DOCSLIB.ORG

USAID Cooperative Agreement Award No. 72011518-CA-00001

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
USAID Cooperative Agreement Award No. 72011518-CA-00001 INTERNEWS CENTRAL ASIA MEDIA PROGRAM USAID Cooperative Agreement Award No. 72011518-CA-00001 QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT OCTOBER 1 – DECEMBER 31, 2019 Dmitri Surnin Dylan Gray Regional Director, Europe & Eurasia Senior Director of Grants and Contracts 1133 15th St. Ste. #350 PO Box 4448 Washington, D.C. 20005 Arcata, CA 95518 tel. +1 (202) 833-5740 tel. +1 (707) 826-2030 [email protected] in [email protected] 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................ 3 Highlights/Impact ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Background/Context ............................................................................................................................................... 7 Project Activities ................................................................................................................................................... 10 Objective 1: Improve media capacity to provide balanced, informed and unbiased reporting on key policy and public interest issues ..................................................................................................................................... 10 1.1. Increase supply of fact-based, balanced information through local content ............................................... 10 1.1.1. Grants and technical support for quality content production Labs ....................................................... 10 1.1.2. Inclusive Content Labs ............................................................................................................................... 15 1.1.3. Recognizing outstanding journalism ......................................................................................................... 16 1.2. Strengthen professional development of media practitioners across traditional and “new” media platforms ......................................................................................................................................................... 17 1.2.1. Thematic and skills-based training for media practitioners ............................................................... 17 1.2.2. Annual Central Asia Festival “MediaCAMP Fest” ............................................................................. 22 1.3. Strengthen management and financial viability skills of independent media .............................................. 22 1.3.1. Professional development opportunities for media managers and sales teams ................................. 22 1.3.2. Financial Future grants .......................................................................................................................... 23 Objective 2: Increase media and information literacy among youth and adults to become critical consumers and producers of information .......................................................................................................... 23 2.1. Strengthen media literacy skills to improve citizens’ ability to evaluate information, critically and competently ......................................................................................................................................................... 23 2.1.1. Develop online media literacy and analysis resource .......................................................................... 23 2.1.2. Support broad-based media literacy education ................................................................................... 25 2.1.3. Assess levels of media literacy, consumption, and trust ...................................................................... 30 2.2. Increase citizens’ ability to engage with and produce news and information .............................................. 34 2.2.1. Foster development of citizen reporting networks .............................................................................. 34 2.2.2. Build additional avenues for citizen engagement with local media .................................................... 37 Objective 3: Improved legal enabling environment for media ........................................................................ 42 3.1. Support efforts to improve legal and regulatory environment for media ..................................................... 42 3.1.1. Support and improve legal monitoring, analysis, and advocacy ........................................................ 42 3.1.2. Strengthen media industry associations for improved representation and self-regulation.............. 43 3.1.3. Build the capacity of relevant government agencies and legislatures ................................................ 44 3.1.4. Nurturing partnerships and resource sharing ..................................................................................... 45 3.2. Support independent broadcasters to advocate for and ensure their equities in the digital switchover process ......................................................................................................................................................... 46 3.3 Access to public information is increased for all media and journalists ....................................................... 47 Challenges/Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................................ 50 Collaboration with Host Country Governments and Other Donor-Funded Projects (USG and International) ........................................................................................................................................................ 52 Gender Analysis .................................................................................................................................................... 53 List of Attachments ............................................................................................................................................... 55 Annex 3. Press Clippings ................................................................................................................................. 56 Annex 4. Public Communication Materials ................................................................................................... 58 Annex 5. Key media law issues Kazakhstan during the quarter (Activity 3.1.1) ........................................ 62 Annex 6. Links to Asia Plus publications on labor migration under Activity 3.3 ...................................... 64 2 Executive Summary The Central Asia Media Program (MediaCAMP) aims to improve content quality and audience engagement, strengthen media outlet financial sustainability, increase media literacy, and strengthen the enabling environment in Central Asia. The overarching program goal is to develop a more balanced information environment in Central Asia to increase openness among youth and adults for differing ideas, opinions and perspectives and in turn increase their engagement in civic participation. The program will run from October 1, 2018 through September 30, 2023. MediaCAMP’s activities are implemented toward meeting three objectives: • Objective One: Improve media capacity to provide balanced, informed and unbiased reporting on key policy and public interest issues • Objective Two: Increase media and information literacy among youth and adults to become critical consumers and producers of information • Objective Three: Improved legal enabling environment for media Highlights/Impact Regional • On November 28, 2019, MediaCAMP presented its Media Consumption and Media Literacy Survey to a wide range of media specialists at Media Kuryltai, one of the biggest annual media events in Almaty, generating great interest among the professional community. Preliminary analysis reveals that, as expected, TV was the main reported source of news in all three countries; surprisingly, over half of the survey participants reported they did not have access to a smartphone; and social media consumption patterns are diverse across the three countries, with WhatsApp leading in Kazakhstan, Viber in Tajikistan, and Telegram in Uzbekistan. The study results will bring rare data on local audience behavior and their media literacy levels, which will help MediaCAMP’s partners to better understand their audiences’ needs and expectations. • Thirty media outlets in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan expressed interest in building formal cooperative links with local citizen journalists through a MediaCAMP grant program. The 10 selected partners represent a good mix in terms of their geographical representation. Each will build a network of citizen reporters, increasing local civic participation and the flow of local content and news reporting. • For the first time since it’s re-design and re-launch in January 2019, the NewReporter.org website saw audience growth this quarter. The number of unique visitors to the site increased by 20% in October-December 2019, and the number of views grew by 26%. Additionally, New Reporter’s Facebook audience increased by 10%, also the first increase since the re- launch. The website was designed to become a popular media literacy and analysis resource for local media communities, students, and young people with an interest in media. The growing viewership and responses to its content from journalists signals progress towards achieving this goal. 3 Kazakhstan • A total
Load more

Recommended publications
  • (Stop a Douchebag) Vigilantes in Russia
    © Laboratorium: Russian Review of Social Research. 2019. 11(3):16–45 16 DOI: 10.25285/2078-1938-2019-11-3-16-45 EROES OR HOOLIGANS? HMEDIA PORTRAYAL OF STOPXAM (STOP A DOUCHEBAG) VIGILANTES IN RUSSIA Rashid Gabdulhakov Rashid Gabdulhakov, Department of Media and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Address for correspondence: Erasmus University Rotterdam, Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands. [email protected]. The author expresses sincere gratitude to the informants for their contributions, as well as to peer reviewers and editors of this special issue for their valuable feed- back. This work was supported by the Dutch Research Council (NWO) project num- ber 276-45-004. Several state-supported digital vigilante groups emerged in Russia at the downturn of the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi (Ours), when its former commissars formed issue- specific movements to counter perceived legal and moral offences through exposure of targets on social media. One of such groups is StopXam (Stop a Douchebag), specializ- ing in road-traffic and parking violations. StopXam participants confront the drivers and retaliate by placing stickers that read “I spit on everyone I drive where I want” on the targets’ windshields. The retaliation is often accompanied by verbal and physical fighting; the process is filmed, edited, and shared on YouTube, receiving millions of views. While digital media made such practices possible, traditional broadcasters maintain significance in rendering meaning to the phenomenon of vigilantism and in framing vigilantes, their targets, police, and other actors. As the existing literature on digital vigilantism is predominantly focused on digital media affordances, this article aims to address this gap through a qualitative analysis of traditional media coverage of StopXam.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Private Military Companies: Continuity and Evolution of the Model
    Russia Foreign Policy Papers Anna Borshchevskaya All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Author: Anna Borshchevskaya Eurasia Program Leadership Director: Chris Miller Deputy Director: Maia Otarashvili Edited by: Thomas J. Shattuck Designed by: Natalia Kopytnik © 2019 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute December 2019 COVER: Designed by Natalia Kopytnik. Our Mission The Foreign Policy Research Institute is dedicated to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. It seeks to educate the public, teach teachers, train students, and offer ideas to advance U.S. national interests based on a nonpartisan, geopolitical perspective that illuminates contemporary international affairs through the lens of history, geography, and culture. Offering Ideas In an increasingly polarized world, we pride ourselves on our tradition of nonpartisan scholarship. We count among our ranks over 100 affiliated scholars located throughout the nation and the world who appear regularly in national and international media, testify on Capitol Hill, and are consulted by U.S. government agencies. Educating the American Public FPRI was founded on the premise that an informed and educated citizenry is paramount for the U.S. to conduct a coherent foreign policy. Through in-depth research and events on issues spanning the geopolitical spectrum, FPRI offers insights to help the public understand our volatile world. Championing Civic Literacy We believe that a robust civic education is a national imperative.
    [Show full text]
  • Connecting the Dots of PMC Wagner Strategic Actor Or Mere Business Opportunity? Author: Niklas M
    University of Southern Denmark 1 June 2019 Faculty of Business and Social Sciences Connecting the dots of PMC Wagner Strategic actor or mere business opportunity? Author: Niklas M. Rendboe Date of birth: 04.07.1994 Characters: 187.484 Supervisor: Olivier Schmitt Abstract Russia has commenced a practice of using military companies to implement its foreign policy. This model is in part a continuation of a Russian tradition of using non-state act- ors, and partly a result of the contemporary thinking in Russia about war and politics as well as a consequence of the thorough reform process of the Russian military which began in 2008 under Anatolii Serdiukov. By using the subcontracting firms of business leader Evgenii Prigozhin as a channel for funding Wagner, the Kremlin has gained an armed structure which is relatively independent of its ocial military structures. The group was formed as part of a project to mobilise volunteers to fight in Ukraine in 2014- 15. The following year, Wagner went to Syria and made a valuable contribution to the Assad government’s eort to re-establish dominance in the Syrian theatre. Since then, evidence has surfaced pointing to 11 additional countries of operations. Of these, Libya, Sudan, Central Africa and Madagascar are relatively well supported. In all these coun- tries, Wagner’s ability to operate are dependent on Russia for logistics, contracts and equipment. Wagner is first and foremost a tool of Russian realpolitik; they will not win wars nor help bring about a new world order, but they further strategic interests in two key ways; they deploy to war where Russia has urgent interests, and they operate in countries where the interests of Russia are more diuse and long-term to enhance Rus- sian influence.
    [Show full text]
  • Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam As a Tool of the Kremlin?
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 99 Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin? Marlène LARUELLE March 2017 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the few French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European and broader international debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Observatoire Russie, Europe orientale et Caucase”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-681-6 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2017 How to quote this document: Marlène Laruelle, “Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 99, Ifri, March 2017. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Ifri-Bruxelles Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 1000—Brussels—BELGIUM Tel.: +32 (0)2 238 51 10—Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).
    [Show full text]
  • Europe & Eurasia
    Vibrant EUROPE & EURASIA Information Barometer 2021 Vibrant Information Barometer VIBRANT INFORMATION BAROMETER 2021 Copyright © 2021 by IREX IREX 1275 K Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, DC 20005 E-mail: [email protected] Phone: (202) 628-8188 www.irex.org Managing editor: Linda Trail IREX project and editorial support: Stephanie Hess and Ben Brewer Editorial support: Alanna Dvorak, Barbara Frye, Elizabeth Granda, and Dayna Kerecman Myers Copyeditors: Melissa Brown Levine, Brown Levine Productions; Carolyn Feola de Rugamas, Carolyn.Ink; Kelly Kramer Translation support: Capital Linguists, LLC; Media Research & Training Lab Design and layout: Anna Zvarych Notice of Rights: Permission is granted to display, copy, and distribute VIBE in whole or in part, provided that: (a) the materials are used with the acknowledgment “The Vibrant Information Barometer (VIBE) is a product of IREX with funding from USAID.”; (b) VIBE is used solely for personal, noncommercial, or informational use; and (c) no modifications of VIBE are made. Disclaimer: This publication is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The opinions expressed herein are those of the panelists and other project researchers and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government, or IREX. 2 USAID leads international development and humanitarian efforts to IREX is a nonprofit organization that builds a more just, prosperous, and save lives, reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance and help inclusive world by empowering youth, cultivating leaders, strengthening people progress beyond assistance. institutions, and extending access to quality education and information. U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering IREX delivers value to its beneficiaries, partners, and donors through its America’s interests while improving lives in the developing world.
    [Show full text]
  • From Shamanism to Sufism
    5 Transmission of Sacred Knowledge in Its Connection to Sufi Tradition 15.USTAD–SHOGIRD TRAINING IN MEDIEVAL SOURCES Historically, Ustad–Shogird (master–apprentice) has been the only form of knowledge transmission for professional guilds. This chapter examines a medieval document which reflects on the Ustad–Shogird process of training and rite of initiation. Ahloqul solihiyn (On Ustad [Master] and his conditions) was written in fifteenth-century Herat by Husayn Voiz Koshifiy.147 It explains many different issues related to Ustad–Shogird relationships, from its forms to its content. It is based on the Sufi way to perfection, of absorbing knowledge, and therefore includes certain ceremonial duties and obligations. The manuscript employs a particular terminology related to training systems within professional guilds: ‘on the road’ means during the process of training; ‘fasten the belt’ means initiating the relationship of Ustad–Shogird (master–apprentice); and ‘stations’ means stages in the process of professional and spiritual train- ing related to Sufi tradition. In fact, this treatise is a manual on the master–apprentice (Ustad–Shogird) relationship and its connection with Sufi tradition. The very first paragraphs of treatise emphasise the points that the Ustad– Shogid relationship lies in the very heart of any professional training. Know that no work is done without an Ustad, and every work done without an Ustad is in vain. There is a belief that even though a person might reach a certain degree and carry out a certain amount of work, if he had had no Ustad, or if his Ustad had not been a good one, his work would achieve nothing.
    [Show full text]
  • Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics
    Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics Rafis Abazov Greenwood Press CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS The Central Asian Republics. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc. Culture and Customs of the Central Asian Republics 4 RAFIS ABAZOV Culture and Customs of Asia Hanchao Lu, Series Editor GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Abazov, Rafi s. Culture and customs of the Central Asian republics / Rafi s Abazov. p. cm. — (Culture and customs of Asia, ISSN 1097–0738) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–313–33656–3 (alk. paper) 1. Asia, Central—History. 2. Asia, Central—Social life and customs. I. Title. DK859.5.A18 2007 958—dc22 2006029553 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Rafi s Abazov All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006029553 ISBN: 0–313–33656–3 ISSN: 1097–0738 First published in 2007 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Series Foreword vii Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Notes on Transliteration xvii Chronology xxi 1 Introduction: Land, People, and History 1 2 Thought and Religion 59 3 Folklore and Literature 79 4 Media and Cinema 105 5 Performing Arts 133 6 Visual Arts 163 7 Architecture 191 8 Gender, Courtship, and Marriage 213 9 Festivals, Fun, and Leisure 233 Glossary 257 Selected Bibliography 263 Index 279 Series Foreword Geographically, Asia encompasses the vast area from Suez, the Bosporus, and the Ural Mountains eastward to the Bering Sea and from this line southward to the Indonesian archipelago, an expanse that covers about 30 percent of our earth.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Global Reach: a Security and Statecraft Assessment
    Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment Edited by Graeme P. Herd About the Marshall Center The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is one of five U.S. Department of Defense Regional Centers and the only bilateral Center. It is also the only regional center for the Federal Republic of Germany. The mission of the Marshall Center is to enable solutions to regional and transnational security challenges through capacity building, access, and a globally connected network. An instrument of German-American cooperation, the center addresses regional and transnational security issues for the U.S. Department of Defense and German Federal Ministry of Defense, and maintains contact with a vast alumni network of security professionals. The legacy, goals, and ideals of the Marshall Plan continue through the security education initiatives of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The Marshall Center, dedicated in 1993, is a renowned international security and defense studies institute that promotes dialogue and understanding among the nations of North America, Europe and Eurasia. The Marshall Center is committed to carrying Marshall's vision into the 21st century. Supported bilaterally by the governments of the United States and Germany, the Marshall Center boasts an international faculty and staff with representatives from ten partner nations. In addition to supporting the European theater security cooperation strategies and objectives, the Marshall Center supports five South and Central Asian States: Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Marshall Center also has a supporting relationship with Mongolia and Afghanistan. For reprint permissions, contact the editor via [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • CONTROL? INTERNET CENSORSHIP and SURVEILLANCE in RUSSIA © Pixabay
    TAKING CONTROL? INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE IN RUSSIA © pixabay A digital version of this report with links and references can be found online: www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/russiareport A REPORT BY REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS/ NOVEMBER 2019 © pixabay TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface 5 3 1 Overview 6 2 Laws restricting press freedom and freedom of expression 10 Chronology from 2012 to 2019 3 Changes of ownership and dismissals 23 Editorial departments under pressure 4 Courageous and committed 32 The diversity of Russian online media 5 Arbitrary and severe penalties 45 Every user risks prosecution 6 The intelligence service is reading right along 56 The fight against anonymous communication 7 Pressure on internet companies 66 The crucial role of international platforms 8 Recommendations 74 PREFACE Today the internet is thought to be a strategically crucial sector in Russian politics although for a long time those in power in the Kremlin did not recognise its importance. Ten years ago, the virtual space in Russia was still a place where lively debates about problems in society and politics unfolded. In the future, it is 5 planned to be censored and surveilled centrally, according to Russia’s new “sovereign internet law”. The present report traces the development from the first bans on content in 2012 to the present day. It shows how critical editorial teams are put under pressure and how the authorities attempt to silence individual journalists and bloggers. It provides information about new online media that report on societal ills against all odds, and it raises the question about the relevance of international platforms for the freedom of expression in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Conference on Oct. 15 - 16, 2019 “Russia Policy Under the Next U.S
    Conference on Oct. 15 - 16, 2019 “Russia Policy Under the Next U.S. President” October 15-16, 2019 In the United States, a presidential election kicks into full swing after Labor Day. With party conventions in the rearview mirror, and with the summer winding down, the candidates begin campaigning in earnest. On the stump, in interviews, and during debates, they outline their policy positions on a wide-range of issues, including national security. This year, President Trump and his challenger, former Vice-President Joe Biden, have focused on the challenges posed by the pandemic, the struggling economy, protests over police shootings and the disorder that has accompanied them. A perennial issue facing presidents is American policy towards Russia. Specifically, the next President will need to address some recent Russian moves: interference in our elections, intervention in Syria, support for Taliban attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, assistance to insurgents in Ukraine, and difficult negotiations over a new START Treaty. With these challenges in mind, the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy and the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service hosted a conference last fall that asked experts to advise the next U.S. president on Russia policy. The gathering provided a forum for practitioners, journalists, and scholars to outline the issues they believed will shape the future relationship between the United States and Russia. We organized the conference around three panels that addressed the following questions: • What drives Russian foreign policy? • What is the future for the U.S.-Russia security relationship? • What are the foundations of Russia’s economy? After the conference, we asked our panelists to provide a summary of their comments and the subsequent discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • Mercenaries in the Service of Authoritarian States
    CSS Analyses in Security Policy No. 274, November 2020 Mercenaries in the Service of Authoritarian States By using mercenaries and ostensibly private security services, China and Russia project power and protect their interests abroad without openly deploying their armed forces. However, in doing so, the two countries follow two very different paths. By Julia Friedrich and Niklas Masuhr In a European context, the privatization of military tasks is often associated with the use of Western private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are increasing reports of other state actors turning to private military services. Out- sourcing the government’s security func- tions to private providers, or creating new security tasks for nominally private secu- rity providers, is thus not only a Western phenomenon. When considering the use of private con- tractors by non-democratic states, China and Russia particularly stand out. Official- ly, the latter is a “managed” democracy that has increasingly developed into an author- itarian state over the last two decades. In the recent past, both powers have resorted Foreign security guards stand guard at the scene of a bomb attack in Baghdad, 3 October 2007. Ceerwan Aziz / Reuters to methods that exploit legal grey areas in their respective regional contexts. These approaches include the growing use of nominally private military and security services beyond their borders to enforce tant to grapple with the individual con- be difficult to discern: providing field train- and safeguard national interests. At the texts in which they operate. ing can effectively lead to combat missions, same time, Beijing and Moscow take en- regardless of the original intention.
    [Show full text]
  • CONTROL? INTERNET CENSORSHIP and SURVEILLANCE in RUSSIA Update © Markus Spiske / Unsplash
    TAKING CONTROL? INTERNET CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE IN RUSSIA update © Markus Spiske / Unsplash This is an update of the report “Taking Control? Internet Censorship and Surveillance in Russia” published by RSF in November 2019. The deadline for this update was 1 July 2021. You can find the English version at: www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/russiareport-update Дополнение к докладу „Всё под контролем: интернет-цензура и слежка в России“, опубликованномy РБГ в ноябре 2019 года. Информация по состоянию на 1 июля 2021 года. Русская версия доступна здесь: www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/doklad-update Grundlage dieses Updates ist der Bericht „Alles unter Kontrolle? Internetzensur und Überwachung in Russland“, den Reporter ohne Grenzen im November 2019 veröffentlicht hat. Redaktionsschluss für dieses Update war der 1. Juli 2021. www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/russlandbericht-update A REPORT BY REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS / AUGUST 2021 © Markus Spiske / Unsplash TABLE OF CONTENTSI 1 Overview 5 2 Laws restricting media and internet freedom 9 Chronology from December 2019 to July 2021 3 Lawsuits and brutality 22 Journalists, bloggers and tech companies under attack 4 Taking aim at international platforms 35 Authorities up the pressure on Facebook, Google and Twitter 5 Digital security training and scholarships 49 How RSF supports journalists and bloggers 6 Recommendations 52 OVERVIEW What a contrast to the mood in the country before the last elections in the summer of 2019! Back then, tens of thousands took to the streets after opposition candidates were excluded from regional elections in the biggest protests the country had seen 5 since the 2011/12 demonstrations against Vladimir Putin.
    [Show full text]