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Schweiz-Zimbabwe Swiss-Zimbabwean Friendship Association Vereinigung Schweiz-Zimbabwe Swiss-Zimbabwean Friendship Association Rundbrief / Newsletter Nr. 65, Mai 2015 Editorial Chaos in Zimbabwe Seit Zanu-PF wieder alleine an der Macht ist, befindet Ruth Weiss sich die Wirtschaft wieder im freien Fall. Die verschie- denen und sich widersprechenden Aussagen der Chaos, Wirren und Machtkämpfe verunsichern das Regierung über weitere Landbesetzungen oder die Land seit August 2014. Damals tauchte Präsident Ro- Indigenisierung tragen nicht zur Beruhigung allfälliger bert Mugabes Gattin Grace aus dem Nichts auf, um für Investoren bei. den Vorsitz der Zanu-PF Frauenliga zu kandidieren. Mit dem Partei-Ausschluss von Joice Mujuru, Didymus Während landesweiten Auftritten stand sie im Rampen- Mutasa und deren Anhängern ist Bewegung in die Par- licht mit schrillen Angriffen auf wirkliche oder vermeintli- teienlandschaft gekommen, auch wenn sich sonst che Feinde. Der folgende Sturm in der Regierungspar- nichts bewegt (wie Eddie Cross schreibt). Zanu-PF ist tei, die kränkelnde Wirtschaft und die südafrikanische gespalten. Die Ausgeschlossenen reklamieren für sich, Ausländerfeindlichkeit, der auch ZimbabwerInnen zum die wahre Zanu-PF zu vertreten, haben den Parteiaus- Opfer fielen, gab wenig Grund, den 35. Jahrestag der schluss angefochten und bereiten die Gründung einer Unabhängigkeit im April zu feiern. neuen Partei vor. Gleichzeitig versucht Simba Makoni, Zanu-PF Präsident von Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (Morgenröte), und früher unter anderem Finanzminister in der Regie- Die giftigsten Worte der First Lady galten Joice Mujuru, rung Mugabe, die zerstrittene Opposition auf einem mi- seit 2004 Vize-Präsidentin, deren Neuwahl beim Partei- nimalen Konsens zu einen. Wird das der Anfang vom kongress im Dezember erwartet wurde. Noch vor dem Ende? Kongress wurde Mujuru aus dem Politbüro ausge- schlossen und abgesetzt. Mugabe änderte die Partei- Im vorliegenden Rundbrief fasst uns Ruth Weiss wieder verfassung und ernannte als neue Vize-Präsidenten die Ereignisse des letzten halben Jahres zusammen. den Justizminister Emmerson Mnangagwa und den Ar- Weiter dokumentieren wir unter anderem Aspekte des mee-Offizier Phelekezela Mphoko. Letzterer machte täglichen Lebens, die Diamantenstory, Aktionen von bald erstaunliche Äußerungen: Der Westen und nicht Woza Zimbabwe, das Harare International Festival of Mugabe sei verantwortlich für Gukurahundi. Damals, the Arts und stellen die Schriftstellerin NoViolet Bula- 1989, wurden in einer grosssen Milititäroffensive etwa wayo vor. 20‘000 Personen getötet, weil sie fälschlicherweise be- schuldigt wurden, mit der von Apartheid-Südafrika un- Gertrud Baud, Mitglied des Vorstandes terstützten Opposition zusammen zu arbeiten. Der Kongress dezimierte die Mujuru-Fraktion, acht Mi- nister verloren ihre Ministerien – 16 insgesamt bis Feb- Inhalt ruar - andere ihre Parteiposten. Pro-Mujuru-Militärs Editorial 1 wurden aus hohen Stellen entlassen. Pressesprecher Chaos in Zimbabwe 1 Rugare Gumbo und Didymus Mutasa, bislang enger Ein heisser, heikler Sommer 4 Vertrauter Mugabes, wurden aus der Partei und aus Es bewegt sich nichts – das Problem 5 dem Parlament ausgeschlossen. Mugabe warf Mujuru Es ist alles verteilt – Zimbabwe-Reise 7 unter anderem vor, sie wolle ihn mit Hilfe eines N’anga (Zauberer) stürzen. ‘War-Vet‘ Führer Jabulani Sibanda, Parteien und Personen 9 der gegen einen „Schlafzimmer Putsch“ wetterte, wurde Makoni: Der Fisch stinkt vom Kopf; Mugabe prompt verhaftet. will fall in 2018; Joice Mujuru Wirtschaft 11 Grace Mugabe sass als Führerin der Frauenliga beim Mnangagwa looted diamonds; Army chiefs ersten Auftritt im Politbüro neben dem Präsidenten, an- continue Marange plunder; Diamond merger costly statt auf dem ihr zustehenden niedrigeren Sitz. Mutasa und Gumbo erklärten, Grace Mugabe säe Anarchie und Zivilgesellschaft 14 Zerstörung und reichten im Februar wegen Verstosses Itai Dzamara missing; Daily life of an ordinary Zim gegen die Parteiverfassung eine Klage beim Gericht citizen; Police disturb WOZA loveday; WOZA and ein. Der Präsident erklärte, kein Richter würde den Fall CSOs march; Freunde für Matibi: Direkthilfe annehmen, was allgemein als Versuch zur Einschüch- Kultur 19 terung der Justiz angesehen wurde. NoViolet Bulawayo; Irene Sabatini Jahresbeitrag, Impressum, Unsere Quellen 20 Im April schloss Zanu-PF Mujuru wegen einer Reihe von angeblichen Vergehend aus der Partei aus. Mit 1 ihrem verstorbenen Mann Solomon Mujuru hätte sie 14 Orten Neuwahlen stattfinden, die von MDC-T und sich seit 2004 gegen Mugabe verschworen. Mujuru MDC wegen fehlenden Reformen boykottiert werden. wies die Vorwürfe zurück, beteuerte ihre Unschuld und Das führte zu heftigen Auseinandersetzungen und dem wies auf den mysteriösen und bis heute ungeklärten Aufstellen von Zanu-PF-nahen ’unabhängigen‘ Kandi- Tod ihres Mannes in einem Brand 2011 hin. daten – praktisch ein Geschenk für Zanu-PF. Mnangag- wa schüchterte die WählerInnen bei zwei Nebenwahlen Die Sieger im Machtkampf, die Fraktionen von Mnan- im März, die MDC boykottierte, so ein, dass seine Frau gagwa und die Generation 40, die Unterstützer von einen Sitz gewann. Grace Mugabe, kämpfen um die Pfründen der Verlierer. Andere Minister und Funktionäre, die verdächtigt wur- Und trotz Repression kommt es immer wieder zu Unru- den, zur Pro-Mujuru-Fraktion zu gehören, wurden be- hen: Am 10. März protestierten wütende junge Men- spitzelt und drangsaliert, einige sollen aus der Partei schen gegen das Verschwinden des Menschenrechts- ausgeschlossen werden. aktivisten Itai Dzamara. Am 13. März endete ein Auf- stand hungriger Gefangener in Harare, „die wie Ratten Mugabe wurde ab Januar zum abwesenden Präsiden- leben“, mit fünf Toten. Am 17. März vertrieben ebenfalls ten, entweder aus Gesundheitsgründen oder wegen hungrige Studenten in der Hauptstadt den Vize-Kanzler Besuchen. Regierungsgeschäfte und die Lösung der der Uni und anderes Verwaltungspersonal aus ihren Wirtschaftskrise liegen dadurch brach. Zwischen Janu- Büros. Im April protestierten während des SADC- ar und Ende März reiste er achtmal, was Steuerzahler Gipfels in Harare 200 Mitglieder von MDC-T. US$10 Mio. kostete. Auch im April war er zweimal un- terwegs. First Family Seit 2014 ist Mugabe SADC-Vorsitzender, seit Januar Im April wurde Mugabe mit seiner Frau beim Staatsbe- auch Vorsitzender der African Union. Mugabe erklärte such in Südafrika mit Pomp und Herzlichkeit empfan- am SADC-Gipfel, er begreife nicht, warum so viel Zim- gen. Graces Erscheinen stiess auf Interesse, da sie ab babwerInnen nach Südafrika zögen. Es liege wohl dar- dem 8. März für vier Wochen verschwunden war. Bei an, dass sie dort grosse Geschäfte tätigen könnten. einem Besuch in Japan im März wurde Mugabe von Botswanas Präsident Ian Khama hatte eine andere Er- Tochter Bona begleitet. Anscheinend war die First Lady klärung: Nach ihm verursachen schlechte Führung und zur medizinischen Behandlung in Dubai. Sie wurde eine falsche wirtschaftliche Politik die Flüchtlingsströme während der Urlaubsreise im Januar in Singapur ope- in Afrika. Hat Mugabe das gehört? Zuvor hatte Mugabe riert, angeblich wegen Blinddarm, vermutlich wegen für die Kalangas als unausgebildete, kleine Kriminelle Krebs, und war zwei Monate abwesend. Bei ihrer Rück- bezeichnet und damit für grosses Entsetzen gesorgt. kehr wurde die, laut Mugabes Pressesprecher “private Bürgerin”, von einer grossen Schar von Ministern, Ge- Im Februar stürzte der 91-jährige Präsident am Flugha- nerälen und Zanu-Gössen nach diversen Kommentare fen, was Analytiker seiner Gebrechlichkeit zuschrieben, „wie eine Königin“ empfangen. Gerüchte verbreiteten, seine Entourage aber einem Teppich. Weder dieser Grace, nicht der kränkliche Präsident, halte die Zügel Vorfall noch die schlimme wirtschaftliche Lage hielten der Macht in der Hand - mit Blick auf den obersten den Präsidenten aber ab, im Februar seine übliche Ge- Platz. Doch in diesem Jahr schweigt die schwatzhafte burtstagsfeier, die US$1 Mio kostete durchzuführen. 20 Frau. Vielleicht ist ihr Ehrgeiz durch die Krankheit ein- 000 Gästen verzehrten nicht nur Rind und Geflügel, geschränkt. sondern auch Elefanten-, Löwen-, Buffalo- und Impala- Fleisch. Für Viele verstiess die Feier gegen Anstand Während ihrer Abwesenheit wurde bekannt, dass sich und Umweltschutz. Politiker wie Eddie Cross wiesen Grace Mugabe eine weitere Farm in Mazoe angeeignet darauf hin, dass 90% der ZimbabwerInnen ums Überle- hatte, angeblich zur Schaffung eines Naturschutzgebie- ben kämpfen, 70% hätten weniger als 35 Cents pro tes. Nach Kennern ist die 1‘800 Hektaren umfassende Tag, die Lebenserwartung betrage 34 Jahre, Kranken- Farm aber zu klein, um die fünf Grossen (Löwe, Leo- häuser seien zu Leichenhäusern geworden und Schu- pard, Elefant, Buffalo, Rhino) anzusiedeln. Wahrschein- len zu Aufbewahrungsstätten. licher ist, dass die die Farm wegen der dort vermuteten Goldvorkommen interessant ist. Seit 2000 arbeiten auf Opposition der Farm informelle Bergarbeiter, die nun vertrieben Die Opposition ist nach wie vor schwach und gespalten werden sollen. 300 Familien klagten im Februar erfolg- und mit eigenen Machtkämpfen beschäftigt. Nach ver- reich gegen die Vertreibung und erwirkten einen Stopp schiedenen Beobachtern stellt gegenwärtig eine mögli- der Umsiedlung. Allerdings wurde dieser Gerichtsent- che Spaltung von Zanu-PF zusammen mit dem Nieder- scheid durch den Einsatz von 100 Zebras auf den Fel- gang der Wirtschaft eine grössere Gefahr für die Regie- dern der Bauern unterlaufen. rung dar, als die orientierungslose Opposition. Wie üblich verbrachte
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