November 2017 24/2017

Olli Ruohomäki & Wolfgang Mühlberger The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Gaza reconciliation: Burying the hatchet or changing stripes? After a decade of intra-Palestinian strife, rival factions Fatah and Hamas realised the need for a political compromise. The signature of the reconciliation agreement indicates the adaptability of Hamas’s survival strategy and Fatah’s quest for renewed legitimacy. Yet its implementation remains uncertain.

Ten years after its coup in Gaza, Hamas. Both grew up in Gaza’s Khan symbolic, seemingly pragmatist Islamist Hamas signalled its readi- Younis refugee camp. measures seem to be due to Egypt’s ness to advance an intra-Palestinian The agreement, which is sup- repressive measures against the reconciliation with secular Fatah, posed to tackle institutional and movement, ever since the armed amidst deep economic recession and security issues, represents the forces wrested power from it in 2013 a humanitarian crisis. Compared seventh attempt at reconciliation and its role in the blockade of the to other clandestine Islamists, who within a decade. It aims at unify- Rafah crossing. became visible players during the ing the geographically separate On the other side, changes Arab spring, the Palestinian Hamas administrative bodies under the within Fatah have introduced a new has been an important political actor umbrella of the Palestinian Authority dynamic. PA President Mahmoud since its election victory in 2006. (PA). This includes the reinsertion Abbas’s popularity has slumped to a Ever since the Israeli withdrawal of roughly 40,000 civil servants historical low, with more than 50% in 2005, Gaza has practically been hired by Hamas, as well as control demanding his resignation. His in- under siege, a blockade intensified of the border crossings by the PA’s ternal rival, Dahlan, made a forceful following the forceful takeover of the official security agents. The purpose comeback from exile in the United city-state in June 2007. of the agreement is to reunite the Arab Emirates (UAE), mediating Currently, the dire circumstances Palestinian political leadership between his own faction, Hamas and have pushed Hamas to engage with and ultimately provide it with a Egypt. He also managed to work on its rival Fatah, which also faces de- public mandate through elections. local-level reconciliation bolstered creasing popularity in the Palestinian However, previous agreements with by substantial financial support from polity. A deep economic recession similar objectives have not come to the Emirates. Despite his progress in Gaza (massive unemployment fruition on this sticking point. inside Gaza, and his visible role in coupled with lack of mobility) Even though both parties to the the Cairo negotiations, President compounded by the humanitarian conflict have been coerced into the Abbas rejects any future political role situation (depletion of fresh water negotiations by local circumstances for Dahlan, due to their unresolved resources, limited electricity provi- and external actors, a number of differences. sion and basic health services) led personnel and ideological decisions Since the Hamas-Fatah rap- Hamas to the negotiation table. prepared the ground. In February, prochement started in summer 2017, As a result, representatives Yahya Sinwar was appointed the new Cairo’s General Intelligence Service of the rival movements signed a Hamas leader of Gaza, whereas the has offered its good offices to help reconciliation agreement in Cairo former PM Ismail Haniyeh replaced broker the latest agreement. Its on 12 October. Instrumental in the Khaled Meshaal, head of the Political parameters basically refer to the 2011 preparations on behalf of Fatah has Bureau, its central policy- making Cairo Agreement, an earlier version been Mohammed Dahlan, the former body. Furthermore, in May, Hamas of the intra-factional entente. Its security chief in Gaza, whereas introduced a revision of its charter main objective then was the forma- Yahya Sinwar, previously a leader in by dropping any direct reference tion of an interim government in the Qassam brigades, represented to the Muslim Brotherhood. These preparation for the election of a 2

Finnish Institute of new PA government. Nevertheless, learning from the experiences of the International Affairs the 2011 agreement was not imple- Muslim Brotherhood movement, in Kruunuvuorenkatu 4 mented due to profound differences. order to guarantee its own survival. POB 400 Nonetheless, the PA set up a tech- Fatah, on the other hand, regards 00161 Helsinki nocratic National Unity Government the agreement as an opportunity led by PM Rami Hamdallah in 2014. to regain political credibility and Telephone Egypt’s motivation is linked to legitimacy. Yet even if fulfillment of +358 (0)9 432 7000 establishing stability in Sinai and the agreement duly appears obvious, being perceived as a regional power fundamental differences could make Fax broker. Cairo’s efforts to quell the its practical implementation, as +358 (0)9 432 7799 ongoing jihadist insurgency in hitherto, difficult. Sinai could be supported by stable Furthermore, it is also in Israel’s www.f iia.f i governance in Gaza, the reason why interests to see its South-Western cooperation with Hamas is consid- flank more settled. Hence, the ered to be of added value in order to agreement is conducive to its own pre-empt increasing jihadist activity security, since its implementation in the Gaza strip. At the same time, would put the security forces in Gaza Cairo considers the current regional under central PA command, ide- setting an opportunity to push back ally preventing a renewed military Qatari and Turkish influence, confrontation. However, as Israeli both essential Hamas and Muslim intransigence continues to face Brotherhood supporters. As the UAE Palestinian irredentism, the pros- share the terrorist designation of the pects for a negotiated solution to the

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an Brotherhood with Cairo, they view Israeli-Palestinian conflict currently independent research institute that produces high-level empowering Dahlan as a chance to remain doubtful. research to support political decision-making and extend their regional influence by public debate both nationally and internationally. weakening Hamas’s grip on power. The very fact that the two arch- All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the high quality enemies, Azzam al-Ahmed (Fatah) of the publications. In addition, publications and Saleh al-Arouri (Hamas), signed undergo professional language checking the agreement indicates that the sit- and editing. The responsibility for the views uation has become ripe for a deal at expressed ultimately rests with the authors. the intra-Palestinian level. Hardship and pressure pushed the parties to Both authors served as diplomats in Palestine during the Hamas election victory in 2006 and the ensuing phase of pragmatism. Hamas has been able inter-factional conflict. to adapt to changing circumstances,