Policy Focus 2017-4 THE PALESTINIAN QUEST FOR RECONCILIATION CAN IT BE ACHIEVED? SUMMARY KEY POINTS After a new round of talks in Cairo, Palestinian Internal political divisions and overdue elections factions Fatah and Hamas have announced an have undermined the legitimacy of Palestinian initial, partial reconciliation agreement. Despite leaders, hampered internal Palestinian dialogue continuing obstacles, this latest attempt to reunify regarding the future of their national movement, the long-divided Palestinian political system shows and contributed to the cycle of Israel-Gaza signs of potential progress. Egypt is demonstrating wars. a new proactive willingness to mediate between President Sisi, who sees Palestinian unity as the Palestinian factions and work with Hamas, fundamental to resolving the wider conflict, is having forged a constructive relationship with showing renewed commitment to reconciliation. Yahia Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza. Nevertheless, obstacles to a deal remain, with The Palestinian factions must reach agreement both Israel and Palestinian President Mahmoud on the status of Hamas’s controversial armed Abbas bluntly demanding the total disarmament group, the Qassam Brigades, as a key step of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades. It remains to be seen toward sharing political power. whether Egypt will be able to impose a settlement that leads to elections and the emergence of Hamas appears ready for partial compromise Palestinian leadership with a renewed democratic with Egypt and Fatah, and is willing to give up a mandate. modicum of control in Gaza.If President Abbas is perceived to be obstructing this Egyptian- backed effort, it could damage his relations with Cairo and open the door for exiled Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan to play a wider role in Gaza. NATHAN STOCK October 2017 Nathan Stock Introduction Nathan Stock directed The Carter Center’s Israel- Palestine Field Office for On October 12, after marathon meetings in three and a half years, leading Cairo, delegations from the Palestinian fac- efforts to facilitate Palestinian tions Fatah and Hamas announced an initial, political reunification and to assert Palestinian sovereignty. partial reconciliation agreement. Accord- Mr. Stock has also worked to ing to a leaked text of the agreement and strengthen local civil society organizations in Afghanistan statements by Fatah and Hamas officials, the and lived in the Gaza Strip, agreement should see: working with a Palestinian N.G.O. to design and fundraise for conflict resolution programs. Mr. Stock is currently Palestinian Authority (P.A.) forces taking based in South Carolina, where he consults and writes over Gaza’s border crossings on Israeli-Palestinian affairs. He holds a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Colgate University and a The P.A. cabinet taking control of Gaza’s master’s degree in international peace and conflict resolution governance by December 1, 2017 from American University’s School of International Service. An administrative committee settling the status of civil servants (which Hamas hired as part of its Gaza administration) rightful leadership of the Palestinian nation- by February 1, 2018 al movement. They also accuse Hamas of Recent P.A. financial measures targeting having launched a “coup” against Palestinian Gaza cancelled President Mahmoud Abbas in 2007. Hamas Long overdue Palestinian elections hardliners view Fatah as collaborators with organized within one year the Israeli occupation and a spent political There are also reports that Hamas’s cease- force lacking an effective national agenda or fire with Israel may be extended to cover strategy. both Gaza and the West Bank. Nevertheless, despite this deep-seated an- This agreement is the latest attempt to re- imosity, there are factors working in favor unify the long-divided Palestinian political of this reconciliation attempt which have system. Given the Palestinians’ repeated not existed in the past. Foremost, there is failures to reconcile—this is the eighth such a newfound Egyptian willingness to be di- agreement since the 2007 division—there rectly involved in promoting and monitor- are significant reasons for pessimism. Fatah ing a reunification process. Egypt appears to and Hamas have been at loggerheads re- have recognized that, if nothing else, a Fa- garding a host of practical questions pertain- tah-Hamas agreement is in its national inter- ing to P.A. governance, security coordination, est. Further, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the conduct of elections. appears ready—at least for now—to use the tools at his disposal to secure a deal. They also are divided by a more basic strug- gle for power and deep mistrust. Fatah The key question going forward will be stalwarts view Hamas as usurpers to their whether Egypt can leverage a compromise The Palestinian Quest for Reconciliation 1 regarding the status of Hamas’s armed wing, the Hamas-backed cabinet in Gaza was dis- the Ezzidine al-Qassam Brigades. While Ab- solved in 2014, Palestinian governance has, bas has insisted on disbanding the Brigades, in practice, remained divided between the there are steps—short of dissolving the Bri- West Bank and Gaza. Because of the split, gades—which could do much to stabilize the Palestinian Authority legislature has not the Israel-Gaza relationship, while allowing convened for a full session in a decade, leav- Abbas to credibly claim a renewed nation- ing Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the P.A.-gov- al mandate. Also sensitive in the short-term erned West Bank cities effectively ruling by will be working out the modalities for ad- decree. The split also has left the Palestinian dressing the salaries of Hamas-backed em- parties unable to agree on the modalities for ployees in Gaza and the deployment of P.A. organizing national-level elections, such that security forces to Gaza’s borders. the terms in office of the Palestinian presi- dent and the P.A.’s legislators have long ex- The Fatah-Hamas Split pired. Handicapped the Palestinians Beyond the mounting damage to Palestin- ian democracy, the Fatah-Hamas division In the summer of 2007, skirmishing between has had at least four significant, negative im- Hamas and Fatah security forces culminated pacts. First, both autonomous governments increasingly have used partisan security apparatuses to stymie ...the Palestinian internal dissent. In a recent ex- ample, well-known Palestinian Authority legislature has human rights activist Issa Amro not convened for a full was arrested by West Bank P.A. security forces, after post- session in a decade... ing Facebook messages critical of Abbas. More broadly, a pat- tern of detention without due in a bloody fight which saw Fatah partisans, process and even extra-judicial killings of op- loyal to Abbas, routed in Gaza. In the West ponents constitutes a new set of intra-Pales- Bank, Hamas was driven underground by Fa- tinian human rights violations, coming atop tah. With Abbas accusing Hamas of having the depredations of the Israeli occupation launched a coup, he declared the elected and experienced by Palestinians in the West government of Hamas-backed former Prime Bank and Gaza alike. Minister Ismail Haniyeh illegal and established an alternate, “emergency” cabinet, based Second, Palestine’s deep political divisions in the West Bank city of Ramallah. Though make it difficult for Abbas to speak on behalf 2 Nathan Stock of the Palestinian people. If Israel was serious In this context, the latest agreement and about reaching a negotiated two-state solu- Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s tion, there are legitimate concerns regarding October 2 arrival in Gaza—his first visit to Abbas’s ability to bring the Palestinian public the coastal territory since 2015—are signif- on board, much less implement a deal on the icant. ground in Gaza. Third, even with prospects for a two-state International Hindrance to agreement being remote, the Fatah-Hamas Reunification split has handicapped the ability of Palestin- ians to conduct a sorely-needed conversa- The Fatah-Hamas division has long been tion regarding their national goals and strate- more than a simple partisan Palestinian affair. gy. There is widespread agreement, amongst Going back to the 2006 P.A. elections, which Palestinians, that the Oslo-era strategy of saw Hamas win a majority of seats in the relying on the United States to deliver a Pal- Palestinian Legislative Council, the stance of estinian state via bilateral talks with Israel Western governments, particularly the Unit- has failed. There is, however, no consensus ed States and the European Union, has at regarding how to address their current pre- times posed a direct obstacle to Palestinian dicament. The Fatah-Hamas dispute, the grip reunification. More recently, fractures in the maintained by their respective security forces, the lack of elections—all this has sucked Hamas’s isolation in Gaza the oxygen out of the Palestin- ian political system, making it has contributed directly difficult to forge agreement on to the...wars between any issue or for new actors to emerge on the national stage. Gaza and Israel. Finally, fourth, the split and Hamas’s isolation in Gaza has Middle East between pro-Saudi and pro-Ira- contributed directly to the recurring wars nian forces, as well as the spike in conflict be- between Gaza and Israel, the last of which, tween Qatar and Turkey on the one hand, in the summer of 2014, left over 70 Israelis and Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other (the vast majority soldiers) and 2,100 Pales-