Melvin Laird and the Origins of Vietnamization
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Getting Out: Melvin Laird and the Origins of Vietnamization A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts David L. Prentice November 2008 © 2008 David L. Prentice. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Getting Out: Melvin Laird and the Origins of Vietnamization by DAVID L. PRENTICE has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Chester J. Pach Jr. Associate Professor of History Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 Abstract PRENTICE, DAVID L., M.A., November 2008, History Getting Out: Melvin Laird and the Origins of Vietnamization (166 pp.) Director of Thesis: Chester J. Pach Jr. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was instrumental in initiating America’s withdrawal from Vietnam. Laird’s Vietnamization program- the policy of improving South Vietnamese military capabilities while withdrawing American troops- became the centerpiece of President Richard Nixon’s strategy to end the American War in Vietnam. Vietnamization reflected Laird’s commitment to the preservation of the Republic of Vietnam as well as his determination to quell domestic dissent. In 1969, Laird worked to secure presidential approval for Vietnamization and then keep Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, from replacing it with a more militant foreign policy. Laird ultimately succeeded, and the Nixon administration continued withdrawing U.S. troop from South Vietnam on a regular basis. Approved: _____________________________________________________________ Chester J. Pach Jr. Associate Professor of History 4 For my parents 5 Acknowledgments This work has been the product of many hours of meticulous research, writing, and revising, but it is in no way the product of one man. Many people guided, enriched, and encouraged this thesis, and I consider myself forever in their debt. Its omissions and errors, however, are my own. First, I would like to thank Brooks Flippen. His guidance and timely advice were invaluable to me as I began my own career as a historian. From explaining what a historian does to commenting on my work, Dr. Flippen has been diligent to make me a better scholar. He was also more than willing to help me at a time when the future seemed less clear, something I will not soon forget. Dr. Flippen was the first person to show me what it means to be a professional historian, and it is an example I will always strive to live up to. Without the aid of the hard-working people at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, this thesis would never have had the sources necessary to sustain some of its central arguments. In particular, I would like to thank William McNitt who introduced me to the archival system and helped me locate key documents. I was more than a little apprehensive about my first trip to an archive, but the friendly and courteous staff at the Gerald Ford Library quickly put me at ease. Moreover, they went out of their way to review and declassify documents on my behalf. I would also like to thank former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird whose unexpected generosity continues to amaze me. I never will forget that fateful February night, when while working on the seminar paper that prefigured this thesis, I received a 6 surprise telephone call from Laird himself. While Laird has provided me with priceless conversations and leads, perhaps his biggest contribution to my present and future work was that first phone call. For a new generation of scholars born after the Vietnam War, it is all too easy to forget that we are writing about real people and events. Laird brought that realization home to me, and as a result, I have shown greater diligence to test my assumptions and portray events as accurately as possible. On that same note, I would like to thank Melvin Laird’s personal secretary Kathy Weaver. Working with Laird, she has made certain I received important documents and articles. She has also made sure my work has reached Secretary Laird for his comments. Finally, she has shown great patience in putting up with my questions as well as my attempts to schedule a formal interview with Laird. I would be remiss if I did not thank two of my thesis defense committee members, Marvin Fletcher and Kevin Mattson. Both provided insightful comments on the thesis while raising great questions I had not even thought to ask. I anticipate working with them again in the future. I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my advisor, Chester Pach. Dr. Pach suggested I look into Vietnamization as I began searching for a topic that utilized recently declassified Nixon administration documents. As I began delving deeper into Vietnamization, Dr. Pach continued to provide timely advice despite having his own heavy workload. Perhaps most valuable of all was his thorough comments on each of the thesis’s revisions. They made for a much better thesis, and I look forward to continue studying under such an excellent scholar. 7 Most important of all have been the love, support, and encouragement of my family: my wonderful sister Amy and my parents, Russell and Ann Prentice. Words cannot describe how much they mean to me, and so I will keep it relatively short. God could not have blessed me with a more loving family, and I will always treasure my time spent with them. Although I am presently far away from my home in Caddo, their encouraging phone calls and thoughtful care packages remind me that life is so much more than books and study. It is for my parents that I have dedicated this thesis. 8 Table of Contents Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3 Dedication ........................................................................................................................... 4 Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 5 Abbreviations Used in Text and Footnotes ......................................................................... 9 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 10 1: The Pessimist’s Unshakable Commitment to South Vietnam ..................................... 19 2: The Establisment on the Defensive ............................................................................. 61 3: Vietnamization is Born ................................................................................................ 94 4: Kissinger Strikes Back ............................................................................................... 125 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 153 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 162 9 Abbreviations Used in the Text and Footnotes ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam CIA Central Intelligence Agency FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States GVN Government of Vietnam JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff LP Melvin R. Laird Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library MACV U.S. Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam MAD Mutually Assured Destruction NLF National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam NSC National Security Council NSSM National Security Study Memorandum VC Vietcong 10 Introduction Vietnam was America’s longest war. In part, American apathy towards Vietnam provided President Lyndon Johnson with a “permissive context” that allowed him to escalate and then Americanize this conflict by deploying U.S. Marines in early 1965.1 While America’s role in Vietnam preceded 1965, Johnson’s commitment of large numbers of U.S. troops steadily ended America’s disinterest towards Vietnam. Indeed, after three years of intense ground fighting and thousands of U.S. casualties, an increasing number of Americans wanted the United States out of Vietnam. This thesis explains how one man helped initiate America’s departure from Vietnam. Richard Nixon’s first Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, was the key architect and proponent of America’s exit strategy, Vietnamization-- the policy of improving South Vietnamese military capabilities while withdrawing American troops. Although Washington bureaucrats and politicians had discussed both components of Vietnamization during the Johnson administration, Laird was the policymaker who assimilated the two and then turned it into a viable policy in 1969. Laird championed Vietnamization in order to alleviate domestic pressure to end the war on any terms. As a staunch anticommunist, he remained committed to the preservation of a non-communist South Vietnam, but he also believed that events within the United States necessitated a change in its conduct of the war. Laird’s sixteen years as a congressional representative made him adept at reading public opinion, and he, like many other Americans, witnessed the mounting domestic unrest in 1967-1969. Therefore, Laird felt obligated to defuse the 1 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 403-404. 11 ticking time bomb of domestic opinion before it exploded into something worse than the social chaos that defined 1968.2 Vietnamization was his tool of choice. In the process, Vietnamization limited the diplomatic and military