A CASE STUDY Falling from Aristotle to Heidegger
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A CASE STUDY Falling from Aristotle to Heidegger A Dissertation Submitted to the Division of Media and Communications of the European Graduate School in Candidacy of the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy By Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei 2011 Supervised by Avital Ronell τὰ δεσποτῶν γὰρ εὖ πεσόντα θήσομαι, τρὶς ἓξ βαλοὐσης τῆσδέ μοι φρυκτωρίας. I shall take advantage of the dice that have fallen well for my masters — this beacon-watch has thrown me a triple six! — Aeschylus, Agamemnon 32–3 Fig. 1: Two knucklebones (ἀστράγαλοι), a type of Greek dice. Left with the χῖον (1) side up, right with the κῶϊον (6) side up. Both have the πρανές (4) side facing forward, marked by the horn-like protrusions and de left side of the knucklebones. Fig. 2: Two knucklebones (ἀστράγαλοι), a type of Greek dice. Left showingὕπτιον (3) side, right showing the πρανές (4) side. Fig. 3: A South-African Boer ox wagon made from a jawbone (kakebeenwa) pulled by ten oxen made from knucklebones (dolosse). (Voortrekkersmonument, Pretoria sa). Contents Prefatory Remarks . xi Preamble The Stranger. 21 §1 A detour through case. 21 §2 Introducing the Stranger . 26 §3 Noun-words and time-words. 31 Chapter One Aristotle. 35 §4 Homonymy, synonymy, paronymy . 35 §5 Qualities and relatives. 39 §6 The paradigm of case. .42 §7 Noun-words and time-words . .47 §8 Excluding cases . .49 §9 Unmasking sophistic use of case. 52 §10 The first declarative sentence . 56 §11 Calling the noun-word. 60 §12 A discourse of something . .63 §13 The case of the subject. 67 Chapter Two The Stoics . 71 §14 Stoic logics . 71 §15 Case on the move. 77 §16 The straight case and the generic name . .82 §17 The example of wrestling . .89 §18 The example of the falling stylus . 91 §19 Creating space for ontological difference . .95 §20 The subject and his habits. 100 ix a case study Excursus Matthew Barney: Drawing Restraint 10 . 105 §21 Sexual and ontological difference. 105 §22 From differentiation to thrownness . 109 Chapter Three Martin Heidegger. 111 §23 The time that remains . 111 §24 The movement of caring. 114 §25 Addiction as the case of care . 117 §26 Restructuring the λόγος . 121 §27 Time-traveling to Plato’s pharmacy . 125 §28 Defining the category of case. 131 §29 Casting the knucklebones. 136 §30 Recasting the subject. 139 §31 The subject’s Being-in-the-world. 141 Concluding Remarks Marcel Broodthaers: Un Coup de dés…. 145 Bibliography . 155 x Prefatory Remarks In this thesis, it is our aim to discuss several aspects and developments of the Greek concept of πτῶσις, commonly know as case. This term was first coined by Aristotle in relation to both the grammatical and the philosophical category of the ὑποκειμένον (hypokeimenon) or subject. It is our contention that the concept of πτῶσις (ptōsis), as it was first developed by Aristotle and inscribed by the Stoic philosophers in a grammatical regime, can be deployed to inspect several aspects of Martin Hei- degger’s concept of the Verfallenheit or fallenness of Dasein, and that a reading of his work through the lens of Stoic grammatical theory reveals several complications of the concept of the subject that have, in our opinion, not yet been brought to the fore. Our interest for what is called case dates back to a first — or, what we would like to think of as first — encounter with philosophy, namely the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Witt- genstein. The famous, often quoted first paragraph of this work reads “The world is all that is the case.”1 The vertical, monolithic presence of this sentence has fascinated us ever since. However, as we discovered later on, the German original includes an essential punctuation mark that is lost in the English translation: “Der Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.”2 There is a comma behind alles, everything, making the sentence ambiguous. Was der Fall ist can be interpreted as either referring to the anteced- ent Der Welt ist alles, or merely to alles, as is proposed by the English translation. Thus this sentence, read by itself, allows for other interpretations, such as “The world is everything, which is the case.” The Dutch artist and theorist Dick Raaijmakers suggested to read Wittgenstein’s paragraph in a third way, namely as “The world is all as it has fallen.”3 This potential reading of the German sentence is definitely lost in the English translation. Raaijmakers takes the GermanFall literally to mean “fall,” which has a gravitational connotation that we will constantly keep in mind during our work. We will have to be aware of the physical concept of fall when discussing the metaphysical concept of πτῶσις, case.4 It is the (metaphorical) oscillation between these two poles — physical and metaphysical — that will interest us throughout this thesis. 1 Wittgenstein 1974, 5, §1. 2 Wittgenstein 1977, 11. 3 Raaijmakers 1984, 59. 4 In this sense, we are staying close to Heidegger when he states in Phänomenologische Interpretationen aus- gewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik (Phenomenological Interpretations from Selected Treatises by Aristotle on Ontology and Logic) that “Im Lichte des angesetzten Faktizitätsproblems ist Aristoteles nur die Vollednung und konkrete Ausformung der vorangegangenen Philosophie; zugleich aber gewinnt Aristoteles in seiner ‘Physik’ einen prinzipiellen neuen Grundansatz, aus dem seine Ontologie und Logik erwachsen[.] Das zentrale Phän- omen, dessen Explikation Thema der Physik wird, ist das Seiende im Wie seines Bewegtseins” [GA62]. xi A Case Study The following chapters are also an exercise in restraint. As Wittgenstein already suggested, the concept of case offers a fragmented view on the world, focusing on single or multiple items at the same time: “Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.”5 But the items that will be the case in our inquiry will pertain directly to the course set out above: an investigation of the Artistotelian concept of πτῶσις vis-à-vis Heidegger’s concept of Verfallenheit and their common “substrate,” the subject as (becoming) Dasein. This dissertation is an attempt, as Jacques Derrida formulated, to interpret the moment, the present before the fall, to interpret being-thrown as passivity, [which] could be reinscribed into a problematics much later than subjectivity (active or passive). What means “throw” before all syntaxes? and being-thrown before the fall, whether Platonic or Christian?6 We are interested in exactly this “being-thrown before the fall,” that which sets the fall in motion. But at the same time, this means that we will have to suspend the theological issues concerning the fall from Paradise, and the legions of falling angels. It is not the Christian concept of sin that we will concern ourselves with, but again, just like Heidegger proposed, we intend to read Aristotle without the burden of Christian interpretation. Likewise, we will refrain from explicitly addressing the psy- choanalytic discourse with its abundance of case studies, although, in our concluding remarks, we will not be able to resist their attractive force. Similarly, a linguistic investigation into the empirical manifestations of case systems, the way in which case manifests itself formally and superficially in language, as we have investigated before7 will remain external to this thesis. We are aware that these excisions potentially weaken our intended thorough reading of the concept of case, but instead we suggest that by focusing on the singular relation between πτῶσις and Verfallenheit, there will emerge a potentially new reading that may thence be applied to the above domains of theology, psychoanaly- sis, and linguistics. There are two methodological issues that we would like address before discussion the general organi- zation of this thesis. The first one pertains to our philological method, and the second one to the con- cept of paradigm. Because of the entanglement of philosophy and grammar marking the origins of this inquiry, our approach can neither be exclusively philosophical nor solely grammatical; it departs from the acknowledgement that the occidental study of grammar8 has emerged from a philosophical 5 Wittgenstein 1974, 5, §1.21. 6 Derrida 1990a, 165–6. 7 Van Gerven Oei 2005. 8 The study of grammar of course emerged in other parts of the world as well, such as the magnificent Sanskrit xii Prefatory Remarks debate over the heritage of Aristotle’s thought, which itself is partially founded on the reworking of Platonic concepts, and that grammatical categories in their turn have supplied a basis for philosophi- cal considerations about language. This complex relationship becomes specifically acute at the moment that we link these develop- ments to the conception of subject. As has already been remarked by Friedrich Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil, the subject as a philosophical category is, perhaps erroneously, intimately bound up with grammar: “Aren’t we allowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicate and object? Shouldn’t philosophers rise above the belief in grammar?”9 In other words, Nietzsche urges the philosopher to fall out of his role which always already assumes the structural integrity of language as something external to philosophy proper. In Nietzsche, this displacement within philosophy becomes apparent in his use of philologi- cal techniques,10 which are in a precise sense, “ironic.” They interrupt and disrupt, as Paul de Man suggested,11 the canonical philosophical argument as it has been built up carefully over the centuries, with its own, “philosophical” pattern of clearings and shadows. And it is these philological tech- niques that will be featured prominently in the main part of this thesis. That is, in the commentary and exegesis of both antique and modern texts.