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Introduction th The Hague International Model United Nation 2021| 25 ​ January 2021 ​ ​ ​ ​ Forum: Security Council Issue: The question of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal Student Officer: Ata Güvendi Position: Deputy President of the Security Council Introduction In the summer of the year 2002, the international community displayed a raised level of attention towards a possible nuclear weapons programme, led by the government of Iran. The attention to this potential weapons programme in the making was brought by a then exiled political dissidents group, called the National Council of Resistance Iran (NCRI). The roots of Iran’s nuclear energy programme dated many years back, where before the Iranian Revolution, during the Shah regime, efforts were made by several European countries and the United States to start a nuclear programme, which included the setup of a research reactor. The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) is an agreement between the Government of Iran and 6 Member States, all 5 Permanent Members and Germany, where the parties agreed to set terms limiting stockpiles of materials used for creating nuclear weaponry. The deal also granted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rights to inspections in named nuclear facilities, in exchange for the mounting international sanctions against Iran to be lifted. With reports being posed by the IAEA that Iran now holds over 5 times the stockpiles allotted per the agreement and following the unilateral withdrawal of the Trump administration in 2018, reinstating harsh sanctions on Iran, the future and the upholdment of the JCPOA has therefore been placed in a situation of uncertainty. Research Report | Page 1 of 15 ​ ​ th The Hague International Model United Nation 2021| 25 ​ January 2021 ​ ​ ​ ​ Definition of Key Terms International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The IAEA is the agency that has the role of serving as the objective third party in ensuring terms of the JCPOA are met. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) The NPT is a UN treaty that commits its signatories towards peaceful development of nuclear technology. Heavy Water Reactors A reactor type that creates a plutonium biproduct in its reactions, which are weapons grade and therefore considered sites with weapons making potential. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) The plan of action agreed upon by Germany, P5 nations and Iran, refers to the “Iran Nuclear Deal”, inspected by the IAEA. Fissile Fuels Fissile fuels are Uranium and Plutonium isotopes, which are the two elements used in the construction of nuclear weapons, but also have other peaceful purposes such as energy production and research as well. Background Information Before the Iranian Revolution, there existed an Iran with a drastically different foreign policy, which entailed cooperation on numeral fronts with Member States such as the USA. In fact, it was with the western nations that Iran began laying the foundation for its nuclear efforts as early as the late 1960s, through some research reactors (A History of Iran's Nuclear Program). Following the implementation of the NPT (discussed more in detail later), Iran began contracting the construction of new nuclear power plants. The NPT, by its terms, restricted these reactors to be used for peaceful purposes only, however Iran’s close alignment with leading NATO nations accounted for its potential security issues. Research Report | Page 2 of 15 ​ ​ th The Hague International Model United Nation 2021| 25 ​ January 2021 ​ ​ ​ ​ Less than a decade after the start of the constructions, Iran underwent a revolution that would redefine Iran as a nation, and the entire Middle East along with it, its effects tangibly manifesting to this day. The Revolution, beginning in 1978, was concluded in February of 1979, where the Shah regime was toppled, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. This marked a crucial turning point for Iran’s foreign policy as well, where a previously NATO-block aligned (not a member) nation harbored mass protests clearly demonstrating against the Shah regime and its methods. Tensions reached a peak during the well known Hostage Crisis, where multiple American consulate workers in Tehran were besieged in the consulate, and held captive for a year in Tehran against the extradition of the Shah to Iran, who was undergoing medical treatment in the U.S. at the time. The U.S. response was harsh, which stopped purchase of Iran’s oil, blocked billions in monetary assets belonging to Iranian officials, passing UNSC resolutions, then filing an ICJ case against Iran, which ordered the release of the hostages. One year later, the Iran-Iraq War, which served as a test to both the military and economic capacity of the two nations began, where the effect of the heavy sanctions against Iran began to be apparent. This renewed the diplomatic efforts that would ultimately end with the release of the hostages at President Reagan’s administration. The war, as is the nature with all wars, proved destructive and damaging to Iran’s economy, alongside Iran’s new reactors in construction. The end result was Siemens, the contractor abandoning the construction of the reactors, coupled with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s firm stance against nuclear weapons as Supreme Leader of Iran. The nuclear program was effectively brought to a standstill. It wasn’t until the 1990s that Iran began resuming its nuclear efforts, through international help thanks to newfound allies such as the USSR, China and Pakistan, where the countries signed bilateral treaties affirming nuclear cooperation. Within this timeframe, Iran had begun autonomizing its nuclear processes, where through uranium exploration and mining activities once again dating back to the Shah regime coupled with the assumption that Iran acquired, or at least began to acquire, enrichment technology for uranium (enriched uranium is a sought after component for nuclear weapons). At this time, Iran was attracting little to no attraction from international audiences, especially in comparison to what happened after 2002: the world was alerted to the clandestine nuclear research programme through an announcement by a prominent dissident figure Alireaza Jafazadeh. This speech uncovered the existence of two prominent nuclear power plants, Natanz and Arak. Unsupervised power plants constituted a serious threat, as Iran could Research Report | Page 3 of 15 ​ ​ th The Hague International Model United Nation 2021| 25 ​ January 2021 ​ ​ ​ ​ have been building nuclear weapons without the world knowing in these facilities. Mr. Jafarzadeh also pointed to the Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), which had been the administrator to these projects. It was uncovered that Iran had been disguising its nuclear efforts under an environmental project’s umbrella, and visitations to these sites by the head of the Atomic Agency, AEOI, only went to reaffirm the true purpose of these facilities. Natanz and Arak, furthermore, were heavy water facilities, whose spent by product for its nuclear reactions created plutonium, another element used in the building of nuclear weapons. The motivations of these projects were suspected to be for the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, where behind closed doors, Iran’s Security Council had strategized that "access to nuclear bomb is the most important guarantor of our survival and in case of having the bomb, the Western countries will not be able to block penetration and expansion of the Islamic Revolution" (“Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program”). Since this reveal in 2002, the IAEA has not been able to confirm the benign intentions proclaimed by the Government of Iran, which are a motivating factor for the sanctions to be rolled out as discussed below. In 2006, the UNSC in conjunction with the international community began to mount pressure on the government of Iran, threatening crippling sanctions to Iran’s efforts if those pertaining to the enrichment of fuels, were not brought to a halt. Iran’s noncompliance with the open demands of the Security Council began the installation of sanctions through a unanimous vote of the Resolution 1737. The resolution enabled the block of trade for any items that would be determined as contributory to the building and delivery of such weapons, as well as its delivery systems. It should be noted that these sanctions related resolutions were titled under “Non-Proliferation”, that pertain to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the NPT, Iran was obligated to allow inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which it failed to do so by failing to disclose its facilities that were allegedly being used for non-peaceful purposes as demonstrated by the hiring of 3 prominent Russian and Ukranian nuclear scientists for the task, alongside the statement remarked above that was made within the National Security Council of Iran. This was a non-peaceful move, considering Iran had hired these scientists on a person by person basis, meaning the scientists’ countries’ volitions played no part in these actions, very likely to be tasked with weapons research. Research Report | Page 4 of 15 ​ ​ th The Hague International Model United Nation 2021| 25 ​ January 2021 ​ ​ ​ ​ Alongside the UN recognized sanctions, the U.S.A. began instating sanctions of its own. In 2012, in a very detrimental move against the banking sector of Iran, all banks within Iran were disconnected from the worldwide SWIFT monetary exchange system. Without this system, the exchange of funds over an international platform would be rendered near impossible, seeing as most nations today, more importantly back in 2012, used SWIFT as a singular medium of electronic money transfer. This penalty that Iran faced has not been contained in its effects to just the banking sector, but in another crucial blow to the nation, undermined Iran’s position of a major petroleum exporter, considering purchases over U.S. Dollars were both subject to sanctions alongside the blockade over the SWIFT system, rendering large purchases infacilitatable.
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