The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation Can It Be Achieved?

Policy Focus 2017-4

The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation Can it be Achieved?

Summary Key Points

After a new round of talks in Cairo, Palestinian Internal political divisions and overdue elections factions Fatah and Hamas have announced an have undermined the legitimacy of Palestinian initial, partial reconciliation agreement. Despite leaders, hampered internal Palestinian dialogue continuing obstacles, this latest attempt to reunify regarding the future of their national movement, the long-divided Palestinian political system shows and contributed to the cycle of Israel-Gaza signs of potential progress. Egypt is demonstrating wars. a new proactive willingness to mediate between President Sisi, who sees Palestinian unity as the Palestinian factions and work with Hamas, fundamental to resolving the wider conflict, is having forged a constructive relationship with showing renewed commitment to reconciliation. Yahia Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza. Nevertheless, obstacles to a deal remain, with The Palestinian factions must reach agreement both Israel and Palestinian President Mahmoud on the status of Hamas’s controversial armed Abbas bluntly demanding the total disarmament group, the Qassam Brigades, as a key step of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades. It remains to be seen toward sharing political power. whether Egypt will be able to impose a settlement that leads to elections and the emergence of Hamas appears ready for partial compromise Palestinian leadership with a renewed democratic with Egypt and Fatah, and is willing to give up a mandate. modicum of control in Gaza.If President Abbas is perceived to be obstructing this Egyptian- backed effort, it could damage his relations with Cairo and open the door for exiled Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan to play a wider role in Gaza.

Nathan Stock October 2017 Nathan Stock Introduction Nathan Stock directed The Carter Center’s Israel- Palestine Field Office for On October 12, after marathon meetings in three and a half years, leading Cairo, delegations from the Palestinian fac- efforts to facilitate Palestinian tions Fatah and Hamas announced an initial, political reunification and to assert Palestinian sovereignty. partial reconciliation agreement. Accord- Mr. Stock has also worked to ing to a leaked text of the agreement and strengthen local civil society organizations in Afghanistan statements by Fatah and Hamas officials, the and lived in the Gaza Strip, agreement should see: working with a Palestinian N.G.O. to design and fundraise for conflict resolution programs. Mr. Stock is currently Palestinian Authority (P.A.) forces taking based in South Carolina, where he consults and writes over Gaza’s border crossings on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. He holds a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Colgate University and a The P.A. cabinet taking control of Gaza’s master’s degree in international peace and conflict resolution governance by December 1, 2017 from American University’s School of International Service. An administrative committee settling the status of civil servants (which Hamas hired as part of its Gaza administration) rightful leadership of the Palestinian nation- by February 1, 2018 al movement. They also accuse Hamas of Recent P.A. financial measures targeting having launched a “coup” against Palestinian Gaza cancelled President Mahmoud Abbas in 2007. Hamas Long overdue Palestinian elections hardliners view Fatah as collaborators with organized within one year the Israeli occupation and a spent political There are also reports that Hamas’s cease- force lacking an effective national agenda or fire with Israel may be extended to cover strategy. both Gaza and the West Bank. Nevertheless, despite this deep-seated an- This agreement is the latest attempt to re- imosity, there are factors working in favor unify the long-divided Palestinian political of this reconciliation attempt which have system. Given the Palestinians’ repeated not existed in the past. Foremost, there is failures to reconcile—this is the eighth such a newfound Egyptian willingness to be di- agreement since the 2007 division—there rectly involved in promoting and monitor- are significant reasons for pessimism. Fatah ing a reunification process. Egypt appears to and Hamas have been at loggerheads re- have recognized that, if nothing else, a Fa- garding a host of practical questions pertain- tah-Hamas agreement is in its national inter- ing to P.A. governance, security coordination, est. Further, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the conduct of elections. appears ready—at least for now—to use the tools at his disposal to secure a deal. They also are divided by a more basic strug- gle for power and deep mistrust. Fatah The key question going forward will be stalwarts view Hamas as usurpers to their whether Egypt can leverage a compromise

The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 1 regarding the status of Hamas’s armed wing, the Hamas-backed cabinet in Gaza was dis- the Ezzidine al-Qassam Brigades. While Ab- solved in 2014, Palestinian governance has, bas has insisted on disbanding the Brigades, in practice, remained divided between the there are steps—short of dissolving the Bri- West Bank and Gaza. Because of the split, gades—which could do much to stabilize the Palestinian Authority legislature has not the Israel-Gaza relationship, while allowing convened for a full session in a decade, leav- Abbas to credibly claim a renewed nation- ing Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the P.A.-gov- al mandate. Also sensitive in the short-term erned West Bank cities effectively ruling by will be working out the modalities for ad- decree. The split also has left the Palestinian dressing the salaries of Hamas-backed em- parties unable to agree on the modalities for ployees in Gaza and the deployment of P.A. organizing national-level elections, such that security forces to Gaza’s borders. the terms in office of the Palestinian president and the P.A.’s legislators have long ex- The Fatah-Hamas Split pired. Handicapped the Palestinians Beyond the mounting damage to Palestin- ian democracy, the Fatah-Hamas division In the summer of 2007, skirmishing between has had at least four significant, negative im- Hamas and Fatah security forces culminated pacts. First, both autonomous governments increasingly have used partisan security apparatuses to stymie ...the Palestinian internal dissent. In a recent ex- ample, well-known Palestinian Authority legislature has human rights activist Issa Amro not convened for a full was arrested by West Bank P.A. security forces, after post- session in a decade... ing Facebook messages critical of Abbas. More broadly, a pat- tern of detention without due in a bloody fight which saw Fatah partisans, process and even extra-judicial killings of op- loyal to Abbas, routed in Gaza. In the West ponents constitutes a new set of intra-Pales- Bank, Hamas was driven underground by Fa- tinian human rights violations, coming atop tah. With Abbas accusing Hamas of having the depredations of the Israeli occupation launched a coup, he declared the elected and experienced by Palestinians in the West government of Hamas-backed former Prime Bank and Gaza alike. Minister Ismail Haniyeh illegal and established an alternate, “emergency” cabinet, based Second, Palestine’s deep political divisions in the West Bank city of Ramallah. Though make it difficult for Abbas to speak on behalf

2 Nathan Stock of the Palestinian people. If Israel was serious In this context, the latest agreement and about reaching a negotiated two-state solu- Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s tion, there are legitimate concerns regarding October 2 arrival in Gaza—his first visit to Abbas’s ability to bring the Palestinian public the coastal territory since 2015—are signif- on board, much less implement a deal on the icant. ground in Gaza.

Third, even with prospects for a two-state International Hindrance to agreement being remote, the Fatah-Hamas Reunification split has handicapped the ability of Palestin- ians to conduct a sorely-needed conversa- The Fatah-Hamas division has long been tion regarding their national goals and strate- more than a simple partisan Palestinian affair. gy. There is widespread agreement, amongst Going back to the 2006 P.A. elections, which Palestinians, that the Oslo-era strategy of saw Hamas win a majority of seats in the relying on the United States to deliver a Pal- Palestinian Legislative Council, the stance of estinian state via bilateral talks with Israel Western governments, particularly the Unit- has failed. There is, however, no consensus ed States and the European Union, has at regarding how to address their current pre- times posed a direct obstacle to Palestinian dicament. The Fatah-Hamas dispute, the grip reunification. More recently, fractures in the maintained by their respective security forces, the lack of elections—all this has sucked Hamas’s isolation in Gaza the oxygen out of the Palestin- ian political system, making it has contributed directly difficult to forge agreement on to the...wars between any issue or for new actors to emerge on the national stage. Gaza and Israel.

Finally, fourth, the split and Hamas’s isolation in Gaza has Middle East between pro-Saudi and pro-Ira- contributed directly to the recurring wars nian forces, as well as the spike in conflict be- between Gaza and Israel, the last of which, tween Qatar and Turkey on the one hand, in the summer of 2014, left over 70 Israelis and Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other (the vast majority soldiers) and 2,100 Pales- have seen key regional states backing one or tinians (mostly civilians) dead, while devas- the other Palestinian faction, hardening the tating the Gaza Strip. divide.

The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 3 This history makes the October 2 statement Egypt and Hamas Turn a by U.S. Special Envoy Jason Greenblatt significant. According to Greenblatt, the Unit- Page ed States “welcomes efforts to create the Meanwhile, reports going back months conditions for the Palestinian Authority to suggest that Hamas, particularly the orga- fully assume its responsibilities in Gaza.” The nization’s leader in Gaza, Yahia Sinwar, has statement also emphasized “that any Pales- succeeded in improving the Islamist move- tinian government must unambiguously and ment’s relations with Cairo. Over a series of explicitly commit to nonviolence, recogni- meetings, Sinwar successfully differentiated Hamas in Gaza from the wider Muslim Brotherhood, bête Sinwar successfully noire of the Sisi regime. In re- differentiated Hamas cent months, Hamas has also arrested dozens of Salafi-ji- in Gaza from the wider hadists in Gaza, while working to tighten security along the Muslim Brotherhood... Rafah border and coordinate with Egypt on security issues, addressing longstanding Egyp- tion of the State of Israel, acceptance of pre- tian concerns regarding the Sinai insurgency. vious agreements and obligations between 1 the parties, and peaceful negotiations.” Hamas is attempting to impose internal dis- cipline, ensuring compliance with its obliga- For Washington, this was a relatively positive tions in these agreements. According to the response, which may reflect the close rela- New York Times, Sinwar recently threatened tionship between Sisi and President Donald to “break the neck of anyone who doesn’t Trump. This framing also leaves open the want the reconciliation, whoever he is, from possibility of U.S. engagement with a future Hamas or any other faction.”2 Hamas also has Palestinian unity government. While Hamas, its own reasons for compromising—at least as a party, will not meet the conditions out- to a point. P.A. financial measures against lined in the statement (recognizing Israel, ac- Gaza, including cutting salaries to local civil cepting prior agreements, etc.), it is possible servants and reducing the electricity supply, to imagine a P.A. government backed by, or added to the misery in the besieged territo- perhaps including, Hamas that could agree to ry where unemployment hovers around 42 these terms—if this were the price for al- percent and the electricity supply is down to lowing a role for Hamas in Palestinian politics four hours per day. and improving conditions in Gaza.

4 Nathan Stock But the most important factor working in Egypt has been involved in the “finest de- favor of this agreement appears to be the tails” of these agreements over the last two nature of Egypt’s involvement. Going back weeks.3 to Egyptian-brokered reconciliation talks in 2009, Cairo has zealously guarded its role Sisi has come to view the Palestinian division as the primary intermediary between the as a logical point of engagement for Egypt, Palestinian factions. But despite having taken contributing to the wider peace process with on this mantle, Egypt’s level of engagement Israel. In an October 8 statement, Sisi de- with the Fatah-Hamas dispute has waxed scribed the reconciliation talks as a “prepa- and waned over time. Under former Pres- ration for a just peace between Palestinian ident Hosni Mubarak and after his fall, Egypt and Israeli sides, and the establishment of an 4 convened several high-profile reconciliation independent Palestinian state.” After years meetings, the most prominent of which of hostility toward Hamas, the Sisi regime were talks including all major Palestinian fac- has also reached the conclusion—at least for tions in April 2011. However, even in those now—that they can better satisfy Egyptian periods when Egypt was engaged, there was interests by engaging Hamas in Gaza, rather little effort to work with the Palestinians on than attempting to isolate them. implementation. It is worth recalling that Sisi has a good per- A variety of media reports, as well as recent sonal relationship with Abbas’s arch-neme- discussions with Palestinian analysts in Ra- sis, exiled Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan. mallah and Gaza suggest that At several points in 2016 and as recently as Egypt is prepared to engage in a more serious manner this Sisi has come to view time around—including having monitors on the ground in the Palestinian division Gaza and a willingness to call as a logical point of out both sides for failures to meet their commitments. Lead engagement for Egypt. Fatah negotiator for reconciliation, Azzam al-Ahmad, who has been at the forefront of years of reuni- the summer of 2017, Egypt quite publicly fication talks, may have hinted at this during promoted Dahlan as their Fatah protégé. the October 12 press conference announc- According to the text of an agreement being the agreement, noting that “the Egyptian tween Dahlan and Hamas, leaked to Pales- attempt this time was different from all the tinian media in late June 2017, Dahlan was preceding ones.” According to Hamas leader slated to lead a new Palestinian government and former health minister, Bassem Naim, in Gaza, while his Fatah allies took responsi-

The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 5 bility for Gaza’s border crossings with Egypt to the P.A. monthly. These funds constitute and Israel. Per the agreement, Hamas would some two-thirds of the P.A.’s operating bud- have retained control of Gaza’s interior min- get, and Israel has not hesitated to stop this istry—and presumably security issues inside flow of resources in the past. the territory. After Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian Legis- The leaked text stated that the agreement lative Council election, customs revenues to was “sponsored by the Arab Republic of the P.A. were cut for over a year. However, Egypt,” something never denied by the Egyp- Israel allowed P.A. and Egyptian officials into tian government. Palestinian analysts specu- Gaza for the early October cabinet meet- lated at the time that the mooted agreement ing. Responding to news of the October 12 with Dahlan was designed to pressure Ab- agreement, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu posted a warning on his official Facebook page Israel possesses a variety that Israel opposes “any recon- of levers to stymie ciliation in which the terrorist organization Hamas does not Palestinian reunification. disarm and end its war to de- stroy Israel.”5 That said, a variety of Israeli commentators bas into engaging with Hamas constructively, have noted that Israel’s practical response to lest he see his rival ensconced in Gaza, with this agreement has been significantly more Egyptian support. There is speculation in muted than in past cases. And, reports out Ramallah now that Egypt will turn back to of Israel’s first Security Cabinet meeting, to Dahlan to manage Gaza with Hamas, should discuss the new reconciliation agreement, Abbas fail to cooperate. suggested that Israel will not actively oppose its implementation or cut ties to the P.A.

Israel’s Objections Regardless, the Trump administration is likely to influence Israel’s position on this matter. Given its control over the occupied Pales- Netanyahu has demonstrated notable defer- tinian territory, Israel has a variety of levers ence to Trump, including being accommodat- to stymie Palestinian reunification. Besides ing to the administration’s push for a peace simply preventing Palestinian officials from agreement. If Egypt succeeds in restoring a moving between the West Bank and Gaza, veneer of P.A. unity in Gaza, it is possible to Israel controls customs revenues on goods imagine Egypt and the United States working coming into the West Bank and Gaza, which to ensure that Israel does not unduly under- it collects at border crossings and turns over

6 Nathan Stock mine reunification. Further, if this agreement and Fatah have seen more than a decade of is implemented, Israel may lessen its opposi- sometimes violent conflict, and there are tion, as Gaza is stabilized. hardline elements in Hamas who routinely deride the P.A.’s security coordination with Abbas’s Objections Israel as collaboration with the enemy. The challenge posed by Abbas’s stance is The more immediate challenge is likely to that there is no scenario in which—as long be the position of Palestinian President as the occupation continues—Hamas will Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas has long insisted disarm. In this regard, Hamas’s position is that there can be no compromise on the similar to other militant groups (consider the question of Hamas’s weapons. As recently challenges inherent in Irish Republican Army as an October 2 interview with the Egyptian news sta- tion C.B.C., President Abbas The more immediate repeated his standard line, emphasizing “one state, one challenge is likely to be government, one gun.” Ac- the position of President cording to the Palestinian president, “Just as I imprison Mahmoud Abbas. Fatah members for holding weapons, so it will be with all 6 groups.” disarmament in the course of the Good Fri- Abbas has been resistant to any partial re- day Accords.) However, there are scenari- deployment of P.A. forces to Gaza. In the os through which Gaza could be stabilized, aftermath of the 2014 war, there was talk while Abbas regains a credible national man- of sending the Palestinian Presidential Guard date, even without Hamas’s disarmament. to Gaza’s borders, as a step toward the in- stitutional reunification of the P.A., but Ab- Will this Reconciliation bas never ordered his forces south. He has Agreement Survive? also stymied any serious discussion of sharing power with Hamas in the Palestinian Libera- Experience suggests that this agreement tion Organization. could falter quickly. The 2014 Beach Camp Abbas’s reticence is not unfounded. As Agreement began to unravel in a matter of Hamas has made clear repeatedly, including weeks when Hamas employees in Gaza failed in recent days, the organization refuses to to receive their paychecks from the P.A. gov- surrender its weapons to P.A. control. Hamas ernment. Keeping money flowing to these

The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 7 employees is key to buying goodwill and time Egypt, and it is already coordinating border for the modalities of wider P.A. civil service security matters with Cairo. There is thus reform and reintegration to be finalized. every reason to believe that, if Hamas made commitments to Egypt regarding allowing Some reports have suggested that the P.A. personnel at Rafah, it will follow through. agreement includes plans for Abbas to visit Gaza, something he has not done since pri- The challenge for Egypt will be convincing or to the 2007 division. Abbas has long re- Abbas to do his part, though Cairo should sisted entering Gaza while it remains under be able to deliver this step. The presence of Hamas control. Advisors to Abbas have cit- Palestinian intelligence chief Majed al-Farej ed, among other things, threats to his safety at the talks suggests that Abbas must have as a concern. If Abbas goes to Gaza, it would authorized what was signed. Further, a deployment at Rafah, under an A P.A. deployment on Egyptian mandate, is a relatively low-risk move for Abbas. the Rafah border will And, it would allow the Pales- tinian president to take credit be another early test of for a significant step toward Egyptian resolve. reunification. If, however, Sisi cannot induce Abbas to send personnel to constitute a significant symbolic gesture. Rafah, we are likely to witness a serious rup- ture in relations between Cairo and Ramal- The deployment of P.A. security to the Egyp- lah—one that could reopen Egyptian en- tian border is another critical step to watch. gagement with Mohammed Dahlan. Despite agreements in 2014 to deploy P.A. forces on Gaza’s borders, Abbas never even But the biggest challenge in the short-term issued orders to his security chiefs to begin will be a framework for managing Hamas’s serious planning for the move. P.A. customs armed wing, the Qassam Brigades. A va- and security officials, consulted by the author riety of reports from Ramallah and Gaza at the time, also expressed concerns that any have confirmed that Egypt sent a proposal personnel deployed to Gaza’s borders could to Hamas and Fatah that would see it con- be endangered by Hamas militants. vene a coordinating body to manage security affairs between Qassam and the Palestinian A P.A. deployment on the Rafah border will Authority. Hamas has agreed to this formula, be another early test of Egyptian resolve. while Abbas has yet to respond. This con- For its part, Hamas is loath to run afoul of cept appears similar to an Egyptian proposal

8 Nathan Stock for addressing Palestinian security sector re- For his part, in remarks on October 24, form that dates back to the 2009 Cairo Ac- Hamas leader Yahia Sinwar reiterated that cord, though Egypt never activated the body. Hamas “cannot forgo our weapons.” But The difference now appears to be that Egypt he suggested that Hamas’s arms “certainly is pushing this forward. Such an agreement should be under a unifying national umbrella will not satisfy Netanyahu or Abbas’s de- in which every Palestinian participates. That mands for Hamas’s disarmament, but—if im- umbrella is the Palestine Liberation organi- plemented—this mechanism could do much zation.”8 to finally end the bloody cycle of Israel-Gaza wars. If an understanding is reached regarding the Qassam Brigades and Hamas’s use of force, Hamas has gone to war with Israel three agreeing on modalities for sharing political times since 2008 in part because it has been power and organizing elections will consti- so isolated. The key to stabilizing the Isra- tute significant additional challenges. el-Gaza equation has been to end that isolation. The more Gaza is opened and Hamas is pulled into wider Palestinian and Arab political and security relationships, the less motivation and latitude Hamas will have to take Palestine to war unilaterally. Hamas’s ability to do just that, without consulting the Palestinian president, much less the Palestin- ian public, has been one of Abbas’s principal grievances with the organization.

Egypt’s security proposal may finally hold out the prospect of tying Hamas into a coordination mechanism that should disincentivize its use of force against Israel. In October 12 remarks to Asharq al-Awsat, Fatah leader Ab- bas Zaki appeared to support this approach. “We believe that the weapons are needed and the resistance is a duty, but we are seek- ing an agreement over the need for a collec- tive national decision as the basis for the use of those weapons.”7

The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 9 Endnotes

1. Jason Greenblatt, “Jason Greenblatt’s Statement on Pal- estinian Authority Visit to Gaza,” (October 2, 2017), ac- cessed October 8, 2017, https://jru.usconsulate.gov/palestinian-authority-visit-gaza/.

2. David M. Halbfinger, “Palestinian Factions, Fatah and Hamas, Move Toward Reconciliation in Gaza,” New York Times (October 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/ world/middleeast/palestinian-fatah-hamas-reconciliation-gaza.html?_r=0.

3. Basem Naim, interview by Nathan Stock, October 9, 2017.

4. Dov Lieber and T.O.I. Staff, “Egypt’s Sissi: Fatah-Hamas unity a prelude to Israeli-Palestinian peace,” Times of Is- rael (October 8, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/ egypts-sissi-fatah-hamas-unity-a-prelude-to-israeli-palestinian-peace/.

5. T.O.I. Staff and A.F.P., “PM: Israel to oppose Palestinian unity gov’t unless Hamas disarms, stops terror,” (October 12, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-says-will-on- ly-accept-palestinian-reconciliation-deal-if-hamas-disarms/. ibid.; ibid.; ibid.

6. Avi Issacharoff, “As Hamas sticks to its guns, Abbas pours cold water on reconciliation efforts,”Times of Israel (Oc- tober 3, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/as-hamas- sticks-to-its-guns-abbas-pours-cold-water-on-reconciliation-efforts/.

7. Mohamed Nabil Helmy, “Fatah Commits to Resis- tance Arms, Says Use Exclusive to National Decision,” Asharq Al-Awsat (October 12, 2017), https://aawsat. com/english/home/article/1050041/fatah-commits-resistance-arms-says-use-exclusive-national-decision?amp.

8. Adam Rasgon, “PLO Official To ‘Post’: We Welcome Sinwar’s Proposal,” Jerusalem Post (October 26, 2017), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/PLO-official- to-Post-We-welcome-Sinwars-proposal-508444; ibid.

10 Nathan Stock The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 11 www.mei.edu