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Kurdish Elections: Implications for and the Region Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, D.C. | August 6, 2009

On August 6 Henri Barkey, Qubad Talabani and Joost Hiltermann, participated in a discussion focused on the outcomes of July’s Kurdish elections in Iraq at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The panel was moderated by Carnegie’s Aliza Marcus.

Henri Barkey opened the conversation by emphasizing the success of the Goran (“Change”) Movement in July 25’s elections. Goran was able to tap into the widespread discontent with the cronyism and nepotism rampant in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). An important shift in this election was that Goran, whose leader Nawshirwan Mustafa is a former PUK official, gained votes from the Patriotic Union of ’s (PUK) support base. This is not surprising, Barkey argued, given that the PUK is a broad-based middle class movement, which has historically been the vanguard of dissent and discontent in Kurdistan. Barkey noted that the elections yield major implications on three levels: • Domestically, Goran has undone the delicate balance of power enjoyed by the PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Given the PUK’s low turnout, there is imbalance between the two parties, which are nevertheless agreed to split their seats 50-50. With serious opposition and imbalance between the PUK-KDP alliance, there are serious prospects for reform. • Nationally, a warped balance of power in the KRG will change relations with Baghdad. The election connected the North to Baghdad by affirming that the KRG will not secede. He predicts that Northern Iraq and Baghdad can work together as long as they distinctly define the limits of federalism. • Regionally, the new Kurdish government could play an important role in Turkey’s efforts to proactively solve its dispute with Turkish (half of PKK forces are based in Iraq). Turkey is regarded by (a squeaky clean PUK leader in Baghdad who will likely lead the KRG) as an important strategic partner for Iraq. For Iraq, Turkey is the gateway to the West, hosting trade routes and enjoying strong relationships with America and Europe. Aliza Marcus agreed that the Kurds will play an important role in Turkey’s Kurd integration plans and PKK demilitarization.

Qubad Talabani touted the elections as a “defining moment in Kurdish politics and the development of democracy.” The elections were free and fair, characterized by energetic campaigns and 80% turnout, he said. Furthermore, the election procedure received positive feedback from EU, UN and U.S. observers. With only slight irregularities, the winner of the election was the region as a whole. Kurds have demonstrated political maturity, he said. This is marked by the emergence of a healthy opposition, which will hold the government accountable.

What does this mean? Kurds delivered a strong message to the leadership, conveying to the world that that the election was about domestic Kurdish issues, such as accountability, government effectiveness,

transparency, education, public works and health care. After the elections, the KRG now has an opportunity to evaluate itself and take steps to modernize from a revolutionary movement to a structure trained to govern rather than resist.

Joost Hiltermann said that despite some tension and violence in and Suleimaniya, the elections went well. Worth overview, he argued, is the results of the presidential vote. Masoud Barzani won with 70% of the vote. This was widely anticipated, yet the 25% won one presidential contender Kemal Meraldeh indicates a shift in Kurdish political forces. Meraldeh’s votes came from Suleimaniya, the Goran stronghold. Given that Goran capitalized on PUK constituents, Barzani and the KDP accuse the PUK of losing Barzani’s votes. The parliamentary election results reveal a considerable shift in the demographics of the new parliament. 59 seats were awarded to the KDP-PUK, 25 to Goran, 13 to the Reform Service List, 2 to Islamists (based in Halabja) and 1 seat was awarded to the Communist ticket.

The implications are positive, Hiltermann argued. Kurds are demanding transparency, accountability and an end to corruption, perhaps a national budget will be public for the first time. Importantly, the elections have affected the future of the PUK-KDP alliance. The election revealed “malaise” in the PUK. After it performed poorly in the election, he questions whether the PUK will remain partnered with the KDP. Will the PUK suffer “junior partner” status in the distribution of senior leadership? Other possible implications of the elections include how the changing political landscape will influence the outcome local and municipal Kurdish elections, as well as how the Kurds will present themselves in national elections in 2011—as a new “list,” unified on Kurdish nationalist issues, or as multiple fragmented blocs.

Prime Minister Maliki’s recent trip to the North may indicate that the national elections are on his mind. Maliki spoke of “justice,” he may be trying to win Kurdish support in the election. Hiltermann noted that Maliki may even attempt to join forces with Goran to create a cross sectarian ticket.

Like the other participants, Aliza Marcus noted the importance on the emergence of a real Kurdish opposition in a region where there is a lack of similar political leadership among Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran. She questioned whether the PUK-KDP alliance will use the election as a step to reform the KRG or entrench its position.

The panelists largely agreed that the next challenge facing Kurds is resolving the status on Kirkuk vis- à-vis Baghdad. Dispute over the jurisdiction of the oil rich city has delayed development and inflamed conflict. Thus the coherence of the Kurdish position must thus be strong, or else Baghdad could play off of Kurdish divisions and incorporate Kirkuk’s oil revenues into national administration. Talabani insisted that with al-Qaeda making inroads into Kirkuk, implementing article 140 of the Iraqi constitution is now the priority for Arabs and Kurds to create “intercommunity harmony.” (Article 140 offers a 3-step process to counter the Arabization process of Kirkuk initiated by ).

Hiltermann rejected the idea of a referendum vote on Kirkuk and suggested that a consensus agreement from political parties should be presented to the city’s voters. Moreover, he noted that Kirkuk is currently included in Kurdish jurisdiction in article 2 of the Kurdish constitution. Yet the legitimacy of the constitution—which concentrates a great deal of power in the executive—is uncertain, since it was hastily passed after parliament was adjourned (perhaps in reaction to Goran’s ascendance). Talabani argued that a Kurdish constitution has been in the grapevine for decades, and predicted that in the next year a thoughtful and revised constitution will come out of Kurdistan.

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