NSD-S HUB
S January 2020
Russia’s
Course of Action
in
Africa and the Middle East
The NSD-S HUB was established at Allied Joint Force Command Naples in order to improve NATO awareness and understanding of the opportunities and challenges from the South, while contributing to the overall coordination of NATO activities and efforts. NSD-S HUB products are developed with open-source information from governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, academic institutions, media sources and military organizations. By design, NSD-S HUB products or links to open-sourced and independently produced articles do not necessarily represent the opinions, views or official positions of any other organization.
Russia’s Course of Action in Africa and the Middle East 2020
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the last few years, Russia has been able to assert its role as a relevant international actor, first in the Middle East and then in Africa. In Syria, Russia’s relatively small military deployment has delivered substantial results, bolstering its status as power broker in the region. In Africa, Russian diplomats are endeavouring to build a network of relationships modelled on the Soviet one.
Russia’s increasing assertiveness in Africa and the Middle East can be seen both as a reaction to the economic and political containment regime enforced by western countries after the annexation of Crimea and as a further effort to improve its geopolitical standing, well beyond the near abroad where Moscow has been consistently advocating the idea of a “Russian world”.
While Russia’s course of action in this wide and diverse southern region has thus far mixed politics and business based on an opportunistic approach, there is nevertheless growing evidence of the Kremlin’s Grand Strategy intention to redesign the international order so as to accommodate Russia into the world’s elite.
Russia’s determined use of overt and more often covert actions in the military and informational domains should definitely be considered a matter of concern for the wider international community, since it can fuel existing conflicts and destabilise the region.
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Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 3 INTRODUCTION ...... 5 RUSSIA’S ACTUAL INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ...... 6 RUSSIA’S POLITICAL STRATEGY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ...... 6 1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Russia’s political engagement in Africa ...... 6 3. Russia’s political engagement in the Middle East ...... 8 4. Summary ...... 9 RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ...... 10 1. Introduction ...... 10 2. Trade ...... 10 3. Oil and Gas ...... 11 4. Mining and Nuclear Energy ...... 12 5. Russia-Africa Summit: Main Economic Take-Away ...... 13 6. Summary ...... 14 RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ...... 15 1. Introduction ...... 15 2. Russia’s Actions in Africa ...... 15 3. Russia’s Actions in the Middle East ...... 16 4. Summary ...... 18 RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST ...... 19 1. Introduction ...... 19 2. Russia’s Actions in Africa ...... 19 3. Russia’s Actions in the Middle East ...... 21 4. Summary ...... 22 SWOT ANALYSIS ...... 23 1. Strengths...... 23 2. Weaknesses ...... 24 3. Opportunities ...... 24 4. Threats ...... 25 CONCLUSIONS ...... 26
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INTRODUCTION
Almost two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s ambitions and reach were still largely confined to its immediate periphery. Since 2014, however, when the illegal annexation of the Crimea overturned the post–Cold War security order, Russia’s image on the world stage has started to go through a major transformation and its intervention in the Syrian civil war epitomises its renewed ambitions and abilities to play a major role in the broader Middle East.
In several regions around the world where its presence had not been felt since the time of the Cold War, Russia is now perceived as a serious actor. The Kremlin has to be credited with this accomplishment, even more so when one considers the relative scarcity of available resources when compared to those of the United States, the European Union or China.
Russia’s course of action in Africa perfectly reflects this astute, low cost approach to global projection. In a continent where its activities were negligible for more than two decades, since mid- 2000 Moscow has been able to establish and consistently expand a network of relationships, building on the remnants of Soviet era political, economic and military connections and exploiting the full spectrum of newly built tools in the information environment.
Now that the strategic landscape where great-power competition has once again become a primary topic of interest for statesmen and scholars, Russia’s ambitions and actions in the global arena deserve close, careful consideration. To contribute to this overarching effort for a heightened understanding of Russia’s strategy, ways and means, the Hub held a workshop to discuss these matters with distinguished subject matter experts from the southern countries where Moscow appears to be ever more dynamic.
Progressing from a shared baseline of facts and data from open sources and relevant literature, Hub analysts and the regional SMEs assessed Russia’s course of action in Africa and the Middle East, dissecting its relative strengths and weaknesses as well as opportunities for and threats to Russia’s CoA arising from the ongoing, fast-paced political, economic and cultural transitions in the southern region. This workshop report summarises all of the available background information and the subsequent findings.
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RUSSIA’S ACTUAL INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
RUSSIA’S POLITICAL STRATEGY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
1. Introduction In the foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation, the Middle East and Africa generally rank after the USA, their neighbouring countries, Europe and Asia. However, in the past decade, Russia has shown growing interest in strengthening ties with the countries in the Middle East and Africa. Committing diplomatic, economic, military and soft power resources to both geographical areas provides Moscow with the opportunity to achieve its wider global strategy. All of its strategic objectives serve its main goal - to establish the Russian Federation as a global player in a multipolar world order while preserving the domestic regime.
In the Middle East and Africa, Moscow has developed its strategy to achieve the abovementioned objective by:
Building a network of allies through diplomacy by establishing itself as a new and trustworthy powerbroker, the expected outcome being to unsettle traditional players in the regions (US, France, Britain and Europe), thereby challenging the world order; Establishing a Russian military presence; Improving trade by ensuring Russian presence in important markets: arms, nuclear, oil & gas and food; Using soft power to support positive public opinion and pro-Russian views at all society levels.1
2. Russia’s political engagement in Africa After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s presence in Africa was negligible. In the mid-2000s its ties were limited mainly to political cooperation with South Africa and the African Union. Only after joining peacekeeping operations and the international anti-piracy task force has it gradually returned to the continent. In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote-off 20 billion USD of African debt2 and some months later the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, visited 5 African countries (Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Ethiopia). That same year, many African leaders attended President Putin’s inauguration in Moscow. On 23-24 October, 2019 Sochi hosted the first high-level Russia–Africa Summit attended by official representatives of all 54 African states.
1 The Arab Youth Survey shows favorable opinion regarding Russia among the youth in Arab countries https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019%20Arab%20Youth%20Survey.pdf 2 While the Russian debt relief would amount to around 20 billion USD over twenty years, Chinese entities provided 143 billion USD in commercial loans across Africa between 2000 and 2017. Therefore, the economic impact of the cancellation of Russian credit should not be overestimated.
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92 agreements, contracts and Memoranda of Understanding were signed, worth a total of 1,004 trillion RUB (approximately 12.5 billion USD), excluding those agreements whose values are secret. This highlights the growing importance of the continent in terms of Russian diplomatic effort.
There have been frequent official visits between Russia and African countries over the past few years.3
Russian diplomacy is closely linked to military engagement and cooperation, since Russia often uses arms trade and/or military cooperation as leverage to enhance its influence and relationships.
Russia’s efforts in Africa are focused mainly on two regions for specific reasons, with the result that their diplomatic approaches and tools they use are in accordance with the specific objectives. The two key areas are:
The Horn of Africa: projecting power in and beyond the continent. The Sub-Sahara: for creating commercial opportunities and securing diplomatic support.
3 Data from Carneggie Endowment for International Peace https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party- russia-s-return-to-africa-pub-80056
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3. Russia’s political engagement in the Middle East The Soviet Union already had several ties with countries in the Middle East, though the region was not on the top of Russia’s foreign policy agenda before President Putin came to power and the so- called Arab Spring, with its subsequent political events, changed the importance of the Middle East.
Timeline of engagement: From 2012 to late 2013: building relationships o 2011 November: launching of Russia – GCC Strategic Dialogue o 2013 February: Arab – Russian Cooperation Forum From late 2013 to 2015: reactive o Growing involvement in domestic affairs, mainly as a response to emerging challenges – involvement culminated in the intervention in Syria From 2016: proactive o Syria, Astana talks
President Putin and the Russian foreign policy apparatus have been successful in building and maintaining good relations with almost all actors in the Middle East regardless of hostilities in the region. It is also noteworthy that he has managed to build ties with traditionally pro-American countries and with those the Soviet Union had had weak links with (e.g. Israel, Iran and the Gulf countries). Geopolitical realities are a limiting factor for Russian cooperation in the region, but the Russian approach builds on opportunities and its (apparently) de-ideologized approach provides a base for cooperation for all countries in the region. The chart below summarises the strenghtening and weakening factors in the relations between Russia and its important partners:
PLUSES MINUSES Iraq Historical ties Economic interests Iran Animosity towards the USA Historical mistrust Arms sales Russia’s cooperation with Strategic economic cooperation regional adversaries (nuclear power plants, North-South Transport Corridor) Saudi Arabia Economic cooperation (especially Saudi Moscow support for the Syrian investment)4 regime Stabilising oil prices (OPEC+) Russia’s ties with Iran Support for common partners For SA: cooperation with Russia can be used as leverage with the USA
4 King Salman’s visit to Russia in 2017 generated billions of dollars in Saudi pledges for the Russian petroleum industry. This included pumping money into Novatek’s Arctic 2 liquefied natural gas complex and Russia’s largest petrochemical facility, Sibur. The Saudis also promised to invest in Eurasia Drilling, Russia’s largest private oil and gas drilling subcontractor. These pledges have still to materialize. https://www.mei.edu/publications/putins-visit-riyadh-could- help-shape-next-chapter-russia-saudi-relations
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PLUSES MINUSES GCC Russian plans to attract investment and Russian ties to Damascus boost trade, investment, tourism, agriculture and industry Control oil prices and output Israel Russian speaking minority in Israel Russian involvment in Syria Economic cooperation (energy, defense sector) Limited political cooperation
4. Summary Russia has managed to establish itself in Africa as a global player and even more so in the Middle East. However, as noted in a RAND paper “…Russian pragmatism, motivated by short-term requirements for stability and economic opportunity, drives a series of transactional behaviours rather than a collective, considered movement towards long-term strategic objectives”.5 This approach serves the Russian strategic objective of promoting a multipolar world order where Moscow is one of the important global players. To reach this objective, Russia needs allies and most of all diplomatic activity supported with economic, military and soft power tools to create the image of a strong country on the global scale. However, especially in the case of Africa, Moscow is active on the surface while the substance of the relationships has remained limited thus far.
5 RAND Corporation – Russian Strategy in the Middle East. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236.pdf
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RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
1. Introduction In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed interest several times in recovering and strengthening the ties with Africa and the Middle East which had been weakened after the fall of the Soviet Union. Unlike China, whose foreign policy is mainly economy-driven, Russia’s economic engagements in Africa and the Middle East appear to be mainly politically driven. However, this analysis will attempt to isolate the economic strategy, focussing on its goals, its means and the main consequences.
2. Trade Trade balance
Russia Trade Balance, Hub calculation from OEC data
The figure illustrates the main discrepancy between official narrative and economic reality. Although Russian officials present Africa as an economic partner of strategic importance, in 2017 Africa represented only 1.1% of total Russian imports ($ 2.53 billion) and 3.7% of its total exports ($ 12.6 billion). Adding the Middle East’s share does not change the balance significantly: 1.8% of total imports ($ 4.23 billion) and 5.8% of total exports ($ 20 billion).
During the first Russia–Africa Summit (23-24 October, 2019 in Sochi) it was stated that trade relations with Africa are constantly growing and have totalled around $ 100 billion over the last decade. By comparison, during the same period, Chinese exports to Africa amounted to over $ 800 billion.
According to the IMF, Russia is the fourth fastest growing exporter to Africa and the second fastest growing importer. However, in terms of value, Russia’s trade with Africa is well below the level of other direct competitors and (purely by way of comparison) even slightly less relevant than Turkish trade.
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Arms trade
Over the last decade, Russia’s share of global arms exports has decreased by about a fifth, from 27% to 21%. As Russia strives to limit and even reverse this trend, its focus is set on Africa and the Middle East. Charles Robertson, the global chief economist at the Russian investment bank RENCAP, says the relationship includes political and military aspects, with one in seven of all Russian exports Evolution in volume of the 10 largest exporters in 2014-2018 to Africa being arms-related. compared to 2009-2013. Source: SIRPI Arms trade with Africa and the Middle East has grown significantly in the same period, one reason being Russia’s military engagement in Syria. This year, Russia increased its exposure at the annual International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) in the United Arab Emirates. The IDEX is the Middle East’s largest defence summit and Russia used this platform to increase its footprint on weapons trade worldwide. During the IDEX event, UAE signed for $ 5.4 billion in arms and military equipment in addition to already signed deals, becoming Russia’s best client during the IDEX.
In Africa, the importance of Algeria in Russia’s priorities explains why, in 2006, President Putin cancelled an Algerian military debt of $ 4.5 billion in exchange for Algeria’s commitment to buy $ 7.5 billion worth of Russian arms equipment. Between 2014 and 2018, Russian-made weapons represented 66% of Algeria’s military equipment acquisition, positioning Algeria at the top of Russia’s client list in Africa. In Egypt, like in the UAE, Russia increased its exposure during the biggest arms exposition in Cairo, EDEX and signed a $ 2 billion deal with Egypt to deliver 20 Su-35 heavy multi-purpose fighters, starting in 2020. “Russia’s participation in the exhibition is extremely important and it has the largest representation alongside the United States. Today, Russian-made weapons account for about a third of all the Egyptian military hardware” Egyptian General Samir Farag said.6
3. Oil and Gas Oil and gas revenues represented 6.5% of Russia’s GDP in 2017, rising to 8.7% in 2018. The following figure7 illustrates Russia’s main Oil and Gas activities in Africa.
6 TASS, https://tass.com/defense/1034510 7 The Africa Report n. 87. Source: Russia Briefing https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-africa-continental- investment-opportunities-potential-explained.html/
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Gazprom is currently working on several projects in Africa, such as the three gas fields discovered in Algeria, gas fields in Libya (whose activities have been significantly reduced since 2011) and a gas pipeline project to link Nigeria to Europe via Algeria. Likewise, Lukoil recently discovered a number of oil and gas deposits in Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Egypt. Rosneft signed an agreement with Mozambique for oil and gas exploitation that could be extended to gas. It is also investing in Egypt's offshore gas field and is gearing up to be involved in over 20 projects with Oranto Petroleum in Nigeria.8
Due to historical reasons, Russia had no partnerships in the energy sector in the Middle East until recently. Amongst other Russian trade and economic partnerships in Africa factors, the oil crisis in 2015 pushed Russia to develop relations with potential partners in Asia and the Middle East. In December 2016, Rosneft signed a $ 5 billion investment deal with Qatar and bought a 35% share in a gas project off the Egyptian coast for $ 1.13 billion. The three leading companies Gasprom, Rosneft and Lukoil also engage in projects in Egypt, Iraq (including the Kurdistan Regional Government)9 and especially in Iran, following a “strategic” energy deal worth up to $ 30 Billion signed in 2017.10
4. Mining and Nuclear Energy
Mining activities focus mainly on the African continent, depicted in Fig.4. The world's top diamond producer, Russia's Alrosa, founded the Catoca mine in Angola in 2003. Russia went as far as building an electric power plant next to the mine. Since 2014, Alrosa has also been trying to develop its activity in the country through the search for new deposits. In January 2019, Russia invested over $ 250 million in the diamond industry in Zimbabwe and Alrosa announced new mining activities in the country. Around 25% of the aluminium company Rusal’s bauxite ore shipments originate from Guinea.
Nuclear cooperation is a long-term partnership and could be an entry point to create other bilateral relationships (both political and economic).
8 France24 – Russia eyes Africa business, https://www.france24.com/en/20191018-oil-diamonds-and-nuclear-power- russia-eyes-africa-business 9 BARMIN, YURY. “Russian Energy Policy in the Middle East.” Insight Turkey, vol. 19, no. 4, 2017, pp. 125–136. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26300561. 10 Russia and Iran Sign $30Bn Energy Agreements, Financial Times, 1 November 2017.
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Russian Power Plants in Africa and Middle East (2015)
Operating Under construction Ordered Deal cancelled Broad agreement or memorandum
Russian Nuclear Power Plants Abroad (2015). Source World Nuclear Association
On the one hand, since 2016, eight African countries have signed nuclear energy Agreements with Russia’s state-owned company Rosatom: Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia and Ghana; in the Middle East, at least four countries (Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran) have already built or are on their way to build nuclear power plants. On the other hand, Jordan cancelled its joint venture project with Russia due to investment and financial disagreement. Because of the growing interest and potential of the Middle East region as far as nuclear energy is concerned, Rosatom opened an office in Dubai (UAE) in order to consolidate and expand its influence.
5. Russia-Africa Summit: Main Economic Take-Away The main topics of the first Russia-Africa summit held in Sochi (Russia) from 23-24 October, 2019 were economic and military cooperation. According to Russian sources, during the summit, President Putin and the Russian administration signed $12.5 billion worth of memoranda with more than 40 African partners mainly for mining, oil exploitation, nuclear energy and military cooperation. However, the economic successes announced by Russia in both the opening and closing remarks have to be nuanced. The documents signed during the summit11 were largely memoranda and not deals or contracts. On the nuclear front, according to Alexey Likhachev (Rosatom CEO), only Egypt, Rwanda and Zambia have shown real interest in cooperating with the Russian energy giant. In addition, the solidity of such memoranda should be tempered; Rosatom signed a MoU with Nigeria in 2017 but no progress has as yet been made.
11 Penney, J. (2019). Passblue.com. https://www.passblue.com/2019/10/28/of-oil-and-kalashnikovs-at-the-first-russia- africa-summit-putin-makes-power-plays/
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6. Summary Russian economic engagements abroad follow Moscow’s political guidelines. Although Russia does not have the same economic wingspan as its direct competitors (US and China), its footprint in Africa and the Middle East is rapidly increasing. Its best assets are the energy sector and weapons trade since Africa and the Middle East are major clients for both. However, on the one hand, the Russian energy sector is greatly vulnerable to oil and gas price fluctuations. Therefore, the decrease of commodity prices could delay or even reverse these positive trends while the nuclear sector represents a more certain option. On the other hand, Russia is trying to invert the decline in arms trade, caused mainly by an ever greater Chinese presence in the African weapons market. In short, the most significant results of Russian international economic strategy might be geo-strategic and political, rather than purely economic.
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RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
1. Introduction In its overarching effort to (re-)gain an influential role in Africa and the Middle East, Russia is making ample use of modern communication techniques, building on the valuable experience it obtained while battling for greater influence in the western countries.
2. Russia’s Actions in Africa Information campaigns The major instruments for propaganda are Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik, which already broadcast in Africa. RT is widely available12 on the continent through satellite and cable TV, while Sputnik can be accessed on the internet. Moreover, Russian state-owned media moved towards establishing a stronger footprint on the continent by setting up partnerships with domestic media corporations. The Kremlin uses its information campaign to legitimise itself and sustain its other strategic objectives in Africa. It uses an evolving set of narratives to portray itself as a great power, peacemaker, humanitarian actor, counter-terrorism partner and counter-narcotics fighter. As for its humanitarian intervention, Russia is positioning itself as a partner in the fight to eradicate Ebola. Astutely, Russia’s mineral company Rusal financed a campaign of trial vaccinations against Ebola in Guinea in 2018. Russia later announced plans to ship the vaccine to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Kremlin amplifies the importance of these limited investments through its propaganda machine.13 Network of influence The Kremlin has been expanding its low-cost human networks across Africa since 2018. It uses limited but targeted measures and investments in human capital, amplified through its media networks, to achieve strategic gains at relatively low cost – a necessary optimisation given its struggling economy. “Political technology”: The term “political technology” was prevalent across the former Soviet area and might perhaps be best described as “a euphemism for what is by now a highly developed industry of political manipulation”.14 The Kremlin has widely used this tool in the former Soviet republics since the 1990s as well as further afield over the last decade to help friendly authoritarian regimes around
12 As per its official webpage, RT has coverage in 53 African countries (only Cape Verde and DRC are not listed), https://www.rt.com/where-to-watch/ 13 Institute for the Study of War (ISW), The Kremlin’s Campaign in Africa: Assessment Update (2019) 14 National Endowment for Democracy – Kremlin exporting ‘political technologists’: West confronts Russian (dis)information machine. https://www.demdigest.org/west-confronts-russian-disinformation-machine-exporting- political-technologists-beyond-africa-to-europe/
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Russia’s Course of Action in Africa and the Middle East 2020 the world stay in power or indeed to assist authoritarian-leaning opposition parties in more liberal countries to win elections.15 The mission to increase Russian influence on the continent is probably led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a businessman from St. Petersburg reputed to be a close ally of President Putin. Prigozhin’s activities appear to be aimed at endangering the US and former colonial powers’ interests, primarily the UK and France, in strategic hotspots around the globe. According to Proekt Media,16 the Prigozhin network operates in 20 countries on the African continent, Prigozhin network in Africa not only through political strategists
(•), but also with mercenaries (•) and “geologists” (•). Investment in education of “future leaders” Russia is increasing the number of scholarship opportunities for African students. For the academic year 2016/2017, approximately 17,000 students from Africa were studying in Russia, of which as many as 74% on a contractual basis. The following year, 1,696 state scholarships (quotas) for training African citizens in Russian universities were allocated in the Russian federal budget. However, despite these recent efforts to augment their scholarship programs, Russia still trails far behind France (102,000 African students), China (50,000), USA (44,000), South Africa (36,000) and the United Kingdom (33,000).17
3. Russia’s Actions in the Middle East Information campaigns Russia uses its information warfare capabilities, especially its RT Arabic and Sputnik news services, to advance its foreign policy goals in the Middle East, become a great power in the region, reduce
15 The Jamestown Foundation, Moscow Exporting ‘Political Technologists’ Beyond Africa to Europe, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-exporting-political-technologists-beyond-africa-to-europe/ 16 Master and Chef – How Russia interfered in elections in twenty countries. https://www.proekt.media/investigation/russia-african-elections/ 17 The State Duma, Analytical Material Russia-Africa in support of Second International Forum “Development of Parliamentarism”, June-July 2019.
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Russia’s Course of Action in Africa and the Middle East 2020 the influence of the United States, prop up allies such as Bashir al-Assad in Syria and fight terrorism.18 RT began broadcasting in Arabic as Rusiya al-Yaum TV on May 4, 2007, rebranded as RT Arabic in 2009. That RT’s first choice of broadcasting language after English was Arabic, followed by Spanish, reveals the early emphasis the Kremlin placed on reaching out to the Middle East. Currently, RT Arabic is available in the Middle East via satellite. More importantly, however, the channel is available online worldwide and is extremely active on Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. RT Arabic correspondents are also on-site in the region, posted in Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Israel and the Lebanon, much as they are present in the United States and Britain. The Sputnik news service is newer and less prominent than RT. Nevertheless, the network’s own description claims that it has more than eighty native speaking Arabic writers active in over fifty countries. Diplomacy through proxies: the case of Ramzan Kadyrov Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, has probably been the most visible Russian official to engage the Arab rulers in the Middle East in recent years. Being the head of a Russian Federation federal entity, Kadyrov doesn’t officially have any diplomatic role. In reality, Kadyrov is an essential part of Moscow’s strategy of employing its Muslim community to build bridges with the Muslim world. The exact nature of the relationship between Kadyrov and the Kremlin remains subject to debate. While Kadyrov is endorsing President Putin’s foreign policy goals (and reportedly considers himself accountable only to the president), he seems to enjoy a high degree of independence. At times, Kadyrov’s relatively uncontrollable actions have even been contra to the Kremlin’s official diplomatic course of action. In any event, he has managed to build a strong network of relations with virtually all relevant leaders in the Arab world, to the extent that he has become an indispensable tool for Russian foreign policy19 in a world in which Moscow doesn’t normally have many religious and cultural ties. Selected trips in 2018 to the Middle East include an August hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, including a stop in Jeddah along the way where he met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz. A trip in November brought him to Bahrain, where he met Prince Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, commander of Bahrain’s Royal Guard and visited a military base to observe training exercises. He then stopped in Dubai for the Formula One Grand Prix, where he again met Mohammad bin Salman. He also held talks with Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates.20
18 Donald N. Jensen, Russia in the Middle East: A New Front in the Information War, published in Russia and the Middle East by Jamestown Foundation (2018) 19 Besides the quasi-diplomatic role, Kadyrov also plays a pivotal function in Russia’s military intervention abroad since he provided hundreds of battle-hardened Chechen “loyalist” fighters, incorporated in the military police, for crucial operations, especially in Syria. 20 The Defense Post, Princely Ties: Chechnya-Gulf Security Relationship, https://thedefensepost.com/2018/12/27/russia-chechnya-gulf-security-relationship/
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4. Summary The soft tools described in the previous sections are part of a wider arsenal employed by Russia to achieve its strategic goals in Africa and the Middle East. Therefore, in order to assess the success of Russian strategy along NATO’s southern flank, the aforementioned “covert”/“deniable” actions and instruments should be integrated into the wider spectrum of Russia’s foreign policy mechanism.
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RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
1. Introduction Military involvement abroad is one of Russia’s main tools to expand and reinforce its influence. It can take several forms, such as military engagement, training or contribution to peace-keeping operations, and it can be achieved by way of various means, such as the regular security apparatus or private military companies (PMC). In the following paragraphs, the main focus will be on PMCs and mercenaries.
2. Russia’s Actions in Africa The use of mercenaries or proxies is a tactic with deep roots in Russian history. The Kremlin views them as powerful tools to pursue its objectives while hiding both its intentions and involvement, thereby avoiding the use of and risks to national troops. President Putin, in a revealing comment on PMCs in 2012, said such firms were an “instrument for achieving national interests without the direct participation of the state”.21 The most well-known “unofficial” Russian military tool abroad is widely accepted to be the Wagner Group. Its role and the secrecy around it stem from its origins as a covert creation by the Russian security apparatus, built to serve the needs of the regime. Wagner is used by the Kremlin to recruit, train and deploy mercenaries, either to fight wars or to provide security and training to friendly regimes. The legal framework of Wagner Group and Russian PMCs It is worth mentioning that the Wagner Group is not a legally registered company in Russia. Russia has no legal or regulatory framework for PMCs, and the Russian criminal code outlaws the participation of mercenaries in armed conflicts or hostilities. Despite years of effort to legalize them, the Russian cabinet definitively dropped the idea in March, 2018, arguing that state authorities alone are responsible for the use of armed force and that “private armies” could seriously destabilize the country. On the other hand, keeping Wagner outside the law may also be advantageous for the Kremlin by helping maintain deniability.22 In terms of international norms and standards, the Kremlin is neither a signatory to the Montreux Document,23 nor a member of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association. The former outlines how international law applies to PMCs and is endorsed by fifty-five
21 https://yuagroprom.ru/en/remont-kvartiry/chto-proishodit-s-siriei-siriya-poslednie-novosti/ 22 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Putin’s not-so-secret mercenaries, published July 2019 https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner- group-pub-79442 23 The Montreux Document is the result of an international process launched by the Government of Switzerland and the ICRC. It is an intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights law whenever private military and security companies are present in armed conflicts. It is not legally binding as such but, rather, contains a compilation of relevant international legal obligations and good practices. The Montreux Document was finalized by consensus on 17 September 2008 by 17 States, and the number of participating States is growing steadily.
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Russia’s Course of Action in Africa and the Middle East 2020 countries, including the United States. The latter sets standards for PMCs to adhere to international humanitarian law. In order to properly assess the role of the Wagner Group within the Russian power structure, close attention must be paid (again) to Yevgeny Prigozhin, his position inside the regime, and how the pursuit of power and profit drives his activities. His ability to support Wagner’s actions and interventions abroad is almost certainly thanks to the huge profits from very lucrative businesses he has in Russia. Keeping Wagner in Prigozhin’s hands provides obvious advantages for the Kremlin. First, Moscow possesses a mercenary force without having the financial burden. Second, the Kremlin can deny responsibility for Wagner’s actions by officially keeping it outside state control. President Putin himself argued in a 2018 interview that Russia has no responsibility for what Prigozhin does because he has no official position in any state apparatus. Besides Wagner, there are other companies in Russia which can be defined as Private Military, or Security, Companies.24 The RSB-Group and the Moran Security Group, for example, precede Wagner and are more comparable to their western counterparts. The founders of these groups are ex-employees of the Russian military and security services. Another PMC, Patriot, is allegedly directly linked to the defence ministry.
Wagner in the Central African Republic Wagner’s most conspicuous presence is perhaps in the Central African Republic. As early as December 2017, Russia obtained a UN exemption to the CAR arms embargo. This allowed Russia to supply light weapons in 2018. Weapons, though, were not the only export sent to the CAR. Wagner Group “employees” were deployed to protect both government officials and mining facilities. The CAR President claimed the troops were there to “train our forces in combating plunderers”. The footprint of Russian forces, either fully fledged as official military organisations or disguised as private companies, could expand further. In January 2019, the CAR Minister of National Defence suggested that a new Russian military base might be on the horizon. Wagner in Sudan Although most of the attention drawn by Wagner is due to its activities in the CAR, sightings of Russian soldiers were reported in south Darfur in July, 2018. This was confirmed by former Sudanese President, Omar Bashir. This presence is neither surprising nor unexpected. Stratfor25 reported that the Wagner Group sent “employees” to Sudan in January, 2018 to protect gold, uranium and diamond mines. Photos from the region suggest Wagner operatives might also be working with Sudanese military and security services.
24 List of Russian PMCs and area of involvement: https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-ideology-how- russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/ 25 Russia Revisits an Old Cold War Battleground, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-revisits-old-cold-war- battleground
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Wagner in Libya Wagner’s presence is also obvious in Libya. In a meeting at the end of 2018 between Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Prigozhin was not only present but a full participant in discussing the possible transfer of further Wagner mercenaries to Libya.26 Moreover, the Russian news outlet RBC confirmed Russian forces were already in Libya by October, 2018 and supporting Haftar. This support also allegedly includes dozens of (regular) Special Forces and military bases in Tobruk and Benghazi.27 Russian military presence in Mozambique - a different case On 2 October, the British newspaper “The Times” reported that about 200 Russian soldiers, including elite troops and 3 assault helicopters and crews had arrived in Mozambique to help the government to fight violent extremists. However, the press secretary for the Russian president, Dmitry Peskov, categorically denied the presence of any Russian military personnel in the country.28 Russia’s renewed interest in Mozambique is undoubtedly driven in part by the country’s hydrocarbon sector,29 although this involvement may trigger negative reactions from other partners which have conflicting interests, mainly South Africa.
3. Russia’s Actions in the Middle East “Limited action” in Syria Russia has made its first bold move outside the former Soviet Union in Syria. In terms of actual deployment of troops, the scale of this intervention has been limited, but focused and sustained, revealing ambitious intentions. The Russian strategy and experience in Syria may serve as a model for future military interventions in other conflict zones. Moscow now controls airspace over western and central Syria. It also has a military agreement with Damascus for a long term presence of Russian navy vessels in the Mediterranean port of Tartus. Moscow has also opened an air base in Hmeimim, its main operating base in Syria. Hmeimim is next to Tartus, on the eastern Mediterranean coast, and both are a major component of Moscow’s anti access/area-denial (A2AD) layout in Syria. Russia has military assets in several other locations throughout the country.30 Wagner troops have become a crucial asset in Syria performing defensive and offensive roles. By guarding energy and military facilities, Wagner “employees” alleviated the personnel shortage
26 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Russia’s Mediation Goals in Libya. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/78940 27 Russia’s Wagner Group Quietly Moves into Africa, https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-wagner-group-quietly-moves-into- africa/ 28 According to Daily Maverick, the personnel deployed are from Wagner Group; they were rushed into the battle without proper preparation and intelligence support, and suffered severe casualties. https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-wagner-private-military-force-licks-wounds-in-northern- mozambique/ 29 In 2010, the Italian oil and natural gas corporation ENI discovered substantial gas fields, which ranked Mozambique in the top 14 countries in terms of deposits. 30 It is also definitely worth mentioning the role played by Chechen battalions in Syria. See Note 19.
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Russia’s Course of Action in Africa and the Middle East 2020 which had hindered Assad’s ability to simultaneously protect facilities and mount offensives to recapture territory. Wagner also provided offensive manpower in circumstances like the Battle for Palmyra (2016), where it supplied the initial force to reclaim the city from the Islamic State. However, the heavy casualties suffered by Wagner’s mercenaries at Deir ez-Zor, where the group was deployed to seize oil and gas fields in early 2018, illustrated the downside of the use of Russian mercenaries in conjunction with Syrian forces. Approximately 200 Wagner personnel were killed in a battle against local fighters supported by the US. The degree of control Russia exercises over Wagner in Syria remains unclear. While some sources close to the Defence Ministry claim that Wagner’s disaster at Deir ez-Zor came as a surprise, others allege the Kremlin was well aware of Wagner’s course of action and the associated risks. However, it seems to be a fair assumption that Wagner coordinates with the Defence Ministry but does so loosely, which could explain a failure to secure approval for this specific offensive.31
4. Summary Wagner is not a PMC in the proper sense and Russia’s criminal code outlaws such groups. Neither Moscow nor the Wagner Group abides by international standards and norms for PMCs. By pursuing Russian strategic objectives under a private banner, Wagner provides the Kremlin with a veil of plausible deniability, bolstering Russian foreign policy flexibility and minimizing the official casualty counts which could otherwise doom Russian involvement in domestically unpopular conflicts like the one in Syria.
31 Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Who really controls Wagner?”, published October, 2019
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SWOT ANALYSIS32
1. Strengths Russia’s strengths in Africa lie in: Narrative, Politics & Leadership and the Economy.
Russia’s political discourse has consistently portrayed the country as a major world power. This narrative has been effectively spread and has nurtured already prevalent perceptions whereas, in fact, relatively little is known about the actual strength of Russia while much is still remembered about the role played by the Soviet Union on the world’s stage.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a strong force in Africa, building its influence as a non- colonial power33 and thus gaining political support across the continent. Despite its later collapse, there remain many elites to this day who still remember the support which was provided by the Soviet Union. Building on this narrative of being a non-colonial power without the burden of having been part of the slave trade, Russia is today able to exploit the persistent anti-colonialism sentiment in order to offer a non-Western-centric option as far as political and economic development models are concerned. Through the use of traditional and new media, as well as local opinion leaders purposely trained in Russia, it continues to hone its message of support for Africa, ensuring the population there believes that Moscow is ready to engage on mutually beneficial terms, while furthering its own objectives.
The Russian so-called “power vertical” is perceived as another element of strength. Remaining in power over the last twenty years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been able to deeply shape the country and its foreign policy in accordance with long-term aims. President Putin himself (no mention was made during the workshop of the power circle which actually shares the responsibility of running Russian political and economic activities with the president) is understood to be the centre of gravity of Russia’s actions in Africa. The approach of providing financial assistance,34 apparently without political pre-conditions, in exchange for negotiation is enticing for some African heads of state, a similar rhetoric used by China which has proven its effectiveness. Military
32 SWOT analysis is a technique used to evaluate a system’s competitive position by identifying its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Specifically, SWOT analysis is a foundational assessment model that measures what an organization does well, where it is failing, what are the opportunities to develop the organization, and which are the potential threats to its principles. Also, SWOT analysis is a framework used to evaluate a system’s competitive position. Specifically, SWOT analysis is an assessment model that measures what an organization can and cannot do, and its potential opportunities and threats. While the overall discussion during the workshop referred to Russia’s CoA in both Africa and the Middle East, the SWOT analysis was focused primarily on Russia’s in Africa, in order to properly take advantage of the background of the SMEs participating in the exercise. 33 This definition is perhaps debatable. While the Soviet Union has never been a colonial power in the traditional term, it is also true that it established a relationship with many “satellite” states which closely resembles the colonial patronage model, although based on a different set of ideological and practical tenets. 34 This issue was mentioned during the workshop without hard evidence on the actual amount on financial support provided by Russia to African state over the last decade. Nonetheless, the perception of Russia as a financial donor or supporter deserves close attention.
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Russia’s Course of Action in Africa and the Middle East 2020 cooperation is also understood to be a strong component of Russia’s course of action in Africa, due to the perception of the Russian military as being advanced and powerful. The sale of weapons is therefore assessed as an effective tool for further strengthening Russia’s position on the continent. Russian diplomacy significantly contributes to the image of being a great power: Russia has hosted 12 African heads of state in Moscow since 2015 – six of them in 2018 alone – and the first Russia- Africa summit in October 2019 in Sochi clearly shows Russia’s rapidly growing ambitions.
As far as the economy is concerned, Russia is perceived as a relatively strong actor35 and the announced cancellation of the Soviet era $20 billion debt definitely reinforces this appearance.
2. Weaknesses Russian weaknesses in Africa lie in Politics & Leadership and the Economy.
These two topics, apart from the strengths mentioned above, also have facets which can be considered as weaknesses. While President Putin’s persistent leadership is identified as a strength, it becomes a weakness when the post-Putin uncertainty about Russia’s CoA is factored in. Hence, there is concern that the Russian regime is vulnerable to the changes which his eventual departure might create, since it is unknown whether such changes will have an overall beneficial or detrimental effect on Russian cooperation with Africa. The direct comparison of Russia to the Soviet Union is also a double-edged sword because the latter is remembered for its inept use of resources, eventually leading to its own collapse. Therefore, Russia will have to come up with a different, credible political and economic model, which is definitely not an easy task for a leadership which is pretending to bring the country back to the old Soviet ways. Also, although the Russian economy is considered stable at the moment, it has shown vulnerability to external sanctions and pressures which have long-term impact, widening the gap between Russia’s ambitions for growth and its overall economic means to achieve them.
3. Opportunities Cooperation in counter-terrorism activities and the Education of the next-generation leadership Russia has become one of the largest arms suppliers to Africa where it now exports up to 35 percent of its weapons. These sales are presented by Russia and its African customers as supporting the counter-terrorism effort, preventing further global and regional insecurity. Russia is viewed not only as having succeeded against terrorism but also as a more loyal partner when compared to western countries. Therefore, providing further equipment, training and bilateral military agreements is definitely an option for Russia, and this could further improve its chances of establishing new military bases in Africa.
35 In order to maximize the contribution from regional SMEs in terms of local perspective on Russia’s CoA, actual data on Russian GDP, showing that the country is definitely far from being a true economic power, were not mentioned.
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It was also mentioned that there is an increasing number of young students in Africa showing the willingness to receive an advanced education in Russia, particularly in the field of information technology. Since more than 17000 students from the African continent are studying in Russian universities, Russia is well positioned to take advantage of this new cohort of “Russia-friendly” emerging leaders as they become influential in their native countries.
4. Threats Internal African threats which may prove difficult for Russia There are a variety of economic scenarios which could unfold for both Africa and Russia. Russia’s relative economic weaknesses are exacerbated by the increased international competition for natural resources. The fluctuation of oil and gas prices becomes prevalent when considering the future of agreements between countries, while new gas fields in the Mediterranean represent a new alternative to Russian gas for European countries. The social environment could similarly play a significant role in relations between Africa and Russia. As requests for greater accountability, rule of law and human rights rise, the ability of Russia to meddle in local politics might decrease proportionately. Finally, the progress towards more effective regional integration works against Russia’s long-term objectives. Although “Pan-Africanism” has been supported by Moscow as a way to hamper western interests in the region and disrupt former colonial power, the actual integration of African countries in political and economic realms would make it much more difficult for Russia to pursue its strategy and remain relevant on the continent.
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CONCLUSIONS
From an economic perspective, Russia’s course of action in Africa and the Middle East looks rational and understandable. On the one hand, Moscow needs to circumvent the regime of sanctions imposed by western countries after its aggression in its neighbouring countries and the overt breach of international norms. On the other, the growing populations of African and Middle Eastern countries promises ever growing gains for those who are able to establish a firm foothold there and generate a steady flow of trade. The export of weapons is part of both the economic and wider political strategies because it is also a tool for reinforcing or even creating an asymmetrical relationship where Russia clearly has the upper hand. In Russia, the enactment of this comprehensive and far-reaching strategy has been sometimes portrayed as the second-half of a strategic match, when the country finally recovers its status as a great power and reclaims its role on the world stage. A consistent narrative has been crafted in order to reconnect Russia’s present course of action with that previously pursued by the Soviet Union. However, the ultimate success of Russia’s strategy in Africa and the Middle East remains doubtful. Firstly, Russian resources are already stretched very thin. Its wealth doesn’t allow for the investment of as many resources as China or western competitors’ does, and the relatively small number of competent officers in the security and diplomatic apparatuses has required them to be moved across this wide region. Secondly, there is apparently a mismatch between the narrative put forward by Moscow and the actual perception of its actions in the southern countries. The “politics of memory” could be a double-edged sword when the true details of the patronage exercised by the Soviet Union are properly elaborated. Also, African and Middle Eastern countries seem eager to benefit from the wider competition among global powers though they neither perceive the multi-polar system as a zero-sum game nor want to take sides in any new cold war. Finally, Russian actions to help those leaders it wishes to stay in power and to weaken or overthrow those it opposes could potentially prove to be short-sighted. Africa and, to a lesser extent the Middle East, show clear signs of a political and cultural transition towards a model where leadership is more accountable to the population and must better represent the people’s needs. In the long term, it is expected that this slow but steady evolution will reduce the effectiveness of Russia’s manoeuvres in the grey zone where illegitimate political and economic interests can be pursued with impunity.
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