Text of Nixon Statement to GOP Platform Panel on the War." New York Times August 2, 1968: 16.

252 Ibid., 16.

253 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 181.

254 Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag, 181. 92 the-road strategy to win election. As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, although he advocated Vietnamization during the 1968 campaign, Nixon was not married to the policy as a definitive preference for his administration's overall Vietnam strategy.

Rather, during the first several months of his new administration, Nixon remained open to all possible options toward the war. Ultimately, Laird's memorandum summarizing his trip to South Vietnam in early March 1969 served as the definitive factor in Nixon's decision to implement Vietnamization.

Polls had indicated growing support for the idea. In April 1967, a Gallup Poll stated that 61 percent of those surveyed were in favor of a form of "Vietnamization,"255 and by September 1967, 77 percent agreed that the U.S. should let the South Vietnamese take on more responsibility for the fighting of the war in Vietnam. 256 Moreover, and most important to Nixon's candidacy, by August 11, 1968, two-thirds of Americans stated that they would be inclined to vote for a candidate who turned over more of the fighting in Vietnam to the South Vietnamese.257

Nixon's policy platform was appealing to the general public. As Nixon said himself, domestic and foreign policies are like Siamese twins, "separate them and they die."258 As the catalyst of his electoral vision, Vietnamization served as the policy platform for the most important issue of the campaign. 259

255 Gallup, George Horace. The Gallup Poll; Public Opinion, 193 5-1971. New York: Random House, 1972. 2061.

256 Ibid., 2080.

257 Ibid., 2151.

258 Schmemann, Serge. "Moscow Journal." New York Times International February 19, 1993: A4. 93 Reinforcing this platform, Nixon campaign manager John Mitchell recruited

David Derge as part-time director of survey research and polling operations for the Nixon campaign. At Derge's recommendation, the campaign contracted the Opinion Research

Corporation in mid-July 1969 to poll more than seven thousand participants over fourteen states who each answered a distinct set of sixty-three questions three separate times before Election Day. To that date, the undertaking represented the "most complex, sophisticated and expensive private polling effort in American political history."260

Never before had so many people provided so much information during a campaign about their feelings and leanings, especially how they changed from month to month. The Nixon polling effort was designed for facts and analysis to support decision making, not for election predictions, and proved especially instrumental in Nixon's strategy on Vietnam, particularly, as this chapter will later demonstrate, Nixon's reaction to President Johnson's October 31, 1968 bombing halt.

Statistical Analysis of the 1968 Campaign

As Jeffrey Kimball argues, "No presidential election has ever been a referendum on a single issue, but some issues are more important than others, and the war was a very important issue in 1968."261 In fact, the Johnson administration's record of foreign or military success and failure during the previous presidential term was as significant a

259 Fifty percent of those respondents said that Vietnam was the most important problem facing the nation today. Nixon knew this was the most critical issue of the election and, subsequently, to be elected. See Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2090.

260 Oberdorfer, Don. "Unsung Poll Helped GOP Chart Path to Victory." The Washington Post December 29, 1968: Cl.

261 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 60. 94 factor in securing the White House for Richard Nixon in 1968 as any other leading policy issue. For example, at no time has an incumbent party retained the White House when it has failed during the previous term to secure either a foreign or military success or avoid a foreign or military failure. 262 Moreover, with the exception of 1968, in each election in which both of these variables turned against the incumbent party, either the short-term economy was in recession or the long-term economy confronted "real per- capita economic growth during a presidential term equaling or exceeding the mean growth during the two previous terms."263 As a result, numerous factors contributed to determining the outcomes of those elections. In 1968, however, according to Allan

Lichtman, Democratic difficulties "were unrelated to economic performance" because the

"pace of economic growth exceeded the rise of inflation. "264

Rather, building on The Keys to the White House, variables such as Party

Mandate, Party Contest, Incumbency, Third Party, Social Unrest, and Incumbent

Charisma were triggered largely as the result of the war in Vietnam, particularly the incumbent party's loss of Lichtman's Key 10, Foreign or Military Failure, which has one of the highest triggering effects on the turning of additional keys (8.2) against the incumbent party and, when turned, is a leading determinate in diminishing the percentage of the incumbent's share of the two-party vote (see Tables 2.1and2.2).

262 In 1960, 1968, 1976, and 2008, the incumbent party failed to secure a foreign or military success, while also failing to avoid a foreign or military failure.

263 Lichtman, The Keys to the White House, 3.

264 Lichtman, The Keys to the White House, 134. 95

Table 2.1. Importance of Keys in an Incumbent/Challenger Victory

KEYS INCUMBENT CHALLENGER

Party Mandate 55.9 2.6 45.7 7.1

Nomination Contest 56.l 3.0 45.3 7.6

Incumbency 56.5 2.9 46.4 8.0

Third Party 55.7 2.8 44.6 6.8

Short-term Economy 55.9 3.0 45.8 7.9

Long-term Economy 56.2 2.9 46.1 7.9

Policy Change 56.5 2.6 45.6 7.6

Social Unrest 56.1 3.0 44.6 7.5

Scandal 55.7 2.9 47.3 8.3

Foreign Policy Failure 56.l 3.0 45.7 8.2

Foreign Policy Success 56.5 2.9 46.4 7.6

Incumbent Charisma 57.6 1.6 44.7 7.4

Challenger Charisma 56.0 3.1 45.0 8.3

Incumbent: Represents the average of the corresponding key that falls in favor of the victorious incumbent party. The second number represents the average keys that are lost when an incumbent party holds the corresponding key and subsequently maintains incumbency.

Challenger: Represents the average of the corresponding key that does not fall in favor of the incumbent party in an election in which they fail to maintain power. The second number represents the average for the amount of keys that are lost when a corresponding key is lost by the incumbent party in an election in which they fail to maintain power. 96

Table 2.2. Key Analysis for Incumbent/Challenger

KEYS INCUMBENT CHALLENGER

v D v D

Party Mandate 12 11 02 12

Nomination Contest 22 01 03 11

Incumbency 17 06 06 08

Third Party 20 03 08 06

Short-term Economy 23 00 06 08

Long-term Economy 16 07 05 09

Policy Change 14 08 03 11

Social Unrest 19 04 08 06

Scandal 21 02 11 03

Foreign Policy Failure 19 04 08 06

Foreign Policy Success 16 07 04 10

Incumbent Charisma 08 15 02 12

Challenger Charisma 21 01 10 04

Incumbent V: Represents the number chimes the corresponding key remained in favor of the incumbent party in their subsequent victory.

Incumbent D: Represents the number of times the corresponding key turned against the incumbent party in their subsequent victory.

Challenger V: Represents the number of times the corresponding key remained in favor of the incumbent party in their subsequent loss. 97 Statistical analysis establishes that certain keys are more relevant than others.

For instance, the personality keys, as represented in the regression analysis by their -2.02 loss in an incumbent's share of the two-party vote for every personality key lost, is greater than the average key value for an incumbent's political (-1.83) or performance (-

1.63) categories.265

In 1968, the Johnson administration's lack of a foreign or military success and its inability to avoid a foreign or military failure reduced the incumbent party's share of the two-party vote by 3.6 percentage points. Even more consequential, the turning of these two foreign affairs keys initiated a triggering effect on six additional keys, diminishing the Democrats' share of the two-party vote by 14.4 percentage points. Moreover, regression analysis demonstrates a 3.47 variance between the electoral forecast and the actual percentage of the Democrats' share of the two-party vote in 1968 (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4).

Table 2.3. Regression Analysis

Types of Keys Total Value Individual Value

Political Keys 1-4 -7.316 -1.83 Performance Keys 5-11 -11.399 -1.63 Personality Keys 12-13 -4.041 -2.02 Values contingent on the IPTPV before any keys are decided= 60.557. The r-square is moderate at .468.

265 Political Keys - Party Mandate, Nomination Contest, Incumbency, and Third Party; Performance Keys - Short-term Economy, Long-term Economy, Policy Change, Social Unrest, Scandal, Foreign or Military Failure; Personality Keys - Incumbent Charisma, Challenger Charisma. 98

Table 2.4. Regression Analysis

ISTPV Key Value r-square p-values

60.547 -1.803 .478 .000 Notes: The ISTPV (Incumbent Share of the Two-Party Vote) represents the percentage of the two-party vote an incumbent holds if no keys are lost. For every key lost, an incumbent loses -1.803 percentage points from their share of the two-party vote. In this case, the r-square is moderate and explains only that percentage of the variance. In addition, this study finds that the share of the two-party vote that the incumbent begins with is 37.103 and increases 1.803 for every key won.

Ultimately, the Democratic Party lost in 1968 not as a result of economic indicators, but because the electorate viewed the Democrats as responsible for reducing

American power and prestige overseas. As Stephen Ambrose notes, Democratic nominee

Hubert Humphrey's problem was that as Vice President, he could not break with the

Johnson administration on Vietnam to offer a credible policy position that starkly contrasted with what Nixon was proposing.266 For Humphrey and the Democrats, the considerable lack of maneuverability on policy and the popularity of Nixon's Vietnam policy platform, proved too critical to overcome.

The Mainsprings ofVietnamization

Vietnamization was not an entirely new idea. The French had tried a similar version in the ill-fated Navarre Plan of 1953 and 1954. Jaunissement, or "yellowing," as

266 Ambrose, Triumph of a Politician, 182. 99 the French called it, attempted to establish a Vietnamese National Army, so that the

Vietnamese, once sufficiently trained, could assume greater responsibility for combat against the Viet Minh and French troops could be phased out.

Similarly, during the Kennedy administration, American advisors concentrated on training ARYN officers. In October 1963, American General Charles J. Times proudly announced, "We have completed the job of training South Vietnam's armed forces." Yet, two years later, the major rationale for committing U.S. troops was to buy time to build an effective South Vietnamese army and then tum over the fighting to them. In a letter to

Duong Van Minh on January 1, 1964, Lyndon Johnson promised that as "the forces of your government become increasingly capable of dealing with the aggression, American military personnel in South Vietnam will be removed."267

Scholarship has recently discovered President Kennedy's close-hold effort in

1962 and 1963 to get U.S. military commanders in Vietnam to adopt a plan for withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965. According to Gareth

Porter, Kennedy loyalists, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, were urged by the President to press the military to go along with his timetable. By August 1963, the Joint Chiefs accepted an initial withdrawal for planning purposes subject to final approval by October 31, 1963. Despite these efforts, Kennedy's assassination in Dallas on November 22, 1969 triggered a reversal of the military's commitment to the slain President's plan.268

267 Olson and Roberts, Where the Domino Fell, 219.

268 Porter, Gareth. Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam. Los Angeles: University of California Press,2005. 165-79; and Porter, Gareth. "Analysis-U.S.: JFK's 100 Four years later, the Johnson administration continued to struggle to de-

Americanize the U.S. presence in Vietnam. In October 1967, Defense Secretary Robert

McNamara reawakened the strategy as a step towards disengagement and an alternative to escalation. He urged President Johnson to impose a partial bombing halt, establish a ceiling on troop levels, stabilize the ground war, and tum over more responsibility to the

South Vietnamese.269 A month later, on November 21, 1967, U.S. General William

Westmoreland, speaking at the National Press Club, announced that if the revitalization of the South Vietnamese army proceeds as hoped, in two years "we will provide new military equipment to revitalize the Vietnamese army and prepare it to take on an ever increasing share of the war.'mo

During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, however, the de-

Americanization of U.S. involvement in Vietnam did not produce significant results, although, some have suggested, the considerable development of the RVNAF in the year before Nixon assumed office may have been an important factor that influenced the new

President's thinking when he considered ways to end the war. 271 Despite this improvement, American soldiers were not phased out of Vietnam during the Johnson

Failure Suggests Obama's Iraq Plan at Risk." Global Information Network. New York: November 28, 2008.

269 Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994. 58; Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 73.

27°Farrar, Fred. "Westmoreland Sees Beginning of the End to the Vietnam Conflict." Chicago Tribune November 22, 1967: 5.

271 Nguyen, Duy Hinh. Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire. Washington, :U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. 11. 101 administration; rather, the numbers of American troops in Vietnam rose throughout his presidency.

The Impact of President Johnson's October Surprise

Although some ingredients for de-Americanizing the war were in place, Nixon solidified these variables during his 1968 campaign into a strategy to phase out American troops and end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A significant difference between the plans that Westmoreland initiated in 1967 and those ordered by Nixon was that under Nixon's plan, the South Vietnamese would be expected to deal with both the Viet Cong and the

NVA after the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops. The Johnson administration plan did not envision that the South Vietnamese armed forces would be able to deal with North

Vietnam's army.

After securing the Republican nomination for president and solidifying his party's national platform for Vietnam, Nixon set out in the fall campaign determined to win the

White House. Despite this momentum, the former vice-president encountered road bumps on the campaign trail. The most significant came as a result of President

Johnson's October 31 announcement of a complete bombing cessation in Vietnam.

Coming five days before the general election, the announcement of a bombing halt made t h e e1 ect10n . a v1rtua . l toss-up. 212

The election of 1968 took place in the context of ongoing peace talks with the

North Vietnamese in Paris. With the first official conversations opening on May 13,

272 The last poll numbers were Nixon, 43%; Humphrey, 42%; and Wallace, 15%. See Poll Election Report in Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2167-8. 102 1968, spring gave way to summer and then to fall with very little to show at the bargaining table. Bombing was a central issue in the discussions; by late October,

Johnson was inclined to order the halt on the conditions that significant discussion begin within twenty-four hours and that Hanoi discontinue shelling and new attacks on South

Vietnam.

An accomplished poker player, Nixon kept a tight watch on the hand Johnson was playing at the peace talks. During the summer and fall, Nixon refused to say anything that would undermine the peace process in Paris. In fact, at a White House briefing on

July 26, Nixon told Johnson that he would continue to support American goals in South

Vietnam and "pledged not to undercut Johnson's negotiating position in the case the

Communists came around."273 Despite this private overture, Nixon knew that if the talks in Paris succeeded, or at least offered positive developments, Humphrey would regain most of the liberal voters disaffected by the war. As a result, Nixon and his campaign staff agreed that they had to stall the talks if he was going to become president-elect.274

In preparation for such an action by Johnson, Nixon initiated a plan involving a covert overture to the South Vietnamese government. Anna Chennault, a prominent

Republican fundraiser and wife of General Claire Lee Chennault, of the Flying Tigers fame, and Bui Diem, South Vietnam's Ambassador to Washington, served as information conduits to the Nixon campaign during the summer and fall of 1968.

After Johnson announced the bombing halt in late October, both Chennault and

Diem advised South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to forestall the upcoming

273 Nixon, Memoirs, 308.

274 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 74; Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 56-9. 103 substantive negotiations by refusing to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks. The

Nixon campaign told the South Vietnamese government that its national interests would be better served if it assisted in Nixon's election by ruining the peace process.275

Polling was especially critical to Nixon during this time. For example, after

President Johnson issued the bombing halt, the Nixon campaign called for "instant research" to provide the candidate with nationwide poll data on the subject within 48 hours. After polling 709 carefully chosen citizens from coast to coast, the sample demonstrated three critical insights: 74 percent favored President Johnson's bombing halt and only 14 percent opposed; 50 percent believed that the bombing halt was a sincere move toward peace in Vietnam, whereas 32 percent viewed it as a last-minute attempt to help Hubert Humphrey win the election; and probably most critical to the Nixon campaign, 98 percent agreed that the announcement of the bombing halt did not cause them to change their mind about who they would vote for. Of the 2 percent who admitted to a switch because of the announcement, 1 percent said that they were switching to

Humphrey, whereas the other 1 percent said they were switching to Nixon.276

Although the polling data was favorable to Nixon, Thieu was still pressed to announce that the South Vietnamese would boycott the peace talks, thus negating any potential political windfall for the Democrats. 277 Ironically, after the campaign was over,

Opinion Research Corporation argued on the basis of its polls that "the last-minute

275 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 56-9.

276 Oberdorfer, Don. "Unsung Poll Helped GOP Chart Path to Victory." The Washington Post December 29, 1968: Cl.

277 Nguyen Tien Hung, and Jerrold L. Schecter. The Palace File. New York: Harper and Row, 1986. 28. 104 Humphrey surge was a culmination of a trend already in motion, not merely a result of the last-minute bombing halt announcement."278

As a result of these developments, Nixon owed Thieu a debt of obligation. In retrospect, given the polling data, Nixon probably didn't need to press Thieu to boycott the peace talks. Moreover, Thieu probably wouldn't have sent a delegation, preferring negotiations with a hard-line Republican administration to one that would make concessions to the Communists in a peace settlement. Nixon couldn't be completely sure of this at the time and, thus, needed this assurance. This obligation would become a significant impediment to Nixon's freedom to conduct the war. William Bundy said it best: "That the new President started with a heavy and recognized debt to the leader he has above all to influence was surely a great handicap brought on by Nixon for domestic political reasons."279

With respect to the Keys to the White House, an eleventh-hour peace agreement would not have turned enough keys to change the outcome of the election in favor of the incumbent party. For example, although an accord would have prevented Vietnam from constituting a Foreign or Military Failure, it still would not have been enough to decree

278 Oberdorfer, Don. "Unsung Poll Helped GOP Chart Path to Victory." The Washington Post December 29, 1968: Cl.

279 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 48; Historians are divided over whether Nixon's actions mattered to the overall outcome of the election. For example, Robert Dallek argues that "Nixon's pressure on Thieu made no difference (Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 77)." Rather, Dallek argues that "The country wanted a clean break with the immediate past. The assassinations ofMLK and Robert Kennedy, the inner city riots, militants demanding black power, campus upheavals, and the turmoil in the streets at the Democratic convention in Chicago exasperated the country and turned it against Johnson, Humphrey, and the Democrats, whom it identified with all the difficulties" (Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 77). On the other hand, Jeffrey Kimball argues that Nixon's last-minute actions advanced his victory (Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War. 60). Playing the center, William Bundy concludes that Nixon intended the result and did all he could to produce it. Yet there is no way to prove beyond doubt that the operation was decisive in Saigon (Bundy, A Tangled Web, 47). 105 Vietnam a Foreign or Military Success. Even in securing the Foreign or Military

Failure key, the incumbent party still faced a deficit of seven keys. 280 By the last week of the campaign, not one of the remaining keys the incumbent party failed to secure in 1968 was in a position to change as a result of a last-minute peace settlement (Party Mandate,

Party Contest, Incumbency, Third Party, Social Unrest, and Incumbent Charisma). As a result, the keys reinforce this dissertation's contention that although the election-eve peace talks were an important event of the 1968 U.S. presidential contest, they were not, however, a critical determinant in securing the election.

Richard Nixon won the popular vote in the presidential election of 1968 by just over five-hundred thousand votes, or a margin of roughly one percentage point. His electoral-college margin was more substantial, 301 to 191. As President-elect, Nixon faced a myriad of challenges, but none greater than Vietnam. With a campaign platform of Vietnamization in place, Nixon entered the presidential transition period with a clear electoral directive from the American people to bring the war to a swift but successful conclusion.

280 This is consistent with the average number of keys triggered against an incumbent party by failing to secure a Foreign or Military Success (7.6); see Table 2.1. CHAPTER3

THE STRUCTURING OF NIXON ADMINISTRATION

FOREIGN POLICY

From Formulation to Implementation

After experiencing many of the highs and lows of elected office, especially the

1968 presidential election in which he won only 43 percent of the popular vote, Nixon was keenly aware that he was not necessarily the first choice for president of a grievously split nation yearning for order and an end to the war. To make matters worse, Nixon became the first newly elected president since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to work with a

Congress in which both chambers were controlled by the opposition. Without the luxury of time and goodwill, Nixon faced one of the most difficult decisions of his presidency: how to end American involvement in Vietnam, without giving the appearance of losing the war or making too many concessions to the Communists.

After a short post-election vacation in Key Biscayne, Florida, President-elect

Nixon went about the important business of selecting a team and program to bring peace to Vietnam. Critical to the decision about what course his new administration should pursue for the war was the selection of a foreign policy establishment that supported the organizational and bureaucratic structure of his administration.

On the surface, no man could have been better prepared to endure the rigors of the

American presidency than Richard Nixon. Nixon was one of the most experienced of

106 107

American politicians; after service in the United States House and Senate, two terms as

Vice President under President Dwight Eisenhower, and more than twenty years of campaigning for Republican candidates, Nixon was considered by admirers and detractors as a "master of political tactics and as a keen strategic political thinker."281 In

May 1968, in the midst of the presidential campaign, Nixon, ever the politician, advocated an organizational structure that "would disperse power, spread[ing] it among able people." Nixon added, "Instead of taking all the power myself, I'd select cabinet members who could do their jobs, and each of them would have the stature and the power to function effectively .... Every key official would have the opportunity to be a big man in his field. "282 This apparently humble approach to the presidency may have resonated with voters. However, as Nixon prepared to organize his administration during the presidential transition, he was clearly of another mindset.

Fluent in politics and policy, Nixon, in November 1969, had a clear ethos for his administration. As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed, "When people take high office in our government they do not come in with a clean slate. They have a firm mindset."283 Nixon was no exception. His decision to assume presidential control of foreign policy by directing it from the White House,284 and the selection of politicians to represent the upper echelon of his foreign policy establishment, laid the foundation for

281 Barone, Michael. Our Country: The Shaping of American from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press, 1990. 455.

282 Barber, James David. Politics By Humans: Research on American Leadership. Durham.: Duke University Press, 1988.119.

283 Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Robert and Jacquelyn K. Davis. National Security Decision: The Participants Speak. Lexington,: Lexington Books, 1990. 3.

284 Nixon, Memoirs, 340. 108

Nixon's isolated decision-making process and the politically motivated advising that pervaded the Vietnamization debate. Because Nixon sought control of policy and surrounded himself with advisors who spoke his language, he could strive to achieve the ambitious goals he envisioned for his administration with a minimum of internal dissent.

White House Centered Control of U.S. Foreign Policy

Throughout American history, the White House has functioned as an extension of the occupant's personality. For example, Richard Nixon's administrative style and vision mirrored his very disciplined and structured personality. Uncomfortable in large groups,

Nixon preferred quiet personal time and, only if necessary, small, non-confrontational group setting. His personal style necessitated a formal, highly structured White House organizational and advisory system. Accordingly, Nixon sought to "restore the National

Security Council to its pre-eminent role in national security planning."285 Established by the National Security Act of 194 7, the NSC serves to advise the President with an integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The

Act was intended to ensure coordination of national security matters between the

President and his cabinet members. In the years before Nixon assumed the Presidency, the nature of the Council varied from very formal to strict to flexible and free flowing, depending on a particular president's preference.

As an active participant in the innerworkings of the NSC as Vice President, Nixon held strong opinions concerning the Council's role in making foreign policy. According

285 "Nixon Speaks Out." Nixon Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968, 242-3; Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979: 38-9. 109 to Nixon, "Since 1960, this Council has virtually disappeared as an operating function ... .! attribute most of our serious reverses abroad since 1960 to the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower's successors to make effective use of this important Council. "286

President Kennedy, for example, had replaced the NSC's strategic planning with tactical crisis management, and Johnson, "largely because of concern with leaks, had reduced

NSC decision making to an informal weekly luncheon with only a few advisors."287

Johnson's informal decision-making environment, according to Nixon, made it difficult for participants to know exactly what decision had been made, which left the door open for interpretations that best suited an advisor's interests or constituencies.288

From his experiences, Nixon concluded that "then and now, the key to a successful presidency is in the decision making process."289 Intending to operate on such a wide-ranging basis, Nixon argued that "he was going to need the best possible system for getting advice."290 Nixon was intent on avoiding what he perceived as the mistakes of past administrations. In particular, unlike Eisenhower, Nixon did not want to be bogged down with unimportant events that drained his time and energy. Nixon believed that

Eisenhower's staff time cluttered his schedule, and he believed that he could absorb more material by reading it, rather than talking about it. Nixon also thought that the Johnson

286 Ibid., 242-3.

287 Nixon, Memoirs, 341.

288 Kissinger, White House Years, 11-12.

289 Nixon, Memoirs, 337-8.

290 Ibid., 341. 110 administration's decision-making procedures gave the President "no real options."291 As

Kissinger later explained, "The decisions of the Johnson administration had been taken too frequently at informal sessions, often at meals - the famous "Tuesday lunches" - without staff work or follow-up. It was therefore difficult to know exactly what decisions had been made. Even with the best of goodwill, each interested agency was tempted to interpret the often ambiguous outcome of such meetings in the way most suited to its own preconceptions. "292

Given the importance Nixon placed on the NSC in his new administration, his selection of a National Security Advisor was critical to advance his vision of directing foreign policy from the White House. At 10 A.M. on November 25, 1968, Harvard

Professor Henry Kissinger arrived at the Nixon transition headquarters on the thirty-ninth floor of the Pierre Hotel for a meeting with Nixon. According to Kissinger, "I did not expect a conversation that would change my life. I thought it likely that the President elect wanted my views on the policy problems before him."293 For three hours, the two discussed power, the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and the need to control the making of foreign policy.

Prior to this meeting, Nixon and Kissinger were relative strangers, having met only at Clare Luce's 1967 Christmas party. According to Kissinger, "Nixon arrived just as I was about to leave .... We exchanged a few strained pleasantries and went our

291 Kissinger, White House Years, 11.

292 Ibid., 11.

293 Kissinger, White House Years, 10. 111 separate ways."294 Nixon noted in his Memoirs that he had read Kissinger's book

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy when it first appeared in 1957.295

At their presidential transition meeting at the Pierre Hotel, Nixon said Kissinger recommended that he "structure a national security apparatus within the White House that, in addition to coordinating foreign and defense policy, could also develop policy options for me to consider before making decisions. "296 Putting before the President the fullest range of choices and their likely consequences seemed to Kissinger to be essential because it permitted the President to make a real choice. Ideally, Nixon wanted a

"system that would provide the President with a full range of options for decision rather than a single agreed interagency view."297 This, according to Kissinger, was "indeed the main job of the national security advisor."298

Upon his appointment as National Security Advisor, which did not require the approval of the Senate, Henry Kissinger spent several weeks creating a new organizational plan for foreign policy operations. Nixon wanted the change to be more than cosmetic. He told Kissinger that they should "give the people of this country the foreign policy they want, a system that took power from the bureaucrats and placed it where it belonged, in the White House."299 In accordance with Nixon's clearly defined

294 Kissinger, White House Years, 9.

295 Nixon, Memoirs, 340.

296 Ibid., 341.

297 Lord, Carnes. The Presidency and the Management of National Security. New York: Free Press, 1988.

298 Kissinger, White House Years, 41. 112 guidelines, Kissinger selected Morton Halperin to prepare a memorandum laying out the reorganization of the national security machinery. In an effort to combine the best practices of its predecessors and make the system more orderly, efficient, and effective, the Nixon administration instituted a hierarchic structure, placing the NSC in a position of advisory prominence. Nominally, President Nixon retained all decision-making power.

In National Security Decision Memorandum 2 (NSDM2), President Nixon called for the reorganization of the NSC system. According to the memorandum, "The National

Security Council shall be the principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring

Presidential determination. The nature of the issues to be considered may range from current crises and immediate operational problems to middle and long-range planning."300 In addition, the Council was limited to agenda subjects, except in unusual circumstances, set by the Assistant for National Security Affairs, at the direction of the

President and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense. 301

The NSC's structured procedures for planning and discussiOn promoted the systematic analysis of issues to make sure that all the facts and options were considered, including their advantages, disadvantages, budgetary costs, and operational consequences. This way Nixon would receive the information he needed to make a decision: a clear understanding of the issue, a full list of alternative actions, and the knowledge of likely ramifications.

299 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 84.

300 http://nixon.archives.gov/virtual library/docurnents/nsdrn/nsdm 002.pdf, 1.

301 Ibid.,l. 113

NSDM 2 also called for the creation of the National Security Council Review

Group. The Review Group, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, included membership from representatives for the Secretary of State,

Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, depending on the issue, other agencies deemed appropriate by Kissinger. The purpose of the Review Group was to review papers to be discussed by the NSC in order to ensure that the "issue under consideration is worthy ofNSC attention," that "all realistic alternatives are presented," and that the "facts, including cost implications, and all department and agency views are fairly and adequately set out."302

In addition to the National Security Council Review Group, NSDM 2 called for the creation of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, which considered issues referred to it by the NSC Review Group and the National Security

Council Interdepartmental Group. This Committee provided policy papers for consideration by the NSC, as well as discussion and decisions on interdepartmental issues.303

The position of the National Security Advisor and his staff was enhanced by the fact that all the key committees were either chaired by Kissinger or by a member of his staff. No major department head was permitted to chair a committee that was responsible for the formulation of policy. As Winston Lord aptly notes, "in the government, whoever chairs the committees helps run the show."304 As a result of Kissinger's chairmanship of

302 Ibid., 2.

303 Ibid., 3-4. 114 the various NSC committees, the new NSC system enhanced presidential control over the formulation of foreign policy and weakened the ability of departmental and agency officials to exercise independent judgments and influence.

At a December 27, 1968 meeting with Secretary of Defense Designate Melvin

Laird and Secretary of State Designate William Rogers in Key Biscayne, Florida,

Kissinger revealed his organizational proposals that later were issued in NSDM 2 and distributed to senior administration officials305 on January 20, 1969. Laird and Rogers were unaware that Nixon approved of Kissinger's organizational plan the day before.306

A meeting in which the script was determined in advance was commonplace in the early days of the Nixon administration.

Although Rogers and Laird opposed the restructuring that was condemned by their bureaucracies as inimical to their respective departments, Nixon, after a brief hesitation, ordered the implementation of Kissinger's plan. According to Robert Dallek,

Nixon and Kissinger saw it as a vital first step in extricating the United States from

Vietnam and creating an international balance that reduced the chances of a Soviet-

American conflict and opened the way to a more stable world order. 307

The restructuring of the NSC under Nixon and Kissinger created an isolated, politically influenced decision-making structure. Nixon used meetings not to decide, but

304 Lord, Brookings, 7.

305 Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Treasury, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Director of the Bureau of Budget.

306 Kissinger, The White House Years, 44.

307 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 85. 115 to sort out; not to reach consensus, but to air ideas. Rarely were decisions made at NSC meetings. For example, of the two formal Vietnam-focused NSC meetings held on

January 25 and March 28, 1969 prior to the implementation ofVietnamization, all the critical decisions, especially pertaining to Vietnamization, were decided in advance. This was especially true when Nixon announced to an informal grouping of the NSC on March

15, 1969 his inclination to pursue Vietnamization, a decision he made two days prior.

The real policy debate and discussion largely took place in meetings between

Nixon and a senior advisor in the Oval Office or in Room 180, Nixon's Old Executive

Building Office. Final decisions, however, were made by Nixon alone, often at night, and after careful reflection on the information and options before him. The decision would then be relayed to Kissinger. According to Kissinger, "Nixon's style of government made him prepared to make decisions without illusion. Once convinced, he went ruthlessly and courageously to the heart of the matter."308 This self-imposed isolation was Nixon's preferred decision-making style in foreign policy, especially as applied to his decision to implement Vietnamization.

Brent Scowcroft, former Nixon administration Deputy National Security Advisor, pointed out, "Nixon instituted a system allowing him to take papers to his study, come back with them marked up, and would make decisions principally in that manner. "309

Only after this private deliberation would Nixon decide on a course of action. This allowed the President time to sit alone, reflect, and make a decision. Relying on a very

308 Kissinger, White House Years, 482.

309 Lobel, Aaron. Presidential Judgement: Foreign Policy Decisionmaking and the White House. John F. Kennedy School of Government: Hollis Publishing Company, 2001, 113. 116 few top advisors, Nixon closed himself off from people, ideas, and options. In short,

Nixon decided alone, often without consulting his top aides. As Henry Kissinger noted,

Nixon usually made "decisions in solitude on the basis of memoranda or with a few very intimate aides .... He would decide from inside his self-imposed cocoon .... All this led to a vicious circle in which the President withdrew ever more into his isolation and pulled the central decisions increasingly into the White House."310 As Nixon explained, "I like to work in a relatively small room with my papers all around ... when I have to do brain work, I'll go over there (EOB Room 180)."311 Within this politically isolated decision- making process, Nixon decided in principle to implement the policy ofVietnamization.

Influence of Public Opinion Polling

His orderly and centralized filtering and written communication process led the

President to rely on distinct sources of information essential to his own decision-making process. One of the most important was private opinion polling. As in the presidential campaign, polling in the Nixon White House was viewed as an instrument with which not only to win electoral competitions but also to make policy. In particular, Nixon believed that regular polling should be used in "running the government" and, accordingly, became a "permanent concern to the White House, rather than just during elections."312

Only nine days into his administration, Nixon instructed his staff to track "what moves

310 Kissinger, White House Years, 45, 482, 483.

311 Osborne, John. "How's He Doing in the White House." The New Republic 160.6 (February 8, 1969).

312 Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Shapiro, Robert Y. "The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective. Public Opinion Quarterly (Summer 1995): 169. 117 and concerns the average guy" and to fight the tendency to get out of touch from the outside world. 313

Frustrated with being forced to "almost exclusively rely on Gallup or Harris,"314

Nixon believed that internalizing polling maximized the "power in having the statistics yourself."315 Thus, Nixon contracted private pollsters to give him confidential assessments on public opinion broadly and on specific policy issues. From 1969 to 1972,

David Derge, a consultant during the 1968 campaign, and his successor, Robert Teeter, conducted a total of 233 private polls for the Nixon administration.316 The overwhelming majority of these polls sought Nixon's job approval rating and his overall handling of the

Vietnam War. Although most of the data were consistent with the results from Gallup or

Harris, Nixon's internal White House polling was more sophisticated in its analysis, especially on Vietnam. With a keen eye towards reelection in 1972, Nixon sought a more acute breakdown of issues critical to the American electorate.

313 Haldeman, Harry R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: G.P. Putnam's, 1994. January 29, 1969 entry.

314 Memo from Higby to Haldeman, April 7, I 970; Memo from Nixon to Haldeman December 30, 1969, and Memo from President to Haldeman, Nov 30, 1970, Box 403 Haldeman files NPM; Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, July 13, 1970 entry.

315 Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995, 166-7.

316 7 in 1969, 29 in 1970, 44 in 1971, and 153 in 1972; Nixon's use of private polling was not different in principle from his immediate predecessors, Kennedy and Johnson. All used polling for the purpose of strategizing policy options, but what separated Nixon was the staggering pace of polling, especially as the 1972 election approached. Nixon contracted 233 private polls between 1968 and 1972; Kennedy, 93 from 1958 to 63; and Johnson, 130 from 1963 to 68, 188 (See Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995, 166- 7, and the Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA). 118

The president reviewed his private polling results "fairly regularly" and often engaged his closest advisors about their findings. 317 In particular, Nixon would usually meet with his Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, more than once a week specifically to discuss polling and public opinion. Even the NSC was instructed when preparing position papers to take into consideration public opinion, because their recommendations had to be realistic in terms of political acceptability. 318 According to Harry Dent, who devised the Southern strategy that aided Nixon's electoral strategy in 1968, "Nixon could not have taken an initiative in any particular area without looking at some [polling] statistics"; in making policy, "Nixon did not fly through planet earth by the seat of his britches."319

Although a strong proponent of opinion polls, Nixon withheld his affinity for them not only from the general public, but also from most of his closest associates. For example, the internal polls conducted for Nixon were locked away in H.R Haldeman's

West Wing office as a tightly held secret known by only a select number of advisors. In regard to the general public, Nixon did not want to be perceived as weak by pandering to popular sentiment. For instance, when a reporter suggested that he get out of Vietnam before the popular outrage that drove Johnson from office did the same to his presidency,

317 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, January 12, 1970 entry.

318 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 167.

319 Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995, 191; Both Jacobs and Shapiro argue that archival evidence indicates that the White House tested the waters with polling before making a move on potentially controversial policy decisions. In U.S. policy over Vietnam, Nixon and his advisors repeatedly turned to polling results (191 ). 119

Nixon instructed John Ehrlichman to tell the reporter that, regardless of the polls, "RN will do what his long experience and conviction tells him is right."320

In decision making for the war, opinion polls served two important domestic purposes: they provided an analysis of opinion in response to possible policy options, and they upheld the public relations task of building and maintaining support for

Vietnamization. As Nixon put it, opinion polls "let us know what obstacles we confront in attempting to sell a policy"321 and provide the opportunity to "test a few specific issues in depth. "322

Moreover, opinion polls in the United States had an influence on how the North

Vietnamese conducted the war. At a meeting of the NSC on March 28, 1969, Philip

Habib said, "The North reads this very carefully, based on how things are going on the ground but also how they read U.S. domestic attitude. They are most sensitive to it. This is the basis for their current tactics. They are conducting a long low-level attack and watching U.S. opinion concurrently."323 Ultimately, polling was central to Nixon's decisi~n to implement Vietnamization and his consideration and timing of subsequent troop withdrawals; it also had a great influence on how receptive the North Vietnamese were to U.S. proposals to end the war.

320 Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 280; Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, February 3, 1969 entry; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995, 183.

321 Memo Nixon to Haldeman, December 30, 1969, Box 403 HRM Papers, Nixon Presidential Materials.

322 Memo Higby to Haldeman, April 7, 1970, Box 403 HRH Papers, Nixon Presidential Materials.

323 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, January-March 1969. 120

Nixon's Foreign Policy Establishment

How a president organizes his administration and who he chooses to serve him determines, to a great extent, what will be done. Possibly the best statement of this is

President John Kennedy's comment, "I must make appointments now; a year hence I will know who I really want to appoint."324 Selecting participants of an administration is one of the first tasks of a president-elect as well as one of the most important.

The Nixon administration's elite foreign policy bureaucracy consisted of the

President, National Security Advisor, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Military Commander in Vietnam, CIA Director, and members of the

White House staff played supporting advisory roles. It is through these executive agencies that Nixon discharged policy and attempted to orchestrate domestic legitimacy for Vietnamization.

The selection of politicians to represent the upper echelon of the Nixon administration foreign policy establishment laid the foundation for the politically motivated advising that pervaded the Vietnamization decision-making process. Each of his primary advisors, Kissinger, Laird, and Rogers, all served in some capacity to politically influence the decision to implement Vietnamization.

Two days after interviewing with Nixon on November 25, 1968, Harvard scholar and Professor Henry A. Kissinger was formally offered the position of National Security

Advisor. According to Nixon, Kissinger said "that he would be honored to accept."325

324 Galbraith, John Kenneth. How to Control the Military. New York: New American Library, 1969. 7.

325 Nixon, Memoirs, 341. 121

Having met Kissinger only once before, Nixon later commented, "Considering the importance I placed on the post, I made my choice in an uncharacteristically impulsive way."326

Kissinger earned a reputation for a keen foreign policy mind. Throughout the

1950s and 1960s, Kissinger published numerous articles and books; served as a consultant to the White House, NSC, Rand Corporation, and the Department of State; and served as Study Director in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy at the Council on

Foreign Relations. Most importantly, in the summer of 1967, Kissinger served as an intermediary between Washington and Hanoi in a peace initiative codenamed

"Pennsylvania." In his first experience dealing with the difficulties of negotiating with the North Vietnamese, Kissinger's efforts resulted "in a significant change in the U.S. position on what conditions Hanoi had to meet to get a halt to the American bombing of

North Vietnam."327 "Pennsylvania" was the first time the U.S. had offered to halt the bombing without "insisting that negotiations be formally agreed to beforehand."328

No stranger to politics, Kissinger, a liberal Republican, sought to increase his influence on American foreign policy. Kissinger was an active supporter and advisor of

New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in his three attempts to secure the Republican nomination for President in 1960, 1964, and 1968. Not surprisingly, Kissinger was critical of Nixon's capacity to be President. His rhetoric and position changed in August

326 Ibid., 340; A year prior, both Nixon and Kissinger attended Clare Luce's 1967 Christmas party. Both exchanged brief pleasantries, with Nixon mentioning that he had first read Kissinger's book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in 1957.

327 Isaacson, Kissinger, I 21.

328 Isaacson, Kissinger, I 21. 122 of 1968, when the political winds shifted and it became apparent that Nixon would secure the Republican nomination for President.

In an attempt to secure an appointment in the Nixon administration, Kissinger, in mid-September 1968, used his connections from his time as a Johnson negotiator and traveled to Paris to speak with members of the U.S. delegation about the progress of the negotiations. Upon his return he informed the Nixon campaign that "something big was afoot. "329 Whether Kissinger violated security or confidence, the information he provided proved to be extremely useful to the campaign. As Nixon later noted, "During the last days of the campaign, when Kissinger was providing us with information about the bombing halt, I became more aware of both his knowledge and his influence. "330

Kissinger's work as a backchannel source during the political campaign of 1968 raised his stock and credibility by demonstrating to Nixon his propensity for risk and his skill at playing politics. By politicizing the peace process, Kissinger owed his selection as much to his political gamesmanship as to his scholarly reputation.

In addition to his fall 1968 campaign intrigue, three additional reasons were responsible for Kissinger's elevation to the NSC post. First, both Nixon and Kissinger shared a common "realist" orientation to foreign policy.331 As Nixon noted in his

Memoirs, "I knew that we were very much alike in our general outlook in that we shared a belief in the importance of isolating and influencing the factors affecting worldwide balances of power. We also agreed that whatever else a foreign policy might be, it must

329 Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 132.

330 Nixon, Memoirs, 340.

331 Hersh, The Price of Power; Bundy, A Tangled Web; Mitchell, Making Foreign Policy, 49. 123 be strong to be credible."332 Second, with Kissinger working out of the West Wing basement, Nixon could direct foreign policy from the White House. Third, Kissinger, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, was "a very shrewd negotiator ... the best I've seen in seven years."333 With a great intellectual mind and an acute negotiating prowess, Kissinger could negotiate a Vietnam settlement in such a way that it would fortify America's standing with other nations, particularly the Soviet Union and China. Kissinger could win battles behind closed doors, while Nixon, more attuned to political winds, could seek to win battles in the public eye.

Announcing Kissinger's selection as NSC advisor at a press conference on

December 2, 1968, Nixon described the security advisor role as principally devoted to planning. In this capacity, Nixon argued that Kissinger "would not come between the

President and the Secretary of State."334 Further, Nixon asserted that the unnamed

Secretary was going to have a strong influence on the making of foreign policy. 335

President-elect Nixon chose William P. Rogers, U.S. Attorney General during the

Eisenhower administration, as his Secretary of State. Nixon had known Rogers since the

Alger Hiss episode during the early post-war period. Rogers, then serving as a

Committee Counsel in the U.S. Senate, examined the documentation from the House Un

American Activities Committee's investigation of Alger Hiss and advised a young

Congressman Nixon that Hiss had lied and that the case against him should be pursued.

332 Nixon, Memoirs, 340.

333 FRUS, Vietnam, 1967.

334 The New York Times December 3, 1968: 1.

335 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 81. 124

Over time Nixon would tum to Rogers for advice. For example, he called upon

Rogers during the 1952 presidential campaign when his position as Dwight D.

Eisenhower's vice-presidential nominee was threatened after disclosure that a group of

California supporters had set up a fund to help pay the Republican senator's office expenses. With Eisenhower refusing to endorse or condemn his running mate, Nixon decided he would make his case to the voters in a televised appearance that came to be known as the "Checkers" speech. In his book Six Crises, Nixon said that the night before the speech, "I took a long walk with Rogers up and down the side streets near the hotel to get some fresh air and exercise and to test out the first outline of my speech on him. He encouraged me to go forward with the plan I had adopted."336 Nixon and Rogers became even closer during Eisenhower's heart attack and ileitis episodes, with Rogers offering advice and counsel, but out of office, as New York City lawyers competing for clients during the 1960s, their friendship had cooled. 337 Despite this somewhat distant friendship, Rogers represented what Nixon was looking for in a Secretary of State; "a good negotiator, rather than policymaker. .. and a strong executive who would insure State

Department support of the President's policies."338 According to Nixon, "Rogers is one of the toughest, most cold-eyed, self-centered, and ambitious men he had ever met. As a negotiator he would give the Soviets fits, and the little boys in the State Department had better be careful because Rogers would brook no nonsense. "339

336 Nixon, Richard M. Six Crises. Garden City: Doubleday, 1962. 106-7.

337 Ibid., 106-7.

338 Kissinger, White House Years, 26. 125

According to Robert Dallek, Nixon also viewed "Rogers' unfamiliarity with the subject an asset because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in the White

House."340 Despite this arrangement, Rogers still contributed to the Vietnamization debate. Contrary to those who argued similarly that "Nixon's choice of Rogers was to be predicated on an ability to use him as a front man, rather than a partner or even participant in foreign policymaking,"341 Nixon said he could trust Rogers "to work with me on the most sensitive assignments in domestic as well as foreign policy."342 This would be the case in deciding a course for the war in the early stages of the administration, with Rogers' domestic political background proving invaluable to the debate.

Broadly, Rogers did not enjoy the strong influence on foreign policy as many of his predecessors had. With a background in domestic politics, Rogers had no settled views in foreign policy. According to Henry Kissinger, Rogers' primary objectives were to avoid domestic controversy and the charge ofrigidity."343 Rogers' Undersecretary

Elliott Richardson said of his boss, "He has the effect of a lawyer: he dealt in cases rather than grasping a way to look at the situation strategically."344 Moreover, according to

Kissinger, Secretary Rogers' experience in domestic policy, highlighted as Attorney

339 Ibid.

34°Kissinger, White House Years; Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 83.

341 Gary, Murray. The Washington Star December 13, 1968: 1.

342 Nixon, Memoirs, 339.

343 Kissinger, White House Years, 261.

344 Isaacson, Kissinger, 196. 126

General from 1957 to 1961 for the Eisenhower administration, made him acutely sensitive to public and Congressional opinion, "with less of an instinct for the geopolitical consequences of an American defeat or for what decisions motivated by domestic considerations might do to American negotiating positions. "345 The military effect he considered beyond the scope of his office.346

Rogers' frustration later led him to criticize the revitalized NSC system under

Nixon. Rogers specifically argued that the NSC should have met more regularly, the

Secretary of Treasury should have been a member of the NSC, Kissinger had become

"too much of a policy maker,"347 and the Secretary of State, not the NSC advisor, should be the principal foreign policy advisor. 348

Making matters worse for Rogers was Nixon's belief that "he had a massive organizational problem."349 Nixon distrusted the existing bureaucracy, especially the

State Department, because it had no loyalty to him and the "Foreign Service had disdained him as Vice President and ignored him the moment he was out of office. "350 In addition, according to Kissinger, Nixon "felt it was imperative to exclude the CIA from the formulation of policy; it was staffed by Ivy-League liberals who behind the fa<;:ade of

345 Kissinger, White House Years, 476.

346 Ibid., 476.

347 Rogers Testimony, March 31, 1975, 13-16, 24, Box 43, Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy Records, National Archives and Records Administration, 20.

348 Ibid., 18-19, 22, 25, 31.

349 Kissinger, White House Years, 11.

350 Ibid., 11. 127 analytical objectivity were usually pushing their own preferences. They had always opposed him politically."351 Accordingly, Nixon marginalized the input of CIA Director

Richard Helms. While a participant in NSC meetings, Helms never became a confidant of the President, largely because of his perceived CIA bias, but also because he suspected that the CIA chief was well liked by the liberal Georgetown social set Nixon despised. In fact, the President tried to remove Helms from the position, but ultimately compromised at the suggestion of Kissinger, who argued, "It would be dangerous to tum the CIA into a political plum whose Director would change with each new President. "352 Rather, Nixon sought to reduce Helms' input at NSC meetings.353

Instead, Nixon preferred to use young foreign policy professionals from outside of government to avoid the taint of the inside-the-beltway mentality Nixon disparaged. This had the result of isolating the State Department and CIA, agencies that Nixon believed had contributed to past presidential policy failures.

Barry Goldwater, in a private meeting with Nixon at the White House in March

1969, seconded this contention. According to Goldwater, Nixon asked where he saw the problems facing the nation. Goldwater replied that Nixon should remove all of the

Kennedy-Johnson administration holdovers, especially those in the State Department who had been responsible for the no-win policy in Vietnam.354 This distrust of the State

351 Ibid., 11.

352 Ibid., 36.

353 Ibid., 36.

354 Goldwater, Barry M. With No Apologies: The Personal and Political Memoirs of United States Senator Barry M. Goldwater. New York: Morrow, 1979. 214-15. 128

Department eventually served to isolate Rogers, but in the early stages of the administration, Rogers utilized his political sensibilities to advise the President on the proper course to pursue for the war.

Melvin Laird, a seventeen-year veteran of the House of Representatives and an expert on defense appropriations, was selected to fill the spot of Secretary of Defense.

As Nixon noted later in his Memoirs, "Mel Laird was respected by his congressional colleagues as a strong man and shrewd politician."355 In particular, Nixon liked Laird's reputation for deviousness. As Eisenhower told Nixon, "Of course Laird is devious, but for anyone who has to run the Pentagon and get along with Congress that is a valuable asset."356 These types of attributes led Kissinger to describe Laird as a "finely seasoned politician. "357

Nixon also viewed a reliable Defense Secretary as another priority in ensuring his control over foreign policy. According to historian Robert Dallek, Nixon "preferred a party wheel horse that would be more an administrator and liaison with Congress which, under Democratic control, seemed likely to be troublesome in setting a timetable for leaving Vietnam, endorsing treaties, and supporting defense budgets. "358 As a result of his ties with Congress and his knowledge of the Pentagon and its operations, Laird turned into one of Nixon's most independent department heads. Because he remained influential in Congress, especially through his friendship with the powerful chairman of

355 Nixon, Memoirs, 339.

356 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners, 84.

357 Kissinger, White House Years, 32.

358 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 84. 129 the House Appropriations Committee George Mahan, Laird could be ignored by the

President only at serious risk.359

Critical to determining a course for the war, Laird recognized the significance of the new NSC structure and the fact that all information would have to flow through

Kissinger before it would reach the President. Despite his objections and Kissinger's assurances that he would not be cut out of the loop, Laird, with a long record of impressive bureaucratic maneuvers, cleverly took matters into his own hands. Extracting a hand-written letter from Nixon that promised that he could appoint his own people to key positions, Laird did not move to select a deputy-secretary, as one would expect.

Rather, he selected Vice Admiral Noel Gayler as head of the National Security Agency, the spy outfit that electronically intercepts satellite and other communications from around the world. Laird told Gayler that, if he was loyal to him, he would get a fourth star. Getting what he desired, Laird received from the NSA a "copy of every back channel message Henry [Kissinger] sent, though I made sure he didn't know that."360

According to Laird, "Sometimes you have to do these things and play someone else's game against them."361 In September 1972, a few months before Laird left office, Gayler was made a four-star admiral.

Of all Nixon's foreign policy advisors, Melvin Laird was the most outspoken proponent of the policy ofVietnamization. The Secretary of Defense's pervasive political advocacy, most especially presented in a memorandum to the President

359 Kissinger, White House Years, 32.

360 Isaacson, Kissinger, 201.

361 Isaacson, Kissinger, 201. 130 summarizing his visit to South Vietnam in March 1969, was the determining factor in

Nixon's decision to implement the policy. Written by a career politician, Laird's memo dovetailed with a number of complementary variables, most notably public opinion polling, to appeal to Nixon's fluency in politics. Laird was able to bureaucratically maneuver around the formal White House structure to submit his recommendation for the war directly to the President. The Defense Secretary's intrigue highlights Kissinger's lack of critical influence over Vietnamization policy and decision making. Despite

Kissinger's powerful range of influence over the making of foreign policy throughout

Nixon's first term, in the case of Vietnamization, he would continually and decidedly lose in this inter-bureaucracy battle with Laird.

Review of Political Science Distinctions

Building on the work of political scientists, this chapter demonstrates the role of

Nixon's advisory system and personal power and influence on the policy and decision making processes that led to Vietnamization. Contrary to the advisory and management concepts of Johnson and George, this chapter establishes that the formalistic, collegial, and competitive categories are too simplistic because they fail to capture the complexity and diversity of presidential advising, especially the system's mixture of formal and informal procedures. Informal decision processes were critical to Vietnamization policy and decision making and thus hinder attempts to fit presidents or policies into one or the other analytic categories developed by political scientists.

For instance, despite the wide range of viewpoints within his inner circle, Nixon engaged only one formal meeting of the NSC before deciding to implement 131

Vietnamization. The January 25, 1969 meeting was an initial review of options just five days into the administration. Rather, Nixon preferred smaller, more intimate meetings with only a handful of senior advisors. On many occasions, to avoid confrontations and disputes, the President isolated himself from his discordant bureaucracy and constituency to minimize the inherent "bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government. "362

Moreover, contrary to scholars such as Neustadt and Allison and Halperin, this study contends that Nixon's actions within the policy and decision-making process establish that although he was not the sole formulator of the Vietnamization policy, the

President was not just another puller and hauler. Rather, he was by far the most powerful player. In creating his administration, President Nixon selected the advisors, determined their access, and, in the end, made the final decision to implement policy. Accordingly,

Nixon established his presidential role as a leading formulator of U.S. foreign policy, which befits a highly experienced president who was confident of his own judgment and highly sensitive to the political implications of wartime decisions.

In retrospect, despite his significant pre-presidential foreign and national security policy experience, Nixon would have been best served if he was supported by an advisory system that enhanced his strengths but compensated for his personal shortcomings. Unfortunately, he was not. Rather, Nixon was emboldened with the view that he did not need a strong advisory system. He was a world statesman; he would have

362 Allison, Essence of Decision, 162. 132 the answer in Vietnam, and he would make sure that the answer enhanced his prospects for reelection in 1972.

Consequently, Nixon did not hold regular meetings on Vietnam, which allowed him to retreat into isolation and cut him off from people and distractions. This served to enhance Nixon's acute sensitivity to political winds and his ability to get the most out of his available political resources. It also allowed others to feed his political insecurities.

For example, by speaking the same political language as the President, Secretary Laird had a critical impact on Vietnamization decision making. By submitting his recommendation for the war directly to the President, Laird bypassed the "formal" nature of the Nixon system and largely determined the formation of the policy as well as the timing and shape of the withdrawal schedules. CHAPTER4

THE DEBATE OVER VIETNAMIZA TION

What Nixon Faced

At the time of Nixon's inauguration on January 20, 1969, the United States was bogged down in Vietnam to such an extent that the government appeared able to handle little else. With 536,000 American troops on the ground in Vietnam and over thirty thousand casualties since John Kennedy took office, the American public viewed

Vietnam as the nation's most important problem; Americans were growing impatient for the war to end and for their soldiers to come home. 363 Despite these public pressures as

Nixon assumed office, The New Republic observed that "the peace movement holds its breath, there is a momentary calm. But this is the eye of the hurricane. "364

Given his familiarity with executive branch decision-making, Nixon entered the

White House fully aware that time can be an enemy to the President in the policy-making process. According to Nixon, "When a President sends American troops to war, a hidden timer starts to run. He has a finite period of time to win the war before the people grow

363 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2080; 40 percent said Vietnam was the most important problem. Crime and lawlessness was second, with 17 percent.

364 "Eye of the Hurricane." The New Republic March 15, 1969: 11. 132 133 weary of it. "365 Nixon understood that such weariness had set in well before he took his oath of office as president.

Ending the war quickly became essential to Nixon because he had already begun to think about his second term before even commencing his first. Indeed, Nixon's overriding concern during the first months of his administration was the domestic political implications attached to the resolution of the war. Having promised to bring the

American commitment to a conclusion during the campaign, the new president would have to make good on his pledge to win the peace or face the consequences at the ballot box. Writing to Nixon two weeks prior to the inauguration, Daniel Patrick Moynihan warned him that "his would be a one-term presidency unless the war in Vietnam ended soon."366

During his inaugural address, Nixon did not directly address the war, but his remarks included oblique references to ending the conflict. Asserting that "the greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker," Nixon gave a "sacred commitment" to "consecrate my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause of peace among nations."367 As Stephen Ambrose aptly put it, "Peace in Vietnam would solve many of his other problems and lessen all ofthem."368 At a minimum peace would

365 Nixon, Richard M. No More Vietnams. New York: Arbor House, 1985. 88.

366 Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 67.

367 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements ofthe President, Volume I. 1969, #1 "Inaugural." January 20, 1969. Washington:GPO, 1970.

368 Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 225 134 enhance his standing with the public and enable him to focus on defusing Cold War tensions and improving the domestic economy.369

To achieve peace, Nixon had to deal with challenges inherited from the Johnson administration. The North Vietnamese had no intention of ending the war with less than

Communist control of Vietnam. The South Vietnamese were incapable of effectively defending themselves and winning the allegiance of the Vietnamese people. Escalation and the commitment of increased numbers of American troops had not worked.

Stalemate was unacceptable. An increasingly agitated American public would no longer tolerate a long-term commitment to an open-ended and unwinnable war.370 Moreover,

Nixon confronted a bureaucracy permeated with diverse policy preferences over the war.

Through these many challenges, the answer was clear for Nixon: get out of Vietnam.

The problem, a political one, was how to navigate it without abandoning our South

Vietnamese allies to the Communists and becoming the first American president to lose a maJor war.

With a wide range of options and alternatives to address this challenge, Nixon utilized the first two months of his presidency to reflect fully on the situation confronting him. Although he advocated Vietnamization during the 1968 campaign, Nixon was not married to the policy as a definitive preference for his administration's overall Vietnam strategy. Closely monitoring the events on the ground in Vietnam, as well as the internal and external debate simmering to a boil, Nixon, according to Kissinger, did not

369 Ibid., 225.

370 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 2007, 126-7; Garment to Haldeman, May 13, 1969, Handwriting President's Office File, Box 2, Nixon Presidential Materials. 135 communicate his strategy for the war within the bureaucracy. Instead he waited

"until about the middle of March because he wanted to get on top ofthings ... he wanted to know what the pressures were."371

As a metaphor for impending doom, the Ides of March, or March 15, is best known as the infamous date that Julius Caesar was assassinated. On the same day, two thousand and thirteen years later, Richard Nixon, in an informal meeting of the NSC, announced his intention to pursue Vietnamization as the centerpiece of his policy for

Vietnam. As this chapter will demonstrate, Nixon ruled out the majority of options over time, leaving him to decide informally, two days prior, the most domestic politically pleasing path to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Military Victory

On the flight back to his transition headquarters in New York City on November

11, 1968, President-elect Nixon stopped off in Washington, D.C. to be briefed on the status of the war by President Johnson and his senior foreign policy advisors. Nixon later recalled that "the travail of the long war was etched on the faces around me."372 Men such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, and National

Security Advisor Walt Rostow, according to Nixon, "seemed very nearly worn out. .. .I sensed that, despite the disappointment of defeat, they were relieved to be able to tum this morass over to someone else."373

371 Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 127.

372 Nixon, Memoirs, 336-7. 136 Under great domestic and foreign pressures, Nixon sought a broad range of considerations to initiate the painstaking process to achieve what his predecessor could not - peace with honor in Vietnam. To provide Nixon with the best survey of alternatives and options for the war, as well as advocates of each position, Kissinger, in mid-December 1968, called upon his old colleague and occasional critic, Henry Rowen, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and, at the time, president of the Rand Corporation

374 , to compile a comprehensive, confidential analysis of Vietnam options. Kissinger was comfortable with the request because he had "attended many seminars about Vietnam at

Rand, and he knew the people there to be tough-minded skeptics about U.S. policy."375

Rowen accepted and appointed Daniel Ellsberg, who had lectured at Kissinger's defense policy seminars at Harvard in the 1960s, to head the project. 376 On Christmas Day 1968, both flew to New York, where for four days they met with Kissinger at the Pierre Hotel to discuss the report. 377 This Vietnam policy analysis, 378 which offered alternative political, military, and negotiating strategies for ending the Vietnamese conflict,

373 Ibid., 336-7.

374 The Rand Corporation is a nonprofit research and policy organization that conducts a broad array of national security research for the U.S. Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and key allied governments and ministries of defense.

375 Isaacson, Kissinger, 162.

376 Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 124-5.

377 Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 162.

378 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 24-6; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 3, 12-14. 137 identified disagreements among U.S. agencies and outlined approaches for military escalation, unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, and negotiated settlement.

After receiving the Rand Report, Kissinger and his staff, in consultation with

Melvin Laird, tucked themselves away at the Pierre Hotel in New York City and fine- tuned the Rand alternatives into an official NSC report that was "designed to be an initial cut at broad alternative objectives and courses of action" and "will have served its purpose if it stimulates a discussion of basic issues."379 On January 16, four days before the presidential inaugural, Kissinger sent out a Vietnam Alternatives Report to senior administration participants to be reviewed and discussed at a meeting of the NSC on

January 25. 380

379 Memo; Subject: NSC Meeting on January 25 on Vietnam; Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 24 January 1969, National Security Council Meetings Schedule 2/19/69-12/19/70: Box 019, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, l.

380 Vietnam Policy Alternatives [I 968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park; Memo; Subject: NSC Meeting on January 25 on Vietnam; Henry Kissinger to President Nixon; 24 January 1969; National Security Council Meetings Schedule 2119/69-12119170: Box 019; Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 1; Under the first alternative, the "U.S. would seek to bring all of SVN (South Vietnam) under complete and assured GVN (Government of the Republic of Vietnam) control. U.S. forces would remain until either the NVA (North Vietnam Army) had been withdrawn and the VC (Viet Cong) forces and structure eliminated, or until Hanoi had negotiated a settlement for such withdrawals including assured GVN control and perhaps international supervision and guarantees." Under the second alternative, the "U.S. would seek the withdrawal of NV A forces from South Vietnam and the end of infiltration. In return, the U.S. would phase out the withdrawal of its own forces with those of the NV A, tacitly or by agreement, even in the absence of political accommodation in SVN." Under the third alternative, "the U.S. would seek a political accommodation which would end the military conflict in South Vietnam in a manner acceptable to both sides. The U.S. could seek to participate in the negotiation of this accommodation or it could leave such negotiations to the South Vietnamese. U.S. forces could be withdrawn from SVN only after an agreement acceptable to the GVN and the NLF (National Liberation Front) had been negotiated." Under the last alternative, "the U.S. would accept or even encourage a division of South Vietnam into several large Vietcong or GVN regions, and seek to terminate the war through ceasefire, explicit or tacit. U.S. forces could be reduced or perhaps completely withdrawn as the threat from the NVA could be handled by RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces), or as the NVA withdrew." According to the President's Daily Diary, the following attended the meeting: Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, Helms, Kissinger, Elliot Richardson, U. Alexis Johnson, George A. Lincoln, Robert Murphy, Andrew Goodpaster, William Bundy, Philip Habib, Alexander Haig, and Bryce Harlow. 138 Three main policy options directed the Nixon administration's thinking on

Vietnam: military victory, unilateral withdrawal, and negotiated settlement. Within these outcomes were a wide range of alternatives. For example, escalation and current military posture represented two possible approaches to achieving military victory. Escalation called for an increase in U.S. forces in South Vietnam to 750,000 or more and expanded military operations, which ranged from resumption of bombing or ground operations into

Cambodia to limited or full invasion of North Vietnam and Laos. Advocates of this military strategy argued that the North Vietnamese Army could be destroyed or driven out, the Viet Cong defeated within 12 to 24 months, and the Government of Vietnam

(GVN) maintained, and that military victory, in the conventional sense, should be pursued at every and all costs. Proponents tied this argument to the historical basis of

U.S. involvement in Indochina, which stemmed from America's apprehension over the spread of Communism. Republican Senator John Tower of Texas often took a vocal lead in advancing this position.381

Some hardliners who advocated military escalation, however, demanded that a change in strategy accompany the buildup. They urged the invasion of North Vietnam, extensive bombing of the complex irrigation dike system, and the aggressive mining of

Haiphong Harbor, "aimed to destroy the will and capacity of the North Vietnamese to support insurgency in South Vietnam."382 As Kissinger best explained it, military victory would mean the destruction of North Vietnam through a program of heavy bombing and

381 "Five Ways Out of Vietnam," Newsweek October 20, 1969: 30

382 Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 1-1. 139 a blockade of North Vietnamese ports, accompanied by stiff warnings to Moscow and

Peking not to interfere.

Critics discounted this option by contending that expanded operations would be

costly in terms of money and casualties, would generate increased American domestic

opposition, and would create a significant risk of confronting larger participation in the war by China or Russia. Opponents also argued that U.S. objectives in South Vietnam

could be achieved by other means.383

Current military posture, the other strategy aimed at military victory, called for the continuation of current force levels and military operations. This strategy centered on the withdrawal or destruction of NVA/VC forces and structure within 12 to 24 months to a level where the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) could handle them and remain in power. Proponents of this option predicted victory by South Vietnam no later than 18 to 24 months, with or without explicit settlement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

Advocates contended that there was no risk of dramatic setbacks, but they were skeptical of any considerable troop withdrawals in the ensuing 12 to 18 months because

RVNAF improvement was marked, and even though 50,000 troops might be possible, this would have undesirable psychological effects on both the GVN and Hanoi. Critics argued, however, that the status quo approach was unlikely to produce victory in less than five years, or possibly ever. With the American public unwilling to support an extended

383 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park. 140 war effort, and without a visible exit strategy, continuing the current military posture would hardly be an acceptable strategy for the electorate.384

Although some within the U.S. government, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler, Commander of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam

Creighton Abrams, and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, advocated these two options aimed at military victory, neither Laird, Rogers, or Kissinger agreed.

In fine-tuning the Rand report, Kissinger did not include military victory as an option in his Vietnam alternatives memorandum. He believed, like the others, that the time for military victory had passed. Moreover, Secretary Laird, summing up the military's viewpoint, argued that despite the military progress throughout South Vietnam, "none of our officials, either military of civilian, is under any illusion that the battle in South

Vietnam can be brought to a military conclusion within six months, a year or even several years."385 With short-term military victory ruled out, and with Abrams, Bunker, commanders in the field, and GVN leadership in unanimous accord that the "enemy's efforts will gain no territory, nor will they bring about any permanent reduction in the level of pacification,"386 a military stalemate was a realistic possibility.

As Nixon reviewed the set of options aimed at military victory, several factors mitigated against renewing the U.S. combat commitment to the war. Johnson's de-

384 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 28; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 16-17.

385 Laird Report, Vietnam Subject Files Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 4.

386 Ibid., 3. 141 escalation announcement of the previous March had all but foreclosed significant expansion of military force on the part of the United States. Moreover, domestic polls increasingly registered strong sentiment in favor of a lessened U.S. role in the region. A

Gallup Poll in January 1969 indicated that 57 percent of those polled believed the time had come to gradually reduce the number of American soldiers in Vietnam.387 Also,

Nixon was not prepared to authorize an aggressive expansion of ground or air efforts, fearing that if he did, domestic and international fallout from such an action would do irreparable damage, not only to his ability to sustain the domestic support necessary to see the war through to a successful conclusion, but in securing a second presidential term.

Despite the fact that opinion polls showed a significant percentage of the public favored military victory in Vietnam,388 Nixon said he "would have to prepare public opinion for the fact that total military victory was no longer possible."389 As Nixon noted in his Memoirs, "Most people thought of military victory in terms of gearing up to administer a knockout blow that would both end the war and win it. "390 The problem was that there were only two knockout blows available to Nixon. The first was to bomb the elaborate system of irrigation dikes in North Vietnam, resulting in floods that would kill hundreds of thousands of civilians. The second involved the use of tactical nuclear weapons. According to Nixon, "The domestic and international uproar that would have

387 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2179-80.

388 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2189. Thirty-two percent called for escalation while only 26 percent called for a pull out.

389 Nixon, Memoirs, 349.

390 Ibid., 349. 142 accompanied the use of either of these knockout blows would have gotten my administration off to the worst possible start."391

Renewed escalation did not offer Nixon a solution to the problem of ending the war as much as it held the potential to complicate the situation hopelessly. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Nixon had clearly decided against military escalation even before he had taken the oath of office. In an unpublished campaign memo, Nixon argued that the policy of his new administration would involve a "shift away from a one dimensional military approach ... to a multi-dimensional use of diplomatic and economic power of the U.S."392 Besides, 65 percent of the American public disagreed with going all-out to win a military victory in Vietnam using atomic bombs and weapons.393

Consequently, in accordance with Laird, Rogers, and Kissinger, Nixon argued that military victory "was an option we ruled out very early."394

Unilateral Withdrawal

Another alternative considered by the Nixon administration was the unilateral withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam. This option involved a U.S. decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Vietnam in one to two years, whether or not an agreement was reached in Paris. Although this position lacked advocates within the government, proponents deemed the war unwinnable and said that withdrawal limited

391 Ibid., 349.

392 Campaign Memo dated July 7, 1968. Nixon Papers. Hoover Institution Archives.

393 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2111.

394 Nixon, Memoirs, 347. 143 damage, saved lives, and conserved resources. Critics of withdrawal countered by charging that this policy would lead to the probable collapse of the GVN and a

Communist takeover of all of Vietnam. 395

Pressure for withdrawal came both from those who rejected the basis for U.S. involvement in Indochina, as well as those who believed that the U.S. was wasting precious men and material in a futile war. Proponents deemed the war unwinnable largely because of an inability to solve political problems at the heart of the war, particularly American public opinion. Among those pressing for this option was former

Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, who urged that U.S. combat troops be withdrawn by

January 1971 with only support troops left behind to assist the South Vietnamese.396

However, Kissinger, Laird, and Rogers opposed unilateral withdrawal. Of the three, Kissinger, probably the leading critic of this option, said, "We could not simply walk away from an enterprise involving two administrations, five allied countries, and

31,000 dead as if we were switching a television channel. "397 Moreover, Kissinger later wrote, "Unilateral withdrawal had all the makings of an awesome and bloody fiasco.

Above all, the Nixon administration was convinced that unilateral withdrawal would turn into a geopolitical disaster."398 Kissinger was afraid unilateral withdrawal would produce profound disillusionment among America's allies. 399

395 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 2, 30-1.

396 "Five Ways Out of Vietnam," Newsweek October 20, 1969: 29.

397 Kissinger, White House Years, 228, 261; Isaacson, Kissinger, 165. 144 Kissinger eliminated the unilateral withdrawal option on the first day of discussion over the Rand Report. In an interview with Walter Isaacson, Fred Ikle, former

Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Nixon administration, said, "Henry said it was so far outside what was going to happen that it didn't help the options paper, and it would upset Nixon."400 Although the Nixon team quickly ruled out a full unilateral withdrawal, Secretary Rogers, assessing the situation through the eyes of a politician, stated at a January 25, 1969 NSC meeting, "I think we can expect more from the American people, especially if we could at some point reduce our commitment by perhaps 50,000."401 Rogers' comment led Nixon to reply, "If you can do this perhaps maybe we can buy time and perhaps some support."402

Although Rogers favored a partial American troop pullout for domestic political considerations, his rationale, according to Kissinger "did not give great consideration to the military impact of troop withdrawals and their impact on negotiations."403 Despite these limitations, Rogers' advocacy of withdrawal was attractive to the Nixon administration for two reasons: "to win public support and give Hanoi an incentive to

398 Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

399 Ibid.

400 Isaacson, Kissinger, 163.

401 Meeting; National Security Council, 25 January 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box H-019; National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974); Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 34.

402 Ibid., 34.

403 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 180-1. 145 negotiate seriously by enhancing the staying power of our remaining forces."404

Moreover, according to then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis

Johnson, "Rogers believed that a partial withdrawal of American troops would check the rising domestic pressures for total withdrawal. "405 As a key component of the policy of

Vietnamization, this consideration would later become the cornerstone of the Nixon administration's approach to Vietnam.

Of a similar mindset as his top advisors over the unilateral withdrawal option,

Nixon argued, "this option had long since been foreclosed. A precipitate withdrawal would abandon 17 million South Vietnamese ... we simply could not sacrifice an ally in such a way. If we suddenly reneged on our earlier pledges of support because they had become difficult or costly to carry out, or because they had become unpopular at home, we would not be worthy of the trust of other nations and we certainly would not receive

't ,,406 1 .

Despite the apparent downside, Nixon, ever the politician, considered the withdrawal option because it encompassed some undeniably compelling political arguments. As one of Nixon's friends in Congress put it, "You didn't get us into this war, so even if you end it with a bad peace, by doing it quickly you can put the blame on

Kennedy and Johnson and the Democrats. Just go on TV and remind people that it was

404 Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 81.

405 Johnson, Alexis U. The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat. Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1984: 528.

406 Nixon, Memoirs, 348. 146 Kennedy who sent the 16,000 Americans in there, and it was Johnson who escalated it to 540,000. Then announce that you're bringing them all home, and you'll be a hero."407

After carefully reviewing the arguments on both sides, Nixon directed that the option for an immediate commitment to a complete withdrawal be deleted. Such a course of action would have meant capitulation, or an elegant "bug out," leading within months to North Vietnamese control over South Vietnam and the eventual communist domination of Southeast Asia. Nixon knew that the Thieu government was not yet politically strong enough and that the ARVN was not adequately trained or equipped to guarantee the security of their own nation. As a result, according to CIA Director Helms at the January 25, 1969 meeting of the NSC, "under the present ground rules, assuming the withdrawal of our troops, South Vietnam would be able to go it alone for approximately one year."408 For this reason, as well as Nixon's belief that "it will take a long time to withdraw U.S. forces completely and, frankly I don't think it can be done within six months,"409 and "thousands of people ... would be slaughtered if we just pulled out...it is obvious that if we pulled out other countries would crumble,"410 plans for a full- scale unilateral withdrawal were pulled from consideration.

407 Ibid., 348.

408 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

409 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

410 Sulzberger, C. L. Seven Continents and Forty Years: A Concentration of Memoirs. New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1977. 505. 147 Although he ruled out a full unilateral withdrawal, in concurrence with his

Secretary of State, Nixon considered a small reduction of approximately 50,000

American troops for domestic political considerations. At the same January 25 NSC meeting, Undersecretary of State Richardson asked the President, "Could we not also seek a small reduction of U.S. forces along the route, perhaps three or four months from now?"411 To this, Nixon replied, "This might be the thing to do in four months or so, after the initial negotiations are underway. Maybe we had better cut out the bilateral staff talks and conduct this as a unilateral move in four months or so."412 Nixon made clear, however, that this consideration "should not be done in the context of our negotiating framework,"413 and "must be held very closely until the time of execution."414

Ultimately, Nixon did not pursue this option. The domestic political benefits of a troop withdrawal were shrouded under the umbrella of Vietnamization. So with neither renewed military escalation nor unilateral withdrawal representing appealing outcomes to end the war, Nixon had to choose a negotiated path to end the war carefully, lest the costs of the U.S. effort in Vietnam over the previous generation be recast as purposeless sacrifice.

Negotiated Mutual Withdrawal

411 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

412 Ibid.

413 Ibid.

414 Ibid. 148 Some within the U.S. government were proponents ofrelying exclusively on

negotiations to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. For example, W. Averill Harriman and

Cyrus Vance, former principal U.S. negotiators in Paris, strongly supported this option.

They argued that the North Vietnam was as interested in avoiding needless bloodshed as the United States was, and that if presented with reasonable proposals, would move quickly toward a resolution. The key to settlement, they believed, lay not in military aggressiveness in Vietnam but rather in diplomatic aggressiveness in Paris.415

Others, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Earle Wheeler, argued that a successful negotiated outcome in Vietnam could only be achieved "if it results in the withdrawal of all NV A units and NV A cadre and fillers from South Vietnam,

Cambodia, and Laos to North Vietnam."416 Otherwise, Wheeler added, "If negotiations fail to eliminate North Vietnamese presence in these three countries, the war will in effect have been lost, regardless of the political settlements reached."417

With varying levels of advocacy for negotiation within the U.S. Government, the

Nixon administration coalesced these perspectives into three alternatives targeted towards a compromised settlement: negotiated mutual withdrawal, negotiated political accommodation, and a substantial reduction in U.S. presence while seeking a compromise settlement.

415 "Five Ways Out of Vietnam." Newsweek October 20, 1969: 30-1; "Harriman Bids U.S. Reduce War Levels." New York Times June 22, 1969: 3.

416 Wheeler to Kissinger, January 1, 1969, Henry A. Kissinger Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, Transition Box 1, 5. ..

417 Ibid. 149 The first of these alternatives, negotiated mutual withdrawal, sought to negotiate in Paris the mutual withdrawal of NV A and U.S. forces from South Vietnam.

Proponents contended that mutual U.S./NVA withdrawal could be agreed upon and carried out in three years, giving the GVN a fair chance to overcome the VC insurgency gradually. At a meeting of the NSC on January 25, 1969, JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler argued that this alternative was not possible. Opponents such as Wheeler argued that the reason for not seeking an overall political accommodation as part of mutual withdrawal was that the GVN would oppose it, it would probably require protracted negotiations, and it might deeply involve the U.S. in a settlement that resulted in a Communist takeover.418

In response to Wheeler's contention that mutual de-escalation was not a possibility, Secretary Rogers replied, "Frankly, I cannot accept such a concept."419

Rogers made clear that he believed withdrawal and mutual de-escalation were the only practical ways out of an impossible situation. Rogers was convinced that the faster the pace of withdrawals, the more chance there was for a breakthrough at the Paris peace talks. Adding to Rogers, Kissinger argued that "de-escalation would increase public support for the war. .. gives us time to work out a settlement," reduces casualties, and

418 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 3, 23-6; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 1, 12-14.

419 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 3, 23-6; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 12. 150 strengthens our staying power. 420 On the other hand, the Military Assistance

Command Vietnam (MACV) and JCS argued strongly against de-escalation. In particular, the MACV argued that de-escalation would "shift degree of initiative from us to the enemy, which he would exploit to rebuild his strength in populated areas; would result in a shift in the killed in action ratios in a direction less favorable to the U.S. as a result of a cutback in artillery and air support, and would only bog talks down while adversely affecting the morale of our troops."421

Ultimately, in accord with the MACV and JCS, Rogers, Kissinger, and Laird all discarded this option. In particular, Kissinger fell in line by noting, "If we were to adopt a policy of de-escalation the enemy would lose much of the incentive for negotiating a settlement and the very act of talking about it is a time waster."422 Moreover, Rogers argued, "I agree that de-escalation is not good but we cannot say this in public." 423

Despite advocacy within the U.S. government to rely exclusively on negotiations,

Nixon, as well as Laird, discarded this option because they did not believe that the war could be resolved through negotiation alone. In fact, Nixon "was not hopeful about the prospects of settling the Vietnam War through the Paris talks," and according to

420 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969; Paris Meetings; Plus; Library of Congress, Manuscript division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan-Mar 1969.

421 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

422 Meeting: March 28, 1969, 17; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan-Mar 1969.

423 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969. 151 Kissinger, "felt that we needed to rethink our whole diplomatic and military policy on

Vietnam."424

Nixon was fully aware that the greatest threat to a negotiated settlement was the time it would take to accomplish results. A lack of progress in the peace talks would risk an adverse domestic political reaction to the President's policies that could translate into real pressure to settle at almost at any cost. The North Vietnamese could rely on the rapidly eroding American will to achieve for them what fighting on the battlefield could not -- the withdrawal of the U.S. from Indochina. Hanoi's resolve convinced Nixon that the North Vietnamese had to be pressured into meaningful discussions.

Despite being advised by U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Bunker that the

North Vietnamese were in Paris because "they are suffering on the ground," 425 and by

CIA Director Helms that the North Vietnamese "were serious about negotiations,"426

Nixon took matters into his own hands during the presidential transition period to pressure the enemy into meaningful discussions. The President was in communication with the North Vietnamese through Frenchman Jean Sainteny, a former French

Government official with extensive official experience in Indochina who was personally known to the top leaders in Hanoi. The President initiated the exchange with his message on December 20, 1968, which informed the North Vietnamese that his administration was prepared to undertake serious talks. On December 31, 1968, Hanoi sent its reply, which

424 Nixon, Memoirs, 340-1.

425 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

426 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969. 152 emphasized that its point of primary concern was U.S. willingness to withdraw troops. The ball was kept in play by the President-elect's response of January 2, which stated that his administration was ready to withdraw U.S. forces from South Vietnam as part of an honorable settlement that included mutual troop withdrawal.427

Negotiated Political Accommodation

Within the Nixon camp, Henry Kissinger was the chief proponent of the second negotiated alternative, negotiated political accommodation. This option sought to negotiate in Paris a political accommodation that would end the military conflict in South

Vietnam in a manner acceptable to both sides. The U.S. could seek to participate in the negotiation of this accommodation, possibly leading to a speedier agreement, or it could leave such negotiations to the South Vietnamese.

Proponents such as Kissinger favored utilizing the current military strategy and contended that successful negotiations, which would probably take 12 to 18 months, could lead to a non-Communist South Vietnam that would be viable for at least five years. In public, Kissinger was more optimistic than this assessment, telling a group of protesting

Quakers, "Give us six months and if we haven't ended the war by then, you can come back and tear down the White House fence."428 Anthony Lake, who served as

Kissinger's assistant, said of his boss, "I believe that Henry was sincere in believing he

427 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 861, Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memoranda, 1969-1970.

428 Isaacson, Kissinger, 165. 153 could negotiate an end to the war, and do it sooner rather than later."429 Critics, on the other hand, argued that such negotiations would almost certainly take 2 to 3 years, resulting in unacceptable costs and fatality levels.430

Despite considerable optimism, Kissinger was well aware that the North

Vietnamese considered themselves in a life-and-death struggle, and that the Paris talks were not a device for settlement but an instrument of political warfare. According to

Kissinger, the North Vietnamese used negotiations as "a weapon to exhaust us psychologically, to split us from our South Vietnamese ally, and to divide our public opinion through vague hints of solutions just out ofreach because of the foolishness or obduracy of our government."431 Clearly, the North Vietnamese did not want to enhance our staying power. They instead preferred secret talks because it gave them "an opportunity to reconnoiter the terrain without paying the price of the appearance of progress. "432

To face this challenge, Kissinger proposed a two-track strategy requiring two major demands: the North Vietnamese troops must be withdrawn from the South, and the government of Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon must not be ousted other than by free elections. Kissinger argued that this negotiating strategy paralleled the one which

429 Isaacson, Kissinger, 165.

430 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 3, 21-2; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 1, 16-7.

431 Kissinger, White House Years, 260.

432 Ibid., 260. 154 "Harriman and Vance had urged in their transition memoranda and which I had outlined in my Foreign Affairs article."433

Kissinger favored a strong military posture to force North Vietnam to choose between devastation and genuine negotiation. He argued that an honorable outcome depended on our ability to create political incentives for Hanoi to compromise, which would be impossible unless the U.S. could convert its military position on the ground into a durable political structure. According to Kissinger, "We needed a strategy that made continuation of the war seem less attractive to Hanoi than a settlement." This assessment ironically reflected President Lyndon Johnson's initial strategy for escalating the war in

Vietnam in 1965. In June 1965, Johnson told his cabinet, "Our objective is just that: it is to convince them that they can't win there. We think we can achieve this objective by moving toward a stalemate, convincing them that the situation in the South will not lead to a military victory." 434

By ruling out mutual withdrawal early in the administration, Nixon, like

Kissinger, turned his support to the negotiated political accommodation option. The

President believed that negotiations would not amount to anything until the military situation changed fundamentally, and he thought Hanoi would accept compromise only if it had no other choice.435 Given this considerable challenge, the President "saw little

433 Ibid., 262.

434 Ibid., 262; Lichtman, Allan J. White Protestant Nation: The Rise of the American Conservative Movement. New York: Grove/Atlantic, 2008. 271.

435 Ibid., 261. 155 hope for such a settlement."436 Nixon argued that the U.S. might end up with a settlement of some type without a formal agreement, a sort of mutual accommodation in which either side was not deprived of the hope of ultimate success.437 As a result, the negotiated accommodation option was slowly ruled out.

In a March 16, 1969 meeting with Rogers, Laird, Kissinger, and Wheeler; Nixon observed, "The state of play in Paris is completely sterile. I am convinced that the only way to move the negotiations off dead center is to do something on the military front.

That is something they will understand."438 A negotiated settlement held little intrinsic value for Hanoi and consequently offered little incentive for them to engage in concessions simply in order to achieve settlement. The U.S. needed a resolution to the conflict and could ill afford the political costs associated with a protracted struggle.

Hanoi neither shared the U.S. time schedule nor the need for a negotiated resolution to the war. Accordingly, Nixon was "convinced that the combined effect of the military pressure from the secret bombing and the public pressure from my repeated initiations to negotiate would force the Communists to respond. "439

In the President's mind, U.S. participation in the peace talks had less to do with the realities of the conflict with North Vietnam than it did with the realities of domestic conflict within the United States. With the decision against a military solution,

436 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

437 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969

438 Nixon, Memoirs, 381.

439 Ibid., 390. 156 negotiations were a critical consideration in U.S. efforts to end the war, serving to convince the American people that their government was expending every effort to pursue a settlement of the unpopular war.

One of his central and most consistent strategies for dealing with the North

Vietnamese, Nixon's so-called "madman theory," an array of threats, bombing spasms, and psychological warfare, was intended to coerce Hanoi into negotiations and concessions. As he told aide H.R. Haldeman, "I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for god's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry - and he has his hand on the nuclear button' - and Ho Chi Minh will be in Paris in two days begging for peace."440 Nixon believed that unpredictability was a great asset for a diplomat.441 Given his fierce anticommunist record, Nixon assumed that he could scare the Communists into believing that he would exert enough force to compel an acceptable end to the war for the

United States.442

Although he supported a negotiated political accommodation and its attendant

"madman" strategy, Nixon was also a political realist. He knew this option did not take into account the reality that he was elected by a domestic constituency determined to see the reduction of American military presence in Vietnam. The need to monitor and

440 Isaacson, Kissinger, 163-4.

441 Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves, 61.

442 DaJlek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 106-7; Haig to Kissinger February 12, 1969, National Security Council Files, Box 955; Nixon to Kissinger February 1, 1969; March 21-22 1969, President's Office Files, Box 30. 157 accommodate public opinion was rarely, as in Nixon's case, a key consideration for

Kissinger's Vietnam policy. As a result, Kissinger advocated a policy that appealed to

Nixon's anticommunist resume, but not to the President's domestic political concerns.

Because of Nixon's sensitivity to public pressure, Kissinger, relying too heavily on negotiations, lost this strategic battle over Vietnam policy early on in the Nixon administration. 443

Vietnamization

The final outcome considered by the Nixon administration was Vietnamization, or the substantial reduction in U.S. presence option, which attempted to seek a compromise settlement withdrawal of between 100,000 and 200,000 men in the first year and additional withdrawals thereafter. For the first few months, however, essentially no U.S. troops were to be withdrawn and the strategy was not to be revealed in an effort to negotiate a mutual withdrawal with the North Vietnamese. Afterwards, the preferred mode of implementation was to obtain GVN approval of a schedule for withdrawal and to continue programs to modernize the RVNAF, with the expectation that the South

Vietnamese would carry an increased share of the burden, so as to reduce the number of

American servicemen in Vietnam to 100,000 by the end of 1971. 444 Describing the program before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary Laird argued that

443 Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, 42.

444 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 27-9; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 2, 31-33. 158 Vietnamization was "the effective assumption by the RVNAF of a larger share of combat operations from American forces" so that "U.S. forces can be in fact withdrawn in substantial numbers. "445

The possible replacement of U.S. troops in Vietnam was considered at a meeting of the NSC on January 25, 1969. At that meeting, President Nixon approved continuation of US-RVN discussion on such a possibility but with the stipulation that the talks be on a "strictly close-hold, need to know basis."446 The President and his advisors took up the question again in a February NSC meeting. They agreed that the United

States should envisage the replacement of U.S. troops with Vietnamese forces as soon a possible, but, confronted at this time with the threat of an enemy offensive similar to the

Tet Offensive, the Nixon administration chose to defer action on Vietnamization until

Laird returned from visiting Vietnam in early March. 447

Within the bureaucracy and especially within Nixon's inner circle, points of disagreement on RVNAF capabilities were more numerous than points of agreement.

Critics, such as Wheeler, Abrams, and Bunker, argued that North Vietnam had no incentive to reduce its commitment to the war as long as it believed the U.S. support for the war was diminishing, and if Hanoi increased its level of effort, the result could be

Communist control of much of South Vietnam.448 Moreover, the first withdrawals would

445 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives. Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture, Part I, 91 st Congress, 2nd session, 1970, 7023-7024.

446 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

447 Wheeler to Abrams, January 24 and 28, 1969, 1081and1184. Abrams Papers. U.S. Army Center of Military History. 159 increase the pressure for more withdrawals and, thus, diminish the administration's freedom of action. If the pressure of withdrawals became too great or if the president went too far in stressing them, the U.S. might lose what advantage it had in Paris by destroying any incentive for the enemy to negotiate on terms favorable to American interests.

Although Vietnamization may have made political sense, it was a disaster from the U.S. military's point of view. Military advisors considered Vietnamization tantamount to a slow surrender. According to Kissinger, "Deep down they knew that it was a reversal of what they had fought for. However presented, it would make victory impossible and even an honorable outcome problematical. The process of withdrawal was likely to become irreversible."449 As a result, no informed senior U.S. official had confidence that such a Vietnamization plan would work without a U.S. willingness to reenter the war if necessary.45° For many in the military, victory in Vietnam meant obtaining the withdrawal of all Communist subversive forces from South Vietnam within

1 to 2 years and the retention of the current South Vietnamese government.451 Not surprisingly, Vietnamization was a tough pill for the generals and admirals to swallow.

448 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: HenryA Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 27-9; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 2; 31-33.

449 Kissinger, White House Years, 272.

45°Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy ofa War: Vietnam. the United States. and the Modem Historical Experience. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. 353-4.

451 Vietnam Policy Alternatives [ 1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, I. 160 The U.S. commander in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, was not overly optimistic about the prospects ofVietnamization. Abrams argued that the South

Vietnamese could not stand alone against a combined threat; according to Secretary

Laird, Abrams wasn't "gung ho with doing this."452 Abrams believed that

Vietnamization was not likely to break the military stalemate or provide Nixon with the bargaining leverage necessary to convince the enemy to negotiate concessions. In fact, the South Vietnamese army was surely not going to achieve the victory that had eluded a vastly superior American army at full strength. With this many strikes against it, Abrams believed that Vietnamization contradicted the proper military strategy for Vietnam.453

Like Abrams, many experienced generals expressed open pessimism over South

Vietnam's chances of survival without substantial American combat support. They argued that Vietnamization would take years to accomplish, would make North Vietnam less and less likely to concede anything,454 and place the U.S. in a race between the decline in our combat capabilities and the improvement of South Vietnamese forces, a race whose outcome was at best uncertain.455 According to General Goodpaster, it would

452 http://www.clubhistorian.com/Projects/?projectid=20

453 Hoff, Joan. Nixon Reconsidered. New York: BasicBooks, 1994. 212; Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, 247; Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 74; Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army, 286.

454 Isaacson, Kissinger, 247; Kissinger, White House Years, 272-3; Kolko, Anatomy ofa War, 369; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President. Volume l, 1969, 472.

455 Isaacson, Kissinger, 235. 161 "take about two years for the Vietnamese to be ready to take over," 456 but "this depends on what the South Vietnamese themselves do."457

Despite skepticism about Vietnamization, the American military did recognize the

RVNAF's steady improvement. According to General Goodpaster, "We have moved from 750,000 to 855,000 troops and the caliber of the force has improved. There can be no question about their improvement. The RF and the PF have grown quantitatively and qualitatively." 458 Echoing this sentiment, General Lincoln said, "I think South Vietnam had improved its forces but it is not being reported, especially back here." 459

As a result, according to Goodpaster, because "the overall improvement has been substantial... what we visualize is the replacement of certain U.S. units with certain GVN units."46° Consequently, Goodpaster added, "we are, in fact, closer to de-Americanizing the war," 461 but any reduction of U.S. forces would need at least three months to get ready to start any withdrawals, at least six months to get the people and equipment out. 462

Although "most reluctant to commit the U.S. on this at this time," Goodpaster made clear that a decision would only be made "in the light of conditions at the time. Our view this

456 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

457 Ibid.

458 Ibid.

459 Ibid.

460 Ibid.

461 Ibid.

462 Ibid. 162 time will be July."463 Goodpaster's argument led Rogers to reply, "It is time that the military realized the kind of problems we have. Why do the military always talk about how much time it will take to withdraw, why do they always rattle a saber in public?

This is what has caused our problem with the young people."464

The military was also particularly skeptical of Laird's push for Vietnamization.

Just days into the administration, Defense Secretary Laird began laying out his own strategies and tactics for de-Americanizing the war. For example, Wheeler, writing to

Abrams, argued that Laird viewed the prospects for troop reduction as imminent465 and that Abrams was urged to "quietly put the damper on any public discussion [of troop withdrawals] by senior U.S. officers."466 This letter came on the heels of a meeting

Abrams and Ambassador Bunker had with President Thieu on January 17, 1969 at which the possibility of American troop redeployments under the new Nixon administration was formally discussed.467 Laird, citing political pressures at home, directed Abrams to prepare plans to put the new policy into action "before the time given the new administration runs out...probably with[in] the next three or four months."468

463 Ibid.

464 Ibid.

465 Wheeler to Abrams, January 28, 1969, JCS 0118 1, Abrams Papers, U.S. Army Center of Military History; Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. 239-42.

466 Ibid., 239-42.

467 Bunker to Rogers, 1410 January 1969; Pike, Douglas. The Bunker Papers: Reports to the President From Vietnam, 1967-1973, Vols. 1-3, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1990.

468 Meeting: March 28, 1969; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan-Mar 1969, 13. 163 Laird's words and actions led some, such as Field General William

Westmoreland, to argue that the Secretary of Defense "was obsessed with getting out of

Vietnam for political reasons as soon as possible," and that he had a strong mandate to make the administration look good.469 With such an emphasis on withdrawal,

Westmoreland added, "Laird was virtually indifferent to what happened on the battlefield."470 Summing up the military perspective, Jerry Friedheim, Laird's deputy at the Department of Defense, argued that his boss was "more interested in ending the war in Vietnam rather than winning it."471

The North Vietnamese were even more skeptical of the prospects of

Vietnamization. Nguyen Tho, the North Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S., argued that the U.S. knew that "when it withdraws its forces the puppet administration and army would disintegrate ... and if the U.S. just gradually withdrew as the puppet administration and army were being consolidated, the U.S. would never succeed."472 Warning the U.S. not to implement the policy, Tho summed up the dilemma for many about

Vietnamization, "Before, there were over a million U.S. and puppet troops, and you failed. How can you succeed when you let the puppet troops do the fighting? Now, with only U.S. support, how can you win?"473

469 Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City.: Doubleday, 1976. 471.

47°Kissinger, White House Years, 4 71.

471 Hammond, William H. Interview of Jerry Friedheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1969-1973, Ott 86, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

472 Nixon Presidential Materials. Haig Chronological Files. January 19, 1969, 2.

473 Ibid., 444. 164 Within Nixon's inner circle, Kissinger was by far the most critical of

Vietnamization. According to Walter Isaacson, for Kissinger, "Vietnamization violated his cardinal rule ofrealism: military force and diplomacy must work together."474 In his

1957 work, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger had critiqued the U.S. decision to cease offensive operations in Korea while armistice talks were being held.

Kissinger believed that "our insistence on divorcing force from diplomacy caused our power to lack purpose and our negotiations to lack force." 475

According to Kissinger, Vietnamization would weaken the U.S. bargaining position in negotiations with the North Vietnamese, reduce morale of those troops who remained after American units withdrew, and cause the U.S. to lose what advantage it had in Paris by destroying any incentive for the enemy to negotiate on terms favorable to

American interests. 476 Instead, Kissinger viewed the policy as a "bargaining ploy, a negotiating tool" that he never thought would work.477 Ultimately, Kissinger believed that Vietnamization, although "necessary for domestic political reasons, was an opportunity, which, if it ever existed, had been lost by his predecessors," and a political decision that closed off diplomatic and military options, at least insofar as it involved

U.S. force reductions.478

474 Isaacson, Kissinger, 237.

475 Isaacson, Kissinger, 237.

476 Hammond, William M. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973. Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1996. 11 O; Kissinger to Nixon, September 10, 1969, Nixon Presidential Materials.

477 Kalb and Kalb, Kissinger, 129.

478 Kissinger, White House Years, 262. 165 Kissinger was also skeptical about the South Vietnamese ever becoming the kind of fighting force that could assume a primary combat role against the North

Vietnamese. According to Kissinger, "We recognized from the beginning the uncertainty that the South Vietnamese could be sufficiently strengthened to stand on their own with the time span that domestic opposition to American involvement would allow."479 A peace settlement, argued Kissinger, was therefore required to leave the South a healthy interval to determine their fate on the battlefield. 480

The Secretary of State was even less optimistic about Vietnamization than

Kissinger, particularly as regards South Vietnam's military capacity, their political stability, and the ability of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to be trained quickly enough to prosecute the war on their own. 481 At a March 28, 1969 meeting of the NSC, Secretary

Rogers, commenting on the lack of RVNAF improvement, said, "We have been saying this for over a year and a half. What do we say now? ... We see no movement. How can we convince the [American] people after all this failure."482

Rogers believed that the RVNAF's motivation, leadership, and desertion problems were long term and highly complex, and demonstrated that significant

479 Kissinger to Nixon, September 1971, Vietnam, NSC Files, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Box 1013, General Haig's Trip to Vietnam, September 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials.

480 Ibid; Similarly, the CIA contended that South Vietnamese progress had been "slow, fragile, and evolutionary," and this made it "difficult to see how the U.S. can largely disengage over the next few years without jeopardizing the advancements." (CIA Response to NSSM 1 XXIII-2) The CIA add that without U.S. support, the ARVN's will to fight offensively would diminish, leading to the worst situation for the RVNAF - "the withdrawal of all U.S. combat support, while the NV A filler remained." (CIA Response to NSSMl, XI-l-Xl-3)

481 Kissinger, White House Years, 475-6.

482 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969. 166 improvement could not be accomplished in the upcoming years.483 Moreover, Rogers added, "Under current and foreseeable circumstances, it will probably take a minimum of two years before structural and technical reforms can make any substantial contribution toward RVNAF fighting effectiveness," and in the absence of U.S. troop involvement, any favorable short- and long-term prospects would be negated. 484

On one point, though, Rogers' position differed from Kissinger's. Unlike the

National Security Advisor, Rogers supported a small unilateral withdrawal to quell domestic criticism.485 Although not advocating Vietnamization, Rogers knew the value of public opinion. Although not an outspoken advocate of the strategy, Rogers was committed to supporting the program and its domestic political implications.

On the other hand, those advocating Vietnamization argued that the policy reduced political risks, costs, and fatalities; increased the credibility of the U.S. remaining as long as necessary; and created an outcome in South Vietnam that depended on whether the GVN/ARVN pulled itself together, collapsed, or negotiated with the National

Liberation Front. 486

The main proponent of Vietnamization within the Nixon camp was Defense

Secretary Melvin Laird, the sixteen-year veteran of the United States House of

483 U.S. Department of State Reply to NSSMI, February 13, 1969, 29-30.

484 Ibid., 42, 44.

485 As noted earlier, Rogers was on record advocating a small withdrawal of 50,000 troops.

486 Vietnam Options Paper [1969] folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 27-9; Vietnam Policy Alternatives [1968], folder: Vietnam - RAND, Box 3, National Security Council Files: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, HAK Administration and Staff Files, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, 2, 31-33. 167 Representatives and the first member of Congress to occupy the Secretary position.

At a meeting of the NSC on March 28, 1969, General Andrew Goodpaster, then serving as General Abrams' deputy in Saigon, reported to the President that substantial improvement in the South Vietnamese forces had already been made and that MACV was in fact close to "de-Americanizing" the war. Taking exception to Goodpaster's term

"de-Americanizing," Laird contended, "what we need is a term like Vietnamizing to put the emphasis on the right issue."487 Praising Laird's political maneuver, Nixon replied,

"That is a good point Mel."488 Thus, Vietnamization's chief proponent within the administration was also responsible for coining its name.

In order for Vietnamization to work, Laird believed that the administration must change the mission statement that guided how U.S. troops were used. Instead of fighting a limited war, for limited objectives, and with limited resources, Laird's new mission statement defined the American military role as assisting South Vietnam's army, staking out a defensive rather than offensive posture, and giving the Vietnamese people the opportunity to choose freely their own government. Laird not only wanted to withdraw

American troops from Vietnam faster than the Pentagon thought the South Vietnamese forces could be trained to replace them, but he also wanted U.S. allies to realize that they could no longer depend upon American manpower to defend them in conventional war.489

487 Meeting: March 28, 1969, 17; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan-Mar 1969, 13.

488 Ibid., 13. 168 Laird utilized his perceptive view of the rapidly waning patience of the

American public to centralize himself in the debate over Vietnam, and greatly enhance his influence in the administration as to the pace and magnitude of American troop withdrawals. 490 According to Kissinger, Laird was "politically astute. His major concern was to get the U.S. out of Vietnam before we lost too much domestic support."491

According to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Laird "was opposed to widening the war in any way and was convinced that the United States had to pull out of

Vietnam before losing any more political domestic support," but wanted to do so without the collapse of the South Vietnamese.492 Alexander Haig later described Laird's plan as a

"stroke of public relations genius," pointing out that it was "a program designed to mollify American critics of the war, not a policy for the effective defense of South

Vietnam."493 Ultimately, Laird's viewpoint sprang from his acute sense of the domestic political costs of the war. 494

Upon assuming the office of Secretary of Defense, Laird sought to accomplish three outcomes: get Americans out of Vietnam, tum over the responsibility to South

489 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 163-4, 213; Isaacson, Kissinger, 237-8; Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The 25- Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984. 97; Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999. 113-4.

490 Sorley, A Better War, 116.

491 Kissinger, White House Years, 262.

492 Ibid., 262.

493 Haig, Alexander M., and Charles Mccarry. Inner Circles: How America Changed the World, A Memoir. New York: Warner Books, 1992. 226.

494 Kamow, Vietnam, 596; Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 137-8. 169 Vietnam, and end the draft and establish an all-volunteer force. 495 Accordingly, Laird

called for the fastest withdrawal possible within the outer limits of what the President's

military advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would accept. Laird believed that in order to "maintain public confidence it was important to make the withdrawals look as

inexorable as possible."496 For example, in early February, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense argued that with momentum built up in the pacification program, the expansion and modernization of the RVNAF, and the steady attrition of the enemy, it was possible to plan for removing one division from South Vietnam during mid-summer of 1969.

According to estimates, this could free up fifteen to twenty maneuver battalions and

support units to reduce troop levels by some 30,000 to 40,000 without a decrease in total allied force capability.497 For the first time, a concrete option to withdraw troops was established. It gave Nixon an escape clause to temper public opinion.498

Assessing the situation through the eyes of a politician, Laird's strategy for

Vietnam was largely solidified on his first trip to Southeast Asia from March 5 to 12,

1969. Laird, at the direction of President Nixon, traveled to South Vietnam to assess the military situation first hand and to make clear that "the American people expected the new administration to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion ... and a satisfactory

495 http://www.clubhistorian.com/Projects/?projectid=20.

496 Kissinger, White House Years, 476.

497 Executive Summary ofNSSMI, 30-1.

498 Ironically, although he denounced Vietnamization in private, Kissinger's public views were not dramatically different from those of Laird. In 1969, Kissinger maintained, "American objectives should be to bring about a staged withdrawal of external forces, North Vietnamese and American, thereby to create a maximum incentive for the contending forces in South Vietnam to work out a political agreement." (Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect, 29, 43) The major difference was that Laird's Vietnamization strategy gave no guarantees for simultaneous North Vietnamese and American withdrawals. 170 conclusion to most Americans meant eventual disengagement of U.S. troops from combat."499 Thus, according to Laird, "It was essential to decide now to initiate the removal from Southeast Asia of U.S. military personnel."500

This trip, representing the first opportunity for any member of the new administration to visit Vietnam, was a crucial step towards deciding a course of action for the war. According to Laird, "both practically and symbolically, it was the beginning of a concerted and dedicated attempt by your Defense leadership to come to grips with the complexities and practicalities of the Southeast Asia conflict."501 In Vietnam, Laird, along with General Wheeler, consulted with Ambassador Bunker, Generals Abrams and

Goodpaster, and South Vietnamese leaders, including President Nguyen Thieu, Vice

President Nguyen Ky, and Prime Minister Tran Van Huong. In addition, Laird spent two days in the field where the major part of the current military activity was taking place, and the final day and half at U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) headquarters in Hawaii, where he discussed with Admiral McCain and his staff their views on the current status of affairs in Southeast Asia. This allowed Laird to interact personally with all relevant principals to solidify his viewpoint.

Laird stressed to American military leaders in Vietnam that the "key factor in sustaining the support of the American people is to find the means by which the burden

499 Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 66.

500 Meeting; National Security Council, January 25, 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box H-019; National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974); Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 13.

501 Laird Report, Vietnam Subject Files Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 2. 171 of combat may promptly, and methodically, be shifted to the South Vietnamese."502

Laird believed that they could be equipped and trained to defend themselves, and that would, he reasoned, according to Laird's military assistant Lieutenant General Robert

Pursely, "send a signal to the North Vietnamese that the United States was going to help build a force in the South that could last as long as the North could. At the same time this would send a message to the Congress that there was another way than just sending more

U.S. troops and taking more casualties."503 This would lead to the eventual disengagement of American men from combat. However, the policy had to be accomplished within the parameters of insuring the safety and security of American and allied forces while working towards the objective of self determination for the South

Vietnamese. 504

After viewing the situation in Vietnam first hand, Laird described the enemy's objectives as not primarily military but, rather, political and psychological. According to

Laird, "the enemy's goal appears to be that of producing pressure which will lead to an early and disorderly withdrawal of American forces." 505 In addition, Laird argued that the uniform view of military leaders in Vietnam, CINCP AC staff, and the GVN leadership was that they had and could "retain sufficient military strength to preclude the enemy from achieving any kind of military verdict in South Vietnam."506 In particular,

502 Ibid., 3.

503 Sorley, A Better War, 115-6.

504 Laird Report, Vietnam Subject Files Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 2-3.

505 Ibid., 3-4.

506 Ibid., 2-3. 172. the most recent North Vietnamese offensive in February 1969 was deemed, from a military standpoint, destined for failure. 507 According to Abrams, Bunker, commanders in the field, and GVN leadership, there was unanimous accord that the "enemy's efforts will gain no territory, nor will they bring about any permanent reduction in the level of pacification."508 Despite the military progress throughout South Vietnam, Laird argued that "none of our officials, either military of civilian, is under any illusion that the battle in South Vietnam can be brought to a military conclusion within six months, a year or even several years."509

Without the threat of serious enemy advancement and projections that a successful U.S. military verdict in Vietnam could be open ended, Laird's preference for the reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam was solidified. The Defense Secretary did not agree with the necessity for the continued presence of over 549,000 Americans in South

Vietnam and Thailand. 510 He particularly disagreed with Abrams that U.S. withdrawals had to be tied to commensurate Communist withdrawals, and he argued that the large

U.S. effort stifled South Vietnamese initiative and prevented them from getting on with taking over the war effort. According to Laird, "to enhance the vital interests of our country, to stimulate increased self-defense effectiveness and self-reliance by the GVN, and to sustain the support of the American public for our stated objectives, plans should be drawn for the redeployment of 50-70 thousand U.S. troops from South Vietnam this

507 Ibid., 3; Wheeler to Laird, Vietnam Special Forces, Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 1.

508 Laird Report, Vietnam Subject Files Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 3.

509 Ibid., 4.

510 Ibid., 9. 173 year. .. .I am convinced that this will in no way jeopardize the security of the remaining U.S. public support for our continued efforts in South Vietnam."511

While stressing the need to wind down American involvement in the war, Laird made clear, though, that he was disappointed by the "relatively low rate of progress evidenced toward raising the RVNAF capability to assume more of the burden of the war."512 According to Laird, "we have told [the American people] there was going to be improvements in the South Vietnamese force. There are only a couple of divisions that are worth anything. In several, there has been no improvement whatsoever."513

He thus directed his senior U.S. military commanders in South Vietnam to get to work on shifting their focus from fighting the war to preparing the South Vietnamese to stand on their own. Despite this slow progress, Laird argued, "to show improvement ... we must explore ways to accelerate equipment delivery and increase combat effectiveness. We shall need to provide additional funding for RVNAF modernization purposes."514 In concurrence with Laird, President Thieu argued that he wanted to "reduce the burden on the United States,"515 but that his "Vietnamese armed forces must be better trained and equipped so as to enable the United States gradually to reduce the size of its forces."516 Despite slow improvement, Laird argued that the South

511 Ibid., 9, 12.

512 Ibid., 8.

513 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

514 Laird Report, Vietnam Subject Files Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 12.

515 Ibid., 2. 174 Vietnamese government was "entirely ready for a reduction," especially Thieu, who

"expressed this opinion forthrightly in our private discussion on March 8."517

Upon return from Vietnam, Laird compiled his thoughts and recommendations in a memorandum to the President. As will be discussed in the next chapter, in reviewing the options and alternatives for the war, Laird's memorandum, which emphasized domestic considerations, served as the definitive factor in Nixon's decision to implement

Vietnamization.

Laird was not alone in his advocacy of Vietnamization. Republicans such as

Charles Percy asserted that at least 50,000 American troops should be withdrawn from

South Vietnam in 1969; he said, "Anything else than that would not do the job of convincing the South Vietnamese that they should not place total reliance on our security forces."518 Despite his concerns, however, Percy did not go as far as to demand a definite withdrawal date, as did some U.S. Senators,519 such as Republican Senator Hugh Scott of

Pennsylvania, who called for a unilateral withdrawal of a "substantial number" of

Americans as the way to prod North Vietnam into "real bargaining sessions."520

During Nixon's first term, the U.S. Congress, seeking to restrict funding and force an American withdrawal from Vietnam, convened a total of eighty roll call votes on the war, as opposed to just fourteen between 1966 and 1968. Two in particular, the Cooper-

516 Ibid., 2.

517 Ibid., 12.

518 Hartley, Robert B. Charles H. Percy: A Political Perspective. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975. 190

519 Ibid., 190.

520 The Washington Post May 3, 1969. 175 Church Amendment and the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, were especially important. The Cooper-Church Amendment was an effort to quell the Nixon administration's expansion of the Vietnam conflict by cutting off all funding for the

Cambodian incursion by June 30, 1970. The proposed amendment represented the first time Congress had restricted the deployment of troops during a war against the wishes of the president; it also marked the first successful use of congressional budgetary authority to limit the war.

Also in 1970, the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, although it failed to gamer a majority in either House of Congress, would have required the end of U.S. military operations in Vietnam by December 31, 1970, and a complete withdrawal of American forces halfway through the next year. It represented the most outstanding defiance of executive power regarding the war to that date. Moreover, and although outside the scope of this study, the War Powers Act, which requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action, was passed by the U.S.

House and Senate in 1973. The legislation also forbid armed forces from remaining for more than 90 days without an authorization of the use of military force or a declaration of war.

The Decision to Implement

Nixon, the master politician, understood that he needed to demonstrate to the

American public that the war in Vietnam was not a perpetual struggle. At the January 25 meeting of the NSC, Nixon asked the question, "What is the most effective way to bring 176 the war to a conclusion?" 521 Answering his own question, Nixon stated, "The mix of action should be something like this. We talk hard in private but with an obvious peaceful public stance, seeking to gain time, initially giving the South Vietnamese a chance to strengthen the regime and add to the pacification effort while punishing the

Viet Cong. Within three or four months bring home a few troops unilaterally as a separate and distinct action from the Paris negotiations and as a play for more time domestically, while we continue to press at the negotiating table for a military settlement. "522 After three months of limited success driven by a combination of secret bombings and public pressure aimed at influencing negotiations, Nixon was forced to ask the question, "How do we de-Americanize this thing in a way as to influence negotiations and have them move along quicker?"523 A frustrated President, seeking a "symbol" to demonstrate progress in Vietnam, called upon his final option, Vietnamization, or the substantial reduction in U.S. presence, to provide the contingency plan he sought to round out his grand strategy to negotiate an end to the war. Secretary Rogers summed up

Nixon's dilemma best: "We have to de-Americanize the war to safe side a failure in negotiations. We need discemable progress." 524

As the centerpiece of his presidential campaign platform for the war,

Vietnamization was a determining factor in Nixon's successful bid to secure the White

521 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-!09, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

522 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

523 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

524 Ibid. 177 House in 1968. Despite the importance of the program domestic politically during the 1968 campaign, Nixon still had questions about the feasibility of the program bringing an end to the war. Nixon was particularly interested in the adequacy of the program to modernize and upgrade the Vietnamese Armed Forces. 525 On December 19,

1968, President Johnson, as well as then President-elect Nixon, received a secret telegram from U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker that emphasized that the

"government and people of South Vietnam continue to make steady, indeed accelerating, progress in many ways. "526 Reemphasizing this position at the January 25, 1969 meeting of the NSC, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued, "I think we are moving but started very late."527 General Wheeler continued, "I think we are going about as fast as both we can provide and the South Vietnamese can accept."528 Moreover, General

Goodpaster added, "We are paced about right."529

Regardless of the progress, Nixon asserted, "The South Vietnamese needed to do more ... 530 we must plan this. We must get a sense of urgency in the training of the South

525 Meeting; National Security Council, January 25, 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box H-019; National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974); Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 13.

526 Vietnam Alternatives File; Bunker to President Johnson Secret Telegram: December 19, 1968; NSC Meeting Folder 1/25/69; Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park.

527 Meeting; National Security Council, January 25, 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box H-019; National Security Institutional "H'' Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974); Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 13.

528 Ibid., 13.

529 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

530 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969. 178 Vietnamese. We need improvement in terms of supplies and training."531 To accelerate this objective, Nixon approved continuation of US-GVN discussions currently underway in Saigon about the possibility of selected U.S. troop reductions in conjunction with increasing GVN military capabilities. Nixon emphasized "that they be held on a strictly close hold basis." 532

On the other hand, a month earlier Nixon read a CIA intelligence assessment that was very critical of the Thieu government and the capabilities of the RVNAF. 533 The memo concluded that it would be at least two years, perhaps longer, before the ARVN would become an effective fighting force. 534 General Goodpaster, at a meeting of the

NSC on March 28, 1969, concurred with the CIA assessment. 535 The President's strong endorsement of Goodpaster' s position demonstrated Nixon's concurrence with these findings. 536

To gain insight for this option within a discordant bureaucracy, Nixon ordered

Kissinger on Inauguration Day to deliver National Security Memorandum 1 (NSSMI) to the desks of the U.S. Ambassador to Saigon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, Department of Defense, State Department, Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, and the

531 Ibid.

532 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

533 Wheeler 14581 to Abrams 12217, December 1968, RVNAF Capabilities Abrams Papers, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C.

534 Ibid.

535 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

536 Ibid. 179 Commander in Chief, Pacific. NSSMl was intended to provide a comprehensive assessment of the situation in South Vietnam in order to arrive at a workable strategy. 537

Prepared and collated by Daniel Ellsberg, a consultant of Kissinger's, NSSMl consisted of twenty-eight questions that largely reflected Nixon's concern for the capability of the

South Vietnamese armed forces to stand on their own and the viability of the Thieu government.

Although it did not provide definitive answers, NSSMl did give Nixon insight into the level of disagreement within the government over whether the South Vietnamese forces had the ability to handle various assumed levels of action against them. 538 In general, the consensus held that although the RVNAF was larger, better equipped, and generally more effective than the previous year, in the short term, due to lack of motivation, leadership, and desertion, Saigon could not likely survive alone. 539

Ultimately, NSSMl demonstrated more points of disagreement than agreement concerning RVNAF capabilities. Some agencies and authorities within the government considered the improvements in the RVNAF much more significant than others. 540

537 Isaacson, Kissinger, 164.

538 In the report, the respondents agreed generally on five points. First, the GVN and allied position in Vietnam had been strengthened recently in many respects. Second, the GVN improved its political position, but was not certain that the GVN and other non-communist groups would be able to survive a peaceful competition with the NLF for political power in South Vietnam. Third, the RVNAF alone could not, in the short term or in the foreseeable future, stand up to the North Vietnamese-Viet-Cong forces. Fourth, the enemy had suffered some reverses but they did not change their essential objectives and had sufficient strength to pursue these objectives. Fifth, the enemy was not in Paris primarily out of weakness.

539 NSSM I Summary Report, 15, 17.

540 Bundy, A Tangled Web, 63; NSSMl full report, 3. 180 In summarizing these points, Henry Kissinger stated, "The answers [to

NSSMI] made clear that there was no consensus as to facts, much less as to policy."541 If there was consensus in the bureaucracy, it was the view that the South Vietnamese were incapable of standing alone in the short term. In the long term, Nixon could not with certainly argue that the RVNAF could eventually withstand communist aggression from the North without substantial assistance from American combat forces. To choose the path of self-sufficiency for the South Vietnamese required at best an educated guess based largely on domestic political considerations.

In the end, despite considerable downside risks, Nixon based his Vietnamization decision on domestic political motives. During the 1968 campaign, Nixon supported the policy for its acceptability as the most politically pleasing strategy to gain support of the

American public and win election. Several months later, after reviewing the broad range of options and alternatives for the war, and after minimal tangible results demonstrating the administration's efforts to bring the war to a close, Nixon endorsed Vietnamization as his contingency plan for Vietnam in 1969 in an attempt to check rising domestic pressures for total withdrawal, augment RVNAF capacity, and seek a negotiated settlement. Like most of his predecessors, Nixon could not escape the fundamental motivation of politicians and political behavior -- getting and staying in office. Nixon, as any first-term president, faced pressures to demonstrate policy success. In particular, the

President was aware that this decision in Vietnam would define his 1972 reelection prospects.

541 Kissinger, White House Years, 239. 181 Sensitive to the political environment surrounding his capacity to end the war

in a way that would safeguard his reelection in 1972, Nixon believed, with strong support from his Defense Secretary, that the public's attention needed to be drawn away from the struggle. The President was keenly aware that in a January 6, 1969 Gallup Poll almost 60 percent of the nearly fifteen-hundred people polled agreed that "the time has come to begin to reduce month by month the number of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam."542 As a champion of this line of thinking, Laird strongly advised Nixon to implement

Vietnamization. Laird's memorandum summarizing his trip to South Vietnam was the deciding factor that led Nixon to pursue this domestic politically pleasing strategy to end

U.S. involvement in the war.

Cognizant of how the creation of the Nixon administration's new formal NSC structure undercut his ability to control the flow of paper and policy development directed at the President, Laird utilized his political savvy to bypass this formal and hierarchical White House - centered structure to personally and informally influence the

Vietnamization debate. On March 13, 1969, shortly after returning from South Vietnam,

Laird met privately with Nixon to provide his first hand assessment of the war. Shortly into their conversation, Laird, without Kissinger's or the NSC's typical pre-screening, presented the President an unfiltered memorandum that summarized his trip and recommendations for the war.

Written and formulated by a career politician, Laird's memo highlighted his political background as an astute observer of home-front political winds and his unique,

542 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2177-8. 182 intimate, and accurate appreciation of the temper of the American people. It was this sense of American public opinion that appealed to Nixon's domestic political side, especially in his advocacy of Vietnamization as a useful tool for containing domestic criticism, easing anti-war pressures, reducing draft calls, cutting casualties, and withdrawing American combat forces. 543

Besides helping to alleviate public concern about an unending war,

Vietnamization could also eliminate one possible source of opposition in Congress by keeping the cost of the conflict within tolerable limits. This was an increasingly important incentive given the rumbles of discontent emanating from the U.S. Capital's

Rotunda. For example, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator J.W.

Fulbright of Arkansas argued to Laird on March 21, 1969, "You've got to do something radical to change this war or we're going down the drain. Soon it will be Nixon's war, and then there will be little chance to bring it to an end. It is time to de-escalate and settle it. ,,544

In addition to domestic political imperatives, Vietnamization left Nixon hopeful that the implementation of the policy would encourage a negotiated settlement in

Vietnam. As Nixon later noted in his Memoirs, "Early in the administration we had decided that withdrawing a number of American combat troops from Vietnam would demonstrate to Hanoi that we were serious in seeking a diplomatic settlement."545 Nixon

543 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered, 163-4, 213; Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 138; Palmer, The 25- Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, 97.

544 Evans and Novak, Nixon in the White House, 83-4.

545 Nixon, Memoirs, 392. 183 added, "If the enemy feels that we are going to stay there long enough for the South

Vietnamese to be strong enough to handle their own defense, then I think they have a real incentive to negotiate, because if they have to negotiate with a strong, vigorous South

Vietnamese government, the deal they make with them isn't going to be as good as the deal they might get now."546 Even this was a risky proposition, however, because

Vietnamization was an irreversible process. With the public in no mood for re-escalation,

Nixon needed the North Vietnamese to be more forthcoming at the bargaining table before the last American soldier left Vietnam.

In addition, Vietnamization could prevent the charge that Nixon was simply continuing a futile and costly war. In the public's eye, a policy of withdrawals coupled with increased U.S. aid meant that the President was neither abandoning an ally nor following a bankrupt military strategy in Vietnam. Unfortunately for Thieu, adequate

American support would not be forthcoming. As previously noted, Nixon owed Thieu a debt of gratitude for his last-minute sabotage of peace talks in the waning days of the

1968 campaign. With the 1968 electoral win behind him and with foresight for 1972,

Nixon could ill afford to support Thieu the way he needed. Thus, the South Vietnamese leader was politically expendable. As Nixon later wrote, "I was not personally attached to Thieu."547

Although Vietnamization was not what Thieu had bargained for, he did, in fact, agree to some U.S. force reductions. At the March 28, 1969 NSC meeting, Nixon asked why Thieu had agreed to some force reductions. General Earle Wheeler replied to the

546 Nixon, Richard M. A New Road For America. Garden City: Doubleday, 1972. 681.

547 Nixon, Memoirs, 349. 184 President: "to insure U.S. support and maybe also to help his own domestic image in the sense that it suggest that the government is progressing and their forces are growing."548 Thieu recognized the need for peace and, according to Ambassador Bunker,

"agreed to accept a greater share of the burden of conducting the war."549 Moreover, at a meeting with Kissinger on April 4, 1969, South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Ky reported optimistically on the prospects ofVietnamizing the conflict. 550

Nixon, to soften the blow of the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam, assured Thieu of eight years of continued support, four years of military Vietnamization during his first term, and four more years of economic Vietnamization during his second term. Despite this pledge, Thieu viewed Vietnamization as an American subterfuge designed primarily to solve American domestic political problems; he considered

"Vietnamization" nothing more than a fancy title devised for consumption in the United

States. 551 According to Thieu, "A year ago, we could only talk in terms of military victory. Six months ago, we could talk in terms of a peace settlement. Today, we can talk in terms of a political settlement."552

548 Meeting: January 25, 1969, Meeting; National Security Council, January 25, 1969; National Security Council Draft Minutes: Box H-019; National Security Institutional "H" Files Minutes of Meetings (1969-1974); Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, National Archives at College Park, Maryland, 35.

549 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

550 Memorandum of Conversation, April 4, 1969, Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 6308.

551 Isaacson, Kissinger, 235; Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 150; Nixon, Memoirs, 392.

552 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969, 2. 185 Although Nixon was concerned about honoring his commitment to stabilizing

South Vietnam, he did not believe that the nation's autonomy would be a definitive outcome. South Vietnam's stability was limited by problems with its armed forces, which included alarming leadership and desertion problems as well as a lack of the technical expertise and logistical sophistication necessary to absorb and properly use the massive quantities of American equipment being thrust upon them. Nixon's plan to end the war by significantly altering the military's ground strategy from an emphasis on conventional military operations to intensified training and supply aimed at turning over the principal share of combat to the South Vietnamese was married to the success of a program whose chances were viewed by most as cautiously optimistic at best. Despite advocating that Vietnamization would be "accomplished as an act of strength rather than weakness," and was "the result not of American determination to withdraw from Vietnam but of Saigon's genuine ability to defend itself,"553 Nixon did not have confidence in the ability of the RVNAF to succeed on the battlefield. In a telephone call with Kissinger on

May 12, 1969, Nixon said, "In Saigon, the tendency is to fight the war to victory ... But you and I know it won't happen - it is impossible. Even General Abrams agreed."554

Despite these reservations, Nixon later noted, "Early in the administration we had decided that withdrawing a number of American combat troops from Vietnam might calm domestic public opinion by graphically demonstrating that we were beginning to wind down the war."555 With nearly 60 percent of the American public calling for a

553 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 126.

554 Nixon to Kissinger, May 12, 1969, Presidents Office Files, Nixon Presidential Materials. 186 progressive withdrawal timetable, and with only 44 percent of the public approving of his overall handling of the war, Nixon's decision would go a long way in augmenting his public approval rating. 556

On March 13, after being debriefed by Laird over his recent trip to South

Vietnam, Nixon, isolated within his domestic politically influenced decision-making structure, made one of the most crucial decisions of the war,557 opting for a middle-of- the-road political strategy. By accepting his Defense Secretary's recommendation to

Vietnamize the war, Nixon could propose a politically appealing course of action to particular portions of the administration and the electorate. He could advocate an end to the war, negotiations, and the withdrawal of American forces, but also simultaneously propose putting pressure on the enemy in support of the South Vietnamese government. 558 Although Laird's optimistic assessment ofVietnamization was not widely shared within the administration or the bureaucracy at large, Nixon argued in his

Memoirs that it was largely on the basis of Laird's enthusiastic advocacy after returning from a visit to South Vietnam that the administration undertook the policy of

Vietnamization. 559

555 Nixon, Memoirs, 392.

556 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2 I 79.

557 Kimball, Nixon's Vietnam War, 138-9.

558 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 683.

559 Litwak, Robert. Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability. 1969-1976. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 129; Morris, Roger. Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 87-8, 153-4; Nixon, Memoirs, 392. 187 The Implementation of the Decision

At a meeting of the NSC on March 28, 1969, which considered the question of

Vietnam, Nixon followed his precedent of conducting meetings where the script was determined in advance. To the knowledge of only a few shareholders present, fifteen days earlier, Nixon had decided in principle to pursue Vietnamization as a strategy to end the war. 560 The March 28 meeting served to provide consensus on the RVNAF's capacity to justify the redeployment of some U.S. forces, although the actual announcement would be delayed until mid-year. 561

At this meeting, timing was a particular issue for the President. According to

Nixon, "We must move in a deliberate way, not to show panic. We cannot be stampeded by the likes of Fulbright. "562 Challenging the President's conservative statement, Rogers replied, "But if we say we are going to be deliberate, the American people won't stand for it." 563 Sensing Rogers' urgency, Nixon argued, "On the other hand, we do have the internal problem in the U.S. and it will be very difficult to continue without some change.

We do have this problem. We thus need much from Paris as it affects our public attitudes at home. It also means we may have to take more risks in a settlement than we would

560 Longhand notes taken by Wheeler at March 28, 1969 NSC Meeting. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969; Key principals included Laird, Rogers, Wheeler, and Helms; Kissinger was not present at the meeting.

561 Longhand notes taken by Wheeler at March 28, 1969 NSC Meeting. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

562 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

563 Ibid. 188 prefer. While I am optimistic that it can be done, I am worried about our ability to sell it to the American people. "564

On April 1, 1969, Kissinger promulgated the decision of the March 28 meeting to direct the development of a "specific plan timetable" for the Vietnamization of the war. 565

Ten days later, Kissinger issued more specific instructions. The directive, NSSM36, was issued on April 10, 1969. Under its terms, Laird, in coordination with both Rogers and

Helms, was responsible for the overall planning of timetables for the transfer of the U.S. combat role in Vietnam.

Privately, the Nixon administration established a strategy for the war that directed the equipping and training of South Vietnamese forces as a national priority. 566 Publicly, there was neither an official announcement nor any comment by government officials that the United States was considering a troop reduction in Vietnam. Eighty-five days would pass between Nixon's initial decision and the announcement of the first round of withdrawals on Midway Island. During that time, Nixon flirted with reporters by suggesting that the reduction of forces was "high on the agenda of priorities,"567 and that he saw "good prospects that American forces can be reduced" when he looked to the future. 568 Despite these overtures, Nixon, maintaining a steady poker face, never showed

564 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

565 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDM.

566 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSSM 36.

567 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President. Volume 1, 1969, #34 "The President's News Conference of February 6, 1969." Washington: GPO, 1970. 189 his hand. With a decision and its varying contingencies in place, Nixon could begin the process to implement Vietnamization, a policy he advocated over the previous year and a half; a policy that he would continue to utilize and manipulate to support his political objectives.

Review of Political Science Distinctions

Building on the work of political scientists, chapter 3 reinforces the argument of the bureaucratic politics model that diversity and conflict permeate the policy process by demonstrating the wide range of alternatives for the war and their advocates within the government; for example, Henry Kissinger supported political accommodation; William

Rogers, withdrawal and mutual de-escalation; General's Earle Wheeler and Creighton

Abrams, strong military posture; and Melvin Laird, Vietnamization.

In particular, this chapter demonstrates how Laird's influence on the policy- making process reinforces the bureaucratic principle that policies are the results of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence. For example, unlike Kissinger and, to a lesser extent, Rogers, Laird, by speaking the President's political language, was able to communicate with Nixon in a way to maximize his influence. Moreover, Laird's bureaucratic maneuvering in bypassing the formal NSC system and submitting his policy recommendation privately to the President demonstrates Laird's unequal influence on the

Vietnamization policy and decision-making processes.

568 Ibid., #156 "The President's News Conference of April 18, 1969." Washington: GPO, 1970. 190 On the other hand, Laird's bureaucratic maneuvering directly challenges the bureaucratic school's contention "that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government."569 As noted previously, Laird bypassed the formal and regularized NSC and interagency channels to directly influence the decision to implement

Vietnamization.

Moreover, in the policy-making process that led to the implementation of

Vietnamization, Nixon tempered this bureaucratic principle by isolating himself away from his discordant bureaucracy and constituency to minimize the inherently disjointed interagency bargaining process. For example, Nixon engaged only one formal meeting of the NSC before deciding to implement Vietnamization. The January 25, 1969 meeting was an initial review of options just five days into the administration. Nixon preferred smaller, more intimate meetings with only a handful of senior advisors. This allowed

Nixon to avoid confrontations and disputes, which are the natural offspring of meetings of such a diverse group of advisors with distinct opinions. Thus, Nixon's decision to pursue Vietnamization did not flow from NSC discussion; it came from the informal interworkings with key advisors. Without a forum in which diverse policy options could be aired in the presence of the President, Laird's example of bureaucratic maneuvering became an attractive avenue to carry out advisory functions.

Additionally, and also contrary to the bureaucratic politics school, this chapter does not wholly support the contention, "Where you stand depends on where you sit."570

569 Allison, Essence of Decision, 162. 191 For example, as Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird should have largely supported and defended the considerations of his senior military advisors; rather he was the leading proponent of Vietnamization and troop withdrawals. Moreover, although Secretary of

State William Rogers should have been one of the leading proponents of diplomatic considerations, he, like Laird, stressed domestic political imperatives. Despite these challenges, this chapter contends that the decision to implement Vietnamization was largely the result of Laird's bureaucratic maneuvering after his return from South

Vietnam in early March 1969, which lends support to the bureaucratic school's contention that the President is not the single maker of U.S. foreign policy.

570 Allison, Essence of Decision, 176; Art, Robert J. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973): 472-3; Ball, Desmond J. "The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory." Australian Outlook 28 (April 1974): 77; Caldwell, Dan. "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making." American Behavioral Scientist 21 (September./October 1977): 99; Krasner, Stephen D. "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)." Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972): 165; Nathan, James H., and James K. Oliver. "Bureaucratic Politics: Academic Windfalls and Intellectual Pitfalls." Journal of Political and Military Sociology 6 (Spring 1978): 81-91. CHAPTER 5

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VIETNAMIZATION

The Forward-Looking Political Tool

Over the course of American Presidential history, U.S. Presidents, whether concerned about an imminent election or facing intense domestic pressure, have found themselves constrained to pursue foreign policies based on domestic political calculations. Although specific foreign policies might not affect a voter's decision, they do relate to a president's job performance and the public's perception of his leadership skills. As a result, domestic political considerations exert a tremendous influence on the way in which presidents formulate foreign policy.

President Richard Nixon was no exception. Keenly attune to American public opinion, Nixon understood his Vietnam strategy had to be popular on the home front.

Despite confessing publicly that he "was not about to be bullied by some noisy war protestors" because "the test of great leadership is to lead public opinion, not be led by it,"571 Nixon, confronting the same domestic pressures that taunted his predecessors, was, in fact, absorbed with the way the American public portrayed him and actively sought to influence and manipulate their perceptions.

As the public became increasingly hostile throughout his first presidential term,

Nixon's Vietnamization policy and subsequent troop withdrawals became increasingly

571 Crowley, Nixon in Winter, 250. 190 191 driven by the demands of domestic politics. The administration's troop withdrawal announcements during this time coincide with times in which the President was particularly constrained to influence public opinion. This suggests that domestic, more than international, conditions motivated the President. As pollster Louis Harris said,

"The war may be settled not nearly so much in the field as in public opinion. "572

Similarly, as Nixon speechwriter Pat Buchanan wrote to the President, "The war in

Vietnam will now be won or lost on the American front. "573

The Nixon administration's policy of Vietnamization was implemented as a forward-looking political tool to positively influence public opinion, particularly with regard to Nixon's overall handling of the war and job approval ratings, and to win reelection in 1972. Nixon's desire to influence public approval, whether high or low, determined the timing and structure of troop withdrawals. As the President said, "The public hears the poll results and that makes an impact on them. " 574

The Pressure for Action Builds

Just two months into the administration, many Americans were growing impatient with Nixon's lack of progress in ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The bellwethers of the anti-war movement had initially given the President time to coordinate U.S. policy and direction for the war, but by late March 1969, it was apparent to them that Nixon was

572 Witcover, Jules. "Gallup and Harris: Diligent Samplers of Public Opinion." The Washington Post September 20, 1970: 109.

573 Buchanan, Patrick J. The New Majority: President Nixon at Mid-Passage. Philadelphia: Girard Bank, 1973. 138.

574 Memo Colson to Strachan, May 24, 1971, Box 102, Colson Papers, Nixon Presidential Materials. 192 not meeting their demands for an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. As a consequence, they began preparations for renewed agitation against the war. Protests erupted at nearly three hundred campuses over the spring, occurring at the rate of almost two a day. 575 Between February 3 and 5, a thousand members of Clergy and Layman

Concerned About Vietnam gathered in Washington to demonstrate and visit their legislators. 576 On Easter weekend, roughly a hundred thousand people marched in a GI-

Civilian demonstration in New York, forty thousand paraded in San Francisco, thirty thousand in Chicago, and Quakers held sit-ins at draft boards and committed other acts of disobedience in more than thirty cities. On Easter Sunday, four protesters were symbolically crucified on giant crosses in front of the White House. "As long as this war continues," they declared, "it is always Good Friday."577 The largest demonstrations since Nixon's inaugural occurred on April 5, 1969, when in cities across the country anti- war activists demanded an end to the war in Indochina. 578 An internal White House poll highlighted this domestic unrest. In seeking a solution to the war in Vietnam, only 35

575 Sale, Kirkpatrick. SDS. New York: Vintage Books, 1973: 511-2; Wells, Tom. The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. 297.

576 MacKaye, William R. "Anti-War Group Drafts Prescription for Peace." The Washington Post February 5, 1969: A20.

577 Halstead, Fred. Out Now! A Participant's Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War. New York: Monad Press, 1978. 451-2, Churchill, Ward and Jim Vander Wall. The COINITELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent. Boston: South End Press, 1990. 60, DeBenedetti, Charles and Charles Chatfield. An American Ordeal: The Anti-war Movement of the Vietnam Era. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990. 245-6; Wells, The War Within, 294.

578 The New York Times April 6, 1969: 1. 193 percent responded that the President was doing a good job, whereas well over half argued that his efforts were fair at best. 579

With most Americans firmly calling for an end to the fighting in Vietnam,580 U.S. casualties became an increasing public concern. Making matters worse, during the period from February 1 through March 29, U.S. casualties exceeded those of the RVNAF. 581 As a result, Nixon instructed General Wheeler and General Abrams to find ways to drastically reduce U.S. military deaths in Vietnam, especially as an essential measure to get the U.S. into a strong negotiating position. According to Nixon, "We must assume that if, by about next August, U.S. military deaths in Vietnam are still at the present figure of about 200 a week, public opinion may well become quite wild and erratic. At the least, there will be a strong demand to hurry. " 582

In an attempt to enlist public support for his Vietnam policy, Nixon addressed the nation on May 14, 1969. After noting his administration's intensive review of all options and alternatives for Vietnam, he argued that the United States would not withdraw unilaterally from Vietnam nor accept a settlement in Paris that would amount to a disguised American defeat. According to Nixon, the United States had ruled out

"attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield .... What we want is

579 Folder 9:3. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

580 Harris, Louis. "Public Optimism Over Peace Fading, Harris Survey Finds." The Washington Post. March 20, 1969: 88.

581 Wheeler to Abrams, April 3, 1969, Wheeler File 091 Vietnam, April 1969.

582 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 182, Paris Talks, Meetings, Paris Talks, Vol, II, 2/3-69, Memos and Miscellaneous. 194 very little but very fundamental. We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference. "583

Prior to the speech, in a May 11 memorandum for the President, Secretary Laird noted that his major concern about the upcoming address was its lack of emphasis on the previously cited three points for measuring progress in the war: mutual withdrawals, improvement in the military situation, and improvement in South Vietnamese capabilities.584 Heeding Laird's advice, Nixon, in his nationally televised address, hinted that a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces might be feasible. The President also noted that there had been excellent progress in training the South Vietnamese forces and that apart from any developments in the Paris negotiations, the time was approaching when the

RVNAF might be able "to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by

Americans. "585

The morning after the speech, Nixon held a joint meeting of the NSC and his

Cabinet to brief his administration's leaders on the significance of his address.586 One of the most important points about the speech, according to the President, was that the South

Vietnamese Government seemed to accept its main themes. He said that no one would

583 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume I, May 14.1969, #195 "Address to the Nation on Vietnam." Washington: GPO, 1970.

584 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 76, Vietnam Subject Files, Speech Planning and Miscellaneous.

585 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President. Volume I, May 14.1969, #195 "Address to the Nations on Vietnam." Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970.

586 Memorandum ofa meeting by Jim Keogh, May 15; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, President's Office Files, Box I, Memos for the President's File, 1969-1970, Beginning May 11, 1969. 195 have predicted six months ago that President Thieu would have approved the substance of the speech. "The cooperation of the South Vietnamese is extremely important," the

President added, because "while some say it will be impossible to make peace with them, it will surely be impossible to make a peace without them. "587 Secretary Laird noted,

"there is nothing inconsistent in the mutual withdrawal plan in this speech and the

Vietnamization of the war."588 Laird also noted that the speech had a veiled reference to reduction of U.S. forces. "The question whether some of our forces will soon be withdrawn," said Laird, "will be discussed when Rogers returns from Vietnam."589 To clarify the situation with regard to a prospective withdrawal of some U.S. forces, the

President explained, "Apart from any progress in Paris, we are considering withdrawals based upon the strengthening of the Vietnam forces." 590

Nixon's speech did little to allay dissatisfaction with the war. The next day, at the same time Nixon was meeting with his senior administration officials, six Democratic

Congressmen introduced a resolution calling for the President to withdraw 100,000 U.S. troops unconditionally and a cease fire. A long-time opponent of U.S. involvement, U.S.

Senator Frank Church expressed bitter disappointment that the Nixon plan for ending the war was "the same as the Johnson plan."591 Similarly U.S. Senator Harold Hughes said

Vietnamization is "simply an extension of Johnson's foreign policy ... it will perpetuate

587 Ibid.

588 Ibid.

589 Ibid.

590 Ibid.

591 Smith, Hedrick. "Targets at Home and Abroad for Nixon's Peace Initiative." The New York Times May 18, 1969: E2. 196 our involvement."592 Moreover, U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright declared in June that the Nixon administration had only a month before the country would lose confidence in the President's willingness to change U.S. policy in Vietnam.593

Nixon could have given in to this opposition and let Congress take the heat for the withdrawals, but clearly, Nixon had too much at stake to allow the war to be taken out from under of his control. Nixon wanted to be seen as the "peacemaker," and only in having control could he dictate and take credit for bringing peace to Vietnam, which was critical to his prospects for securing reelection in 1972.

With a keen sense of Congressional temperament, Secretary Laird pressed Nixon on troop withdrawals, aware that by June 1969 the "time was running out for us because the public wasn't going to support the war any longer."594 In keeping with the

President's request in NSSD36 for an initial Vietnamization report by June 1, 1969, Laird noted that it was essential "we fulfill the requirements specified by the President" and stressed that the July-December 1969 period must be treated in sufficient detail "for the highest level decisions and for possible implementation."595

To implement Vietnamization, five options for redeployments in 1969 were offered in NSSM36, ranging from withdrawals of 50,000 to 100,000. Secretary Laird recommended a total of up to 50,000 for 1969, depending upon the evaluation of the

592 "Mr. Nixon's War. The New Republic162.7 (February 14, 1970).

593 The New York Times May 16, 1969: 9.

594 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 130; Memcon June 8, 1969, National Security Council, Box 1026; Notes: Midway June 8, 1969, President's Personal Files, Box 49.

595 Laird to Wheeler, "Progress in NSSM 36," May 21, 1969. NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-142., NSSM Files, NSSM 36. 197 reaction to the first withdrawal. Analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense also argued that a reduction of 325,000, leaving a balance of 225, was attainable within forty- two months. Secretary Rogers expressed his preference for an alternative involving a total of 85,000 in 1969, "for reasons of political impact in this country, in North Vietnam, and on the negotiations in Paris. "596 The longer term plans on Vietnamization provided a series of alternatives for U.S. troop reductions, with varying timetables from 18 to 42 months, and varying ceilings from the residual American troops in South Vietnam ranging from 260,000 to 306,000.597

Although disappointed in the progress made by the South Vietnamese in assuming more of the burden for the war, Laird argued in a memorandum to the

President, "They are improving and with the right kind of help from us, continuing improvement can be expected."598 He also mentioned that there were many unknowns, so we must "recognize the possibility that even with additional training, improved equipment, and increased combat support, the RVNAF will not be able soon to stand alone against the current North Vietnamese and Viet Cong force levels."599 As a result,

Laird argued, "our timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam should take such conditions into account. We should strive for a sensitive balance between too much, too soon and too little, too late. "600 Laird argued that this was best accomplished

596 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-142, NSSM Files, NSSM 36.

597 Ibid.

598 Ibid.

599 Ibid. 198 by making an early announcement of the withdrawal of a modest number of troops

(20,000-25,000) and then carefully weighing the situation, to include various reactions before making the next move. 601

Laird advocated this action because "the North Vietnamese would be very hard pressed to counter it, the South Vietnamese would have further opportunity to understand that we are indeed serious about Vietnamizing the war, and although those Americans who have been most vocal against the war probably would not be silenced by this action, important elements of the U.S. public would be encouraged."602 If this assessment of initial reactions proves to be correct, argued Laird, "you could then decide to withdraw a second increment later in the year. If conditions were favorable, a decision on a third increment could be made in October or November for additional withdrawals to begin before the end of the year and be completed in early 1970."603 By favorable, Laird meant politically favorable. As the Defense Secretary astutely concluded, troop withdrawals would go a long way toward alleviating domestic political pressures by demonstrating to the American people that the war was not endless. Thus, Nixon needed to deliver more than rhetoric to end the war.

At the six-month mark of Nixon's presidency, the war in Vietnam dominated the

White House agenda. The mounting losses of American lives, divisive American public

600 Ibid.

601 Ibid.

602 Ibid.

603 Ibid. 199 opinion, and the President's fear that three more years of fighting would destroy his prospects for reelection made the conflict Nixon's top priority.

These challenges heightened Nixon's desire to demonstrate to the American public his resolve to see the war brought to an end. A central impediment to his chances for reelection was that only one in six Americans believed that the chances for ending the

Vietnam War had improved since Nixon took office. To win reelection, Nixon believed that he would have to decisively shift public opinion in his favor.

Nixon's June 8, 1969 declaration that 25,000 American soldiers would be returning home represented the first tangible manifestation of the President's promise to end the war. On the same day, a Gallup Poll reported that 59 percent of Americans agreed it was time to begin to reduce month by month the number of U.S. soldiers in

Vietnam.604 Nixon's decision reflected both the will of the people and the grim political reality that less than 50 percent of the American public were in favor of his overall handling of the war. 605

The President's June 8 announcement also coincided with same-day high-level consultations with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. At their meeting,

Nixon expressed to Thieu that he had "a difficult political problem in the U.S. and that he appreciated Saigon's understanding for his domestic problems."606 Nixon also stressed

604 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Gallup, George Horace. The Gallup Poll; Public Opinion, 1935-1971. New York: Random House, 1972. 2199.

605 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Rating Declines on Handling of Vietnam." The Washington Post October 6, 1969: A6. Harris Poll noted Nixon's rating on Vietnam Handling was 47 percent in June.

606 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 1, Memos for the President's Files, 1969-1970, Beginning June 8, 1969. 200 that the Congressional situation and the importance of the 1970 elections and beyond were critical determinants in his decision making over the war. 607 Ultimately, according to Nixon, "The U.S. situation is a weapon in the war."608

President Thieu did not object to Nixon's troop withdrawal announcement.

According to Thieu, "The reduction in U.S. forces has now been a subject of open discussion for six months, the South Vietnamese people are accustomed to the idea, and it would not be a surprise if an announcement was made." 609 Prior to meeting with Nixon,

Thieu disclosed to Ambassador Bunker that "it is accepted here that something like a reduction of 50,000 this year would be the figure, and both the principle and number of this size would be understood here. A figure of 100,000 would not be understood."610

This extreme option brought great apprehension to Thieu.611 The South Vietnamese

President expressed this concern on a number of occasions to U.S. representatives. For example, Thieu expressed to Wheeler his apprehension "that our CY 1969 withdrawal program will go beyond the level discussed with him by General Abrams and by

President Nixon at Midway." 612 As a result, Wheeler argued, "I am of the opinion that a withdrawal of more than 50,000 in CY 1969 and/or failure to consult with President

607 Ibid.

608 Ibid.

609 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 65, Vietnam Subject Files, 8- A, All Backchannel.

610 Ibid.

611 Wheeler to Laird, July 21, 1969, Wheeler File 091, July 1969. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

612 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-142, NSSM Files, NSSM 36. 201 Thieu regarding CY 1970 would impose severe psychological and political handicaps upon the Government of Vietnam. Additionally, I believe that the effect upon the

RVNAF could be deleterious in the extreme."613

Thieu told Ambassador Bunker that "any announcement would have to be tied to one of the three conditions which the President has laid down, and this would probably be the improvement in the Vietnamese capacity to take over a greater share."614 Thieu concluded, "The time and form of the announcement will need to be discussed and worked out, but the substance is understood and accepted here. 615 Unfortunately, despite the warnings of both Thieu and the JCS, by the end of 1969, Nixon would announce the withdrawal of more than 100,000 troops. As comfort to Thieu at the time, though,

General Wheeler reported that Vietnamization could not be completed by either

December 31, 1970 or June 30, 1971.

Despite Thieu's approval, the perspectives of those in the field provided the

President good reason to hold back on his June 8 withdrawal announcement. For example, the President asked General Goodpaster whether there would be another offensive in May or June of 1969. Goodpaster noted that there would probably be an

613 Ibid.

614 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 65, Vietnam Subject Files, 8- A, All Backchannel.

615 Ibid. 202 offensive in May;616 accordingly, he added, "you can't pull out troops in the midst of an offensive." 617

Moreover, in a backchannel message to Kissinger, South Vietnamese Ambassador

Bunker argued that, after consulting with Abrams and giving further thought to the

President's intention to announce an initial troop reduction after the Midway meeting,

"the more prudent course would be to wait for a host of reasons, most importantly that there were indications that two attack waves were brewing, with one possibly in June and another in July."618 General Abrams, according to Bunker, argued that a withdrawal could put some U.S. troops at risk and "wished to reserve on the withdrawal. .. until he can better assess the situation."619 Both Bunker and Abrams agreed that a June 30 cut-off date was appropriate for assessing an incremental withdrawal. According to Bunker, "by then we would have the June record of the enemy in hand, and a clearer picture of their

July and subsequent intentions ... and would come about one month after the Midway meeting. "620 Both Bunker and Abrams suggested that the announcement of the first troop reduction could be made sometime in July if "our reading of the situation is correct."621

616 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 82, NSC Meetings, Jan Mar 1969.

617 Ibid.

618 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 65, Vietnam Subject Files, 8- A, All Backchannel.

619 Ibid.

620 Ibid.

621 Ibid. 203 Despite reservations from those on the ground in Vietnam, Nixon still called for a

25,000 troop withdrawal. In response to Bunker's backchannel message, Kissinger canvassed the President's perspective. According to Kissinger, the President "believes we could meet Thieu's views by making an announcement at the conclusion of the

Midway meeting to the effect President Thieu has informed the U.S. Government that the first ARVN division is ready to replace the Third U.S. Marine Division and that therefore the President has ordered the withdrawal of the Third Marine Division from South

Vietnam commencing during the month of July."622 According to Kissinger, Nixon considered such an "announcement would: (1) dampen growing speculation on troop withdrawals which if it continues much longer will deprive us of the impact of a troop withdrawal decision; (2) would greatly strengthen Thieu's image here; (3) would break the stride of those elements here who have been pressing for large and immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces."623

Nixon's response to Bunker clearly emphasizes the domestic political implications, not the military ramifications, of the withdrawal decision. In the first round of troop withdrawals, it is clear that despite Thieu's consent, Nixon contradicted the position staked out by his field advisors and, in accord with Laird and Rogers, chose a path that was most politically acceptable to the American people.

Accordingly, public support for Vietnamization and Nixon's June 1969 announcement was positive. Public approval of the President's handling of the war rose from 47 to 53 percent, and according to a Harris Poll, two out of every three Americans

622 Ibid.

623 Ibid. 204 endorsed Nixon's announcement and his decision to turn over more of the fighting to the

South Vietnamese.624 As a result, Nixon, according to Kissinger, "was jubilant. He considered the announcement a political triumph."625 Utilizing Vietnamization to augment public opinion was now settled precedent within the administration.

Throughout his first term, Nixon would call upon this strategy to enhance his public opinion rating and his chances for reelection in 1972.

Building on the First Withdrawal

On the heels of the June 1969 withdrawal announcement, the Nixon administration considered further troop reductions. Nixon had intimated at Midway

Island that an additional redeployment would occur shortly. On the evening of July 7,

1969, Nixon assembled his inner circle for over four hours on the presidential yacht,

Sequoia, to review the status of the war and get a read out on the progress of

Vietnamization. 626 From the meeting it was assumed, especially by General Wheeler, that the second incremental withdrawal would be 25,000.627 This total was supported by

General Abrams.628 Moreover, the JCS were adamant that total reductions in 1969

624 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; According to an internal White House poll, nearly seventy percent approved of the withdrawal announcement; Harris, Louis. "Public Pessimistic on Viet Piece." The Washington Post July 7, 1969:Al4.

625 Kissinger, White House Years, 274.

626 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary.

627 Wheeler to Abrams, July 9, 1969, Wheeler File 091 Vietnam, July 1969. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 205 exceeding 50,000 troops, without substantial decline in the enemy threat, would be

"clearly without justification on military grounds and beyond the threshold of prudent risk."629 Thus, the JCS advocated using a "cut and try" approach to Vietnamization rather than establishing an overall schedule with a set completion date. 630

After traveling to South Vietnam, Wheeler reported to Laird on July 21, "The

"military situation in Vietnam is better than I have observed on any of my earlier visits there." 631 But he noted that Abrams did not believe "an additional increment above

25,000 would be feasible" and "to increase the number to be withdrawn ... will throw a real burden upon the Vietnamese military in the planning for and redeployment of their own forces, and will introduce an unfavorable psychological factor because of the discussion and planning done to date."632 Nixon's senior military advisors made clear to the President that they were opposed to any withdrawal announcement in which the figure exceeded 25,000 troops.

The American military leadership was not the only source of skepticism about

Vietnamization and the subsequent timing and pace of troop withdrawals. National

Security Advisor Henry Kissinger argued, "We should certainly move as fast as possible

628 Wheeler to Abrams, August 8, 1969, Wheeler File 091 Vietnam, August 1969. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

629 Wheeler to Laird, August 30, 1969, Encl A to JCS 2472/523, August 27, 1969, JMF 911/374, August 9, 1969. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

630 Wheeler to Laird, August 25, 1969, Encl A to JCS 2472/467-4, August 19, 1969, JMF 911/305, April 1, 69. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

631 Washington National Records Center, DOD/ISA Subject Files: FRC 330 72 A 6308, Box 8, Vietnam#2 1969, 000.1.

632 Ibid. 206 with Vietnamization, but we must weigh in and balance the favorable impact of the U.S. against a possibility unfavorable to Saigon and Hanoi. A too-rapid withdrawal might seriously shake the Thieu Government, particularly if coupled with pressure on Thieu for a political settlement. It might also create excessive optimism in the United States and make the withdrawal irreversible."633 Ultimately, Kissinger stressed to the President, "I believe that you should defer judgment on further withdrawals until early August. This is when you have promised another review, and, by then, the enemy intentions should be much clearer and we will have fully analyzed them. If you make a decision now, it will leak."634 The safest course, according to Kissinger, "would be to proceed slowly with

Vietnamization in an effort to get a political settlement."635

Similar to the JCS and Kissinger, Secretary Rogers agreed that the effects of U.S. withdrawal must be evaluated during the process. He believed that the United States should preserve the flexibility to adjust both the pace and scope in accordance with events, being prepared to reexamine not only increments of the timetables, but also the size of the residual force. On the other hand, Rogers argued that the JCS assertion that a withdrawal in excess of 50,000 in 1969 would be a significant military risk was "unduly pessimistic."636 In particular, Rogers pointed out to Laird that withdrawal of the first

25,000 troops had occasioned only "relatively modest concern" in South Vietnam, and he

633 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 74, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam, Memo to the President for NSC, 1969.

634 Ibid.

635 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-142, NSSM Files, NSSM36.

636 Rogers to Laird, September 3, 1969, Wheeler File 091 Vietnam, September 1969. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 207 believed that the RVN leaders and public were prepared to accept further 1969 withdrawals. 637 As a result, Secretary Rogers called for withdrawal of an additional

60,000 troops by the end of the year. 638

Leaning closer to the political sensibilities of his Secretary of State, and despite the opinion of the JCS that neither the military situation nor RVN capabilities justified moving to a higher redeployment level than 25,000, Nixon expressed to Laird that he intended to announce a second withdrawal of 37,000 troops. 639 Like the President and

Rogers, Laird and his advisors did not concur with the JCS assessment and instead argued that 34,500 troops could be withdrawn.640 In a memorandum to the President on

September 4, Laird argued, "I feel Vietnamization has been successful so far. ... There is ample reason to believe the Vietnamization program can be continued, even at an accelerated pace. "641

Unfortunately, for Nixon, further reduction couldn't come fast enough. The advances gained as a result of his June announcement were short-lived. During the summer of 1969, Nixon confronted a situation in Vietnam not dissimilar to that faced by

Lyndon Johnson a year prior. With Hanoi's intransigence, rumblings of congressional

637 Ibid.

638 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 74, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam, Memo to the President for NSC, 1968.

639 Wheeler to Abrams, August 8, 1969, Wheeler File 091 Vietnam, August 1969. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

640 Wheeler Meeting on August 14, 1969, "Phase Two U.S. Redeployments," August 14, 1969, JMF 077 (CY69).

641 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 91, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnamization, Vol. IA. 208 discontent, and fading approval ratings, Nixon not only came under constant pressure to deliver on his promise to end the war, but struggled to stem the loss of public approval he so desperately sought to gain.

In a memorandum for the President, Kissinger raised many of these issues.

According to the National Security Advisor, "The pressure of public opinion on you to resolve the war quickly will increase - and I believe increase greatly - during the coming months. While polls may show that large numbers of Americans now are satisfied with the administration's handling of the war, the elements of an evaporation of this support are clearly present. The plans for student demonstrations in October are well known, and while many Americans will oppose the students' activities, they will also be reminded of their own opposition to the continuation of the war. I do not believe that

"Vietnamization" can significantly reduce the pressures for an end to the war, and may, in fact, increase them after a certain point. " 642 Kissinger stressed that as a result of the recrudescence of intense public concern to polarize public opinion, "you will then be somewhat in the same position as was President Johnson, although the substance of your position will be different, you will be caught between the Hawks and the Doves. " 643

Consequently, Kissinger was not optimistic about Vietnamization. He did not believe in the ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces to assume a larger part of the burden for the war. 644 Kissinger was concerned that Vietnamization would become like

642 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-024, Special NSC Meeting Folder 9/12/69, Vietnam.

643 Ibid. 209 "salted peanuts to the American public. The more U.S. troops come home, the more will be demanded."645 Ultimately, according to Kissinger, Vietnamization must "be considered both with regard to its prospects for allowing us to turn over the war to the

Vietnamese, and with regard to its effect on Hanoi and U.S. public opinion."646

Making matters worse for the President, former Secretary of Defense Clark

Clifford, in an article in Foreign Affairs, called upon the White House to withdraw

100,000 troops by the end of 1969 and all troops by the end of 1970.647 Clifford believed that ifthe United States reduced military action in South Vietnam, the enemy would do likewise. To Clifford's contention, Nixon replied, "For five years in the administration in which he was Secretary of Defense in the last part, we had a continued escalation of the war; we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam; we had 35,000 killed; we had over 200,000 injured."648 Rather, Nixon continued, "I believe that we have changed that policy. We have started to withdraw forces. We will withdraw more .... I would hope that we could beat Mr. Clifford's timetable, just as I think we have done a little better than he did when he was in charge of our national defense."649 An internal White House poll in July 1969

644 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 91, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnamization, Vol. IA.

645 Ibid.

646 Ibid.

647 Clifford, Clark. "A Viet Nam Reappraisal." Foreign Affairs 47 (July 1969): 601-22.

648 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements ofthe President, Volume 1, June 19,1969, #248 "The President's News Conference." Washington: GPO, 1970.

649 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume 1, June 19,1969, #248 "The President's News Conference." Washington: GPO, 1970. 210 affirmed Nixon's contention, with 73 percent of the public approving a total withdrawal of 100,000 troops from Vietnam in 1969, although only 36 percent of those believed he could do so.650

To encapsulate this change in policy, Nixon, in an informal press conference on

July 25, 1969, announced what became known as the Nixon Doctrine. As a way to present Vietnamization as more than what Kissinger described as an "elegant bugout," the Nixon Doctrine was useful. It came to represent the institutionalization of the

Vietnamization policy.

The premise of the Nixon Doctrine, according to Nixon, "was that countries that were threatened by communist aggression must take the primary responsibility for their own defense."651 That did not mean that U.S. forces had no military role. It meant that threatened countries had to be willing to bear the primary burden of supplying the manpower. The U.S. would focus on supply, support, and training. Thus, the Nixon

Doctrine hinged on a rapid buildup of the South Vietnamese military so that American forces could be quickly withdrawn without a Communist victory. Nixon's announcement did little to augment his public approval ratings. More than anything, it served as the intellectual support for his policy of Vietnamization.652

On July 30, Nixon met with President Thieu to discuss the war further.

According to Thieu, "There seemed to be two alternatives, either for the U.S. to speed up

65° Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

651 Nixon, Richard M. The Real War. New York: Warner Books, 1980. 106-7.

652 Isaacson, Kissinger, 242; Nixon, The Real War, 106-7; Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army, 283; Summers, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Washington, D.C., 1983. 176-7. 211 the war or to help the GVN to take over more of the war burden."653 Based on recent developments, Thieu supported Nixon's assertion that Asians should take over more responsibility for their own security. According to Thieu, the Nixon Doctrine was a

"constructive policy and that if the U.S. wishes to disengage, the best course is to help

South Vietnam grow strong."654 Thieu added, "If you help us to resist and chase the aggressor, we can handle the rest of the problem."655

The discussion then turned to the question of troop reduction. Nixon argued that no statement should be made about the next increment because it would give the impression that the purpose of the visit was to put pressure on Thieu. Thieu responded by suggesting that it was important that any further reductions be coordinated between the two nations. According to Thieu, "It was important that the reductions should not appear to be sudden improvisations responding to some particular influence."656

Ironically, every U.S. troop withdrawal was the result of "sudden improvisations," resulting largely from domestic political considerations.

Two weeks later, on August 14, Nixon discussed the subject of troop withdrawals with Laird, Wheeler, and Kissinger at the San Clemente White House in California. The

President argued that despite an increase in enemy tempo of operations, and especially

653 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK Memcons, President Nixon and Thieu, 7130169.

654 Ibid.

655 Ibid.

656 Ibid. 212 the objections of his senior military leadership, he was unwilling to limit the reduction to

25,000. According to Nixon, "it must be more than that."657

At a meeting of the NSC on September 12, 1969, Nixon further illuminated his thinking. 658 According to Nixon, troop withdrawals were a way to buy time and public opinion.659 The President stressed that the critics "will never be satisfied .... Next we give a ceasefire, then it could be dump Thieu. We will only lose the war on the third front - at home."660

Winning the hearts and minds of the American people was no easy task, but according to Secretary Rogers, "Most of the public agree with our moves so far. We get heckled but not too bad. We must convince the people we have a program we will follow. If we go ahead with reductions, we will get public support. But if it looks like a public relations program, they will distrust us."661

Accordingly, Kissinger replied, "We need a plan to end the war, not only to withdraw troops. This is what is on people's minds.662 Ultimately, Nixon noted that the key to moving forward was to read what the critics were saying, but also to watch the deeper theme of the people.663

657 Ibid.

658 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969.

659 Ibid.

660 Ibid.

661 Ibid.

662 Ibid.

663 Ibid. 213 After the first round of troop withdrawals, Nixon's military leadership and his

National Security Advisor cautioned Nixon not to pursue a withdrawal announcement of more than 25,000. On the other hand, both Laird and Rogers pushed the President for a larger withdrawal based largely on its domestic political ramifications. A significant reason for Laird's and Rogers' advocacy and Nixon's subsequent support was that from the period shortly after first introducing Vietnamization to mid-September 1969, the public's approval of his handling of the war fell eighteen points to 3 5 percent. 664

Moreover, as summer gave way to autumn, it was clear that the lull in protests over the preceding months was fading. As Secretary Laird accurately warned Nixon, "I believe this may be an illusory phenomenon .... The actual and potential antipathy for the war is, in my judgment, significant and increasing."665 Attuned to this pressure, Nixon was well aware that another announced troop withdrawal could go a long way toward reducing anti-war tensions and improving his declining approval ratings.

Given the rising tide of opposition and his plummeting approval rating, Nixon announced at a meeting with Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, Helms, Kissinger, and Bunker on

September 12 his decision to withdrawal an additional 35,000 troops, a decision he made several days prior. 666 The President, in publicly announcing his withdrawal decision in a televised speech on September 16, told the U.S. viewing audience that after "careful consideration with my senior civilian and military advisors and in full consultation with

664 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Harris, Louis. "President's Popularity Level's Off." The Washington Post September 29 1969: A2.

665 Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 299.

666 The New York Times September 13, 1969; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDM 17, September 1969. 214 the Government of Vietnam," he had decided to reduce U.S. military strength to 484,000 by December 15, 1969.667 Unfortunately, despite his statement to the contrary, the

President did not heed the advice of his senior military leadership, which described an augmented troop withdrawal as an unacceptable risk. Despite military advice to the contrary, Nixon once again utilized Vietnamization for domestic political gain: to augment his public approval rating, undercut anti-war activists, and move closer to his goal of reelection in 1972. According to a Los Angeles Times article, "The entire White

House operation is ... an extension of the campaign organization which is now bending all the affairs of state to the 1972 election. "668

As in June, Nixon's withdrawal announcement enhanced his approval ratings, particularly on Vietnam. Because 71 percent of the American people endorsed Nixon's commitment to bring back another 35,000 American fighting men from Vietnam, the

President's Vietnam rating increased from 35 to 52 percent.669 Moreover, his job approva1 ratmg. rose to 60 percent. 670

The Silent Majority

667 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages. Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume l, September 16, 1969, #361 "Statement on United States Troops in Vietnam." Washington: GPO, 1970.

668 Annotated News Summaries, February 1970, President's Office Files, Box 31.

669 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Harris, Louis. "Vietnam, Pullout Supported, but Defeat Is Seen." The Washington Post October 27, 1969: A2; Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2217.

670 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2217; Nixon's public approval rose from 55 percent to 60 percent in June. 215 As Kissinger predicted, despite significant public approval gains, critics continued to challenge President's Nixon's Vietnam agenda. With the return of students to the campuses for the fall term in September 1969, even more strident criticism of President

Nixon and his war policy was levied, especially as preparations and publicity for the

October moratorium were stepped up. For example, U.S. Senator Frank Church ofldaho, one of the leading Democratic critics of the war, said, "If Nixon did not extricate the country from the war it may become his war."671

On September 20, Nixon spent nearly two hours discussing the war with some

225 college and university students. The President talked to and with them. As the first of its kind during his presidency, this unique occasion was largely judged a considerable success among participants. 672

Despite Nixon's overture, domestic agitation culminated in massive demonstrations in October and November. The long-promised moratorium of October 15 was the largest demonstration to date against the Vietnam War. Protests, expressed in noisy street rallies, teach-ins, forums, candlelight processions, and prayer vigils, took place across the country, and what was originally planned as a student activity spilled over to include people of all ages, from various strata of society. Although it was impossible to measure the number of participants, estimates ranged from one to several million.

671 Statement, September 29, 1969, Cooper Papers: Senatorial Series II, 1956-1972, Legislative File, Foreign Relations Committee, Box 482.

672 "Nixon Meets Students. The New Republic 161.14 (October 4, 1969). 216 Prior to the demonstrations, a reporter asked Nixon about the approaching moratorium. Nixon responded that he was aware of the anti-war activity and expected it but stated "under no circumstance will I be affected whatsoever by it. "673 On the other hand, in a meeting with his political team on September 27, Nixon expressed his frustration by noting, "If for one month everybody would shut up about the war, we would be a long way toward getting it over."674

Despite his discomfiture with the anti-war movement, Nixon took no public notice of the moratorium. He remained at the White House conferring with advisors on

Vietnam, working on Latin American policy, and hearing an Urban Affairs

Subcommittee Report on education. 675 Moreover, to divert attention from the moratorium, White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler announced on October 13 that

President Nixon would address the nation to discuss the Vietnam situation on the evening of November 3. The timing was keyed, Mr. Ziegler said, to the anniversary of the announcement of the November 1968 bombing halt over North Vietnam. 676

With criticism building over several weeks, culminating with a moratorium on

October 15, 1969, Nixon's Vietnam approval rating again fell below 50 percent. Pressure

673 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume 1, September 26,1969, #374 "The President's News Conference." Washington: GPO, 1970.

674 National Archives. Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 79, Memoranda for the President, August 3-December 28, 1969 (Notes drafted on September 29 as a memorandum for the President's file by Patrick J. Buchanan).

675 The New York Times October 16, 1969: l; The New York Times October 17, 1969: l; The New York Times October 19, 1969: IV-I.

676 The New York Times October 13, 1969: 1. 217 was clearly on the President to act more decisively.677 As Nixon later recalled, "Public support for our war effort was eroding. Our peace initiatives, the start of our withdrawal program, and our conciliatory speeches slowed the erosion, but they also whetted the appetites of the anti-war activists. As we approached the first anniversary of the bombing halt on November 1, 1969, I knew the time had come for a bold move to mobilize

American support for our military efforts."678

In a November 3, 1969 speech outlining his policy ofVietnamization, Nixon, needing to build public support, boldly sought the backing of the American "Silent

Majority." In a memorandum to Kissinger on October 23, 1969, Laird summarized the main theme of the speech. According to Laird, the United States had a program to accomplish its main objective in Vietnam, Vietnamization, and that a positive momentum had been established in implementing the program.679

Just prior to the President's broadcast, Kissinger indicated the importance of the address to reporters by stating, "Nothing that we have done since we came into office has been done with as much seriousness, I may say with as much anguish, as this speech."680

Moreover, the address, Nixon later claimed, was one of the few speeches that had

"actually influenced the course of history,"681 and was "probably my greatest speaking

677 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Gains Support on Vietnam Policy." The Washington Post December 8, 1969: A2; Nixon's approval for his handling of the war fell to 46 percent.

678 Nixon, No More Vietnams, 112.

679 Washington National Record Center, Chronological Files of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense: FRC 330 74 0045, October 1969.

680 Background Briefing by Dr. Kissinger, "President's Vietnam Speech," ¥/heeler File 091 Vietnam, November 1969. 218 triumph, apart from the fund speech, which saved my political career. "682 With an impassioned plea for patience and support, the President appealed directly to the

American people. Nixon's pleas for support and unity were, he later wrote, designed to alleviate domestic pressures: "I sought to go over the heads of the anti-war opinion makers in the media and to appeal directly to the American people for unity."683

As a result of internal White House polling prior to his address, Nixon was aware that 69 percent of the American public were opposed to the moratoriums and thus believed they were actually hurting U.S. chances for settling the war. 684 With this insider knowledge, it is not surprising that the speech achieved its intended effect. Seventy-eight percent of the American public liked the speech and an even higher 82 percent gave

Nixon high marks for "wanting to end the war."685 Nixon's overall handling of Vietnam also jumped five points to 51 percent, 686 and his job approval rose from 57 to 68 percent.·687 Moreover, polling indicated that 64 percent of the public agreed with Nixon's views on Vietnam,688 and 73 percent of Americans favored Nixon's plan to turn over

681 Nixon, Memoirs, 409.

682 Crowley, Nixon in Winter, 252.

683 Nixon, No More Vietnams, 114.

684 Folder 4:8. Box 4. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; The polling demonstrated that the advocates of the moratoriums were found among the youth, nonwhites, professed liberals, and those claiming not to be part of the "Silent Majority."

685 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Builds Up Goodwill, Buys Time on Big Problems." The Washington Post January 12, 1970:A9.

686 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Gains Support on Vietnam Policy." The Washington Post December 8, 1969: A2.

687 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2223. 219 more of the burden for the war to the South Vietnamese.689 This outpouring of positive public approval emboldened Nixon to press on with his policy ofVietnamization.

Despite the success of the "Silent Majority," Nixon and his advisors harbored no illusions that this support would remain fixed in face of developments not only on the battlefield, but particularly at home. In a memorandum to the President on November 15,

1969, Kissinger noted, "The Nixon administration was considering three alternative plans which would provide for the withdrawal of 1) 50,000 troop over a three month period, 2)

60,000 over a 4.5 month period, or 3) 100,000 troops over a 6.5 month period."690

Kissinger emphasized that in the wake of positive public attitudes, "you may wish to point out that you have [options] 1 or 2 ... this would give you flexibility later on to consider the announcement of a larger increment should the conditions favor it."691

Kissinger recommended that Nixon remain flexible and avoid being harnessed to a fixed time schedule as proposed by Secretary Rogers. 692

Hoping to sustain the momentum gained by his November 3 address, Nixon announced a reduction of an additional 50,000 troops from Vietnam on December 15,

1969. In making this decision, Nixon was fully aware that evidence demonstrated a

688 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Higby to Magruder. November I I, 1969, Box 134, H.R. Haldeman, Staff Members' Office Files, White House Special Files, Nixon Presidential Materials.

689 Harris, Louis. "Pollster Cites War Pessimism." The Washington Post November 18, 1969: A19.

690 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 140, Vietnam Country Files, Vol Xl I, November l-15, 1969.

691 Ibid.

692 Ibid. 220 substantial increase in enemy activity, negotiated progress was at a standstill, and the

South Vietnamese were progressing achingly slowly in increasing its share of the burden of the war. These developments contradicted the President's statement outlining

Vietnamization in June 1969, especially his private reassurances to Thieu. At that time,

Nixon said, "The rate of American withdrawals from Vietnam would depend on three criteria: progress in the training of the South Vietnamese, progress in the Paris negotiations, and the level of enemy activity."693 This change in U.S. policy caused

Thieu to fear "the psychological blow to the Vietnamese if automatic U.S. redeployments were to continue. "694

Like Thieu, the JCS argued against any further reductions at the time. On

"military grounds," a further reduction exceeded "prudent military risks." The JCS believed that a redeployment during the next several months would risk the shortfall in allied capability to meet the enemy threat. Thus, an extra burden would fall on the

RVNAF at a time when the U.S. prime objective should be to ensure that the RVNAF maintained momentum and suffered no major defeats. Nevertheless, the JCS recognized that "other considerations" might require redeployment in the near future. 695

Apparently, the "other considerations" that the JCS had mentioned proved compelling. In making this announcement, Nixon had exceeded the military's 1969

693 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume 2, April 20, 1970, #126 "Address to the Nation on Progress Toward Peace in Vietnam." Washington: GPO, 1971.

694 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 56, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Vietnam Policy Documents, September-November 1969.

695 Wheeler to Laird, November 1969, Wheeler Files 911/374, August 25, 1969. Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History. 221 recommended total of 50,000 by 65,500, and in the process reduced the total force authorization in Vietnam by a combined total of 115,500.

In this light, Nixon's decision to withdraw additional troops can be seen as politically motivated, particularly since the advice of his senior military advisors strongly militated against such a move. The announcement was simply designed to sustain the momentum of domestic support the President enjoyed in the wake of the

"Silent Majority." Not coincidently, after Nixon's appeal to the "Silent Majority," coupled with an additional withdrawal announcement in December 1969, the public approval rating of the President's handling of the war increased from 51 to 65 percent by

January 29, 1970. 696

After a year in office, the Nixon administration actively sought a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, but in the absence of a dramatic political breakthrough, continued the transfer of an increasing portion of the combat responsibility to the RVNAF while gradually reducing U.S. forces. Throughout 1969, President Nixon was able to avoid a firm timetable, choosing instead to key the rate of Vietnamization to the developing situation in Vietnam and the strength of his public approval. Thus, the President could rely on this path when he was politically vulnerable.

As Nixon entered 1970, he realized more than any time before that the ultimate success of Vietnamization depended in large part on the ability of the South Vietnamese forces to assume the combat burden as U.S. troops withdrew. Highlighting Nixon's view in an address to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters,

696 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2236. 222 Secretary Rogers stated, "President Nixon's program to end American participation in combat in Viet-Nam is irreversible. We are training and equipping the forces of the

Republic of Viet-Nam to take care of themselves as we transfer to them the whole of the combat role. There is growing confidence in South Viet-Nam that this can be done.

Assuming its success - and our policy makes this assumption - the result will be valuable for the future security of the area: a feeling of independence and self-reliance not just in

South Viet-Nam but in Southeast Asia as a whole."697

Although improvement of South Vietnamese forces progressed significantly in

1969, many problems persisted. In the areas of training, leadership, and morale much needed to be done. This was not news to Nixon and his advisors. They were quite aware that these were issues that could not be easily or quickly resolved. The environment contributing to the RVNAF's record of low morale, poorly trained leaders, and limited technical knowledge was deeply entrenched. In spite of sustained efforts to eliminate these weaknesses, they persisted as 1970 dawned.

A quarter of the way through his first term, Nixon consistently demonstrated a capacity to utilize Vietnamization as a political tool to augment public opinion.

According to an internal White House poll, 56 percent of the public believed that the administration was doing as well as could be expected in handling the war, nearly two- thirds approved of the President's handling of the situation in Vietnam, and over two- thirds believed that President Nixon had a plan to bring about the end of American mvo. 1vement m. v·1etnam. 698

697 Department of State. Bulletin February 2, 1970: l l 8-120. 223 Central to this plan and his reelection hopes, Vietnamization scored the singular success of his first year in office. Nixon's policy effectively pulled the teeth out of the anti-war movement. As noted in The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam, "The winter and early spring of 1970 was a low period for the anti-war movement. Many activists remained skeptical of the movement's clout and questioned the point of holding more demonstrations. Public support for Nixon's Vietnamization policy was disheartening. America troop withdrawals sapped the strength from the movement - why protest if the war was ending, some activists reasoned?"699 By convincing a majority of

Americans that he wanted to terminate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the President moved closer towards winning reelection and shaping a positive presidential legacy.

Continued Pressure for Withdrawals

After peaking at a 65 percent Vietnam approval rating in late January 1970, by mid-April, Nixon's overall handling of the war decreased 17 percentage points to 48 percent. 700 Worsening conditions in Cambodia and Laos slowed the momentum Nixon enjoyed since his "Silent Majority" appeal. As in December, the combat and diplomatic situations strongly militated against further troop withdrawal schedules. By March 1970,

698 Folder 4:8. Box 4. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Folder 4: 10. Box 4. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

699 Wells, The War Within, 403.

70°Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2244. 224 war threatened to envelop all of Indochina, negotiations in Paris were sterile, and Nixon's

Vietnamization program was in flux as a result of developments in the field.

On March 13, 1970, General Abrams forwarded to JCS Chairman Wheeler a detailed assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. According to Abrams, the enemy's logistical buildup in Laos, as well as the shifting of regiments, portended increased offensive activity in South Vietnam during the spring and early summer.

Fearing that additional redeployments were being contemplated without regard to the operational requirements or the progress of the RVNAF, Abrams argued that such action could upset "the military and psychological balance" in South Vietnam and jeopardize the ultimate success of Vietnamization. Abrams concluded that the previous U.S. withdrawals strained the capabilities of the RVNAF; therefore, he opposed further deployments pending developments over the next three months.701

Wheeler presented the Abrams assessment to Laird on March 16, 1970. Despite the significant progress in Vietnamization over the past 10 months, Wheeler affirmed

Abrams' call for a pause in redeployments, arguing that the gains were fragile and the enemy was capable of causing significant setbacks. Consequently, the JCS recommended that the decision and announcement on further U.S. troop redeployment from South Vietnam be deferred until June 15, 1970. They recognized that this delay might bring adverse public reaction but believed that the reaction could be reduced by "a

701 Wheelerto Laird March 16, 1970, Encl to JCS 2472/552-17. March 16, 1970, JMF 911/535, November IO, 1969, sec 6. 225 factual public affairs program."702 At the conclusion of their meeting, Wheeler recommended Laird provide the JSC assessment to the President. 703

The central problem for Wheeler was that Laird did not agree with the position of the JCS. Although Laird presented the military's position in a memorandum for the

President on April 4, 1970, he made clear that "to maintain U.S. support for

Vietnamization, to provide proper incentives for the South Vietnamese to assume more responsibility for the war, and to keep the U.S. burden within tolerable economic limits, I believe we must continue to reduce U.S. forces in South Vietnam."704

Laird based this assessment on his recent trip to Vietnam in mid-February 1970.

Summarizing his trip, Laird noted, "the South Vietnamese were making satisfactory progress in Vietnamization, especially on the military front," and "Thieu has succeeded in selling the concept as something the Vietnamese want, rather than as something pressed on them by the United States."705 Moreover, Laird underscored that even though

Abrams had expressed to him that the military situation was entirely satisfactory and the

RVNAF modernization program was "moving well," the Secretary of Defense could not with certainty "fully understand all of Abrams arguments about the gravity of the next increment."706 As a result, according to Laird, "unless the enemy significantly increases

702 Wheeler to Laird, April 3, 1970, Encl A to JCS 2472/611, April 2, 1970, JMF 911/374, April 2, 1970.

703 Ibid.

704 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 145, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, April 1, 1970.

705 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 140, Vietnam Country Files, Vol XI I, November 1-15, 1969. 226 the tempo or alters the patterns of the war, I believe we should continue our redeployments." 707

Contrary to Laird, Kissinger continued to be "concerned for some time about the progress of the Vietnamization program."708 Kissinger was in alignment with the JCS and their recommendation for a pause in troop withdrawals until June 15, 1970.709

According to Kissinger, "My overall impression from reviewing the reports of the military, Secretary Laird, as well as my own staff, is that we are making budget and troop withdrawal decisions today without fully examining the implications of these decisions for the future. We may not know we are in trouble until it is too late to do anything about it. Moreover, if and when we get in trouble, we may have no budget flexibility to cope with the situation." 710

Despite full awareness of the military situation in Vietnam, Nixon, failing to heed the advice of his advisors in the field, once again, relied on the advice of his Secretary of

Defense in calling for an additional troop withdrawal. On April 13, 1970, the President met with Laird, Rogers, Wheeler, and Kissinger to discuss the fourth redeployment increment from South Vietnam. From the meeting, Nixon decided in principle to withdrawal 150,000 additional U.S. forces over the next year or so. Transmitting this decision to a nationally televised audience a week later, the President said, "We have now

706 Ibid.

707 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 145, Vietnam Country Files, Vietnam, April 1, 1970.

708 Ibid.

709 Ibid.

710 Ibid. 227 reached a point where we can confidently move from a period of 'cut and try' to a longer- range program for replacement of Americans by South Vietnamese troops."711 The

President avoided setting out any schedule for the reduction, merely stating that it would be completed "during the spring of next year," with the timing and pace determined by

"our best judgment" of the current military and diplomatic situation. 712 The President sought to stem the tide of public disapproval by announcing that 60,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn by the close of 1970, and that an additional 90,000 troops would depart Vietnam in 1971. Although he shared this decision with Thieu and Bunker, in keeping with his penchant for secrecy, Nixon decided to withhold this decision from the members of the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, as well as countries contributing troops, until the decision was announced. 713

The fact that the announcement came at a time when the situation seemed to demand that the U.S. remain flexible and not restrict its options in the region illustrates the influence domestic pressures have on presidential decision making. As during his

"Silent Majority" speech, Nixon justified his April troop withdrawal decision in terms of

Vietnamization's positive progress, but he unquestionably intended for the announcement to defuse domestic criticism. As he later wrote: "Despite the impasse in the secret talks and the worsening military situation in Cambodia, I decided to go ahead with the troop withdrawal. .. the time had come to drop a bombshell on the gathering spring storm of

711 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements ofthe President, Volume 2, April 20, 1970, #126 "Address to the Nation on Progress Toward Peace in Vietnam." Washington: GPO, 1971.

712 Ibid.

713 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 95, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam, Troop Replacements 1970. 228 anti-war protest."714 Moreover, Nixon was advised by his Defense Secretary that he had to take 60,000 men out of Vietnam by the time of the November Congressional election or "you might just as well forget about the election."715

Ultimately, despite being advised by the military against proceeding with a troop withdrawal announcement given the tenuous battlefield situation, the President still chose this path.716 For his trouble, Nixon enjoyed an increase in sustained approval. An internal White House poll disclosed that nearly 70 percent of respondents had a favorable reaction to the President's speech, and nearly two-thirds believed the President not only had a plan to end American involvement in Vietnam, but that it would work. 717

Nixon's troop announcement, coupled with his April 30, 1970 nationally televised address in which he tied the Cambodian operation to the program of U.S. troop withdrawals, was a shrewd move that solidified this approval. In his address, Nixon announced that U.S. and South Vietnamese troops had crossed into Cambodia. In announcing the Cambodian operation, Nixon said, "A majority of the American people ... are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken .. .is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program."718 Even though

714 Nixon, Memoirs, 448.

715 Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 146.

716 Sell, Ted. "Nixon's Pullout Schedule Took Even Joint Chiefs by Surprise." The Los Angeles Times April 21, 1970: 1, 9.

717 Folder 1:10. Box 10. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

718 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume 2, April 30, 1970, #139 "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia." Washington: GPO, 1971. 229 this decision inflamed visceral protest, polling revealed that the Cambodian incursion had considerable support. In a private White House poll, 58 percent ofrespondents believed that sending U.S. troops into Cambodia was the right move. 719

Over the next couple of months, Nixon enjoyed modest gain in his overall handling of the war largely because of o his troop withdrawal timetable and the public's approval of his Cambodian decision. Consequently, by June 1970, the President enjoyed

53 percent approval on Vietnam, as opposed to 46 percent prior to his April withdrawal announcement. 720

Primarily as a result of domestic events, Nixon's positive momentum was short- lived. In early May four students were tragically killed at Kent State University in Ohio, and just five days later a massive protest involving nearly 100,000 demonstrators in

Washington, D.C. prompted police to position buses as a protective cover around the

White House. The effects of these anti-war demonstrations are not often cited in official documents, but as Nixon's Chief of StaffH.R. Haldeman makes clear in his diary, they had a profound impact on the state of mind of the President and his advisors. 721

The domestic unrest led Nixon to convene his inner circle of advisors in San

Clemente, California, on May 31, 1970 to consider whether the administration should speed up withdrawals. General Abrams informed the President that, in his judgment,

60,000 troops could be withdrawn by December 31, 1970 and 90,000 withdrawn by

719 Folder 6: 16. Box 6. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; "The Public Appraises the Nixon Administration, (Revised) (June 1970)," p. x, Gordon Strachan: 1972 Campaign Materials, Box 406, White House Series Files, Nixon Presidential Materials, 39.

720 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2252-3.

721 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 158-64. 230 May 1, 1971, but it would strain the capabilities of the South Vietnamese. Anything beyond this would be nothing short of dangerous."722 Kissinger supported an action plan similar to Abrams', calling for a limited withdrawal in 1970 of 50,000 troops to be accomplished by October 15, and a phased withdrawal of 100,000 after January 1 "with the terminal date for the withdrawal to be determined at a later date based on your assessment of the situation and enemy reactions."723 Kissinger contended, "The risk more than outweighs whatever small advantage could be gained by a speed up of withdrawals .... We should withdraw enough forces to calm public opinion but we should do so slowly enough to give Hanoi an incentive to negotiate and to avoid risks to our forces." 724

On the other hand, Secretary Laird argued that there should be withdrawals in addition to the 50,000 presently scheduled on October 15. 725 According to Laird, "The

South Vietnamese have shown they can do the job. We must keep the momentum going.

I don't believe it is too easy to judge the relative merits of 60,000 or 100,000 and we must get Congressional support for our funding next year. Thus, we have got to win politically as well as militarily."726 Responding to Laird, Nixon stated, "Of course, that is

722 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Presidential/HAK memcons, Meeting at San Clemente with President, May 31, 1970.

723 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) Box H-074, WSAG Meeting, 5/22/70.

724 Ibid.

725 Ibid.

726 Ibid. 231 why we must continue to draw down our forces."727 Ultimately, according to Nixon,

"We must stretch the South Vietnamese ... [because] I will be judged on

Vietnamization."728 Nixon knew Vietnamization would largely determine his party's prospects in the 1970 mid-term election, as well as his own prospects for reelection in the fall of 1972. Unfortunately for Nixon, in June 1970 only 3 7 percent of the public believed that Nixon's plan to bring home all U.S. troops as soon as the South Vietnamese were able to defend themselves would work. 729 Accordingly, Ray Price, a Nixon speechwriter, told H.R. Haldeman, "We're in trouble - deep trouble."730 As a result, according to Robert Dallek, in the spring of 1970 "the administration's inability to find a prompt, satisfactory exit from the war made Nixon and Kissinger almost desperate to achieve some foreign policy victories they could emphasize in the run-up to the

November elections."731

The 1970 and 1972 Elections

During the summer and early fall of 1970, Nixon and his advisors continued to debate the merits of Vietnamization and formulate a strategy to break the deadlock in

Paris. In an address to the nation on October 6, 1970, the President called for a cease-

727 Ibid.

728 Ibid.

729 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

730 Price to Haldeman, May 25, 1970, White House Central Files, Box 15.

731 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 211. 232 fire, expanded peace talks, and the mutual release of all POWs.732 Despite generally bipartisan support for the address, only 44 percent of the American public approved of the

President's handling of the war. 733 Seeking to capitalize on bipartisan momentum, increase his public approval, and support his party in the upcoming November off-year elections, Nixon stressed the "continued progress of the Vietnamization program" and announced a further withdrawal of 40,000 troops from Vietnam.734 An internal White

House poll indicated that as a result of the speech, Nixon's public approval rating rose to

67 percent. 735

Nixon's October 6 speech, combined with the withdrawal announcement, effectively neutralized the war as a campaign issue, and the country went into November largely unencumbered by intra-governmental strife over Vietnam. As New York Times columnist James Reston noted during the mainsprings of the 1970 campaign, a majority of Americans believed that although the Vietnam War was a mess and a mistake "after all, it is coming to an end."736

Reston's comment reflected Nixon's thinking from the year prior. In a meeting with the political team he selected to help prepare for the 1970 Congressional elections

732 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President. Volume 2, October 7, 1970, #335 "Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia." Washington: GPO, 1971.

733 Harris, Louis. "Support for Nixon on War Drops to 34%." The Washington Post March 13, 1971: A7.

734 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume 2, October 12, 1970, #340 "Statement Announcing Further Withdrawals of U.S. from the Republic of Vietnam." Washington: GPO, 1971.

735 Folder I :4. Box 1. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

736 The New York Times August 28, 1970: 26. 233 on September 27, 1969, 737 and ever mindful of his prospects for re-election, Nixon noted that he "had three years and three months left" to tum it around in Vietnam, and by the

1970 elections, "one way or the other, it is going to be over with; we are going to be able by then to see the light at the end of the tunnel."738

Nixon's actions leading into the election were crucial in building support and confidence in the administration's Vietnam platform and the Republican Party. For example, even though the Republicans lost nine U.S. House seats, the average loss for a sitting U.S. President's party was four times greater during the previous 50 years. 739

Moreover, in the U.S. Senate, the Republicans gained two seats. These results demonstrated that Nixon's Vietnam policy resonated with the American public. These positive events led Nixon to comment, "We have increased our majority now to a working majority. We have a working majority in both the House and the Senate for national defense and also for foreign policy; a working majority of four in the Senate, which means that in terms of the President's ability to conduct foreign policy, to make decisions that he considers and that his administration considers are important to the

737 According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held on September 27 at 2: 15pm. The group included Senators Hugh Scott, Robert Griffin, and Rogers Morton; and H.R. Haldeman, Bryce Harlow, Donald Rumsfeld, Harry Dent, Lyn Nofziger, and Patrick Buchanan from the Office of the President (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, White House Central Files, Staff Members and Office Files, Office of Presidential Papers and Archives, Daily Diary).

738 National Archives. Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 79, Memoranda for the President, August 3-December 28, 1969 (notes drafted on September 29 as a memorandum for the President's file by Patrick J. Buchanan).

739 The average over the previous 50 years was 36. 234 future of the country and to the cause of peace generally, that he can speak with a much stronger voice in the world than was previously the case."740

In addition to Nixon's Vietnam policy, the mood of the electorate in 1970 was driven by economic and social issues, particularly inflation, crime, violence, campus unrest, and race. 741 According to Louis Harris, "If the election were to be cast in issue terms, it would be the Republican advantage on foreign policy vs. the Democratic edge on the economy."742 As Nixon later recalled, "The Democrats unleashed a full-scale attack on us about the economy, which was undeniably having problems. They hammered the fact that unemployment had climbed to 5.5 percent and insisted it was to go higher still."743 Unquestionably, economic issues curtailed many of the electoral gains

Nixon anticipated as a result of the progress made toward ending U.S. involvement in

Vietnam.

Underscoring the economic and social issues critical to the 1970 election, Richard

Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, in their 1970 work The Real Majority, argue that the elections in 1970 and 1972 would be decided by the "Social Issue." 744 As Nixon explained in his Memoirs, "The purpose of The Real Majority was to persuade

740 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume 2, November 4, 1970, #340 "Remarks to Reporters on the Results ofthe 1970 Elections." Washington: GPO., 1971.

741 The New York Times August 28, 1970: 26.

742 Harris, Louis. "Voters Being Tugged in Opposite Directions." The Washington Post November, 2 1970: A2.

743 Nixon, Memoirs, 492.

744 Scammon, Richard M., and Ben J. Wattenberg. The Real Majority. New York: Coward McCann, 1970. 235 Democrats to stop playing so heavily to the fashionable but unrepresentative constituencies of the young, the poor, the racial minorities, and the students. Once the

Democrats got on the right side of the Social Issue, they could win the election by taking the offensive on the economy, which was the Republicans' weak point."745

Intrigued by Scammon and Wattenberg's thesis, Nixon sought to counter their strategy by reaching out to disaffected Democrats, blue-collar workers, and working-class white ethnics, but as Nixon later recalled, the Democrats "successfully blunted the Social

Issue."746 Accordingly, much like the economic challenges, social issues curtailed many of the electoral gains Nixon anticipated in 1970.

In the end, the most important aspect of the 1970 off-year elections was their significance for the presidential contest in 1972. Despite confronting domestic social and economic challenges during the 1970 election, Nixon secured the requisite Congressional majority he needed to keep his 1968 campaign pledge to end the war in his first term.

Two years in, Nixon was making progress, but much more was required. Nixon continued to seek an end to U.S. involvement, through negotiations and Vietnamization.

Since negotiation brought scant success, Nixon proceeded with Vietnamization.

In accordance with the President's wishes, General Abrams concentrated on making Vietnamization succeed. While U.S. combat operations were reduced, RVNAF actions were expanded. As U.S. ground units redeployed during the year, more reliance was placed on U.S. reconnaissance, artillery, tactical air, and B-52 resources. Remaining

745 Nixon, Memoirs, 491.

746 Nixon, Memoirs, 491-2. 236 U.S. forces increasingly shifted their effort to supporting, equipping, and training the

RVNAF and providing territorial security and pacification assistance.

The military situation at the close of 1970 was encouraging. During the year, the

RVNAF expanded by approximately 80,000 men and assumed a major share of the combat operations. Simultaneously, U.S. troop presence dropped by almost 140,000 men, resulting in a significant decline in casualties. American combat deaths in Vietnam in 1970 fell to approximately 4,200, or about half of the 1969 figure, and significantly below the record figure of 14,561 in 1968.

The President could relish the fact that, as in 1968, the 1970 off-year elections demonstrated that the policy of Vietnamization sold at the ballot box. Equally as important, the President's decision to utilize Vietnamization as a political tool to augment public opinion to win reelection was not only on course, but working to plan. Over the next two years, Nixon would continually lean upon this strategy to win support for his candidacy to help secure a second term in 1972.

Despite the positive gains enjoyed from the 1970 off-year elections, Nixon's approval ratings progressively fell, so much so that by February 1971, only 34 percent of the American public approved of his handling of the war,747 and only 43 percent approved of his overall job performance. 748 Anti-war sentiment in the United States was a significant catalyst; it reached such an intense level that the President could no longer

747 Harris, Louis. "Support for Nixon on War Drops to 34%." The Washington Post March 13, 1971: A7.

748 Harris, Louis. "Nixon's Rating Now Is 53 % Favorable." The Washington Post November 29, 1971: A22. 237 easily balance negotiations and Vietnamization in his effort to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion.

For example, when news services reported that at least 25,000 South Vietnamese ground troops, backed by 9,000 U.S. combat troops, were positioned on the Laotian border while the heaviest round-the-clock bombing of the war was in progress, a wave of nationwide demonstrations erupted. For instance, on February 10, the Student

Mobilization Committee (SMC) reported that over 50,000 people took part, braving severe winter conditions in much of the nation. 749 The largest was in Boston Common, which led an SMC spokesmen to say, "I would characterize the reaction now as a slow bum which will, without question, grow."750

Given the precariousness of the domestic environment, Nixon assigned Chief of

Staff and former advertising executive H. R. Haldeman to sit in on all critical foreign policy meetings to bring consideration of congressional and public relations factors in the decision-making process.751 In a conversation with then Democrat Treasury Secretary

John Connally, Haldeman admitted the depths of White House preoccupation with polling. He recorded in his diary the White House feeling "that we should meet each problem as it's shown in the polls, and worry about how the statistics play and so forth."752

749 Halstead, Out Now, 589-90.

75°Christian Science Monitor February 12, 1971.

751 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 243.

752 Ibid., 243. 238 On February 1, 1971, Haldeman predicted that the president's approval would drop in the ensuing months and suggested that Nixon not respond to minor criticism "but engage in large scale symbolic events such as the operations in Cambodia, the Paris negotiations, and troop withdrawals."753 Haldeman's prediction came to fruition in

March 1971, when Nixon reached the lowest point of his popularity since his 1968 election win. 754 According to an internal White House poll, Nixon's Vietnam approval rating was a mere 32 percent.755 To stem this downturn, on March 30, 1971 Haldeman predicted that "the basic turning point" in presidential support would be achieved the next week with the announcement that no more draftees would serve in Vietnam, coupled with another increment of troop withdrawals. 756 Equally prescient in his thinking, Haldeman correctly predicted the announcement's positive spike in public approval.757 Still, by July

1971 both Nixon's handling of the war and overall job approval ratings were barely pos1t10ne. . d a b ove 40 percent. 758

As the 1972 election season approached, Nixon had a good sense of where the public stood on Vietnam. For example, in May 1971 an internal White House poll

753 "Projected Gallup Approval Ratings February 1971-August 1972, February 1, 1971," Box 388, H.R. Haldeman Files, While House Series Files, Nixon Presidential Materials.

754 Harris, Louis. "President's Job Rating Rises." The Washington Post May 13, 1971: A9; Note: A 56 percent negative rating.

755 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

756 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, 262.

757 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2324.

758 Folder 1: 17. Box 1. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Harris, Louis. "Nixon's Rating Now Is 53 % Favorable." The Washington Post November 29, 1971: A22. 239 concluded that 68 percent of the public would approve a proposal by Congress requiring the U.S. government to withdrawal all American troops by the end of the year. 759 In a

July 1971 Gallup Poll, 61 percent of Americans supported a candidate who advocated getting all U.S. troops out of Vietnam by July 1, 1972. 760 More specifically, nearly three- quarters of the American public favored "getting completely out" of Vietnam by May

1972.761 Even more telling, three out of five Americans favored the withdrawal of

American troops from Vietnam, "even if the government of South Vietnam collapsed."762

These numbers demonstrated that the majority of Americans wanted the war to end expediently, regardless of the consequences.

Nixon needed to demonstrate to the American public that he would meet this expectation. In May 1971 a Louis Harris poll asked the American public to rate the job

Nixon had done "winding down the war in Vietnam."763 The public responded with a ratio of 53 percent negative to 23 positive.764 As the 1972 election season approached, the President would need to utilize his proven strategy of Vietnamization to augment his public approval in an election year, honor his 1968 campaign pledge to end the war, and win reelection.

759 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA.

760 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2316.

761 Harris, Louis. "Public Backs Viet Pullout by May 31." The Washington Post November 8, 1971: A5.

762 Harris, Louis. "Tide of Public Opinion Tums Decisively Against the War." The Washington PostMay3, 197l:Al4.

763 Harris, Louis. "President's Job Rating Rises." The Washington Post May 13, 1971: A9.

764 Ibid. 240 From November 1971 to August 1972, Nixon announced five troop withdrawal increments. Each withdrawal attempted to maintain his public approval momentum and demonstrate that the President was keeping his pledge to end the war before the end of his first term. For example, Nixon's November 1971 announcement of an additional withdrawal of 45,000 troops increased his approval on Vietnam by twelve points to 53 percent. 765 In January 1972, after announcing an additional 70,000 troop withdrawal,

Nixon enjoyed an increase in approval from 49 to 55 percent. 766

Unfortunately, Nixon was unable to sustain this momentum. From February to

April 1972, the President experienced a steady decline in his overall approval ratings. In

March 1972, a rather discouraging state of public opinion faced Nixon as the 1972 election campaign rolled into full swing. For example, a plurality of 46 to 20 percent of the American people believed that "if there is no negotiated Vietnam peace agreement," then the President "will not have kept his 1968 promise to end U.S. involvement in

Vietnam."767 Moreover, 70 percent of the public did not believe that "all U.S. involvement in Vietnam will be ended by election time," and only 42 percent approved of his handling of the war. 768

765 Folder 9:5. Box 9. Dr. David Derge Collection. Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace Foundation, Yorba Linda, CA; Harris, Louis. "Nixon's Rating Now Is 53 % Favorable." The Washington Post November 29, 1971: A22.

766 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Gets 59% Rating, His Highest." The Washington Post August 21, 1972: A3.

767 Harris, Louis. "Vietnam War Issue Found Still Pivotal Factor in Voting." The Washington Post March 16, 1972: F2.

768 Ibid. 241 Not surprisingly, Nixon called for an additional withdrawal of 20,000 troops in

April. Just as he did with his troop withdrawal announcements in December 1969 and

April 1970, Nixon made the decision despite a clear indication that a major NV A strike was imminent; he had also revealedthe fact that Henry Kissinger had been conducting secret negotiations with North Vietnamese representatives in Paris, which exposed South

Vietnam and the remaining U.S. forces to attack. 769 Once again, Nixon's decision to withdraw additional troops can only be seen as politically motivated, particularly since the combat and diplomatic situations strongly militated against such a move. For his efforts, Nixon's overall approval rating climbed to 52 percent.770

From April to June 1972, the President's approval rating increased from 52 to 56 percent. After announcing a troop withdrawal of 10,000 in June and an additional 12,000 in August 1972, Nixon's overall approval rating increased from 56 to 59 percent, and his rating on handling of the war increased five points to 47 percent. 771 But probably most important to Nixon, by September 1972 a majority of 46 percent positive to 44 percent negative believed the President had kept his 1968 pledge to end the war, which represented the first time the public had made the distinction.772 Moreover, for the first time since 1969, by a ratio of 45 percent positive to 43 percent negative, Nixon inspired

769 Hoff reports that Kissinger opposed making the record of these talks public; Hoff, Joan. Nixon Reconsidered. New York: BasicBooks, 1994. 119.

770 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Gets 59% Rating, his Highest." The Washington Post August 21, 1972: A3.

771 Ibid.

772 Harris, Louis. "Swelling Majority Supports President's Stand on the War." The Washington Post September 11, 1972: A2; Note: An increase of eight points from April 1972. 242 confidence in the White House. Put in perspective, a year earlier the President enjoyed a confidence rating of only 29 percent.773

By Election Day 1972, Nixon had managed to reduce the American ground force commitment from 550,000 to 20,000 and election-year casualties to under 400. As

Americans went to the polls on November 7, Nixon proved that the war was not endless.774 As a result, Vietnamization, utilized as a forward-looking political tool, is arguably as important as any other factor in securing President Nixon's reelection in

1972.

As in 1968, the 1972 election revolved around a number of significant issues. At the onset of 1972, Nixon's prospects for reelection were certainly tenuous. Faced with a sluggish economy, rising prices, and tempered progress in Vietnam, Nixon ventured new initiatives to expand fiscal policy, stem inflation through federal price controls, engage in detente with the Soviet Union, lead the surprise opening of relations with China, and expand Vietnamization. Accordingly, Nixon witnessed the expansion of the election year economy, augmented his administration's foreign policy resume, and according to Allan

Lichtman, "salvaged reelection" based largely upon these efforts. 775

As demonstrated in chapter 1, the lack of a foreign or military success, and the inability to avoid a foreign or military failure, triggered variables such as social unrest and disjunction within the Democratic Party, which ultimately constricted the electoral

773 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Gets 59% Rating, His Highest." The Washington Post August 21, 1972: A3.

774 Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph ofa Politician, 655; Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves, 230.

775 Lichtman, Keys to the White House, 13 7. 243 hopes of Hubert Humphrey. In 1972 the Vietnam War and, especially, Vietnamization triggered a more positive effect, most particularly because Nixon secured both foreign affairs keys.

Especially for an incumbent, Lichtman's two foreign affairs keys are important determinants in forecasting elections. For example, out of twenty three elections when an incumbent has won, only four times (17.4%) has he won when the Foreign or Military

Failure key (Key 10) was turned against him. Moreover, of the fifteen elections in which an elected incumbent is seeking reelection and loses to the challenging party, in twelve cases (80%) the incumbent has failed to secure a Foreign or Military Success key. In addition, securing a Foreign or Military Success key establishes both the highest percentage of the two-party vote of any of the performance keys, and one of the lowest averages for all keys triggered against an incumbent party.

In 1972 Nixon failed to secure four keys, Party Mandate, Long-term Economy,

Policy Change, and Incumbent Charisma. As a result of these losses, and building on the works of political scientists, regression analysis demonstrates that Nixon's share of the two-party vote reduced 7 .21 percentage points. On the other hand, by establishing a

Foreign or Military Success while also avoiding a Foreign or Military Failure, Nixon's share of the two-party vote increased 3.6 percentage points, and ultimately helped cement his landslide reelection.

In highlighting the importance of Vietnamization as a Foreign or Military Success during Nixon's first term, this chapter challenges the subjective nature of The Keys to the

White House, especially Lichtman's assertions that, "Although progress in Vietnam did not constitute a major foreign policy success, the disengagement of American troops, 244 combined with improved prospects for a negotiated settlement, kept it from counting as a major administration failure, preserving Key 10 for the party in power,"776 and that

Nixon's successful turning of Foreign Policy Success Key 11 was the result of detente with the Soviet Union and the surprise opening of relations with China. Rather, this chapter contends that the Vietnamization program, by reducing the American ground force commitment from 550,000 to 20,000 by Election Day 1972, was also one of the most critical and visible successes of the President's first term. With election-year casualties falling to under four-hundred, the American public came to believe that the war was not endless.

Review of Political Science Distinctions

In addition to demonstrating the importance of Vietnamization to Nixon's electoral success in 1972, this chapter, also building on the works of political scientists, establishes Nixon's firm hold on the formulation and implementation of the

Vietnamization policy. Contrary to the bureaucratic politics school, this chapter demonstrates that because Nixon commanded such considerable central direction and control over the Vietnamization policy-making process and was thoroughly and politically invested in the implementation phase of the program, the school's assertion that a gap most often exists between the decision and its implementation does not apply in this case. The importance of Vietnamization to his prospects for reelection in 1972 was too critical for Nixon to allow for gaps in the implementation of the program.

776 Lichtman, The Keys to the White House, 137. 245 Post-Election Peace

On January 27, 1973 the Paris Peace Accords were signed, initiating a cease-fire that temporarily halted the war and ended direct U.S. military involvement. On March 29

Nixon announced that "for the first time in 12 years, no American military forces are in

Vietnam. All of our American PO W's are on their way home. The 17 million people of

South Vietnam have the right to choose their own government without outside interference, and because of our program of Vietnamization, they have the strength to defend that right. We have prevented the imposition of a Communist government by force on South Vietnam."777

Unfortunately, this was short-lived. In direct violation of the treaty, China and the

Soviet Union quickly resumed and enhanced their support for North Vietnam. Nixon, overwhelmed with the Watergate scandal, did not have enough political capital in

Congress to expand support for South Vietnam. He resigned the U.S. Presidency on

August 9, 1974. Consequently, the South Vietnamese government could not stand on its own and capitulated to the North in 1975.

777 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches and Statements of the President, Volume V, 1973, #98 "Address to the Nation About Vietnam and Domestic Problems March 29th, 1973." Washington: GPO, 1974. CHAPTER6

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined the process of Nixon's decision making leading to the implementation of Vietnamization. By addressing interdisciplinary scholarly issues standing at the forefront of academic and historiographical debate, this dissertation, using

Vietnamization as a catalyst, has served to challenge and synthesize the works of historians and political science theorists, bridging the existing gap in the scholarly literature. By both reinforcing and challenging historical interpretations of the principles behind the policy, the role of each decision maker, the timing of the decision, the process that led to Vietnamization's implementation, and the impact of the policy on Nixon's

1972 reelection, as well as utilizing political science theory, particularly the governmental politics, presidential management, institutional, and electoral forecasting models, this dissertation moves beyond the works of historians and political scientists to examine more deeply than before the decision and policy-making processes that led to the implementation of Vietnamization in Richard Nixon's first term.

From formulation through implementation, Vietnamization was motivated by domestic political concerns. Nixon advocated Vietnamization, which was conceived in the campaign of 1968, because it was a tool to win public approval and, therefore, election. As the impetus of his electoral vision, Vietnamization not only served as the

246 247 policy platform for the most important issue of the campaign, it also represented the most politically pleasing, middle-of-the-road Vietnam strategy to win the White House.

Inexamining the mainsprings of Vietnamization, this dissertation reinforces the scholarly view that although Vietnamization was not a new idea, it was Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign for president that foreshadowed the policy.

By 1968, Nixon was as seasoned in American politics and foreign affairs as anyone of his generation. Acutely aware that his proposed handling of the Vietnam issue would go far in determining the outcome of the election, Nixon knew he needed a

Vietnam campaign platform that resonated with the American public. In April 1967 a

Gallup Poll stated that 61 percent of those surveyed were in favor of a form of de

Americanization; 778 by September 1967, 77 percent agreed that the U.S. should let the

South Vietnamese take on more responsibility for the fighting in Vietnam.779 Because opinion polling indicated growing public support for the idea, Nixon, who was acutely sensitive to the domestic political winds ushering in the period of disenchantment and cynicism that defined the 1968 presidential election season, privately formulated

Vietnamization as his blueprint for winning the election.

Although it reinforces the opinion in the established literature that Nixon's propensity for private opinion polling was a consideration in his decision making, this study goes further than the established literature, especially in utilizing the David Derge

Collection, by contending that public opinion not only guided Nixon's decision making

778 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2061.

779 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2080. 248 about Vietnamization, but shaped the recommendations of others who understood the president's focus on domestic politics.

Although he remained ambiguous about a Vietnam strategy throughout most of the 1968 campaign, Nixon addressed the strategy on numerous occasions during the spring and summer of 1968. For example, according to Nixon, "The nation's objective should be to help the South Vietnamese fight the war and not fight it for them .... If they do not assume the majority of the burden in their own defense, they cannot be saved."780

On another occasion, Nixon proclaimed, "Unlike the U.S. role in Korea and then in

Vietnam, we furnished the arms, we furnished the aid and most of the men; in the future, we should furnish the aid, but they must furnish most of the men."781 These statements, like others on the campaign trail demonstrate Nixon's advocacy ofVietnamization as an election strategy.

Nixon solidified his "secret plan" during the 1968 Republican Convention in

Miami Beach, Florida. In a position paper submitted to the Republican platform committee, Nixon argued, "We need far greater and more urgent attention to training the

South Vietnamese themselves, and equipping them with the best of modern weapons. As they are phased in, American troops can-and-should be phased out. This phasing out will

780 "Nixon Urges Rise in Allied Soldiers." New York Times March 15, 1968: 1.

781 Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America, 507. 249 save American lives and cut American costs."782 Nixon's strategy required the need "to encourage assumption ofresponsibility by the Vietnamese."783

Moving beyond the established historiography, this dissertation argues that

Vietnamization was one of the most critical factors in securing the White House for

Nixon in 1968. Driving his electoral vision, Vietnamization served as the policy platform for the most important issue of the campaign. 784 Although some ingredients for de-

Americanizing the war were in place, Richard Nixon, in response to domestic electoral imperatives, solidified these variables during his 1968 campaign to offer an alternative to the Johnson administration's tarnished record in Vietnam.

For example, this study, through regression analysis, contributes to the existing scholarship by establishing that the Johnson administration's lack of a Foreign or Military

Success and their inability to avoid a Foreign or Military Failure reduced the incumbent party's share of the two-party vote by 3.6 percentage points. Even more consequential, the turning of these two foreign affairs keys initiated a triggering effect on six additional keys, diminishing the Democrats share of the two-party vote by 14.4 percentage points.

Ultimately, the Democratic Party lost in 1968 not as a result of economic indicators, but because the electorate viewed the Democrats as responsible for reducing

American power and prestige overseas and sacrificing lives and resources in pursuit of an unwinnable war. Nixon's publicly popular Vietnam policy platform proved too critical

782 "Text of Nixon Statement to GOP Platfonn Panel on the War." New York Times August 2, 1968: 16.

783 "Republican on Vietnam." Los Angeles Times August 6, 1968: A4.

784 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 2090. 250 for Hubert Humphrey and the Democrats to overcome. According to a post-election

Harris survey, with over 70 percent of Americans considering themselves "conservative" or "middle-of-the-road," Nixon's viewpoint "almost precisely fits the voters view of their own political philosophy."785 In the end, after winning the election under great stress and domestic strife, Nixon began his tenure as President-elect with an electoral directive to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

Richard Nixon entered the 1968 presidential transition determined to "restore the

National Security Council to its pre-eminent role in national security planning"786 and to create "the best possible system for getting advice."787 Schooled in the experiences of past administrations, Nixon sought to "structure a national security apparatus within the

White House that, in addition to coordinating foreign and defense policy, could also develop policy options for me to consider before making decisions."788 Nixon sought options, not diverse opinions. Despite Nixon's intention, decision making about

Vietnamization encompassed diversity of opinion, minimal consensus, and conflict within his inner circle. Although the President minimized conflict by isolating himself from his discordant bureaucracy, this study reinforces the bureaucratic politics principle that diversity and conflict permeate the policy process.

785 Harris, Louis. "Nixon Views Seen Matching Voters." The Washington Post December 2, 1968: A13.

786 "Nixon Speaks Out." Nixon Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968, 242-3; Kissinger, White House Years, 38-9.

787 Nixon, Memoirs, 341.

788 Ibid., 341. 251 More specifically, Nixon utilized NSC meetings to air out ideas and opinions, not to serve as a vehicle to make decisions. Thus, the NSC process did not lead to vigorous debate or shape policy. As a result, over the first several months of the administration,

Nixon's foreign policy advisory structure, through reorganization of the NSC system and centralization of foreign policy decision making in the White House, established an informal, isolated, and politically charged decision-making environment.

Before deciding to implement Vietnamization, Nixon engaged only one formal meeting of the NSC. The January 25, 1969 meeting was an initial review of options just five days into the administration. Nixon preferred smaller, more intimate meetings with only a handful of senior advisors. Thus, this dissertation challenges the argument of presidential management theorists by establishing that it is too simplistic to label Nixon's advisory system as formalistic, collegial, or competitive, because each fails to capture the complexity and diversity of presidential advising, especially the system's mixture of formal and informal procedures. Although the Nixon administration's policy-making structure was formalistic, the decision-making structure was largely informal, with Nixon creating a power structure that admitted only a select few. Rather, informal decision making processes were critical to Vietnamization policy and decision making, and thus hinder attempts to categorize presidents or policies into one or the other processes.

Although Nixon may have restored the NSC's power in the policy-making process, ultimately, by conducting NSC meetings in which the script was largely determined in advance, he diminished the weight of the meetings and the inherent formal nature that was intended in the creation of his institutional structure. As a result, Nixon's 252 decision to pursue Vietnamization did not flow from NSC discussion; it came from the informal interactions with key advisors. Vietnam decision making lacked a forum in which diverse policy options could be aired in the presence of the President, leaving bureaucratic politics as the only available avenue for advisors to carry out their functions.

Considering the character of his decision-making process, Nixon's informal advisory opportunities put a premium on the bureaucratic skills and resources of the advisor. In this environment, information and recommendations were given weight because of the properties of the recommender, not because of their intrinsic merits. This served to enhance Nixon's acute sensitivity to political winds and his ability to get the most out of his available political resources. It also allowed others to feed his political insecurities.

Accordingly, in conferring on critical Vietnam decisions with those in his inner circle, Nixon steered closest to the advisors that were most in line with his school of thought. Melvin Laird's expert bureaucratic and political skills are a testament to his impact on the decision making and implementation ofVietnamization, as well as the informal nature of the Nixon advisory system.

By speaking the same political language as the President, Secretary Laird had a tremendous impact on Vietnamization decision making. As the main proponent of

Vietnamization within Nixon's inner circle, Laird, at the direction of the President, solidified his viewpoint for the war after traveling to Southeast Asia from March 5 to 12,

1969. Laird assessed the war through the eyes of a politician; he returned from Vietnam convinced that the "key factor in sustaining the support of the American people is to find 253 the means by which the burden of combat may promptly, and methodically, be shifted to the South Vietnamese,"789 and to make clear that "the American people expected the new administration to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion ... and a satisfactory conclusion to most Americans meant eventual disengagement of the United States troops from combat."790 As Nixon noted in his Memoirs, "It was largely on the basis of Laird's enthusiastic advocacy after returning from a visit to South Vietnam that the administration undertook the policy of Vietnamization."791

Laird's memo, written by a career politician, dovetailed with a number of complementary variables, most notably public opinion polling, to appeal to Nixon's fluency in politics. Laird was able to maneuver bureaucratically around the formal, yet isolated White House political structure to submit his recommendation for the war personally to the President. Contrary to the existing scholarship, this dissertation demonstrates that Nixon decided in principle to implement Vietnamization during an hour-long meeting with Laird on March 13, 1969, but in keeping with his penchant for holding meetings in which the outcome was determined in advance, announced two days later at a meeting of the NSC his formal intention to pursue the policy.792

As a result of Laird's actions, in particular, this dissertation challenges the bureaucratic politics theory that "where you stand depends on where you sit."793 For

789 Laird Report, Vietnam Subject Files Box 70, Nixon Presidential Materials, 3.

790 Berman, No Peace, No Honor, 66.

791 Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine, 129; Morris, Uncertain Greatness, 87-8, 153-4; Nixon, Memoirs, 392.

792 Nixon met with Laird from 11: 15 A.M. to 12: 18 P.M. in the Oval Office. 254 example, as Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird should have largely supported and defended the considerations of his senior military advisors, but he was the leading proponent of Vietnamization and troop withdrawals. Likewise, whereas Secretary of

State William Rogers should have been one of the leading proponents of diplomatic considerations, he, like Laird, stressed domestic political imperatives.

As a result of Laird's maneuvering and advocacy, Nixon went against the viewpoint of his top military advisors and pursued Vietnamization for domestic political considerations. Although some leading scholars argue that "Vietnamization was Nixon's only option, given his domestic critics,"794 this study demonstrated that Nixon, after reviewing a full range of options and alternatives for the war, implemented

Vietnamization, along with South Vietnamese pacification, diplomatic isolation of North

Vietnam, and peace negotiations. In addition, and contrary to the bureaucratic politics school, Nixon, although not the sole formulator of the Vietnamization policy, was the leading power broker and not just a puller and hauler during the policy- and decision making processes; President Nixon selected the advisors, determined their access, and, in the end, made the final decision to implement the policy.

During the implementation phase ofVietnamization, Secretary Laird continued to be an outspoken advocate of the policy. He and Secretary Rogers were routinely the strongest proponents within Nixon's inner circle for largest possible troop reductions at any given time. Secretary Rogers, in particular, was especially aggressive, advising the

President to consider a withdrawal timetable for Vietnam. As a result of domestic

793 Allison, Essence of Decision, 176.

794 Bennan, No Peace, No Honor, 52. 255 political imperatives, and despite the continued warnings of his senior military advisors against the timing and pace of the Vietnamization program, every Nixon administration troop withdrawal announcement was a result of Nixon's desire to manipulate his public approval ratings with an eye towards the midterm elections of 1970 and, most importantly, his reelection campaign in 1972.

As the public became increasingly hostile about the war throughout his first presidential term, Nixon needed to demonstrate that he could bring an end to the war to win a second term. Consequently, this study moves beyond the existing literature to demonstrate that as the public became increasingly hostile throughout Nixon's first term, the administration's Vietnamization policy and subsequent troop withdrawals were increasingly driven by the demands of domestic politics, not the military ramifications of the withdrawal decision. In particular, this study established that Vietnamization was implemented as a forward-looking political tool to augment public opinion, particularly regarding Nixon's overall handling of the war and job approval ratings, and to win reelection in 1972.

This study also establishes Nixon's firm hold on the formulation and implementation of the Vietnamization policy. Because Nixon commanded such considerable central direction and control over the Vietnamization policy-making process and was thoroughly and politically invested in the implementation phase of the program, the bureaucratic politics school's assertion that a gap most often exists between the decision and its implementation does not apply in this case. The importance of

Vietnamization to his prospects for reelection in 1972 was too critical for Nixon to allow 256 for gaps in the implementation of the program.

Leading into the 1972 election season, Nixon's prospects for a second term were certainly tenuous. Faced with a sluggish economy, rising prices, and tempered progress in Vietnam, Nixon ventured new initiatives to expand fiscal policy, stem inflation through federal price controls, engage in detente with the Soviet Union, lead the surprise opening of relations with China, and expand Vietnamization.

Much like the analysis of the 1968 presidential contest, this study, using political science methodology as well as The Keys to the White House, establishes that although the 1972 election revolved around a number of significant issues, it was Nixon's policy of Vietnamization that was arguably as important as any other factor in securing his reelection. In particular, statistical analysis demonstrates that securing Lichtman's Key

10, Foreign or Military Failure, and Key 11, Foreign or Military Success, increased

Nixon's share of the two-party vote, prevented other keys from turning against his favor, and ultimately secured the President's reelection.

Moreover, in highlighting the importance of Vietnamization as a foreign policy success during Nixon's first term, this study challenges the subjective nature of The Keys to the White House, especially Allan Lichtman's assertions that, "Although progress in

Vietnam did not constitute a major foreign policy success, the disengagement of

American troops, combined with improved prospects for a negotiated settlement, kept it from counting as a major administration failure, preserving Key 10 for the party in power,"795 and that Nixon's successful turning of the Foreign Policy Success key (Key

795 Lichtman, The Keys to the White House, 13 7. 257 11) was the result of detente with the Soviet Union and the surprise opening of relations with China. Rather, this study contended that the Vietnamization program, by reducing the American ground force commitment from 550,000 to 20,000 by Election Day 1972, was also one of the most critical and visible successes of the President's first term. With election-year casualties falling to below four-hundred, the American public came to believe that the war was not endless.

Nixon's success, in particular, represents an important determinant in forecasting presidential elections. For example, of the fifteen elections in which an elected incumbent is seeking reelection and loses to the challenging party, in twelve cases (80% ), the incumbent has failed to secure a Foreign or Military Success. Moreover, securing a

Foreign or Military Success establishes both the highest total of the percentage of the two-party vote of any of the performance keys and one of the lowest averages for all keys triggered against an incumbent party.

In 1972 Nixon failed to secure four keys, Party Mandate, Long-term Economy,

Policy Change, and Incumbent Charisma. As a result of these losses, this dissertation's regression analysis moves beyond the existing literature to demonstrate that Nixon's share of the two-party vote was reduced by 7.21 percentage points. On the other hand, by establishing a Foreign or Military Success while also avoiding a Foreign or Military

Failure, Nixon's share of the two-party vote increased 3.6 percentage points and ultimately helped cement his landslide reelection.

This dissertation also challenges both Allan Lichtman's and J. Scott Armstrong and Alfred Cuzan's regression analysis by yielding a more significant conclusion in 258 correlating the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote and the number of keys won. For example, while failing to demonstrate whether certain keys are more important,

Armstrong and Cuzan argue that an incumbent begins with 37.3 percent of the two-party vote and increases 1.8 percentage points for each key won;796 similarly, Allan Lichtman contends that an incumbent begins with 36.75 percent of the two-party vote and increases

1.84 percentage points for each key won. In contrast, this dissertation concludes that an incumbent begins with 37.1 percent of the two-party vote and increases 1.80 percent for every key won. Over the course of 38 presidential elections, the regression yields only a

3.42 variance in absolute percentage point error. Ultimately, this study's regression analysis augments the literature by highlighting that not only do certain types of keys or variables matter more than others, but that the total variance of the weight of keys over the course of 38 elections is relatively small, which, ultimately, holds strong among other electoral forecasting models.

By demonstrating the critical importance of Vietnamization in securing the White

House for Nixon in 1968 and 1972, and establishing the extensive use and influence of

Nixon's White House polling operation on Vietnamization decision making and the

President's largely informal policy-making structure, this dissertation challenges traditional scholarly interpretations of the Nixon administration, twentieth-century

American foreign policy, American presidential elections, and the Vietnam War.

In the end, this study concludes that Vietnamization was a political decision. It was born in the campaign of 1968; was largely formulated by politicians; was accentuated by

796 Armstrong and Cuzan, 2006, I 0-13. 259 intense domestic pressure; failed to endorse military considerations; was decided within an isolated, domestic politically influenced decision-making structure; and was arguably as important as any other factor in ensuring Nixon's reelection in 1972. In establishing this conclusion, this study attempts to achieve greater consensus within the scholarly literature.

This study of President Richard Nixon's Vietnamization decision making offers a unique insight into the man and his Presidency. It contributes not only to the historiography of the Nixon administration, twentieth-century American foreign policy,

American presidential elections, and the Vietnam War, but also to the continuing social science research on presidential advisory systems and bureaucratic politics. From another lens, this study offers insight into the secrecy, isolation, and politics that planted the seeds for Watergate, which ended Nixon's Presidency; it also highlights the mainsprings of the permanent campaign.

Vietnamization shaped not only Richard Nixon's presidential destiny, but that of the nation and world. Based largely on his campaign promise to end the war, Nixon was elected as the thirty-seventh President of the United States. Utilizing his campaign platform of 1968, Nixon secured Vietnamization as the centerpiece of his Vietnam policy during his first term, and it was a critical determinant in securing his electoral triumph in

1972. Arguably, there was no other policy, issue, or situation so intrinsically linked to the political fortunes of Richard Nixon as Vietnamization. Through this prism,

Vietnamization can be viewed as an unparalleled success or failure. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Collections

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, Abilene, Kansas Richard M. Nixon Papers

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Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum, West Branch, Iowa Richard M. Nixon Papers

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National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Nixon Presidential Materials

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Murphy Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland United States Department of State Central Files

National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C. Andrew Goodpaster Papers

Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, California David Derge Collection

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United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania Creighton Abrams Papers

United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania William C. Westmoreland Papers

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