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Forum: Security Council
Issue: The question of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal
Student Officer: Ata Güvendi
Position: Deputy President of the Security Council
Introduction
In the summer of the year 2002, the international community displayed a raised level of attention towards a possible nuclear weapons programme, led by the government of Iran. The attention to this potential weapons programme in the making was brought by a then exiled political dissidents group, called the National Council of Resistance Iran (NCRI). The roots of Iran’s nuclear energy programme dated many years back, where before the Iranian Revolution, during the Shah regime, efforts were made by several European countries and the United States to start a nuclear programme, which included the setup of a research reactor.
The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is an agreement between the Government of Iran and 6 Member States, all 5 Permanent Members and Germany, where the parties agreed to set terms limiting stockpiles of materials used for creating nuclear weaponry. The deal also granted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rights to inspections in named nuclear facilities, in exchange for the mounting international sanctions against Iran to be lifted.
With reports being posed by the IAEA that Iran now holds over 5 times the stockpiles allotted per the agreement and following the unilateral withdrawal of the Trump administration in 2018, reinstating harsh sanctions on Iran, the future and the upholdment of the JCPOA has therefore been placed in a situation of uncertainty.
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Definition of Key Terms
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA is the agency that has the role of serving as the objective third party in ensuring terms of the JCPOA are met.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
The NPT is a UN treaty that commits its signatories towards peaceful development of nuclear technology.
Heavy Water Reactors
A reactor type that creates a plutonium biproduct in its reactions, which are weapons grade and therefore considered sites with weapons making potential.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
The plan of action agreed upon by Germany, P5 nations and Iran, refers to the “Iran Nuclear Deal”, inspected by the IAEA.
Fissile Fuels
Fissile fuels are Uranium and Plutonium isotopes, which are the two elements used in the construction of nuclear weapons, but also have other peaceful purposes such as energy production and research as well.
Background Information
Before the Iranian Revolution, there existed an Iran with a drastically different foreign policy, which entailed cooperation on numeral fronts with Member States such as the USA. In fact, it was with the western nations that Iran began laying the foundation for its nuclear efforts as early as the late 1960s, through some research reactors (A History of Iran's Nuclear Program).
Following the implementation of the NPT (discussed more in detail later), Iran began contracting the construction of new nuclear power plants. The NPT, by its terms, restricted these reactors to be used for peaceful purposes only, however Iran’s close alignment with leading NATO nations accounted for its potential security issues.
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Less than a decade after the start of the constructions, Iran underwent a revolution that would redefine Iran as a nation, and the entire Middle East along with it, its effects tangibly manifesting to this day. The Revolution, beginning in 1978, was concluded in February of 1979, where the Shah regime was toppled, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. This marked a crucial turning point for Iran’s foreign policy as well, where a previously NATO-block aligned (not a member) nation harbored mass protests clearly demonstrating against the Shah regime and its methods. Tensions reached a peak during the well known Hostage Crisis, where multiple American consulate workers in Tehran were besieged in the consulate, and held captive for a year in Tehran against the extradition of the Shah to Iran, who was undergoing medical treatment in the U.S. at the time. The U.S. response was harsh, which stopped purchase of Iran’s oil, blocked billions in monetary assets belonging to Iranian officials, passing UNSC resolutions, then filing an ICJ case against Iran, which ordered the release of the hostages.
One year later, the Iran-Iraq War, which served as a test to both the military and economic capacity of the two nations began, where the effect of the heavy sanctions against Iran began to be apparent. This renewed the diplomatic efforts that would ultimately end with the release of the hostages at President Reagan’s administration. The war, as is the nature with all wars, proved destructive and damaging to Iran’s economy, alongside Iran’s new reactors in construction. The end result was Siemens, the contractor abandoning the construction of the reactors, coupled with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s firm stance against nuclear weapons as Supreme Leader of Iran. The nuclear program was effectively brought to a standstill.
It wasn’t until the 1990s that Iran began resuming its nuclear efforts, through international help thanks to newfound allies such as the USSR, China and Pakistan, where the countries signed bilateral treaties affirming nuclear cooperation. Within this timeframe, Iran had begun autonomizing its nuclear processes, where through uranium exploration and mining activities once again dating back to the Shah regime coupled with the assumption that Iran acquired, or at least began to acquire, enrichment technology for uranium (enriched uranium is a sought after component for nuclear weapons).
At this time, Iran was attracting little to no attraction from international audiences, especially in comparison to what happened after 2002: the world was alerted to the clandestine nuclear research programme through an announcement by a prominent dissident figure Alireaza Jafazadeh. This speech uncovered the existence of two prominent nuclear power plants, Natanz and Arak. Unsupervised power plants constituted a serious threat, as Iran could
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have been building nuclear weapons without the world knowing in these facilities. Mr. Jafarzadeh also pointed to the Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), which had been the administrator to these projects. It was uncovered that Iran had been disguising its nuclear efforts under an environmental project’s umbrella, and visitations to these sites by the head of the Atomic Agency, AEOI, only went to reaffirm the true purpose of these facilities. Natanz and Arak, furthermore, were heavy water facilities, whose spent by product for its nuclear reactions created plutonium, another element used in the building of nuclear weapons.
The motivations of these projects were suspected to be for the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, where behind closed doors, Iran’s Security Council had strategized that "access to nuclear bomb is the most important guarantor of our survival and in case of having the bomb, the Western countries will not be able to block penetration and expansion of the Islamic Revolution" (“Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program”). Since this reveal in 2002, the IAEA has not been able to confirm the benign intentions proclaimed by the Government of Iran, which are a motivating factor for the sanctions to be rolled out as discussed below.
In 2006, the UNSC in conjunction with the international community began to mount pressure on the government of Iran, threatening crippling sanctions to Iran’s efforts if those pertaining to the enrichment of fuels, were not brought to a halt. Iran’s noncompliance with the open demands of the Security Council began the installation of sanctions through a unanimous vote of the Resolution 1737. The resolution enabled the block of trade for any items that would be determined as contributory to the building and delivery of such weapons, as well as its delivery systems.
It should be noted that these sanctions related resolutions were titled under “Non-Proliferation”, that pertain to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the NPT, Iran was obligated to allow inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which it failed to do so by failing to disclose its facilities that were allegedly being used for non-peaceful purposes as demonstrated by the hiring of 3 prominent Russian and Ukranian nuclear scientists for the task, alongside the statement remarked above that was made within the National Security Council of Iran. This was a non-peaceful move, considering Iran had hired these scientists on a person by person basis, meaning the scientists’ countries’ volitions played no part in these actions, very likely to be tasked with weapons research.
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Alongside the UN recognized sanctions, the U.S.A. began instating sanctions of its own. In 2012, in a very detrimental move against the banking sector of Iran, all banks within Iran were disconnected from the worldwide SWIFT monetary exchange system. Without this system, the exchange of funds over an international platform would be rendered near impossible, seeing as most nations today, more importantly back in 2012, used SWIFT as a singular medium of electronic money transfer. This penalty that Iran faced has not been contained in its effects to just the banking sector, but in another crucial blow to the nation, undermined Iran’s position of a major petroleum exporter, considering purchases over U.S. Dollars were both subject to sanctions alongside the blockade over the SWIFT system, rendering large purchases infacilitatable.
While both the UN through new UNSC resolutions and the USA remained on their previous trajectory of pushing new sanctions against Iran, it is also important to consider that although enrichment of uranium does indeed have weaponry based applications, its uses are not circumscribed solely by weapons technology. In fact, it would be within the NPTs terms to seek enriched uranium for non-weapons technology purposes, which was a suggestion made in a 2007 CIA publication: “Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be” (“Support to Policymakers:The 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” 8).
The foundation of the JCPOA with the P5+1 in conjunction with the Islamic Republic of Iran was in exchange for sanctions relief (and the abandonment of the threats of bombing missions to be carried out against Iran’s key nuclear sites) for Iran. Per the agreement, all sanctions would be gradually lifted as the 2015 deal was reached. In exchange for the lifting of the two sanctions, Iran made the concession that it would allow inspectors from the IAEA alongside curtailing its nuclear activities. The terms of the deal specify that Iran is to reduce its enriched stockpiles by 98%. The status of the heavy water reactors, such as that of the one in Arak, was also brought into question. Even though the first demand of the P5+1 was the dismantlement of the Arak site, the reactor was agreed to remain out of operation until 2031,
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due to concerns about the production of fissile plutonium, which as discussed previously, is a weapons grade material. With the phasing out of heavy water reactors, Iran also would be barred from building any other heavy water reactors and maintaining the technology.
With his faith clearly lacking in Iran’s intentions to abide by the nuclear deal, President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA marked a rock bottom for relations with Iran since the establishment of the deal. It was U.S. policy to reinstate sanctions on Iran as a more forceful way of hampering Iran’s potential weapons progress, which was believed to be enough for the development of around 10 nuclear warheads per intelligence gathered by the Obama administration.
One of the criticisms brought against the JCPOA as remarked by John Bolton, the national security adviser to the Trump cabinet, was the expiration date of the agreement. This would, in 2031 re-enable Iran in its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, alongside the lifting of the sanctions of small arms trade, although Iran has recently reiterated that they would not be making large scale purchases in response to the upcoming expiry of the sanctions. It was the administration’s maintenance that sanctions were a more efficient way to go, as it would allow the US to set its own expiry dates and ensure that the sanctions are upheld, due to their unilateral nature.
With the reestablishment of the sanctions, the first field that was targeted was the oil sector of Iran, alongside trade entities and financial institutions. The effects have been harsh on the Iranian economy, which has thrown Iran into a now 2 years long and still ongoing recessionary state. With unemployment projected to rise, Iran has taken measures to mitigate the effects of the sanctions, and Iran was last projected to see no growth or shrink during 2020, which is a vast improvement from 2018 (the worst year for its economy, even worse than planet-wide economic crash years). This is not, by any means, ideal for any country to remain in, as maintaining no growth can lead to problems in the future. It should be remarked that the 0% change projections would be on par with 2007-8, which were the years that the first round of sanctions took their toll on.
The implications of the U.S’s withdrawal is enough of a warrant to dissuade further deals, as the first formal withdrawal to the deal came from the American camp, that makes future deals all the more difficult to achieve.
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As concerns are on the rise with Iran’s abidance of the terms of the JCPOA, with Iran showing a major increase in its enriched uranium stockpiles, far above its allotted share per the JCPOA, where Iran was over 674 per cent over its allotted approximately 200 kilograms of enriched uranium, which constitutes a clear flout of both the agreement and the promises made to the P5+1, throws the entire deal into question, alongside the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Metzler).
Major Countries and Organizations Involved
United States of America
As remarked above, the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, which had served its purpose of curtailing Iran’s nuclear assets dramatically has reset Iran’s trajectory in which stockpiles are increasing as time passes. The U.S. withdrawal’s reasons inalienably included the change of its leadership, highly differing in their foreign strategies. President Trump’s open dislike of the Iran Deal was a byproduct of his vastly different view than that of President Obama’s, who was in office when the JCPOA was founded.
With a new president inbound for the White House, Joe Biden, crucially the Vice President to the Obama cabinet, a reversal in foreign policy, yet again seems likely. However, these vagaries in the U.S. policy only contributes to the hardship any cabinet will face if a deal is to be returned to, seeing as Iran demands economic compensation for the nation’s actions in essentially blockading major sectors of the Iranian economy from the USD centralized world. Mr. Biden has previously remarked that his administration would make credible efforts in returning to the JCPOA, through diplomatic channels.
A more recent attempt at sanctioning Iran through the UNSC, about extending the small arms embargo on Iran which was set to expire within 2020, closely ties this conflict with other events in the Middle East, and it would be inaccurate to evaluate U.S. policy without considering its oppositionary position to Iran in Syria and Yemen, and the U.S.’s close allies Israel and Saudi Arabia, which are both crucially not backing down against their stances towards Iran.
Iran
Iran has been focusing on bracing itself against sanctions and for some time, has been criticising the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Although both sides have arguments justifying their reactions, it only adds another obstacle for a multinational solution to be reestablished. The
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nation has done well to consolidate its economic position after the new wave of sanctions, and has furthered its relations with other nations to continue its oil trade which remains a key part of its economy. It is noteworthy that historically, nations such as China have found ways to abide by U.S. sanctions. This was made possible by the implications of the U.S. sanctions: any nation which used U.S. dollars in making purchases from a sanctioned sector would also be included within the sanctions. This serves as the essential deterrent for countries to disobey sanctions, but also serves to eliminate workarounds such as a third country serving as a middleman to allow trades to go on with minimal disruption. China obeyed these sanctions by making petroleum purchases over non-USD currencies.
Iran’s ambition in pursuing its nuclear programme has been further reinforced by two assassinations of its high ranking individuals. The first being Qassem Solemani, who was a top general in the Iranian army. He was said to have been targeted due to his links to terrorist groups (from the U.S. perspective), such as Hezbollah, the Houthi Rebels and Palestinian liberation movements. The second noteworthy killing was that of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, speculated to be a key figure in Iran’s nuclear programme. The U.S. claims that this attack was carried out by Israel, a state that is very widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. Considering the deeply rooted tensions between Iran and Israel (a close ally of the U.S.A. in the Middle East), Iran’s wish to match the level of nuclear threat posed by Israel becomes easier to understand.
The over limit condition of Iran’s stockpiles is a fact that was previously recognized by the Iranian government, that adds to Iran’s willingness to operate outside the bounds set by a clearly regressing deal. Although the U.S. has withdrawn from the agreement, Iran remains part of the JCPOA, and so does the ‘P4+1’, which makes Iran accountable to the remaining nations all the same.
IAEA
The IAEA is the main non-governmental organization that is involved with the JCPOA. Its main task in this context is to police the standards of the JCPOA, which it has been for some time signaling inconsistencies with the terms on the part of Iran. IAEA’s involvement dates further back then the JCPOA, where as mentioned previously, the organization was also key in investigating Iran’s nuclear assets after 2002. Keeping its far spanning history with this conflict in mind and observing the fact that the IAEA was an organization that was trusted by the
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P5+1 and Iran, it is likely the appropriate authority to call on for future mediations regarding this conflict.
Russia
The official position of the Russia Federation underlines its commitment to the deal. A Kremlin statement which highlighted the new trend of UNSC’s proposed resolutions (likely in reference to the U.S.’s more recent resolutions) that were of destructive nature and only worked to forward aggravation instead of pursuing negotiations. Russia has called for a summit to be held where it has urged parties to responsibly and respectively approach each others’ positions, pointing out that the deal safeguards the international community from an even greater crisis.
Timeline of Events
Date Description of event The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty went into effect during the heightened stages of the Cold War, which implicated that new nuclear weapons’ March 4, 1970 development, under its terms, was contradictory to the aims of the treaty.
Iran begins experimenting with nuclear reactors supplied by the U.S. 1967
The Iran Revolution takes place. Over the course of this revolution, the international community witnessed a strict anti-U.S. view manifest in crowds that January 7, 1978 flooded the streets, followed by a government change.
The Iran-Iraq War erupts, causing wide scale damage to both countries and September 22, 1980 making newly instated U.S. sanctions’ gravity more apparent.
Alireza Jezfardeh makes the announcement revealing Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme, which in response to, the IAEA attempts to acquit Iran from the August 14,2002 allegations but fails to do so.
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A series of UNSC resolutions instating harsh sanctions against Iran pass, alongside Member States such as the U.S. rolling out their own sanctions as March 24, 2007 well.
Iran is disconnected from the SWIFT electronic funds exchange medium, November 8, 2012 causing wide scale damage to financial, petroleum and other sectors.
July 14, 2015 The JCPOA is founded with the P5+1
President Trump abandons the JCPOA, and begins the process of restarting the May 8, 2018 sanctions programme. Iran’s stockpiles begin to increase following this incident, reaching new highs every month.
Relevant UN Treaties and Events
● Security Council Resolution 1696, 31 July 2006, (S/RES/1696)
Resolution 1696 was a precursor to the sanctions to follow, where this resolution expressed concern over the lack of proof that IAEA was able to produce about there being no nuclear weapons in Iran. It also, in operative clause number 8, elaborated on the consequences (sanctions) should Iran continue in its then-current trajectory.
● Security Council Resolution 1737, 27 December 2006, (S/RES/1737)
Resolution 1737 began the first round of sanctions against Iran, prohibiting the trade of any item that could relate to weapons production, also underlining that sanctions would continue if Iran would not back down from its policies.
● Security Council Resolution 1747, 24 March 2007, (S/RES/1747)
Resolution 1747 was a follow-up on 1737 that held the same position as its predecessor, reaffirming the previous sanctions.
● Security Council Resolution 1803, 3 March 2008, (S/RES/1803)
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This resolution was passed after Iran had opposed an IAEA attempt to perform inspections, thus reaffirming previous positions alongside noting a problem with Iran’s refusal to grant the IAEA access.
● Security Council Resolution 1929, 9 June 2010, (S/RES/1929)
Resolution 1929 was firm in its tone, outlining that Iran should halt its activities at once regarding its nuclear research, calling for inspections both in Iran, but also by states regarding trade vessels that were tied with Iran within compliance with international law.
Previous Attempts to solve/aid the Issue
Previous attempts to tackle Iran’s increasing stockpiles have relied on more force rather than diplomacy. The U.S. sanction policy was by design, supposed to leave Iran no choice in their vision, but has worked to forward Iran’s autonomy and made Iran develop an even less westernly reliant system. Calls for diplomacy by countries like Russia, Turkey, and doubters of the efficacy of sanctions like Indonesia have made plain that there are attempts to revive the deal, however countries have not attempted to disobey the Treasury Department's economic penalties on Iran, as disobedience towards such sanctions extends the sanctions in question to those in breach of the sanctions as well. The newer proposals by the Trump administration extending new sanctions after the U.S.’s leave of the deal were also denied, further testifying the existence of an audience ready to reinitiate talks. These sanctions were essentially backtracks to UNSC resolutions outlining sanctions mentioned in the section above, as it regressed to unilateral action from multinational agreements. It was, however, the U.S.’s discontent with the sustainability of the JCPOA and its expiry date which motivated such a regression in the first place, which might have justified a similar stance to the sanctions to unilaterally cripple Iran’s capacities strategy.
Possible Solutions
With a potential change of U.S. foreign policy on the horizon, the prospect of a renewed solution, however negatively its ease of achievement may have been affected over the years, looks plausible. With nations already demonstrating an active interest, especially those within the P5+1, towards brokering new talks, a set plan in the reestablishment of the JCPOA, in a similar trend of the removal of sanctions in exchange for Iran conceding its overlimit stockpiles may restore the previous status quo which was less fragile. It would be a reasonable
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expectation that within reasonable limits, a more active enforcement of stockpile caps be put in place. That expectation does not come unilaterally, as demonstrations by the U.S. camp in continued dedication to uphold the JCPOA as it has previously failed to do so, is also imperative.
A notable concern to address would be how easily inspectors from the IAEA were denied access to Iran during the post-2006 years, where a more rigid set of terms more strictly enforced would very likely be welcomed, seeing as the IAEA’s powerlessness and dependence on the UNSC to assert its authority was demonstrated previously.
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Appendices
I. Iran's Nuclear Program: Status
II. Map to Iran's Nuclear Facilities III. A Visual of the Growth in GDP of Iran, on a Timeline
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