CEU eTD Collection The Kurdish Nationalist Movement inIraq In partial fulfillment of therequirements the for degree ofMaster of Arts Out oftheMountains intoPolitics: Supervisor: Professor Maria Kovacs Department of Nationalism Studies Central European University European Central Kristen M. Sornsin 29 May2008 Submitted to Submitted By CEU eTD Collection framing. cultural mobilization, to andcritical attention resource effective of key political opportunities, Kurds, this paper explains the rise of Kurdish political power as a result of the successful use power? By applying social movement theory to the ethnic nationalistmovement of the Iraqi- extraordinary occur? Why havechange of thecircumstance Kurdsgainedpolitical such negotiating with international andcorporations, greetingheads How state. of did this loss of their families from chemical gas attacks are serving in official political offices, the mourned and Kalashnikovs with hills the through ran once who women and men same knees in this bloody example of state political violence. Fast-forward twenty years, and the Iraq, historically a rebellious and strong conglomeration of Kurdish tribes, was brought to its military campaign now known as the Anfal Genocide. The Kurdish nationalistmovement in Abstract In 1988, Kurdishthe population of Iraq wassystematically in targeted an organized i CEU eTD Collection - The Kurdish Institute of Paris, France, for allowing my extensive pilfering of their library. their of pilfering my extensive allowing for France, Paris, of Institute Kurdish The - in in Kurdistan-Iraq January 2008, whichinspireda significantpart of paper;this inmy sponsoring onGenocide Against International Conference Kurdsthe participation the - The Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs of the Kurdistan Regional Government for opportunities’; - Dr. Shlomo Avineri of Hebrew University for his inspirational idea of ‘historic and furnishing muchneeded guidance and grounding; - My supervisor, Professor Maria Kovacs, for bearing with my ever-evolving research ideas direction, and enough coffee to fuel a jet engine. Thank you all…and special thanks to: In the course of this project,many mentors, colleagues, friends,family and advice,provided Acknowledgements ii CEU eTD Collection Table of Contents of Table ilorpy...... 65 ...... Bibliography 62 Chapter 7 ...... – Conclusion 49 Chapter 6 – Cultural ...... Framing Chapter 5 – Resource 40 Mobilization...... Chapter 4 - Political 24 Opportunity Structure...... Chapter 3 – Historical 11 Background...... 4 Chapter 2 – ...... Theoretical Background Chapter 1 1 – Introduction...... ocuin...... 60 ...... 6.4 Conclusion 6.3 External: Showcasing 58 Democracy...... 6.2 Internal: Framing 53 Division versus ...... Framing Unity 51 6.1 The Tools ...... of Framing: Media 48 ...... 5.4 Conclusion 5.3 Legitimization 45 of Political Parties...... 5.2 Developing 43 as an Interest Group...... 5.1 Kurdish Nationalism 41 as a Social Movement...... 38 ...... 4.4 Conclusion 4.3 Allies and Enemies: 32 Joining the Shia, ...... Flouting Turkey 4.2 30 Kurdish Unity, ...... orthe Lack Thereof 4.1 Institutional Background: Opportunities to Escape 24 Repression...... 22 3.7 Another ...... New Beginning 3.6 De Facto 22 Independence...... 3.5 Ba’athist and Saddam: Beginning 19 of the End?...... 18 3.4 Revolutionary Iraq...... 15 3.3 Planting the ...... Seeds of Revolution 13 3.2 War, Peace, and Betrayal...... 11 3.1 Early History...... 2.6 Additions to 9 the Paradigm...... 8 ...... 2.5 Cultural Framing 2.4 Resource 7 Mobilization...... 2.3 6 Political ...... Opportunity Structure 2.2 Social 5 Movement Theory...... 2.1 Nationalism: The Fuel 4 for a Movement...... iii CEU eTD Collection Erbil, Iraq, 6 Dec 2007. 2 factbook/geos/iz.html. Accessed December8, 2007. of emergence the the hasfocused on that In research available the movement. as asocial powerful? politically become so didHow this happen a historicallyto minority?oppressed Why have the Kurds of Iraq 1 Iraq: northern in region Kurdish the of situation in the change 6, 2007, the KRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Falah Mustafa Bakir described the dramatic instudents Kurdistan-Hawler of University new the of Erbil English-language December on negotiating withinternational andcorporations, heads greeting In state. of a speech to the offices, political in official serving are attacks gas chemical from families their of loss the The same men and women whoonce ran through the hills Kalashnikovs with andmourned federal government. in central Iraqi a democratic, participating entity territorial legitimate twenty years, and the picture changes dramatically. The Kurdistan Regional Government is a by in Fast-forward stood silence. community whileinternational werekilled the thousands complete vulnerability of the Iraqi Kurdish community was proven with bloody efficiency, as Hussein, directed by Ali Hassan al-Majid, and carried out by the Iraqi Ba’athistmilitary. The campaign.What would later become known as the Anfal Genocide was ordered by Saddam approximately 17% of the state’s population approximately state’s the 17% of – Introduction 1 Chapter KRG Minister of ForeignAffairs Falah Mustafa Bakir, in a speech to the University of Kurdistan-Hawler, “Iraq,” CIA World Factbook, movement nationalist Kurdish the understanding involves questions these Answering process. political the binds and drives that engine the player, akeypolitical today we are Iraq, in minority Once we wereapersecuted color. by menandevery creed and of women visited are we onlyfriends, today, our mountains were the Once stage. international jure. Once independence todayitisOnce was andde-facto, founded well our andde- unstable we were the recipients of humanitarian aid, today we play a role on the In 1988, the Kurdish minority inside Iraq, estimated at 5 million, or 2 Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 1 , was targeted in a planned, systematic military 1 CEU eTD Collection a longtime friend andpolitical to the advisor Iraqi Kurds, theunique pinpoints in situation Galbraith, Peter Former USAmbassador circumstances. andpolitical structures state various movement has also caused the Kurdish communities to develop very differently under a wider Kurdish states to prevent host of their respective intense determination The decades. cultural andlinguistic division among Kurds the themselves,at keptthe threat bay for Kurdish populations, combined with policiesstate-specific and asignificant amount of system of which these communities are imbedded. The lack of extensive contact between the Kurdish ethnicidentity are valuable,lack but political and social depth exclusive tothe state paper narrows focusthe specifically Kurds the into Broad cross-borderIraq. studies of the entity with significantpolitical power. framing, the Kurdish nationalmovement in Iraq has developed intoalegitimized territorial political opportunities, effective resource mobilization, andcritical attention to cultural movementin following Iraq the Anfal. Kurdishas it movement has developed after seeming the destruction of Kurdishthe emergence of political Ihope opportunities, to fill gapby this focusing my onthe analysis significantattention must be paid historical to especially developments, regarding the recent events, especially through the lens of social movements. Though I recognize developments are also plentiful. Yet, there is a gap in the proper scholarly analysis of these political current of accounts journalistic Recent rich. intellectually and abundant is movement Kurdish Iraqi the of emergence initial the analyzing and tracing literature The Much can be learned from justdoing this with a relatively ‘successful’ nationalist movement. theoretical these toexaminetools and development the changes insidethesemovements. extended have fewer Even behavior. organizational and movements social of ideas utilized have scholars few very in general, movements nationalist and movement, nationalist Kurdish Though the interaction national and of desires all Kurds arevital myto thesis, this This paper will arguethatthroughtheuse ofkey 2 CEU eTD Collection and Schuster,and 2006), 149. 3 nationalism, and the place where the Kurds are closest to their dream independence.” of dream totheir Kurds areclosest wherethe place andthe nationalism, horrifically as in Iraq. Not surprisingly, therefore, Iraq is the incubator of Kurdish Iraq, writing, “The Kurds have suffered in all the countries where they live, but nowhere as Peter Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, 3 (London: Simon (London: 3 CEU eTD Collection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 15. 7 Academic Press, 2001), 251. 6 5 4 interests. nations entitiesassume arehomogenous that andnational with well-defined agreed-upon identity.” of national framework the form conceptual the that sentiments and ideas of set a consciousness...[and] “national to pointing identity, national community.” political imagined “an as specifically a nation, of definition his with point Gellner: Nationalism is “a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture isthe culture of similarity that maintains which principle “a political is Nationalism Gellner: arguments. This paper will employ a modernist viewof nationalism as defined by Ernest answer exists. The body of nationalism theory is full on conflicting concepts and vague structures. the continuously changing nature of nations under the impact of political and social Brubaker in such limited imaginings.” past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for community imagined is a “deep, horizontal comradeship...that makes it possible, over the it as ‘imagined,’ saying that nationalism invents nations through a process of imagining. The of classification his of indefense nationalism of modernity the of idea Gellner’s Ernest cites Anderson’s Benedict identity. national Any discussion of national movements must begin with a clear definition of nation and 2.1 Nationalism:TheFuelforaMovement Background – Theoretical 2 Chapter Rogers Brubaker, Liah Greenfeld, “Etymology, Definitions, Types” in Ibid, 7. Benedict Anderson, As for a precise delineation of the term ‘nationalism,’ no clear-cut, satisfactory noclear-cut, of term ‘nationalism,’ aprecisethe As for delineation 7 Rather, nations mustbe viewed through the lens ‘constructivism’,of recognizing Myths andMisconceptions in theStudy ofNationalism, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism.” Imagined Communities, 5 Liah Greenfeld offers a view on how this community creates a (New York: Verso, 1991), 6. Imagined Communities Encyclopedia of Nationalism, Volume 1 4 6 However, echoing Rogers However, provides a suitable starting Ethnicity Without Groups it would be a mistake to , (San Diego: . 4 He CEU eTD Collection and actively mobilize againstgroup ethnic it. their for sentence adeath as assimilation regard Tibetans In contrast, goal. tobeanoble Americans context. Forexample, the American onacultural Civil Rights depend Movement argument this of consideredThe facts the integrationrights. ofminority andrealm inthe assimilation space its and of blackassimilation † 10 Press, 1996), 1. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 9 8 assimilationist. and euro-centric wasinherently rights view human and equality on predominate the on Blackthe American Civil Rights Movementand did incorporate ideas of ethnic identity, environmental issues, gender rights, or labor policies. Though significant research was done studiesprovide used to weightand credibility these newly to developed regard theories development of these study areas, stressing theirinterconnected nature. Most of the first case McAdam, McCarthy, Zald and provide abasic overview of theoreticalthe beginnings and factors: of three importance the on consensus theoretical general a as identify they what from components three these choose sections). own in their further be explained will theories (these processes framing to buildframework asynthesized involving political mobilization,opportunity structures, and book landmark in their Zald, N. Mayer these seemingly separate social movement theories, Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and makingadvancements significant asnew cultural and political eras emerge. Pulling together Theory 2.2 SocialMovement nation). of (or being sameculture the members bond” social basic I would like to avoid the appearance of making a moral judgement concerning the often-tense debate over debate often-tense the concerning judgement a moral ofmaking appearance the avoid to like Iwould Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Ernest Gellner, Ernest Ibid, 2. mediates between opportunity and action. opportunity between mediates that construction andsocial attribution, interpretation, of processes collective (3) the (2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal), available toinsurgents; and (1) The structure of political and opportunities confronting constraints movement; the years, has ideas isthe evolvedof adiversethrough theory set that Social movement Nations and Nationalism. † Peter Vermeersch’s study of Romani ethnic mobilization presents asimilar presents mobilization ethnic study of Vermeersch’s Romani Peter 8 and wherethe authority membersbetween itself legitimizes through (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 9. Comparative Perspective on SocialMovements, 5 Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 9 They aim CEU eTD Collection 15 14 13 12 Central Europe, 11 fourthrough approachescan that provide aframework for analysis. active.” becomes it when enter must movement a which into conditions opportunity (POS)can structure be defined as“the complex formalof informaland political future.European Turkey half (about world’sthe of Kurds) and Turkey’sfocus shifting towardsa democratic, on the Turkish Kurds stems from his interest in the sheer number of Kurdish citizens in toconductframework a studythorough of Kurdishthe in movement focusTurkey. Romano’s Mobilization, and Identity, contribution to in uniqueopportunities national the to context which they are embedded.” and“social areshapedby setmovements and revolutions of broader the political constraints mobilization collective action anddid behaviors adequately not resource factthat the address his study behaviorof inriot early the 1970s. Structure 2.3 PoliticalOpportunity ininterpreted a slightly mannerdifferent provide to greater clarity and generalapplicability. significant political and social details. This paper uses a similar set of theories, though adequately hisextend social movementfocus beyond the Turkish borders, leaving outmany combined. often are not of identity andethnic literature theories movement social that criticism, saying Vermeersch, 39. Ibid, 3. McAdam et al., 23. 24. Romano, Peter Vermeersch, Peter 1. David Romano, in his book Peter Eisingerfirst Peter tocoin the in the became opportunities’ of term ‘structure political 11 The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system political institutionalized closureof the or openness The relative (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 28. Comparative Perspectives onSocialMovements 12 The Romani Movement: Minority Politics andEthnic Mobilization in Contemporary Though he does provide a short overview of the Iraqi Kurds, he fails to employs McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald’s synthesized theoretical The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, 13 The emerging literature andresearchon literature Theemerging 6 , attempts toprovide clarity 15 McAdam, in his McAdam, 14 Political CEU eTD Collection 20 19 Movement Theory, MobilizationResearch Program,” in AldonD. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, 18 17 16 2.4 ResourceMobilization a unique thatthe movement complications can face.territorial ethnic movement theory did not pay enough attention to ethnic identity and tries to compensate for opponents.” its or state the However, Romanoadds a fifth factor: “5. International and influences foreign supportive of mobilization (RM) theories. (RM) mobilization providingnew casestudies and research possibilities. From eraemergedthis the resource theory. mobilization resource and Future oftheResource Mobilization Program,Research incorporate Dieter Rucht’s incorporate definition: political andstructures opportunity cultural framing. of the theories was missing in mobilization action idea collective words, the other of resource address limitationsthese arenotdesigned toreplace RM, butrather to be integrated it.into In limited focus on structural and cultural areas. However, he believes that the theories built to McAdam et al., 186. Ibid, 332. Mayer N. Zald, “Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the 25. Past and Romano, Future of the Resource McAdam et al., 27. Mayer Zald, in his essay 4. 3. 2. people. skills, and technical and toprocess tools information distribute influenceand to mobilization such activities, requireas money resources frames,people, knowledge, andactors publics outside themovement. Forlarge-scale and sustained movement carrying out protestactions which are visible“products” movementaddressed to isMobilization theprocess of andmovementcreatingstructures and preparing shall this paper analyzemobilization, to resource aframework searchfor In the The state’s capacity and propensity for repression allies absenceof elite or The presence undergird apolity The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically 20 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 326. 17 He, along with Vermeersch, believes that traditional social 19 18 Zald recognizes that RM has limitations, particularly in its The 1960s marked awatershed social for scholars,movement Looking Backward toLook Forward: onthe Reflections Past 7 16 details the development of development the details Frontiers in Social CEU eTD Collection work do just this asthey pull their conception ‘frame’of from Erving Goffman’s seminal 1974 American Sociological Review, 22 21 andfactors psychological perspectives.” and structural/organizational Movement Participation, in contend their essay his colleagues a full explanation of how the movement gains support and constituents. As David Snow and factors and strategic uses of frames of understanding by movement elites, we are left without mobilizationresource and political Withoutattentionopportunity structures. cultural to be used toinvestigate social motivation,movement itwas developed tofill in gaps the of on Their Emergence, Mobilization,and Dynamics, action.” collective andmotivate legitimate that by efforts groups of people fashion to of shared understandings world the andthemselves of Comparative PerspectivesonSocialMovements, 2.5 CulturalFraming casestudy. of the mobilization the toevaluate features) main andstructural (mode of operation, resources, factors these three paper will politics.This use and bureaucratic political interests into overlap of somemovement how organizations picture clarity aninteresting and offer analytical Rucht’sideas can if guide point, firmused asastarting for However, types. characteristics ismobilization, toosimplisticunderstanding andcan problemspresent if concrete taken as This ittable, though provides clear andextremely helpful factors can that aidin David A. Snow, et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” Ibid, 6. As quoted in Romano, 21. Frame Analysis As defined by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy,and Mayer N. Zald in their work , defining it as a “primary framework [that] allows its user to locate, “little headwayhas been made in linking socialtogether 51, (1986). InDoug McAdam and David A. Snow, Frame Alignment Processes, and Micromobilization, (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing, 1997), 235. 8 21 Though this theory can stand on its own and own its on stand can theory this Though cultural framing is “…conscious strategic 22 SocialMovements: Readings Snow et al. attempt to CEU eTD Collection 26 25 University of WisconsinPress, 1995), 271. 24 23 its terms.” identify,perceive,label and infinite a seemingly of number inoccurrences definedconcrete movement theoretical set in order to fully explain the Kurdish nationalist movement in movement nationalist Kurdish the explain fully to in order set theoretical movement bemust social addedtothe national trauma politics, andcollective diaspora paradiplomacy, and states growing regions. economicinterdependence The of concepts andpolitical of increased ponder immigration,globalinstant consequencesof the the and communication, to one leaving action, into swung had globalization before formed were theories movement to add paradigmthe in tocomplete order their casestudy pictures. Also, the socialoriginal felt They itboth of necessary movements. identity several aspects ethnic neglected theory has 2.6 AdditionstotheParadigm specific by group appealing to,and sometimes manipulating, public collective memory. complementary.” interests, values, and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and individual of set some that such orientations, interpretive organization] movement [social remembered. Snow et al. call this frame alignment, or“the linkage of individual and SMO historical facts (accuracy optional)for certain events and traditions to remain relevant and ‘social memory’ and ‘historical reconstruction’. potential legitimization of political and social claims of the present, emphasizing the ideas of them.” experiences memories of a shared past that are preserved by members of a specific group who cultural values. Maurice Halbwach defines collective memories, recognizing them as “ Snow et al., 235. Ibid, 274. Ben-Yehuda, Nachman Erving Goffman, Erving Just as both Peter Vermeersch and David Romano recognized, social movement social recognized, Romano Vermeersch and David as both Peter Just and memory collective includes built are frames such which with material The 23 Frame Analysis, Frame 26 Essentially, the movement leaders are selling their ideas and actions to a 24 He also points out the importance of collective memory of the past as The Masada Myth: Collective Memory andMythmaking in Israel, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 21. 9 25 Social memory needs the reconstruction of (Madison: CEU eTD Collection some serious gaps using paradiplomacy, diaspora politics, and collective national national politics, and gapsusingparadiplomacy,sometrauma. serious collective diaspora theoretical lines of thought to fully flesh out social movement theory, Iwill attempt to fill in today’s political structure. Just as McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald chose to integrate three 10 CEU eTD Collection Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 31 30 ethnicity. true oppression their report to violent of reluctant often are history Kurds ethnic recent the genocide, with and Also, things. such under-report usually governments state numbers, official, unbiased source forsuch statistics. Just as Kurdish nationalists will have a tendency to exaggerate their 29 28 Accessed 28 April 2008. against outside influences, rather than any conception nationalinfluences, thanany identity.of rather outside against conception wereabout leadershipstruggling tribal however, ‘pre-modern’revolts that out, early these Bruinessen,in his working paper“Transnational Aspects of Kurdishthe Question,” points 27 rule - are most interesting, creating a continuity of sorts with future, more modern, nationalist measure –usuallysome of feelsof self- revolts results these the DavidMcDowall reasons, 637, though they Arab eventually acquiesced to andrule Islamicfaith. in of Mesopotamia Arab wereagainstthe conquest Kurdishrecorded revolts first the systems, hundreds ofyears. Traditionally through organized kinship loosely (often interpreted) tribal connection between ethnic Kurdish tribes and theirinhabited territory did notemerge for Kurdish identity in inscriptionsSumarian from four thousand years ago, a more distinct 3.1 Early History stateless ethnic in group world.the is largest Kurds the it thought the that are for theentireethnicity Kurdish estimated Armenia. Syria, and Iraq, Turkey, Iran, between up alargeregion border of the part is areathat Kurdistan amountainous takes Background – Historical 3 Chapter Martin Van Bruinessen, “Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question,” Kurdish ofthe Aspects “Transnational Bruinessen, Van Martin David McDowall, no is There estimations. that, just are of Kurds percentages related and populations the for Estimations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurd#External_links Map found at: found Map Though is Though there of evidence vague a 27 With more than 27 million 27 than more With Welcome to Kurdawary Website, A Modern History of the Kurds. ( (Florence:European University Institute, 2000),3. 28 29 http://www.geocities.com/viyan2000/kurdistan.html. , New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 21. 11 EUI Working Papers: Robert 30 Martin van Martin 31 Whatever the Whatever CEU eTD Collection 36 As quoted in McDowall, 53. Sheikh Obeidallah toDr Cochran, 5 October1880, Inclosure in Abbottto Thomson, Urumiya,7 October 1880. 35 34 Ethnic Conflict, 33 32 dynasty. Safavid and Persian the Empire theOttoman between beknown as areacaught comethe to able achieve to functional independence.” aspirations. He details, “Even when they were not in a state of rebellion,many tribes were imperial imperial in loyalties, ending failure.a spectacular and old sentiments tribal- walk newnationalist to alinebetween tried unsuccessfully that The revolt that his son led in Iran in 1880 was, according to McDowall, a confused attempt William Abbott, the sheikh penned: Tabriz, in Consul-General British tothe letter a In leader. nationalist Kurdish first the some consider Allah, who Sheikh Ubayd emerged From intothis chaos. areastemporary the of many plunging and chieftains the of autonomy the eliminating principalities, Kurdish the in forces. forautonomy military area againstand his rivals potential exchange preferred topay for theloyalty Kurdish principalities,of offering for the support ruler of the life, Persian Empires Ottoman and the and intosociety Kurdish political arms administrative supplies,respect, from andsupport empires.the Instead of extending theirrespective McDowall, 55. Bruinessen, in Atabaki and Dorleijn, 27-29. Jack David Eller, McDowall, 21. Parliamentary Papers, This manner of autonomy continued into age the of empires, whenKurdistan would nation apart. We want our affairs tobe in our own hands. matter, having shall into understood the We inquire state. Governments a our alsoare [Ottoman and Qajar], and that necessarily something must be done, so that European agreed that matters cannotbe carried on in this way with the two Governments Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan, on and all are united and The Kurdish nation…is a people apart…the Chiefs and Rulers of Kurdistan, whether into bureaucracy centralized their pushed eventually they progressed, Empires the As 33 Essentially, the support of the Kurdish chieftains was seen as a political tool to get (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 153. From Culture to Ethnicity toConflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Turkey No. 5(1881)Correspondence Respecting the Kurdish invasion of Persia, 32 12 36 Yet, the rhetoric behind the revolt, the behind rhetoric the Yet, 35 34 CEU eTD Collection 40 39 38 37 carved uptheobviously intofailing Ottoman colonial Empire spheres. Agreementof 1916, signed betweenFrance and Britain andapproved by Russia, which troops. This ‘great game’ played out by the major powers is clearly seen in the Sykes-Picot Kurdistan was almost destroyed in its role as the battleground for the Ottoman and Russian Young Turkspushed the Ottoman intoEmpire the war with interritorial mind. conquests their world dramatically. societies were setup,spreading dissentand pushingrevolt; yet the FirstWorld War changed of aftermath their coup. in immediate the non-Turkish schools, organizations, clubs, andpublications thatthey had graciously allowed would later give birth to the Treaty of Sèvres. nationalism. Turkish open of policy official an adopted eventually 1908 and, despite language of cultural freedom, managed toalienate most ethnicities and group, the Union and Progress Committee. The Unionists seized control in a coup in July asplinter of formation the to led divisions internal aconstitution, of introduction the through diverse group of many ethnicities, including Kurdish. forces began to rise from the rubble, namely in the form of the Young Turks, originally a debt mounted and central authorities desperately tried to control their vast lands, nationalist 3.2 War,Peace,andBetrayal conception and ‘Kurdish-ness’ of identity. ethnic-territorial whetheryetfully by understood Kurdish inhabitants or not,signals a inturning point the Ibid. Ibid, 28. Gerard Chaliand, ed., McDowall, 100. As Gerard Chaliand writes in his famous book famous in his writes Chaliand Gerard As The Ottoman Empire at the turn of the century was crumbling from the inside. As A People Without aCountry, 39 Several Kurdish paramilitary and underground (Brooklyn: Olive BranchPress, 1993), 13. 13 37 A People Without aCountry Striving tore-invent empire the 38 They banned all of the 40 This agreement This , the , CEU eTD Collection 44 Press, 1990), 182-184. 43 42 41 attributes. political andcultural distinct developing regimes, under various treatment different experienced identities. In his opinion,instead of a strong pan-Kurdish movement, each state’s Kurds have Kurdish of separate for development the watershed as the moment to this Ellerpoints incorporating their piece of Kurdistan intoa new state called Iraq. Anthropologist Jack David by the old Ottoman administrative millet called Mosul,fell under British ‘mandate’, and many Kurds splitthe between states. coming upwith Treatythe of Lausannein 1923, which left an out idea of minority autonomy Kemal Atatürk’s revolution, the new Turkish government renegotiated with the Allies, Considering what came next, we can understand the wistful longing for Sèvres. Following that treaty this is regarded so fondly in Kurdish eyes,saying: his Chaliand fact a create points promisedout at the confusion Kurdish to 1920, nation-state. World WarI.Gaining from Wilson, support Woodrow Treaty the Sèvres,of signed inAugust the Ottoman-Armenians, presented their case to the Paris Peace Conference at the end of of of tribal factions and loss of provincial leadership. shambles. Yet, the Kurdish urban class was not well developed, still dealing with the history independent Kurdistan were higher than ever before. The empire’s administration was in Eller, 155. Hurst Hannum, Ibid, 32. Ibid, 31. was alsoan affront tothe Kurds. Treaty…was not only profoundly andhumiliatingunjust for the Turkishit people, andits traditional notgrazing grounds, mentionto Persian Kurdistan…The Sèvres from which two-thirds ofits territory had been lopped off,including its fertile areas Kurdistan’The ‘independent envisagedbytheTreaty acountry therefore, was infact, As the Ottoman Empire conceded defeat on October 10, 1918, hopes for an Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination 44 42 43 The Kurds in ‘Southern Kurdistan,’ also denoted 14 41 Despite this, they,in conjunction with . (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania CEU eTD Collection (New York: Walker& Company, 2008), 14. 49 48 47 46 45 Kurdish as the official language in all their activities,” their in all language official asthe Kurdish administrators, magistrates, and teachers in their country…from their own ranks, and adopt behad destroyed to RoyalAir usingthe Force. least,the plagued by a number of problems, one ofwhich involved alarge Kurdishrevolt that Great Britain’s struggle to form an Iraqi state after World War Ihad been troublesome, to say modern day Iraq, but the League of Nations extended the mandate to cover the Mosul area. a piece of Iraq. Technically, British forces had only occupied the southern two-thirds of this paper’s subject,theIraqi beginningKurds, with history their Britishunder the as mandate ofRevolution 3.3 PlantingtheSeeds Iraqi state under the Hashemite monarchy and King Faisal. andKing monarchy under Hashemite the Iraqi state Iraqi Treaty of June 1930 officially ended the British rule and began the independence of the any real laws or projects benefiting the Kurdish people of their new mandate. The Anglo- independence naturally led tovarious political withindevelopments andIraq, specifically new the However, power. into put had they which monarchy, Hashemite the over influence of inroot taken Kurdistan. Obviously, the Wilson’s idea of self-determinationpolitical based on national identity had Treaty of Sevres, with pages from the Koran,like a talisman wrapped around his arm.” President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points verbatim and wore a Kurdish copy of the released). The Sheikh, as described by British officer Arnold Wilson, was “a man who quoted Mahmoud Berezendji had previously(who been forarrested leading revolts butlater said nothing Kurdish about the region of Sulaymaniah, led prompting by revolts Sheikh Quil Lawrence, Quil Ibid, 149. Ibid, 148. Charles Tripp, Chaliand, 146. Paying attention to Eller’s theory about separate development, wenow must focus on Though themandate inofficially ended 1932, the British keepa tried to tightsphere History of Iraq, Invisible Nation: How Kurds’ the Quest for Statehood is Saping Iraq and the Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2000), 55. 15 46 Despite promises to draw “the 47 the British did little to implement to little did British the 48 Much to the Kurds’ anger, it 49 45 CEU eTD Collection 55 54 53 52 51 50 overpowered the Iraqi Army,forcing them to retreat. fighter, rebel Kurdish famous the Barzani, Mustafa Mullah when 1943, in again yet intervene forcein an occupation to reestablish in theHashemites 1941. deaths and coups that displaced the Iraqi monarchy with pro-Nazi politicians, the British sent independence in 1948. to Iraq’s membership in the Arab Coalition that violently opposed Israel’s declaration of leading eventually Iraq, of rest the among rapidly growing been had sentiments pan-Arab and dealing with developments on the larger Iraqi stage and on an international scale. Anti-British organization.the Party, which heldits firstconference onAugust1946, 16, electing Barzani as of ‘president’ asylum inUnion. Soviet the attempt at establishing a Kurdish state in Iran - caused Barzani and his fellow fighters to seek subsequent collapse of short-livedthe Kurdish Mahabad Republic–a Soviet-supported institutions.’ Inotherwords itwas aimed against the Kurdishmovement.” established armed bands tooverthrow or seeking organizations, activity associations, of Treaty, which, among other things, promised coordinated efforts against “‘the formation and regarding Kurdish the question.1937, Turkey, In created Persia, Iraq and Saadabadthe associations.” recognitionthe of rightspeasants’ and workers’ and introductionsthe oflabour ethnic) which based group, aLeftist “adopted programme, callingfor agricultural reform and being transformed by secretary-general party Ibrahim Ahmada more into civic (rather than Ibid, 297. McDowall, 296. Chaliand, 149. Chaliand, 149. Tripp, 108. Chaliand, 149. Despite being in exile, Mustafa Barzani managed to create the Kurdistan Democratic 55 During the intra-Kurd powerstruggle for party control, leaders the were also 54 For a number of years, the party struggled to find it’s identity, eventually 53 16 52 The defeat of this revolt, and the 51 The Royal Air Force had to 50 After a setof After CEU eTD Collection 60 59 58 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2801487.stm. Accessed 15April 2008. power relationsthrough with a newproved governmentstronger ideology,than compelling Hashemites. However, internal Kurdish leadership struggles and the prospect of gaining rhetoric in this new regime, on would think that the Kurdish elites would have sided with the officials, and, of course, the Hashemite royal family.With the popularity of Nasser and his Karim Qasim, carried out a classic coup d’etat, killing Al-Sa’id, a number of his government 57 56 with the British-supported Hashemites. gamble in signing the placingBaghdad Pact, his and government, himself, directly in line efforts. the same light at the Treaty of Saadabad, as a regional agreement for suppressing the Kurdish influence in SovietEast. Middle the against project in the Cold War game, this was designed as a regional defense force and an alliance signed the Baghdad Pact in 1955, along with Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain. A new conqueror of colonialism conqueror European and Zionism.” leader President Gamal Abdel Nasser “emerged…a hero both in Egypt and abroad...as the had an entirely opposite result in public opinion, especially in Iraq. Egypt’s Arab nationalist Israel, had met with military success, their invasion of the recently nationalized Suez Canal disastrous Suez Crisis. Though the Western powers, including Great Britain, France, and politics anddangerous for too Hashemitethe monarchy he was protect.trying to Western alliance, believing andpro-Soviet pan-Arabism attitudes tobe divisivetoo forIraqi Minister Nuri Al-Sa’id, who came topower shortly after the defeat, pushed Iraq intoa pro- especially considering the blame placed on Iraq from other Arab coalition partners. Prime Tripp, 142. Derek Varble, Derek McDowall, 300. “Lesson from History: 1955 Baghdad Pact,” Tripp, 141. 58 The Coalition’s indefeat Israel was a hardblowfor the general Iraqi political public, The pro-Western partnership did not last long, however, essentially killed by the Essential Histories: TheSuez Crisis 1956, 60 BBC BBC News: MiddleEast, In July 1958, the Free Officers,led by ‘Abd al- 57 However, KDP the leadership viewed inthis 17 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003), 84. 59 Nuri Nuri Al-Sa’id hadtaken a political 56 Instead, he CEU eTD Collection 64 63 62 61 regime. back from his exile in the Soviet Union,following Barzani’s pledge of devotion to the new Iraq 3.4 Revolutionary led byAbdBa’athists, al Karim Qasim. KDPthe toplace theirhope and supportbehind these new Freeincluding Officers, the control of the KDP. He never showed an ideological affinity for oragainst communism, centered on the consolidation of power for both of them. To begin, Barzani wanted complete led Command, by Nasserist Abd al SalamRevolutionary Arif. the of Council National emerging the with in lot his threw Barzani andBa’athists. nationalists pan-Arab the leaders they court, likelycoup groupsmost the in that to findrealized fact, to successwere, imminent change in leadership. As Barzani and the KDP began to look for the next potential puta supported, drain on Qasim’sandpersonal government reputation, signaling an and military options. political his reevaluate to him led - nationalism Arab virulent on based union Egyptian-Syrian feltby Barzani, and theprospects of Iraqi membershipin Unitedthe Arab Republic –an joining Nasser’s the Arab United Republic. of idea the with flirting and support necessary the for forces tribal opposing to looking andviolence from conflicting Qasimbegan the leadership, away to turn from KDP,the confusion as intofell leaders. KDPandKurdish public KDPthe Yet, other the powerful that preferred towork with feeling hisand Barzani, leadership was more charismatic reputation Ibid. Ibid, 313. Ibid, 307. McDowall, 302. Indeed, Qasim, promised ademocratic republic andinvited MullahMustafa Barzani The Kurdishbegan revolt in 1961, and,relatively though unorganized and poorly 61 Qasim did not trust the current KDP secretary-general Ibrahim Ahmad and 64 The myriad of deals made between Arif and Barzani all 63 In a move that wouldimpress Faust himself, 62 This loss of alliance, the personal humiliation 18 CEU eTD Collection 70 69 68 67 66 65 autonomy. on behalf of KDP,the essentially on compromising previously sacred conditions likepolitical support Arif’sof for Arif’scoup backinghis of leadership,Barzanisigned apeace agreement international support from Iran and Israel, re-opening the war against the regime. the waragainst the from andIran support re-opening Israel, international his reverting agreement, his position back tothe more hard-line policies and, by encouraged within KDPledthe by Jalal beganTalabani power. gaining preferringfollow to winds to offinancial unencumbered.support a Yet, left-leaningfaction order to neutralize the threats that mightarise.” that threats the toneutralize order in in government representation broader a of illusion the create to “wanted slant, nationalist Arab anotable Ba’athParty,its The head. reareddespite context, Ahmad versusBarzani and oftheEnd? Beginning 3.5 Ba’athistandSaddam: army. within elements the Ba’athist Israel tothe against military this time1967 war caused another coup, power providing Kurdish demands. The combined strain of Kurdishthe question and apoorshowingin the refusing of policies the continued government Nassarist his accident, in ahelicopter died Arif between rising Saddam Ba’athist ‘star’ Mullah Hussein and Mustafa Barzani. placenegotiate showinterest in to to their negotiations ultimately took gestures 1969,the inindispensable negotiation Therefore, when process. any making governmentbegan the the peshmerga troops, continued the guerilla war efforts, proving that he was ultimately government, trying to obtain important concessions. Yet, Barzani, still in control of most of enemies close. Talabani and Ahmad took opportunity the cooperate withto newthe Ibid, 327. Ibid, 324. Ibid, 320. Ibid, 317. McDowall, 315. 19. Lawrence, With yet another coup, the internal power struggle, usually played out in a Talaban 66 After assuring his position at the helm of the KDP, Mullah Mustafa reneged on 68 19 69 In short, they preferred to keep their keep to preferred they short, In 65 Topreventthis, exchanging his 70 67 Even after CEU eTD Collection 75 74 73 Grove Weidenfield, 1991), 330. before another agreement on Kurdish autonomy in Iraq would be threatened by the exact same issues. same 72 exact by the be threatened would Iraq in autonomy Kurdish on agreement another before Press,1990), 191. It must be noted thathere Hannum’s book was published in 1990,which isseventeenyears 71 Kurdish region and the nationalization of the Kirkuk oil fields. ofthe borders on exact the disagreements down due to peace broke short the Interestingly, effectively participate in well opportunity government. as asignificant to Ba’ath the this ceasefire accord gave extensive minority protections and language rights to the Kurds, as with his cold statement that “secret service operations are not missionary work.” ‘friendship treaty’ was signed in April 1972. over $16million Kurdsthe to during early the 1970s; especially an after Iraqi-Soviet hadThe CIA channeled perspective. Israeli realist the to matchedexactly The USattitudes saying: well, Kurds quite the towards position Israeli realist the Danin expressed later years,Ezra In interests of Iran, Israel, and even a Cold War-focused United States. Yet, this wasn’t tolast. international influence. a For time, Kurdsthe had played apivotal in role pushing the resumed. Evidence also exists toshow that Barzani refused this agreement in light of Report tendered to the US Congress explained this position saying: Congress position US explained tothe tendered this Report Black Morris,and 330. Ibid, 330. Ibid, 332. Ian Black and Benny Morris, Hurst Hannum, Barzani achievingBarzani autonomycame Kurdish closest to in March1970agreement; the forcingby it army todeal Iraqi with the of the Kurdishpart problem. aconsiderable of hands the tying by advantages military gained Israel factthat the despite and wasanoble contribution itself assistance the butbe interpreted asexploiting the Kurdish tragedy for our own ends, even through in could not fighters Iraq theKurdish wegaveto mewas clear assistance to It the that action, ours covert wasof a cynical context surprise.in the Even fighting. continue to encouraged were who clients, the sap to resources ally’sof our neighboring country [Iraq]. This policy imparted toour was not sufficient hostilities of level a continue simply insurgents the that instead [the Shah]…preferred of head Dr.Kissinger, andtheforeign state The president, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination Israel’s Secret Wars: A History ofIsrael’s Intelligence Services, 75 73 20 Nonetheless, Henry Kissinger summeditup 72 . (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 71 Needless to say, the fighting 74 (New York: The Pike CEU eTD Collection Report, 79 78 77 76 campaign, but no significant action was taken in fear that it significantnoaction incampaign,wouldwas taken fearthat but peace upsetthe help and evidence of mass violence had been pouring out from the beginning of the for in Pleas had silence. violence been the watching relative community The international Kurdishbetween meeting leaders and Ba’ath the party in government 1991: trying toplace a number on the death toll, aHuman Rights Watch report gives the details of a regime. create and Kurdish to the theiragainstSaddam fight differences Hussein’sBa’ath Front struggles. Yet,during Iran-IraqWar, the these by groups, supported aside Iranians,the put creating ensuing(PUK),for intra-Kurd conflictandpower atmospherethe necessary the civil (KDP), but were challenged by Jalal Talabani’s new party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan March 23, 1975, fleeing to Tehran, then the United States for cancer treatments. With KDPthe by overrun Iraqi tanks andtroops, Mullah abandonedMustafa his fight on chased from a taken from spot onthe camp.concentration andchasedtheir or killed to villages either problem. Thousands of Kurdish ifcivilians, they lived through chemicalthe were bombs, began in 1988 with a mandate from Saddam findHussein to asolution to Kurdishthe military campaigns, organized and led by Ali Hassan al-Majid – later called ‘ChemicalAli’ – Human Rights Watch, “Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds.” Ibid., 357-360. Ibid, 352. McDowall, 337. http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. have been more than 100,000." is"What this figure exaggerated of 182,000?" he issaidhave to "Itcouldn't asked. al-Majid jumped reportedly tohisin feet a ragewhen discussion the took turn.this 182,000--a rough extrapolation based numberthe on of destroyed villages. Ali Hassan leaders][Kurdish raised the question of Anfaldeadandthe mentioned afigure of After in Barzani’sdeath 1979, his sons tookoverhis KurdishDemocratic Party 77 The reaction from Baghdad is now known as the Anfal Genocide. The series of 79 21 Human Rights Watch 76 78 In CEU eTD Collection 82 81 80 and impressing the American administration with their zeal.As the Americans began their militia) foughtalongside of inCoalition troops sustainingnorthern Iraq, casualtiesnumerous 3.7 AnotherNewBeginning compelledtopresentcooperate that them a unitedactively politicalto military stance.”and 1998. a until brokered democracy peace dealin and reconstruction USgovernment the September Talabani at the helm. However, fighting between the parties erupted, halting the budding resulted in a KDP-PUK power sharing arrangement, with Massoud Barzani and Jalal fighting. On May 19, 1992, the KRG held peaceful, contested, multi-party elections that Baghdad, effectively gave the Kurdish region of Iraq the autonomy for which they had been homes. their to over much of the Kurdish territory, providing the protection necessary for refugees to return humanitarian access inside Iraq. To complement this effort, a‘no-fly zone’ was established UN Security Council issued Resolution 688 denouncing the violence and demanding force. brutal on unstable ground. Uprisings in both the Shia south and Kurdish north were put down with the Kuwaitis. The six-week Persian Gulf War was decisive and left Saddam Hussein’s regime force,led mostly by the United States Army,launched a defensive counter-attack on behalf of 3.6 DeFactoIndependence sheerrebellion crumbled turned asthefocus onto survival. negotiations between Broken Iran and Iraq. and reeling,ideas anyfurther ofKurdish Ibid, 462. Ibid, 380-385. McDowall, 373-376. 81 Yet, in McDowall’s opinion, “It was only the imminence of a US invasion of Iraq Upon the US invasion in March 2003, the Kurdish peshmerga (the Kurdish regional In January 1991, after Iraqi the marchedarmy into Kuwait, aninternational military Alarmed by the flood of refugees into neighboring Turkey, Iran, and Syria, the 80 This international shield, combined with strict embargo sanctions from 22 82 CEU eTD Collection business development, and even tourism. Kurdistan Regional Government, as a ‘bastion of democracy,’ safe for foreign officials, now asthe officially Kurdish leadersrecognized the wereabletoestablish Kurdistan-Iraq, from citizens, cooperation peaceful andrelatively relations public international coordinated Constitution,the ensured Kurdish demands and protections for their vital interests. Through andsubsequently Law theTransitional for Administrative Kurdistan.’ (TAL), Negotiations federalism was strikingly similar to the old war cry of ‘Democracy for Iraq. Autonomy for line, playing between nationalist andAmerican aspirations The support. new gameof cooperation. A wouldstruggle ensue in which Kurdishthe leaders would have towalk athin installattempt to in they democracy toKurdish Iraq, looked often leadersforadvice and 23 CEU eTD Collection independence period of independence of period 2003,1991 and to Americanthe invasion itsand ensuing events. defacto are the state of the capacity therepressive impact on hadsignificant that structure together, ascomplementary The twomaincharacteristics. openings in structure the Inmythreat. framework, Ihave combinedfactors these two of politicalthe opportunity be more likely to utilize repressive measures to prevent any social challenge or political regime. Obviously, when a regime is closed toindependent civic activity in general, they will the repressivewith capacity of the state, especially connected when that state is underinherently the ruleis of an authoritarian allowed, are movements freedom social and political toEscapeRepression Opportunities 4.1 InstitutionalBackground: movementnationalist look to for openings in favorable politicalthe structure Kurds. for the We will be examining these components in the recent developments of the Kurdish analysis: for into characteristics three fivefactors these I haveFor this reorganized paper, overlap. specific features, and Romano’s addition of a fifth,I find these given determinants still Structure Opportunity 4 -Political Chapter The relative open or closed nature of a political system, determining how much how system, of closed determining nature a political or open The relative 3. 2. 1. Despite McAdam’s usefulfusion of political structure theory opportunity intofour structure andstructure international the larger structure for or opposition to the social movement, both within the state political Internal/External Allies and Enemies – the presence or absence of support movement leadersof social the within established/potential Unity in Movement Leadership – the amount of accord, or lack thereof, systems and the capacity for state repression that stems from this nature makeup,structural particularly on focusing open/closedthe nature of the Institutional – Background state,regional,the international and institutional 24 CEU eTD Collection 85 84 JuneUtrecht, 1990), 26. First Conferenceon Ethnicityand EthnicIdentity in the Middle Eastand Central Asia, 83 interference in the domestic affairs of member of states. affairs in domestic the interference making for the United Nations; it was the first step in reconsidering the doctrine of non- ititself sameconsiders as integral the part Arab time, an of widerthe nation.” condemnation of regime’sviolentthe tactics, Kurdishpour continued refugees towardsthe to humanitarian aid access to communities inside of Iraq. Kurdish population, demanded and that Iraqi the allowgovernment international denounced the Ba’ath regime’s oppression Iraqi civilians,of specifically mentioning the beganstatehood developinto 1991 with Resolution from 688 UNSecurity the Council which structure, allowing the movementmature to in several ways. Iraqi Kurdistan’s defacto 2003 provided abreakin repression important state the and an inopening political the various regimes imposed upon them, defacto the autonomy from experienced 1991 until changed from in1991, ushering a new era of relative freedom. on both sides. Yet this entire structure of political givens, expectations, and constraints moreleading militarization to being untrustworthy, state asense completely the fostered of cycle failed constant regimes between of andtheKurdishvarious negotiations leadersonly recognized their Kurds as Kurdish, rather than Iraqi, thus targeting them as such. The existence of the Kurdish identity (a tactic well-known in Turkey), Iraq has historically their history and cultural traditions, but oppressed because of it. Instead of ignoring the is an incubator for frustrated nationalists. They are allowed just enough room to cultivate but severely restricts any political or social development in the name of minority nationalism, identity minority national of thea admits existence in the state andeven zone, tolerates which Ibid. McDowall, 375. Turaj, Atabaki, and Margreet Dorleijn, eds., “Iraq is the only country which allows the Kurds a certain cultural autonomy. But at Though theKurdish Nationaliststruggled Movement for many decades under the Kurdistan in Search of Ethnic Identity: Papers presented to the 25 85 84 Yet, even after the UN’s official This resolution was history in the (Utrecht: University of 83 This middle This CEU eTD Collection internationally ‘no-fly’ supported zone playeda key in role thisproviding opportunity for the that the north would crumble without Baghdad’s control, the siege backfired. Though the refusing toallow fuel shipments topass through border.the Despite his egoistic conviction build ablockade, cuttingsalaries, government stopping any food imported goods, andor own siege was essentially leaving the Kurds to fend for themselves. He used the army to his on add to choice Saddam’s intervention, humanitarian limited very and weak relatively Iraq). rest of the to (as compared today Government Regional Kurdistan the of and relations diplomatic infrastructure relatively advanced the for explanation an as capacity-building and institution for measures, intervention ‘historicthe of opportunity’ bestthe thing happen to to IraqiKurds.the political Israeli scientist Shlomo Avineri to points was potentially yetanother rebellion failed from resulted that independence defacto pay, the assistance. governing moredropping chemical ortroops,butnotweapons providing any officially organized essentially put aroof of sorts headsover the of Kurdishthe territories, keeping Saddam from 2008. 89 revolt. their for retribution group that participated in the uprisings of 1991. The Shi’awere also brutalized by Ba’aththe regime in 88 87 86 ‘no-fly zone’ for Iraqi aircraft anywhere north of the 36 28, 1991, samethe US-led had coalition that defeated Saddam’sforces in Kuwaitdeclared a a million Kurds. Heproposed ideathe within of of borders haven’ the ‘safe Iraq. Turkey, TurgutOzal, Halil wasstruggling under pressure the toopenhis borders to over half of president the farther, any doctrine non-interference the stretch to unwilling was UN Iranian and Turkish borders as a result of the lack of force behind the resolution. Though the Shlomo Avineri, interview held during meeting at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, March Hungary, Budapest, University, European atCentral meeting during held interview Avineri, Shlomo Notably, the ‘no-fly zone’ also protected asignificant part of the Shi’a ethnic territory, Ibid, 378. another large ethnic Ibid. Though yearsthe of repression and the Anfal genocide wasan incredibly high price to 88 de facto independence,provided by UN‘no-flythe zone’ 26 89 Though the ‘safe haven’ was a th parallel. 87 This ‘no-fly zone’ 86 On April CEU eTD Collection 91 90 Iraq without key the frontnorthern upon which they had planned. itswith border through Iraq, military northern American invadingthe facedof prospect the When the Turkish parliament refused to allow the American 4 adversary, Turkey,provided one of bestthe opportunity for theKurdishopenings leaders. many suitors they had in the Bush administration and Pentagon. Oddly enough, a powerful andinfluential well-placed, members of Kurdish-Iraqi the wereablediaspora court to the second chance for Kurdistan. In the time leading up to the declaration of war, Kurdish elites maturity.” political toward way their stumbled Middle East author of decision, Saddam had createdanew openingin his own political system. AsQuil Lawrence, repressive capacity of his regime towards the Kurds. In a fairly direct result from his itKurds,was ultimately Saddam’s policy blockadeabout the decision thatreduced the support of humanitarianthe for Kurdishaid -inrefugees 1991, Garnerhad metmany of the – military namefor UScode the the Comfort Leading Operation ground. familiar to returning and Humanitarian Assistance, Jay Garner, arrived in Iraq on April 15, 2003, he was actually before the war and continued to do so after. interests of alignment this of advantage took elites Kurdish the of actions The Pentagon. them, neutralizing Mosul and Kirkuk, andgained the respectand admiration manyof in the setbefore tasks the accomplished peshmergaquickly the Forces, Special with American offered services upthe of newly theirforces. peshmerga Combined andwell-trained reunited Galbraith, 158. 4. Lawrence, The 2003 invasion of Iraq by American-led coalition forces was, in everyway, a When retired army officer and newly appointed head of the Office of Reconstruction Invisible Nation:How the Kurds’ Quest forStatehoodisShaping Iraq andthe writes, “It wasn’t always pretty, but for the next dozen years Kurdish leaders 27 90 th Infantry Division to move 91 The Kurdish leaders CEU eTD Collection 95 94 93 negotiations: inthese position Kurdish 92 in Galbraith,his book Peter leaderswererelentless. Kurdish influence future political opportunities and the structure in which they would function, the interests.their Understanding that this opportunity to affect Constitution the wouldin turn Kurdish elite in Iraq and DC,pressured Washington, internal and external to protectactors Kurdish leaders, who worked their American contacts with great political expertise. for control with Bremer, thisbe proved toan opportunity than rather a hindrance for the ‘MagnificentSeven’ onthe Leadership Council Though through. carried Councilfoughtthe of an process. approach Iraqi-led interim processes with an iron fist. This was a huge game change from Garner’s original was directing the government it theAmerican clear made that anddecisions actions Bremer’s government.” administrator of postwar Iraq…[who] would oversee the selection of an Iraqi transitional barely a month after arriving, Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer as the new “civilian Allawi, and a relatively unsupported Sunni named Naseer Kamel al-Chaderchi. However, leaders of SCIRIandthe Da’wa parties, famous Shiite exiles Ahmed Chalabi Ayadand a cross-section of the Iraqi public. This group included both Barzani and Talabani, the Shiite felthe who represented leaders of key seven Council, agroup Leadership the Garner created Kurdish leaders before and constantly involved them in all of politicalthe negotiations. Galbraith, 162. Ibid, 37. Ibid, 36. Larry Diamond, Kurds knew the strength of their hand: they controlled their own territory, they had their own they army, and they territory, were own politically their united. controlled they hand: their of strength the knew Kurds Their goal was simple: to have a document that took the least away from them. The Through the drafting of the TAL and, subsequently, the Constitution of Iraq, the 93 Highly criticized on both sides of the American and Iraqi political fences, and of sides onboth American political the Iraqi criticized Highly Squandered Victory, 94 (New York: Henry Holt and Company,2005), 33. However, Garner’s original involving approach the 28 95 The End of Iraq, details the 92 CEU eTD Collection 96 before. As the KRG Foreign Minister acknowledges: foreign Kurdsgovernments, the hadexposure toeven more opportunities and than resources of offices the of doors front the in through allowed Now, before. had they what essentially of practically nothing. opened political system, Kurdish the elite hadreduced therepressive capacity of Baghdad to Kurds werenow assuring themselves of safety federalism.through By the newlyutilizing central the toastrong regime, vulnerable Where Kurds entirely in the they Iraq. were once as one of two official Iraqi languages – would secure a powerful and protected position for autonomy,maintaining the peshmerga underKurdish forces control, establishing and Kurdish the legal minefield. Their achievements - ensuring a federal arrangement that guaranteed their ambassador for Croatia and negotiator in the Dayton Peace Accords, to walk them through a former Galbraith, including experts political Western several enlisted eventually and leaders takingof be that advantage thisKurdishwouldtask, understood arduous process an The opportunities of ensured pastthe this new open structure to buildfuture. their The establishing northern Iraq as a distinct national homeland for the Kurds. Lawrence agrees, for the Kurds. Lawrence homeland asadistinctnational Iraq northern establishing exercise of nation building, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 had the immediate effect of W.George Bush’s initial presidential campaign in 2000 expressed anoted aversion any to shortly,ishas what allowed the Kurds considerableconsolidate to political Though power. The recognition of this change and alteration of mobilization styles, which shall be examined Bakir, speech, 6 Dec 2007. beinga de-jure ade-facto to of world.the part in Iraq, and Kurdistan is a legally autonomous region. We have progressed from constitutionally mandated position within Iraq. The KRG is a recognized government with countriesother and international Our legitimacyorganizations. stems from our from more equal relationship a webenefit entity, wearealegitimate because Today, That old phrase, the Kurds have no friends but the mountains,is nolonger true. The Kurdish position in the new political environment became a legitimized version 29 96 CEU eTD Collection York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 6. 98 97 the Mountains, defend the Kurdish people. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris,in their book parties andfactions agreed toform Front, Kurdistan the joining in together an attempt to from the massive Anfal campaign being waged against them, the Kurdish leaders of various position utilizingand power, tribal topitfactions Kurd against Kurds.In June 1988,reeling variousthe nationalistand in theKurdish Baathistrevolutions forIraq, leadership grappled due tointra-Kurdish powerstruggles between elites and their respective Throughout parties. example. As seen in historicalthe background of themany Kurds, efforts ended in disaster is case aperfect theKurdish-Iraqi structure, of feature political the as animportant movement andleadership. If any case study importance to of can attest the forin the unity leadership its on depends often organization movement andsuccessof the development the concerns, 4.2 KurdishUnity,ortheLackThereof becannot unmade,savebycatastrophe.” that homeland “The Kurds will never willingly backgo -America has played midwife aKurdish to freedoms, but physical protection of life itself. This front would not last long. in absence of that, a significant status of autonomy that provided not only social and political Essentially had organizations these samethe goalinmind:ideally, independentstate, but, an John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Harvey and Bulloch John 5. Lawrence, Though social movements may begin as passionate public pleasdriven by crucial of the Iraqi Communist Party. Democratic Party, the small socialist PASOK Party and the Kurdish regional branch Talabani, the Kurdistan Socialist Party, Sami Abderrahman’s Kurdistan People’s Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,led by Jalal list the partners involved in the front: in the involved partners the list No Friends But the Mountains: TheTragic History of the Kurds, 98 30 97 No Friends But (New CEU eTD Collection 103 102 101 26. (c.1993), conference, aregional at presented paper Development,” 100 99 goal. that towards dollars million H.George W. Bushissued anauthorization ‘remove’to Saddam Hussein, provided and 40 political casualties andlost opportunities are quite notable as well. InMay 1991, President region. Kurdish the through spreading dispute between an innocuous a landlordand tenants, and violence the quickly escalated, to afrustration waseasilythat ignited into acivil war. The fightingbegan on May 1, 1994,in added totheunwieldy led pool of system resources, andever-diminishing an power-sharing share. heprovidingrefusedan to with Barzani advantage economic increasingly disturbed by KDP’scontrol the over akey border crossinginto Turkey, much conflict. Saddam’s blockade and the UN embargo sanctions placed on the whole of Iraq were causing Economics in power-sharingthe Kurdish government, alsoargued that combinationthe of regional conference in 1993, Dr. Salahhadin M. Al-Hafeed, the Minister of Finance and cripple the efficiency and effectiveness of the new government. In a paper presented at a to served only and halves two into region autonomous the split essentially arranged was it 45% to 43.6% victory.45% to ended with the KDP having a sliver of an advantage over the PUK, the numbers showing a in muchelections May 1992, worldadvertised tothe asa democraticwatershed moment, landmark The peshmerga. PUK KDP Barzani’s Talabani’s and Masoud war between andlargely wasted due was bloody political maturization to the infrastructure occurred, civil The historical opportunity offered by of period the de factostatehood, thoughmuch Lawrence, 65. Lawrence, Ibid, 67. Ibid, 68. 73. Lawrence, Social and Economic the on influences Its onKurdistan: Embargo “The Al-Hafeed, M. Salahhadin Though hundreds,maybe of thousands, people lost theirlives in conflict,the the 100 The parties had begun to bicker over the scare resources. ThePUK was scareresources. the bickerover to begun had Theparties 99 A power-sharing agreement was instituted, though the way inwhich way the though instituted, was agreement Apower-sharing 103 Though the American CIA officers are probably just as 102 31 101 These disagreements, These CEU eTD Collection 106 105 104 In the domestic sphere, we will be paying special attention to the role of the Iraqi Shiite up again and againtoexplain the historical lack of trustworthy allies for Kurdishthe nation. Turkey theShia,Flouting 4.3 AlliesJoining andEnemies: parties. As one Kurdish citizen poetically warns, “This unity is based on egg shells.” bein found incompatible run Kurdistan’s two, the by networks cellular their respective themselves largely divided in two spheres of influence. One of the best example of this can international travel, urban professional life, and diaspora connections, citizens still find people.the Thoughmuch of Kurdishthe public isnow being heavily influenced by goals of the larger nationalist movement. Powers, however, seem alignto more quickly than Barzanihaveputthe pastbehindMasoud andorder to secure in them interests common the Throughout the constitutional negotiations and related political arguments, Jalal Talabani and refrained from fighting over a few key posts in the Kurdistan Regional Government.” functioning partof country the encouraged KDP the andcooperate, PUKandto rivals the Kurdish political elite wasestablished and unified. “Seeingthatthey were the only ethnic, religious, orpolitical groups had contested or completely absent leadership, the Kurdistan Regional Government. In an atmosphere of confusion and chaos, when other fabric in new of very the the together lessthemselves tied a decadebefore than other wouldhave not would done that…I say we would beindependent today.” Qubad Talabani lamented the lost opportunities during civil the war, saying, if “God, we focus on their own power struggle. Ininterviewan with journalistQuil and author Lawrence, guilty forleaky intelligence sources, Kurdish elites bungled the operation with their incessant [Source wishes to remain anonymous], email message to author, May 14, 2008. Ibid, 313. Ibid, 87. ‘The Kurds have no friends but the mountains.’ This old cultural proverb is brought is proverb cultural old This mountains.’ the but friends no have Kurds ‘The Learning the lesson of division, the same Kurdish leaders who had tried to kill each 32 104 106 105 CEU eTD Collection Saddam’s oppression. Inearly Leadership Councilnegotiations, Masoud Barzani paid a substantial thecommon Shiites andKurdsground, do share historical of the experience and decided toapproach the Shiiteleaders to form an alliance of sorts. Despite the lack of any realized madeleaders essentially their that ‘kingmakers,’ them unity and political position disagreements, keeping their political weight below the needed majority voice. The Kurdish oppressive regime. However, the Shia political scene was and still is full of divisions and overjoyed atthe thought of a traditional,majoritarian democracy following Saddam’s invasion. American situation stands in stark contrast to the circumstances, which emerged soon after the enemy, two groupsdid the cooperate not outside of international exile conferences. This the 32 the of south coalition international by same established zone the few mention complementary the 36 the of north zone ‘no-fly’ the Though Bush. President by for’ ‘called been have not may or may which uprising, the preferred tofocus on their inproblems. own Yet, these1991, problems collided andformed and movement nationalist Kurdish in the interest little relatively had Shiites the officials, by oppressed minority madethe who apreponderanceArabs, up Sunni of Baathistthe 107 the ethnic compositionof Iraq. † 4.3.1 Domestic Friends4.3.1 movement, is the changing relationship between Turkey and the United States. intoplay. However, of particular interest concerning the development of the Kurdish Arabs.Widening our focus to an international scale, many state and international actors come http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/flash/0,9223,488793,00.html. Accessed May 21, 2008. This number is a rough estimate based on various sources. Currently, there are no reliable, exact statistics on statistics exact reliable, no are there Currently, sources. various on based estimate a is rough number This “Iraq: No Fly Zones Interactive,” nd Stemming from the knowledge of their own sheer numbers, Shia Iraqis were largely The Arab Shia makeIraqis uparound 60%of Iraqi the population. latitude meantprotectlatitude revolting the population. to Shia th parallel receives much historical and political attention, very The Guardian UK Online, 33 107 Despite the common the Despite † Historically CEU eTD Collection 111 110 109 108 Shia provinces. overwhelmingly- in the sources oil significant the over control more with them provide could their status as a majority in the whole of Iraq, the Shiite elite realized that regional powers andleaders. Despite an found negotiators in Shiite the ally powers devolved federalist, strong for their interests in the Constitution. The Kurdish desire for a weak central government with Hakim in order build better domestic relation and promote a potential alliance of interests. historic visit to the SCIRI leaders, Ayatollah Sistani and Ayatollah Mohammed Baquir al- fiascos of fiascos of 1920sandthe Israeli-Iranian the of support 1960s. the movement has been used almost as a pawn in larger political games, as seen in the treaty with other international ‘friends,’ are not trusted. For decades the Kurdish nationalist along they, interests, Kurdish-Iraqi to (Saddam) enemy main the destroying for endlessly leading theinternational coalition providedthat the‘no-fly’ protection and arethanked destruction Kurdishof nationalist opportunities. Though Americansthe arecredited from 4.3.2 Just aPawn? power. providedelections opening the needed for newthe tocomealliance Kurdish-Shia full into presence of Shiites.the Indeed, Galbraith Sunniagrees thatthe boycott of Januarythe 2005 destined tocontrol.” they wanted; the Kurds,in turn, agreed to a strong prime ministry that the Shiites were at the centerthat and theveto intact, much ofthepeshmerga tokeep (in effect) ability the remembers,process, gave “The Shiites regional including the Kurdssignificant autonomy, Galbraith, 189. Ibid, 171. Ibid, 167. Diamond, 41. 111 This internal alliance allowed theKurdsmanipulate to their situation in topushorder International allies have always played an important part in both the creation and creation the inboth part important an played always have allies International 109 As Larry Diamond, a key CPA staff member involved in the constitutional 110 Yet, the absence of Sunni cooperation was almostas fortuitous as the 34 108 CEU eTD Collection 114 113 112 1990 and early 1991. had held talks with Kurdishthe leadership and otherregime in opposition London in late recentreminder of their involves position precarious the 1991 failed uprising. British officials years. themost overthe Perhaps Kurds andhasmade assistance international them wary of Barkey,in his book on the role of Turkey in Middle Eastern politics, describes a set of seven (as it has historically) is Turkey and its importance in regional political alliances. Henri Kurdistan is in the hands of the USA.” independent “An admitting, reluctantly one US, the from betrayal another fear even and government’s plans for Iraq.Yet Kurdishthe citizens understand alignment atenuous this and American the interests between their connections political moral,the and economic, variousThrough methods we will the chapters, inlater examine Kurdish leadershave pushed military. and politicians American the with themselves aligned swiftly and in2003, them for fend themselves. them left to international community restof US andthe the effect was immediate. The Kurds of the north and the Shia of the south, did rise up, but the The President would always deny that his statement was intended to call for arevolt, but the saying: statement that would eventually ignite a firestorm thatforever would change Kurdistan, implicitsupport for regime Then, overthrow. February on Bush16, President made apublic [Source wishes to remain anonymous], email message to author, May 13, 2008. Ibid, 11-12. Bulloch Morris, and 10. The betrayal of international The betrayal for‘allies’ hasinternational become of areoccurringnightmare Iraqi the Despite this historical Kurdishpain, the elite understoodthe opportunity set before loving nations. dictator, to step aside, and comply with the UN, and then region the family of peace- Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands, toforce Saddam Hussein, the There’s another way for the bloodshed to stop. That is for the Iraqi military and the One factors of holdthat the for potential ruining the chancesthe for independence 112 113 This sudden political wasinterpretedopening by Kurdsthe as 114 35 CEU eTD Collection 118 Mazda Publishers, 2005), 3. of representatives regional this government. accept the idea of a Kurdish region in a federal Iraq and started to treat the KDP and PUK as Formation inKurdistan-Iraq since theIraqiWar, 117 116 States Institute for Peace, 1996), 46. 115 Union. seizures and supplies, andimpending negotiations on future the of Turkey in European the between relationship Kurdishthe peshmergaand military,the American arms growing stance. more of moderate a advantages political and economic namely canonly beconfusing factors, other through acceptance explained Barkey’s the hasprotests, allowed theKurdistan Regional Government to establish itself andflourish. This Kurdish minority population to rise up. Yet, the Turkish government, despite diplomatic Indeed the Turkish elites have always been wary of any measures that might induce their own northern Iraq. Kurds of for measures the autonomy legitimate of any never accept true, Kurds. other economic and strategic choices often offset the Turkish position towards the Iraqi Though Barkey admits thattheKurdish questionis themostfactor, important he presses that that he names are still the overriding concerns in the countries’ relationship. He enumerates: key factors definethat theTurkish-Iraqi Despiterelations. being publishedin issues1996, the Ibid, 3. Robert Olsen, Ibid, 48. Henri J. Barkey, ed., 116 118 Robert Olsen, in his book finally, the impact of domestic politics in both countries on their foreign policies.” security environment, the relationship of Turkey and Iraq to the U.S. and Europe, and regional new the maintenance, and determination boundary of issues question, Kurdish the the interactions, economic resources, oil andother “Water pipeline Many includingscholars, Barkey, thoughtthat the Turkish once governmentwould One can watch this struggle in the choice between a more Western, modern stance The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq, Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, The Goat and the Butcher: NationalismandState 117 36 Some of these reasons included the developing gives various reasons why beganTurkey to (Washington, D.C.: United (Costa Mesa: (Costa 115 CEU eTD Collection everyone in Erbil has a generator on hand and has accepted their use as a daily normality. The largest hotel, the hotel, largest The normality. adaily as use their accepted has and on hand agenerator has Erbil in everyone † Dec.2007), http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/17/africa/turkey.php.Accessed May 2008.12, 122 121 Accessed May 12, 2008. 120 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6906010.stm. Accessed May 12, 2008. 119 statement: engagement. political formal of instead cities KRG into Turkey from flow that lines electricity particularly KRG,with the make preferring to public statements through shutting off the and hideouts Iraqfor training bases.northern resumed attacks on Turkish military continuinginterests, use to formidablethe mountains in thePKKhasfive later, andyears Yet, methods demands. tomoderate their attempted of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was arrested in 1999, the PKK declared a ceasefire and governmentbegan in 1984 and escalated till 37,000peopleover werekilled. After leader the demands of independentan for state Kurds in Turkey. Party (PKK). Worker’s Kurdistan the over centering quarrel heightened the tensions on both sides, and in the United States, who is trying to referee the have northern Iraq into troops of incursions andTurkish missile attacks Recent over. well. and anationalistic, aggressively attitude religious play in out Turkish internal as politics solution. demandTurkish that officials use diplomatic meanstoengage Iraqin an agreed-upon governmentconsiders the cross-border raids tobe a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and military against the PKK rebels inside Iraqi borders are quite contentious. The Iraqi KRG, agree on the PKK’s status as a terrorist organization, the actions taken by the Turkish In a trip to Erbil, Kurdistan-Iraq, in January 2008, I witnessed the electrical shortages first-hand. Most “Iraq condemns Turkish air attack as a violation of sovereignty,” violation a as attack air Turkish condemns “Iraq Ibid. “Profile: The PKK,” “Two Faces of Modern Turkey,” 119 The PKK ideologywas formed underMarxist-Leninist in the late 1970s and made To Olsen,it seems that the modern Turkey is winning. However, the contest isn’t 122 The Turkish government has, however, remained aggressive in their relations, † KRG Foreign Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir explains further in a public BBC News Online, BBC News Online, (15 Oct. 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7044760.stm. 121 37 (19 July 2007), Despite the fact that all parties, including the 120 Their conflict with the Turkish International Herald Tribune Online, (17 CEU eTD Collection were in the dark. in the were down. went power the when In the 20 secondslobby it took forgenerators hotel the toengage,the in he pausednever in speech his official or acknowledged KRG wea that with conversation a having was I life. of way this Erbil International (locally knownas the Sheraton, though no connectionwith the hotel chain), has also adopted population of Also,populationno in can theeffectinvolvement one Americanof Iraq. of refute assisting Kurdish the be usedagainst to allowed community international the that of repression isin external invasion. 1991 the before allies evident of The amount absence committed the greatly of contrasts allianceafter impactShiite-Kurdish 2003 domesticthe the with support allies played asignificant role progressionof in the Kurdishmovement.the Thelack of pre- from the new Iraqi state. Lastly, we can deduce that the presence of both internal and external social)gain mostfront to not fostering(if aunited political the being applied, are currently autonomousto, butespecially period. Yet, during thedefacto lessons learnedfrom the this inKurdishunity have leadership damaged potential prior the the couldthat occurred progress lack of the Second, Kurds. the against action for repressive capacity state’s changing the and 2003USinvasion the servedof Iraq aslargebreaks openingsor in political the structure, era thatindependence the is,facto of first, from Whatde we can task. attempt this conclude difficult notably is a movement asocial as nationalists Kurdish the upon impact the analyze 4.4 Conclusion its fingers stretched into their affairs. focused Turkey. However, the Iraqi Kurds have no doubt that their neighbor will alwayshave placedin Barkey’s and framework holdsfor dealingpromise with increasingly an EU- Bakir’s recognition of the potential of economic benefits toease nationalistic tensions is well- Pulling the myriad of events, alliances, and interests into a coherent framework to framework a coherent into interests and alliances, events, of myriad the Pulling tension in the relationship in the future. bilateral bufferas further against act with to Turkey, economic relations deepen our to need we reason, for this partner…And a regional KRGas the accept times and Weneighbor. aredisappointed andcall move by attitude upon Turkey this with to the world that chooses to ignore our constitutionally mandated governmentTurkey-Iraq-KRGsolve talks to is this issue. itBut also isironic that theone country in the our isfour-party talks. for KRG has pushed One the thing US- Wehave suggested 38 CEU eTD Collection organization. movement social a as nationalists Kurdish the of workings internal the understand to need Wealso powerhouse. political to alegitimate group warfare from a guerrilla movement However, all theseof conclusions notdo adequately explain the developments of the Kurdish holdsTurkey make breakaviable toeitherpotential Kurdistan, astate.that or asaregion or the recognize also must we Similarly, positions. political legitimate towards leaders Kurdish 39 CEU eTD Collection 124 123 a through movement a social from development movement’s nationalist Kurdish the examine typology also lends itself to the study of development. Iwill be using this structure to practices, mobilizingunderstanding structures, and His of an organization’s resources. provide to comprehensive he asaframework usescan that serves The categories movementorganizations overlappolitical into and interests bureaucratic politics. point, Rucht’s ideas can offer analytical clarity and an interesting picture of how some ingroups varying ranges offormality and structure. However, if as used a starting guide example of such a group, particularly since the movement developed to consist of several take that often blur the lines of his typology. The Kurdish nationalist movementis a perfect understanding mobilization,is toosimplistic, ignoring repertoirethe of actions can a group This ittable, though provides clear andextremely helpful factors can that aidin of interest socialmobilization of and actors: movements, groups, parties. human and financial capital. require often as Theseactivities well public. general the as actors at issue-specific targeted involvesmobilization forming structures whichthrough perform to certain operations Mobilization 5 –Resource Chapter Structural Features Main Resources Operation of Mode Ibid., 187. McAdam et al., 186 As we established in the theoretical background chapter, DieterAs we in Rucht’s established backgroundof definition chapter, theoretical the Figure 1:Rucht's Typology of MobilizingAgents oilMvmns Interest Social Groups Movements and organizationsand Networks of groups adherents Committed Protest Actions 123 As seen in Rucht’s typology below, he identifies three kinds Formal organization cooperate to refusing decision-makers, to access money, Expertise, members in politics of Representation 40 Formal organization Voters of political offices Occupation Parties 124 CEU eTD Collection Jabar and Hosham Dawod, eds., 127 126 125 identity.” national Kurdish of affirmation the of politics “the as nationalism Kurdish explains Politics,” Fragmented and Identity Fragmented fighters for the peshmerga. Abbas Vali, author of the essay “The Kurds and their ‘Others’: military forces. Kurds often engaged in armed rebellions, itmost always focused on governmentofficials and that they would forfeit the goodwill of the world if they took to terrorism.” Morris reason, “The Kurdish leaders, despite their political differences, understood very well to defy the official power and promote theirinterests through demonstration. As Bulloch and much same: are the actions actions,’intentions of these the as‘protest operations movement Palestinian Hamas. Though the tribal militias do present aproblem when trying to label the avoid terrorist tactics that would separate their argument from other state-less groups like state regimes, the leaders of the Kurdish movement made an important political decision to state opposition aKurdish to identity and regime’s the attempt toimpose another ‘national’, of various groups. are itsmovement adherents, committed and thestructure resembles informal fairly networks The of main a social state. of the resources political any process intolegitimate without incorporation action protest mostly is operation of mode its First, characteristics. three by as aSocialMovement 5.1 KurdishNationalism structures. political party official – into group interest Rucht’s resembles it in which – maturization political of period Abbas Vali, “The Kurds and their ‘Others’: Fragmented Identity 229. and Fragmented Morris, and Politics,” Bulloch in ”Faleh A. Ibid. The variousleaders movement never had aproblem Kurdishgathering committed The obvious focus onguerrilla warfare and military armed againstrebellions Iraqi the Using Rucht’s typology to structure our investigation, asocial movement is defined 125 The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, 41 127 This identity, he holds, was defined by the (London: Saqi Publishers, 2006), 126 Though the Though CEU eTD Collection manner, establishing the AKSA as the PUK-version of the KSSE. Barzani’s KDP gave birth to the splinter opposition PUK, the student group splitin a similar quickly and followed Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s armed revolt with great interest. Later, when KSSE, most of the members were from Iraqi and Syria Kurdistan. disputes. Of firstthe Kurdish studentgroup established in inEurope 1956, knownas the abroad, educated better becoming mobilizationthe largely followed these tribal lines and greatwould official to come powerthrough KDP.Thoughthediasporathe was growing and 129 128 http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/index.html. 2004. in found was death World violent their of evidence forensic providing grave mass The forces. military abducted and killed by Saddam Hussein’s orders in theearly 1980s, on suspicion of collaborating with Iranian † development. movement to Kurdistan. This process was gradual, however, and can be seen through the next stage of publicurban, educated andthereturn of diasporathe –who normally lack tribal affiliation – atmosphere for civil conflict. Today, this tribal structure is much weaker, due to a more the middle and the created down Kurdistan essentially Iraqi divided that systems bureaucratic imbedded with a gooddeal tribal of mentality as havewell, developedidentical into two can see a mostly tribal structure, with a focus on the strength of the Barzani clan for loyalty exchange their personal power. to relations of Kurdishthe tribes, with leadersthe providingimportant services inand goods patron-client also traditional must the recognize We adherents.’ ‘committed of Rucht’s Kurdish constituents tosupport a nationalist social movement, building alarge pool resource often Arab, identity. Pulling from this, the movement leaders found it easy convinceto their Though not included in accounts of Anfal the genocide, almost 8000 men andboys of the Barzani tribe were Ibid, 9. 9. Aspects,” “Transnational Bruinessen, story “Saddam’s Road to Hell” is provides excellent coverage of the effort to find these missing men. See In examining the structure of the Kurdish nationalist movement before the 1990s, one 42 129 128 Theparty structures, The movementgrew † –who Frontline CEU eTD Collection 131 130 Comparisons: Nationalism,SoutheastAsia,and the World, andlinesorganized of structures command. formally more with mature, politically more much and different very is itself structure existin a social movement structure, is another resource valuable to the Kurds. Yet, the political access. The ability beto uncooperative with the main regime, a tactic that can also international and money, expertise, including movement, asocial than wider much are pushing their into way the prevailing political structures. The resources of an interest group interest group.The mode of operation we willbe looking forinvolves themovementleaders process was a difficult one, and not ‘complete’ according to Rucht’s clear-cut model of an more unofficial internally formal state, and externally bewould organization needed.This emerging political Suddenly opportunity structure. facing opportunity the to runtheir own allowed the Kurds to further develop their organization to better meet the needs of a new among other important political capitals. political important other among theirinterests. Both PUK the and KDPhad party representatives living inWashington, D.C., way into backpush the internationalin engagingefforts hallsto politics, of paradiplomatic wiggle diaspora to educated their well-placed, the they ofpolitics, out utilized Baghdad’s notably movement. resources of Though Kurdishthe lockedthe leadersthe wereessentially by the regime, de facto independence allowed a new space for growth in several arenas,most Where were society forceblockade civil crushedonce Kurdistan-Iraq. efforts of brutal with in political the structure providedopportunity by ‘no-fly’the zone andSaddam’s economic of experience the Yet, characteristics. with some political organization Group 5.2 DevelopingasanInterest Lawrence, 63. Lawrence, McAdam et al., 186-187. The Kurdishhad, movement upuntil 1991, been a rebel-based, paramilitary To understand the change inmobilization strategies, wefirst must recall openings the 131 Benedict Anderson, in 130 43 explains the growing trend of The Spectre of de facto statehood CEU eTD Collection influence for Bush the administration’s invasion.2003 various Iraqi opposition mostlygroups, exiles – was,and arguably, largest the single Chalabi, exiled an bankerwhoestablished Iraqi the National Congress – an alliance of 134 133 132 intensification of economy global marketthe and the increasing useoffederalist Yet,with the states. for sovereign reserved are normally community international in the actors between relations realm, diplomatic traditional Inthe paradiplomacy. Kurdsthe nonetheless increased their political repertoire andinternational standing. ideas. and spreadtheir contacts to renew freedom their new can utilize leaders,who opposition those persons in exile, whether forced or by personal choice, tend to be intellectuals or Bruinessen also offers an important connection between exile and nationalism, pointing out Kurdish Question, remarks on the activity of the diaspora, saying: of the Aspects “Transnational regarding in his essay Bruinessen, Van Martin structures. politics and can play incredible inparts important the mobilization and opportunity diaspora community, can have a serious impact on international affairs as well as domestic if into apolitically charged organized nationalists, long-distance These than assimilate. that the ease of travel and communication allows immigrants tohold on to their culture rather believing globalization, and technology, capitalism, to phenomenon this attributes Anderson nationalism.” it“long-distance emergence of the to andconnects diasporas active ethnic Lawrence, 67. Lawrence, Ibid, 7. 4-5. Aspects,” “Transnational Bruinessen, 133 This type of diplomacy‘back-door’ byactorspracticed non-state is known as towards the part of Kurdistan and the state of origin. become (re-)oriented haveincreasingly thesediasporas developments, technological themselves in Kurdish diasporas. Due to a combination of political factors and populations orother migrants from samethe widerregion they have organized a strong sense Kurdishof identity insteadand of gradually merging with hostthe In their new places of residence, alarge portion of them have retained or rediscovered Oddly enough, theirwas also position pushed a Shi’itethrough Arab named Ahmed 44 134 Never given a front-door welcome, 132 CEU eTD Collection 135 pronounced duringpronounced the lead-upand to during the US invasion in 2003. Turninginto official, 5.3 LegitimizationofPoliticalParties until law invasion. occur not American would the after of underrule operating parties and offices political legitimate changeinto true The cleanly. though the Kurdish elites finally made the move from rebels politicians,to through not Despite the violentgrowing pains during this important time of ittransition,would seem as head while he wasin describes theproblem saying: exile, simply, is group not aquickpainless or move. Nawshirwan Mustafa,interest who served as Talabani’s deputy party official more a to movement social conglomerated loosely a from transition utilized to its full potential. The civil war between KDP and PUK forces proves that the in was created 1991. Kurdish movement’s new relations with the international community after the protective zone with various states other than the one in which they reside; a perfect example being the interesting andperfectly applicable cases of ethnicmovements nationalist and their dialogue recognized federal units or official autonomous regions. However, they miss out on many organizations or sub-state units. Aldecoa and Keating confine their theoretical applications to whetherthey are regional actors, of non-state relations diplomatic define asthe what they Subnational Governments, Michael Keating, in their book line arrangements, the sovereignty for isquite andAldecoa blurred. becoming Francisco Ibid, 62. The increasing political maturization that took The increasing political place during took maturization that 1990swas the moreeven They should change from freedom fighters tostatesman? noteasy.It’s land? of master the Suddenly become the they state. wanted the to destroy and order, fifteen years or thirty years they live in caves or mountains. They were against law Imagine for aperson who has been against the central government all theirlife – for The period of independence,de facto an important though opportunity, wasnot make a significant effort to developmakefield to effort the of paradiplomacy, asignificant Paradiplomacy in Action: TheForeign Relationsof 45 135 CEU eTD Collection 138 137 136 Kurdistan preferred no constitution to one that did not meet their demands, they had every that Americans the and Arabs the he told “When in Baghdad. negotiations official in the demands Barzani’s backed body legitimate a constitutionally from commitment political This endorsement of a certain set of demands they felt were “nonnegotiable [and] minimal.” among the various Kurdish politicians, had the Kurdish National Assembly issue an official during the constitutional Masoudtalks. Barzani,having built a formidable political consensus in itself legitimacy becamearesource of section This democracy. Iraqi politics as alegitimate opportunity a constitutionally provided through federal mandated imbeds Kurdishsystem Zebar and Barham whoextolledSalih, upon Kurdish democratic experience. their use of the diaspora, specifically the two Kurdish representatives in the US, Hoshyar movement. The international media also added to the authenticity of Kurdish politics through politics, established the legitimacy of a political party based on an ethnic nationalist beginning of the process, starting with Garner, Bremer, and following through to present day soactors clearly. two these separating between interest group and political party, forcing one to question whether Rucht is correct in system. political larger formalityother increasedthan come and addedlegitimacy intoa from that being accepted features of an official party and an interest group in Rucht’s typology do not differ much, generalizedintowhether public through ballot support, means. or other structural The iseasily theideatranslated of “voters” However, government. of forms democratic Western non- and culture tribal ignores he as bias culture Western inherently some showing “voters,” operate through official political offices. Ruchtlists the main resources of these offices as to movement allows the structures, political thestate into accepted parties, legitimized Galbraith, 196. 204. Lawrence, McAdam et al., 186-187. The American government acceptance of the Kurdish political leaders from from leaders very the of Kurdishacceptance political the government The American 136 Applying framework this to Kurdishthe blurs movement the lines 46 137 The 138 CEU eTD Collection Accessed May 14, 2008. 143 142 141 140 139 unitsfederated toproject their domestic responsibilities abroad.” This type of activity is a giving exclusive competence to the federation, often clashes with the desire on the part of the “where division of powers, the states, infederal relations paradiplomatic these frequency of community international the and businessmen Kurdish between connections generate and development, International Fair, an economic draw designed tradeshow investors,to attract industry 4 the host will Government Regional Kurdistan the 2008, October In realm. economic the into crossing politics, beyond went expertise and contacts their and diaspora give answer.” immediate an to at thetable,are underpressure sit they participation in the talks. “Leaders rarely understand all the nuances of a text and, when they on point,this explaining advantage the of using negotiators instead of leaderdirect in listfirst national election. the electoral a common Coalition Kurdish including Islamists, the convinced 80%of theirKurdish eligible voters to cast theirfor ballot meet Barzani, partieswith smaller doesparties, other Talabani, substantial and evidence. Kurdistan also gave Kurdsthe bargaining andinfluence great power in negotiations.further to believereason him.” power in the complex consultations with the American CPA. Galbraith and other ‘friends’ in the international community, toincrease their influence and During the constitutional negotiations, theKurds in brought such outside experts, as Peter facto resources they autonomy de as key duringdeveloped the toreach theirpractices goals. use the to continue parties Here, theKurdishnationalist sole resource. asthe incomplete “Erbil International Fair 2008,” Galbraith, 163. Ibid, 239. Ibid, 259. Ibid, 197. Considering this, Rucht’s naming of ‘voters’ as a resource for these official political withoutthrough Baghdadfirst going 139 The fact that, after 2005, Jalal Talabani was elected as President of IFP Iraq, http://www.ifpiraq.com/ifp_agent/show_overview.aspx?id=83. 47 . 143 Keating and Aldecoa point out the out point Aldecoa and Keating 141 Galbraith had advised them advised had Galbraith 142 140 Utilization of the However, itis th annual annual Erbil CEU eTD Collection and mode of operation as necessitated by modeand situation. of the as necessitated operation resources, in for change structure, allow that areindeed those movements social successful most the find will one believe I in particular, movement Kurdish-Iraqi the about questions in which it operates. Though the purpose of this chapter, and of this paper, is to answer over time, as it evolves to meet the needs of its people and the requirements of the structure organization movement asocial of development the shows movement nationalist Kurdish the of each type of organization – social movement,group, interest political or party – doexist, useful when used to investigate the inner workings of a movement. Though clean examples of social movements, the factors and features with which he builds his theories are more 5.4 Conclusion in investigated section the framing).on cultural Kurdistan, specifically as the ‘other’ Iraq (a key public relations campaign which will be consciousbuild effort to upthe and infrastructure international business reputation of Though Rucht may have intended his typology to serve as a means for categorization 48 CEU eTD Collection 146 145 144 mobilize frames completely to new or create bytoutilize,change, elite Kurdish attempts the transformation. includes four categories: frame bridging,frame amplification,frame extension, and frame Kurdistan.’ around problems specific to the Kurdish minority of one country, rather than ‘Greater revolve often most issues framing in Efforts nation. Kurdish the split have circumstance and in development differences social and political the lines, international transcend does that support intra-Kurdish is substantial there Though borders. state across division The nature tenuous of Kurdish identity can bemost accurately seen through lensthe of the personal distinctions, such as tribe, family, and diaspora connections. He explains: recognizes that this is notan easy task for an identity that is mixedso with other important movement processes, or vice versa. Martin Bruinessen, aleading expert on Kurdish identity, action,” collective motivate and legitimate that worldandof of the themselves understandings framingis “…conscious strategic by efforts groups of people tofashion shared match with the values and cultural constraints of the targeted public. Recalling that cultural makingin participation,encourages and adialoguegoals the movement that of a actions Framing – Cultural 6 Chapter Snow et al., 238. Bruinessen, in Atabaki and Dorleijn. 26. McAdam, et al.., 6. As quoted in Romano, 21. Snow et al. offer an extremely useful typing of frame alignment processes that shares a common destiny. individual Kurd, Kurdish the nation is not the entityonly with which he feels he feel one and have an awareness of a common destiny, they are a nation. But for each awarenessThe of whichpeople. was one the rise of Kurdish nationalism. constitute they that To the extent them of that many the Kurds among awareness the only but What unites them is not any set of objective, economic, political or cultural criteria, To effectively mobilize a constituency, movement elites mustengagemovement their elites audience a constituency, mobilize To effectively 144 we are searching for attempts to incorporate the Kurdish identity political into the Kurdish identity the incorporate to for attempts wearesearching 146 These can help us to recognize the relevant cultural frames and the 145 49 CEU eTD Collection 152 151 150 149 148 147 secure participants.” jettisoned, beliefs anderroneous ‘misframings’or reframedin togarnerorder supportand find that“new valuesmay have tobe planted andnurtured, understandingsoldmeaning or when their activities beliefsand not matchdo up toagroup’s traditional life frames. They could do movement et organization what a Snow al.ask Here, frame transformation. process, involves some stretching of frames, it is not nearly as extensive as the fourth and final of potential adherents.” interests or thevalues objectives…with primary primary framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its reach inability by“extendingcertain of to pools boundaries ofitspotential the constituents andevent. group arecent target a issue-specific aninterpretivebetween the frame, connection energizes certain providing and clarifies Amplification sentiments. or emotions inactivated previously into tap to frames issue regarding problem,”structurally aparticular unconnected or but links congruent “ideologically effectively.resources Frame bridging movementthe media. After setting for the means by which they accomplish their framing, we will consider leaders messagesand Iraqi-Kurdish project theirKurdistan, to the namely print broadcast perceptions. new social to according tactics,” define blame,[and] attribute metaphors, invent the political structure, elites, either old ornew, have a chance to “attempt to define the issues, open up for newframesopportunities andperceptions tobe putforth. various actors and angles, cultural breaks, disruptions in the political or social situation, can Ibid, 269. McAdam et al., 268. Ibid, 245. Ibid, 243. Ibid, 239. Ibid. Under the Iraqi flag, past and present, we must first examine the tools through which 152 150 Though Though framing andre-framing are process continuously in usefrom 148 Frame extension addresses the problem of the movement’s 50 151 149 After this openingin 147 Though this Though allowing a SMO CEU eTD Collection 155 154 153 propaganda purposes. propaganda entertainmentunder official supervision governmentas well for controlledas information and regime during 1970sand the 1980s,this was reallyonly allowto for Kurdishcultural 6.1 TheMedia ToolsofFraming: which the Anfal campaign is utilized, as well as their aims. 2003 US invasion. We will also study the substance of the frames, specifically the way in provided byboth defactothe autonomy violent the events(including leading uptoit) and the Throughout this investigation, special attention will be paid to importantthe cultural breaks both internal, domestic framing and external,international public relations efforts. Kurdish identity issues and through television broadcast. opportunity provided by defactothe independence period and the newatframing attempt East Middle Report government broadcast stations, seeing them as a tool of Saddam’s regime. Ann Zimmerman’s that the PUK channel was more apt to show films about Baath Baath regime to showfilms crimes: more apt about was PUKchannel that the put their according spin broadcasts own totheirviews.explainstheiron Zimmerman party international films and news programs that Saddam’s censors would never have allowed, they after the de factoautonomy took hold. Though all of the parties delighted in showing owned and by mainbroadcasts, operated Kurdish werecreatedshortly the political parties, Ibid, 21. Ibid, 21. Zimmerman, Ann “Kurdish Broadcasting in Iraq,” Though werefirstThough madeKurdish language broadcasts available Baathist the under show ‘Saddam's Crimes.’ less sure of the West's reliability and the limits on Saddam, and their stations rarely Kurds shutall to to future negotiationdoors for Saddam's return. The partiesother are on a dailyconvince northern to and PUK weekly basis, reflecting determination in Since its first broadcasts PUK 1991,the October channel thesehas featured films article, “Kurdish Broadcasting in Iraq,” details this key political 153 This changed with this uprising of 1991, when rebels targeted the 155 Middle East Report, 51 154 Various Kurdish television Kurdish Various No. 189, (Jul – Aug 1994), 20. CEU eTD Collection 158 157 http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=7896. Accessed May 5, 2008. 156 Khalil explains, "Both the PUK and the KDP are trying hard to penetrate the Hawlati staff Hawlati fundednewspapers, arestill parties. through the Theoneandonly newspaper, independent under the Kurdistan Regional Government, these media outlets, along with dozens of the KDP’s new tool. He also suggests that the PUK established its channel KurdSat shortly after tocompete with establishedKurdistanTV in counterorder to attacks from a new pro-PKK satellite channel. from various Kurdish sources – Dr. Hussein Tahiri presents the evidence that the KDP Kurdish Media: United Kurdish Voice – an independent website that gathers news articles However, there is much question and criticism regarding this media. In an article for the cultural frame, balancing adesire for independence with currentthe political situation: by with of current matchexactly that the values and goals KTVcompany the expressed via in satellite.” aswell international community broader population Iraq as tothe local tothe of Kurdistan of state the aspirations and political cultural the to “communicate today. to continues media arrangement this in circumstance, change political asignificant Despite leaderof Kurdistan. rightful castas the party respective to the controlled With each party funding their own television broadcasts and newspapers, news was Hussein Tahiri, “Kurdish War Goes to Sky,” Ibid. “KurdistanTV,” Even though the political structure has evolved to focus much more on Kurdish unity Kurdish on more much focus to evolved has structure political the though Even state. independent its people have endured in their fight to establish a free, democratic, multicultural, and whichThe status Kurdistan enjoysis today theresult of long,the hard struggle which andnations, and strongly condemns terrorism… It has also promoted the concepts of federalism, cooperation amongKTV toachieve hasworked Kurdistan’sprime goal rightthe differentof toself-determination. peoples Kurdistan TV, a satellite station, began broadcasting in 1999 and gave itself the task , reports that it constantly operates under severe political pressure. Editor Faisal KurdistanTV, 157 http://www.kurdistantv.net. Accessed 2008. May 3, Kurdish Media, 52 (3 January 2000), 156 The 158 CEU eTD Collection 160 WorldPress.org, 159 2003 invasion. Kurdish national identity and the cultural frames surrounding it– Anfalthe Campaign and the in political the structures allowedthat opportunity for redefinition and reinvigoration of independentnation, and free. Thereare two key cultural breaks, corresponding with openings Kurdish a distinct for fighting as itself framed consistently movement Kurdish the opposites, Kurdish nation. Thoughnegotiation and collaboration did happen with ideologicalthese Kurdish identity had a clear enemy, the regime that was trying to erase the existence of a movement can be seen through a paradoxical lens of both division and unity. In the past, versus FramingUnity Division 6.2 Internal: Framing theseactivities. accomplish and through they to what are trying government message brings us to the question of the content of the KRG’s political frames a tospread media sources toutilize and determination content journalistic to attention followed against some who overstep the standards of the journalism profession." controllinghappens media,saying,commitment to isthatlegal “What are procedures democracy they are trying build, to liaison UN Dindar Zebari expressed thegovernment’s politicians. Though the KRG recognize that freedom of the press is an integral part of the journalists who wish to report on governmentcorruptions or be critical of policies and laws strict the believesfor that political areabused againstslander hindering purposes, 161 http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/BAY554793.htm. Accessed May 11, 2008. journalists. and legal taken against arrests, actions harassment, its repeated for Nations Mission Assistance in Iraq (UNAMI) criticized the Kurdistan Regional Government andlure, even bribe,staff our stop working to for the newspaper." Reuters, “U.N. criticizes Iraq's Kurdistan on press freedom,” As quoted in David Axe, “Propagandistan: Iraqi Kurdistan is Free – But its Media Sure Isn’t,” Ibid. Immediately after the Anfal Campaign ended, the Kurdish-Iraqi population was nationalist Kurdish the of leaders the of efforts framing cultural current The (5 April, 2006), http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/2308.cfm. Accessed May 2008.3, 53 Reuters AlertNet, 159 In2007,theUnited (25 April 2007), 160 161 The UN This CEU eTD Collection frames through frames through which social movements promote and organize their actions. Masstrauma is These four criteria canbe seen as buildingcultural materialsthe strategic for constructing is blame? Who victims? immediate to to the does relate widerthe victims?How audience the are Who beactually happened?” “What answered: must questions four relevant, considered trauma does not exist without social belief in its existence. In order for a cultural trauma to be a group that in writing realm ‘imagined event community,’ the the of traumatic collective Connecting his theories with Benedict Anderson’s, Alexander places the notion of a C. Alexander, one of the authors of incorporate this event intosocial memory and collective action plans. According to Jeffrey that frames mechanisms new for and collective with needcoping perceptive followed the is that often directed atamassin front audience placeor of takes eventa violent that trauma, by Saddam’s regime. by Saddam’s northern Iraq during the uprising of 1991 stemmed from an fear overwhelming of retaliation fleeing amountrefugees of massive aswell. were killed The of of ethnicities Iraqis other target for the organized military campaign wasthose of Kurdish nationality, a number though 162 http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?smap=02010200&lngnr=12&asnr=&anr=17055&rnr=73.See genocide. as Campaign Anfal of the recognition international the for precedent legal important an set under genocide.experts, Legal including the attorneys working on thisparticular defined case, were agree these attacks gas proceedings Kurdish the whether not chemicals, ofhis use the of knowledge personal his regarding doubt on reasonable based was acquittal the genocide, in ofcomplicity charge additional of the acquitted gas attacks at Halabja and other villages, was convicted of complicity in war crimes. Though hewas officially † villages sick with the lasting effects of chemical gas. The obvious, and now legally proven well as leaving thousands of children orphaned, women widowed, families dislocated, and violent, yet systematic mannersucked any hope for future struggles out of movementthe as devastated, both spiritually and physically. Theloss of over 150,000 Kurdish livesin such a In a criminal court case in the Netherlands, a prominent Dutch businessman, who sold chemicals used in the Lawrence, 52. Lawrence, irrevocable ways. irrevocable marking theirmemories forever and changing theirfuture identity in fundamental and to ahorrendous eventleaves that indelible marks upon consciousness,their group of been feel they have whenmembers a collectivity subjected occurs trauma Cultural 162 This event qualifies as a perfect example of a collective national Cultural TraumaandCollective Identity 54 : † , CEU eTD Collection 163 crowds mourningcrowds of women and children. showcased the rows of coffins, draped with the Kurdish flag (notably not the Iraqi flag), with held a massive ceremony for the remains of 371 victims. Regional and international media mass graves havebeen uncovered. OnJanuary Kurdistan14, 2008,the Regional Government With the new availability internationalof forensic experts and scientific equipment, many of and do…We must make the memory of our sacrifices a driving force to build our future.” public statement, “This legacy of genocide will remain with us…[as] a part of all we think Iraqi identity. As Nechirvan Barzani, the current Prime Minister of the KRG, explained in a since the invasion, and almost all involve the Anfal genocide as an integral piece of Kurdish- in the framework of a multi-national Iraqi state, can be seen in number of different arenas personal struggles.power The intensification and reprioritizing ofKurdish national identity, political opening asan foropportunity peaceful democratic autonomy priority took over Kurdish leaders toredefine a unified, Kurdish national identity. Claiming this particular largely continuedintra-Kurdish with the of violence wasted the struggles. providing apublicprocess meansto painfulthe memories.personal Yet, this opportunity was movement, nationalist their into event the incorporate to frames cultural utilize to opportunity certain ensuing responses. Thefollowing period de of factoautonomy gave the Kurdsan a group itrecognizesas their chance andagreesa specific upon itof interpretation – with when only can be seized butopportunity break, cultural immediate of example perfectan the 164 Accessed 27March 2008. 2008. http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.jsp?id=0160756B8FF85192A678DDD09B7D2A60. in mind, it is important to observe that, though the ceremony itself was held in KDP- in held was itself ceremony the though that, observe to important is it mind, in loss andmourning be to expressed.” provide “some collective meansfor undoing repression and allowing emotions the pent-up of Shamal Aqrawi. “Ceremony mourns victims of Iraq's "Anfal" genocide.” Alexander, 7. The secondbreak, cultural USinvasion the providedof 2003, asecond chance for the 164 In veinthe strategic of framing with goal the of unity 163 In Alexander’s opinion, these communal acts 55 Kurdish Globe Online. 15 January 15 CEU eTD Collection March 2008. http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.jsp?id=0120D26473B1E249ABF2838FFDBFD707. Accessed 26 Online, January 2008. AsQuoted in Fergadi, Eleni “Genocide; isit a question of national identity?” 165 issues connected to the Anfal identity frame to issuesDr. Anfalidentity bridging adanger the connected through represent that These day events. current them with andconnect experiences emphasize certain to seeking obviously, these events are aimed at Snow et al.’s ‘frame amplification’ and ‘frame bridging,’ including the trials ofAnfal and perpetrators the constitutional status of Kirkuk.Quite legal of proceedings, various on the progress centered were at the conference presentations, well as identification of the victims. Much of the informal discussion, as well as a number of forensic research results were presented, providing scientific answers to what happened as Someforthe framing. of criteria Alexander’s answer in to were, conference essence the Kurds is the most important aspect in the formation of the Kurdish Nation." language, geography, history...form part of our national identity, genocide sothe the against mincedid notin words a speech abouttheimportance of such research saying, "just asour Kurdish television channels. Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff of the Kurdish presidential office, including complete television broadcasts of openingthe and closing ceremonies onregional presented their involving work the Anfal. media The coveragefor the eventwas extensive, capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government, dozens of researchers, politicians, and artists eventinvolving the Anfal genocide yet. Over the course of three days in Erbil, the regional on Genocide Againstthe isKurdsin arguably Kurdistan-Iraq largestandmostthe focused Conference International first the memory, Anfal the involved have 2003 since Government collective of the experience asaforce. genocide uniting political elites are effectively sharing the powerof Anfalthe memory,inherently declaring PUK’s traditional power base. Through careful orchestration of events such as this, the dominated Erbil actual the province, placeburial the nexttook day in the Sulaimaniya, Fuad Hussein, speech International atthe Conference on Genocide Against Kurdsthe in Kurdistan Iraq, 26 30 January 2008. Though many projects and programs supported by Kurdistanthe Regional 56 165 Kurdish Globe The aims of CEU eTD Collection to accept their Iraqi citizenship necessitates much attention. Falah Mustafa Bakir recently Mustafa Bakir Falah muchattention. necessitates citizenship to accepttheir Iraqi 98% circled theKurdish flag.With likeattitudes this, the effortconvince to Kurdish citizens of Iraq orshouldit be independent?” 166 twoflags,sported Iraqiflag the flag andKurdistan the 2005, an unofficial placereferendum took outside of Kurdish polling The stations. ballot idea to adherents must not be underestimated. On the same day as Iraq’s first elections in to promote Kurdishin challengethe nationalism of past,the the amore moderated selling as a solution for Kurdishthe issue.With manyso Kurdish people literally fighting and dying opportunity Instead, theKRGstructure. cultural chooses to promote and political autonomy andseparate independent Kurdish notisstate a viable short-term goal in givenpoliticalthe a status, Kurdish time, rulingelitetruly the independent that over have, recognized immediate federal autonomous status within Iraq. Though many groups still profess an outright goal of to extend andframe accepta existingindependence cultural transform the regarding to effort simultaneous the to contradictory legacy seems sharetrauma of acommon people who 167 emblem forthe Kurdish nationalist movement. symbolism is inherently threatening to those opposing a greater Kurdish independent state, but isalso a key sun. This same flag was used for short-livedthe Iranian-KurdishMahabad Republic in1946. The cross-border † 26, 2008. http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.jsp?id=0120D26473B1E249ABF2838FFDBFD707. Accessed May Globe, Globe Erbil and an expert on Kurdish identity politics, recognizes. In an interview with aprofessorin at Zafer Yoruk, Kurdistan-Hawler University newthe English-language of The Kurdish flag is a tricolor background with red, white, and green stripes; in the center is the 21 point yellow point 21 the is center the in stripes; green and white, red, with background atricolor is flag Kurdish The Dr. ZaferYoruk as quoted in Eleni Fergandi,“Genocide; is it a question of national identity,” Galbraith, 171. , hedetailed Anfal between this the connection andKurdish identity Genocide saying: (30 Jan 2008), This promotion of Kurdish nationality in Iraqasa unified and repressed distinct, forgive. also iscompensation very real. The Kurdsshould definitely butthey remember, should relying on traumathe of genocide,the thenthepotential danger of seeking personality disorders.' Simply put, if the Kurdish nation insists on building itself by positive bonding role, but such selection also means the emergence of 'collective In the process of nation building, a collective trauma may be 'selected' to play a 166 167 Of the two million Kurdish voters who took part, 57 † , and asked,, and “Should Kurdistan be part The Kurdish TheKurdish CEU eTD Collection 170 18, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/25/AR2006072501254.html. Accessed May 169 168 the Bush Administration. Perhaps there was an underlying purpose purpose to thesemessages, BushAdministration. was an Perhaps the there since underlying tourism, one cannot help but imagine the positive impactit had on the Kurdish relations with and investment economicattract was intentto of this campaign stated the war.Though the coalition soldier has been . . killed in the Iraqi Kurdistan region” addition to thanking the USA, the television ads spread the claim that “not one American or of Iraq as a stronghold of stability, economic opportunity, and thankful, peaceful citizens. In message of the TV commercials, print ads, and public statements portrays the Kurdish region firm, the KRG developed a media blitz campaign entitled “Kurdistan: The Other Iraq.” of Kurdish influence. Enlisting the services of Russo, Marsh, and Rogers Public Relations Kurdish leaders frame theirintentions and interests is a key part of comprehending increase and governmental connections aroundtheworld. Understanding the wayin which the international relations,public utilizing their anddiaspora extensive expertise tobuildmedia Democracy 6.3 External: Showcasing in well is not society. still accepted match new framerealities to political cultural existing the transform to this attempt However, Kurdistan is only viablecurrently inside of a federalized Iraq, saying: provided the ‘party line’ toacrowd of Kurdish attempting intellectuals, toconvince them that Ibid. Al Kamen, “The Iraq We Haven’t Seen,” We Haven’t Iraq “The AlKamen, Bakir, speech, 6 Jan 2007. The Kurdistan Regional Government has become known for its expertise in development. economic toward course own our charting to and activities, thatwe will neverareand leadership pluralistic Iraq…Butour is “redline”remarkably onthe united issues compromiseessential federal,of a democratic ismove aspart course ahead best to our that andaccept must on our basic torightsup – often violently – by strong neighbors.us, For us, there is no realisticto alternative. self-rule, We andseen time and again that small, weak regions which try to “go itwhile alone” are swallowed to democracy, non-states. formerFrom Republics, Africa the throughout and Asia Soviet wehave we arein for world today’s is secureplace no there reality safethe and mustthat We accept happy to give and take on day to day The Washington Post, 58 (26 July 2006), 170 since the beginning of 168 169 The CEU eTD Collection 173 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7238114.stm. Accessed May 18, 2008. 172 171 which areferendumrequires by endof the 2007 todetermine the status of Kirkuk.This the drafters of the Iraqi constitution left the issue unresolved at the time, creating Article 140, KRG’s official statements confirm this sentiment. Due to the contentious nature of this issue, believe that thecity Kirkukof belongs tothe provincesthree make that upKurdistan; the Kirkuk will be run by KRG and become partof Kurdistan again.” MostKurdish citizens bethat should outcome andthe be should areferendum there that believe “People saying, Human Rights Law Institute, explains that Kirkuk is a main issue for the KRG and the Kurds, ethnic nationalist independence The movement. test for this will inplay out Kirkuk. internal of an the demands in with democracy Iraqi participant a willing imageof external However, there are still serious doubts and challenges about the KRG’s ability to combine the farfrom and theyare farfrom constitution." that Iraqi the Kurds are government Iraqi the Kurdish National Assembly, said it "is a reply to the misunderstanding and feeling that the resolution of the issue to make a pointed statement. Adnan al-Mufti, the speaker of the being criticized for being too demanding and divisive in Iraqi politics, the KRG used the have been from removed flag. Iraqi the regime, Saddam’s of representative which were Kurds held the stars, green three reached: the flagto fly acompromise Kurdish in the hasbeen flag, keeping its Iraqi place. However, the multiethnic, and united.” that the Kurds [will] play their assigned role in building a new Iraq that [is] democratic, region Americanwants (though involvement toensureonly theviability KRG).the of they obviously match with Snow’s frame assuring alignment, Washington thethat Kurdish Ibid. “Kurds hoist reworked Iraqi flag,” Galbraith, 158. Kurdistan Daloye, the Iraq Country Director for the DePaul University International University DePaul the for Director Country Iraq the Daloye, Kurdistan However, these messages should not be, as Galbraith says, misinterpreted “as asign misinterpreted be,says,not asGalbraith thesemessagesshould However, 171 Until February 2008, the Kurdistan Regional refusedGovernment BBCNews Online, 172 Coming in a time when the Kurdish leaders were 59 (10 Feb. 2008), 173 CEU eTD Collection 2006), 8. 174 theirmobilization style but also ushered in a new conception of Kurdish identity and cultural loyalty. politicalgave The that opportunity Kurdstheirthe secondchance notonly changed Kurdish media didnotform cultural frames promoting Kurdish public unity, butrather party efforts. This process has had its own learning curve, however. The initial creation and use of the manipulating creatingpolitical structures, opportunities, andare garneringfurther resources to movementtheir elite political Kurdish the transformation, outright to amplification 6.4 Conclusion of rights. human standards democratic international of satisfying their constituents with a referendum but also matching up to the new followwith through Article 140,butmust also adelicate walk keepingtightrope, balance the organizations such as the United Nations to pressure the Baghdad central government to andof support fueling aggressive nationalism. TheKRG continues touseinternational issue, this type of ethnic argument, with seemingly scientific backing, is finding a solid base population. Though Kurdishthe community is dividedon bestthe way solveto the Kirkuk arguments about the KurdishKirkuk, rightand to forcing hopefully thesizable out Arab use it truthfully.” it use booklet of highly politicized maps, writing that “maps are the identity for those who want to “High forCommittee Kurdistan de-Arabization’ recently published the offenses toregain Kirkuk under Kurdish administration. A semi-political calledgroup the process to the Anfal campaign, attempting to pull the legitimacy afforded by human rights surrounding the Kirkukissue has been intensified by claims connecting the Arabization to placetake in June of no2008, though plans havebeen formalized. The national discourse referendum has been officially delayed several fortimes various political reasons andis due High Committee forKurdistan de-Arabization, Through Through utilizationthe of cultural framing everything techniques, frame from 174 These maps were drafted with the intention of intention rhetorical with supporting Thesemapsthe weredrafted of Atlas of Kirkuk, 60 (Erbil: Kurdistan Regional Government, Atlas ofKirkuk, a CEU eTD Collection images with internal the values. cultural in face leaderslinking agreatchallenge external Kurdish will the the hopefully resolved, front. As the issues of Kirkuk, oil revenue laws, and constitutional powers are discussed and Yet this picture of a united, wholly democratic and free Kurdistan is shaky on the domestic values. The KRG’s efforts in promoting their image abroad have met with relative success. 61 CEU eTD Collection recognized, constitutionally mandated territorial government entity. Yet, made entity. mandatedterritorial obvious Yet, government recognized, constitutionally from a loose social movement to an interest group trying togain political access to a formally road. My research has shown that the Kurdish nationalistmovement has made this transition has been a difficult by governments international recognized politicalorganization legitimate from connecteda tribal conducted loosely operations guerilla to peshmerga soldiers warfare growing painsand adifficult developmental overthepastprocess twenty years. Movingfrom and its mode of operation, Kurdish the nationalist movementhas obviously experienced great zone. external andinvolvementsupport prior to creationthe of ‘no-fly’the humanitarian protection contrasts dramatically with pre-1991 Iraqi state repressive capacity as well as the lack of political opportunity system with little, if any, capacity to repress Kurdish interests. This 2003, specifically Shiitethe constitutional Americandeal hasand support, produceda following allies external and internal of presence the However, efforts. Kurdish-Iraqi the decision to unite the KDP and PUK leadership was a major reason for the current success of hurtaccord themovement’s factopotential independence, de during butalso that specific the structure of leadership movementthe was examined for unity, concluding thatthe lack of independence from period 1991 to2003and after theinvasion US Iraq. Theinternalof dramatically,historical for providing Kurdsthe opportunities of duringIraq defacto the state and international systems, in which the Kurdish movement was embedded changed the both background, institutional the that first, shown, have I in Iraq. Kurds the of movement explain thedramatic increasein experiencepower by political nationalist Kurdish the regarding political resource structure, opportunity mobilization, andcultural framing –to – Conclusion 7 Chapter In closer consideration of the structure of the movement itself,its available resources, In this paper, Ihave attempted to utilize social movement theory – in particular, ideas 62 CEU eTD Collection years, Ihave discovered two opportunities that can be compared with each other. First, the twenty past the over movement the of development the on focus particular with movement, goal of independence. a long-term on focused andarestill federalism of Iraqi prospects the on unconvinced fairly campaigns. However, Kurdish citizens, still subject to divisive, party-funded media, remain has been effectively spread toexternal,international actors, through various media an independent Kurdish isstate, new,the more possible movementgoal. This framepolitical harder: theconvincing Kurdishautonomy prove peoplein than rather ademocratic that Iraq, party or tribal affiliation, as well as garner international sympathy. The next challenge would memory itsurrounding generate a to conception Kurdishof identity couldthat transcend opinion. This meant, first, using the cultural trauma of the Anfal Genocide and the collective foster a new political and social consensus that would be more compatible to international formany decades, the Kurdish-Iraqi elite began to strategically alter these cultural frames to Kurdish-Iraqi understanding asadistinctive, nationalculture of identity has existed repressed making Though a collective actors external regarding Kurdish interests. decisions for and ethnicity Kurdish of those for internally both identity, national Kurdish of perceptions without recognition the of significantthe role by played continuously the changing opportunities opened tothem, particularly 2003.after ofmost political of the advantage effectively take movement to nationalist the have allowed Kurds’ ever-growing pool of resources (intellectual diaspora, economic development, etc.) from stages inprevious its development. These strategies and devicesfor mobilizing the mobilization tactics Kurdish leadersemploy still resource the decisions, certain Baghdad KRG’sthe through andthe samerefusalwith cooperate the useof to peshmergatroops The picture of mobilization and political opportunities is complete, not however, By investigating the Kurdish nationalist movement in the context of asocial of context in the movement nationalist Kurdish the investigating By 63 CEU eTD Collection potential potential in anew,transitioning Iraq. interests as politically desirable objectives, has allowed the Kurds to maximize their power mobilization of resources such as a well-connected diaspora and the framing of Kurdish excellent with along in Iraq, movement Kurdish the of development organizational grievancespromote a to strong Kurdish identity behind which mobilize.to The continuous opportunity for the leaders to unite, utilize their extensive resources, and begin frameto their in contrast stark tothesecond opening 2003,in after international which providedallies akey structural allies, and effectiveframing identity promote to peace and mobilization. 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