sign in sign up
<<
Home , Alexander of Battenberg, Andrei Katkov, April Uprising of 1876, Bulgarian Exarchate, Bulgarian Patriots, Dragan Tsankov

1

EMPIRE UNGUIDED: RUSSO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, 1878-1886

A dissertation presented

by

Mikhail Sergeyevich Rekun

To The Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the field of

History

Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts March, 2016

2

EMPIRE UNGUIDED: RUSSO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, 1878-1886

by

Mikhail Sergeyevich Rekun

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University March, 2016

3

Abstract

Empire Unguided seeks to explain the very rapid breakdown in Russo-Bulgarian relations in the years immediately following the Russian liberation of from the in 1878. At the beginning of the period, the and the were extremely close allies, bound together by sentiment, by geopolitical reality, and by strong administrative ties. Yet by 1886, relations would degenerate to the point that the Bulgarian

Prince was overthrown in a Russian-backed coup, there were serious discussions of a Russian invasion of the country, and diplomatic relations were ultimately severed entirely for the better part of a decade. Empire Unguided contends that the proximate cause of the break was the aggressive and tactless behavior of a series of Russian military and diplomatic agents in

Bulgaria, who frequently followed their own policies and ideas without regard for the foreign policy preferences of St. Petersburg. More broadly, the organizational weakness and backwardness of the Russian foreign policy apparatus meant that the Russian Empire was unable to develop a single policy approach, or to force its acceptance by its agents in Bulgaria. This gap was instead filled by Panslav ideology, with sharply negative consequences both for Russo-

Bulgarian relations and for ‘s geopolitical goals in the . Ultimately, Empire

Unguided demonstrates the critical importance of organizational competence in diplomatic affairs.

4

Acknowledgements

There is a very good and very famous line by the English devotional John Donne, which runs ―No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the , a part of the main.‖ The same can be said, if less eloquently, for dissertations. Empire Unguided was done with the help of many hands and many minds, and nothing gives me greater pleasure than to thank them now.

First place goes to my dissertation committee. Prof. Harlow Robinson, for being my guide through Northeastern University and getting me to this point to begin with. Prof. Heather

Streets-Salter, for being an eternal pillar of support. And Prof. Howard Malchow, for seeing this project from its beginnings at Tufts and now seeing it to the end at Northeastern. I would also like to thank the members of my MA thesis committee at Tufts, who oversaw the earlier version of Empire Unguided – Prof. Malchow, but also Prof. Daniel Mulholland, for putting up with all of my last minute questions and concerns, and Prof. Gregory Carleton, for riding to the rescue at the last moment.

I would like to thank Professors Ina Baghdiantz-McCabe, David Proctor, and Jeffrey

Burds for all the help, advice, and suggestions they have given me. I would like to thank

Margaret Casey and Annette Lazzara at Tufts and Bonita Knipfer, Kirsten Bilas, and Amy

Killeen at NEU for their help with a never-ending stream of technical and bureaucratic issues.

And I would like to thank the hardworking staff at the Tisch and Snell Libraries for securing a veritable dragon‘s hoard of obscure and forgotten tomes.

5

I would like to thank the American Research Center in for giving me the funding, lodgings, and resources to go to Bulgaria for my research, and to the Gillis Family Fund for the funding to go to Russia. This project would not have been possible without their assistance.

I would like to thank the helpful staff at the Russian State Library, State Archive of the Russian Federation, and Russian State Military-Historical Archive. I would particularly like to thank the very kind women who worked at Sofia‘s Central State Archives, who were remarkably helpful despite us being utterly incapable of mutual communication.

I would like to thank my fellow ARCS Fellows, in particular Victor Petrov, for translating some of the trickiest Bulgarian sources for me, and Francesco La Rocca, for serving as a sounding board and brainstorming assistant when I finally figured out what this dissertation was about. I would like to thank my proofreaders, Marlie Philiossaint, Eleanor Ferron, Regina

Kazyulina, and Serge Rekun, who helped make this dissertation far more readable. And I would like to particularly thank Galina Tyrtova for all of her assistance in working and living in Russia.

I would have been a great deal more lost and confused without her.

And finally, I would like to thank all of my friends and family, for putting up with me when I embarked upon long-winded monologues about the politics of in the fall of 1886. They have had the patience of saints.

6

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... 2

Acknowledgements ...... 4

Table of Contents ...... 6

Preface...... 7

Introduction ...... 8

Chapter 1: A until 1878 ...... 27

Chapter 2: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ...... 75

Chapter 3: Panslavism...... 108

Chapter 4: Setting up the State, 1878-1879 ...... 131

Chapter 5: The First Troubled Year, 1879-1880 ...... 159

Illustrations ...... 186

Chapter 6: Assassination, Ultimatum, Coup, 1880-1881 ...... 196

Chapter 7: Simmering Resentment, 1881-1882 ...... 220

Chapter 8: The Nadir, 1882-1883 ...... 232

Chapter 9: The Unification of Bulgaria, 1883-1885 ...... 265

Chapter 10: The Final Act, 1886...... 293

Conclusion ...... 319

Glossary of Names ...... 333

Bibliography ...... 337

7

Preface

No work on Slavic History in the can avoid addressing the issue of calendars and nomenclature. Regarding the latter, this study uses the American Library

Association – transliteration system for most Russian and Bulgarian names, with four exceptions. Names which are famously known by other spellings maintain those – thus one speaks of II and not Aleks ndr. Russian or Bulgarian authors who also wrote in English keep the spelling they themselves used, so one speaks of D. I. Abrikossow and not the more modern Abrik sov. Cities are called by their modern names, for instance instead of

Philippopolis. Finally, names quoted directly from sources are left in the original spellings.

Regarding dates, specific dates are cited according to both the used in the West and the in use in Russia and Bulgaria whenever possible. During the

19th century the two calendars were twelve days apart, the Julian being the earlier of the two. In some cases, particularly when dealing with sources, the author has been unable to determine precisely which calendar a given date is using – in those cases, the date is delivered as it is in the source, though one can usually assume that it is the Julian calendar being used. Bulgaria would maintain the Julian calendar until 1916, and Russia until the Revolution a little later.

Abbreviations Used in Endnotes

TsDA: T Sentralen d"rzhaven arkhiv (Central State Archives in Sofia, Bulgaria) RGVIA: Rossiĭskiĭ gosudarstvennyĭ voenno-istoricheskiĭ arkhiv (Russian State Military- Historical Archive in , Russia) AVPRI: Arkhiv vneshneĭ politiki Rossiĭskoĭ imperii (Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire in Moscow, Russia)

8

Introduction

On August 8th/20th, 1886 the twenty-nine-year-old of the Principality of

Bulgaria, Alexander von Battenberg, worked late into the night before retiring to his bedchamber in the royal palace. What happened a few hours later would change the course of Bulgarian history. As he later recalled to his chaplain, Adolf Koch, he had,

…scarcely fallen asleep, when I was awakened by noise that reached me from the passage before my bedroom. It might have been half-past one. The next moment Dimitri, my Bulgarian servant, burst into the room, trembling and quaking in every limb, and cried, ‗You are betrayed; they mean to murder you. Fly before it is too late!‘ I sprang out of bed and seized my revolver. Then I heard the military word of command, and breathed more easily. I said to Dimitri, ‗I am saved, the military is there.‘ But he, still trembling, ejaculated, ‗No, fly; it is just the soldiers who mean to kill you.‘ Then I rushed to the door leading into the garden in my shirt, but as I opened it I was met by firing. Immediately after I heard shots on all sides. I went from here through the dark corridor towards the servants‘ wing, and up the first story into the winter garden, to obtain a bird‘s eye view, and see if it were still possible to escape. Up there, it was so dark that I could not see my hand before my eyes, but, from the line of fire of the soldiers shooting below, I found that the whole Palace was surrounded, and it was useless to think of escape; the shower of bullets permitted no doubt as to the serious nature of situation. At the same time I heard the cry from a hundred throats, ‗Dolu Knjaz!‘ ‗Down with the Prince!‘ I then went back to my room to put on my uniform, for I wished at least to be shot in my regimentals. Once more in my room I resolved to strike a light; but the soldiers straightway fired at the window. I, therefore, put out my light again, and in the dark, without waiting to put on underclothes and stockings, I got into my uniform as quickly as possible. Meanwhile the noise, clashing of arms and shouts of an excited crowd, grew louder and louder. When I was ready, I went out into the corridor. There I was immediately surrounded by a crowd of people, and though only one stearine candle was alight, I could see by the glitter of bayonets, that about a hundred and fifty men stood about me. Resistance was, of course, useless, as only two of the bodyguard were there. They indeed wanted to fire, but I forbade them. I now went, pressed by this mass of people, into the entrance hall of the Palace. At this moment my brother [Prince Francis Joseph of Battenberg, visiting at this time] came too. As I stood there, an impudent cadet tore a leaf from the memorandum-book lying on the table, and the whole troop— in an evident state of intoxication—shouted to me that I was to sign my abdication. Some of the most insolent, conspicuous among whom was Captain Dimitrieff [Radko Dimitriev], held a revolver the while under my nose. Parley with these excited creatures was impossible. I could only say one thing to them:

9

they themselves must write, for I did not know what reasons I should allege for my abdication. Thereupon one of the bystanders took the pen and began to write, but, being tipsy, made so many blots and illegible signs, that when he tried to read aloud what he had written, he was obliged to give up the attempt. Without further delay I took the pen and wrote on the paper, ‗God protect Bulgaria! Alexander.‘ I had hardly written it when they tore the leaf away under my hands, and Captain Dimitrieff stuck it, without looking at it, in his excitement, into his pocket. Then they insisted on my going to the War Office. There I was put into a room, inside and outside of which soldiers were stationed as guards. Besides this, an officer, with a revolver in his hand, paced up and down my room. While I was still there, Captain Bendereff [Anastas Bend rev came, his hands in his pockets, to revel in staring at me. I asked him, ‗What do you mean to do with me?‘ and was answered ‗You will have to come to Russia.‘1

While Battenberg does not record his reaction, it is unlikely that Bend rev‘s words were a surprise. By this point, Russia and Bulgaria had been conducting an increasingly fractious feud for several years, and though the August Coup had its origins in internal Bulgarian disagreements, Captain Dimitriev and Captain Bend rev were acting with the knowledge and support of the Russian Empire.

Russo-Bulgarian Relations, 1878-1886

This represented quite a reverse of policy, since up until a few years earlier, Russia and

Bulgaria had had the very best of relations. After five hundred years of Ottoman rule, Bulgaria was finally liberated during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, a liberation achieved through

Russian force of arms and Russian . The Russian Alexander II was hailed in

Bulgaria as the Tsar-Liberator, there were petitions of thanksgiving, and the very first monarch of independent Bulgaria was a nephew of his wife, the German-born Alexander von Battenberg.

Furthermore, sentiment was strengthened by significant geopolitical and administrative ties. In terms of geopolitics, both Russia and Bulgaria had national interests that were best fulfilled

10 through close relations with the other. The Russian Empire had had its eye on control of the

Dardanelles for a century now, and a powerful, loyal Bulgaria was an excellent stepping stone towards finally acquiring the straits. Meanwhile, while the initial peace treaties had given

Bulgaria vast lands and an enormous population, the in 1878 had carved up

Bulgaria into three parts – the Principality of Bulgaria and the Ottoman provinces of Eastern

Rumelia and . This meant that the Principality had a number of irredentist claims, and the best way to secure those claims was through the support of the Russian Empire. Not to mention that such support was also important in warding off any renewed Turkish aggressions.

And in the realm of administration, in order to secure this alliance the majority of the Bulgarian military command, including the Minister of War and all the senior officers, were in fact Russian subjects on detached duty from the Imperial Army. In short, Russo-Bulgarian relations during the first years after Bulgaria‘s liberation were exceptionally good.

Furthermore, according to most International Relations theory, they should have stayed good. According to a straightforward Realist reading of events, Russia and Bulgaria should have maintained close relations since it was entirely in their mutual security interests – both had regional enemies, most notably the Ottoman Empire, and could benefit from each others‘ military assistance. Looking at Russo-Bulgarian events through a Liberal or International Law perspective is trickier, but still suggests that the two countries should have maintained close relations. Both had been left better off by the than they had been before the

Russo-Turkish War, if not as much as if the had been allowed to remain.

But in any case, there was nothing to be gained for either side from further adventurism, and consolidating their gains would have been the order of the day. Finally, a Constructivist approach

11 to Russo-Bulgarian relations suggests a more ambiguous outcome, but one that still bodes generally well for continued amity. The two countries shared a strong sense of identity, both being Orthodox , which set them apart from their immediate rivals, the Catholic and Magyar of Austria- and the Islamic Turks of the Ottoman Empire. One could identify some fault-lines in the divergent forms of government – Russia had been an absolute autocracy for generations, whereas Bulgaria would develop a liberal constitutional monarchy with a dominant . But overall, Russia and Bulgaria‘s shared identity, under a

Constructivist reading, would suggest pleasant diplomatic relations overall.

Yet they disintegrated with startling speed. There were troubles almost from the beginning, as Alexander von Battenberg found cause for complaint with the he had been left, and entered into a series of squabbles with his first Minister of War, the Russian general P. D. Parensov. Over the following years, Bulgaria would degenerate into a multi-sided political brawl, punctuated by a royal coup in 1881, and with Russian diplomacy and military agents frequently working at cross-purposes. By 1883, matters had reached such a nadir that, in the words of the British Ambassador to Sofia, ―the had tried to carry matters with so high a hand as to make the rival parties among the forget their animosities for the moment and united them against the [Russians .‖2 Personal relations between Prince Alexander von Battenberg and his cousin, Tsar Alexander III, were absolutely poisonous.

The situation became even worse with the Unification of Bulgaria in 1885, when an uprising in Eastern saw that land unite with the Principality of Bulgaria. The Russian

Empire, previously a supporter of unification, now did all it could to try and reverse it, the Tsar going so far as to recall all Russian officers from Bulgaria – a failed effort which only served to

12 harden antagonisms between the two countries. From that point, it was only a short jump to the

Russian-backed coup of August 1886, a coup which failed, although Battenberg was ultimately removed. But the new Bulgarian government refused to accede to Russian demands, and after the possibility of a Russian occupation was threatened, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed entirely. They were not resumed until almost a decade later.

Thus, the first question to ask is, why did Russo-Bulgarian relations fall to pieces so quickly and so completely even though there were sentimental, administrative, and geopolitical reasons for them to continue to be positive?

The simple answer is that many of the Russian Empire‘s diplomatic and military agents in Bulgaria behaved with a singular lack of tact or politesse.i They were rude, they were authoritarian, they were patronizing, they embroiled themselves in endless squabbles over penny-ante affairs that had no geopolitical significance but which nevertheless caused a rift between the Bulgarians and their patrons. They carried out their own policies without consideration of either Russia‘s true geopolitical needs or local Bulgarian feeling, and repeatedly antagonized even those individuals who in other circumstances might have been the allies of

Russia.

Now, this is not to say that the other parties were entirely blameless – Battenberg in particular contributed a great deal to the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations. Nor is it to say that there were never any truly significant disagreements over matters of politics or policy, as

i It should be noted that the Russian Empire sent a great many individuals to work in Bulgaria, including hundreds of military officers. Nevertheless, when this text refers to Russian agents, it primarily means those individuals dispatched by St. Petersburg who had significant influence over the course of Russian policy in Bulgaria – in other words, the Russian Consul-General in Sofia, and those subjects of the Tsar who held cabinet-level positions in the Bulgarian government. This last category includes the Bulgarian Minister of War, who was invariably a Russian general, but at certain points included other individuals, such as General L. N. Sobolev, who held the posts of Minister of Interior and Minister-President.

13 there were. But neither of these other factors would have proved fatal for Russo-Bulgarian amity.

Most Bulgarian politicians, who held the real power in the country, were quite eager to maintain close relations with Russia, and the two countries‘ shared interests far outweighed whatever minor disagreements they may have had.

Likewise, in the interests of fairness, one should note that not every agent of Russia was so culpable. Some individuals, such as Prince Mikhail Aleksandrovich Kantakuzen, the

Bulgarian Minister of War from 1884 to 1885, won plaudits for their tact, grace, and ability to work with their Bulgarian colleagues. But a significant number of Russian agents ended up being reviled in Bulgaria – men such as the Generals L. N. Sobolev and A. V. Kaul'bars, Colonel A. A.

Remlingen, or the Russian Consul-Generals M. A. Khitrovó and A. M. Kumani, or to a lesser extent General Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth, General P. D. Parensov, Colonel A. A. Shepelev, and

Consul-General A. P. Davydov. Clearly, this is a significant number of individuals.

This brings one to the next question. To simply label Russia‘s agents in Bulgaria fools and incompetents is neither accurate nor intellectually satisfying. Many of them had had long and successful careers in the diplomatic and military spheres, such as Davydov, who had previously served in the embassies and consulates of Vienna, , , , and

Washington, DC, or Sobolev, a graduate of the Nicholas General Staff Academy and a veteran of the battles of Plevna and Pass, as well as one of the designers of Bulgaria‘s civil administration after the Russo-Turkish War. Therefore, the second question to ask is why did

Russia‘s agents in Bulgaria behave in the manner that they did?

The answer here lies in two parts. First and foremost, one has to consider the Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period in question. During the 19th century, the art of

14 diplomacy was undergoing considerable change. In 1800, diplomacy largely consisted of finding a suitably cosmopolitan aristocrat, entrusting him with a long list of instructions, and sending him on his way to negotiate a treaty or what-have-you. By 1900, diplomacy had been regularized, professionalized, and bureaucratized. The diplomat, while still of genteel background, was a trained civil servant who was kept in constant contact with the Foreign

Minister by way of telegraph, and who was supported by a large staff of clerks and specialist experts back home. It was simply an entirely different way of doing things, and it was a change to which the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very late in arriving.

In fact, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was plagued with an entire raft of problems during the 19th century. Professional standards were something of a joke, with connections counting for far more than skill – there were some amazingly competent individuals in the Russian diplomatic corps, but overall the level of skill was highly uneven. Administration was confused and there was constant interference from the Ministry of War and the Imperial

Court. Russian foreign policy was regularly subject to both personal rivalries and to the whims of the Tsar, who rarely had much in the way of foreign policy training. There was little coordination between the different embassies and consulates abroad, or between them and St. Petersburg. As a consequence of all of this, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had enormous trouble both in formulating a single line of policy, and in forcing all of its agents abroad to follow that line.

This leads to the second part of the answer. In the absence of a clearly formulated and strictly enforced policy line from St. Petersburg, Russian agents abroad tended to follow their own initiative, and carry out foreign policy as they saw best. And for a great many of them, their ideas of what was best for Russia were informed by the then-dominant ideologies of Panslavism.

15

And Panslavism, with its messianic and chauvinistic tendencies, tended to annoy actual Slavs in the Balkans to no end. Simply put, Russian agents acting from a Panslav perspective tended to expect local Balkan Slavs (including the Bulgarians) to fall into line and carry out Russia‘s every wish, regardless of local concerns. When this didn‘t happen, accusations of ingratitude and betrayal would cloud the air.

This is what happened in Bulgaria. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was singularly unable to either settle on a coherent policy line or to force all of Russia‘s agents in

Bulgaria to follow it. As a result, every Russian agent in the country followed his own line of thinking as to how best to serve Russia, which often clashed with those of other Russian agents, with the big picture as seen from St. Petersburg, and with the desires and beliefs of the

Bulgarians, who while undeniably grateful to their liberators still treasured their .

Combined with a dose of ill luck and a Prince who was hardly any more tactful or politically skilled than his opponents, it is no wonder that Russo-Bulgarian relations fell apart as quickly as they did.

Literature Review

In the words of historian Alfred J. Rieber, ―the historiography of Russian foreign policy has never enjoyed much of an intellectual vogue.‖3 The domestic history of the Russian Empire, particularly with its grand climax in the form of the Revolution, simply attracted more interest.

Furthermore, as Rieber points out, one had to deal with problems of politics and of sources.

Diplomatic archives have traditionally been closely guarded even in more open countries than the Russian Empire or the USSR, and foreign policy lay close to the heart of any number of

16 politically charged conflicts, most notably the . This made writing good diplomatic history, at least from the Russian perspective, an exercise fraught with difficulty.

On the other hand, a number of prominent historians have risen to the challenge over the decades, and several of them have turned their attentions to the problem of Russia‘s break with

Bulgaria in the first years after the latter‘s independence. It is easy to see why. It was a dramatic moment in history, with a great deal of political excitement, and with serious consequences for the later history of both Bulgaria and Russia.

The earliest accounts of the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations came in the form of memoirs from various participants, and these were typically characterized by blatant partisanship and naked self-justification. To pluck a few examples, L. N. Sobolev published his account of his time in Bulgaria in the historical journal k i in in 1886, where he blamed everything on various German and Austrian-backed conspiracies among the Bulgarian ruling elites, while

Adolf Koch, Prince Battenberg‘s personal chaplain, fulminated against Russian intrigues in his

1887 book. While useful as primary sources, neither Sobolev‘s nor Koch‘s analyses could be rated particularly highly. Other contemporary accounts were more judicious, though not without their flaws. General P. D. Parensov published his own, quite extensive memoirs of his Bulgarian odyssey between 1900 and 1908, and while he was much more measured and realistic in his accounting of events, he still devoted several pages to what he perceived as the sinister role of the Austrian Ambassador.4

Of the other significant accounts of the period, three are worth noting. A. F. Golovin‘s

F le nde I on lg ien -1886 was published in 1896. Golovin was Battenberg‘s private secretary, and his work has only ever been printed in German, but follows broadly the

17 same path as Koch in being an apologia for Battenberg. Secondly, General Johann Casimir

Ehrnrooth published his own brief account of his time in Bulgaria in k i in , in direct response to various accusations leveled his way by Sobolev. It is a tepid sort of document, with

Ehrnrooth providing a few justifications and explanations but generally adopting a restrained and un-analytical tone – it is of vital interest to the historian as a source, but not as an analysis.

Finally, the Russian journalist Evgeniĭ L'vov was a correspondent for the St. Petersburg oe

V m i and was one of the first people in after the Bulgarian Unification of

1885. His account (The Rumelian Coup) has sadly been largely forgotten, but contains one of the most lucid evaluations of the inadequacies of the Russian foreign policy apparatus.

The first scholarly works were somewhat superior to the memoirs, but not terribly so.

Count Egon Corti was Battenberg‘s chief biographer, releasing his Alexander von

Battenberg in 1920, followed by The Downfall of Three a few years later. These were semi-popular accounts, written using the remnants of Battenberg‘s own private papers (many of the originals were destroyed by Battenberg‘s brother upon the former‘s death in 1893) and interviews with surviving participants. Corti‘s books adopt a rather gossipy tone, spending a great deal of time on Battenberg‘s private life and failed romances, and providing relatively little in the way of serious analysis. They did, however, provide an invaluable service by including copies of key telegrams and letters in their entirety, as most of Battenberg‘s private papers were later lost.5 In Bulgaria, the main chronicler of this period of history was , whose

1911 The Founders of Contemporary Bulgaria remains one of the most detailed accounts to this day, even if it is somewhat out of date as new information has appeared. Another early writer on the subject of Russo-Bulgarian relations was the Russian court historian Serg ĭ Spirid novich

18

Tat shchev, who touched upon Bulgarian matters in his many monographs on Russian foreign policy in the 19th century. But Tat shchev was himself a peripheral participant in the Tsar‘s court during the time, and as such his works hewed closely to the official line, being, as Reiber put it,

―technically polished and respectful in tone… yet… generally apologetic and lacking in any broad interpretive interest.‖6 Tat shchev was a recorder, not an analyst.

This mention of Tat shchev brings up an important point, however, which is the dearth of good Russian and Soviet scholarship on the topic. As mentioned earlier, scholarship of Imperial

Russian foreign policy was plagued by the twin issues of politics and sources – simply put, if one wished to access archives during the Imperial or Soviet period, one had to prove that one was politically reliable. This rather cast a pall on the study of late Imperial Russian diplomatic history, and those Russian scholars who did persevere and try to work in the field, men such as

M. N. Pokrovskii or F. I. Notovich, simply did not turn their attention to the study of Bulgaria immediately after liberation. It remained an obscure topic, regularly mentioned in historical texts but rarely examined in depth. The one exception would be S. D. Skazkin‘s Kone o- ko- ge m n kogo o i (The End of the Austro-Russo-German Alliance), published in 1928.

Though a bit long in tooth, for decades it remained one of the few works on the subject that took advantage of Russian archives, and was thus integral in the scholarship of later authors such as

Cyril Edwin Black.

On the English-language side of things, three historians of note have turned to the subject of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the years before the fall of the . The first of these gentlemen was the aforementioned Cyril Edwin Black, a student of the renowned historian of international relations William Langer. It was while still a young scholar operating under

19

Langer‘s tutelage at Princeton that Black published his first major work, The Establishment of

Constitutional Government in Bulgaria in 1943. Though focused more heavily on internal

Bulgarian matters, Black noted the discord and odd actions of the Russian agents in Bulgaria.

For him, the explanation for the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations could be found in the disagreement between the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of War – an argument that is not without some explanatory value, though it failed to explain why agents who worked for the same ministry disagreed with one another at least as much as agents who worked for different branches of the Russian state. In any case, explaining Russo-Bulgarian relations was not the focus of Black‘s work.ii

It was, however, the key goal of another prominent scholar, Charles Jelavich of Indiana

University. Widely read in Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian, and with access to the personal correspondence of the Russian Foreign Minister N. K. Girs (though not to other Russian archival material), Jelavich published his magnum opus, Tsarist Russia and Balkan in 1958.

Despite its name, it focuses exclusively on Russian relations with and Bulgaria in the years immediately after the Russo-Turkish War, and it remains the standard text on the subject.

Like Black, Jelavich remarked on the confused actions of Russian agents, but his ability to provide a detailed examination of the subject was hampered by the lack of Russian archival materials. Consequently, he focused his argument on the importance of nationalism in explaining the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations, arguing that Bulgarian nationalism ultimately required the Bulgarians to seek independence from their Russian patrons. As with Black‘s

ii As a point of interest, Black was not just a scholar of history, but also a practitioner, so to speak. Via Langer, Black entered government service during the Second World War, and was one of the Allied experts sent to help set up the new Bulgarian state immediately after the end of the war. It was in this capacity that he published one of the most lucid accounts of Bulgaria‘s fall to communism. C. E. Black, ―The Start of the Cold War in Bulgaria: A Personal View‖ in The Review of Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 163-202.

20 argument, there is a great deal of truth in this, but the inability to explain why Russian agents behaved in a way so injurious to Bulgarian nationalism leaves it incomplete.

The final Cold War era scholar of note was George Kennan, the author of the United

States‘s containment strategy, who also turned his attentions to history. Kennan never taught at a university or had students in a conventional sense, but he published several books later in his life.

One of them was his 1979 The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de F nco-Russian

Relations, 1875-1890, which examines at length the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the context of Russia‘s shift from alliance with to alliance with . His approach was informed by his diplomatic experience – Kennan focuses his attention primarily on St.

Petersburg and the Imperial Court, with Bulgaria itself something of an afterthought. He also places enormous weight on the role of individuals as opposed to examining systemic factors, with diplomacy becoming a game of chess between and ministers. In a way, one might consider Kennan‘s work a far more skilled update of Corti‘s biographies. As a chronicler of people and personalities and motivations, Kennan is top-notch, but his analysis was modest, and in any case directed towards his central topic of Russian-German-French relations. The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de provides an important corrective in its emphasis on Russia, but it likewise does not perfectly explain the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations.

The end of the Cold War wrought a sea change in the scholarship of Russia, opening up archives at the same time as state interest in the subject waned (at least in the ). The most prominent recent English-language scholar of Bulgaria, then, is in fact a professor at

Oxford, R. J. Crampton. Crampton has written a number of books on Bulgaria, beginning with his monograph Bulgaria, 1878-1918: A History published in 1983, and most recently

21 culminating in what is now the main English-language tome on the country, Bulgaria published in 2007. As a historian, Crampton is characterized by his mastery of Bulgarian sources, particularly newspapers – most previous scholars, including Kennan, Jelavich, and Black relied heavily on the papers of foreign diplomats stationed in Bulgaria, or on the writings of Russian officials. At the same time, Crampton has not expressed interest in examining the cause of the

Russo-Bulgarian breakup. Rather, he has focused on how that event affected the further course of

Bulgarian history.

The fall of the USSR has also allowed scholars in Russia and Eastern to examine the subject in greater detail, with some very interesting works making an appearance. The most directly relevant is a 2003 dissertation by Petr Ku tsarov of the Russian Academy of Science, entitled The Unification of Bulgaria in 1885 and the Russian Empire. Taking advantage of the newly opened material at the Archive of Foreign Politics of the Russian Empire (AVPRI),

Ku tsarov looked in considerable detail at the way Russian political and public figures reacted to the Unification. His attention to pre-Unification matters is scant, and so he does not really go into detail as to why Russo-Bulgarian relations were so bad in 1885, but he adroitly describes the troubles Russia had as resulting from a ‗politics of feeling‘, where the emotions of individuals

(primarily the Tsar) had an outsized effect on Russia‘s foreign policy. He also , in considerable detail and with excellent sources, the Unification itself, and how it showcased many of the flaws of Russia‘s foreign policy apparatus. Other scholars who have worked in the field include I. V. Grigorash, who has written an article in 2005 entitled ―Russia and the

Establishment of Bulgarian Statehood,‖ and Tatiana Kostadinova, who published Bulgaria,

1879-1946: The Challenge of Choice in 1995. Both touch upon Russo-Bulgarian relations in the

22 post-Liberation period, but their emphasis likewise lies elsewhere – Grigorash focuses on

Bulgaria‘s de jure independence in 1908 rather than its independence in 1878, and

Kostadinova is more interested in the broader sweep of Bulgarian electoral politics. A. V.

Ign t‘ev provides one of the most interesting analytical explanations for the breakup in his 2011 book Foreign Relations of Russia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Century

(Russia before the call of a New Era) -- Ign t‘ev argues that while there were serious subjective reasons for why relations broke apart (imperial mistakes, the tendency of Russian agents to issue peremptory orders to the Bulgarians), there were also key economic reasons, that Russia‘s poverty and agricultural economy meant it had nothing to offer to the Balkan peoples. But as might be deduced from the title of Ign t‘ev‘s book, Bulgaria occupies only a very small part of his work.

Intervention in the Scholarship

With all of this in mind, one now turns to the question of just what Empire Unguided brings to all of this scholarship. The answer is that Empire Unguided tries to go one step further in its explanation of the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations than any of the worthy historians listed in the previous pages. Empire Unguided attempts to explain both the proximate cause of the breakup – the poor behavior of Russian agents in Bulgaria – and the structural causes – the weakness and inefficiencies of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the influence of

Panslav ideology. At the time of this writing, no one else has attempted to do so on an in-depth level using Russian and Bulgarian archival material.

23

The proximate cause of the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations is relatively uncontroversial. Participants then and historians now are generally willing to assign an important role in the downfall to the poor behavior of Russia‘s agents in Bulgaria. Intelligent men and women may disagree over just how to weigh that role relative to the behavior of others such as

Battenberg or to structural causes such as economic weakness or the strength of Bulgarian nationalism. But virtually everyone who studies the subject has been willing to list the behavior of Russian agents as one of the leading causes of the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations. This is good as far as it goes.

But hardly anyone has tried to rigorously explain why these agents behaved as they did.

This is an entirely understandable oversight. For men such as Charles Jelavich, C. E. Black, or

George Kennan, Russian policy was to a significant extent a black box. Gaining access to the

Soviet archives would have been a Sisyphean task, and so these historians were forced to look elsewhere for their sources, to the diplomatic records of other countries, to the few published materials available, or to the fewer still materials that had been carried out of the USSR by

Russian exiles. Consequently, these scholars did not try to explain the behavior of Russian agents

– they couldn‘t, since they lacked the material. Soviet scholars had scarcely more access, and were further constrained by ideology. With the fall of the Soviet Union, source material on

Russo-Bulgarian relations finally became available, but at the same time so did a great deal of material on virtually every other aspect of Russian history – and at the same time, American government funding for Russian studies plummeted, and diplomatic history was going through a long and gradual decline. Later scholars therefore, such as Ku tsarov, Ign t‘ev, or Crampton,

24 simply had other things they were focused on. They touched upon the downfall of Russo-

Bulgarian relations, but its causes were relegated to asides of a few pages at best.

Empire Unguided will change that. It is an in-depth explanation of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the years following the , which uses Russian and Bulgarian archival material to answer the question of why Russo-Bulgarian relations declined so precipitously. Previous scholars have either not asked this specific question (Crampton,

Kostadinova, Ku tsarov), or if they asked it, could not access the relevant archives in order to answer it (Kennan, Jelavich, Black). Empire Unguided both asks the question and has the resources to answer it, and in so doing will explain what has been a niggling mystery for well over a hundred years.

Chapter Outline

This work begins with Ch. 1: A History of Bulgaria until 1878, which provides the necessary background for the latter course of Russo-Bulgarian relations. It touches upon

Bulgaria‘s time under the Ottoman Empire, its eventual liberation through the Russo-Turkish

War, the subsequent diplomatic maneuvering that led to Bulgaria‘s , and the broader geopolitical situation in the Balkans at the time.

Ch. 2: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs looks at that troubled institution. The chapter begins with a brief history of the Ministry, and then examines a number of problems that plagued the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the late 19th century. Ch. 3: Panslavism provides an in-depth look at what the ideology of Panslavism really involved – in truth, it was not so

25 much a single ideology as an entire constellation of thinking that travelled together, linking disparate elements of nationalist, religious, and pseudo-scientific thought.

Ch. 4: Setting up the State, 1878-1879 is the last of the background chapters, looking at just how the new Bulgarian state was set up, and examines the key figures and political alignments of the period. It is in this chapter that one is introduced to Prince Alexander von

Battenberg, the new monarch of Bulgaria, and to the key Russian figures, including Tsar

Alexander II and the foreign minister N. K. Girs.

Ch. 5: The First Troubled Year, 1879-1880 looks at the first year of Russo-Bulgarian relations, and at the initial conflicts between Battenberg, the of Bulgaria, and the

Russian agents of the time, namely Parensov, Shepelev, and Davydov. The next chapter, Ch. 6:

Assassination, Ultimatum, Coup, 1880-1881 focuses on Parensov‘s replacement, General

Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth, and his vital role in the first Bulgarian coup of 1881, the first major event of Russo-Bulgarian relations after the installation of the Bulgarian government.

With Ch. 7: Simmering Resentment, 1881-1882, one enters into the most damaging period of Russo-Bulgarian relations, as the Bulgarian political parties and Battenberg struggled with two of the more odious Russian agents, Khitrovó and Remlingen. Their replacements, the

Generals Sobolev and Kaul‘bars, proved to be even worse, and it is with Ch. 8: The Nadir,

1882-1883 that Russo-Bulgarian relations become well and truly negative, with the Generals managing to antagonize the entirety of the Bulgarian political elite, who then united to publicly humiliate and evict these servants of the Tsar.

Ch. 9: The Unification of Bulgaria, 1883-1885 looks at that key event in Bulgarian history, and the way in which it both demonstrated the deficiencies of Russia‘s foreign policy

26 apparatus, and how Russian actions during this time (particularly the recall of Russian officers) further strengthened Bulgarian antipathy. Finally, with Ch. 10: The Final Act, 1886, events reach their denouement, with a Russian-backed coup, Battenberg‘s abdication, a final diplomatic mission, and the ultimate severance of Russo-Bulgarian relations.

1 Adolf Koch, Prince ; reminiscences of his reign in Bulgaria, from authentic sources, (London: Whitaker & Co., 1887), 267-269. 2 Sir Henry Elliot to Sir Henry Ponsonby, Vienna, 23 September 1883, in Victoria and George Earle Buckle, The Letters of . Second Series. A Selec ion f om He M je y’ Co e pondence nd Jo n l be ween he Years 1862 and 1878. (London: J. Murray, 1926), Vol. 3, 444-445. 3 Alfred J. Rieber, ―The Historiography of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Survey‖ in Hugh Ragsdale and V. N Ponomarev, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy ([Washington, D.C.]; Cambridge; : Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Cambridge University Press, 1993), 360. 4 Parensov had the advantage of writing with some quarter century‘s worth of hindsight, which invariably colored his perceptions. Among other things, he had access to Koch‘s book when writing his own memoirs, and devoted several pages to absolutely shredding some of Koch‘s more outré accusations – and it should be noted that later scholarship supports Parensov‘s interpretation over Koch‘s. Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 39; P. D. Parensov, ―V Bolgarii: vospominaniye ofitsera general‘nago shtaba‖ (In Bulgaria: The Memories of an Officer of the General Staff), k i in , CXXXIV (1908), 271-273; Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism; Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 53. 5 George F. Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de F nco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 447. 6 Rieber, ―The Historiography of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Survey‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 365.

27

Chapter 1: A History of Bulgaria until 1878

One of the factors that makes the eventual breakdown of Russo-Bulgarian relations so unusual is that, at the outset of the time-period, there existed a genuine commonality of interests between the Russians and Bulgarians. The two countries were bound together in antagonism against the Ottomans and their desire to see a new Bulgarian state arise on the Balkan Peninsula.

The first step in understanding the ultimate breakdown of the positive relations of Russia and

Bulgaria, therefore, is to understand the origins of positive relations. To do this one must first look at the history of Bulgarian nationalism and Russian diplomacy in the .

Bulgaria under Ottoman Rule

Relative to much of the Balkans, Bulgaria came to the business of national-liberation very late. Bulgaria had been under the domination of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, having submitted to the Turks at the end of the fourteenth century.7 Neighboring Serbia had achieved a sort of de facto independence in 1815, while the had founded the Kingdom of in

1830. Even the would begin their long move towards independence decades before their southern neighbor. Bulgaria would not achieve even de facto independence till the late

1870s, long after the other states of the Balkans. Formal, de jure independence would have to wait until 1908, just a decade before the Ottoman Empire became defunct entirely. For a number of reasons, the Bulgarian nationalism that developed over the course of the 19th century was focused primarily on the cultural and religious arena, and not towards the development of political independence or societal restructuring.

28

To begin with, Bulgaria lay much closer to the Ottoman heartlands than did Serbia,

Greece, or . For the Porte, to give up the Bulgarian lands would have been to give up the very concept of -in-Europe, and this no Sultan would do. More to the point, Bulgaria lay in easy reach of the Ottoman armies, who routinely stamped out any efforts to rebel against

Turkish rule. Uprisings were attempted in 1408 in Western Bulgaria, in 1598 around Tarnovo, and again in 1688 in Chirpovets in , and all of these were quite thoroughly crushed. Military resistance to Ottoman Rule, therefore, took the form of small-scale banditry by the ‗‘,iii -esque robbers later lionized as early Bulgarian patriots, but these bands of a dozen men were militarily insignificant. The Bulgarians had somewhat more success in raising auxiliary troops to assist the various invasion forces that began to invade the Ottoman

Empire in the 18th and 19th century, supporting Russia in its several wars against Turkey (in the

1730s, 1790s, 1810s, and late 1820s), and participating in the Serbian War of Independence in

1807. Still, these were a far cry from serious threats to Ottoman dominance over the Bulgarian lands.8

The other factor that contributed to the slow development of the political independence movement was that much of the Bulgarian population in the 19th century was relatively well off, in large part due to gradual reforms inside the Ottoman Empire itself. First off, a series of treaties and the deregulation of the Ottoman grain monopoly allowed for improved trade between Turkey and Europe, and Bulgaria was particularly well-positioned to benefit from that trade. The of

Svishtov, which lies along the , transformed from a virtual ghost town in 1830 to a major point of commercial exchange. A second element, even more important, was that

iii Kh d i e in Bulgarian; the word ‗‘ possesses an unclear etymology, but variations are found in numerous Balkan languages.

29 reforms of the army weakened the power of the old Spahi landowners and led to what was effectively land reform, distributing land among the Bulgarian peasantry. Though the landowners managed to hang on in some parts of the (particularly in the southwest Kyustindil and in the northwest near Nish and , the latter of which suffered uprisings around the mid- century), most Bulgarian peasants were transformed into small freeholders. A third element, also related to the Tanzimat army reforms, was that the Ottomans now required a large supply of cloth for their new standing army‘s uniforms, and they turned to Bulgarian producers to fill that requirement. Workshops sprung up like weeds all across Bulgaria – to take one example, in the town of in the 1850s there were 569 workshops, of which 120 were devoted to the creation of the braid used on Turkish army uniforms, while a further 69 made the aba cloth out of which the uniforms themselves were made. Leading cloth-producers became increasingly wealthy, and in some cases known outside of Bulgaria. The Plovdiv producer Konstantin

Mandradzhioglu was able to export aba to India, and his concern had a branch in Calcutta till the

1920s. 9

The third and final factor was that the 19th century reforms had removed some of the worst abuses of the Ottoman administration. Concurrent with the land reforms, tax collection was somewhat regularized, with tax-farming being outlawed.10 The Tanzimat reforms even attempted to institute an appointed council, or mejliss, which would advise the provincial governor of each province (including Bulgaria), and serve both as a check on his power and as a means of representation for the non-Muslim population. The project failed, but the launched a new wave of reforms inside the Ottoman Empire. In an 1856 decree, the Sultan

30 guaranteed the rights of minorities, abolished the differences in status between Muslims and non-

Muslims, and upheld traditional religious rights.11

This should not be taken to mean that pre-independence Bulgaria was some Arcadian idyll, but certainly the typical peasant or townsman of pre-1876 Bulgaria was prosperous and not terribly oppressed. This was commented on at the time. General P. D. Parensov wrote of how the

Russian troops entering Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 marveled at the rich fields and pastures, at the fruits and vegetables unavailable even to middle-class dwellers of

Russia, with no forced conscription, and how those soldiers asked themselves ―so where was the suffering of our ethnic and religious kinsmen, where is the oppression, where is the struggle?‖12

Considering that Russia had freed its own serfs only in 1861, and levied them with heavy redemption payments, this was not an entirely unreasonable question.

Ultimately, political independence came late to Bulgaria because the barriers to it were much higher – in the form of the proximity of the Ottoman armed forces – and the desire for it was lessened – due to economic prosperity and Tanzimat reforms. Bulgaria did have a nationalist awakening in the 19th century, but the energy of activists was initially directed elsewhere.

The Creation of the

Bulgarian nationalism thus took the form primarily of a cultural revival. There were broadly successful movements for the establishment of schools, both religious and secular, and for the creation of a Bulgarian literary language and a Bulgarian press. But the most dramatic part of this revival was the campaign for the Bulgarian Exarchate, that is, a Bulgarian Orthodox church that would be independent of the Greek-dominated in . It was

31 a campaign that would be significant for Russo-Bulgarian relations as well, as the Bulgarian

Exarchate came about in part due to the efforts of the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople,

Count N. P. Ign t'ev, one of the leading Panslavs in Russia.

The campaign for the Bulgarian Exarchate had ramifications beyond the obvious religious ones. Under the Ottoman system, ethnic groups were typically divvied up according to religion, each religious grouping or millet having a modest degree of self- administration, with the Bulgarians being a part of the Orthodox millet which was dominated by the Greeks. The millet determined the manner of school, the form of lower level laws (so that a member of the Islamic millet would be tried under Sharia-based law, whereas one of the Jewish millet would be tried using rabbinical law), and aspects of administration. The question of revenue was particularly significant, as during the 19th century the Bulgarians were paying roughly double in taxes to the Orthodox Church the amount they paid to the Sultan. Under those circumstances, the nascent Bulgarian nationalist movement deeply resented the Greek control over what was the most important organ of civic life.13 The earliest calls for religious independence began in the 1820s, but it was in the 1860s that the campaign heated up, with the

Bulgarian Bishop Ilarion of Macariopolis excluding the Patriarch‘s name from the Easter Sunday liturgy in 1860, a kind of formal declaration of independence that got Ilarion and his supporters excommunicated and anathematized. Over the course of the early 1860s, the Greek Patriarch,

Joachim, made various efforts to reconcile the Bulgarians by offering concessions, but to no avail.14

For Russia, which had long used the Orthodox Church as a source of influence in the

Balkans, this break was a rather dangerous state of affairs. When Ign t'ev arrived as the new

32 ambassador to Constantinople in 1864, his first priority was to somehow resolve the situation. As he wrote a decade later, ―My principal preoccupation in the question… has always been to procure for the Bulgarians, without breaking with the Greeks, a national form.‖15 In other words, to secure a separate Bulgarian church without antagonizing the Greeks more than necessary. In

Ign t'ev‘s mind, this would secure Bulgarian affection for Russia and lead to a further diminution of Ottoman unity, always something worthwhile in Russian eyes. Over the course of the following few years, Ign t'ev worked ceaselessly to achieve an Exarchate, alongside Bulgarians such as the Bishop Ilarion or . By 1865, a portion of the Greek laity was willing to admit the need for an independent Bulgarian church. By 1867, the Greek Patriarch Gregory agreed to a separate Bulgarian community. In 1870, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz issued a decree establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate.16

In all likelihood, the Bulgarians would have achieved their Exarchate even without

Ign t'ev‘s assistance – their movement had broad popular support, and sooner or later the

Ottomans would have recognized it as a fait accompli. But Ign t'ev was undeniably helpful to those efforts, and his aid went a long way towards securing Bulgarian affection for the Russian

Empire. Indeed, between the creation of the Exarchate and his later Treaty of San Stefano,

Ign t'ev was to be one of the most personally popular Russians in Bulgaria, visiting the country in triumph as late as 1902.17

The April Uprising and the Massacre of Batak

With the successful creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, the attention of nationalist activists turned at last to political independence. Past experience and a glance at the map was

33 enough to convince these activists that independence could only come through an uprising, and so Bulgarian nationalists such as Georgi , , and began to set up revolutionary committees throughout the country. The first of these was the Secret

Central Bulgarian Committee (SCBC) founded by Georgi Rakovski in 1867, which was supported by both Russian and Romanian authorities and which was to recruit armed bands from outside Bulgaria. It was not, however, successful, and after its collapse following Rakovski‘s death, it was replaced by the Karavelov‘s and Levski‘s Bulgarian Revolutionary Central

Committee (BRCC). The BRCC, unlike its predecessor, viewed that any uprising had to come from within the country, and so swiftly set about creating subordinate revolutionary committees throughout Bulgaria. By the mid-, the BRCC had some two hundred regional committees all over Bulgaria, although the actual number of members was quite small – in the early 1870s,

1001 members could be identified, primarily members of the intelligentsia and the merchant classes. Levski himself was arrested in 1872 and executed the following February, but unlike its predecessor, the BRCC was able to survive its founder‘s death. Efforts to set up an armed uprising continued apace, with only an opportunity now necessary.

That opportunity came with the Great Eastern Crisis of the 1870s. This pan-Balkan conflagration began when Christians in southern Herzegovina rose up against the Ottomans, and was followed by larger uprisings in Nevesinje in northern Herzegovina. By August, was also consumed by revolt. Powerful war parties arose in both Serbia and , and despite the efforts of the Great Powers to restrain the Balkan states, a war between them and the

Ottomans seemed inevitable (and would indeed come in June of 1876).18 Certainly, it seemed inevitable to the Bulgarians. Back in August of 1875, one revolutionary reported to the BRCC

34 that in the town of , ―Everyone is buying arms and supplies.‖19 There was a palpable sense of enthusiasm in the air, enough so that the Russian Consul in Ruse wrote that ―It seems to me that the time is not far off when the whole of Bulgaria will rise up.‖20 More practically, the

Serbians were offering material aid, Prince Milan promising a shipment of 2,000 rifles.

The result was the , called by historian R. J. Crampton ―the beginning of the birth of the modern Bulgarian state.‖21 It was also, by all accounts, an unmitigated disaster. Initially planned for May, the preparations were discovered by the Turkish authorities in the Panagyurishte district, and the revolt was forced to begin ahead of schedule.

This was only the beginning of the Uprising‘s woes. The rebels were poorly organized and had little internal coordination, and preparations for the rebellion had been rushed through in just four months. There were few chains of communication between individual rebels and their commanders, and for that matter between the Bulgarian rebels inside the country and the émigré organizations beyond. Furthermore, the Bulgarians were dreadfully underequipped. The promised arms from Serbia failed to materialize, and Danube boatmen refused to transport guns that had been bought and stored in Romania. Rather famously, the Bulgarian rebels crafted approximately forty cannons made out of wood, but as Crampton dryly notes, ―these were useless in the military sense.‖22 Adding to the Bulgarian‘s troubles, the Ottomans had suspected that a revolt was in the offing since the previous autumn, and had taken measures. Patrols were increased along the Danube, agents were sent into Bulgarian lands, and the rebellion itself was preceded by dozens of arrests of nationalist activists.23

Most seriously, the Bulgarian rebels dramatically overestimated the amount of popular support their cause had among the population at large. Before the Uprising, the BRCC had

35 expected some 70,000 people to join them, and that even the government officials and chorbadjii

(wealthy landowners with close ties to the Turkish state) would join the revolt en masse. In actual fact, only some 10,000 Bulgarians joined the April Uprising.24 In the area around the town of , the revolutionary committees of the BRCC managed to muster a grand total of sixty men. Around the city of Tarnovo (modern-day ), ―action was confined to a few isolated monasteries and villages.‖25 In the province near the Romanian border, ―there was no popular uprising at all.‖26 Local elites either remained neutral or assisted the Ottomans, such as at where they fed information to the Turkish police.27 In short, the April

Uprising lacked numbers, leadership, firepower, organization, or any support from outside the country whatsoever. Putting it down would prove no challenge for the Ottomans.

However, the Ottomans at this time were already embroiled in suppressing revolts in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their regular army was preparing for the coming conflict with

Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, the Ottomans made the decision to supplement regular army troops with bashibazouks. Bashibazouks were essentially armed mobs, undisciplined irregular units composed either of local Circassians or of (descendants of those ethnic

Bulgarians who converted to during the Ottoman occupation). There had been some attacks on Muslim communities during the April Uprising, and now the bashibazouks launched a wave of extremely brutal and bloody reprisals against the Bulgarian Christian population. The most famous was the Massacre at Batak, where bashibazouks led by one Ahmet Aga killed approximately five thousand people, primarily women and children, many of whom they herded into a church which was then set alight.28 An American journalist, Januarius MacGahan, passed through Batak a few months after the massacre and wrote in the London Daily News that:

36

We were told there were three thousand people lying here in this little churchyard alone, and we could well believe it. It was a fearful sight — a sight to haunt one through life. There were little curly heads there in that festering mass, crushed down by heavy stones; little feet not as long as your finger on which the flesh was dried hard, by the ardent heat before it had time to decompose; little baby hands stretched out as if for help; babes that had died wondering at the bright gleam of sabres and the red hands of the fierce-eyed men who wielded them; children who had died shrinking with fright and terror; young girls who had died weeping and sobbing and begging for mercy; mothers who died trying to shield their little ones with their own weak bodies, all lying there together, festering in one horrid mass… We looked into the church which had been blackened by the burning of the woodwork, but not destroyed, nor even much injured… What we saw there was too frightful for more than a hasty glance. An immense number of bodies had been partly burnt there and the charred and blackened remains, that seemed to fill it half way up to the low dark arches and make them lower and darker still, were lying in a state of putrefaction too frightful to look upon. I had never imagined anything so horrible. We all turned away sick and faint, and staggered out of the fearful pest house glad to get into the street again. We walked about the place and saw the same things repeated over and over a hundred times. Skeletons of men with the clothing and flesh still to and rotting together; skulls of women, with the hair dragging in the dust, bones of children and of infants everywhere. Here they show us a house where twenty people were burned alive; there another where a dozen girls had taken refuge, and been slaughtered to the last one, as their bones amply testified. Everywhere horrors upon horrors.29

The massacres stoked the Bulgarian revolutionary spirit more effectively than anything the

BRCC had ever managed. Furthermore, journalists such as MacGahan and diplomats such as his companion spread the knowledge of what would become called the Bulgarian

Atrocities far and wide. It became a subject for debate all over Europe – in Britain, W. E.

Gladstone published a pamphlet on the ―Bulgarian Horrors,‖ and a conference was called in

Constantinople to force reforms to prevent a recurrence of such crimes. Yet the greatest effect was in Russia.

37

The Great Powers and the

Leaving Bulgaria for the moment, it is worth examining the state of European diplomacy with regards to the Balkans. During the 19th century, international diplomacy was dominated by the five Great Powers, the premier states of Europe – , France, Austria-Hungary,

Russia, and Germany (or , before 1871). Each possessed a combination of industrial might, financial resources, and military strength that allowed them to impose their will on smaller polities, though the Ottoman Empire and after 1861 the Kingdom of were sometimes able to hold their own.

The Eastern Question, meanwhile, was one of the paramount diplomatic problems of the

19th century. At its core was the question of just how to deal with the steady decline of the

Ottoman Empire, which Tsar Nicholas I had famously termed the ―Sick Man of Europe.‖ Since the late 18th century it had become clearer and clearer that the Ottoman Empire was in decline, unable to survive in a world of growing nationalism and industrialization. Reform movements, such as the Tanzimat reforms between 1839 and 1876, were able to delay the Ottoman slide into disintegration, but only for a time. This was a major international dilemma because the Ottoman

Empire was an enormous state, controlling at their greatest extent territory in the Balkans, North

Africa, and the Middle East. Their empire stretched from Budapest almost to the Horn of , from the Algiers to the . The first census in 1885, after almost a century of losing territory, showed that the Sultan still governed the fates of over seventeen million people.30

Unfortunately, many of these people had little interest in being governed from Constantinople, and so the 19th century saw repeated nationalist insurrections against the Ottoman Empire, of which the April Uprising in Bulgaria was only one. Thus the usual form of the Eastern Question

38 was the question of whether or not this or that population should be granted independence from the Ottoman Empire, and if so, how it would fit into the geopolitical environment of the Balkans.

Of all of the Great Powers, France and Germany had the least immediate interest in the

Eastern Question. Bismarck, quite famously, said that ―The whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier,‖ preferring to focus on Germany‘s immediate problems.

One of those problems, mind, was keeping the Austro- and the Russians congenial to one another, at the same time as they were competing viciously for control over the Balkan areas that the Ottomans left behind. The French, for their part, had traditionally had significant financial interests in the Ottoman Empire, but in the early years of the Third Republic they were still too focused on internal affairs to play a major role in Balkan diplomacy. The British were less sanguine about the Eastern Question. The Ottoman Empire served as an important buffer for

British interests, blocking the Russians – Britain‘s main geopolitical rival for much of the 19th century – from the vital British holdings of India and the recently-completed Suez Canal.

Consequently, throughout the 19th century the British were the most common protectors of

Ottoman sovereignty, even if the British public was not always enthusiastic about aiding the heathen Turks.

It was for Austria-Hungary and for Russia that the Eastern Question was a matter of life or death, however. For the Dual Monarchy, this came in the form of nationalism. Both the

Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires were multiethnic empires which controlled significant populations in the Balkans that were deeply different from their rulers – certainly it is debatable how much preferable Orthodox Greeks or Bulgarians or would have found a

Catholic German Emperor in Vienna to a Muslim Turkish Sultan in . Much of the

39

Habsburg monarchy‘s population was composed of Slavs, and thus it was very much in Austria-

Hungary‘s best interests that nationalist feeling not grow too successful in the Balkans, for fear that the local peoples would start rebelling against the Habsburgs as well as against the

Ottomans. More prosaically, Austria-Hungary had few other avenues for expansion during this period. After 1866, interference in the petty German statelets was closed off to the Habsburgs, and geography prevented Austria-Hungary from becoming involved in the kind of colonial ventures that consumed so much of France and Great Britain‘s energies. As historian Charles

Jelavich notes, ―the Balkan Peninsula became the only field open to imperial expansion. The dream of a great empire stretching from Vienna through the western half of the Balkan Peninsula to Salonika was exceedingly attractive.‖31 Consequently, Austria-Hungary devoted considerable effort to securing the allegiance of the small, newly-independent Balkan states.

In this, the Austro-Hungarians had certain advantages and disadvantages. They were militarily potent, and they could offer their Balkan allies the advantages of the ―West,‖ both economic and cultural. Austria-Hungary may not have been as industrialized as Germany or

Britain, but they were more industrialized than Serbia or Bulgaria by a good distance, and they sat astride the main overland trade routes to the rest of Europe. They were also possessed of considerable reserves of capital to invest in the Balkans. In terms of culture, Vienna was rivaled only by as a center of European cultural life. On the other hand, the Habsburgs were unable to call upon ties of ethnic or religious kinship, and after the Ausgleich of 1867, Habsburg foreign policy had to deal with the Magyars. The Magyars, in turn, were sharply jealous of their position as equals of the ruling German ethnic group, and opposed anything that would allow Slavs more say in Austro-Hungarian affairs.32

40

For the Russian Empire, the Eastern Question was just as important, because the

Ottomans controlled the , the Straits that could allow transit to and from the Black

Sea. To begin with, this was important out of trade considerations, as controlling the Dardanelles would have given Russia access to the shipping lanes of the Mediterranean. But even more importantly, whoever had access to the Dardanelles would be able to menace the entire southern flank of the Russian Empire. This was not a theoretical concern, as only a quarter-century earlier an alliance of the French and the British had done precisely that in the Crimean War, with devastating consequences for the Russian state. Consequently, securing the Straits was something of an idée fixe for Russian foreign policy. Likewise, there was a great deal of sympathy for and solidarity with the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans, as seen in the run-up to the Russo-Turkish War.

Compared to Austria-Hungary, Russia had one advantage the Habsburgs had, and lacked one that they possessed. Like Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire was a prominent military power, even greater than the Dual Monarchy, and in a position to force events in the direction that the Russians wished. Unlike the Habsburgs, they also were able to appeal to the Balkan peoples on the basis of shared ethnic and religious sentiment. Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro,

Greece, and Romania all shared the Orthodox faith with Russia, and the first three also shared the Slavic ethnicity. These were genuine ties of kinship, if perhaps not as powerful as the

Panslavs might have wished them to be.33 Unfortunately for Russia, there was one area in which the Tsarist state was unable to compete with Vienna, and that was in the economic realm. The problem was basically that the Russian and the Balkan economies were too similar. Both emphasized agricultural production and the extraction of natural resources such as timber or

41 minerals, and both looked to the West for capital and manufactured goods.34 Austria-Hungary‘s industrialized economy, the Russian government worried, could be more attractive than the bonds of kinship, at least in times of peace. On October 9th/21st, 1878, the Baron A. G. Zhomini wrote to N. K. Girs that:

[Austria-Hungary‘s industrial and commercial superiority [over Russia] is evident. The material interests of the Slavs are all directed to that side. They have nothing to sell to us or buy from us, nor we to them. With the aid of railroads, their ties with Austria and the West will soon become indissoluble, and from this time forward ties of race, language, and faith will be only weak arguments. The only thing which attaches the Slavs to us is the oppression from which they suffer and the hope which they place in our assistance.35

The situation was perhaps not quite as dire as the oft pessimistic Zhomini made it out to be, but certainly the economic realm was one of Russia‘s weakness.

The Eastern Question was thus usually a battleground between the interests of Austria-

Hungary and Russia, as they were the two Great Powers most intimately concerned with the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Neither was powerful enough to force a resolution through on their own, and so each sought the assistance of the other Great Powers. Austria-Hungary usually had an ally in the form of Great Britain, as both had a vested interest in keeping the Ottoman Empire stable.

Russia, meanwhile, repeatedly tried to achieve the assistance of Germany in Balkan matters. This was usually less successful, as Germany under Bismarck was interested in maintaining close relations with Tsarist Russia, but not at the cost of relations with Austria-Hungary. As a result, the Russian state repeatedly hoped for more from German aid than they were able to realistically receive – such was the case at the Congress of Berlin. This led to a strained, sometimes-warm, sometimes-cold relationship between the two countries, which the then-Prince of Bulgaria,

Alexander von Battenberg, compared to an unhappily married couple. He wrote:

42

Russia‘s swinging over towards Germany, after all that has happened during the past years, reminds me of a married couple getting a divorce. Just when they are about to sign the deed of divorcement their eyes meet and they remember all the good times they have had together. Instead of signing, they fall into each other‘s arms shedding tears of joy. It won‘t last long; they will hate each other all the more in the end.36

This was the dynamic of the Eastern Question that played out over the course of the Great

Eastern Crisis – a declining Ottoman Empire, Balkan nations seeking independence, Austro-

Russian rivalry, Anglo-Austrian alliance, and a complex, difficult relationship between Germany and Russia.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78

Earlier in 1876, N. P. Ign t'ev told the young revolutionary and future Minister-President of independent Bulgaria Stefan Stambulov that ―Russia cannot do anything for Bulgaria if the

Bulgarians do not give us a reason to do so.‖37 The Bulgarian revolutionaries, though lacking the military knowledge to defeat the Ottomans, were very well aware of the value of publicity for their cause, and the massacres ensured that they had grisly material to work with. Bulgarian newspapers were translated into French and Romanian and sent abroad, while Ivan Evstratiev

Geshov, a prominent revolutionary in Plovdiv, sent English-language reports to the London

Times.

The message was heard most prominently in Russia. There were, at this time, two strains of thought with regards to Russian involvement in the Balkans. Russian Panslavs wished to advance their cause in the Balkans. Russian officialdom, by and large, had no desire to get drawn into a conflict in the Balkans, for a variety of excellent reasons.

43

To begin with, there was the Eastern Question. While Russian long-term planning focused on the Straits, in the near-term the situation was problematic. A re-opening of the

Eastern Question would attract the attention of all the other Great Powers, with unforeseeable consequences. That is why Gorchak v, the Russian Foreign Minister at the time of the Great

Eastern Crisis, could say to Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador to Berlin, that: ―There were two ways of dealing with the eastern Question. 1st a complete reconstruction or 2nd a mere replastering which would keep matters together for another term of years. No one could possibly wish for a complete settlement—everyone must wish to put it off as long as possible.‖38 From a geopolitical perspective, then, Russia had no immediate goals in the Near East. There were long- term objectives, and Russia could stand to benefit from a successfully prosecuted war against the

Ottomans. However, this risked attracting the interference of the other Great Powers which could lead to turmoil.

Moreover, Russia was in the late 1870s simply in no shape to go and engage in a war, even with the very weak Ottomans. The Russian military had been badly damaged in the

Crimean War some twenty years previously, when what had previously been considered the great Russian juggernaut was revealed to have atrophied significantly. Tsar Alexander II, who came to power at the close of the war, had made internal reform – civil and military alike, most notably the liberation of the serfs – the hallmark of his reign. To embark upon a war now was to risk destabilizing all of the progress that had been made. This was the point that D. A. Mil i tin, the Russian Minister of War, made in a memorandum entitled ―Our Political Situation at the

Present Time,‖ on January 26th / February 7th, 1887. He wrote that:

…Not a one of the changes undertaken is yet finished. The economic and moral powers of the government are still far from equal to their needs. In all branches of

44

government development that have been made or are being made efforts which will bear fruit only in the future… War in this situation would be truly a great catastrophe for us. To the great efforts required internally would be added external pressures, all useful work would be paralyzed, and the unexpected sacrifices could swiftly push the government to utter exhaustion. The problem of our national well-being, to which with such care and love were dedicated all the years of the present reign, would again be forced into the future, and with it could be shaken even the very greatness of Russia.‖39

To these worries, Mil i tin adds the caution that while Russia was unfriendly with no Great

Power at the present, neither could any of the other Powers be considered her close allies and supporters in this matter. There was the very real risk that ―Even in favorable circumstances,

Russia may find herself completely isolated, while in unfavorable circumstances – she may find herself suddenly hit with the blows of a massive European coalition.‖40 To high Russian officials such as Mil i tin and Gorchak v, getting involved in the Balkan crisis was an exceedingly risky proposition.

Yet theirs was not the only voice that mattered. At the very moment that Gorchak v and

Mil i tin were counseling caution and restraint, the Panslavs were pushing forward a program of

Russian support for the Bosnians and Herzegovinians and Serbs and Bulgarians. A fuller exploration of Russian Panslavism will have to await a later chapter, yet at the moment it is enough to say that many of the Russian Empire‘s leading newspaper publishers and editors, men such as I. S. Aks kov, A. A. Kraevski, and General Mikhail Chern iaev, were members of the

Slavic Benevolent Societies that were the heart of organized Panslavism, such as it was. Russian newspapers were full-throated in their urging towards Russian intervention in the Balkan crisis.

In an article from July 19th, 1875, the Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti wrote that ―Again on the

Balkan Peninsula Christian blood is spilled… On the support of Russia, without a doubt, these governments [Serbia and Montenegro] – one of which was even called to life by the triumph of

45

Russian arms – can and should always be able to rely upon.‖41 The following September, the

Russkie Vedomosti stated that ―The insurgents expect help only from Russia, and these expectations, we hope, will not be in vain.‖42 In May of 1876, the Nikolayev Vestnik wrote that

―especially cruel are the Circassians and bashibazouks, who rob peaceful villages… In Bulgaria more than 150 villages, places, churches, and monasteries have been turned into ruins… [this will continue] until Russia, the natural defenders of the Slavs, does not decide to energetically demand the improvement of their condition.‖43 Reports of the genuine atrocities in Bulgaria were coupled with calls for the Russian state to do something to resolve the situation.

The response from the Russian public was immediate and enthusiastic. The artist Il' i

R pin, the scientists Dm triĭ Mendel ev and Nikol ĭ Pirog v, the dominating art critic Vlad mir

St sov all called for aid to Bulgaria. Iv n Turg nev, the author of the novel Fathers and Sons, wrote a pamphlet in poem form entitled ―Croquet at Windsor‖ in which he castigated Queen

Victoria for ignoring the plight of the Bulgarians.44 Konstantin Makovskiĭ‘s painting The

Bulgarian Martyresses became the definitive image of the April Uprising. Lev Tolst ĭ, publishing his novel in installments during the crisis, has several of his characters decamp to Serbia to fight against the Ottomans – though Tolst ĭ‘s pacifistic views meant that he was less than thrilled with the war-fever.iv Less elite figures were equally

iv ―In the circle to which Sergey Ivanovitch belonged, nothing was talked of or written about just now but the Servian War. Everything that the idle crowd usually does to kill time was done now for the benefit of the Slavonic States. Balls, concerts, dinners, matchboxes, ladies' dresses, beer, restaurants-- everything testified to sympathy with the Slavonic peoples. From much of what was spoken and written on the subject, Sergey Ivanovitch differed on various points. He saw that the Slavonic question had become one of those fashionable distractions which succeed one another in providing society with an object and an occupation. He saw, too, that a great many people were taking up the subject from motives of self-interest and self-advertisement. He recognized that the newspapers published a great deal that was superfluous and exaggerated, with the sole aim of attracting attention and outbidding one another. He saw that in this general movement those who thrust themselves most forward and shouted the loudest were men who had failed and were smarting under a sense of injury--generals without armies, ministers not in the ministry, journalists

46 enthusiastic. Among the archives of I. S. Aks kov, at the time head of the Moscow Slavic

Benevolent Society, one finds numerous letters from peasants seeking aid in order to get to the

Balkans and fight the Turks. In September of 1876, a trio of peasants wrote to Aks kov that having ―heard about the beastly actions of the bandit-Turks done to the Christians,‖ they intended to go to Serbia and fight, and could Aks kov help them get to Serbia?45 Another peasant, G. Feodulov, wrote to Aks kov that ―I desire to fight and even shed blood for the faith and freedom of our brother Slavs, but I do not know the way to Serbia and do not have enough resources to make these thoughts real, and thus am turning to you with the heartfelt request,‖ to see Feodulov to Serbia that he could fight.46

As these letters indicate, the Panslavs did more than just propagandize, they were also active in collecting funds and organizing support. General Mikhail Chern iaev, the publisher of the newspaper ki Mi went to Serbia in April of 1876, where within a matter of weeks he was given a Serbian citizenship and then command of its eastern armies.47 The Slavic

Benevolent Societies, under the guidance of Aks kov, also collected funds in aid of the war effort and for humanitarian aid to the Bulgarians, and recruited medical personnel to send to the

not on any paper, party leaders without followers. He saw that there was a great deal in it that was frivolous and absurd. But he saw and recognized an unmistakable growing enthusiasm, uniting all classes, with which it was impossible not to sympathize. The massacre of men who were fellow Christians, and of the same Slavonic race, excited sympathy for the sufferers and indignation against the oppressors. And the heroism of the Servians and Montenegrins struggling for a great cause begot in the whole people a longing to help their brothers not in word but in deed. But in this there was another aspect that rejoiced Sergey Ivanovitch. That was the manifestation of public opinion. The public had definitely expressed its desire. The soul of the people had, as Sergey Ivanovitch said, found expression. And the more he worked in this cause, the more incontestable it seemed to him that it was a cause destined to assume vast dimensions, to create an epoch.‖ Lev Tolst ĭ, Anna Karenina, trans. Constance Garnett (Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs & Company, 1919), 969-970.

A little later, Sergey Ivanovitch and a friend of his travel to the train station to watch the departure of the military volunteers to Serbia, where they encounter Count Vronsky, one of the principal characters and the lover of the titular Anna Karenina. Vronsky, suicidal after his lover‘s own suicide, has outfitted an entire squadron of men and departs with them as a way to seek a decent death.

47

Balkans. Over the course of two weeks in July of 1876, a Moscow merchants consortium raised

130,000 rubles for aid to the Bulgarians.48 The surgeon Nikol ĭ Vasil'evich Sklifos vskiĭ, a senior member of the Imperial Surgical Academy, left for Montenegro to help the wounded on

July 12th/24th of 1876.49 Several members of the student body of that same Academy made a request for passports to leave for Serbia.50 Most dramatically, the Panslavs committees dispatched roughly five thousand volunteer fighters such as Feodulov to Serbia, of whom three thousand fought in battle against the Ottoman armies.51 These efforts, though significant, were not enough to allow the Serbian army or the Balkan rebels to stand up against the Ottoman army, but there was an ulterior motive to the Panslavs‘s strivings. I. S. Aks kov outlined the Panslav endgame very clearly when he wrote to General Chern iaev that ―by equipping and sending you to Serbia, and by supplying you later with volunteers, I had in mind provoking the official participation of Russia.‖52

The Panslavs were able to carry out all of this activity because they had the tacit support of the Tsarist Court, in particular from the Crown Prince, the future Tsar Alexander III. The

Foreign Minister, Gorchak v, saw fit to remind one of his consuls of the fact, telling him ―Do not forget that although the Tsar is opposed to war, his son, the heir to the throne, stands at the head of the Slav movement.‖53 Meanwhile, even those figures who were opposed to getting involved in the Balkans for geopolitical reasons, such as Tsar Alexander II or Gorchak v himself, were known to sympathize with Balkan Slavs who were fighting against the Ottoman

Empire.54 The Baron Aleksandr Genrikovich Zhomini, essentially second in command in the

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a congenitally cautious and reserved man, told a member of the St. Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Society in January of 1876 to ―Do anything you

48 like provided we do not know anything about it officially.‖ 55 When Chern iaev‘s Serbian army scored a victory at Šumatovac, it was reported to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count

Andrassy ―what immense joy this news created everywhere at Tsarskoe [Selo, the home of the

Russian Court .‖ Clearly, even if Russian officialdom preferred not to get embroiled in a war in the Balkans, it was firmly sympathetic to the Serbs and Bulgarians.

This sympathy prevented the Russian state from cracking down on Panslav agitation, and served to compromise Russian foreign policy in the run-up to the Russo-Turkish War. Minister of War D. A. Mil i tin wrote in his diary that:

In this whole affair of the volunteer movement to Serbia the Tsar himself has acted in a dual manner and partly himself contributed to the spread of the conviction that the government encourages this movement… The agitation issuing from Anichkov Palace [the home of the Crown Prince] goes entirely counter to accepted official policy; the Tsar knows this… and closes his eyes to it. With such duality, can there be any definite system in our actions, or any clear plan?56

With this statement, Mil i tin summarized quite neatly the fundamental problems of Russian foreign policy during this period – problems that would crop up again and again in the course of the Russo-Bulgarian diplomatic situation of the following decade. The Russian state was unable or unwilling to focus on a single line of policy, and unable to force the entire state apparatus to follow it.

In any case, the situation from here proceeded as might be expected. The Balkan rebels and the Serbian and Montenegrin forces were unable to defeat the Ottoman Empire, which for all its decline was still significantly larger and more powerful. Efforts at a compromise were made at the Constantinople Conference in late 1876 and early 1877, but these fell through. Serbia was

49 knocked out of the war in March of 1877, and Russian attention shifted more fully to Bulgaria.

Ultimately, on April 12/24th, 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 ended in a Russian victory, but it proved to be far more costly and bloody than the Russian government had expected beforehand, and showed that for all of the reforms of Alexander II and D. A. Mil i tin, there was still a great deal more work to be done. The Ottomans managed to organize a vigorous defense of the fortress of Plevna, holding out against the Russian armies for four months, sapping Russian energy and resolve in the process and allowing the and British time to prepare for the post-war reality.57

Bulgarian auxiliaries and volunteer regiments participated heavily on the Russian side, with the

Battles of entering into national legend. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania also all entered or re-entered the war. Ultimately the Russians and their allies were victorious, and in spring of 1878 Count N. P. Ign t'ev was sent to arrange a peace treaty with the Ottomans.

The Treaty of San Stefano

Though Ign t'ev was a well-known partisan of the Panslavs, his proposed peace terms were submitted to the Russian court for approval. In fact, Ign t'ev drafted two sets of proposals, one maximalist in its nature, one more restrained, which he submitted to Tsar Alexander II in

January of 1878. The maximalist proposal called for a powerful and independent Bulgaria, for territorial concessions to the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Greeks, and for Russian control over the

Dardanelles. This the Tsar rejected as too likely to incur a backlash from the other European

Great Powers.58 The more restrained proposal, meanwhile, ―was approved almost without discussion by top Russian leaders,‖ as historian David Mackenzie puts it.59 There was the

50 realization that even this set of terms might not meet European approval, and so Gorchak v instructed Ign t'ev to ―hasten peace negotiations so as to confront the Powers with a maximum number of faits accomplis,‖ while ―adher[ing stubbornly to everything that affects Bulgaria.‖60

This Ign t'ev managed to do, completing the negotiations on February 19th/March 3rd, 1878 and producing the Treaty of San Stefano.

The central provision of the treaty of San Stefano was the creation of a large, independent

Bulgarian state, equal in size to present-day Bulgaria, but with the addition of Macedonia and eastern . The Bulgarian state was extended to the , cutting Salonika off from the rest of Greece, and it was to have its own monarch, its own administration, and there would be a national militia. Ottoman troops were evacuated, and a Russian caretaker administration was instituted, along with a military occupation, that would have two years to get the new on its feet.61 Other provisions in the treaty granted additional territories to Serbia and Montenegro, but it was eminently clear that Bulgaria lay at the heart of the Treaty of San Stefano. It was a state, in the words of Balkan historian Charles Jelavich, ―whose boundaries satisfied the desires of even the most ardent Bulgarian nationalists.‖62 R. J. Crampton agrees, going further to state that ―San Stefano Bulgaria gave the new nation almost all it could ask in territorial terms and was to remain for generations after 1878 the national ideal of the

Bulgarian people.‖63 The historic areas of , , and Macedonia had been united into one nation, under one church that encompassed land from the to the Aegean.

Crampton recounts how twenty-three thousand Bulgarians wrote a signed a petition of thanksgiving to Tsar Alexander II.64 San Stefano Bulgaria was the manifestation of the Bulgarian

51 nationalists‘ wildest dreams, achieved through the intervention of the Russian Empire, and particularly the Russian Panslavs.

But while the Bulgarians had reason to be happy with the Treaty of San Stefano, they were virtually the only ones. To begin with, the treaty of San Stefano made it exquisitely clear to the other Balkan countries that Russia prioritized the advancement of Bulgaria over their respective well-beings. Greece, Romania, and Serbia all had territorial ambitions which were frustrated by the creation of a large Bulgarian state. Romania was forced to give up the lands of

Bessarabia, which had been taken from Russia at the end of the Crimean War. Immediately prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Romanians made a deal with Russia to allow Tsarist troops free passage in exchange for a guarantee of Romanian territorial integrity. This was violated in the final treaty of San Stefano, and though the Romanians received the territory of

Dobrudja and formal independence from the Ottomans, this was seen as deeply inadequate compensation. Greece, meanwhile, was forced to give up its claims to Macedonia, and moreover was forced to give up Greek lands and accept that Salonika would be cut off from the Greek mainland.65

It was the Serbs, traditional allies of Russia, who felt most betrayed however. After the initial armistice, the Serbian government had informed Russia of its irredentist claims to part of

Macedonia, Old Serbia, and the of Novi Pazar. In response, according to the great

Serbian historian Slobodan Jovanović, N. K. Girs, the Director of the Asiatic Department of the

Russian Foreign Ministry, and future Minister of Foreign Affairs, told the Serbian delegates that

―the interests of Russia came first, then those of Bulgaria, and only after them came Serbia‘s; but that there were occasions on which Bulgarian interests stood on equal footing with the

52

Russian.‖66 Serbia received almost none of their desires in the final treaty, with the total result that more Serbs would have lived outside of Serbia than within. Serbia itself would have been doomed to insignificance, territorial expansion blocked off by the on the one side and the Austro-Hungarian occupation of on the other. The Serbs, understandably, were furious at San Stefano and Russia. A liberal Serbian newspaper, the

Zastava, wrote that ―We see the Bulgarian people, supported by Russian bayonets…, seizing that area which by geography and ethnic position belongs to Serbia.‖67 Jovanović wrote in later years that after San Stefano ―About Slav solidarity there was no longer any mention. Russian state policy came into first place, and it sought sacrifice of Serbian interests to Bulgar interests.‖68

After the treaty, the only ally Russia had left in the Balkans aside from Bulgaria was Prince

Nicholas of Montenegro, whose territory had tripled in size but was still too small and too poorly positioned to be an important ally.69

The Great Powers of Europe were equally unenthusiastic about the Treaty of San Stefano.

Both Austria-Hungary and Great Britain were deeply uneasy about the power that a large, militarily potent positioned right above the Straits would grant Russia. The Dual

Monarchy was likewise concerned, just like the other Balkan nations, about the damage that a large Bulgaria would do to its territorial ambitions in the region, and indeed to its power vis-à-vis the Russian Empire. The British were more concerned for the survival of the Ottoman Empire, and worried that the fall of the Turks would leave them without a buffer state for their key possessions in India and the Suez. But unlike or , the Great Powers were not compelled to accept the Treaty of San Stefano as a fait accompli, whatever Gorchak v‘s hopes.

53

Great Britain and the Dual Monarchy insisted on a revision of the terms of the treaty, and a great, pan-European congress was called at Berlin for the summer of 1878.

The Congress of Berlin

To explore all that happened at the Congress of Berlin would require a book, of which many have been written. Nevertheless, a few elements stand out as particularly relevant to the future course of Russo-Bulgarian relations, aside from the final treaty itself. To begin with, no actual Bulgarians were allowed into the Congress itself, as was fairly typical for diplomacy of the period. Matters would be resolved between the Great Powers exclusively.

More problematic for Bulgarian interests was the fact that the Russian negotiators sent to the Congress of Berlin were simply not very good. The delegation was led by the Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Prince Aleks ndr Mikh ĭlovich Gorchak v himself, for decades one of Europe‘s great diplomats and the architect of Russia‘s post-Crimean foreign policy. But by this point

Gorchak v, a schoolmate of the Russian poet Pushkin, was just shy of eighty years old. The great historian of Russia B. H. Sumner wrote of him that he was ―much enfeebled; very senile, in his wheel-chair.‖70 Prince Alexander von Battenberg, the future monarch of Bulgaria and an observer at the Congress, referred to Gorchak v as ―the illustrious ruin.‖71 He frustrated allies, adversaries, and subordinates alike. Bismarck, who sought to help the Russians as much as possible without antagonizing Austria-Hungary, grumbled in his autobiography that ―I had the impression that Prince Gortchakoff expected from me, as a lady from her admirer, that I should guess at and represent the Russian wishes without Russia having herself to utter them, and thereby to undertake any responsibility.‖72 Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister, was far

54 less diplomatic, writing in a letter to his wife that Gorchak v was a ―little insignificant old man,-

-full of compliments,-- but otherwise (sic) having lost his head…‖ and that ―There is no doubt the presence of Gortchakoff materially complicates matters and that if some kindly fit of gout would take him off we should move much faster.‖73 After one meeting between Gorchak v and

Salisbury where the former announced a repudiation of all prior agreements and then stormed out, Count P tr Andr evich Shuv lov, Gorchak v‘s assistant at the Congress, told Salisbury to

―Wait for me,--I am coming back. Pay no attention—this is all a pack of nonsense.‖74

It fell to Shuv lov to do much of the actual work of the Congress, but his situation was a difficult one. As only second-in-command of the Russian delegation, he was forced to work behind Gorchak v‘s back, and it was broadly acknowledged at the Congress that it was Shuv lov who was being set up to take the fall for the Congress‘s result. One of the German diplomats,

Joseph Maria von Radowitz, wrote in his memoirs that whenever the situation looked bad for

Russia, Gorchak v ―was always sick… and imperceptible; yet, when the aim of his absence was reached, he always returned, appearing ‗fresh and rosey‘.‖75 Gorchak v may have been old, but he wasn‘t entirely without his political wits.

Finally, Russia‘s raw diplomatic situation was extremely poor. Russia was opposed by both the Austro-Hungarians and the British, who had no intention of allowing the Treaty of San

Stefano to stand. Russia‘s only ally was Bismarck, who was caught trying to placate both the

Russians and the Austro-Hungarians, and thus limited in how much aid he could render. And if the situation rose to threats of war, the Russian Empire was exhausted and weakened by an unexpectedly vicious struggle with the Ottomans, while the British and the Austrians were fresh and able to fight.76 Even had Russia been served by Talleyrand and Metternich reborn, it is

55 unlikely that the outcome of Berlin would have been too different given this dire underlying reality.

The Treaty of Berlin as it emerged from the Congress dramatically altered the terms that had been settled between the Russians and the Ottomans at San Stefano. To begin with, the large

Bulgarian State that had been created by Ign t'ev was sliced into pieces. The northern Dobrudja was given over to Romania, the was transferred to Serbian control, and the access to the Aegean that had taken territory from Greece was revoked. Macedonia was returned to

Constantinople free and clear, and despite the agitation and intriguing of both Serbia and

Bulgaria and the efforts of local nationalists, would remain there till the end of the Ottoman

Empire. The historic region of Thrace, including the major city of Plovdiv that had been slated to become the new Bulgarian capital, was also returned to Turkish rule, although as an autonomous province with its own governor-general called Eastern Rumelia. The remaining territory would become the newly independent Principality of Bulgaria, north of the .77 All told, Bulgaria was reduced from 172,000 square kilometers under San Stefano to a new total of

64,500 square kilometers under the Treaty of Berlin.78 There were other changes made at Berlin as well – Russian administration of Bulgaria was shortened from two years to nine months,

Austria-Hungary received administrative control over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and other territorial alterations were made.79

In general, the Treaty of Berlin was seen as a defeat for Russia, reducing as it did the gains that had been acquired in the Treaty of San Stefano. At the same time, it should be noted that the Russian Empire, and for that matter Bulgaria, did not emerge from Berlin with nothing to show for their efforts. Russia had re-acquired and portions of Turkish territory in

56

Asia Minor. Bulgaria had become independent, and it was tacitly agreed among the other Great

Powers that it would become a Russian client state.80 Montenegro, a loyal Russian ally, was strengthened and given an outlet on the Adriatic, and the Ottomans, a Russian foe for centuries, were dramatically weakened and saddled with a war indemnity that strained the already uneasy

Turkish finances. While the Congress was still ongoing, N. K. Girs wrote to Baron A. G.

Zhomini to put a positive spin on the Russian results in Berlin. He wrote that:

[A. I. Nelidov [One of Russia‘s senior diplomats in the Balkans, and Ign t'ev‘s successor as Ambassador to Constantinople] is right in telling you that the efforts of our plenipotentiaries to bring the work of the congress to a good result are appreciated here in high circles. The impossibility of obtaining more is recognized and… they will be perfectly satisfied—and indeed with reason, for what war can be compared with this one for results? The independence of three principalities, the creation of one Bulgaria, only tributary, and another autonomous, -- no more rayah [an Ottoman tax] and so many other things. My god! Would we not have treated as mad anyone who would have dreamed of such a result two years ago. And all with the sanction of Europe.81

It was the last point that may well have been the most important, since by receiving European approval, Russia was able to lock in these gains, and protect them against future diplomatic, or to a lesser extent military, misadventure. Unfortunately, this more moderate view did not achieve currency in the Russian Empire.

The final Treaty of Berlin was signed on July 13th, 1878, and Gorchak v wrote in a letter to Girs how ―[I regret having had to put my signature on such a transaction. I doubt it has more vitality than the leaves that fall.‖82 If Gorchak v was unhappy about the treaty, then the Russian press and the Panslavs were absolutely furious. Aks kov was particularly eloquent in his rage, giving a famous speech at the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society on June 22nd/July 4th, 1878, where he said:

57

Are we not once more gathered here today to attend a funeral, but not of a person, but of millions of people, of entire nations, of the freedom of Bulgaria, of the independence of Serbia? Are we not gathered to bury the great, the holy cause, bequeathed by our ancestors, our personal vow, -- are we to bury Russian glory, Russian honor, Russian conscience…? …And who would dare believe that such results from the Congress were passed with the agreement of the Russian state?... How did this happen? Have we lost some battle, some hideous, stupefying loss, worse even than Sedan [the climactic battle of the Franco-Prussian War], as even after Sedan France did not seek peace but fought for five months? Nothing such as this happened, there were no great battles. Only Lord Beaconsfield [, Prime Minister of Great Britain] stamped his foot, and Austria raised a threatening finger…83

Aks kov made such a nuisance of himself, bemoaning Russia‘s actions at the Congress, that even the usually sympathetic Russian government had him sent to the provinces and closed down the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society.84 Yet his views were widely shared, particularly the idea that Russia had betrayed her fellow Slavs. Chern iaev‘s ki Mi wrote that ―We have the right to dispose of our own gains, but in no case do we have the right to sacrifice others—those who trusted us with the defense of their interests‖ (emphasis in the original).85 General P. D. Parensov wrote in later years that the Berlin Congress was a ―trial, not only of Russia, but of and national rights, of the freedom and self-sufficiency of many millions of people, guilty of only one thing – they were Slavs, and thus, as such, close to Russia. At Berlin, there were not judges; there presided greed, pride, envy, and hatred.‖86 Despite the very real gains that Russia had made at the Congress, it would come to be seen as a low point for Russian diplomacy and Russian foreign policy.87

Bulgaria after Berlin – The Principality and Eastern Rumelia

By the Treaty of Berlin, Austria-Hungary received control over Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Russia was acknowledged as the pre-eminent Power in the new Principality of Bulgaria.

58

Technically, the new Principality was to remain a of the Ottoman Empire until 1908, but other than on matters of tribute sent to Constantinople, this was a polite legal fiction. The

Principality was to have its own monarch, a Princev, its own constitution, its own armed forces, and conducted its own foreign policy. Instead, it was Russia that was acknowledged as

Bulgaria‘s patron, both inside the country and without. To begin with, the Tsar was given the ability to select the new Bulgarian monarch. Furthermore, most of the Bulgarian officer corps, including all of the senior officers all the way up to the Minister of War, were Russian army officers on detached duty. The agents of the Russian state – typically the Russian Consul in Sofia and the Minister of War, a Tsarist general – thus exerted significant influence. Professor E. K.

Grimm observed that ―if in Russia they hoped, then in the West they feared that the new

Bulgarian state would become the obedient satellite of [Russia .‖88 Certainly, Russia was a major force in the early life of the fledgling state.

Yet this relationship was not entirely without its thorns. In particular, the Bulgarians did have a strong sense of national feeling, though this did not detract from their feelings of kinship with Russia – as the politician put it, ―We have raised the banner of ‗Bulgaria for Bulgarians‘ because it is the only guarantee of lasting and fair relations between Russia and

Bulgaria.‖89 More problematic were the economic differences between Russia and Bulgaria. Not only was there the incompatibility of their too-similar economic structures as mentioned above, but the Bulgarians tended to find the situation of the peasantry in Russia to be just short of horrific. In Bulgaria, peasants were typically small-scale freeholders, people who owned their

v To be precise, Bulgaria was a Kn iazhestvo, and the ruling monarch was a Kn iaz, a Slavic title traditionally translated as ‗Prince‘ but which is perhaps more equivalent to a Duke, essentially a high Slavic nobleman. The Russian Velikiĭ Kn iaz' or Great Kn iaz, used for members of the Imperial Family, has been traditionally translated as Grand Duke. For the purposes of consistency, this text will refer to the Bulgarian monarch as a Prince, and the state as a Principality, as does most Western scholarship on the matter.

59 own land and were modestly prosperous. In Russia, serfdom had only been abolished less than two decades previously, and the peasantry was still effectively bound to the land by heavy redemption payments. Even broadly Russophilic Bulgarians, such as Stoilov or the general

V"lko Stamov Velchev (who had lived in Russia) had no desire to see the Bulgarian peasantry made like their Russian counterparts.90

Eastern Rumelia, in the meantime, was still under the direct authority of the Sultan with regards to political and military matters. The Turks were allowed to maintain fortresses along the

Rumanian-Bulgarian border, but they were not allowed to use bashibazouks in the fortresses,vi or to billet their troops among the population. Order was to be maintained by a native gendarmerie, though officers were appointed by the Sultan. The Governor-General was likewise appointed by the Sultan, though subject to the confirmation of the other Great Powers. The Capitulations which governed inter-religious matters remained in force.91

Rumelia‘s judicial, financial, and administrative structure was determined by a pan-

European committee, and it showed. To begin with, the work was parceled out to different nations, which resulted in, ―…The English delegates taking charge of the electoral Law, the

Austrians the organization of the Tribunate, the French copied the Administrative Laws of

France for the benefit of the Roumeliotes, the introduced the Financial system of

Italy…,‖ as one of the British agents, a man named Jones, put it.92 Due to a lack of time, no one was able to determine just how appropriate the pilfered laws were to a recently-freed Turkish province, resulting in a Statute that Jones labeled ―not only too voluminous, hastily composed

vi Not that the Turks were likely to have done so in the first place, given that bashibazouks were irregular troops and poorly suited to garrison duty.

60 and ill-digested, but also… containing many contradictions and discrepancies.‖93 Jones provides a particular example in the form of local administration, writing that:

Before the war of 1877, the present Province of Eastern Rumelia was divided into two Sandjacks [Departments] and fourteen Cazas [Cantons]. The two Prefects with the fourteen Baillis who then governed the Province were found more than sufficient. Now, then to the System with which the French delegate has endowed it, there are six Departments and twenty-eight Cantons, and consequently, six Préfet, six ―Conseils generaux,‖ six ―Commissions permanents‖ twenty eighty ―Baillis,‖ twenty-eight ―Commandants de Gendarmerie,‖ twenty- eight ―Commissaires de Police‖ and so forth… Obscure Hamlets which before the War never saw an Official – except the tax collector – have now been erected into ―Chef lieux de Cantons‖ with each of them a ―Baili‖ ―Commandant de Gendarmerie‖ ―Commissaire de Police‖ a ―Juge de Canton‖ a ―Percepteur de Finance‖ a ―Caisser‖ a ―Chef des Contributions indirectes‖ and a Brigade of Gendarmerie consisting of six or eight gendarmes… A Province which contains at the utmost 800,000 inhabitants—the population of a City of the second rank—has been endowed with an worthy of a Kingdom. Besides the Governor General, there is the Secretary General or Director of the Interior, Directors of Justice, Public Works, Education, and a Commander of Militia and Gendarmerie.94

Furthermore, the Rumelians were emphatically displeased with their continued submission to the

Ottomans. The worst of the massacres that followed the April Uprising had occurred in southern

Bulgaria, including Batak, and relations with the Turks were strained. When the new Governor

General, Aleko Bogoridi, a high-ranking Ottoman minister of Bulgarian origin and a relative of

Gorchak v, made for his post, he was informed that if he arrived in Bulgaria in an Ottoman the local authorities could not guarantee his safety. Bogoridi resolved this by throwing away his fez at the border and donning a kalpak, the Bulgarian national .95

Ultimately, while both the fledgling Principality and the autonomous province of Eastern

Rumelia had reason to be unhappy with the Treaty of Berlin, the situation in Eastern Rumelia initially looked a good deal gloomier.

61

International Relations Theory – , , and Constructivism

Having established the shape of Balkan politics vis-à-vis Bulgaria at the conclusion of the

Congress of Berlin, it is now useful to consider just how one would expect the situation to progress. Common sense would indicate that the Russian state would want to hold onto its client state of Bulgaria by any means necessary, but turning to the field of International Relations

Theory can help provide some rigor to that basic conclusion. Before forging ahead, one should bear in mind that International Relations has a vast corpus of theory, with numerous, ever- evolving schools of thought, all of which have their own internal intellectual subdivisions. Of necessity, what follows is only a cursory overview of the state of International Relations theory as of the time of writing, and the analysis that stems from it is perforce superficial – but not, one hopes, without use.

Speaking broadly, during the Cold War the two most popular International Relations theories in the United States were those of Realism (more precisely referred to as Political

Realism) and Liberalism (or the International Law or Liberal Internationalism approach). Both spun off numerous revisions, variants, and descendants – such as Kenneth Waltz‘s Neo-Realism, but they remained the core approaches. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, two quite respected scholars in the field, write that ―These theories represent the oldest and arguably the most influential perspectives in the field, dominating speculation for at least the first fifty years of the discipline‘s life. Although no longer unchallenged for theoretical dominance, they remain highly influential within the field.‖96 They are a good place to begin.

Liberalism in International Relations is heavily inspired by the work of Kant and

Rousseau, on through Woodrow Wilson and Joseph Schumpeter, and then to Michael Doyle,

62

Robert Keohane, and Francis Fukuyama. Put most simply, this approach posits that is in countries‘ best interests to replicate the success of on the international level.

States benefit more from cooperation – particularly in economic terms, from free trade, but also from collective security arrangements from alliance treaties (in the 19th century) or international institutions (such as the UN in the 20th) – than they do from war, conquest, and international anarchy. States still act out of a concept of self-interest, but this idea of self-interest is broader and more long-term, as states may deny immediate gratification on some minor issue in order to reap the benefits of better relations with their neighbors. International Relations Liberalism also includes a great deal of emphasis on democratic peace theory – the idea that democratic states are less likely to go to war with one another out of shared concepts of legitimacy – and on the importance of economic links and free trade, but these are less important for the immediate question of Russo-Bulgarian Relations.97

Realism, though also drawing on a long tradition stemming from Thomas Hobbes,

Thucydides, and Machiavelli, is most closely linked to the reaction against Liberalism by E. H.

Carr and Hans Morgenthau, with Kenneth Waltz greatly expanding on the theory to produce

Neo-Realism (also called Structural Realism) in the Cold War era. The Realist approach emphasizes the importance of power over that of morality – states exist in an anarchic situation in which there is no higher authority, moral principles are difficult to apply to states in any case, and thus a state may do whatever its power (defined broadly) allows it to. States are self- interested and survival-oriented, though the exact balance of those factors can differ. Offensive realists emphasize power-maximization, and the idea that states are driven to domination and hegemony. Defensive realists instead emphasize the security dilemma in their work – the idea

63 that states seek to become secure by having more power than their neighbors, which in turns reduces the security of those neighbors and causes them to see more power. They see this as causing states to act in a more conservative fashion – still driven to maximize power when the opportunity presents itself, but behaving in a more strategic fashion. Realists also focus on the balance of power and deterrence as opposed to collective security as the method by which states are likeliest to seek their own security. Kenneth Waltz‘s Neo-Realism added a heavy emphasis on structure, the idea that the shape of the international system itself, rather than domestic or ideological factors, has the main effect on how states behave. This explains why states with extremely different internal situations (20th century US and USSR, or 19th century Great Britain and Tsarist Russia) behave in broadly similar fashions on the international arena.98

Now to examine the Russo-Bulgarian situation through the lenses of Liberalism and

Realism. Applying the Liberal view of international relations to Russia and Bulgaria in the early

1880s is somewhat problematic, as it would be difficult to claim that the Great Powers of the time were overly concerned with legal niceties – the Congress of Berlin, wherein the Great

Powers forcefully intervened in Russo-Turkish relations to revise an already-completed peace treaty, is an excellent example. And yet, the principles of Liberalism can be broadly applied, in particular the idea that states have more to gain from cooperation with one another. With those assumptions in mind, what would be most beneficial for Russia and Bulgaria in the 1880s? The simple answer was that it would benefit both of them to maintain the terms of the Treaty of

Berlin, which had left the Principality of Bulgaria and more arguably the Russian Empire better off than had been the case before. The Principality was a mostly-independent state despite its nominal vassal status, and the Russian Empire had achieved the goal of creating a dependent

64 client state in the Balkans without provoking Austria-Hungary and Great Britain into an armed conflict against it.

On the other hand, both Bulgaria and Russia could be fairly characterized as revisionist powers, unhappy with the post-Berlin status quo and interested in altering it. Both saw the Treaty of Berlin as being unsatisfactory compared to the earlier Treaty of San Stefano, and both would have preferred to revert to the earlier agreement. The difficulty lay in accomplishing this goal, as further military adventurism was ruled out both by Russia‘s post-1878 military and financial exhaustion, and by the underlying reality of the international system at the time. Trying to re- invade the Ottoman Empire would have simply resulted in a second Congress of Berlin, unless the Russian Empire was willing to risk a military conflict with Austria-Hungary and Great

Britain as well as the Ottomans, and this the Tsarist state was simply not willing to do. As such, the Liberal approach to International Relations Theory would suggest that it would be best for the Russian Empire and the Principality of Bulgaria to make the best of a bad hand, and to try and agitate more subtly for a revision of Berlin – largely through cooperation with the other

Great Powers. In this, they had certain advantages. The Ottoman Empire was a fairly unsympathetic ally for both Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, particularly following the

Bulgarian massacres, and the population of Eastern Rumelia was deeply dissatisfied with its situation. A peaceful revision of the Berlin terms that allowed the Principality to unite with

Eastern Rumelia was far from implausible (as indeed happened in 1885, though not without a good deal of sound and fury and a small Balkan war), and would allow both the Bulgarians to accomplish many of their irredentist goals, and Russia to achieve the large client state that it

65 wished for. Patience, conservation of Berlin‘s gains, and diplomatic negotiation with the other

Great Powers would seem to be the order of the day.

The Realist perspective on Russo-Bulgarian affairs is more straightforward, and is the one that has been more commonly applied to Great Power politics in the 19th century. Alliance between the two states was a matter of security for both.

For Russia, control of the Dardanelles was a security matter first and foremost, to avoid a repeat of the Crimean War. Bulgaria could serve both as a powerful regional ally – especially if its soldiers were trained and led by Russian officers – and a geographically convenient staging ground for a future Russo-Turkish War. The Russian and Ottoman Empires had been fighting wars roughly once a generation since the late 16th century, and with the prominent exception of the Crimean War, Russia had been winning all of them for just over a century. The most recent war in 1877-78 had put the Russian army quite nearly at the gates of Constantinople. It would be eminently rational to assume that another Russo-Turkish War would occur in another twenty or thirty years, in which case Bulgaria might help finally achieve the long-hoped for Russian goal of controlling the Straits. The problem of the other Great Powers would have to be resolved, but that was a problem independent of the wisdom of maintaining a friendly Bulgarian state – worse relations with Bulgaria would not make Austria-Hungary or Great Britain more inclined to allow

Russia the Dardanelles.

For the Principality of Bulgaria, the situation was also about security, but in a much more visceral fashion. Bulgaria had only recently been a part of the Ottoman Empire, and while it had been a reasonably prosperous part of Turkey-in-Europe, the bashibazouks‘ massacres had wiped away any good feeling that may have remained. For Bulgaria, the logic was simple. Bulgaria on

66 its own was not powerful enough to withstand an Ottoman effort to reclaim their wayward province. Bulgaria required a Great Power ally. This could be either Austria-Hungary or the

Russian Empire. Austria-Hungary was somewhat further away, had a vested interest in maintaining the Ottoman Empire, and for internal reasons related to Magyar politics, was not especially friendly to the Slavs. The Russian Empire, on the other hand, was a fellow Orthodox

Slavic state, and had its own reasons not just for maintaining Bulgaria as independent and opposed to their main rival, but also for expanding Bulgaria at the cost of the Ottoman Empire.

While becoming a client state for Russia was not a particularly ideal situation for Bulgaria, it was better than the alternatives on offer. In the Realist perspective then, Russia and Bulgaria had security interests that were threatened or blocked by the Ottoman Empire, and thus continued good relations would allow each to pursue its own national interest.

Now would be an appropriate time to turn to a third perspective, that of Constructivism, growing out of the writings of scholars such as Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, and Christian

Reus-Smit. Unlike Realism and Liberalism, Constructivism is a more recent theory, gaining prominence with the end of the Cold War and the failure of either of its two competitors to predict that momentous event – though Constructivism itself is not without antecedents, both in the critical theory approach of the Post-Modernists and the Frankfurt School, and in the more empirical approach of the English School. The essential argument of Constructivism is that both

Realism and Liberalism are assume a highly rationalist world – that is to say, they assume that individual political actors (whether states or human beings) are purely self-interested, and pursue that self-interest with cold calculation – even if Realism and Liberalism propose different methods by which actors pursue their self-interest. Constructivism, on the other hand,

67 emphasizes that individuals and states are not purely rational actors. What they perceive as their self-interest is socially constructed, and how they pursue it is influenced as much by beliefs, ideologies, and ideas as it is by more concrete factors like military or economic might. To pick a pair of examples offered by Christian Reus-Smit, being a Christian monarch during the Age of

Absolutism (the 17th and 18th centuries) suggested a certain set of interests – suppressing nationalist movements, pursuing rights of succession in other lands, and supporting other

Christian monarchs. A liberal democracy of the modern era, on the other hand, encourages intolerance of authoritarian regimes and a fondness for laissez-faire and human rights.

A corollary of this is that Constructivists tend to be much more historically and empirically focused than their rationalist rivals – if how a state behaves is so deeply conditioned by its mental image of itself and of its fellow states, then understanding the specific circumstances of that state becomes a vital task.99

How, then, would Russo-Bulgarian affairs look through the prism of Constructivism?

Ideologies and beliefs being less clear-cut than geopolitical interests, this is a more complicated question than it is for Realism or Liberalism. Still, one can make a few basic conclusions. To begin with, this is the Age of Nationalism. Race, ethnicity, and national identity were key determinants in a population‘s self-image, and by the latter 19th century they were strongly embedded in Russia and . Furthermore, this was the age not just of nationalism, but of pan-nationalism, when activists and thinkers worked to unite related ethnic groups into more unified supra-national groupings. Out of this one has Panslavism, discussed a few chapters hence, as well as Pan-Asianism, Pan-Turkism, and similar movements. In this sense, both

Russians and Bulgarians had more reason to be friendly to one another than to most of their

68 neighbors. Both were staunchly Slavic countries, and both were faced with non-Slavic competitors in the Balkans – Ottoman Turkey and Austria-Hungary most notably, but to a lesser extent also Romania and Greece. Under the circumstances, both would have found the other a more convivial ally than most of the other countries in the region. Furthermore, both also shared bonds of religion. During the 19th century, religion was still an important determinant of identity and allegiance, particularly in Eastern Europe. The fact that both Russia and Bulgaria were

Orthodox Christian was enormously important to their respective self-images, and further made the two countries inclined to view the other as friend and ally. Indeed, one might note that this

Constructivist perspective fits rather neatly with the generally accepted viewpoint that Russia went to war against the Ottomans out of Orthodox and Slavic fellow-feeling for the Bulgarians – an act which further established Russia as a friend in the minds of the Bulgarians.

At the same time, not all of the ideological currents that Constructivism looks like pointed the same way in Russo-Bulgarian affairs. As will be discussed in greater detail later on, the two countries had sharply different philosophies of government. Russia was a conservative, , indeed, the last absolute monarchy in Europe. The fledgling Bulgarian state, on the other hand, was a constitutional monarchy with a dominant legislature and one of the most liberal in the region. Though sanctioned by the Russian state – which reviewed a draft of the Bulgarian constitution – this contradiction would cause no little amount of friction between the Bulgarians and Russia‘s agents in the country over the years. Likewise, while

Orthodox and Slavic fellow feeling were important forces in keeping the two countries together,

Russian and Bulgarian nationalism did not lead to exactly the same place. While there was general agreement on the short-term goal of producing a large and powerful Bulgaria which

69 could fulfill its irredentist hopes, the for Russia this was largely a means to an end (greater

Russian power), whereas for the Bulgarians it was an end in and of itself. This, in turn, means that Constructivism suggests that there was a degree of instability in the nationalism-based friendship of Russia and Bulgaria. So long as the two pulled in the same direction, it was a force for better relations. But if cracks appeared in Russo-Bulgarian relations sufficient to cause a re- evaluation of what was in each country‘s best interests (as indeed would happen in 1883 and again later in 1885), then nationalism could become a force pushing the two states apart.

Ultimately, then, Constructivism gives a more ambiguous opinion on the prospects for

Russo-Bulgarian relations than the Realist project does. Essentially, while geopolitics strongly suggests that the countries should be allies, the emotional elements of the relationship were more fragile. That said, neither does Constructivism predict that Russo-Bulgarian relations would fall into pieces with such stunning speed – it may show fault-lines, but that is a far different thing from saying that they were doomed to destruction.

Conclusion – The Foundation of Russo-Bulgarian Relations

At the end of the Congress of Berlin, Russo-Bulgarian relations were as warm and pleasant as any international relationships either of the two countries possessed. For both sentimental and geopolitical reasons, the Russian Empire and the Principality of Bulgaria were close friends of one another.

In terms of sentiment, the raw fact is that Bulgaria suffered hideous atrocities at the hands of the Ottomans, at which point the Russian Empire went to war on their behalf – and on the behalf of the other Balkan peoples – defeated the Turks, and produced a peace treaty that gave

70

Bulgaria independence and an impressive peace settlement. Even the subsequent paring back of

San Stefano at Berlin does not change the fact that the Bulgarians were deeply grateful to Russia for this turn of events. To this day Tsar Alexander II is the Tsar Liberator in Bulgaria, with statues and street names in downtown Sofia. And the popular and press feeling that had led to the war was still alive in Russia, if not as powerful as it had been in the mid-1870s. Furthermore, as

Constructivist theory would indicate, they shared a number of important cultural, ethnic, and religious elements which would have brought them together, even if there were a few areas of disagreement which portended potential difficulties ahead.

Now, as the saying goes, gratitude does not have a great deal of staying power in international politics, but in this case, both countries also had excellent geostrategic reasons to stay on each other‘s good side. For Tsarist Russia, the long-term goal was to reach the

Dardanelles, and in so doing both benefit Russian trade and more to the point, secure southern

Russia against a repeat of the Crimean War. Bulgaria was sublimely positioned to help the

Russians achieve just that. More to the point, the Treaty of San Stefano had antagonized every other ally that the Russian Empire had in the region with the exception of tiny Montenegro, so for Russia‘s long-term Balkan policy it was either Bulgaria or no one. Whether one espouses the

Liberal interpretation that recommends working within international norms and respecting the

Treaty of Berlin at least for the time being, or the Realist view that favors a more forceful approach using Bulgaria as a springboard, it was entirely to Russia‘s advantage to maintain as positive relations with Bulgaria as possible.

Meanwhile, the Bulgarians were keenly aware that they needed a Great Power protector to help them carry out their irredentist mission – reclaiming the lands lost at the Congress of

71

Berlin – and also to keep them out of the grasp of the Ottomans, whom the Bulgarians had excellent reason to fear. Austria-Hungary for a number of reasons was an unsuitable partner in this. Consequently, in a mirror of Russia‘s situation, for the Principality of Bulgaria the choices were to either seek the protection of Tsarist Russia, or else to remain divided and unguarded in the face of a possibly revanchist Ottoman Empire.

A second aspect of the pre-1878 situation that has relevance going forward is the Panslav influence upon Russian foreign policy. Both Panslavism and the Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs will be discussed more heavily in the coming chapters, but for the moment, one should note that the Panslavs were repeatedly able to influence the course of Russian foreign policy in their favor. They were deeply involved in the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, as Ign t'ev was one of the leading Panslav figures of the time. Even more prominently, they were able to use their influence over the Russian press and the sympathies of individuals in the Tsarist court

(especially the future Tsar Alexander III) to rouse the Russian Empire in defense of the Balkan

Slavs. The Panslavs were interested in Russo-Bulgarian relations from the very beginning, and though the period immediately before the Russo-Turkish War would mark the peak of their influence, they would continue to be deeply involved in Russo-Bulgarian relations in the decade to come.

7 Cyril Edwin Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, (Princeton; London: Princeton University Press; H. Milford, , 1943), 7. 8 R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 82-84. 9 Ibid., 41-45. 10 Ibid., 41-45. 11 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 16-17. 12 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii‖, CXXXI, 436. 13 Thomas A Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872; a Study in Personal Diplomacy (Madison: [Prepared by] State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Dept. of History, University of Wisconsin, 1970), 17. 14 Ibid., 20-21.

72

15 Ignat‘ev, Izvestiia Ministerstva inostrannykh del, Bk. VI (1914), 161 in Ibid., 28. 16 Ibid., 193-194. 17 Ibid.,, v. 18 David Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 229-233. 19 Cited in Doino Doinov, ‗Iztochnata krisa i revolyutsionniyat podem na Balkanite— 1875g‘, in Konstantin Kosev etal., Aprilskoto vustanie 1876 , 157–215, 180, in Crampton, Bulgaria, 90. 20 Cited in Doino Doinov, ‗Iztochnata krisa i revolyutsionniyat podem na Balkanite— 1875g‘, in Konstantin Kosev etal., Aprilskoto vustanie 1876 , 157–215, 205, in Ibid., 90. 21 Ibid., 91. 22 Ibid., 91-92. 23 Ibid., 91-92. 24 Ibid., 90-92. 25 R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History (Boulder, Colo.; New York: East European Monographs; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1983), 1878-1918, 19. 26 Ibid., 19. 27 Crampton, Bulgaria, 90-92. 28 Ibid., 92. 29 J. A. MacGahan, ―The Turkish Atrocities in Bulgaria: Horrible Scenes at Batak‖ (The Daily News, August 22, 1876), pp.5-6. 30 Shaw, Stanford. 1978. The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (9):323-338. 31 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 2. 32 Ibid., 2-3. 33 Ibid., 3. 34 Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 221. 35 Zhomini to Girs, NKG, 9/21 Oct., 1878 Alekṣandr Genrikhovich Zhomini, Nikolaĭ Karlovich Girs, and Charles Jelavich, Russia in the East, 1876-1880; the Russo-Turkish War and the Kuldja crisis as seen through the letters of A.G. Jomini to N.K. Girs. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959), 86-87. 36 Egon Caesar Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 293. 37 Cited in Encho Mateev, Durzhavnikut Stefan Stambolov (Sofia: Letopisi, 1992), 111 in Crampton, Bulgaria, 93. 38 Lord Odo Russell to Earl of Derby, 1 December 1875, in A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 228-229. 39 D. A. Mil i tin, Our Political Situation at the present time, 7 February 1877 (Doc 164) in Aleksei Leont‘evich Narochnitskii and Institut Istorii SSSR (Akademiia nauk SSSR). o ii i n ion l’no-o obodi el’n i bo ’b n Balkanakh, 1875-1878: [Sbornik Dokumentov]. (Moskva: Nauka, 1978), 226. 40 Ibid., 227. 41 Editorial, Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, No. 188, July 19, 1875 (Doc 6) in Ibid., 52-53. 42 Editorial, Russkie Vedomosti, No. 197, September 13, 1875 (Doc 15) in Ibid., 63-64. 43 Report, Nikolayev Vestnik, No. 42, May 29, 1876 (Doc 57) in Ibid., 114. 44 Viktor Ivanovich Vinogradov, Russko-Turetskaia Voina 1877-1878 Gg. i Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii (Moscow: Mysl‘, 1978), 59. 45 M. P. Golov tsov, S. A. Vdovenkov, and M. V. Chernichonkov to the Moscow Slavic Society, 11 September 1876 (Doc 108) in Narochni ts kiĭ, o i i i n ion l no-o obodi el n i bo b n lk n kh 165-166. 46 G. Feodulov to A. S. Aks kov, 6 August 1876 (Doc 87) in Ibid, 146. 47 Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 232- 233. 48 o emennye I e i , No. 212, 4 August 1876 (Doc 86) in Narochnitskii, o i i i n ion l no-osvoboditel'na i bor'ba na Balkanakh, 145. 49 A. K. Baumgarten to I. P. Bogoevlenskom, 24 July 1876 (Doc 76) in Ibid., 137. 50 F. F. Trepov to A. F. Shultz, 24 July 1876 (Doc 77) in Ibid., 137. 51 Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 235

73

52 S. Nikitin, ―Russkoe Obshchestvo,‖ 62, in Stephen Lukashevich, I n k ko -1886: A Study in Russian Thought and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 137. 53 Kartsov, ―Za kulisami,‖ k i rina CXXXIV (1908): 70-71 in Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 233. 54 ―Dnevnik F. V. Chizhova‖ (of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society), 15/27 Jan. 1876 in Ibid., 232. 55 ―Dnevnik A. A. Kireeva‖ (of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society) 6:114in Ibid., 232. 56 Dmitriĭ Alekseevich Mil iutin and Petr Andreevich Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in , 4 vols. (Moskva: Gosudarstvenna ia biblioteka SSSR imeni V.I. Lenina, Otdel rukopiseĭ, 1947), 2:70, as quoted in David Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 235-236. 57 A. J. P Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), 245. 58 Ign t'ev, ―Zapiski,‖ Istoricheskii viestnik 139 (1915): 44ff.; Mil iutin and Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in , 3:11, both in Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 240. 59 Ibid., 240. 60 Ign t'ev, ―Zapiski,‖ Istoricheskii viestnik 139 (1915): 58, 62, in Ibid., 240. 61 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 6. 62 Ibid., 4-5. 63 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 22. 64 Crampton, Bulgaria, 93. 65 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 10-11. 66 Jovanović, Vlada Milana, 2:199-200 in Ibid., 12-13. 67 Zastava (Novi Sad), 10/22 Mar. 1878 in Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 241. 68 Jovanović, Vlada Milana, 1:414 in Ibid., 241. 69 William L Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Knopf, 1950), 335; Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy 241; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 10-12. 70 B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880. (Hamden [Conn.: Books, 1962), 501. 71 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 74. 72 Otto Bismarck, Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1899), 2:238. 73 Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1921), Vol. II, 279-281. 74 Ibid., 2:284-285. 75 Radowitz, Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz, II, 25 in William Howard Brennan, ―The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 1878-1884‖ (Brennan, 1973), 38. 76 Ibid., 33-42. 77 Cramption, Bulgaria, 94. 78 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 23. 79 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 54; Brennan, ―The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany,‖ 42. 80 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de , 37. 81 Girs to Zhomini, St. Petersburg, June 23/July 5, 1878 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 15. 82 Gorchak v to Girs, Berlin, June 30, 1878 in Ibid., 14. 83 Ivan Sergeyvich Aksákov, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Moskva: Universtitetskaia tipografiia, 1875), 297-308. 84 Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 243 85 Quoted in ―Pregled ruske Stampe,‖ Istok, 21 June/3 July 1878 in Ibid., 243 86 Parensov, ―V Bolgari,i, CXXXIV, 261. 87 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de , 37-38; Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 243-245;

74

88 Grimm, E. K. K Istorii Russko-Bolgarskih otnoshenii // Novui Vostok. 1924, No. 5. Pg. 77 in Petr Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia‖ (Rossiĭska ia Akademi ia Nauk, Institut Slav ianovedeni ia, 2003), 28. 89 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 10 December 1886, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 15, List 28. 90 For Velchev, see Izvlechenie ot Spomenit e Biografiyata na General-Maiora Velchev – Velko Stamov Velchev, TsDA Fond 248K, Opis 1, Delo 2, List 141; For Stoilov, see his diary entry for 9 February, 1880, TsDA Fond 600K Opis 3, Delo 2, List 28 to 30 . 91 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 23-24. 92 ―Report on the Working of the Organic Statute in Eastern Rumelia,‖ Jones to Dufferin, no. 6, Philoppolis, 10 April 1884 in Dufferin to Granville, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, 78/3623, no. 132, Constantinople, 22 April 1884, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 209. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ivanov I. Serbija I Bolgarija ot vremeto na Iztochnorymeliiskija Prevrat na Septembri 1885. Sbornik Statii. Sliven, 1886, pg. 202 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 30-31. 96 Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1996), 24. 97 Ibid., 28-66. 98 Ibid., 67-92. 99 Christian Reus-Smit, ―Constructivism,‖ in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, Theories of International Relations (New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 2013), 217-239.

75

Chapter 2: The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During the Balkan crises of the 1870s and 1880s – and indeed, for most of the 19th century – the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an infamously troubled institution in a land rife with them. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, ‘s Minister of Foreign

Affairs and later the French plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna, and a man who may be safely said to have known something of the art of diplomacy, wrote that ―perhaps no court is as poor in able men as that of Russia.‖100 His indictment, written in 1804, could just as easily have been penned three-quarters of a century later, as Russo-Bulgarian relations began their precipitous decline. The fact of the matter was that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notwithstanding the presence of some famed and skilled diplomats, was burdened with a number of severe shortcomings, some unique to it, others present throughout the late Imperial Russian state. These shortcomings in the Tsarist conduct of diplomacy would be on full display during the decline of Russo-Bulgarian relations.

The Changing Art of Diplomacy in the 19th Century

Before turning to the specific woes of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of

Russia‘s diplomacy in general, it is worth considering the context in which the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs operated.vii The 19th century saw a host of changes in the art and practice of diplomacy, just as it did in every other aspect of human life. In the beginning of the period,

vii This section will focus on the changing patterns of diplomacy in Europe, and specifically among the Great Powers, as this was the arena with which the Russian and Bulgarian actors in the period under consideration were most concerned with. The 19th century also saw a great expansion in the scope of the diplomatic system, as European powers now had to maintain embassies in non-Western lands, and as new actors appeared on the diplomatic scene (with and the United States perhaps the most significant). There is a great deal of interesting activity going on, even with regards to Russia – which maintained diplomatic ties with East in the late 19th century – but it lies beyond the scope of this work.

76 international diplomacy was conducted essentially through individuals. The rulers of a state would select an individual, invariably some high aristocrat with a cosmopolitan view of the world who possessed the trust of his government. This individual would be entrusted with a set of instructions, and then be sent off to, in the famous words of Sir Henry Wotton ―lie abroad for the good of his country.‖ Further communication with the capital could take place only at the speed of a ship or a good horse, and in any case there was hardly anyone at the capital who could help the diplomat abroad – the idea of a foreign ministry with a dedicated staff was still in its infancy. Now consider the art of diplomacy a hundred years later. The diplomat, while still likely of good family, was a trained professional. He had sat for exams and was expected to have certain skills, particularly for languages. He received far fewer instructions, but he was in almost constant communication with the capital by telegraph, and there was now a large, professional, and bureaucratized state department that could assist him with area knowledge or with guidance in the realms of finance or military matters, as necessary. Assuming he dealt with those matters himself, that is, since many embassies now had a host of consuls, military attaches, and even spies on the premises. Diplomacy had undergone a sea change comparable to what would happen after .

Examining these changes one by one can shed further light into the changes happening in the European diplomatic scene. The first which comes to the eye is the change in the nature of the diplomat himself.

The 19th century saw the advent of the idea of the professional diplomat, that is one who had some manner of training and certification in the conduct of international relations. In Prussia, regulations were laid down in 1827 and strengthened in 1842 which stated that any candidate for

77 the diplomatic corps had to, one, have completed three years at a university, two, have passed the first two state civil service examinations, and three, have served for eighteen months in provincial government. If the would-be diplomat met these requirements and was selected by the minister, he could expect to work a further year as an unpaid attaché, followed by additional examinations in modern political history, in commerce, in law, as well as oral and written tests in

French, the language of diplomacy at the time. Failure to pass any of these examinations likely meant the end of the candidate‘s career in the Foreign Ministry. After the Unification of

Germany, these regulations passed more or less seamlessly into the German foreign service. The

French were more resistant to the idea of examinations for diplomacy, but Édouard Thouvenel, the French Foreign Minister from 1860 to 1862 implemented a requirement that all candidates for the foreign service had to possess a law degree, though a ministerial report suggested that candidates without a degree may be admitted after passing examinations in international law, political history, and foreign languages. The British Foreign Office had its own set of examinations, which were separate from the civil service examinations that all British civil servants had to undertake – in fact, there were separate examinations for the Foreign Office as a whole and for the diplomatic corp. It was not until 1905 that all of these different requirements were combined with the general home civil service examinations.101

The 19th century also saw the regularization and professionalization of pay and advancement in the diplomatic corps. In 1858, France‘s foreign minister, Alexandre Colonna-

Walewski, instituted a system for grading embassy and legation staff. This included three classes of secretary, with pay scales and order of promotion, and requirements for entry to those classes

– one had to serve for three years as an unpaid attaché or supernumerary at a foreign ministry

78 before one could enter into the third class of secretary, for instance. In 1861, the British followed suit, with pay grades and advancement protocols that rendered a career in the diplomatic service less chaotic and more delineated.102

None of these reforms changed the fact that the membership of the diplomatic corps was still heavily drawn from the highest layers of society. Wealth was necessary both to survive the unpaid apprenticeships most would-be diplomats had to go through and to hobnob with their peers, and the diplomatic corps selected heavily for cosmopolitan outlooks, skill in languages, and what the Germans called salonfähig, being presentable in society. Many countries specified a minimum private income that a diplomat was expected to have. In Sardinia in 1856, this was

6,000 lire, while in Britain it was £400. Germany maintained a required income of 10,000 marks all the way until 1908. Yet in a sense, these were unnecessary formalities. Few diplomats could expect to survive on the low salaries offered.103 In Britain, in the years between 1815 and 1860, sixty percent of attaches appointed to British missions were aristocrats, and only three of the twenty three ambassadors appointed in those years did not come from the ranks of the aristocracy. In the years following 1860, until the First World War, these numbers improved slightly, but the Foreign Office remained heavily influence by high society – forty percent of the diplomatic corps came from aristocratic families, as did nineteen of the thirty-one career diplomats who achieved ambassadorial rank. Other countries were more or less successful in reducing the preponderance of aristocrats in their foreign ministries. In Germany, where such things were not greatly emphasized, over 80% of the diplomatic corps came from aristocratic lineage at the end of the century. In France, which emphasized republican governance, the number of aristocratic appointments in the period of 1903-1914 was less than 8%. In Austria-

79

Hungary, aristocrats occupied 73% of leading positions in the foreign ministry in 1847, and 56% in 1918. These numbers attest both to the degree that the character of the typical diplomat did and did not change during the 19th century – diplomats were increasingly professionalized, and the number of them drawn from old aristocratic lineages generally decreased, but the still had a strong presence in the membership of most countries‘ diplomatic corps. 104

The second grand change that occurred in the practice of diplomacy in the 19th century was in the relationship between the diplomat abroad and the Foreign Ministry back in the capital, a result of the communications revolution that took place during those years. During the eighteenth century, the practice was to give newly-appointed diplomats long lists of instructions that prepared them for the peculiarities of their post and acquainted them with the desires of their government, and then set the diplomats loose. Once the diplomat had arrived at his new post, it simply took too long to send messages back to the home capital for any kind of close management to be possible. During the winter, a message sent from London could take a month to reach St. Petersburg, and about as long to arrive in Constantinople. The few American diplomats in Europe could expect a message to Washington to take two months to arrive, and then another two months to get back. Even at the very fastest, the record for a London-Vienna dispatch was a week (the record set in 1822). This began to change around the mid-century, when the construction first of semaphores and then of railways and steamships and electric telegraphs sped up communications by an order of magnitude. In 1838, a string of semaphore towers between Berlin and St. Petersburg reduced the time a message spent in transit to just two days, and by the later 19th century, turnaround in communications was reduced to a matter of

80 hours. Letters and dispatches remained for when longer reports (and interesting private letters) were used, but the telegraph meant that routine instructions could be sent on a daily basis. 105

This had enormous repercussions for the distribution of power in a country‘s foreign ministry. Previously, the diplomat abroad had enormous leeway with which to conduct his country‘s foreign policy. Receiving instructions on how to deal with a situation could take anywhere from weeks to months, depending on how far away the ambassador was stationed, and so for all but the most important questions the diplomat abroad had to default to his own judgment and his own initiative. But by the later 19th century, the ambassador at his post could receive new instructions within a day, and as a result the Foreign Ministry in the capital could exercise far greater control. Decision-making was now centralized in the capital, and everything took place much more quickly.

Some argued that this new form of diplomacy still allowed for a great deal of private initiative on the part of the ambassador abroad. Telegrams were necessarily brief, and diplomats no longer received the extensive instructions that they had in the past.106 Stratford Canning, the long-serving British Ambassador to Constantinople (years of service: 1825-1828, 1841-1858), was known to argue just that point, being of the view that this allowed diplomats greater discretion in how to pursue objectives. But the consensus view was that the freedom of movement for a diplomat in the field was much lesser now. Francis Bertie, who would be the

British Ambassador to France (years of service: 1905-1918) stated this view memorably when he said that ―In Downing Street one can at least pull the wires whereas an Ambassador is only a d— d marionette.‖107 Diplomats could still be influential, as Bertie himself was, in their knowledge of conditions at their post and through their strength of personality, but as historians of

81 diplomacy Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne note, ―Real power, the ability to determine the form and timing of diplomatic initiatives, had shifted towards the Foreign Office.‖108 It was now the Foreign Ministry in the capital, not the ambassador abroad, that determined a country‘s foreign policy.

A third important change that took place during the 19th century was the increasing size and complexity of embassies abroad. In the first half of the 19th century, embassies functioned as more-or-less extended families. An ambassador was selected, given a salary and perhaps an expense account, and then expected to maintain the embassy and whatever staff was necessary himself. The ambassador abroad received a secretary, usually, and a paid attaché, along with unpaid attachés who were, as mentioned, usually aspiring diplomats themselves – though some instead used the opportunity to advance socially rather than professionally. 109

By mid-century, the idea of a family embassy was becoming steadily obsolete. Part of the reason was due to the growing professionalization and the increasing number of diplomats who were not aristocrats and could not be expected to afford keeping up an entire household abroad for years on end. But part of the reason was that Foreign Ministries throughout Europe were increasingly using specialist attachés to help with diplomatic business. In the 19th century, diplomatic services remained generally distinct from consular ones, but there was a certain level of interchange between the two branches of government service. Consuls, focused as they were on dealing with the local population, and with greater interest in business and economic matters, were sometimes elevated to diplomatic rank when dealing with that were remote or simply possessed very difficult languages. In Germany under Bismarck, about one third of

Foreign Ministry staff and one fourth of German diplomats had spent time as consuls. As the

82 century wore on, governments began to see the need for a section of the diplomatic corps to focus on economic matters, particularly those above the level of mundane consular duties. The

British Foreign Office established a department charged with handling commercial affairs in

1865, and in 1880 appointed a commercial attaché to the British embassy in Paris, with Berlin,

Constantinople, Peking, and Yokohama soon sprouting such attaches as well. France and

Germany followed the British example, and in 1906 France formally established a corps of commercial attachés. So the staff of embassies was expanded with commercial specialists. 110

Even more than commerce, the needs of warfare expanded embassy staffs as well. The use of military officers in embassies was not a new one – Machiavelli wrote of ambassadors with military experts disguised as valets, and Napoleon had used an army captain at the French

Embassy in Vienna to keep an eye on the Austrian military. But the system of military attachés truly began with the Crimean War, when the British appointed army officers as agents in Paris,

Turin, and Constantinople to help coordinate on military matters. After the Crimean War, the agent in Paris was formally designated a military attaché, and over the following decades all of the Great Powers started distributing military experts to their embassies – by 1914, the French had twenty six in total. Military attachés were seen as useful people. Between friendly countries, military attachés could liaise with general staffs and war ministries, and help coordinate responses when war loomed. In less friendly countries, they could be used to spy on local militaries and provide a certain level of strategic intelligence to their home government. The use of military attachés as spies was generally frowned upon by the Great Powers (though a French complaint about spying did prompt Kaiser Wilhelm II to exclaim ―Damn it! What are my attach s for then?‖) 111, but it should be noted that during the late 19th century all of the Great

83

Powers were engaged in enthusiastic espionage against each other, both in the old-fashioned way of suborning locals, and by establishing cabinets noirs to crack diplomatic codes. All of this expanded the number of people attached to a typical embassy and increased the complexity of diplomatic business.112

In short, the Russian Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs was conducting its Balkan diplomacy against a backdrop of several significant changes in the nature of the typical diplomat, in the size and complexity of the typical embassy, and in the relationship between the diplomat abroad and the Foreign Ministry at home.

A Brief History of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its 19th century incarnation was established on

September 8th, 1802, when Tsar Alexander I issued a proclamation containing a general reorganization of the Russian administrative system. Previously, Russian foreign affairs had been handled by the College of Foreign Affairs, itself created by out of the old

Po ol ki P ik (Посольский Приказ, or roughly translated, the Ambassadorial

Administration) of Muscovite Russia.113 Over the course of the 18th and early 19th century, a number of extraneous functions were stripped out of the College/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as internal administration, ecclesiastical administration, tax gathering, and finally the postal service were all moved out of its remit.114 By the time of Alexander I‘s reforms, something very much like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had developed organically – the chief difference between the

Petrine College system and the Ministry system that replaced it was the presence of a single chief in the latter, but by the late 18th century there was usually one individual handling all foreign

84 affairs, typically with the rank of State Chancellor. The actual administrative changes instituted by Alexander I were minor. There were several departments, including ones that handled protocol, communication with embassies abroad, finance, relations with other parts of the

Russian state, records, and a separate Asian Department, which became increasingly influential as the century wore on.115

In 1868, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchak v instituted a new set of reforms. The internal structure of the various departments was simplified and streamlined, and the chief effect was to drastically reduce the number of people working in the Ministry – from 306 to a mere 134.116 As in 1802, however, the reforms only went so far, and the basic structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued as before. Gorchak v had not tried to alter it, and so it continued. In 1892 the structure of the Ministry was listed in law as consisting of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Central Establishments (the council, the chancery, the Asiatic, Internal Relations, and Staff-and-Economic Departments and the various archives in Moscow and St. Petersburg), and the Establishments Abroad (the embassies, missions, and consulates).117 During the period of the early 1880s, under the Minister of Foreign

Affairs Nikol ĭ K rlovich Girs, the Ministry changed little. There was an expansion in terms of the number and location of consulates and embassies, primarily to Asia and , and in 1893 Consuls were granted slightly greater power.118 Not till 1906 did the Foreign Minister

Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky attempt to institute more serious reforms that would alter staffing and pay and change the internal structure of the Ministry, but these reforms, though fairly modest and reasonable, progressed only slowly and were still at an early stage when Russia entered into

World War I. They became moot shortly thereafter.119

85

In terms of logistics, by 1910 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had eight full embassies (up from six in in 1894), along with thirty or so other diplomatic missions and consulates. It had grown significantly since the beginning of the century – in 1802, when the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, there were a total of 44 embassies, consulates, and missions outside of Russia. By 1902 there were 173. Most of these were quite small – the

Russian embassies in Paris, London, and Berlin, the most important Russia possessed, typically consisted of the Ambassador, one first secretary and two or three other secretaries, a counselor, and an attaché each for naval and military matters. The number of clerical staff was typically minute, so that junior diplomatic secretaries often did a great deal of relatively mundane administrative work.120

The Many Troubles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Professionalization

As one may gather from the repeated efforts to reform the Russian Empire‘s foreign ministry, it was an institution rife with problems, commented on both at the time and since then.

The rest of this chapter will examine the problems faced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, beginning with arguably the most significant – the quality of Russian diplomats in the latter 19th century.

At the heart of the issue is the fact that the idea of diplomacy as a professional career with necessary credentials and skills had not penetrated very deeply into the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. Consider the example of entrance exams. In theory, beginning in 1859, a Russian subject who wished to become a diplomat had to sit for exams that tested their skill in modern languages, in précis writing, and in what were called the diplomatic sciences, that is,

86 international law, economics and statistics, and so forth.121 Yet by 1864, a grand total of five people had actually sat for those exams.122 The regulations that governed the examinations were, in the words of Hamilton and Langhorne, ―almost oriental in their inspiration.‖123 Certain classes of people were able to bypass the examinations entirely, including aristocrats, as well as the sons of ‗men of science or art‘ and ‗young choristers discharged from the court choir after loss of voice.‘ Conversely, emancipated peasants, ‗persons belonging to the classes liable to taxation‘

(that is to say, the merchants classes), and ‗, excepting those who may have degrees in medicine‘ were barred from diplomatic careers.124 Such restrictions made a mockery of any attempt at turning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into a meritocracy. The exams themselves were notoriously easy and had little to do directly with the art of diplomacy, to the point that one diplomat, Dmitri Ivanovich Abrikossow, referred to them as being composed in equal parts of

―repartee and mind-reading,‖ while a scholar termed them a ‗a simple formality.‘ 125 Abrikossow had taken his exams in the very beginning of the 20th century, but it seems unlikely that the exams he took were significantly worse than those that had existed a few decades previously.

In fact, too much expertise in diplomatic skills could have a poor impact on a young man‘s career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consider the example of Andrei Dmitrievich

Kalmykow, a graduate of the School of Oriental Languages in the early 1890s. After graduation,

Kalmykow hoped to enter the diplomatic service, and sought out the one diplomat he knew,

Pavel Mikhailovich Lessar. As Kalmykow recounts,

Lessar laughed with his usual quiet, bitter, and sympathetic laughter. ―You happen to know Asian languages and have graduated from the Oriental School— that is enough to spoil all your future career in the Foreign Office. Any other diploma would be better, even one from the Academy of Music. Then at least you would not be treated as an interpreter fit only for minor positions.‖126

87

Indeed, while skill in French or German – both common among the aristocratic classes of the

Russian Empire – was useful, it would seem that knowledge of obscure languages could actually harm a career.127

If not on the basis of exams or credentials or skills, then the question arises of how, precisely, were Russian diplomats selected? The answer is simple – by connections. In the

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who one knew was far more important than what one knew.128 To be certain, this was by no means a problem unique to Russia – the British Foreign

Office fought tooth and nail to maintain the right to nominate candidates (essentially determining who would actually receive diplomatic posts).129 But in Russia, the problem was particularly severe. Consider the case of young Kalmykow, who had just had his idealistic hopes shattered.

He reported the conversation with Lessar to his mother, who confidently stated that ―Lessar is right, but don‘t worry. All you need is a proper recommendation. I shall get you one.‖ The recommendation was swiftly procured, and in the words of Kalmykow, ―it appeared in the form of an oblong letter signed by a well-known titled name and worked like a charm.‖130 D. I.

Abrikossow had a similar experience, managing to get into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the strength of his name – the Abrikossows being an exceedingly wealthy family of confectioners, a fact that the Vice Minister interviewing Abrikossow paid great attention to.131 Once one had entered into the Foreign Ministry, further connections were required to actually secure any foreign postings. Kalmykow recounts how at the very end of the 19th century, the Foreign

Minister Count M. N. Muraviev had to appoint a secretary for a legation to Bangkok, and ran into certain difficulties. ―Several young men were recommended by influential persons, and

Count Muraviev, in order not to offend them, declared that he already had the right man in view

88 and charged [N. G.] Hartwig [vice-director of the Asiatic Department at this time] to find one without delay.‖132 This lucky soul ended up being Kalmykow, but Abrikossow had to take much more peculiar measures in order to get a post in London. As he recounts in his memoirs,

It was to a dog that I owe the beginning of my career. One day the curate [a friend and roommate of Abrikossow‘s expressed the wish that we had a dog. Shortly afterward I was offered a magnificent borzoi, which in the sunshine looked golden and had the most expressive black eyes. This dog became our companion. As I always returned home for lunch, I would take the dog with me to the Foreign Office and leave it at the foot of the staircase, chained to the railing. No one who passed could fail to notice the dog and ask to whom it belonged. In such a way I succeeded in standing out in the crowd and attracted the attention of those on whom my fate depended. I became known as the man with the magnificent dog. I realize that such a ruse was undignified, but I was desperate and had to do something out of the ordinary. One morning I was called to the Chief of Personnel, who, after complimenting me on the dog, asked casually what would I say to an offer to go to London. He explained that our ambassador there, Count [Aleksander Konstantinovich] Benckendorff, had asked for an increase in staff, stipulating that the clerk sent be a good worker with sufficient means to lead a life befitting a member of the Embassy. Apparently, the combination of industry and money was hard to find… Asked about me, my chief attested that I was quite capable of working even on such dull matters as Russians who died in foreign lands and as for means, a man who owned such a dog could not be poor.133

One might observe that Abrikossow‘s ability to think outside of the box with his canine subterfuge was itself recommendation for a diplomatic posting, but it is difficult to run a

Ministry on such a basis.

Aspiring diplomats resorted to such tricks because work in St. Petersburg home office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was described as being singularly miserable. There were too many low-ranking diplomats in St. Petersburg, too little work, and too few postings. Most ended up doing minor clerical work, as Abrikossow himself did. Morale was abysmal. Abrikossow recounts how,

89

I used to pretend that I was suffocating from the stale bureaucratic atmosphere and, rushing to an open window, pretended that I was about to throw myself from it. A kindhearted but humorless baron who sat near the window would catch me by the arm and try to console me. What depressed me most at the Foreign Office were its endless corridors, where the clerks walked up and down, enviously gossiping about promotions and complaining about the injustice of their chiefs, and where those who returned from abroad met their friends who had remained in the Foreign Office… had I not been so happy in my private life, I would have sunk into a state of acute depression.134

As one might imagine in such an environment, competition for the scarce foreign postings, particularly to prestigious locations such as Paris, London, or Berlin, was absolutely cutthroat.135

Compounding this problem, however, was the brute fact that a diplomatic career simply wasn‘t very prestigious in the Russian Empire, despite the considerable contacts required for entry.136

While a posting in London or Paris was still a worthwhile accomplishment, a term in Tehran or

Bangkok, where Kalmykow spent much of his early career, let alone a career that never left St.

Petersburg, was simply not very desirable to up-and-coming Russian elites. Furthermore, the idea of diplomacy was not held in high regard. Upon returning to his home in Kharkov after becoming a diplomat, Kalmykow recounts being met with disapproval by people he had never met before, who

…Thought that diplomats prevented the declaration of patriotic and, in their opinion, righteous wars, which was partly true, and were solely responsible for the outcome of unlucky campaigns, which was obviously unjust… I found that diplomacy itself was not popular, and even people well disposed toward me personally were dubious about the utility of the diplomatic profession in general. ‗Slightly better than vaudeville,‘ my mother once said about our Foreign Office.137

Thus, one had a veritable conflux of negative factors. Diplomacy was not a prestigious career.

The safeguards that were meant to ensure a high quality of professional, such as entrance exams,

90 were considered a joke. Connections trumped all other considerations, and possession of considerable skills in some areas – such as languages – could actually hinder a man‘s career.

Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that the Imperial Russian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs was routinely criticized for the incompetence of its members. Russian Foreign Ministers complained constantly about the quality of their personnel. In 1806, Sir Charles Stuart, the

British Ambassador to Russia, wrote of the Russian Foreign minister complaining of ―the dearth of talents in the diplomatic line of this country.‖138 Almost precisely one hundred years later and five months before being appointed as the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander

Petrovich Izvolsky showed up at the home of a senior diplomat, Baron M. Taube, where he complained loudly about the quality of the senior diplomatic staff.139 In his memoirs,

Abrikossow waxed poetic in his revilement of the careerists in the Ministry, and of the particular incompetence of certain named diplomats140, while Russian newspapers in the later years of the

19th century assaulted the diplomatic corps of the Empire as lazy and snobbish.141 Kalmykow, meanwhile, wrote of how his friend P. M. Lessar was ―often summoned to assist the Russian

Embassy in London, since the aged ambassadors there were entirely innocent of the intricacies of the map of Asia and stared at it with a blank look which was interpreted by the irate representatives of Downing Street as the acme of perfidy and diplomatic conceit.‖142 Of his superior, the head of the Asian Department Count P tr Aleks evich Kapn st, Kalmykow noted that he was ―unable to retain correctly in his memory a single Oriental name,‖ a serious lack in the man charged with running diplomatic relations with Asia.143 The picture painted of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a dire one.viii

viii One of the less examined consequences of the poor morale and lack of competency at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that the institution was easily penetrated by foreign agents. The Russians diplomatic service was

91

All that said, it would be wrong to say that all of the diplomatic corps or Ministry staff were incompetent. On the contrary, late 19th century Russia produced a number of very skilled and highly respected diplomats, including the Ministers of Foreign Affairs A. M. Gorchak v, N.

K. Girs, and A. B. Lobanov-Rostovsky, and the ambassadors Ign t‘ev, Nelidov, Orlov, Novikov, and others. Internationally, Russian diplomacy often commanded respect.144 The issue, rather, was that the quality of the Russian diplomatic corps was extremely uneven. As one scholar observed, there was an extreme degree of heterogeneity among the Russian Foreign Ministry membership. As he put it, ―experts and ignoramuses, specialists and dilettantes, could all be found working for the Russian Foreign Ministry in the years before 1914.‖ There were people who were masters of the diplomatic craft, both bureaucrats such as Count V. N. L msdorf,

Foreign Minister from 1900 to 1906, and diplomats such as P. M. Lessar, and people who were hard pressed to string together a coherent memorandum, such as the aforementioned P. A.

Kapn st.145 The trouble was that with the emphasis on connections as a means to secure any foreign postings, one could not count on having a skilled man in the place where he was actually needed.

quite notoriously unable to keep a secret, and in his memoirs, Abrikossow recounts a tale of an unnamed secretary at the London embassy who turned out to be a German spy. As Abrikossow writes, the man had a grand way of living despite limited personal funds, spent a great deal of time at the German Embassy, and when reports of the Ambassador vanished, the secretary explained that he had been taking them home to copy for the archives. It was only afterwards, when WWI erupted and the man failed to return from leave that anyone realized he was a spy. See Dmitriĭ Ivanovich Abrikosov, Revelations of a Russian Diplomat: The Memoirs of Dmitrii I. Abrikossow, ed. George Alexander Lensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 141 and William Howard Brennan, ―The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 1878-1884‖ (Brennan, 1973), 123.

92

The Many Troubles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Administration

Another problem which is repeatedly mentioned in both scholarship and memoirs about the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that it was a very poorly organized and inefficient institution.

It was a bureaucracy in the worst sense of the word, with oceans of paperwork and mountains of red tape required to accomplish quite nearly anything. But those very same regulations were often ignored whenever was convenient, and it was difficult to establish authority in the Ministry. Instead of providing organizational clarity and routine, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs was instead an inchoate mass of personal relationships, with the result that a recurring refrain in memoirs is that it took considerable intriguing and politicking to actually achieve anything.146 Even as early as the reign of Alexander I, Ministers found that they had to devote significant time, energy, and political capital to mastering their own bailiwick.147

This bureaucratic inefficiency and incoherence manifested itself in different forms. It took the form of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair‘s slow adaptation to changing diplomatic realities. Embassies were retained in German statelets that had been absorbed into the German

Empire, while only a single Russian ambassador was expected to handle all of , and service in Munich was rated as more desirable than a sojourn to Washington or Tokyo.148 It took the form of a lack of a good system for distributing work inside the Ministry. One has people buried in paperwork while their colleagues at the next desk were left at loose ends.149 And it also took the form of a sharp imbalance in staffing levels between the Ministry of Foreign

Affair‘s home office in St. Petersburg and the embassies and consulates abroad. By contemporary standards, the St. Petersburg home of the Ministry was dreadfully overstaffed,

93 despite recurring efforts to cut the numbers down to something manageable. During the reign of

Tsar Alexander I, seven hundred people could find work at the Ministry, including the famed poet Alexander Pushkin (the Russian Ambassador to London complained that the Russian

Ministry ―contained more people than the offices of all the secretaries of state in Europe combined‖).150 By Gorchak v‘s day, this was down to just over three hundred, and he cut the numbers further to 134.151 For comparison, the British Foreign Office in 1861 had all of fifty-two employees, up from the thirty-one in 1822.152 Meanwhile, when Abrikossow arrived at his post in Russia‘s Embassy in London in the early years of the 20th century, he found that there were now a grand total of six people at the Embassy, with a single typewriter between them. All of them were excruciatingly overworked, between the formal diplomatic work and the busy social schedule they were all but required to keep.153 And this was in one of the most important embassies Russia maintained, to the most powerful nation of the time. The situation in more obscure climes was even worse. In many cases, consulates were forced to take on impromptu diplomatic duties where there was no embassy, including in places such as Bulgaria and India.

There was never enough money to hire support staff – clerks and secretaries and the like – which meant that the consulates were constantly struggling to actually carry out all of their duties.154

The most serious manifestation of the Ministry‘s bureaucratic incoherence was the unclear and frequently overlapping distribution of responsibility between the different parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned, the St. Petersburg home office consisted of the

Minister, Deputy Minister, council, chancery, and three departments (Asiatic, Internal Relations, and Staff-and-Economic), as well as archives. But the question of which jurisdiction a particular diplomatic problem fell under could be answered in different ways. Political matters, that is, the

94 bulk of the Ministry‘s work, was under the purview of the Chancery – except where it had to do with the East, in which case it fell under the Asiatic Department‘s remit. Likewise, political correspondence was edited by two state counselors who reported directly to the Minister and had nothing to do with the Chancery. On occasion, the Internal Relations dealt with political matters without reference to either the Chancery or the Asiatic Department, and on other occasions, matters that would normally fall under the mandate of the Internal Relations or Staff-and-

Economic departments were sent to the Asiatic Department if they could be said to be concerned with the East.155 There was a general confusion as to who was responsible for what, which resulted in duplication of work, internal fragmentation, mismatch between skills and work, and in general made it more difficult for the Minister to control his own office.156

One final note is that solving all of these inefficiencies – in the location of diplomats abroad, in the levels of staffing between center and abroad, in the distribution of work internally, and most of all in the distribution of responsibility in the Ministry – was made much more difficult by the fact that the structure of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was laid down in law. This hampered the ability of successive Foreign Ministers to reform their institution.157

The Many Troubles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Autocratic Control

While problems of bureaucratic inefficiency or professional competency were often bruited about in the halls of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a third problem was more rarely mentioned, as it went to the very heart of the Russian system of government. Put simply, the Tsar was the final determinant of foreign policy, and the Tsar was rarely very skilled in foreign policy.

95

Now, in and of itself, the idea that a country‘s Foreign Ministry is responsible to someone beyond the Ministry is thoroughly uncontroversial. But Russia‘s autocrats exercised a much higher degree of control over foreign policy than the and prime ministers of other lands, and had far fewer checks on their power – after all, until 1905, Russia was the last absolute monarchy in Europe. The monarchs of Germany and Austria-Hungary were still powerful and influential, but they did have to contend with other forces. But in Russia, there was a very powerful idea that the autocrat was the originator of foreign policy. An official report in

1837 was firm that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ―merely the faithful executor of the intentions‖ of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Under the next Tsar, Prince Gorchak v wrote that ―in

Russia there are only two people who know the policy of the Russian cabinet: the emperor who makes it and myself who prepares and executes it.‖158 Another Tsar along, Alexander III said of his Foreign Minister N. K. Girs in 1886 that ―Who does not know that the pitiful Girs is nothing more than an executor of my will?‖159 Twenty years later, another Foreign Minister stated that

―my duty consists in telling the emperor what I think about every question, and then when the

Sovereign decides I must obey unconditionally and try to see that the Sovereign‘s decision is executed.‖160 In terms of his ability to influence and restrain his monarch, the Foreign Minister during the Bulgarian crisis, N. K. Girs, fell within the middle of the pack of late 19th century

Ministers. Gorchak v, Izvolsky and Lobanov-Rostovsky were more powerful, L msdorf and

Muraviev less.161

The problem with this arrangement was that the Russian were not trained in foreign policy and did not always devote the interest to it that the subject deserved. Alexander II and

Nicholas II were both said to have been largely apathetic to international affairs, and to have

96 exercised little control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.162 Conversely, Alexander III was more interested in foreign policy and had a certain sense of what he wanted out of relations with other countries, but he was also well-known as an aggressive personality with sympathy to

Panslav ideologies. 163 But monarchical interest in foreign affairs could be equally troublesome, as demonstrated on one occasion when Alexander II decided to bestir himself. In 1879, the Tsar decided to write a personal letter to the German Kaiser, which included a number of complaints, threats, and lamentations, including a sharp jab at Bismarck, then at the height of his powers.

This caused an incredible commotion in both Russia and Germany, with Bismarck suspecting that it was a ploy of Gorchak v to wreck the Russo-Bulgarian rapprochement, while in Russia, in the words of one scholar, ―there was equal anger and some dismay.‖164 N. K. Girs wrote told one of his colleagues that ―The Emperor has just sent a letter to Emperor William which will, I fear, set the match to the powder.‖165 The Russo-German relations survived that outburst of Imperial initiative, but much more damaging for Russia was what occurred in 1904, when L msdorf proved unable to dissuade Nicholas II from entering into the Russo-Japanese War. As

Abrikossow recalls,

The Foreign Office had a better understanding of the real situation [with regards to Japanese strength vis-à-vis Russia], but at its head was a weak person, without the courage to go counter to general opinion… Not listening to his ministers, Nicholas in the days before the Russo-Japanese War put his trust in two adventurers who had some knowledge of the … In vain the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed to the danger of such a policy, and the Vice Minister complained he could not sleep, for as soon as he closed his eyes, he would see Japanese creeping from every corner to .166

Of the disastrous consequences of this failure, beginning with the Revolution of 1905, no more need be said.

97

In the long run, the effect of this autocratic control was to make it difficult for the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to control their own country‘s foreign policy. There was a great deal of confusion in Russia as to just where foreign policy was created, and much depended on the ability of individuals to play games of courtly intrigue. Furthermore, the other Ministries, or even non-Ministerial or governmental actors, could attempt to influence the Tsar to get a particular foreign policy through – this sort of lobbying was hardly unique to Russia, of course, but the individual-centric form of Russian policymaking made it much more pernicious. Russian

Ministers, and not just Foreign Ministers, often had very little power to affect Russian policy.

Baron Roman Romanovich Rozen, the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo at the time of the Russo-

Japanese War, observed that

We must never lose sight of the fact that the Government of Russia, although nominally an ‗autocracy‘ or rather an autocratic bureaucracy, was far from being invested with the omnipotence which one associates with the idea of ‗autocracy‘ or ‗Tsarism‘. [It was instead in the words of one of our wittiest statesmen, ‗a powerless federation of independent departments whose relations to each other were not always friendly, or even neutral, and sometimes partaking of a character of almost open hostility.‘167

Charles Hardinge, the British Ambassador to Russia at the time, agreed, writing that in Russia, each Minister ran

…his own Department on his own lines, regardless of his colleagues, his sole object being to obtain the Emperor‘s favour… The present ministers are the most worthy and well-disposed lot, and individually one can have a certain amount of confidence in them, but there is no cohesion amongst them at all, and consequently they have no real power.168

The necessity to intrigue and compete mattered not just for Foreign Ministers such as Girs or

L msdorf, but also for ambassadors and departmental chairs. N. G. Hartwig, the ambassador to

Serbia on the eve of the First World War, was an extremely active man able to push through his

98 wishes with regards to Russia‘s Balkan policy. D. A. Kapnist was a more passive man, who did next to nothing. 169 In essence, Russian foreign policy belonged to whoever was most persuasive in getting the Tsar‘s ear.

The Many Troubles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Uncontrolled Policy

All of these problems that have mentioned so far – uneven competency of diplomats, overlapping responsibilities between departments, inefficient or unclear distribution of work, and autocratic meddling – combined to create a much more significant problem for the Russian

Empire. Essentially, it was difficult for the Russian Empire to craft a single, unified foreign policy, and even more difficult to get all of its various diplomats to carry out that policy.

Repeatedly, individual diplomats decided to act upon their own conceptions of what would be best for Russia, regardless of whether or not this matched the official policy of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs or the Foreign Minister. Other times, diplomats and Ministry staff engaged in high profile intrigues and conflicts with one another, to the general detriment of Russian policy.

This was an issue with a long-standing pedigree. In 1819, Friedrich von Gentz, assistant to Prince Klemens von Metternich and one of the most prominent diplomats of the age in his own right, wrote about the shocking ―attitude of independence which the Russian ministers and agents assume everywhere in their opinions, in their language, and very often in their actions, even in regard to the most important affairs.‖ The actions of Russia‘s agents abroad contradicted not just those of other Russian agents, but also the official line from St. Petersburg, and so Gentz was of the view that ―one must never attach too much importance to what is said by Russian agents to foreign courts, even the accredited ones.‖170 Yet successive administrations and

99

Ministers were unable to get this problem under control, and on occasion participated in the intriguing and backbiting themselves.

Two examples from around the time of the Bulgarian crisis can serve to illuminate this problem in the Russian management of foreign affairs. The first was the behavior of the Russian plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Berlin in 1879. Foreign Minister Gorchak v was the main agent of Russia‘s will, but as he was elderly and rather sickly, much of the work was done by his assistant, the younger P tr Andr evich Shuv lov, the ambassador to Great Britain.

Unfortunately, the two men despised each other, and frequently aired out dirty laundry in front of other high dignitaries. One incident, touched upon much earlier, is illustrative. During the

Congress, the two men were to meet with Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Minister and one of the delegates at the Congress, to discuss some matters regarding Bulgaria. Upon arrival,

Gorchak v promptly announced that he was going to repudiate all of the agreements already made on the matter. Lord Salisbury, quite understandably, protested at this, to which in response

Gorchak v left the room. At this point, Shuv lov turned to Salisbury, and as the Foreign Minister later recalled, whispered ―Wait for me,--I am coming back. Pay no attention—this is all a pack of nonsense.‖171 After the Congress, Gorchak v made a point of ensuring that Shuv lov received much of the blame for the less than exemplary result for Russia, inflicting a fatal blow to the younger man‘s career.172 A second example can be seen in the behavior of the Russian ambassador to Germany, P tr Aleksandrovich Saburov, who tended to show much more initiative in the negotiations than his colleagues or superiors were entirely happy with. For instance, when a conference was held in Berlin in the summer of 1880 to resolve a border dispute between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, Saburov offered himself up as an intermediary,

100 without bothering to inform his own government of the fact.173 On another occasion, during the negotiations for the League of Three Emperors, Saburov proffered a proposal to demilitarize much of the Balkans, and even grant Austria predominance in a proposed Balkan confederation in exchange for Russian control of the straits – a proposal that was summarily shot down by the

Russian government when they heard.174 The reportedly rather mild-mannered Girs finally had enough of Saburov and had him removed from his post in 1884.

This operated on a smaller scale as well, as the Bulgarian crisis will illustrate. Essentially,

Russian agents abroad had a tendency towards a very parochial view of global politics, a consequence of both the weak training and the lack of unified direction above them. Thus, if one was an Ambassador to Vienna, then the improvement of Austro-Russian relations took on an increasingly central place in one‘s worldview.175 Meanwhile, the Ambassador to Constantinople was likely to place ever greater emphasis on the Straits and on the Balkan question, and discount or disregard the situation in Western and – as Count N. P. Ign t‘ev did when he negotiated the Treaty of San Stefano, only to see it overturned by the Great Powers. This parochialism continued on through till the very end of the Empire, with diplomats such as N. G.

Hartwig, Ambassador to Belgrade, an enthusiastic Panslav sometimes said to be more Serbian than the Serbs.176

Ultimately, this was the great failing of the Russian diplomatic establishment. Other countries may have had their own difficulties with nepotism or outmoded organizational structures, but it is in Russia that these factors contributed to confusion and anarchy on the level of Great Power relations. And the case of Saburov, while undoubtedly dramatic, was in no sense a unique or uncommon occurrence, as we shall see when we look at Bulgaria.

101

The Many Troubles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Military Interference

There is one last problem that plagued Imperial Russia‘s foreign policy, which further exacerbated the confusion surrounding Russia‘s diplomatic goals, but this time it cannot be blamed entirely on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Just as the departments of the Foreign

Ministry frequently had contradictory, overlapping jurisdictions, so too did the Ministry have to deal with the regular interference of the Imperial military in matters of diplomacy.

As mentioned earlier, military attachés spread throughout European embassies in the aftermath of the Crimean War. But the use of military figures as out-and-out diplomats went back further. In Russia‘s case, one has an increasing number of military men used in the Foreign

Ministry in the latter years of the reign of Alexander I. Partially, this was to try and counteract the regular complaints about the overrepresentation of non-Russians in the diplomatic corps, but it was also because Russia lacked a well-educated and well-trained civil service at the time, and the military was the closest substitute.177 There was also the fact that the three eastern monarchies of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary had a considerable appreciation for the military – one may observe the of the fact that the monarchs regularly wore army uniforms as a sign of this – and consequently many ambassadors both to and from Russia were military men out of the idea that such people would be more appreciated. 178 From 1819 until the

1890s Berlin and St. Petersburg regularly exchanged military plenipotentiaries, who worked independently of their countries‘ embassies,179 while in 1869 Napoleon III sent his aide-de-camp,

General Emile Fleury, as ambassador to St. Petersburg – and both of Fleury‘s successors,

Adolphe Le Flô and Antoine Chanzy, were soldiers as well.180

102

All of this meant that military officials could and did exercise significant influence over foreign policy decision-making and execution, but without the benefit of diplomatic training – such as it was in Russia – or coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Military officials usually had a very different perspective on international politics, one geared more directly to military interests. Consider the differing attitudes of the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople and his military attaché to the of 1908 and the subsequent reorganization of the Ottoman military. The ambassador, N. V. Charykov, expressed hope that a stronger

Turkey would provide for a more stable Balkan peninsula. Meanwhile, his military attaché was concerned that the Ottomans might now be in a position to threaten Russian interests in the Near

East.181 Nor did military officials necessarily restrict themselves to writing dolorous commentaries on events – on the eve of the of 1912 and 1913, the Russian military attachés in Sofia and Belgrade, the Colonels Romanovskii and Artamonov, did a great deal to drum up support for an expansionist and aggressive alliance against the Ottomans.182

Exacerbating the problem was the fact that the Russian military was not any freer of chain-of-command issues than the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Perhaps the chief

English-language historian of the late Imperial Russian army, Bruce Menning, wrote that in the

Russo-Japanese War the Russian military suffered from significant command and control problems, and that while telegraphs and telephones helped some, they ―could not compensate completely for problems stemming from distances within theater, remoteness from the imperial capital, personality clashes, unsatisfactory command arrangements, and the prospect of high level interference.‖183 In the military as well, the Tsar was prone to meddling in affairs without the benefit of guidance, there was a lack of clarity in the chain of command (during the Russo-

103

Japanese War there were two commanding officers who passionately despised one another), and periodically one had commanders showing excessive initiative.

As a matter of fact, local commanders in deciding to conquer bits of

Turkestan was a recurring problem – General M. G. Cherniaev, who later published the Panslav newspaper the Russkiy Mir, was one such general who invaded Central Asia on his own recognizance. One Russian observer of the time noted that,

A positive fever for further conquest raged among our troops—an ailment to cure which no method of treatment was effective, especially as the correctives applied were frequently interspersed with such stimulants as honours and decorations. Not only the Russian Generals but even the youngest Lieutenants craved further extension of territory, while those of the officers who were entrusted with any sort of independent command carried into effect their individual schemes. It was, indeed, impossible that such desires should be resisted when by gratifying them it was possible for a Lieutenant in four years to become a General.184

In other words, it was quite typical for low-level military commanders to take the initiative and try and conquer additional territory, essentially thrusting the Russian Empire into petty colonial wars despite the wishes of the central government. Furthermore, the Russian state never took strong measures to force its low-level officers to follow orders, and weakened its own disciplinary efforts by regularly rewarding this manner of insubordination when it resulted in territorial gains. Consequently, as in the diplomatic corps, the Russian military had recurring problems with local agents acting as they saw fit, and not as orders from St. Petersburg dictated.

And exacerbating the problem further still was the fact that the Russian military and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not get along in the least. As D. I. Kalmykow put it, ―Good relations with the Ministry of Finance were one of the traditions of the Russian Foreign Office, just as distrust of the War Ministry was another. We considered the military a kind of Don

104

Quixotes, aggressive and inefficient.‖185 To the Foreign Office, ―Our chief [bureaucratic adversary was the War Office. The conflict was perpetual, incurable, and on the whole beneficial. It constituted a balance of power.‖186 While one may be doubtful of Kalmykow‘s opinion that the struggle between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War was to

Russia‘s benefit, it is nevertheless quite clear that these institutional rivalries did exist.

In the end, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had enough trouble conceiving and carrying out foreign policy on its own. Having a rival Ministry with similar institutional problems but greater prestige engage in its own foreign policy only resulted in Imperial Russia‘s international actions becoming even more confused.

Conclusion – The Troubled State of Russian Diplomacy

If there is a Platonic Ideal of diplomatic practice, it would flow something like this: out of a strong understanding of a country‘s national interests and with the advice of skilled experts in the area in question, the heads of state and the Foreign Minister form a foreign policy, which is then carried out by well-trained and well-supported diplomats in the field. In Russia, the actual conduct of diplomacy was quite far away from this Platonic Ideal – which isn‘t to say that other nations did not have their own troubles with the formation and execution of foreign policy, but the Russian Empire‘s difficulties were particularly notorious.

There were problems of professionalization, in that diplomats were often poorly trained or even outright incompetent. There were administrative problems, as the bureaucracy was inefficient in distributing both work and responsibility. There were overlapping jurisdictions, both within the Ministry and between the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of War. There were

105 problems in the setting of foreign policy, in that very often Russia‘s foreign policy would be determined by the Emperor, without regard for what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew or thought about a matter. All of this made it very difficult for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to decide upon a policy and then to execute it effectively. There were some very good diplomats and Foreign Ministers, and on some occasions a policy would emerge victorious from the morass of bureaucratic intrigue, and Russia would act with a level of unity and diplomatic skill. But on other occasions, the stage was set for a welter of confused missions, personal projects, and ignored orders – as happened in Bulgaria from 1878 to 1886.

100 Talleyrand, Circular to French Ambassadors, Aug. 14, 1804, SIRIO, LXXVII, 690 in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 27. 101 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), 98-103. 102 Ibid., 108. 103 M. S Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919 (London; New York: Longman, 1993), 125. 104 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 103-105. 105 Ibid., 131-132. 106 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 119. 107 Keith Hamilton, Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador (Woodbridge, Suffolk [England]; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society ; Boydell Press, 1990), 60. 108 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 133. 109 Ibid., 107-108. 110 Ibid., 115-119. 111 Lamar Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914, 142, in Ibid., 122. 112 Ibid., 120-123. 113 Ocherki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del (St. Petersburg: Tovarishchestvo R. Golike i A. Vil‘borg, 1902), 71-72. 114 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 74. 115 Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 24-25. 116 Ocherki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, 162-163. 117 Svod zakonov Rosseyskoy imperii, vol. I, Pt. 2, St Petersburg, I892: Razdel devyatyy, Ucherezhdeniye Ministerstva inostrannykh del, clauses 786-838, in G. H. Bolsover, ―Izvol‘sky and Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,‖ The Slavonic and East European Review 63, no. 1 (1985), 21. 118 V. M Khevrolina and A. V Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii (Moskva: Institut rossiĭskoĭ istorii (Rossiĭska ia akademi ia nauk), 1997), 21. 119 Michael Hughes, Diplomacy before the : Britain, Russia, and the Old Diplomacy, 1894-1917 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Macmillan ; St. Martin‘s Press, 2000), 129-130. 120 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 139. 121 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 101-102. 122 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 124-125. 123 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 101.

106

124 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (1861), vol. VI, 412-413 in Ibid., 101. 125 Dmitriĭ Ivanovich Abrikosov, Revelations of a Russian Diplomat: The Memoirs of Dmitrii I. Abrikossow, ed. George Alexander Lensen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 80-81; I. V. Bestuzhev, Borba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki 1906-1910gg (Moscow, 1969) 60-61 in Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 124. See also Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 135. 126 Andreĭ Dmitrievich Kalmykov, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917 (New Haven: Press, 1971), 13. 127 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 137. 128 Bolsover, ―Izvol‘sky and Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖, 21. 129 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 103. 130 Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, 14. 131 Abrikossow, Revelations of a Russian Diplomacy, 81. 132 Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, 99. 133 Abrikossow, Revelations of a Russian Diplomacy, 92-93. 134 Ibid., 87-88. 135 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 130. 136 Ibid., 126-127. 137 Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, 18. 138 Charles Stuart to Fox, Aug. 9, 1806, private, PRO/FO 65/63 in Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 27. 139 Taube, La Politique russe d'avant guerre, 92-93 in Bolsover, Izvolsky and the Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28. 140 Abrikossow, Revelations of a Russian Diplomacy, 195-196, 211-212, 220. 141 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 128-129. 142 Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, 15. 143 Ibid., 23. 144 Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii, 13. 145 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 138. 146 Ibid., 132. 147 Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 297. 148 Bolsover, ―Izvol‘sky and Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖, 128. 149 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 133-134. 150 S. R. to A. R. Vorontsov, Nov. 8, 1803, AKV, X, 223 in Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 27. 151 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 111 152 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 102. 153 Abrikossow, Revelations of a Russian Diplomacy, 103-105. 154 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 145-147. 155 Bolsover, ―Izvol‘sky and Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖, 22. 156 Ibid., 23; Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 131. 157 Bolsover, ―Izvol‘sky and Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖, 21. 158 Quoted in Bolsover, ‗Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1914‘, in Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, ed. R. Pares and A. J. P. Taylor (London, 1956), 322-323. 159 Margaret Maxwell, ‗An Examination of the Role of N. K. Girs as Russian Foreign Minister under Alexander III‘, European Studies Review, i (1971), 367. 160 D. C. B. Lieven, The Russian Establishment in the Reign of Nicholas II: The Appointed Members of the State Council (PhD Thesis, University of London, 1978), 296. 161 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 151-153. 162 Brennan, The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 75-76, 79. 163 Ibid., 220; Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 233. 164 Brennan, The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 83. 165 Simpson, J. Y. (ed.) The Saburov Memoirs (Cambridge: 1929), 63. Quoted in Ibid., 84.

107

166 Abrikossow, Revelations of a Russian Diplomacy, 89-90. 167 Roman Romanovich Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, (London; New York: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.; A.A. Knopf, 1922), Vol. 1, 190 in Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 151-153. 168 FO 800/141, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 6 December 1904 in Ibid., 151-153. 169 Ibid., 151-153. 170 Gentz to Soutsos, Nov. 16, 1819, Gentz, Depeches, I, 443-445 in Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 19. 171 Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, 2:284-285. 172 Brennan, The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 57-65, 80. 173 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 190- 240. 174 Brennan, The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 153-154. 175 Hughes, Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution, 154. 176 Ibid., 170 177 Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, 29-30. 178 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 122. 179 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 122. 180 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 122. 181 Hamilton & Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy, 121. 182 Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 131. 183 Bruce Menning, Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 197. 184 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880), 48. 185 Kalmykow, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, 140. 186 Ibid., 148.

108

Chapter 3: Panslavism

Little in the has been the subject of as much commentary and as little explanation as Panslavism. An inchoate idea of Slavic brotherhood, political, philosophical, religious, scientific in equal measure, Panslavism would exert significant influence over foreign policy in the last half century of the Russian Empire. Like the other pan- of the late

19th and early 20th centuries (such as the Japanese-backed Panasianism or the Panturkism of the

Ottoman elites), Panslavism existed on the outskirts of more conventional , clearly related and yet with its own unique elements. With that in mind, an examination of

Panslavism‘s origins and manifestations is useful in understanding just how the Bulgarian crisis evolved as it did.

The Roots of Panslavism

As an idea, Panslavism only really emerged in the years immediately following the

Crimean War. As with any social or intellectual movement, there were forerunners and precursors. The earliest was the Croat and Roman Catholic priest named Juraj Križanić, who worked as a missionary in Moscow for a few years in the mid-17th century before being exiled to

Siberia, where he wrote a series of treatises about the unity of Slavdom.187 But the more significant precursors of the Panslavs were the Slavophiles of the first half of the 19th century, who were in many ways the philosophic forebears of the more politically-minded Panslavs.

The years following the and the were a time of considerable intellectual unrest, in Russia no less than anywhere else. The political sphere had been upended, and soon it became clear that the economic sphere was being equally disrupted by

109 the . It was the age of Nationalism and the age of , when a great many thinkers sought to find new ways of making sense of the world, and in particular of their country‘s place in that world. Scholars suddenly began to pay attention to folk traditions and old stories as a way of getting at some underlying sense of the ‗people‘, and obscure languages or dialects were given literary form. Beowulf, the Song of Roland, and the were either written or rediscovered, going from academic curiosities to central elements of national culture. The project of Bulgarian nationalism, touched upon earlier, was one example of this, but it was hardly the only one. At the same time, one also has thinkers and philosophers constructing new theories of identity – as forms a cornerstone of Constructivism in International

Relations theory. One of the most significant of these philosophers was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

Hegel, who posited that human society was progressing through a series of evolutionary stages, to arrive eventually at an absolute, universal ideal – with Germany, according to Hegel, being the furthest along.

Russian philosophical thought in the early 19th century was heavily based on this blend of nationalism, romanticism, and Hegelian thought. It could be broadly divided into the Westernizer and Slavophile camps, the two intellectual trends sprouting from similar roots and sharing a great deal in common (the Westernizing author and publicist A. I. Herzen referred to his Slavophile antagonists as ‗nos amis les ennemis, or more correctly, les ennemis nos amis‘ – our Friends the

Enemy). ix,188 In particular, both adopted the ideas of Hegel with regards to the evolution of society towards a final, universal idea. To the Westernizers, the latest and most advanced stage was to be found in , and they believed that Russia could be a significant nation ix Needless to say, this section should be considered only a cursory summary. For a much fuller account of Russian intellectual history, James Billington‘s The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretative History of (New York: Knopf, 1966) is still the seminal work.

110 on the world scene only if it adopted the culture of Western Europe.189 As Herzen put it, ―Only the mighty thought of the West to which all its long history has led is able to fertilize the seeds slumbering in the patriarchal mode of life of the Slavs.‖190

The Slavophiles took a different tack. They too adopted the Hegelian idea of successive stages of social development that moved towards a final, universal culture, but where Hegel had put Germany as the ‗Chosen Nation‘, the Slavophiles shifted Russia into that position.

Slavophilism‘s key idea was that Russian culture was a unique phenomenon, separate from and incompatible with that of Western Europe. Constantine Aks kov, one of the great Slavophiles, wrote that ―Russia is a land with a way of life all its own, not at all similar to that of European states and lands. Those who ascribe to it European views, and judge it on that basis, are very mistaken.‖191 The Slavophile poet, Fyodor Tiutchev, put this idea in a more eloquent form when he wrote ―Russia is not revealed by mind / Nor by common standards understood / Distinct her destiny in Mankind / And faith alone discerns her mood.‖192 According to the Slavophiles, there were sharp differences in character between Western and Russian concepts of religion, intellectual life, social organization, and attitudes towards government.193

Much of that difference can be found in the mystical and Romantic attitude the

Slavophiles espoused, hinted at in Tiutchev‘s poem. The Slavophiles saw the West as being bound in excessive rationalism, rampant , in secularism, in materialism, in skepticism, all held together by brute force and coercion. Russia, meanwhile, had kept faith. The

Slavophiles believed that Russia was spiritually connected in a way that Europe was not, and they were enthralled with a kind of peasant nationalism and populism, which elevated peasant institutions to high place – notably the commune or obshchina. Ivan Aks kov, who will be

111 discussed in more detail shortly, wrote that ―outside the national soil there is no foundation, outside the people there is nothing real, vital, and any goodly thought, any institution which is not rooted in the national soil or which does not grow out of it organically will not bear fruit but will turn into rubbish.‖194 Ultimately, from Hegel, the Slavophiles adopted the belief that there was an ultimate truth in terms of human society – one derived from religious truth – and that the

Greco-Slavic people were to be the next step in the advancement of humanity.

The Slavophiles were not, on the other hand, particularly fond of the Russian state or its institutions, which they saw as alien and Germanic invaders.195 The Slavophiles were extremely faithful and religious, yet as one of the founders of the Slavophiles, A. S. Khom iakov put it, ―It were better if we had rather less of official religion.‖196 In other words, the Slavophiles were staunchly in favor of Russian Orthodoxy, yet disapproved of the heavy control that the state exercised over the church. The Slavophiles also believed in a kind of governance based on the consent of the governed, emphasizing the old story that the Varangians had been invited to

Russia to rule, and arguing that a truly Slavic way of life was free from political coercion. It was only with Peter the Great that government became westernized, and consequently, coercive.197

The Slavophiles saw the West as decadent and overly rationalistic, and they disliked the Russian state in that they saw Western tendencies in it.

The Slavophiles were not in any way a political movement. They were an intellectual one, a small gathering of religiously-influenced philosophers who were focused on Russia‘s own national problems. They had sympathy for other nationalities, but little trouble in writing off small states or peoples as essentially unimportant. They had no great political influence and they were not activists. Nevertheless, it is from the Slavophiles that the Panslavs took several of their

112 key ideas – the belief that Slavic culture was incompatible with that of a decadent West, the belief that Slavs were to be the torchbearers of the next great human society, and that Russia had a historic mission as the leading representative of the Slavs.198

An Overview of Panslavism

Like their Slavophile predecessors, the Panslavs were primarily a loose coalition of thinkers. Unlike their forebears, however, the Panslavs included more than just philosophers among their number, and they had a significant level of institutional backing. It was a social and political movement as much as it was an ideology or philosophy. There were Panslav newspapers, Panslav organizations (the Slavic Benevolent Societies), and Panslav political figures. For the purposes of Russo-Bulgarian relations, Panslavism is most important as a purely intellectual construct, but the fact remains that Panslavism was more than that. The Panslavs had genuine political influence in late Imperial Russia, particularly in the 1870s and 1880s.

That said, Panslavism was not a coherent political program. There was no Panslav Party, nor had such a thing existed could it have had an agreed-upon platform. Rather, as one of the great British historians of Russia, B. H. Sumner, put it, Panslavism ―was in general not so much

199 an organized policy, or even a creed, but rather an attitude of mind and feeling.‖ The later diplomatic historian A. J. P. Taylor agreed when he labeled it a ―mixture of western nationalism and Orthodox mysticism [which] varied in practice from vague Slav sympathy to grandiose plans for a united Slav empire under Tsarist rule; the sentiment, not the programme, was the important thing about it.‖200 There were certain Panslav ideas and tendencies, but it was never an organized set of political beliefs in the way that, say, the Liberal Party in Great Britain of the time was.

113

Primarily, this was due to the Russian state, which kept a close eye on the Slavic Benevolent

Societies and which censored the writings of Panslav newspapers or writers. Their Slavophile roots had left the Panslavs not entirely friendly with the , who in any case looked poorly on the emergence of any kind of political program.201

Consequently, Panslav thought was enormously fragmented. In subsequent sections, several of these intellectual strains will be explored, as personified in the form of several leading

Panslavs – the publicists Ivan Sergeyvich Aks kov and Mikhail Nikiforovich Katk v, the diplomat Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev, and the author Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky. In the meantime, an overview of the Panslav movement as a social movement would be useful.

If one were to seek a founding moment for Panslavism as a major social movement, one could do worse than to date it from the establishment of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society.

In January of 1858, thirty-one Muscovites submitted a petition to Prince Gorchak v, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, seeking permission to conduct philanthropic activities for the betterment of

Orthodox Christians and Slavs in Russia and abroad. This was granted on January 23rd, 1858, and the founding roster could be read as a who‘s who of significant early Panslav leaders. There were a number of Slavophiles, including A. S. Khom iakov and Sergei and Constantine Aks kov, though the Aks kov most linked to the Panslavs, Ivan, was out of Moscow at the time. There was a contingent from the University of Moscow, with M. P. Pogodin the most prominent, and there were authors and publicists, the most famous being M. N. Katk v. In 1867, a Slavic Benevolent

Society was founded in St. Petersburg, with another set of distinguished members, including

Dostoyevsky, and several ranking members of the Russian military, notably including Major

General M. G. Cherniaev, a hero of Russia‘s Central Asian campaigns. Two years later, another

114

Society was founded in Kiev, and a year after that, a fourth was founded in . They busied themselves with bringing other Slavs to Russia to be educated (particularly Serbs and

Bulgarians), with providing educational and religious materials to schools and churches in the

Balkans, and with maintaining and promoting Slavic culture.202

By and large, the Slavic Benevolent Societies were not large institutions, nor did they have all that much power, for all that they attracted a great deal of attention. In 1872, Pogodin, then president of the Moscow Society, opened up the first session by stating that

In delivering these words I ask you to observe, to the comfort of Austrian and Turkish alarmists over Panslavism, that at this first annual meeting of the Slavic Committee, a total of nine members, including three officers, have gathered! Is it not true that our Committee is very powerful, and that it conceals no trifling threat to two empires!203

But what the Panslav Societies lacked in raw numbers, they made up for it in their connections.

Its membership was composed of significant figures in Russian society, and others donated to the

Slavic Benevolent Societies without ever becoming formal members – the Metropolitan

Archbishop of Moscow, the Empress Maria Alexandrovna, and the Heir Apparent, the future

Alexander III, all donated sizeable sums. The Slavic Benevolent Societies also received a measure of support from the Russian state in their charitable activities, with the Ministry of

Public Education being the single largest donor to the Moscow Society.204

Alongside the Slavic Benevolent Societies, the other manifestation of Panslavism was in the press. A few newspapers were started by the Panslavs in the last years of the reign of

Nicholas I, notably the Moskvitianin published by M. P. Pogodin, but these early pioneers were not terribly successful enterprises. After the Crimean War, the Panslavs would publish an ever- increasing number of newspapers, most short-lived, but influential all the same. M. N. Katk v

115 published the ki V nik beginning in the mid-1850s, and was editor of the extremely influential Moskovskie Vedomosti. I. S. Aks kov, meanwhile, took over the k i Beseda

(1856-1860), and then published the Parus (1859), Den' (1861-1865), Moskva (1867), and

Moskvich (1867-1868).205 General Mikhail Chern iaev began to publish the newspaper ki

Mir in 1871206, while the daily Golos, during the period ―one of the most influential and far- reaching newspapers in Russia,‖ was published by A. A. Kraevski, later a member of the St.

Petersburg Slavic Benevolent Society beginning in 1863.207 In short, the Panslavs had no lack of ability to spread their ideas, even if the number of people who were committed Panslavs was always slight.

Finally, the question of Panslavism‘s relationship with the Russian State ought to be addressed more precisely. Put simply, while some officials in the Russian military, government, and the Imperial Court were sympathetic to Panslavism – most particularly Alexander III – and while both the Ministries of Public Education and Foreign Affairs expressed limited support for the Slavic Benevolent Societies (Gorchak v had allowed the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society to form in the first place), this was a far cry from official endorsement.208 The Panslavs by their beliefs were dabbling in politics, and in the autocratic system this was met with constant pushback. Panslav newspapers were regularly shuttered by the censors, and the Slavic

Benevolent Societies, though supported, were also closely observed. A letter from the censors to

Pogodin can serve to illustrate the opposition the Panslavs would often run into. Referring to an article where Pogodin castigated Russia for standing by while Balkan Slavs suffered under a

Turkish yoke, the censors wrote that the piece was ―a caustic disparagement of our foreign policy… and forbidden interference by a private person in the views and deliberations of the

116 government.‖209 There was support for the Panslavs in the Russian government. There was also opposition.

–

The logical place to begin any examination of Panslav thought is with Ivan Serg evich

Aks kov. Aks kov was born in 1823 to one of Russia‘s most prominent literary and intellectual families. His father, Sergei Timofeevich, was a well-known literary critic and author, whose works A Family and Years of Childhood are known to this day, and his brother

Konstantin Sergeevich was a playwright – both were also prominent Slavophiles. Consequently, the Panslavism of I. S. Aks kov was heavily influenced by classic Slavophile ideas, in particular the enormous emphasis on religion. For his own part, Aks kov was not a theoretician or philosopher, but rather a skilled popularizer – as one of his political enemies wrote, ―By his nature, by the qualities of his talent, Ivan Aks kov was not an innovator but a propagandist; he was not a thinker but a preacher.‖210 Aks kov would publish numerous newspapers advancing both Slavophile and Panslav ideas over the course of his life, and he was one of the leading members of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society, serving first as Treasurer and later as

President (from 1875-1878).

For Aks kov, Panslavism was rooted in the Slavophilist ideas of Hegelian advancement to a final, ideal societal form that would be perfected through the Orthodox Slavic culture, and in the idea that the West was inherently opposed to Russia. On this subject, Aks kov wrote that:

It is time to understand that the hatred, often instinctive, of the West toward the Slavic Orthodox world stem from other deeply hidden causes: these causes are the antagonism of two opposed principles of enlightenment and the jealousy of a senescent world to whom the future belongs.211

117

This is fairly standard Slavophile rhetoric. Yet where Aks kov broke from the Slavophiles is that he believed that Russia had a moral duty to rescue the other Slavs from their Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman masters and unite them under the Russian aegis. Continuing from the above statement, Aks kov went on to write that

To emancipate the Slavic peoples from material and spiritual oppression and bestow upon them the gift of an independent spiritual and even political life under the powerful wings of the Russian eagle is the historical calling, the moral right and the obligation of Russia. 212

In Aks kov‘s framework, then, there is a smooth progression from Slavophile ideas to Panslav ideas. He simply takes the belief in Russia‘s sacred destiny from the Slavophiles and expands it to include protecting and guiding the other Slavs.

The other key element of Aks kov‘s Panslav beliefs was the importance he placed on religion as a marker of what it meant to be a Slav. Indeed, Aks kov‘s biographer Stephen

Lukashevich put it, ―For Aks kov, nationalism could not be divorced from religion because religion was the very content of nationalism; pan-Slavic nationalism therefore, meant

Orthodoxy.‖213 Aks kov‘s calls for Panslavic unity were invariably phrased as calls for a return to a unified Orthodox faith, in particular beseeching those Slavs who had embraced Catholicism to return to Orthodoxy. The Poles, Aks kov perforce wrote off as being too deeply embroiled in the Catholic faith. They were irredeemable, anathema to Aks kov. But the other Catholic Slavs, the and the Czechs, Aks kov believed that them he could still rescue. The following can serve as an example of Aks kov‘s rhetoric directed at those Catholic Slavs.

Now or never, if the Slavs want to remain Slavs and not only that but also free their Slavic souls from the chains of spiritual bondage which subject them to the destiny of the Latin world, they must answer the question posed to them by current history; they must give a definite and undodging answer; they must

118

repudiate Rome and its deeds officially and publicly without compromise and detours… Choose then, Czechs, Moravians, Croats, Slovaks and Slovenes! Do you wish together with Western Europe to procrastinate by making deals and compromises between atheism and superstition? Do you wish to be mired together with Europe in the impassable bog of spiritual contradictions… or do you prefer to take the wide road of Orthodox truth that is followed by sixty millions of your Slav brethren, the road followed once by your ancestors? Do you want Christ or the as the head of the church?214

This, then, was the Panslavism as envisioned by Aks kov and the other Slavophile thinkers.

Panslavism not as a political unification – or at least, with politics coming much later and being much secondary – but as a religious unification, as a messianic effort to unite as many of the

Slavs into a single Orthodox church as possible, and to cast away those who would not convert, leading to a final triumph over the decadent Catholic West.

Panslav Thought – N. a.

If Aks kov was one of Panslavism‘s best popularizers, then Nikol ĭ I akovlevich

Danil vskiĭ was one of its greatest theorists – the man responsible for ―undoubtedly… the greatest single contribution to the Panslavist ideology,‖ as historian M. B. Petrovich put it.215

Danil vskiĭ was born one year before Aks kov, in 1822, the son of a brigadier-general. He received the finest education Russia could offer, was a socialist briefly in his youth (for which he spent time in prison and exile), and spent most of his career as an ichthyologist for the Russian state, conducting nine major expeditions between 1853 and his death in 1885. His primary contribution to Panslavism was the authorship of a book, o i i i E op gl i d n k l nye i poli iche kie o no heni i l i n kogo mi k Ge m no-Romanskomu (Russia and Europe: a

Look at the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavic World to the Romano-German World),

119 which was published as a series of ten articles in the monthly Zarya journal in 1869, and subsequently as a monograph.216

Danil vskiĭ‘s innovation and contribution to Panslav thought was to put it on a scientific basis – or a pseudo-scientific basis, in any case. Drawing on the work of the German historian

Heinrich Rückert (son of the poet Friedrich Rückert), Danil vskiĭ argued that consisted of a historical-cultural societies, which are born, rise to greatness, compete with one another, and then fall into senescence or death – a comparison to Spengler‘s The Decline of the

West is often raised. Danil vskiĭ listed ten major historical-cultural societies (the Egyptian, the

Chinese, the Assyro-Babylonian-Phoenician, the Hindu, the Iranian, the Hebrew, the Greek, the

Roman, the Arabic, and the Germano-Latin or European), with all others being only

‗ethnographic material‘, unimportant and lacking in historical agency.217

Danil vskiĭ broke from the Slavophile thinking of Aks kov in a few key ways. First,

Danil vskiĭ rejected the Hegelian approach of the Slavophiles. There was no great, semi- theological plan, no final and universal idea towards which all societies moved. On the contrary, as historian Pitirim A. Sor kin wrote, for Danil vskiĭ:

Just as botany and zoology gave up the artificial unilinear classification of plants and animals and replaced it by natural classification into a number of different types (genera and species) of organisms, each of which represents not a step in a unilinear hierarchic development on the ladder of gradual perfection of organisms, but rather entirely different plans of organization, each perfect in its own way; just as there are not one but many architectural styles each of which is perfect in its own manner; so also there are not one but many civilizations or historico-cultural types, each perfect in its own way and all together manifesting the infinitely rich creative genius of humanity.218

120

Consequently, for Danil vskiĭ, history was characterized by the competition and struggle of these historical-cultural societies. In o i i i E op he wrote that plants and animals grow old and die, both individually and as species, and that

History speaks the same for peoples: they too are born, achieve various degrees of development, grow old, become senile, and die—not only of external causes. External causes, as in individual persons, in most cases only hasten the death of the ill and weakened body which, if in possession of its strength, its youth or virility, would very well have withstood their harmful effects. 219

It behooved Russia, then, to become one of the great historical-cultural societies, if it did not want to end up as a society fit only as ethnographic material. Europe was of an entirely different society and would never and could never accept Russia. For Danil vskiĭ, the historical struggle was a necessary one, and not necessarily foreordained, though he viewed Slavdom as the young and rising society and Europe as the old and decadent one.

Danil vskiĭ‘s other important difference from the Slavophile approach was in his relative disinterest in religion and emphasis on linguistic kinship. In his book, Danil vskiĭ offered up five scientific-historical laws which summarized his views rather concisely, and the very first one was:

Law I: Every race or family of peoples identified by a separate language or by a group of languages sufficiently similar so that their kinship may be directly perceived without profound philological research constitutes an original cultural- historical type if it is generally capable of historic development in accord with its own spiritual tasks and has already emerged from infancy.220

The other four laws go on to explain that each such linguistic group should form its own political federation, one which will maintain both a level of diversity and a cultural unity. This was to be

Russia‘s final goal, to form a grand confederation which would include not only the Slavs, but

121 the Romanians, the Greeks, and the Magyars, whom Danil vskiĭ found to be sufficiently close to

Slavs that they could be integrated.221

In the end, Petrovich probably put it best when he wrote that Danil vskiĭ ―set out to demonstrate with the authority of science what the Slavophiles before him had already proclaimed with the voice of philosophy.‖222 Danil vskiĭ took a different approach from

Aks kov, but to the same goal of Panslav unity.

Panslav Thought – N. P.

A third pole of Panslav thought may be represented by Count Nikol ĭ P vlovich Ign t'ev, one of the most prominent diplomats of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years following the Crimean War. A younger man than either Aks kov or Danil vskiĭ, he was born in

1832 in a powerful noble family (his father was Governor-General of St. Petersburg and after

1867 President of the Imperial Council of Ministers). As a young man, Ign t'ev served in the

Crimean War as a staff officer, and afterwards had an absolutely meteoric career as a diplomat, in 1860 managing to negotiate the Treaty of Beijing which ceded an enormous amount of territory to Russia.223 The treaty established the then-28-year-old Ign t'ev‘s reputation as the

―star of Russian diplomacy.‖224 He was decorated by the Tsar, promoted to be the head of the

Asiatic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then in 1864 was appointed

Ambassador to Istanbul, where he remained until 1877. It was he who negotiated the Treaty of

San Stefano at at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. After the war, Ign t'ev served a brief term as Minister of Interior before retiring from politics unexpectedly in 1882, at

122 the age of fifty. He was, in short, an extremely significant individual in the Russian state, and particularly in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.x

Ign t'ev was also the most prominent and committed Panslav in the Russian state. While he was at the head of the Asiatic Department, he maintained close ties with leading Panslavs such as Aks kov, Iu. Samarin, V. A. Cherkasskii, and F. Tiutchev – indeed, the Asiatic

Department was the organ of government most sympathetic to the Panslavs, as the various Slavic

Benevolent Societies used it to send their correspondence and philanthropic aid to the Balkans.

After he became Ambassador to Istanbul, Ign t'ev was unable to maintain an active hand in the work of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society, but he regularly met with Aks kov when he returned to Russia, and in general kept close political ties. As one historian of the subject observed, ―the Panslav committees acted as a home guard for Ignatiev by supporting his diplomatic actions in informal conversations and in the press.‖ The links between Ign t'ev and

Panslavism were strong.225

Unlike Danil vskiĭ or Aks kov, Ign t'ev was a politician and not a public intellectual, and so his approach to Panslavism was significantly different. One can glean a sense of Ign t'ev‘s approach to Panslavism from his approach to diplomacy. Writing a review of his first decade at

Istanbul, Ign t'ev wrote that Russian diplomacy in the Near East had ―four clear objectives.‖

First and foremost was restoring Russian influence over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman

Empire (that is, the primarily Orthodox, primarily Slavic peoples of the Balkans). Secondly, the

Russian state must ―intimidate‖ the Turks to show that even after the disastrous Crimean War,

Russia was still an important Great Power. Thirdly, Ign t'ev sought to break up the unity of the x As something of a historical curiosity, Ign t'ev‘s family has remained prominent in politics until the present day. Fleeing to after the Revolution, Ign t'ev‘s grandson, George Ignatieff, became a noted Canadian diplomat, and his great-grandson, Michael Ignatieff, was leader of the Liberal Party of Canada from 2008 to 2011.

123 other Great Powers, which he viewed as ―fictitious and based on exceptional circumstances.‖

Finally, Ign t'ev saw Russian diplomacy in Istanbul as chiefly concerned with dislodging

France‘s dominant position.226 Writing of his early years in Istanbul, Ign t'ev recalled, with evident pride that:

I undertook negotiations with all the Slavic peoples, preparing them for independence. The work of undermining the [the treaty negotiated at the end of the Crimean War] and of countering Western and all foreign influences on the , especially those of Turkey itself and of Austria- Hungary, had to be continued until the development of Russia‘s strength and until propitious events in Europe would permit us to effect an independent solution of the Eastern Question in the Russian sense, that is, by forming territories [oblastii in the original] of coracialists and coreligionists bound to Russia by indissoluble bonds, while leaving the Straits to our disposition.227

It was through the assistance of the other Slavs that Russia would step forward into its old position as the titan of Europe.

Over the years, there have been two scholarly interpretations of Ign t'ev‘s Panslav beliefs, one more charitable, one less. The less charitable approach was that Ign t'ev was nothing more or less than an aggressive Russian nationalist and expansionist, with little interest in the

Panslav causes in and of itself. As B. H. Sumner, one of the leading English historians of

Panslavism wrote, Ign t'ev believed that

To aim merely at emancipating the Slavs, to be satisfied with merely humanitarian success would be foolish and reprehensible. Slowly, they must be united in the form of a defensive union subordinated to the general military, diplomatic, and economic direction of Russia... [Ign t'ev desired] to utilize the growing nationalism of the Slav peoples so as to facilitate the disruption… of the Austro-Hungarian [and] Ottoman Empires, leaving in their stead southeastern Europe… under [Russia‘s unquestioned control.228

124

According to this perspective, Ign t'ev saw the other Slavs as tools for the furtherance of Russian policy, no more and no less. In other words, Slavdom did not have a value in and of itself. It had value for what it could do for Russia.

The other perspective argues that Ign t'ev‘s nationalistic aspirations have been oversold, and his Realpolitik attitudes underemphasized – Thomas A. Meininger was a proponent of this view. Meininger argues that of course any kind of would be subordinated to Russia.

Russia was a Great Power, the largest Slavic state by an order of magnitude, and simple logic dictates that the bulk of military, diplomatic, and economic duties would fall to Russia.229

Furthermore, in stark contrast to Aks kov or Danil vskiĭ, Ign t'ev was an old diplomatic hand.

He was perfectly aware that left to their own devices, the fledgling Slavic nations of the Balkans would seek independence and autonomy, not union with Russia – not for nothing does the term

Balkanization exist. For Ign t'ev, a common union or federation of Slavs under Russian direction was neither a theological nor pseudo-scientific destiny in opposition to an alien civilization, but rather a rational response to rising threats from the specific states of Germany and Austria-

Hungary. For him, a united Slavdom was a defensive alliance on the basis of national self- interest. Finally, Ign t'ev was not about to sacrifice Russian national interest to Panslavism without reserve. He argued that in order to receive the support of the non-Russian Slavs, the

Tsarist state would have to ―make sacrifices,‖ but to allow the fledgling Slavic states to go their own way and even oppose Russia, for Russia to be content with a purely humanitarian approach, would be ―unreasonable and criminal.‖230 The Russian Empire was a Great Power, not a charitable institution.

125

Ultimately, what set Ign t'ev apart from Aks kov or Danil vskiĭ was that the Count had a much more concrete, specific project in mind, with far less recourse to mystical faith or pseudo- science, and that Ign t'ev had a much more explicitly dominant position for Russia in mind in any Panslav federation. He was sympathetic to the Slavs and supported their advancement, but he did so in the context of what he saw as plausibly achievable in the diplomatic sphere, and without losing sight of what he saw as the Russian Empire‘s national interests.

Panslav Thought – M. N.

Mikha l Nik forovich Katk v may serve as the final exemplar of trends in Panslav thought, though to term Katk v a pure Panslav is something of a misnomer for all that he was a founding member of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society. Instead, he may be seen as a fellow traveler of the Panslavs, someone who agreed with them frequently and supported them, but in his own politics was a more straightforward Russian nationalist.

Katk v was born in 1818, and was one of the most significant and influential literary and intellectual personalities of the latter reign of Alexander II and the early reign of Alexander III.

He was the editor of the Moskovskie Vedomosti (‗The Moscow Record‘), one of the most important newspapers in Russia. As the historian George Kennan put it, ―its influence, if the

Petersburg Novoye vremya… be excepted, probably outweighed that of all the rest of the

Russian press put together. The Tsars—both the Alexanders—read it with respect and sympathy.‖231 In addition to the attention of the Tsars, Katk v could also count among his friends and patrons two of the most powerful figures in Russian politics, Konstant n Petr vich

Pobedon s tsev, the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, and Count Dm triĭ Andr evich Tolst ĭ,

126 the Minister of Interior following Ign t'ev‘s retirement. Nor was that the limit of his influence.

As one of his contributors, Prince Vlad mir Petr vich Meshch rskiĭ, later recalled, ―And how many ministers, former and future, officers and officials of all titles and shades I have seen during these twenty-five years in the modest study at Strastnyi Boulevard [where Katk v had his offices. ‖232 Pobedon s tsev observed that ―there were ministries where not a single important action was undertaken without Katk v‘s participation.‖233 In short, Katk v was a man with connections at the highest level of government, and whose ideas were read and respected.234

Figuring out just where Katk v lay ideologically is a trickier matter. In terms of his intellectual views, Katk v has been described as ―an eclectic whose one constant base was a strong Russian nationalism.‖235 As a young man, he had been a Westernizer and close to the famous anarchist M. A. Bakunin. He defended a thesis at the University of Moscow on the subject of ―The Elements and Forms of the Slavic Russian Tongue,‖ and he taught briefly as a lecturer in philosophy. Later, once he became editor of the Moskovskie Vedomosti, he drifted increasingly to the right, transforming from a liberal (in the 19th century English sense) into a staunch conservative (his friendships with Pobedon s tsev and Tolst ĭ, the two greatest conservatives of the age, is testament enough to that) and a nationalist. Yet at the same time, he was seen as an admirer of English parliamentary institutions. After the 1860s, he went from being a Westernizer to being something of a Slavophile, but the fact of the matter was that

Katk v was sui generis, a unique institution that didn‘t precisely fit into any of the categories.

The Westernizers despised him as a supporter of the Russian state, the Slavophiles distrusted him as being too drawn to liberal ideas.236

127

Katk v did have significant links to the Panslavs, for all that. He was a founding member of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Society, as mentioned earlier, and he would often find himself working closely with Aks kov, as both were prominent newspapermen of the era. In particular, both were key to the publicizing and organizing of the Moscow Slav Congress of 1867, which was a kind of high-water mark for Panslav fame. Writing about it in the November, 1867 issue of the Moskovskie Vedomosti , Katk v noted proudly that ―the Slavic idea has evidently shown itself to be the most desirable and most benevolent of all possible Russian ideas."237 His other notable contribution to Panslavism was his effort to bring Russia into conflict with the Ottomans during the run-up to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. During that time, Katk v set up what one scholar termed ―his own propaganda office,‖ the Correspondence Bureau, which heavily edited news coming in from the Balkans to Russia in order to drum up further support for

Russian intervention.238 One of the other newspapers, the otherwise Panslav-friendly Golos, complained that ―Not a single honest line could reach the Russian press from the battlefield…

The Bureau was really a weapon of political blackmail of the most criminal kind. By means of lies and deception, it hoped to involve Russia in a war with Turkey.‖239 Katk v may not have been the most consistent supporter of Panslavism, but he was an important one all the same.

Conclusion – Panslavism in Russian Foreign Policy

Panslavism was a key element in the self-identity of the Russian Empire, and consequently – particularly in a Constructivist framework – vital to understanding why the

Russian Empire pursued such foreign policies as it did. Panslavism did a great deal to make

128

Russia more inclined to the Principality of Bulgaria, but it also encouraged Russia‘s agents to take a condescending and overbearing attitude towards the Bulgarians.

Understanding Panslavism‘s role in the foreign policy of the late Russian Empire more precisely requires balance on two fronts. First, one must realize that Panslavism was not a precise, organized political movement, but neither was it utterly without ideas or unity. It was an intellectual movement composed of a number of diverse viewpoints, but which by and large supported one another. The Slavophiles such as Aks kov, the more-scientifically minded

Panslavs such as Danil vskiĭ, the practical politicians such as Ign t'ev, and the nationalists such as Katk v may not have seen eye to eye on many topics, but they were still allies who tried to advance a general Panslav program of Slavic independence (from the Ottomans and Austrians) and ethnic, religious, cultural, and political unity (with Russia). Secondly, one must realize that

Panslavism was influential but not dominant in Russian foreign policy. Panslavism had friends in high places, especially in the Imperial Family, and certain Panslavs such as Katk v and Ign t'ev were very highly placed. But there were also a great many in the Russian state, even more highly placed, who were opposed to the Panslav political program. Ign t'ev freely admitted in his memoirs that his views clashed with that of his superior, Prince Gorchak v, and his principal advisers, Baron A. G. Zhomini and E. P. Novikov.240 Panslavism was influential – particularly in the Asiatic Department which Ign t'ev had led for a time, and which was most directly concerned with the Balkans, and in Katk v‘s ability to persuade Alexander III – but it was not dominant. This would prove an important distinction.

187 Michael Boro Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 7.

129

188 , My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen, trans. Constance Garnett, 1973, 254. 189 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 45-46. 190 Herzen, My Past and Thoughts, 274-275. 191 Konstantin Aks kov, ―O tom zhe,‖ Sochineniia istorichiskiia, in Polonoe sobranie sochininii, I (Moscow, 1889), 16. 192 F. I. Tiutchev, Stihkhotvoreniia (Moscow, 1935), translated by an anonymous E. M. K. and reproduced in Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 47 193 Ibid., 47 194 Ivan Sergeyvich Aksákov, Sochineniia, 1860-1886. (Moskva: Tip. M.G. Volchaninova, 1886)., 2:186-188, 3-4; Den' editorial of October 14th, 1861. 195 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 47-50. 196 In Ibid., 50. 197 Ibid., 52-53. 198 Ibid., 58-59. 199 Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880, 57. 200 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 229. 201 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 241. 202 Ibid., 132-150 203 M. P. Pogodin, Sobranie statei, pisem, I riechei po povodu Slavianskago voprosa (Moscow, 1878), 136 in Ibid., 137. 204 Ibid., 138-139 205 Ibid., 111-115 206 Narochni ts kiĭ, o i i i n ion l no-o obodi el n i bo b n lk n kh, 76. 207 Ibid., 59. 208 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 138-139 209 Skavichevskii, Ocheri istorii russkoi tsenzury, 451, as in Ibid., 118. 210 Anonymous, ―,‖ Vestnik Evropy (1886), no. 3, pg. 443 in Lukashevich, Aksakov, 2. 211 Aks kov, Sochineniia, 5 212 Ibid., 6 213 Lukashevich, Aksakov, 127. 214 Aks kov, Sochineniia, 177-178 215 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 65. 216 Ibid., 65-67. 217 Ibid., 74; Kohn, Panslavism, 153. 218 Pitirim A. Sor kin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston, 1950), 56. 219 N. I a Danilevskiĭ, o i i i E op pi el’n i ’ i I I k (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966), 76-77. 220 Danil vskiĭ, o i i i E op 95-96. 221 Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), 160. 222 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 75. 223 Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 4-5; Mackenzie, ―Russia‘s Balkan Policies under Alexander II‖ in Ragsdale, Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, 227. 224 Julius Eckardt, Distinguished Persons in Russian Society, trans. F. E. Bunnet (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1873), 170-171, in Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 5. 225 Ibid., 58-59. 226 N. P. Ign t'ev, ―Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignat‘eva, 1864-1874‖, Izvestiia Ministerstva inostannykh del, Bk. I (1914), 103-104 in Ibid., 11. 227 N. P. Ign t'ev, ―Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignat‘eva, 1875-1877‖, Istoricheskii vestnik, I (1914), 56 in Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 262. 228 B. H. Sumner, ―Russia and Panslavism in the Eighteen-Seventies,‖ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, XVIII (1935), 47-48 in Meininger, Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 59.

130

229 Ibid., 60. 230 N. P. Ign t'ev, ―Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignat‘eva, 1875-1877‖, Istoricheskii vestnik, I (1914), 54 in Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 261. 231 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de , 94. 232 V. P. Meshch rskiĭ, Vospominaniia o M. N. Katkove, Russki Vestnik, 250, 1897, p. 49 in Karel Durman, The Time of the Thunderer: , Russian Nationalist Extremism and the Failure of the Bismarckian System, 1871-1887 (Boulder; New York: East European Monographs ; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1988), 8. 233 Letters of Pobedonostsev to Alexander III, Vol 2., Moskva-Leningrad, 1925, p. 141 in Ibid., 8. 234 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de , 94. 235 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 135 236 Ibid., 134-135; Kohn, Panslavism, 137. 237 Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 200, 208, 235-236 238 Durman, The Time of the Thunderer, 188. 239 Quoted in David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Press, 1967), 134-135. 240 N. P. Ign t'ev, ―Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignat‘eva, 1875-1877‖, Istoricheskii vestnik, I (1914), 54-55 in Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 261.

131

Chapter 4: Setting up the State, 1878-1879

The first year or so of life in the newborn Principality of Bulgaria seemed to go well enough. A Russian administration under Prince Aleks ndr Mikh ĭlovich Donduk v-Kors kov came and went, the Constituent National Assembly was convened to write the Principality‘s first constitution, the Tarnovo Constitutionxi, the first Bulgarian political parties formed, and a monarch was selected, the young and well-connected Prince Alexander von Battenberg. Russo-

Bulgarian relations during this period were peaceful, but it was at this point that the seeds of later conflicts were sown.

-Kor and the

With only nine months allotted for their presence in Bulgaria, the Russian administration had a great deal to do and not very much time to do it in. Their goal at this early stage was to give the native population as large a part in the running of the country as was possible. The

Russian hope seems to have been that Bulgaria would be administratively independent, but would choose to associate itself with Russian policy, and that the Bulgarian militia would prove an ally for the Russian army.241

It fell to Donduk v-Kors kov to guide the creation of the Bulgarian state, so as to have some sort of government to whom to hand off the former province when the nine-month occupation was over. This meant that Donduk v-Kors kov had to set up an administrative apparatus for the Principality, at least begin the process of constructing both a strong militia

(vital for Russia‘s long-term regional goals) and a judiciary, and also preparing for the

xi So named because it was written in the city of Tarnovo, also spelled Turnovo in older materials and renamed Veliko Tarnovo in 1965.

132

Constituent National Assembly. Furthermore, Donduk v-Kors kov was to make certain that every Bulgarian of importance was to be present at the Assembly, and also to prepare a draft constitution for the Assembly to consider – this he based on the Serbian and Romanian constitutions.242 He was, in short, a very busy man at this point.

Yet Donduk v-Kors kov was not so busy as to not have the time to get into a quarrel with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreshadowing any number of future conflicts. On March

23rd, 1879 he wrote to D. A. Mil i tin, the Minister of War, that he was being kept completely uninformed about the course of diplomacy as it concerned Bulgaria. He wrote:

…Since I have been named Imperial Commissar, and especially since the complication of the thankless and difficult task that has fallen upon my lot, by the decree of the Congress of Berlin, I have been placed and remain in absolute ignorance of the diplomatic discussions on burning questions, relating to the region. I can judge about this or that direction of our politics, only by the orders and matters I have been tasked to carry out, the consideration of which happened without me… Unfortunately, the main, and in many cases the only, assistance [in carrying out my duties] I was forced to seek only in my clean conscience and in the knowledge of my carrying out the sacred duties before Emperor and Russia.243

Mil i tin passed this message along to Foreign Minister N. K. Girs, who responded with a certain sense of irritation.

I am very grateful to you for passing along the letter of Prince Donduk v, about which I could make a great many comments. I will limit myself to saying that his complaints about his lack of information about diplomatic discussions are, in my opinion, utterly unfair. We have informed him of everything that touches upon his circle of action… Would it not be more fair to rebuke our Commissar in that he is doing everything in his own way, and ignoring our instructions.244

In fact, Girs goes on to mention a letter he received from the Russian diplomatic agent in

Bulgaria, Aleksandr Petrovich Davydov, and states that on the basis of that letter he is more and more convinced that it would be a good idea to replace Donduk v-Kors kov with General

133

bruchev.xii,245 Nothing would come of this, but it would hardly be the last time that local

Russian agents in Bulgaria or Eastern Rumelia would complain about lack of information or guidance, nor that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would fret about those same agents not following instructions.

The Constituent National Assembly met on February 10th/22nd, 1879, and it consisted of 231 deputies, of whom 221 arrived at Tarnovo, the medieval Bulgarian capital.xiii A little over half of the deputies (118) were at Tarnovo ex officio, selected by virtue of their office. Most held ranks in the civil administration of Bulgaria, such as the court of cassation or the district councils. The remainder came from the religious communities, with thirteen Bulgarian bishops, one rabbi, and one mufti attending the Constituent National Assembly. A further 89 deputies were elected by popular franchise, at the rate of one deputy per 10,000 Bulgarians. An additional twenty-one deputies were chosen directly by Prince Donduk v-Kors kov. This was done primarily to allow important people who had not managed to be elected or chosen to be sent to the Assembly, such as the politician P. R. Slaveĭkov, and to give a larger representation to the

Turkish and Muslim population of the country. Finally, the Monastery of St. Ivan of , and the

Bulgarian expatriate communities in Odessa and Vienna were permitted to send a delegate apiece to the Constituent National Assembly, though C. E. Black reports that when the Assembly was finally gathered, two more deputies in this last category materialized. Most of the Assembly were Bulgarians, but there were sixteen non-Bulgarian deputies, primarily Turks but also a few xii Girs does not specify which bruchev he means, as there were several high-ranking Russian military officers of that name at the time, but it most likely refers to General N. N. bruchev, later the Chief of the General Staff. xiii The fact that more deputies were chosen than arrived at Tarnovo has worked to confuse the counts and mathematics surrounding the exact distribution of deputies. There is some disagreement between R. J. Crampton on the one hand and C. E. Black and Charles Jelavich on the other regarding the precise numbers. I have generally hewed to Black‘s numbers in assembling this section, due to their greater specificity, but the differences between the two are on the order of less than one or two deputies out of two hundred-odd, and thus ultimately not significant. Some numbers present in Crampton but not in Black are also used.

134 deputies of Greek or Jewish descent. Sixty of the delegates were teachers, and a further fifty- three were artisans or merchants, while no more than twelve delegates came from small

Bulgarian villages, marking the Assembly as a noticeably middle-class body.246 Nevertheless, it was a highly popular body, and in the words of the Bulgarian Professor S. Balamezov in 1919,

―nobody has denied either then or since that it included absolutely all the prominent Bulgarians of the Principality."247

The Assembly rapidly broke up into two groups that would later form the basis of the

Liberal and Conservative political parties of Bulgaria. A fuller examination of these parties is undertaken later in this chapter, but for the moment the most important thing to note is that the parties differed on whether the legislature or the executive should be the more powerful branch of government, and it was the Liberals, in favor of a stronger legislature, that triumphed. The legislature was a unicameral body, but there were two kinds of legislature, the Grand National

Assembly (Велико народно събрание) and the ordinary National Assembly (Just the народно

събрание). This was a development borrowed from the Serbian constitution of 1869.248 The

Grand National Assembly was to meet irregularly, and it may be considered the successor to the

Constituent National Assembly that had established the Tarnovo Constitution. It was concerned with questions of great national importance. The Grand National Assembly was responsible for electing regents and choosing the Prince, and it was responsible for regulating any territorial changes to the Principality. Most importantly, with a two-thirds majority vote, the Grand

National Assembly could change the constitution. Members of the Bulgarian church, the judiciary, and local government would attend the Grand National Assembly, and the remainder would be elected at the rate of one representative per 5,000 adult citizens.249

135

The ordinary National Assembly was concerned with the day-to-day affairs of governance. It was responsible for passing legislation, and could amend or alter any bills presented by the executive. The National Assembly had control over the budget, and it was also responsible for regulating the actions of the executive, up to and including launching commissions and investigations into their conduct. The National Assembly was elected on the basis of one representative per 10,000 adult citizens, and would be chosen for a three-year term, though the specifics of procedure were left to later lawmaking. The constitution included several provisions guaranteeing the representatives freedom of opinion and legal immunity, and representatives were supposed to represent the entire country, not any specific district. 250 The representatives were paid for their presence and any travel fees required, and the National

Assembly met once a year for two months, from October 15th / 27th to December 15th / 27th.251

The Tarnovo Constitution252 was by contemporary standards a quite liberal document.

It guaranteed universal male suffrage, allowing any man over the age of twenty-one to vote, and any voter of at least thirty years of age was eligible for election to either Assembly.253 The

Tarnovo Constitution guaranteed the inviolability of a Bulgarian citizen‘s person, property, and correspondence. There was unlimited freedom of movement, and freedom of assembly was unlimited so long as it did not threaten the government. Any limitation upon the freedom of the press was forbidden. The constitution instituted compulsory education and two years compulsory military service.254

Unfortunately, the actual constitution was not a very successful document, and this was most apparent when it came to delineating the powers of the executive branch. The difficulty lay in the fact that while the framers of the constitution clearly had in mind that the legislature

136 should be the dominant branch of government, they left a document filled with loopholes and ambiguities. The Constituent National Assembly expended a great deal of effort in controlling and restricting the powers of the Prince, with ―the residence of the prince, the succession to the throne, the regents, the guardians of a minor prince, the civil list and the religious beliefs of the prince's family…all carefully defined‖ in the constitution.255 At the same time, the Prince was given a significant array of powers, being responsible for foreign relations, the commander-in- chief of the army, and most importantly, the Prince had the ability to appoint and dismiss ministers, who would then be ―responsible to the prince and to the national assembly collectively for whatever measures they [took] in common, and individually for the administration of the department entrusted.‖256 There were only six ministries, the Ministries of Interior, Justice,

Education, Finance, War, and Foreign & Religious Affairs.xiv Other articles of the constitution gave the new Prince the power to submit legislation, and importantly, the right to call and to dismiss the National Assembly, though for a limited period. Perhaps even more importantly, while the Tarnovo Constitution was, according to C. E. Black, ―little short of pedantic‖ in listing all the rights of the citizenry, the only protection to assure that the constitution itself was not violated were the oaths of the Council of Ministers, the Prince, and the members of the

Assembly.257 There were also no safeguards put in place against electoral corruption or to maintain an independent judiciary.258 In short, the Tarnovo Constitution was a very liberal constitution, but it was also one which was sufficiently poorly written as to allow for a great deal of leeway to a more autocratically-minded ruler.

xiv In a somewhat unusual turn of events, one Ministry was put in charge of both foreign and religious affairs. This was due to the influence of the Bulgarian Exarchate on Bulgarian communities abroad, particularly in Russia, and due to the fact that the Exarchate itself was based in Constantinople. Thus to the framers of the Tarnovo Constitution, combining the two areas of responsibility into a single Ministry seemed a logical act.

137

In later years, Donduk v-Kors kov was to come in for a great deal of criticism for allowing such a constitution to be written.259 The Bulgarian politician Konstantin Stoilov, who visited St. Petersburg early in 1880 and met with many important people during his time there, wrote in his diary that Girs had said that Donduk v-Kors kov had ―acted very foolishly; he wanted to become popular and thus ruined the work,‖ a sentiment echoed by Count N. P.

Ign t'ev a couple of weeks later.260 Adolf Koch, the personal chaplain of the future prince of

Bulgaria, was rather less judicious, claiming that Donduk v-Kors kov had engaged in straightforward sabotage, supposedly ―declar[ing at his departure that all the mines had been so laid by him that the little German Prince would not be able to rule for half a year.‖261 One may doubt that Donduk v-Kors kov actually said this, but Koch‘s accusation does make clear whom

Koch (and one may reasonably assume, Prince Alexander von Battenberg) blamed for the liberal

Tarnovo Constitution.

In point of fact, Donduk v-Kors kov was acting on the instructions of St. Petersburg.

Girs himself had written on December 27th, 1878/January 8th, 1879 to Donduk v-Kors kov that the Constituent National Assembly was to have ―complete freedom‖ in forming the constitution.262 The draft of the constitution which Donduk v-Kors kov provided the Constituent

National Assembly, meanwhile, had been submitted to St. Petersburg. There it was reviewed by a committee consisting of Prince S. N. Urusov, N. D. Miagov, F. A. Brun, A. A. Mel'nikov, and

A. D. Gradovskii, the last being one of the top legal scholars in Russia. They, along with Girs and Mil i tin, made various comments upon the draft constitution, which was then passed along to the Bulgarians.263 According to the Soviet historian I. V. Koz‘menko, it was primarily

Gradovskii and Mil i tin who pushed the draft constitution (originally a conservative document)

138 more towards the center, the reasoning being that Bulgaria was an actively nationalistic state with marked popular/liberal tendencies. If Russia attempted to impose a more conservative form of government than that which was being provided for Rumelia or which other Balkan states possessed, it would find itself standing in the way of Bulgarian nationalism. Essentially, Russia had more to gain from staying on the good side of Bulgarian nationalism than it did from maintaining strict conservative governance.264 The possibility of a later reunification of the

Principality Bulgaria and the semi-autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia was also a factor. If the Principality possessed a more restrictive and less popular form of government than

Rumelia, then an eventual unification could see the Principality choosing to join Eastern

Rumelia. And Eastern Rumelia‘s government had been designed by Russia‘s geopolitical rivals, particularly Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, and the province in general was much more integrated into the Ottoman Empire. It would be far better for Russia‘s long-term goals if the reverse occurred, that is, if Eastern Rumelia were to break away from the Ottomans to join the

Principality. And since, as R. J. Crampton put it, ―the vast majority of the nation still held the tsar and the Russians in almost mystical awe,‖ the Russian government had relatively little to fear from a popular legislature in the Principality.265

The resultant politically centrist document was then pushed further to the left by the

Bulgarian Constituent National Assembly, which altered the draft Constitution extensively to grant further power to the legislature over the executive. The Russian state, pursuant to Girs‘s instructions to Donduk v-Kors kov, did not intervene in the actual debates – the main concern for the Russian government was to get the Tarnovo Constitution finished and a new government

139 set up before the end of the Russian occupation, so the only pressure they exerted was to speed matters along as much as possible.266

Prince Alexander von Battenberg

The next step in establishing the government of Bulgaria was to choose a Prince, and here the Russian state took a much more active role. It fell to Tsar Alexander II to nominate a candidate to the Bulgarian throne, one acceptable to all of the Great Powers, and then the Nation

Assembly would confirm the election. Alexander II‘s choice would prove to be nothing short of disastrous.

The most popular candidate was Alexander von Battenberg, the second son of the politically influential Prince Alexander of Hesse-Darmstadt. The most important requirement of the new Prince was to be his acceptability to the Powers, and Battenberg had connections to all of the great royal families of Europe. He was a German Prince, educated in Germany and a lieutenant in the Prussian Gardes du Corps. His father, Alexander of Hesse, held the rank of a general in the Austrian army, and was thus closely connected to the Habsburgs. Battenberg‘s aunt and Alexander of Hesse‘s sister, Marie of Hesse, was in fact the wife of Tsar Alexander II, the Empress Maria Alexandrovna. Alexander von Battenberg‘s brother, Louis von Battenberg, married a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, and the two families were close.xv,267 The prospective Prince of Bulgaria himself had served in the Russian military during the Russo-

Turkish War, seeing a good deal of combat.268 Battenberg‘s biographer, Count Egon Corti, put it best when he wrote that as: xv Indeed, most of the family ended up in Britain, where they renounced their German titles and Anglicized their names to Mountbatten during the First World War – Prince Philip, the husband of Queen Elizabeth II, is the grandson of Louis von Battenberg.

140

…A favorite nephew of the tsar, related to the English ruling house, a German prince, the son of an Austrian general, closely connected with Russia by virtue of his participation in the campaign of 1877-78 and yet not a Russian, his choice gave the impression of a concession to Beaconsfield, a compliment to Bismarck, and a favor to Austria, and at the same time it seemed to deliver an irresolute tool in the hands of Russia.269

When it came to dynastic connections, those of Battenberg were first-rate. Moreover, the Prince was young, born in 1857 and only twenty-two years old when selected for the throne. He was a handsome man, considered to be greatly charming by quite nearly everyone who met him, with a respectable military background. Adolf Koch wrote of him as a ―young man in the first bloom of youth, of tall, imposing military figure. The fine features had an expression of energy. His eye looked now decisive, now almost dreamy, but always kindly,‖ while the Russian General

Parensov recalled him as ―undoubtedly handsome, very tall, excellent figure… He suborned all with his amazing appearance; his grace towards all and the courtliness of his manners completed the good impression.‖270 To the Russian government, it seemed that he would be an unobjectionable ruler who would follow a Russian line. The Russian Ambassador to Britain,

Count P tr Andr evich Shuv lov, told Lord Salisbury that since Battenberg ―was poor, and was nothing but a lieutenant, he might look upon the Principality of Bulgaria as promotion, and would probably accept it.‖271

As a matter of fact, Tsar Alexander II was under no illusions that the task of ruling

Bulgaria would be a difficult one for his nephew, writing that ―in his own and his father‘s interests I certainly do not covet it for him,‖ while the Empress Maria Alexandrovna wrote that

―I should be wretched to think of one of my own sons being in so difficult a position.‖272 Yet the

Tsar overcame his misgivings, and Alexander von Battenberg accepted the position of Prince of

Bulgaria. The Battenberg family was at this time in rather dire financial straits, which compelled

141 for instance Battenberg‘s father to seek out employment as a Habsburg general – Battenberg was not particularly in a position to refuse.273 Battenberg was elected by the Constituent National

Assembly as the Prince of Bulgaria on April 17th / 29th, 1879. C. E. Black describes it as follows, saying that:

After Bishop Kliment of Tirnovo, the president of the assembly, had read a list of the possible candidates and explained the reasons for the special aptitude of Alexander of Battenberg for the position, [Petko Rachov] Slaveĭkov [one of Bulgaria‘s most famous , publicists, and public figures rose to say a few words in the Hessian prince‘s favor. No sooner did Slaveĭkov pronounce the word Battenberg, however, than the assembly broke into cheers and he was elected by acclamation.274

Battenberg learned that he was the new Prince of Bulgaria the same day, at a dinner party the

Russian Ambassador to Germany was giving in Berlin. He promptly departed for Livadia Palace in the , where he received a delegation of Bulgarian notables (including Konstantin

Stoilov) who formally invited him as monarch. He was also made a Major-General in the

Russian service, and allowed to keep his rank as a lieutenant in the Prussian Gardes du Corps. 275

Unfortunately for the future of Russo-Bulgarian relations, Battenberg was a severely flawed candidate. While his charm was proverbial, Battenberg had an almost complete lack of political or diplomatic sense. A military man, ―he received orders and executed them or gave orders and expected them to be obeyed,‖ as Charles Jelavich put it.276 The German Ambassador to Russia, Von Schweinitz, wrote that ―the Prince has many excellent qualities… but he is lacking in the gifts of statesmanship.‖277 This was a problem because Battenberg was not the autocrat he wished to be, but a constitutional monarch in a country with a powerful legislature, a strong Liberal party, and where several key figures including the Minister of War took orders from St. Petersburg as well as Sofia. Battenberg‘s inability to learn to operate in this fluid

142 environment – in particular his inability to compromise and work with his political opponents – would cause a great deal of trouble over the course of his reign. At one point, Konstantin Stoilov had a quiet talk with Adolf Koch about the possibility of educating the Prince ―in the political sense‖ through regularly reading political books. The pastor, Stoilov writes in his diary, felt that despite Battenberg‘s ―frank and clear mind and sense‖ the Prince would avoid any such effort.278

Considering that Stoilov and especially Koch were among Battenberg‘s most consistent partisans, this is quite a telling exchange.

Equally problematic was that Battenberg simply didn‘t like either Bulgaria or Russia very much. Battenberg had served with the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish War, and the impressions he brought back of the Russian leadership were less than complimentary. He had considerable affection for the Tsar Alexander II and his wife, Battenberg‘s aunt, but towards the higher classes of the Russian political classes Battenberg felt nothing but contempt. On

November 1st/13th, 1877, Battenberg wrote to his father from the front that,

Such hair-raising things happened daily that if I had simply reported the bare facts, everyone would have regarded them as the exaggerations of a pro- Turk. You have no idea (1) of the levity with which the High Command does its work; (2) of the disorder within the army and behind the army; (3) of the that goes on in the commissariat… But enough of this vexatious theme. How gladly would I – unlike the Press – write nothing but good of the Russians! It is unfortunately impossible, and no one is sorrier about it than Your Sandro.279

As well as being close to the Emperor, Battenberg was apparently reasonably fond of the common Russian soldier, whom he called ―splendid.‖280 But he bore little love for the actual

Russian state, or for his cousin, the future Alexander III.281 Battenberg‘s impressions of the

Bulgarians also left something to be desired. During the Russo-Turkish War, he wrote that ―All the villages are inhabited by Turks and Bulgarians. As soon as news of our approach comes, the

143

Bulgars hurl themselves upon the Turks, murder them, plunder and burn everything,‖ and ―The country [of Bulgaria is simply magnificent, but the are just as fiendish as the Turks.‖282

This did not bode well for Battenberg‘s ability to work with Bulgarian politicians and Russian officials.

These major flaws were supported by certain minor ones. Battenberg was notoriously egotistical. One of the more persistent and less important controversies of his early reign consisted of the question of just which title he was to be referred by, but a smaller example can suffice for the time being. Upon being elected as Prince of Bulgaria, Battenberg took a brief tour of Europe. In Paris, he was hosted by President François Paul Jules Grévy, who introduced

Battenberg to his wife, whom Grévy had married while still a simple lawyer. Battenberg would later recall of Grévy that ―il a eu l'audace de me présenter à sa femme‖ (He had the audacity to introduce me to his wife).283 On another occasion, he attempted to appoint Tsar Alexander II as the ceremonial head of a Bulgarian military unit, something by the etiquette of the time was simply not done – a superior state such as Russia or Britain could grant such an honor to the monarch of a vassal state such as Bulgaria or Serbia, but the reverse was not true.284 Battenberg also tended to put a great deal of stock into superficial appearances, something which drove

Bulgaria‘s first Minister of War, General Parensov, to distraction. Writing to Mil i tin in late

1879, Parensov complained how Battenberg had insisted on a new form of cavalryman‘s gear, gear that Parensov viewed as both too expensive and ill-suited to the Bulgarian environment.285

Actually, Battenberg would be highly involved in military matters in Bulgaria, particularly keen on introducing various German and Prussian ―regulations and forms,‖ prompting Parensov to complain to Mil i tin that ―I would think that my extensive service, my study of military science,

144 and my experience would give me the opportunity to consider my views correct and would not permit me to agree with the views of His , who is twenty-two years old and who has served just three or four years in the military.‖ 286

To be fair to Battenberg, many of his flaws could be blamed on the simple fact that, as

Parensov points out, he was a very young man when he became Prince of Bulgaria. Looking back on his acquaintance with the Prince from the vantage point of his memoirs a quarter- century later and a decade after Battenberg‘s death, General Parensov offered a softer final evaluation of the Bulgarian Prince.

In everything that I have written in this book, one encounters a great many attacks upon Prince Alexander; I accuse him in much. To be fair, I must nevertheless say something which is if not a justification of him, but at least a mitigation of my accusations…. The Prince was twenty-one years old when he became Prince of Bulgaria. He had no serious (governmental) education. Were it not for the [Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78], Prince Alexander would have continued as Prince Battenberg, and in his fondness for military service, undoubtedly, would have ably served in some cavalry—German or Austrian. There he would have ended, leaving behind a memory of himself as a charming, pleasant, very cultured man. Fate pushed him into the political arena, and into the exceedingly complicated Eastern Question no less; he did not withstand the examination. We pushed Prince Alexander forward—consequently, it is we [the Russians], it seems, who will answer before history for our choice.287

The Bulgarian General V"lko Stamov Velchev, a prominent supporter of Battenberg, echoed this sentiment, writing that ―Prince Alexander at the beginning of his reign, as young, inexperienced, and unfamiliar with the feelings, morals, habits, and past of the Bulgarian people… made mistakes.‖288 Ultimately, Battenberg was a young man who had been tossed into a devilishly complex stew of Balkan politics, and wiser and more experienced men than he had floundered in these waters.

145

The Bulgarians

For all that Battenberg possessed several key rights, it was to the National Assembly, and consequently to the local Bulgarian political parties, that the Tarnovo Constitution had left the dominant role in the Principality of Bulgaria.

Though it would later fragment into a bewildering array of political alliances, during the period from 1878 to 1886 Bulgarian politics was divided into two political parties, the

Conservatives and the Liberals, a break that had appeared back during the Constituent National

Assembly and would persist for some time. The primary difference between the two parties was a question of how to distribute power between the executive and legislative branches of government. As C. E. Black notes, ―It is strange that the terms "Liberal" and "Conservative" should have fitted the Bulgarian situation as accurately as they did, and yet they express fully the essential difference between the two points of view. Both parties admitted that Bulgaria was poor and inexperienced, but there the agreement ended.‖289 They differed in their policies, and they differed in their makeup.

The Conservative party was a classic party of the wealthy elite, focused on order and stability. Centuries of direct Turkish rule had left Bulgaria without any sort landed aristocracy,290 but the few large landowners and the rather more numerous wealthy merchants banded together to join into the Conservative party. They had lived quite comfortably under the Ottoman rule, supplying the Turks with a wide range of commodities, and their overriding concern was to maintain the same sense of peace and prosperity that had allowed them to become wealthy and influential in the first place. Many of the Conservatives had been educated in Germany and

Austria, and were sympathetic to the more autocratic modes of government found in those

146 countries. To their mind, the Bulgarian people as of yet lacked the necessary political maturity to allow for a dominant legislature. The Conservatives thought that the more ―substantial‖ citizens of Bulgaria – they themselves -- should be given a greater say in the governance of the country.291

As a group, however, the Conservatives were the weakest of all of Bulgaria‘s political factions, for the simple reason that they had virtually no popular support. The Conservatives were, as a rule, very wealthy, and they were able to maintain a number of newspapers to trumpet their opinions across the country, such as the and the Bulgarski Glas. But the wealth and the newspapers could not make up for the simple fact that they kept losing , by margins of five to one or greater.292 Therefore, their only path to power was through the strengthening of the executive branch, which could restrain the popular, democratic impulses of the people. They were thus typically allies of Battenberg, but they were never able to effectively oppose the

Liberals in the National Assembly.293

What the Conservatives did have was a very capable leadership cadre. The primary public leaders of the Conservatives were Todor Ikonomov (1835-1892), the vice-president of the

Constituent National Assembly, Todor Burm v (1834-1906), the first Minister-President of

Bulgaria, and the Metropolitan Kliment T"rnovski (1841-1901), one of the most respected churchmen in the country. The true leaders of the Conservatives, however, were the so-called

‗Triumvirate‘ of Dimit"r Grekov (1847-1901), Grigor Nachovich (1845-1920), and Konstantin

Stoilov (1853-1901).294

Of these, Stoilov was the most important during the years between 1879 and 1886. He had been born in Plovdiv and educated in American-run in Constantinople,

147 afterwards receiving a law degree in Heidelberg. He quickly became a close friend of

Battenberg, being only four years older and well-acquainted with the German language and

German culture, and was appointed as Battenberg‘s private secretary. Battenberg‘s chaplain,

Adolf Koch, recalled him as ―one of the ablest and most competent statesmen in Bulgaria…

Although at that time only twenty-six years old, he yet possessed very considerable attainments, and his judgment seemed to be that of an experienced man… He spoke and wrote German,

English, and French without effort.‖295 General Parensov, one of Stoilov‘s political rivals, recalled him as a man ―undoubtedly intelligent and educated, and in Bulgaria, with great aplomb… Stoilov, in his appearance and upbringing, in the sense of manners, was entirely

European.‖296 He was also a committed diarist and letter-writer, and his writings provide some of the most intimate accounts of Bulgarian events of the period. He would later become Minister-

President of Bulgaria from 1894-1899. Nachovich, a close friend of Stoilov, came from a wealthy merchant family and was educated in Constantinople, Vienna, and Paris. He was an expert on financial matters, serving several times as Minister for Public Works, and was also the Bulgarian diplomatic agent to Bucharest. Grekov was perhaps the least important of the

Triumvirate, serving in the National Assembly and in various cabinet posts.297

The Liberals, in contrast, were the descendants of the revolutionaries of the BRCC, and their most prominent leader, was the younger brother of Lyuben Karavelov, one of the main leaders of the BRCC.298 Many of the revolutionaries that had fought in the aborted

April Uprising found themselves in the new Liberal Party. The Liberals consisted primarily of the middle class, and there were a great many teachers and intellectuals in their ranks. Many of the Liberals, including the younger Karavelov, had been educated in Russian universities, where

148 they came in contact with the ideas of the Nihilists and other Populist groups that were prevalent on Russian campuses at that time. The Liberals‘ extreme elements owed a certain amount to

Russian nihilists and socialists in their focus on absolute personal freedom, but this was a minor current in the party and the Liberals as a group maintained no connections to revolutionary movements in Russia. The Liberals were a staunchly republican party, focusing on universal suffrage and the other institutions of a liberal democracy. They rejected anything at all that could restrict the rights of the citizenry.299 The Tarnovo Constitution had been largely their creation, and they were interested in copying the governments of more advanced states.

As a party, the Liberals benefitted from the support of the majority of the Bulgarian electorate, winning large majorities in the elections for both the Constituent National Assembly and for the subsequent National Assemblies. In the elections for the first National Assembly, held in 1879, the Liberals won a majority of about 140 representatives to 30 Conservative ones.

In 1880, their majority was even greater. In 1884, there were 139 liberals to 48 Conservatives.

The reason for this, in C. E. Black‘s estimation, is that the platform of the Liberal Party strongly channeled the ―traditional grievances of the people against their oppressors,‖300 and relied on the

―traditional antipathy of the more enlightened of their followers to all forms of oppression and tyranny.‖301 The Liberals were able to position themselves as the direct heirs of the nationalist revolutionaries, and to consistently paint their Conservative antagonists as chorbadzhi, the village elders who had collaborated with the Turks. A secondary reason for the dominance of the

Liberals was that due to the economic and historical factors, Bulgaria was a country of small peasant landowners and artisans, who felt more sympathy to the Liberals who were a part of their class than to the Conservatives who were their social superiors.302

149

The grand old man of the Liberal party was Petko Rachov Slaveĭkov (1827-1895), one of

Bulgaria‘s most famed poets and writers. After the Tarnavo Constitution was finished, however, he largely faded from political life, leaving the Liberal party in the hands of Petko Karavelov

(1843-1903), Dragan T sankov (1828-1911), and Stefan Stambolov (1854-1895), each of whom may be said to have led a particular faction of the Liberals. Karavelov was the most important leader of the Liberals. The brother of Lyuben Karavelov, he had been born in Koprivshtitsa, but from 1859 till 1878 he lived in Russia, where he was first a student and later a tutor to the children of prominent Russians, including I. S. Aks kov. He returned to Bulgaria alongside the

Russian occupation, and rapidly became the most prominent figure in the Liberal party through a combination of name recognition, energy, and sheer knowledge of liberal intellectual traditions.

Battenberg generally detested him, and Koch wrote of Karavelov as ―a perplexing busybody,

[though a not unintelligent man… a pure demagogue he cannot be successful as a statesman, but the want of principles and the consequent untrustworthiness have not ceased to characterize him.‖303 General Parensov gave a quite contradictory, and one suspects truer evaluation of

Karavelov when he wrote that ―Karavelov was an unimpeachably honest man, he lived and died a pauper. One could rebuke him for a great deal, of course; he was a theoretic, unrestrained, emotional, and therefore not always unbiased, but he was undoubtedly incorruptible.‖304

Karavelov was the general leader of the Liberal party, occupying the central position in the party‘s ideological spectrum, and was Minister- on four occasions, and

Minister of Finance on three.305

The same incorruptibility could not be imputed to Dragan T sankov, a former Ottoman civil servant, born in Svishtov and educated in Odessa, Kiev, and Vienna. He had taken part in

150 the struggle over the Exarchate, and was a generation older than most of the other political actors in Bulgaria at the time.xvi He was generally viewed as a skilled and wily politician, a backroom dealer and organizer rather than a public speaker.306 He typically represented the most conservative branch of the Liberal Party. In contrast, Stefan Stambolov was the youngest of the

Liberal leaders, as well as far and away the most radical, having been educated in Odessa and, as

C. E. Black put it, ―stamped with the memories of the oppression of the Russian government and the secret activities of the revolutionary societies.‖307 Parensov recalled him with a degree of both admiration and reproach, writing that he was:

Egotistical and ambitious beyond measure, utterly without principles, harsh and voluptuary, very intelligent and decisive to an extreme, and a fiery and skilled orator of the mob, Stambolov could have, in their time, figured successfully in the role of someone famed for their iron will and cruelty, a bandit or pirate, in any case the kind of character who is pushed forth atop the raging sea of chaos in society or government.308

Stambolov was the leader of the left wing of the Liberal Party. In fact, in later years Stambolov would become Minister-President for seven years from 1887 till 1894, a tempestuous period that concluded with Stambolov‘s quite brutal assassination shortly after he withdrew from the office.309

The Russians

The Russian government, however, having established the Principality of Bulgaria and then defended it at the Congress of Berlin, were not content to leave Bulgaria to its own devices

xvi One of the more peculiar observations one can make about the participants in Bulgarian governance after the Russo-Turkish War was just how young they all were. In 1879, Karavelov and Parensov were 36, Nachovich was 34, Grekov 32, Stoilov 26, Stambolov 25, and Battenberg just 22. T sankov, at 51, was markedly older than his colleagues. He would also outlive most of them, living to the age of 81, while Battenberg died at 36, Stoilov at 47, and Stambolov at 41. Only Nachovich and Parensov would outlast him.

151 thereafter. To begin with, most of the officers in the fledgling Bulgarian military were Russian officers detached from the Tsarist armed forces, including all of the roughly three hundred senior officers.310 There were also several agents of the Russian state in high positions of influence. The

Bulgarian Minister of War during the period was consistently a Russian officer, typically a general, and the Russian Consul-General in Sofia wielded significant influence if less direct authority. At various points between 1879 and 1886 other Tsarist officials held high rank in

Bulgaria – as the Prince‘s aide-de-camp, as Minister-President, or as Minister of Interior. These positions exhibited exceedingly rapid turnover, with the no fewer than eleven people occupying the position of Minister of War during the Principality‘s first eight years of existence. Even if one ignores the more minor, temporary figures, one still has General P. D. Parensov, General K.

G. Ehrnrooth, General A. V. Kaul'bars, and Prince M. A. Kantakuzen as significant individuals with an impact on the course of Russo-Bulgarian relations. The situation with Russian Consul-

Generals was similar if not quite so extreme – the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists six men as occupying that position between 1879 and 1886.311 Consequently, these individuals will be described when they appear on the scene of Russo-Bulgarian relations.

A few words on their superiors in St. Petersburg, however, would not go amiss. The early period of Russo-Bulgarian relations spanned the reigns of two Emperors (Alexander II,

Alexander III) and one Foreign Minister (N. K. Girs), all of whom were intimately involved with the course of Russo-Bulgarian relations. A few other figures, namely Count V. N. L msdorf and

Baron A. G. Zhomini, also deserve a mention.

Of the two emperors, a great deal has been written, and so only a little need be said here.

Alexander II came to the throne during the disaster of the Crimean War, when it had become

152 exquisitely clear that Russian society was in dire need of reform. These reforms Alexander II provided, including major refurbishments of the judiciary, the military, administration, censorship, and most famously, the abolition of serfdom. Politically, Alexander II began his reign in a flurry of reform, but was by temperament reasonably conservative, and by the end of his reign the reforms had mostly run their course. He was a conservative, but a pragmatic one and with a realistic idea of what Russia needed, so to speak. As a person, he was recalled as highly intelligent, empathetic, and sensible, but weak-willed and lacking in determination.312

Famously, Alexander II was assassinated by the terrorists of the Narodnaya Volya revolutionary organization in 1881, whereupon his son Alexander III came to power. Alexander III was more staunchly conservative than his father, and his reign saw a relative freeze upon further reform – given that his father had conducted reforms and liberalizations and been assassinated for his troubles, one can understand that Alexander III did not have very good feelings towards liberals.

In terms of character, he is generally viewed as a less intelligent man than his father, but possessed of the determination and character that Alexander II lacked. He was a notoriously hard worker, paying a great deal of attention to the process of governance, reading reports and commenting on them in a special color of ink reserved for the Tsar. He was also notable for being a singularly peaceful monarch, conducting no wars during his reign and earning the title of

―The Peacemaker" ( иротво ре ) for this. He died in 1894 unexpectedly young, just 49 years old.313

N. K. Girs deserves a little more attention. He was born in 1820, the son of a postmaster near the Austrian border. At the age of 18, he entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a clerk in the Asiatic Bureau, and moved up through the ranks at a respectable clip, a rise helped by the

153 fact that he had married the niece of the Foreign Minister Prince Gorchak v. He served in various postings in Egypt, Persia, , , and the , and was finally named Assistant Foreign Minister and head of the Asiatic Bureau in 1875. In practice, from about the Congress of Berlin onwards, Girs was effectively the head of the Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gorchak v being increasingly sidelined due to his advanced age. In

1882, Gorchak v was finally retired (and would die the next year), and Girs became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in name as well as fact.314 In his new role, Girs was considered a solid but not exceptional diplomat. He was an intelligent and flexible politician, very mild-mannered, and inclined towards moderation and compromise – one might call him ‗diplomatic‘ in the personal sense of the term as well as the professional. Alexander III trusted and listened to Girs, frequently following his advice despite his own more pro-Panslav instincts. At the same time,

Girs was hampered by the fact that he had no independent base of support. He was a stranger at the Russian court despite his marriage alliance with Gorchak v – he was of Swedish ethnic origin, his wife was the Moldavian Olga Cantacuzene,xvii he was a Protestant, and he had no personal fortune to draw upon. This made Girs‘s ability to get things done heavily dependent on his success in persuading the Emperor, an unsteady way of doing things.315 His goal during the years following the Congress of Berlin was to undo what he perceived to be Russia‘s dangerously isolated position vis-à-vis the Great Powers. Grand schemes could wait, first one had to secure peace and safety for Russia. The diplomat I u. S. Kar tsov recalled that:

N. K. Girs was a politician who was perceptive and exceedingly flexible, but he did not consider himself to be a genius and he was not. His intellect was purely analytical. Grand plans were alien to his nature and he didn‘t bother with them… The political approach of Girs corresponded to the situation of the time, xvii A relative of Prince M. A. Kantakuzen, a Russian general and later the Bulgarian Minister of War from 1884 to 1885.

154

was a consequence of it and reached its goal: Russia was granted an extended period of peace… His motto was: to every day its own work. Whatever historical goals Russia may have had, Nikol ĭ K rlovich with a clear conscience put them off until a more appropriate time.316

What Girs emphatically was not was a Panslav, and he regularly opposed the more confrontational, messianic goals of the Panslavs. He was a practical and restrained diplomat who worried a great deal about Russia‘s relations with the Great Powers.

His main assistants were Count V. N. L msdorf and Baron A. G. Zhomini. Though he would later become Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Russo-Japanese War, during the early-mid 1880s L msdorf was the man in charge of the Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, and was something of a protégé of Girs, with a similarly reserved, conciliatory-towards-

Europe orientation. Zhomini was the more significant, an older man (sixty-five years old in

1879) who had been a ‗senior advisor‘ to Gorchak v and continued in that capacity with Girs.

He was a skilled diplomatic hand and an able negotiator, with a rather notoriously pessimistic outlook on Russia‘s situation. Like Girs and L msdorf, he was not a Panslav but was interested in maintaining good relations with Europe, and particularly with Germany and Austria-Hungary

– he had been the one to negotiate the Reichstadt Agreements with Austria in 1875, though after

1879 he took a more skeptical attitude towards Russia‘s western neighbors. Zhomini would be heavily involved in Russo-Bulgarian affairs, and interacted heavily with the Tsar.317 Lastly, one might mention A. I. Nel dov, who had helped negotiate the Treaty of San Stefano and from 1883 onwards was the Russian Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. From his post in Constantinople,

Nel dov was something of the dean of Russia‘s diplomatic agents in the Balkans, and would observe matters in Bulgaria. He was even more skeptical of Germany and Austria-Hungary than

Zhomini, but he was also a relatively pragmatic diplomat.318

155

Conclusion – Original Sins

As Donduk v-Kors kov oversaw the creation of the Tarnovo Constitution and Tsar

Alexander II picked his nephew for the Bulgarian throne, there seemed little reason to expect that anything was amiss in Russo-Bulgarian relations. Certainly Donduk v-Kors kov and Girs had their minor squabbles, but there was a firm government in place, two active and competent political parties, and a charming and well-spoken young aristocrat as the Prince. The countries shared key geopolitical interests, important in Realist or Relations theory, and had a strong sense of shared identity as Orthodox Slavic states, important in Constructivism.

Unfortunately for the future, the Russians and the Bulgarians had made two poor decisions that would make for a great many difficulties later on.

First, there was the Tarnovo Constitution. While the ideas behind it were laudable and were supported by both the Bulgarian political parties and the Russian state, it was simply not a very robust document. It was highly liberal in tone and placed a great many petty restrictions on the executive, but it did not have the teeth to actually enforce itself in the face of opposition – there were numerous loopholes and not nearly enough in the way of enforcement mechanisms.

The result was something of the worst of both worlds, a constitution that would provoke resentment from the Prince and the Conservatives, but which was unable to render that resentment a moot point.

This was problematic due to the second decision, that of picking Alexander von

Battenberg as Prince of Bulgaria. As with the Tarnovo Constitution, on the surface this seemed an excellent decision – he was a handsome, charming, and well-connected young man. But his

156 charm did not extend to political tact, his connections masked the fact that he was markedly cool towards both his Russian patrons and his Bulgarian subjects, and his youth meant that he was inexperienced and impetuous. Most dangerously for Bulgaria, Battenberg was of a decidedly autocratic temperament.

The combination of a liberal constitution and an autocratic monarch set the stage for immediate conflict in the young Principality, and neither the Prince nor the Bulgarian politicians who had written the Constitution had the experience to resolve these conflicts peacefully and quietly.

241 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 57. 242 Ibid., 54; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 33. 243 Donduk v-Kors kov to Mil i tin, 23 March 1879, Tarnovo, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 130, List 2a. 244 Girs to Mil i tin, [Date uncertain, but Early-Mid April, most likely] 1879, St. Petersburg, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 130, List 8b. 245 Girs to Mil i tin, [Date uncertain, but Early-Mid April, most likely] 1879, St. Petersburg, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 130, List 8b. 246 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 69; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 28. 247 S. G. Balamezov, Our Constitution and Our Parliamentarism (Sofia, Pechatnitsa ―Pravo‖, 1919), 28-29 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 70. 248 Ibid., 105. 249 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 33. 250 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 105. 251 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 33. 252 An English of the full text of the Tarnovo Constitution may be found in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 291-309. 253 Tatiana Kostadinova. Bulgaria, 1879-1946: The Challenge of Choice, (Boulder; New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 8. 254 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 34-35. 255 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 103. 256 Provision 153 of the Tarnovo constitution, as reproduced in Ibid., 308. 257 Ibid., 108. 258 Crampton, Bulgaria, 100. 259 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 33 260 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 9 February 1880, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 28; Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 9 March 1880, TSDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 50. 261 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 14. 262 I. V. Koz‘menko, ―Pervonachal‘nye Proekty Tyrnovskoi Konstitutsii,‖ Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot Turetskogo Iga,(Moscow, 1953) 254-256, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 37. 263 Ibid., 33-35. 264 I. V. Koz‘menko, ―Proekty‖ 250-252 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 35-36. 265 Crampton, Bulgaria, 101. 266 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 37-38.

157

267 Ibid., 40-41. 268 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 236. 269 Egon Caesar Corti, Alexander von Battenberg. (London: Cassell, 1954), 52. 270 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 13; Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 373. 271 Lord Salisbury to Queen Victoria. 12 January 1879, in Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series, 3:56. 272 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 251. 273 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 138. 274 Ibid., 134 275 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 117-118. 276 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 91. 277 Denkwurdigkeiten des Botschafters General v. Schweinitz (2 vols.; Berlin, 1927), II, 235-236 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 137. 278 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 8 July 1880, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 70. 279 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 235-236. 280 Ibid., 235. 281 Ibid., 230. 282 Ibid., 231-232. 283 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 118. 284 Ibid., CXXV, 273-274. 285 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November, 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 3b-4a. 286 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November, 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 4b. 287 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXIV, 260 288 Izvlechenie ot Spomenit e Biografiyata na General-Maiora Velchev – Velko Stamov Velchev, TsDA Fond 248K, Opis 1, Delo 2, List 75. 289 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 117. 290 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 33. 291 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 114-117. 292 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 37-43; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 24. 293 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 123. 294 Ibid., 124-127. 295 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 30-31. 296 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 66-67. 297 Black , The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 126-127. 298 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 18. 299 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 117-120. 300 Ibid., 121. 301 Ibid., 124. 302 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 32, 43; Kostadinova, Bulgaria, 1879-1946, 12; Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 124. 303 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 46-47. 304 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXVI, 332. 305 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 86-87. 306 Ibid., 88; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 39. 307 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 129 308 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXI, 450. 309 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 129; Crampton Bulgaria, 133-149. 310 Crampton, Bulgaria, 101. 311 Ocherki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, Appendix, 19. 312 W. E Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (New York: Macmillan, 1958). 313 S. I u. Vitte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. Sidney Harcave (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990). 314 Brennan, ―The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany,‖ 185-186.

158

315 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 17; Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii 221-222. 316 I U . S Kar ts ov, em l i e n li hnem o ok i e - o pomin n i poli iche k i i lichny i (S.-Peterburg: konomicheska ia tip., 1906), 357, 359. 317 Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii 101. 318 A.I a. Vyshinskiĭ and S.A. Lozovskiĭ, eds., Diplom iche ki lo ’ (Gosudarstvennoe izdatel‘stvo politicheskoĭ literatury, 1948).

159

Chapter 5: The First Troubled Year, 1879-1880

Trouble began in Bulgaria almost as soon as Prince Alexander von Battenberg arrived in the country, in the form of strife between Battenberg, the Liberals, and the Russian agents in

Bulgaria. Battenberg would find himself feuding with Major-General P tr Dmitrievich Parensov, the first Minister of War of the independent Principality, and with Colonel Aleksandr

Aleksandrovich Shepelev, the Tsar‘s aide-de-camp and all-purpose Russian adviser to Bulgaria.

Meanwhile, Aleksandr Petrovich Davydov, the new Consul-General, would enter into a series of quarrels with Karavelov and the Liberals.

The Battle Lines over the Tarnovo Constitution – The Bulgarians

From the very start, Battenberg held the Bulgarian constitution in absolute contempt, terming it ―ridiculously liberal.‖319 In fact, when Battenberg went to Livadia Palace in May of

1879, he had made alteration of the Tarnovo Constitution a pre-requisite for accepting the

Bulgarian throne, but despite assurances from Donduk v-Kors kov that such would occur,

Battenberg arrived in Sofia only to find that amending the Constitution would require a two- thirds approval from the Grand National Assembly.320 Given the overwhelming majority that the

Liberals had (roughly 140 to 30), this was simply not in the cards.

Battenberg wasted no time making his antagonism to the Liberals and to the Tarnovo

Constitution clear. When Battenberg arrived in the country on June 24th/July 7th, 1879, elections for the National Assembly had not yet been carried out. They were scheduled, but Bulgaria still needed a caretaker government in order to administer the country until then. As mentioned earlier, it was Battenberg‘s job to select the Ministers, who wielded significant power in the

160

Bulgarian government, and those Ministers were responsible to both the Prince and the National

Assembly. There not yet being a National Assembly, Battenberg had two reasonable options. He could select a cabinet made up predominantly of the Liberal Party, as they had been in the majority during the Constituent National Assembly, or he could have formed a coalition cabinet

(as the Constituent National Assembly was not strictly elective and fell outside the Tarnovo

Constitution). Shepelev advised the latter course, and Battenberg entrusted Stoilov with hunting down candidates. After some initial difficulties (T sankov had been invited as a possible Minister, but was in a personal feud with Grekov and refused to serve in the same cabinet as him, for instance), Battenberg scrapped that idea and appointed a cabinet of almost entirely

Conservatives. Todor Burm v was the first Minister-President, Grekov was the first Minister of

Justice, Nachovich the first Minister of Finance.321

This was the opening salvo in a political war between Battenberg and the Liberals. By virtue of their electoral power, the Liberals should have at the very least been represented in the first cabinet. By not doing so, Battenberg had effectively told them that he could and would ignore their political power and govern the way he preferred.322 As one might imagine, this failed to endear Battenberg to the Liberal party, but Battenberg cared very little what the Liberals thought. To the Prince, the Liberals were all revolutionaries and radicals unworthy of respect.

Battenberg laid out his reasoning for his actions in a letter to his father, saying that he ―could do nothing else. I am too anxious to prove to Europe and to the country itself that with my advent

Bulgaria has become a monarchy… and that not only will I not protect Nihilists, but I shall pursue them with fire and sword.‖323 All in all, poor omens for a harmonious domestic political life in Bulgaria.

161

The situation did not improve after the cabinet was put into place. On September 8th/20th,

1879, Colonel Shepelev wrote a letter to the Russian Minister of War D. A. Mil i tin, where he described the initial Bulgarian political chaos. For instance, Shepelev writes of how the new cabinet promptly fired all of the regional governorsxviii that had been appointed during the

Russian occupation – this resulted in a great many irate former governors and their supporters, needless to say. The new administration also forcibly changed the exchange rate with the

Russian ruble and raised salt duties from 8% to 30%, with anyone who had previously amassed salt at the 8% duty forced to pay the difference – this hit a great many Bulgarians straight in the wallet. Completing the trifecta, the new cabinet also removed the democratic election of village administration, something which had survived for centuries under the Ottomans, and replaced it with appointment from the government administration.324

Nor did the fall elections which gave the Liberals a commanding majority help make for a convivial situation. The conservative Stoilov wrote in his diary for October 21st, 1879, that no sooner had the new National Assembly gathered, than they ―began a disorder, which showed clearly that the people are not against individuals, but entirely against every rule and authority; the ministers were treated with contempt, no one listened to them.‖325 The Conservatives attempted to boycott the Assembly, and then when that failed, to annul Stambolov‘s election by virtue of his youth. The National Assembly then proceeded to imply that Battenberg was subordinate to the Assembly, and accused the Burm v ministry of violating the Tarnovo

Constitution.326 Discord between Liberals and Conservatives became so bad that Stoilov recalled in his diary that ―all the diplomatic agents of the Powers said that such an Assembly should have been dismissed.‖327 As if this were not enough trouble, quite aside from all the politics one xviii To be precise, the regional ―chiefs.‖

162 should note that Bulgaria at this time was still dealing with various minor uprisings and vigilantism, both among the Turks who were unhappy at being left behind in the Principality, and among Bulgarians who were taking extralegal vengeance.328

The Battle Lines over the Tarnovo Constitution – The Russians

What turned this into an issue for Russo-Bulgarian relations was that the three key

Russian agents in Bulgaria were unable to remain uninvolved in the fracas. Even more troublesome, they were also unable to maintain a single, unified policy, instead backing different factions.

Bulgaria‘s first Minister of War was Major-General P tr Dmitrievich Parensov. Born in

1843, he was still a young man of thirty-six when he joined the Bulgarian government. Before then he had served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and was wounded with a concussion during the November 2nd, 1877 storm of the Prave tskikh Heights. He was related to Girs

(Parensov‘s wife was Girs‘s niece) and had a good relationship with Mil i tin, his immediate superior. He was an effective organizer, and there had been talk of making him Quartermaster-

General if hostilities broke out again after the Treaty of San Stefano. Later, Parensov was part of the occupation forces under Donduk v-Kors kov. It was on the basis of these connections and qualifications that he was offered the post of Bulgarian Minister of War. Initially inclined to reject the position, Parensov accepted it with a view towards his further career advancement, an important consideration in light of how the Russian armed forces were going to be slimmed down following the Russo-Turkish War, and promotion opportunities would be thin on the ground. Politically, Parensov was a Panslav, a self-professed follower of Aks kov and

163

Khom iak v who had long been interested in the ―Slavic Question,‖ and was a member of the

Slavic Benevolent Society, though he would prove milder in his Panslavism than some of his successors. 329 In his memoirs, Parensov takes a philosophical approach to his own younger self, writing that:

Soon it will be twenty-seven years since I left Bulgaria; enough time that I can analyze my participation in this, the long-ago past…. Undoubtedly I was at fault in a great many things. Major incidents, aside from [Parensov‘s taking offense at Battenberg over the titles issue, described later] I do not, I confess, recall; speaking of the tone of my actions, I freely admit that in them I was, likely, insufficiently restrained, there was (I admit) too many negative impressions and from that flowed a hot temper; there was not always enough thinking about my actions.330

Adolf Koch, rarely a fan of Russians, essentially agrees with this evaluation, writing that

Parensov was ―much too young… for his responsible position… he was, moreover, entirely wanting in tact.‖331 Essentially, like Battenberg, Parensov was a young military man lacking in diplomacy, placed in an important political position.

The same could not be said of Colonel A. A. Shepelev. While only two years older than

Parensov, he had essentially left the military career track in order to become Tsar Alexander II‘s personal aide-de-camp, a sort of pseudo-diplomatic emissary of the Tsar whom Parensov described as a ―very gifted, charming, possessed of a great deal of tact and unusually restrained.‖332 This is borne out in his reports to the Russian government, which were generally among the most calm and restrained of any Russian agent in Bulgaria. The Balkan historian

Charles Jelavich stated that Shepelev ―stands out as one of the most able Russian officials in

Bulgaria in the decade after the Congress of Berlin.‖333 His role in the new Bulgarian Principality was two-fold. First, he was to serve as the Tsar‘s personal eyes and ears in Bulgaria, reporting directly to Alexander II and not to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of War. This

164

Shepelev was able to accomplish. His second role was to provide Battenberg with the political advice that the young Prince would need to govern effectively. This Shepelev was never able to accomplish, due to the fundamental political differences between him and Battenberg.334

The issue is that while Battenberg and the Conservatives were entirely against the

Tarnovo Constitution, it was the position of the Russian Imperial Court that the Constitution be maintained, something which the Tsar made clear on numerous occasions. Moving ahead in the calendar a little to pick one of the clearest examples, Alexander II sent a letter to Battenberg on

December 16th/28th, 1879, in response to Battenberg‘s repeated complaints about the Tarnovo

Constitution. The Emperor explained that he was sympathetic to Battenberg‘s troubles, but the

Constitution had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin and any direct action on the Tsar‘s part to have it removed or replaced risked Russia being accused of ―exercising illegal intervention in the affairs of the Principality.‖335 A coup was likewise out of the question, as the Bulgarian army was staffed by Russian officers and so any illegal effort of Battenberg‘s to change the Tarnovo

Constitution would be attributed to Russia, with all of the same troubles. This left only legal changes to the Constitution open to Battenberg, and this the Prince lacked the votes for.

Nor was it only the Imperial Court that opposed changes to the Tarnovo Constitution.

The Panslavs also had a case for maintaining the legal status quo, despite the fact that as a derivation of Slavophilism, Panslavism was generally hostile towards Western ideas of liberalism and democracy. In his memoirs, Parensov laid out the Panslav case for supporting

Bulgarian liberalism quite simply, positioning it on two supports. First, in Russia, the existing institutions and traditions were of great antiquity and of a thoroughly Russian character. To be conservative in Russia meant to embrace Slavic ways. In Bulgaria, there were few equivalent

165 institutions, and so there was nothing inherently pro-Slavic in supporting a modern autocratic system as opposed to a modern democratic system. Parensov‘s second point was even more important, which is that in Russia, the monarch was a Russian, and thus an autocratic approach linked the two. But in Bulgaria, the monarch was a German who had no inherent connection to the Slavic Bulgarians. Under the circumstances, tilting the power structure towards a Slavic

National Assembly and away from a German Prince seemed to Parensov the wisest course. One should note that this was hardly a unanimous position among the Panslavs – Aks kov wrote in support of Battenberg and against the Tarnovo Constitution – but it was the position that would be often seen among Panslavs who were actually present in Bulgaria.336

Matters would have rested there, except that the third Russian agent in Bulgaria did not follow the Imperial line. This was Aleksandr Petrovich Davydov, the Russian Consul-General in

Sofia. He was a well-connected diplomat who had previously served in Vienna, London, Rome,

Brussels, and Washington, DC, the last during the American Civil War, before being assigned to

Bulgaria. According to the Slavophilic military man Parensov, Davydov was thoroughly

Europeanized, an ―elderly bachelor, spoiled by the comforts of European ,‖ who was less than enthused about being stuck in Sofia, at that point little more than a tiny Balkan village.xix, 337

While one can debate the point of Davydov‘s decadence, it is unarguable that Davydov despised his posting in Bulgaria, and was absolutely desperate to leave. In March and April of 1879, he wrote to Girs that he would prefer a post in Western Europe, even if it meant a demotion, rather than stay in Bulgaria. In June, he went on a vacation to Vienna and wrote that just five days

xix Prior to the Russo-Turkish War the main town in Bulgaria had been Plovdiv, with Tarnovo coming a close second. Sofia was absolutely minute in comparison, described by the unimpressed Adolf Koch as ―a dirty Turkish town, and the hotels miserable hans,‖ that is, overnight inns and trading posts, while Parensov recalls how as there were no government buildings, the first Bulgarian Cabinet met in Todor Burmov‘s apartment.

166 away from the Balkans he felt better. By August, Davydov wrote that he would ―go willingly no matter where and in no matter what capacity rather than stay here.‖ By October he was ready to leave the diplomatic service. By November he was begging Girs to send him from Bulgaria, unless ―you wish me to lose my head completely.‖338 This apparently annoyed Girs to no end, and the Foreign Minister refused to move Davydov however the latter pleaded.339

With regards to his politics, Davydov was described by S. S. Tat shchev, a leading historian and governmental figure of the time as someone unfamiliar with the Eastern Question.

Instead, Davydov saw his main role in Bulgaria as ―first, in the support of the monarchical and defensive beginnings, and secondly, in maintaining full agreement with his colleagues, the representatives of the other Powers.‖340 Consequently, Davydov was entirely on the side of the

Conservatives, whom he saw as the only individuals capable of putting Bulgaria‘s house in order and whom he assisted in every way he could – Stoilov‘s diary for 1879 records scores of meetings with Davydov, quite nearly every other day.xx,341 Davydov‘s relations with the Liberals, on the other hand, were quite strained. He positively despised Karavelov, the leader of the

Liberals at the time, referring to him as ―unwashed, uncombed, country bumpkinxxi‖ according to

Parensov. When Karavelov was elected President of the first National Assembly, all of the diplomatic agents visited him to convey their congratulations save for Davydov, who stated that

―I will not go to that filthy person, I cannot give my hand to that unwashed cretin,‖ and so forth.

Needless to say the antipathy was mutual, as when Karavelov learned of this he lost no opportunity to annoy Davydov. In one case, Karavelov and a pack of his Liberal allies agreed to attend a dinner Davydov was hosting only in the event that Davydov would let them pay for it – xx In December of 1879, for instance, Stoilov mentions meeting Davydov on the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 22nd, 23rd, 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st. xxiIn the original a ―чумичка.‖

167 in other words, implying that Davydov‘s house was simply a restaurant. The dinner did not occur.342 In his own words, as told to Stoilov, Davydov viewed that there were two parties in

Bulgaria – ―the party of order, and the other, of disorder; the Constitution is that of the latter party, leading to total anarchy.‖343 A letter to Girs put the point even more piquantly, that ―the

Constitution is an absurdity in theory and an insanity in practice,‖ and that it was Russia‘s duty to save Bulgaria from its own constitution.344 As one might imagine, his reports to St. Petersburg were of a decidedly divergent nature from those of Shepelev or Parensov.345

All of these personal and political antipathies had serious consequences, however. The

Principality of Bulgaria hosted serious political divisions from the very beginning, and instead of staying aloof or coming down firmly on either side, the Russian agents in Bulgaria were split among themselves. To the right, one had Battenberg, the Conservatives, and Davydov. To the left, one had the Liberals supported by Parensov and more cautiously Shepelev. This situation resulted in a series of clashes between the two sides, in particular between the two young hot- heads Battenberg and Parensov, which would chip away at the mutual good-feeling between

Russia and Bulgaria.

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – The Question of Titles

The title controversy is one of those political situations whose actual subject plumbs the depths of irrelevance (Crampton calls it something of an ―Opera bouffe‖)346, but which nevertheless proved significant for what it showed about Russo-Bulgarian politics and for the lingering effects it would have on the feelings of all involved. It also holds the dubious honor of being the very first serious clash between Battenberg and the Russian agents in Bulgaria.

168

The essential problem was that Battenberg was unhappy about the sixth provision of the

Tarnovo Constitution, which stated that the Prince was to be referred to by the title of

‗Светлост‘ (in English typically translated as ―Your Grace‖ or ―Your Excellency‖, or in French

Altesse e ni imе)347, even though by virtue of his position as Prince of Battenberg, he felt that he deserved the title of ‗Височество‘ (―Your Highness‖ or Altesse). Battenberg raised the issue on July 5th/17th, 1879, a matter of days after his arrival in the country. There, at the triumphal dinner celebrating the inauguration of the Burm v cabinet, he confronted his Conservative ministers and informed them that he was greatly offended by being referred to by a lesser title, that this was a clear error in the Tarnovo Constitution, and that they should refer to him as

Highness from thence forth. The ministers agreed, and then later asked General Parensov as

Minister of War to join them in this decision. Parensov refused to do this, standing on the maintenance of the Tarnovo Constitution come what may. While Parensov phrased his refusal in terms of maintaining the very Constitution that Battenberg had sworn to uphold a few days earlier, there was also a practical element to general‘s refusal. For the other ministers, switching from one title to another could be dealt with as a personal matter, a question of how they were to address Battenberg in private. But Parensov was responsible for the army and for the guards at the Palace, who had to address Battenberg constantly, and so any change of titles by the Ministry of War would have to be confirmed by an official order and disseminated far and wide, invariably becoming a political issue. When Parensov proved unable to convince the

Conservative ministers to reverse their decision (as they put it, they had promised), he held his ground, and threatened to resign if push came to shove.348

169

Immediately after the dinner, Parensov went to consult with Davydov, and the two were able to put together a quick compromise. Parensov and the army would continue to refer to

Battenberg as ‗Your Excellency‘ in Bulgarian, but in French would use the title Altesse – this meant ―Highness,‖ but dropping the e ni imе was already commonly done in casual speech, so this was a useful bit of ambiguity. The rest of the Bulgarian ministers could do as they pleased, which in practice meant referring to Battenberg as ‗Your Highness‘.349

This would not prove to be the end of the matter. Battenberg was unhappy with the compromise, complaining to Parensov after one military review that ―Only the army calls me

‗Your Excellency‘, at the same time as everyone else, ‗Your Highness‘.‖350 For his part,

Parensov claimed that he had nothing against giving Battenberg the title of Highness, but only if it came about through legal, constitutional means – which was rather unlikely given that this would require a Grand National Assembly where the Liberals, angry at Battenberg, would be in the majority.351 In fact, the Liberals promptly fanned the flames of the conflict by raising

Parensov up as a Liberal icon (to the surprise of the general), and insisting on referring to

Battenberg as Excellency.352 The Liberal leader Stefan Stambolov published an article a few weeks later titled ―The Constitution is being Broken!‖ in the newspaper T selok pn lg i i

(‗Undivided Bulgaria‘), where he supported Parensov, and then added a few more constitutional violations, such as Burm v being referred to as Excellency.353 When Battenberg opened the first ordinary National Assembly, the response speech addressed the Prince as ‗Your Excellency‘, prompting Stoilov to refer to them as ‗jackanapes‘ in his diary.354

The Title Controversy also contains a very good example of just how disjointed the

Russian policy towards Bulgaria could be. In September of 1879, Parensov visited St. Petersburg

170 to report on military and political matters in Bulgaria, and one of the general‘s goals was to nail down the official Russian line on how he should behave vis-à-vis the question of Battenberg‘s titles. First, Parensov spoke to his immediate superior, D. A. Mil i tin. Once Parensov had finished explaining the situation, Mil i tin stated that ―What stupidity. We were here discussing the question of titles [when the draft constitution was being set up], knowing perfectly well who would be the Prince. Please continue as you were.‖ The next day, Parensov visited his uncle and the foreign minister N. K. Girs, and talked about the difficulties Parensov had been experiencing in Bulgaria as a result. Girs listened to everything Parensov had to say, and then said ―Basically, my dear, if it makes him happy, why not go and call him ‗Highness‘?‖ As Parensov recalled, he froze, but decided not to point out that he was receiving contradictory instructions, and the meeting with Girs continued.355

After this point, the Titles Controversy more or less wound down. Parensov and

Battenberg remained in their previous positions, though Battenberg did try various tricks to get

Parensov to change his mind, such as leaving an article from an exceedingly radical newspaper that wrote approvingly of Parensov in a waiting room when the general came to visit.356 It would end up only being resolved after Parensov had been recalled to Russia.

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – German Officers

If the Titles Controversy was ultimately unimportant, then the same could not be said for the question of the German officers. Another disagreement between Battenberg and Parensov, this one touched the very heart of Bulgaria‘s status as a Russian client state – the question of who had final control over the Bulgarian army.

171

Emerging out of centuries of Turkish rule, the new Bulgarian army had no real military experience or tradition of combat. Certainly there had been some skirmishes and banditry before, and Bulgarian volunteers and rebels had acquitted themselves honorably as auxiliaries during the

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, but that was a far cry from being a professional standing army.

Consequently the bulk of the Bulgarian officer corps and all of the senior officers from the rank of colonel right on up to the Minister of War were subjects of the Tsar, temporarily detached from the Imperial Russian Army in order to train and organize the Bulgarian forces. For the

Russian government, a powerful Bulgarian army friendly to the Russians was a key part of the

Russian Empire‘s long-term geopolitical game. Parensov saw his role quite clearly as that of creating an army that would lead to a unified and more powerful Bulgaria.357 The problem was that according to the Tarnovo Constitution, the Prince was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and as a veteran of the Russo-Turkish War and someone trained in German military techniques, Battenberg was unwilling to leave military matters in Parensov‘s hands.358 Some of

Battenberg‘s proposals for the new Bulgarian army were fundamentally harmless, if aggravating for Parensov. Battenberg proposed to alter the form of the changing of the guard, as well as drawing up more Prussian- uniforms for the military.359 But the same could not be said for

Battenberg‘s plan to bring in German officers into the ranks of the Bulgarian army.

Battenberg had served in the Prussian Gardes du Corps, and soon after arriving in the country he directed Parensov to accept some of the officers that he had known in Germany into the Bulgarian army. In this, Battenberg had a few motivations. First, it would appear that he had made promises to his friends in Germany to find them positions in Bulgaria, promises that as monarch Battenberg felt compelled to keep.360 A second reason was born out of the distrust and

172 dislike that Battenberg felt for his Bulgarian subjects – sooner or later, the Russian officers were going to leave Bulgaria, and if that happened Battenberg wanted to have people whom he could trust in positions of power. He had no intention of, in his words, ―being left alone with these bratouschkis‖ (a somewhat pejorative term for ‗younger brothers,‘ used in the Russian context to signify Balkan Slavs).361 Parensov promptly refused, basing his reasoning on two spoken and one unspoken points. First, it was against the Tarnovo Constitution to accept non-Bulgarians into civil or military office without the express approval of the National Assembly – Russian officers excepted.362 Secondly, there were practical considerations, as Parensov explained in a letter to

Mil i tin, such as the fact that the German officers, lacking in , would find themselves hard-pressed to communicate with either their Russian fellow officers or with their

Bulgarian subordinates.363 More quietly, there was the simple fact that Parensov, as a good

Panslav, had no intention whatsoever of allowing Germans and Austrians to populate the

Bulgarian officer corps. Bulgaria was meant to be an ally of Russia, not a country where the higher military ranks were sympathetic to Russia‘s geopolitical rivals. In fact, Parensov rather strongly suspected the Austrian Ambassador, one Count Khevenhuller, of being the force behind

Battenberg‘s insistence on introducing the German officers.364 In any case, matters once more reached an impasse between Battenberg and Parensov, and Parensov‘s real motives in refusing the German officers were widely spoken of, further chilling relations between him and

Battenberg.365

The issue refused to go away. Between October 1879 and March 1880, Parensov was confronted with no fewer than 509 requests from foreign officers for commissions in the

Bulgarian army. Most of them, Parensov was able to send off without trouble, but some arrived

173 in Sofia personally, bearing recommendations from the hand of the Prince, which read

―rеcom nd à l en ion р ci le d mini e de l g e e.‖ In his memoirs, Parensov recalls admiringly of the brazenness of one Westphalian artillery under-officer who pointed out that he was broke and thus wished to join the Bulgarian artillery as a lieutenant, adding that he was good at making fireworks. Battenberg came out to personally lobby for several of these officers, saying that they were good people but in need of money.366 As a consequence, Parensov wrote to

Mil i tin, ―I have no doubt, that my stubbornness in this question cannot have a positive effect on the feelings of the Prince towards me.‖367 These words, penned either on the evening of

November 27th or in the morning of the following day, proved to be prescient.

Matters eventually reached a head on the evening of November 28th, 1879. Battenberg summoned his Minister of War to the palace and commanded him to sign an order to induct an officer by the name of Köller into the Bulgarian army, and also to compose rules for the admission of further foreign officers. When Parensov pointed out that this was against the law, according to him, Battenberg responded by saying that once the National Assembly was over

Battenberg intended to do away with the Tarnovo Constitution. Parensov then threatened to resign once more – a tactic that had proven successful in the past, since Battenberg was on unsteady ground when it came to his authority over the military emissary of his patron Great

Power. The discussion turned into shouting, with Battenberg accusing Parensov of forever opposing him, and Parensov stating that Battenberg did not understand and would not understand military work. Afterwards, Parensov hurried to find Davydov and Shepelev, where they wrote a letter to Mil i tin, and a telegram as well, conveying this information. A note informing

Battenberg of this was sent to the palace.368

174

The next morning, the 29th, a worried Battenberg summoned Davydov, inquiring as to whether the full letter to Mil i tin had gone out yet, and then offered a compromise. If Parensov would accept Köller and one other officer, then Battenberg would drop the matter, so long as this little tiff could be kept from the Emperor. Parensov considered the matter, and it was so agreed.

He would be lambasted by the Liberals for this decision, but so be it. That was the end of the

Officers Controversy.369 Yet it is interesting to note that on the 30th, Davydov had a conversation with Konstantin Stoilov, recorded in the latter‘s diary, wherein Davydov complained that

Parensov had acted exceedingly undiplomatically, and that indeed Parensov had not an ounce of tact within him. Moreover, Davydov told his confidante that he thought Parensov wholly unsuited as Minister of War, and that he would write a letter to St. Petersburg to that effect.370

Also of interest is the telegram of Mil i tin to Parensov, received by the latter on

December 1st, 1879. Mil i tin wrote that:

Regarding your telegram of the 28th of November [about Battenberg‘s ultimatum], I can only convey my private opinion that it would be desirable to keep foreigners, other than Russians, out of the Bulgarian military; but I cannot give you any official instructions as a Minister of the Bulgarian Prince, obedient to the Constitutional Order. It would be an exceedingly awkward intrusion of the Russian government into the internal affairs of the Principality.371

Parensov interpreted this as a full-throated approval of his actions, having received both

Mil iutin‘s private blessing and the broad hint that he was to be obedient to the Constitution. Yet it does highlight the ambiguous nature of Parensov‘s position in the Principality – subordinate to the Prince of Bulgaria but with his own sources of authority, a Russian agent but one that could not be commanded as such.

175

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – Conflicting Orders

The final controversy that roiled Russo-Bulgarian relations during the first year of

Battenberg‘s reign didn‘t involve the Prince or Parensov this time. Rather, it was Davydov and

Shepelev who found themselves at odds, over the question of the Tsar‘s orders.

The two men disagreed over the question of the Tarnovo Constitution, and over related questions of how Battenberg should have ruled. Shepelev intimated as much to Mil i tin in a letter when he talked of Battenberg‘s desire to dismiss the first National Assembly after elections produced a highly Liberal body. Shepelev thought such an action would be disastrous, as it would demonstrate how far apart the Prince and the representatives of the nation were, but he noted that this was a view ―contrary to the opinions of others,‖ referring to Davydov.372 By

November, the disagreement had developed to the point that there was a genuine question over who truly represented the authority of the Russian state – the Consul-General or the Tsar‘s personal emissary. This had occurred even though on the 15th/27th of September, Mil i tin had sent a letter to Shepelev, in which he mentioned that it would have a good effect both on

Battenberg and on Bulgaria if Shepelev ―would always act as one with our diplomatic agent and always with the same thought.‖373 Yet in the absence of directives regarding just what that same thought would be, the political differences between Shepelev and Davydov remained irreconcilable. Stoilov wrote what occurred next in his diary entry for November 17th, 1879, recalling that:

In the evening I was at Davydov‘s. He read me a letter to Girs, which spoke of the disagreement between him and Shepelev, and about the telegram sent to the latter, and said that his reputation before the Prince was shaky, as he conveyed one thing as the will of the Tsar, and Shepelev – something else. The Prince may reach the conclusion that Davidov is changing the instructions or is explaining them wrong; that is why he wanted first to demand to be recalled by

176

telegraph, but because he doesn‘t want a scandal, he will provisionally remain in the post until the crisis passes.374

On the one hand, this may be read as another effort on the part of Davydov to escape his much- loathed Bulgarian posting. But on the other hand, Davydov had in fact hit upon a particularly important point in the Russian state‘s policy towards Bulgaria. There were three high-ranking

Russian agents in Bulgaria, and each of them received orders from a different source – Davydov answered to Girs, Parensov to Mil i tin, and Shepelev reported directly to Tsar Alexander II.

Given that these agents followed sharply different policies, Davydov is correct in saying that this undermined their authority before the Prince and the Bulgarian politicians, since either Russia was confused, or someone was acting incorrectly.

A few days later, on the 20th of November, Stoilov visited with Davydov once more, whereupon the Russian Consul-General read him a part of Girs‘s response letter. While not directly addressing the question of whether or not there were different instructions – at least in the section that Davydov read to Stoilov – Girs did state that the Russian agents should always support the Prince in his struggles with the National Assembly.375 When Stoilov met with

Battenberg the following day, the 21st, the Prince told Stoilov that ―so far as he knows, there was never any difference between the instructions of Davydov and Shepelev; it was the latter who was at fault, as he had not fulfilled them, and was now much hurt in spirit, and maybe even afraid for his position.‖376 So it would seem that whatever the divisions between Shepelev and

Davydov, Girs had come down firmly on the side of his own man, and ordered that Russian authority be put behind the Prince.

Except that barely two weeks later, following Parensov‘s fight with Battenberg over the question of the German officers, Mil i tin strongly hinted that the Russians should hold to the

177

Tarnovo Constitution, and therefore against Battenberg‘s constant efforts to change or get rid of it. While Girs may have solved the immediate source of discord – indeed, Adolf Koch thought that Shepelev was ultimately recalled over the matter – the fact remained that Russian policy in

Bulgaria was still disjointed, with too little coordination both between the Russian agents on the ground, and between their superiors in St. Petersburg.377

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – Minor Conflicts

The foregoing three controversies were by no means the only conflicts that emerged in the first year of Battenberg‘s reign. At the risk of belaboring the point, one may further point out that Parensov acted to remove several Russian officers whom he felt were insufficiently professional or experienced, or who had shown poor judgment that rendered them unsuitable for peacetime duties as trainers.378 The problem was that these officers were also in some cases close to Battenberg, who reacted poorly to their removal – he accused Parensov, saying ―You are attacking my friends.‖379 That Parensov sternly rebuked officers who were too informal with their liege only added credibility to this claim.380 In turn, Parensov was becoming ever more frustrated by Battenberg‘s continuous efforts to introduce Prussian forms into the Bulgarian army, all the more so because Parensov saw them as pointless fripperies. Parensov particularly objected to alterations in ceremonial uniforms and changing of the guards, which he claimed

Battenberg justified by saying that ―it flatters the vanity of the people.‖381 Likewise, Parensov‘s professional pride was offended by the fact that a 22-year-old lieutenant was giving him, a well- trained, highly-experienced general of one of the Great Powers, orders about which military

178 forms to use, without taking into account, according to Parensov, local conditions or the limitations of the Bulgarian troops or treasury.382

Meanwhile, Davydov was bending all energies to figuring out a way around the Tsar‘s prohibition against removing the Constitution. His antipathy for the Tarnovo Constitution was widely known – Parensov wrote to Mil i tin that Davydov was ―a supporter of the destruction of the Constitution even through forceful means, by way of a governmental coup.‖383 The general recalled one particular incident in his memoirs, which occurred soon after the response address of the first National Assembly – the same that had aggravated Battenberg with its use of titles.

Davydov spread the word that he had been offended by the Assembly‘s suggestion that the

Bulgarian military, first established by the Russian occupational government, needed a great deal of improvement. The first that Parensov, the individual most directly concerned with the military, heard of this when a troop of delegates from the National Assembly appeared outside his home begging forgiveness, with Stefan Stambolov at their head. Parensov and the delegates had a long conversation where both proclaimed themselves very happy with one another, yet very soon Davydov was both criticizing Parensov‘s decision to meet with the Liberals, and also turning Battenberg around to his point of view.384

Even Shepelev did not escape further entanglement in the increasingly internecine struggles of Bulgarian politics. On December 17th, Stoilov had a talk with Davydov in which a proposal for altering the Tarnovo Constitution was discussed. This proposal had been sent on to the Tsar via Shepelev, but Davydov suspected that the colonel had delivered the proposal with

―alterations of his own design.‖385 Relations between the three Russian agents reached a nadir.

179

Recalls and Evaluations

As one might imagine, this was not a stable situation, and in early 1880 all three of the chief Russia agents in Bulgaria were recalled. Both Shepelev and Davydov were recalled around late January of 1880, the latter as a direct consequence of his persistent antagonism to the

Tarnovo Constitution.386 Though Battenberg‘s chaplain Adolf Koch framed it as an anti-

Battenberg conspiracy, Davydov himself was entirely pleased to finally escape Bulgaria. 387

Writing to Girs from Bucharest, on his way home to Russia, Davydov wrote that ―I am finally out of that galley. All that I ask is that no one will ever mention the word Bulgaria to me.‖388 A few months later, Parensov followed his two colleagues, after Battenberg visited Russia and complained directly to the Tsar. Alexander II finally opted to support his nephew in the Titles

Controversy, and as a consequence, Parensov was recalled to Russia.389

Both Davydov and Parensov left Bulgaria with few fond memories of their time there, but they did leave certain thoughts and evaluations of the Bulgarian political situation. In

Davydov‘s case, this included a high evaluation of the Prince, whom he called ―the only good card that Bulgaria holds,‖ with particular praise for his ―calm, his judgement, and his good sense.‖ At the same time, Davydov remained certain that only a major alteration of the Tarnovo

Constitution could save Bulgaria.390 Yet Davydov‘s most insightful comment about the Russo-

Bulgarian situation had been made almost a year earlier. In a letter in April of 1879, he had recommended to Girs that a single person should be made responsible for all Russian policy vis-

à-vis Bulgaria.391 This recommendation was ignored, though it was probably one of the most intelligent suggestions made by any individual during the entire period under study.392

180

Parensov‘s recommendations for Bulgaria were laid out most clearly in his November

28th, 1879 letter to Mil i tin, noting that any other Russian general who became Minister of

Bulgaria would have the same problems that Parensov had – conflicts with the Prince and the crossfire of Bulgarian party politics. He also noted that for all that Bulgaria needed and wanted a strong army, they still expected that in the extremity, the Russians would come to save them from the Ottomans. Indeed, Parensov noted that so powerful was the affection for Russia that the

National Assembly would not have accepted a single foreign officer.393

As for Battenberg, his experiences had mostly hardened him in his distaste for Russian officials. His biographer Corti wrote that within a matter of months of ruling, Battenberg had developed ―a violent hatred of all that was Russian. Whenever anything happened he saw the hand of Russia.‖394 Battenberg himself claimed that ―All the scum of Russia has taken refuge here and has tainted the whole country.‖395 In private, he complained to Stoilov that Parensov was a ―poltroon,‖396 and on another occasion showed Stoilov a telegram to his father, which said that ―The Minister of War played a very foul and dastardly role and all the Russians, with the exception of Davydov, made his rule difficult.‖397

Finally, with regards to the Constitution, Battenberg had loathed it from the beginning and continued to do so, but for the moment he was bound by Tsarist injunction to maintain it.

Earlier, in December, Battenberg played his best card, writing personally to his uncle in St.

Petersburg and asking for Alexander II‘s aid in overturning the Tarnovo Constitution.398

On December 11th/23rd, 1879, Tsar Alexander II met with N. K. Girs and D. A. Mil i tin to discuss the Bulgarian situation. Understandably, Girs and Mil i tin both supported the views of their own respective agents. Girs was ready to support the idea of a military co p d’ led by

181

Prince Battenberg, following the same support that Davydov had offered the Prince. Mil i tin, on the other hand, just like Parensov, argued in favor of the Constitution. To Mil i tin, if the Prince‘s authority in Bulgaria were to increase, it must of necessity mean a decrease in the influence of the Russians in the new country. Moreover, Mil i tin pointed out that the Tarnovo Constitution had not even been properly tried as of yet, and the Liberals should be given a chance to put into effect the Constitution following new elections. This was the view that was eventually adopted by the Tsar, and he ordered Mil i tin and Girs, aided by Baron A. G. Zhomini, to draft a letter that would be sent in the Tsar‘s name to Battenberg.399

This letter, couched in diplomatic language, was one of the few cases of a concerted

Russian policy being enacted in the years leading up to the Bulgarian Unification. Dispatched from St. Petersburg on December 16th / 28th, 1879, the letter stated that the Tsar was greatly sympathetic to Battenberg‘s plight, but that the constitution had been sanctioned by the Treaty of

Berlin, and any direct action on the Tsar‘s part to have it removed or replaced risked Russia being accused of ―exercising illegal intervention in the affairs of the Principality.‖ At the same time, for Battenberg to set out on a unilateral coup in Bulgaria was to set a dangerous precedent and could lead to serious unrest. What the Tsar recommended was that Battenberg allow the

Liberals to form their government, in the hopes that they could work together, in which case

Battenberg could proceed ―along constitutional lines [and with Liberal help arrive legally at a revision of those articles of the original pact which experience has proved to be unworkable.‖

The Tsar had advised patience for the time being. Having asked for the Tsar‘s advice, Battenberg had no choice but to follow it.400

182

Conclusion – The First Fissures

As the year 1879 turned over into 1880, one could clearly see that a few cracks had formed in the fundament of Russo-Bulgarian relations. Battenberg had spent much of his first year in a long and increasingly vituperative feud with his Minister of War, while the antipathy between Davydov and the Liberals was the stuff of Sofia gossip. Yet it would be a mistake to say that Russo-Bulgarian relations were doomed from the beginning. Few of the conflicts were over matters of actual substance, and some, like the Titles Controversy or the question of the changing of the guard, revolved around points of etiquette and little more. The more important disputes over the changing of the Tarnovo Constitution or over the inclusion of the German officers in the ranks of the Bulgarian military were resolved either through compromise or with commands from St. Petersburg, and in any case in those situations Russia found itself on the side of the

Liberal majority in the country. Had events turned out differently, it would have been fair to call these the teething problems of a new state and a new monarch, unimportant in the grand scheme of things.

Yet they proved significant for two reasons. First, of course, they strengthened

Battenberg‘s already existing dislike of Russia, and as Prince of Bulgaria, Battenberg was perhaps the single most important political actor in Bulgaria – certainly he was the most persistent, remaining in place while ministers and diplomats and generals came and went. Yet even more important was the way in which all these controversies revealed the chaos going on in the management of Russian foreign policy towards Bulgaria. There were three Russian agents in

Bulgaria, all of whom had their own separate chains of command and their own sources of authority, and who pursued different policies while in Bulgaria. Furthermore the authorities in St.

183

Petersburg, Foreign Minister N. K. Girs and War Minister D. A. Mil i tin, were themselves not always on the same page. Consequently, the Russian agents in Bulgaria came into conflict with one another, and instead of acting as a calming influence on the already tempestuous Bulgarian politics they served to incite even greater disorder. Had the Tsarist government followed

Davydov‘s advice and appointed a single individual as ultimate authority over Bulgarian affairs, things might have turned out quite differently.

319 Corti, Battenberg, 256. 320 Ibid., 63-67. 321 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria,157-158. 322 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 46. 323 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 258. 324 Shepelev to Mil i tin, Sofia, 8/20 September 1879, in Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 511-512. 325 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 21 October 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 20 326 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 164-165. 327 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 14 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 25. 328 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 62-64 329 Ibid., CI, 108-110, 113-115; Ibid., CXXXI, 441; Ibid., CXXXIV, 42; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 47 330 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXIV, 264. 331 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 22-23. 332 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 373. 333 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 54. 334 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 373. 335 The full text of Tsar Alexander II‘s letter is included in Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 372-374; Similar statements were regularly to be found in the Tsar‘s letters and telegrams to Bulgaria – one example is mentioned in Konstantin Stoilov‘s diary entry for 16 November 1879; TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 28. 336 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXIV, 17-18. 337 Ibid., CI, 594; Ibid., CXXV, 71; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 10. 338 Davydov to Girs, NKG, Tarnovo, 27 March/8 April 1879; Ibid., Bucharest, 20 April/12 May 1879; Ibid., Vienna, 27 May/8 June 1879; Ibid., Sofia, 19/31 August 1879; Ibid., Sofia, 7/19 October 1879; Ibid., Sofia, 6/18 November 1879, all in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 53. 339 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 522. 340 S. S. Tat shchev, Russia and Bulgaria, in Ibid., CI, 598. 341 Stoilov‘s Diary Entries for 1879, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 1 342 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 594-595. 343 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 30 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 70. 344 Davydov to Girs, NKG, Bucharest, April 30/May 12, 1879 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 58. 345 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 518-519. 346 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 40.

184

347 Provision 6 of the Tarnovo constitution, as reproduced in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 291. 348 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 378-380. 349 Ibid., CI, 380-381. 350 Ibid., CXXV, 281. 351 Ibid., CI, 280. 352 Ibid., CI, 281. 353 S. Stambolov, ―Konstitutsiyata se narushava‖, T Selokupna B"lgari ia, I, No. 9 (July 25th/August 6th, 1879), 1 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 159-160. 354 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 14 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 25; Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXVI, 332-335. 355 Ibid., CXXV, 521-522. 356 Ibid., CXXVI, 330. 357 Ibid., CXXXII, 613. 358 Article 11 of the Tarnovo Constitution 359 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 279-280; CXXVI, 69. 360 Ibid., CXXV, 280. 361 Ibid., CXXVI, 65. 362 Articles 65 and 66, Tarnovo Constitution; Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 280. 363 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 2b. 364 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXV, 282. 365 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 6 December 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 81 to 83. 366 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXVI, 65-66. 367 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 2b. 368 Parenxov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXII, 612-616; Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 4-5. 369 Parenxov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXII, 617-618. 370 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 30 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 71. 371 Telegram of Mil i tin to Parensov, 1 December 1879, in Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXII, 619. 372 Shepelev to Mil i tin, Sofia, 8/20 September 1879, in Ibid., CXXV, 513. 373 Mil i tin to Shepelev, 15/27 September 1879, in Parensov CXXV 519. 374 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 17 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 32. 375 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 20 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 42. 376 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 21 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 44. 377 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 40. 378 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 3a. 379 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXVI, 65. 380 Parensov to Mil i tin, 20 January 1880, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 8a. 381 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 5b. 382 Ibid., List 3-5. 383 Parensov to Mil i tin, 20 January 1880, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 9b. 384 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXVI, 336-338. 385 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 17 December 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 93. 386 Mil iutin and Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in . 3:191. 387 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 39. 388 Davydov to Girs, NKG, Bucharest, Jan 28/Feb 8, 1880 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 60. 389 Mil iutin and Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in . 3:216, 220; Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXIV, 20-26. 390 Davydov to Girs, NKG, Bucharest, Jan 28/Feb 8, 1880 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 60. 391 Davydov to Girs, NKG, Tyrnovo, April 18/30, 1879. in Ibid., 53-54. 392 Ibid., 54. 393 Parensov to Mil i tin, 28 November 1879, Sofia, RGVIA, Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 135, List 5. 394 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 258.

185

395 Ibid., 258. 396 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 3 December 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 74. 397 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 13 December 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3. Delo 1, List 88. 398 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 58. 399 Ibid., 58-59; Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 179. 400 The full text of Tsar Alexander II‘s letter is included in Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 372-374.

186

Illustrations

Figure 1: A map of Bulgaria, with prominent towns and geographic features.401

Figure 2: An illustration from a Russian periodical just prior to the Russo-Turkish War. The caption reads, ―The peaceful visit of the Bashibazouks to a Bulgarian village.‖402

187

Figure 3: Bulgaria, according to the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.403

Figure 4: Tsar Alexander II404 Figure 5: Tsar Alexander III405

188

Figure 6: Delegates attending the Tarnovo Assembly of Notables in 1879. Stefan Stambolov is in the center, wearing the kalpak and with the number 10 on his suit.406

Figure 7: The Subranie building in Sofia. This is actually the second Subranie building, built in the 1880s, the first having been destroyed in a fire in 1883. The motto translates to ―Unity is Strength.‖407

189

Figure 8: Alexander von Battenberg408 Figure 9: N. K. Girs409

Figure 10: A. M. Donduk v-Kors kov410 Figure 11: Dmitriĭ Alekseevich Mil i tin411

190

Figure 12: Stefan Stambolov412 Figure 13: Petko Karavelov413

Figure 14: Dragan T sankov414 Figure 15: Konstantin Stoilov 415

191

Figure 16: Todor Burm v416 Figure 17: Gregor Nachovich417

Figure 18: Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth 418 Figure 19: Leonid Nikolayevich Sobolev 419

192

Figure 20: P tr Dmitrievich Parensov420 Figure 21: Mikha l Aleks ndrovich Khitrov 421

Figure 22: A contemporary caption describes this as a ―Volunteer Detachment of Schoolboys, 1885,‖ The second figure from the left would be a teacher. R. J. Crampton writes that ―Detachments such as these helped to secure the military victory against Serbia in 1885.‖422

193

Figure 23: A detailed map of Bulgaria, including the Vienna-Sofia-Constantinople railway.423

Figure 24: A depiction of Battenberg‘s removal from Sofia during the August Coup.424

194

Figure 25: A contemporary depiction of Prince Battenberg‘s first abdication.425

401 Crampton. Bulgaria, 40. 402 R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 82. 403 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 84. 404 The Di Rocco Wieler Private Collection, Toronto, Canada. 405 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de , after pg. 68, Plate 2. 406 Duncan M. Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1993), after pg. 66. 407 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 97. 408 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de after pg. 164, plate 5. 409 Ibid., after pg. 68, Plate 1. 410 "Portrety li ts, otlichivshikhs ia zaslugami i komandovavshikh deĭstvu iushchimi chast iami v voĭne 1853-1856 godov," Online collection at the New York Public Library at http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/collections/portrety- lits-otlichivshikhsia-zaslugami-i-komandovavshikh-dieistvuiushchimi#/?tab=about. 411 Portretna ia galere ia russkikh de iateleĭ: Tom 1: 100 portretov: s biografi iami. - V tipografii A. M iunstera, 1865. 412 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 107. 413 ―Petko Karavelov,‖ Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www.minfin.bg/en/page/99. 414 Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, after pg. 66. 415 ―Konstantin Stoilov,‖ Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www.minfin.bg/en. 416 ―Todor Burmov,‖ Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www.minfin.bg/en/page/102 417 ―Grigor Nachovich,‖ Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www.minfin.bg/en/page/98. 418 Author Unknown; exhibit of an exhibition on the life of the Prince of Battenberg (later Alexander I, Prince of Bulgaria), town hall, Bonn-Hardtberg, Germany, at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2010-03- 10_Kasimir_Ernrot_Exhibition_Bonn-Duisdorf.JPG. 419 ―Leonid Sobolev,‖ Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria, http://www.minfin.bg/en/page/101.

195

420 Author Unknown, Album "Pochetnite grazhdani na ," at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gen_Parensov.jpg. 421 Dimit"r Raĭkov, Dimit""r i Konstantin Miladinovi, at http://www.promacedonia.org/dr/dr_11b.htm. 422 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 101. 423 Ibid., 88. 424 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de , after pg. 164, plate 7. 425 Ibid., after pg. 164, plate 6.

196

Chapter 6: Assassination, Ultimatum, Coup, 1880-1881

The spring of 1880 seemed to herald a fresh start for Bulgaria after its first strife-filled year. There were new elections and a new National Assembly, with the wily old politician

Dragan T sankov at the helm. There were also new Russian agents, a new Russian Consul-

General, one Alekseĭ Mikhaĭlovich Kumani, and a new Minister of War, Lieutenant-General

Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth.xxii But while their tenure would begin quietly enough, it would end in early 1881 quite loudly.

The New Russians – Kumani and Ehrnrooth

Kumani arrived to replace Davydov on April 26th, 1880. Previously, he had served in the

Russian Embassies in Constantinople and Paris – later in life, he would also become Russia‘s

Ambassador to .426 By and large, he was a more ambiguous and restrained figure than

Davydov, who would leave far less of a mark on Russo-Bulgarian relations than either his predecessor or his immediate successor. Kumani disliked the Tarnovo Constitution, labeling it a poorly put-together ―magna carta,‖ but rather than going to any steps necessary to be rid of it, he preferred to let it remain until it could display its ―uselessness‖, in other words ―let it, so to speak, exhaust itself.‖427 Others‘ opinions of Kumani likewise ran the gamut. Parensov, whose tenure overlapped with Kumani‘s briefly, recalled him as an ―exemplary man, an expert in the

East and in the Slavic lands, and who, utterly unlike Davydov, curried the respect of all the exemplary Bulgarian patriots.‖428 Parensov further added that not only did Kumani not hesitate to make friends with the ―uncombed‖ (as Davydov had once put it) Karavelov, but Kumani also xxii Probably no other individual in the course of Russo-Bulgarian relations has had his name transliterated as many different ways as J. C. Ehrnrooth. He has been listed as Ehrenroth, Ernrot, Ernroth, and others. As he was a Finn, the Finnish spelling for his name is used, though a transliteration from the Russian would put it as rnrot.

197 befriended the very popular P. R. Slaveĭkov, who never wore either ties or starched clothes.429

On the other hand, when Stoilov was in Vienna in June of 1880, he was at a dinner with Prince

M. A. Kantakuzen and S. S. Tat shchev, senior figures in the Tsarist court. In his diary, Stoilov records how Tat shchev ―said a great deal against Kumani; he was an egoist, who always acted in his own personal interest.‖430 Certainly there were slanders of corruption against Kumani, but nothing that was ever proved.431

Kumani‘s military counterpart, Lieutenant-General Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth, on the other hand, would become one of the most significant figures in Russo-Bulgarian relations of the period. Although of Finnish origin, Ehrnrooth had a long and varied career in the Russian service, having served on the Russian General Staff and as a commander in the , in

Poland, and ultimately as the head of an infantry division in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, where he was wounded.432 He also had the ear of the Tsar. According to Stoilov, who was visiting St. Petersburg at this time, Girs was of the view that Battenberg ―should hold the War

Minister close, as the Tsar listens to him.‖433 He was clearly meant to be Russia‘s man in

Bulgaria. An illustration of this could be found in one of his early interactions with Battenberg, who was also in St. Petersburg when Ehrnrooth was being chosen for the job. Battenberg tried to persuade Ehrnrooth to pledge to obey his commands as he would the orders of the Tsar.

Ehrnrooth refused, being supported in this by Mil i tin, who termed Battenberg‘s desires

―childish‖ and stated that he himself would not have served under these conditions.434

In terms of politics, just as Kumani followed a different arc than his predecessor, so did

Ehrnrooth. Where Parensov had stood foursquare behind the Tarnovo Constitution, Ehrnrooth considered it an ill-chosen document from the very beginning. As Ehrnrooth would later write,

198 the Tarnovo Constitution ―with its all-powerful legislature, with its parliamentary games, and so forth, was inappropriate for Bulgaria; so I thought in 1881, so I think today [in 1886 .‖435 In his diary entry for March 6th, Stoilov recalled that in his first meeting with Ehrnrooth the latter said that: ―His Majesty… is outside the Constitution… [Mil i tin told him that he [Ehrnrooth] should play a political role; he should, so to say, be careful to act lawfully and constitutionally. This is impossible, Ehrnrooth said, because then he would soon have to resign; he is no friend to liberalism as he doesn‘t feel that we can solve the problems that interest us through it‖436

Overall, Ehrnrooth appears to have been a man who much preferred order and administrative efficiency, and had little time for the chaos of parliamentary politics, let alone the tempestuous struggles of the Bulgarian National Assembly.437

As a Finn, he was also quite emphatically not a Panslav – in fact, he later served as

Imperial Russia‘s Minister-Secretary of State for Finnish Affairs from 1888 to 1891, before asking to be removed from his post.438 Parensov, who was a Panslav, poured scorn in his memoirs both on Ehrnrooth‘s capabilities as a military man (relating anecdotes of Ehrnrooth‘s high-handed manner with the Bulgarian officers)439 and as a political figure, claiming he was pro-Austrian and writing in despair of how ―Ehrnrooth replaced me, a follower of Aks kov,

Khom iakov, Kireevskiĭ, apparently, by mistake and to the detriment of my homeland.‖440 In contrast, Ehrnrooth was quite nearly the only agent of the Russian crown for whom the staunchly

Russophobic Adolf Koch had a good word, writing that:

This officer at once made a very favourable impression on the Prince by his candour and sincerity… During the entire period of his ministry he proved himself to be a most honourable man, and a sterling character. He allowed no St. Petersburg undercurrent to influence him, maintained his independence in the face of the Government, and always acted according to his convictions. He was highly respected by the army, a first-rate soldier and a clever organizer… He always

199

showed consideration and due regard for Bulgarian officers, praise that cannot be given to all Russian Ministers of War. He was inexorably severe in his dealings with Russian officers, most of whom were left behind after the period of occupation and were simply the refuse of the Russian army.441

What cannot be argued was that Ehrnrooth was not an individual given to vacillation or irresolution. One of his first acts upon arriving in Bulgaria was to have those individuals convicted of atrocities against Bulgaria‘s Turkish minority publicly hanged.442

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – The Railroad Issue

The year of 1880 also saw the introduction of a new point of disagreement into

Bulgaria‘s internal politics and its relationship with its patron Great Power. This was the

Railroad Issue, or to be precise, the question of where and by whom Bulgaria‘s first railroads would be built.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, and indeed on through the early twentieth century, there was a great deal of interest in the construction of railroads through the Balkans and

Asia Minor, with the goal of linking Europe to the Near East. Both the Balkans and the old

Ottoman Empire offered new markets and new resources for the European economy, and so beginning in the 1860s, various financiers and diplomats started trying to establish railroads in the area. Among the most active of these financiers was Baron Maurice de Hirsch, the Austrian railway magnate, who in concert with the Austro-Hungarian government had received concessions from the Turks in the early 1870s to build railroads linking Vienna to Turkey.

Where those concessions dealt with the territory of Bulgaria, they devolved to the Principality as part of the Treaty of Berlin, binding the new state to honor all of the Ottomans‘ agreements regarding railways. But this was a less onerous requirement than one might initially think. A

200 railway linking Vienna and Constantinople by way of Sofia would have had considerable economic promise for Bulgaria as well, placing her on the central artery of a link between

Europe‘s ―industrial heart‖ and the Ottoman Empire. Bulgarian goods could then travel directly to central European markets.443

The difficulties arose when these cozy agreements between the Austrians and the

Bulgarians were interrupted by the Russians. A powerful investment concern controlled by

Baron Giuntsburg and S. Poliakov wished to build a different railroad in Bulgaria, one that would run from the Danube River near Ruschuk or Svishtov into Sofia, in stark competition to

Baron Hirsch‘s plans.444 The problem was that this proposed Sofia-Danube line had relatively little to offer the Bulgarians. It had a great deal of military promise for the Russians, who could shuttle troops into the area much more swiftly, but there just was not much in the way of possible trade to be had, a consequence of the similarity in the two areas‘ economies remarked upon earlier. It was in relation to the railways Baron Zhomini wrote to Girs on November 4th/16th,

1880, noting that he was unsurprised that the Bulgarians were unenthusiastic about the proposed railway, since Russia had ―nothing to buy or sell in Bulgaria.‖445 Furthermore, Zhomini pointed out that for all that it would have been of military advantage to Russia in any future conflict between the Tsar and the Sultan, it would have had the unenviable side-effect of turning Bulgaria into a battleground. 446

Since Russia was at the moment in the process of negotiating the Dreikaiserbund three- way alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and Austria-Hungary both greatly desired the

Vienna-Constantinople railroad and had the Treaty of Berlin on its side, the Russian government in St. Petersburg had no desire to get embroiled in such controversy. Normally this would have

201 been the end of the matter, since the possibility of alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary outweighed by far any meager benefits that the Danube line would provide. But the negotiations were kept in secret, and at no point did St. Petersburg issue any strong directives to its agents in

Bulgaria regarding how they should behave vis-à-vis the railroad issue.447

Complicating the situation still further was the fact that Baron Hirsch and Giuntsburg and

Poliakov were not the only consortiums interested in building railroads in Bulgaria. The Austro-

French Staatsbahn proposed a third possible line, from in via Tarnovo and

Shipka to the Rumelian border – a route not quite as friendly to Russia as the Giuntsburg and

Poliakov line, but still beneficial. More significant was the fourth and final group, which was a home-grown Bulgarian consortium backed by Ivan Nikolov Khadzhienov, the mayor of Sofia, and by the Conservative triumvirate of Stoilov, Grekov, and Nachovich.448 As might be expected of a matter involving four separate consortiums, two Great Powers, local party politics, the

Treaty of Berlin, and with economic, military, and political relevance, the Railroad Issue swiftly became excruciatingly complex.

It was into this field of battle that Kumani stepped forth, initially as a champion of the

Staatsbahn consortium. Through him, the Staatsbahn group first attempted to secure a loan from the Russian government, but this soon fell through. Kumani did manage to secure the assistance of Dragan T sankov, who much preferred a Russian railroad to an Austrian one, and had no particular interest in helping his political rivals in the Conservative party advance their own line.

In the summer of 1880, Austria-Hungary proposed a quadripartite meeting to be held about the

Treaty of Berlin, primarily on the railroad question. T sankov promptly consulted with Kumani, who suggested that the Bulgarian government hedge until he himself could consult with St.

202

Petersburg.449 The instructions from the Russian government, interestingly, only advised that the

Bulgarians attend the quadripartite meeting and plead poverty – there was no suggestion that they should dodge the Treaty of Berlin‘s obligations or focus on building the Danube (Russian) line.450 The view of the Russian state, it seemed, was that it would be a pleasant bonus for

Bulgaria to avoid building the Austrian line, but no more. In October, Karavelov, at this point

Minister of Finance in T sankov‘s government, visited Russia and consulted with Mil i tin, who wrote the following in his diary for October 7th, 1880:

Today I was visited in Livadia [Palace] by Karavelov—the Bulgarian Minister of Finance; he brought me a letter of recommendation from Prince Alexander and expressed the desire to consult with me on the question of the railroads in Bulgaria. I told him… that Bulgaria at the present time cannot even think about constructing any railroad; her finances will not allow her to approach such a crushing task… Karavelov cheered, hearing from these reasonings, and admitted that in Bulgaria up till now everyone was convinced in the desire of the Russian government to hurry the construction of a railroad from Svishtov to Tarnovo and further. This strange misunderstanding can be explained only by the personal obsessions of our diplomatic agent in Bulgaria Kumani, who clearly has taken under his patronage the aforementioned Franco-Austrian company.451

One observes that Mil i tin appears slightly confused in his railroad companies (it was the

Franco-Austrian Staatsbahn that Kumani supported, not Hirsch‘s group), but the more interesting point is that he does not consider it worthwhile to take action to stop Kumani.

Later in 1880, T sankov was replaced as Minister-President by Karavelov, who clearly took Mil i tin‘s advice to heart. The early years of the Principality were financially precarious, and to Karavelov, railroads were something of a luxury compared to the more basic necessities of schools and roads. There was also the fact that the railroad situation continued to grow ever more complex, and the Liberal Party was quite understandably loathe to come to a decision and thus antagonize all the other groups involved.452 In later part of 1880, Kumani shifted his support

203 from the Staatsbahn group to the Giuntsburg & Poliakov consortium. The Staatsbahn group, in turn, allied with Khadzhienov‘s local Bulgarian consortium in order to block him. Ehrnrooth also began to involve himself in the railroad business – as a Russian general, he preferred the Danube line for its military virtues, but preferred that it be built by Khadzhienov‘s group.453

The Railway Issue would drag on for years to come. It became a consistent kernel of disagreement between all the parties involved, most significantly serving as a wedge between the

Liberals and Kumani, but also between the Conservatives (who wanted their own railroad that they could benefit monetarily from) and Kumani. Ehrnrooth became so worked up over the situation that, as Stoilov records in his diary for November 28th, 1880, he threatened to resign after one bout of instructions received by Kumani made his ―situation untenable,‖ and had to be talked out of it by Battenberg and Stoilov.454 What is interesting is that this was a situation in which the Russian state could have resolved the problem simply by ordering its agents to drop the topic and allow the Austrian railroad to go through. The Dreikaiserbund negotiations would have been reason enough for this to occur. But this didn‘t happen, and indeed the Russian authorities would ward off the Bulgarians from coming to a final conclusion of the matter. In his diary entry for March 16th, 1881, Mil i tin met with Battenberg and ―warned him from any new traitorous efforts of the Austrians along with Hirsch to bamboozle the good-hearted

Bulgarians.‖455

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – Continuing Constitutional Crisis

Bulgarian political life remained rather exciting throughout 1880 and 1881, if not quite as explosively so as before. Dragan T sankov had been originally chosen under the idea that he was

204 the least offensive of the possible Liberal candidates for the leadership position, and the one who could best work with the Prince and with the Conservatives. Once he had been chosen, however, on March 24th / April 5th, 1880, T sankov proceeded to gain enemies at a rapid pace.456

First, T sankov managed to embroil himself in a conflict with the Bulgarian Exarchate when he ordered the annulment of all baptisms of Muslim children and all marriages of Muslim women to Christian men which had been carried out during the recent war. This was done under pressure from the Western Powers for greater religious toleration, but managed to infuriate the

Exarchate. T sankov then proceeded to exacerbate the situation by proposing a reorganization of the Church bureaucracy. By the time his bill reached the National Assembly in the fall of 1880,

T sankov was anathematized, and could now count the Bulgarian Exarchate among his enemies.

The Russian Holy Synod was also displeased, and the supervisor of the Synod, K. P.

Pobedon s tsev, was one of the most influential men in Russia, a close adviser and former tutor of the Imperial Heir, the future Tsar Alexander III. T sankov also managed to antagonize the other diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria, getting into an argument with the French over how much a French financial advisor should be paid; with the British over the Bulgarian failure to dismantle the old Turkish fortifications; and with the Austrians by first promising to support them in an effort to replace the European Danube Commission but then failing to do so. By

October 28th/November 9th, T sankov resigned from his position and was replaced by Petko

Karavelov.457

In some ways, Karavelov was more restrained in his actions, focusing on putting

Bulgaria‘s finances into order and conceding to Battenberg authority over the appointment of

Ministers, something which T sankov had contested. But in other ways he was just as dangerous

205 to the Conservatives. He took actions to exclude Conservative delegates from the National

Assembly, or else simply forbidding them from speaking, and in November of 1880 put forward a legislation that would have given a Karavelov Cabinet, and a Karavelov Cabinet only, the ability to act without the National Assembly being in session. Adding to the strained atmosphere was a series of schemes for radical constitutional changes (including triennial parliaments, ministerial elections, and constitutional reviews, which together would have rendered Battenberg a figurehead at best) which were published in the Liberal newspaper Nezavisimost. They lacked formal Liberal approval, but the fact that the Nezavisimost was the main party newspaper gave them a veneer of official support.458

As if this were not enough, the Principality had problems quite separate from upper-level politics. The country was suffering from the economic dislocations that came with suddenly being cut off from their old Ottoman markets and from the sudden introduction of cheap Western goods.459 Likewise, there was a major problem with bandits and brigands throughout the country

– in April/May, 1880 there was an outright battle near the village of Belibe (Bulair), and in June the wife of General M. D. Sk belev, a Russian war hero globally famous for his exploits in

Central Asia and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, was murdered while travelling through

Bulgaria. Though Ehrnrooth was able to tamp down on the problem, it still showed that the situation in Bulgaria was far from settled.460

No one was happy with this situation, and the Tarnovo Constitution which had set up the current power arrangement came in for most of the blame. On October 6th, 1880, Stoilov recorded a conversation with T sankov in his diary:

Long talks with T sankov on the situation. We don‘t live politically; we vegetate; chaos; the ministry has no ideas, no plan; hasn‘t got the strength to take

206

on a single responsibility, especially in complicated times as might come next spring; this ministry personnel can‘t take any action; is not trustworthy…461

Battenberg continued to be upset about the Tarnovo Constitution, Stoilov noting on October 19th,

1880, that for instance ―His Highness is greatly overwrought. Again the Constitutional question.‖462 But most significantly, Ehrnrooth, never a fan of the Tarnovo Constitution, was coming out increasingly against it. On October 31st, Battenberg relayed to Stoilov how he had met with Ehrnrooth, and how the Minister of War had told him that ―the Constitution is impossible.‖463 Even the dedicated politician Stoilov had enough, telling Ehrnrooth the following

February that he intended to resign from his post as Battenberg‘s secretary, so poorly did the newspapers treat him.464

By the close of 1880, Bulgaria was slowly drifting towards some kind of constitutional crisis. Battenberg himself expressed his feelings most eloquently to his chaplain, telling Koch that:

This very last session has again clearly proved to me that the present Constitution is not suited to the country… The nation suffers under it… Count Miljutin upbraided me on the occasion of my last stay in St. Petersburg because I had not made a sufficiently long attempt to govern by means of the Constitution. He can no longer address such a reproach to me. I have made yet another earnest endeavor. I have borne everything, and am ready to bear still further, but I do not see how I am to comply with Russia‘s demands and wishes… 465

Clearly, the situation was not stable, though it is also relevant to note that Battenberg‘s

Russophobia was by now in full flower, as he further claimed ―a Russian party of underground intriguers is hidden behind the opposition that I encounter.‖466 Yet Tsar Alexander II had advised that Battenberg attempt to govern by the Tarnovo Constitution, and so for the moment the Prince was stuck. Something would have to shift the situation.

207

Assassination

On March 1st/13th, 1881, the Russian terrorist organization Narodnaya Volya (People‘s

Will) assassinated Tsar Alexander II. It was an act that would have immense repercussions for

Russia and for Eastern Europe, but for the purposes of the history of Russo-Bulgarian relations, it was relevant in two ways above all else.

In the long run, the death of the Tsar robbed Prince Alexander von Battenberg of his last great ally at the Russian Court (his aunt having died the previous year). Despite all of

Battenberg‘s troubles with Shepelev, Parensov, and Kumani, Prince Battenberg was still fond of his Imperial uncle, and the feeling was apparently mutual. When Alexander II remarried shortly after the death of Empress Maria Alexandrovna, Battenberg wrote to his father begging him to forgive the Tsar, expressing pity for the ―unfortunate man [who must be the unhappiest creature alive… Forgive him, dear Papa.‖467 Battenberg‘s animosity was reserved for Tsar Alexander‘s advisors, never for the Tsar himself. But this situation would change now that Battenberg‘s cousin, Alexander III, was Emperor and Autocrat of all the . The two cousins had never been particularly close, and Alexander III had much stronger anti-German sensibilities than his father, both of which bode poorly for the German Battenberg. xxiii Compounding these ill omens was the fact that Alexander III, though willing to listen to N. K. Girs‘s moderate advice on matters of import, was nevertheless a Panslav by instinct, a fact generally known at the time.468

In the short term, the death of Tsar Alexander II led to a sudden and sharp backlash against not just the Russian terrorists such as Narodnaya Volya, but any groups or organizations that bore even a faint similarity to them, including the Bulgarian Liberals. Though the Liberals xxiii The fact that Alexander III was married to the Empress Maria Feodorovna, formerly Princess Dagmar of , may well have been a contributing factor to Alexander III‘s anti-German feelings. The Danes had been roundly defeated and lost significant territory to what was then Prussia in the Second Schleswig War of 1864.

208 promptly denounced the murder and praised the Tsar-Liberator‘s memory in their newspaper,

Nezavisimost, rumors spread by Conservatives ensured that there was the feeling that the Liberal

Party was close kin to the terrorists of Narodnaya Volya.469 Matters were worsened when the newspaper Rabotnik, published in Ruschuk (modern-day Ruse) and aligned with the Liberals, published a letter by ―an educated worker‖ which regretted the assassination but hoped that it would lead to reform in Russia – this was widely interpreted, in the near-hysterical atmosphere of Sofia at the time, as support for the assassination.470

It was in this atmosphere that Prince Alexander von Battenberg made hurried arrangements to go to St. Petersburg. Instead of appointing Minister-President Karavelov as regent, Battenberg made the entire Cabinet (including Ehrnrooth) joint regents – a sign of his lack of faith in Karavelov. Then Battenberg left for St. Petersburg the very same day as the assassination. The city and the Russian Court were in chaos at the time, but Battenberg could clearly see that the atmosphere in Russia had taken a sharp step to the right, and there was very little sympathy for liberalism, democracy, or the left. Battenberg was received by the new Tsar

Alexander III, and managed to obtain a private conference where he put forth his complaints about the Tarnovo Constitution to Alexander III and to Girs. The Prince wanted to undertake some kind of alteration of the Constitution – and since this was impossible through the legal channels established at Tarnovo, this meant that Battenberg was asking permission for a coup.

There are no detailed accounts of the conversation, but as C. E. Black puts it, ―the most authoritative reports agree that the Prince did not receive specific permission to violate the

Constitution.‖471 Alexander III and Girs were perfectly willing to agree that the Tarnovo

209

Constitution was a deeply unsatisfactory document, but their sympathy did not change the fact that Russia‘s official position remained that the Constitution should be maintained.472

This point is extremely important, and should be reiterated. The position of the Russian

Empire was that the Tarnovo Constitution should be maintained. The Constitution had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin, and for Russia to support a coup would be to risk the criticism and censure of the other Great Powers – something that the Russian Empire, in its presently weakened state, could little afford. This was the position laid out in Tsar Alexander II‘s letter of December 16th / 28th, 1879,473 and supported by Mil iutin‘s letters and telegrams to

General Parensov.474 Furthermore, this was not a secret or obscure political position – it was widely known in Sofia. Adolf Koch records a monologue where Battenberg refers to Russia‘s insistence that he maintain the Tarnovo Constitution, 475 and Stoilov records in his diary a conversation where Davydov, as staunch an opponent of the Tarnovo Constitution as anyone, tells him that the ―Russia cannot and does not have the right to so interfere.‖476 And the assassination of Tsar Alexander II did nothing to change this. About a month after the assassination, on April 8/20th, 1881, Girs wrote a set of instructions for Kumani‘s replacement as

Russian Consul-General in Sofia, Mikha l Aleks ndrovich Khitrovó. In them, he wrote that ―Any attempt to change the state of affairs as they exist at present in Bulgaria through a constitutional reform should be made with extreme prudence and by legal means.‖477 In other words, the

Russian support for the Tarnovo Constitution was about as unambiguous a foreign policy as one could hope for. This makes what greeted Battenberg on his return to Sofia all the more interesting.

210

Ultimatum

On the evening of April 16th, 1881, Battenberg returned to Sofia.478 He discovered

Ehrnrooth in an absolute uproar, the immediate cause of which appears to have been information received by the Minister of War that the Liberals were planning to manipulate the upcoming elections for district councils. Whether or not they were in fact planning to do so is difficult to say at this remove, but in light of later Bulgarian electoral proceedings the accusation is plausible and certainly Ehrnrooth believed it.xxiv,479 On April 18th, Battenberg relayed the conversation to

Stoilov, who recorded the following in his diary:

His Majesty told me that the war minister was with him for four hours yesterday. They spoke for a long time and [Ehrnrooth] told the Prince that His Majesty cannot stay the way he has been hitherto now; he must immediately find a solution to the situation [of the Constitution]. He showed him a document he had on the elections to the district councils, and a Slaveikov telegram about the Turks; he demanded that Slaveikov must be removed immediately; His Majesty must, via a proclamation, declare he can‘t support this system anymore; must form his own government, to clear up the situation for the people, so everyone knows what is at stake i.e. that it is not about choosing between the Constitution and the Prince but between the Prince and chaos; the Great National Assembly, which should convene in about three months in Svishtov, must decide either for the Prince, and then he will govern for 7 or 5 years without a constitution… or if that doesn‘t pass, there is no point in him [Ehrnrooth] staying; His Majesty should immediately annul the elections for district councilors; must do everything he can for free elections; can appoint military governors, so the people can have their say and the elections to not be falsified; to form a type of state council, with the help of which to govern, as parliamentary governance until now has been a real game. His Majesty advised me to talk with the war minister. All of this moved me. I once again got courage and excitement for the work, because this is the only way to point the people to its future and its fate. This is a highly patriotic decision and is very important, as the Prince is wagering his own crown. This however

xxiv Adolf Koch gave a rather different explanation for Ehrnrooth‘s upset. According to him, a report had reached the War Minister that Karavelov had attended a dinner at the Hotel Odessa in Sofia, where he had toasted the assassins of Tsar Alexander II. Given what is known of Karavelov‘s personal and political proclivities, and in light of the fact that the only accounts of the dinner come from staunchly anti-Liberal sources during a time of near-hysteria over Nihilist terrorists, one should take this accusation with an extraordinarily large grain of salt. Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 47, 87.

211

shows his character and his honesty. I told His Majesty my concerns. Among other things, I told him we should have a different constitution.480

Pursuant to Battenberg‘s instructions, Stoilov then went to Ehrnrooth to discuss the matter further. Of his meeting with Ehrnrooth, Stoilov wrote:

I was at the war minister‘s, who told me his whole plan… The war minister is against a new constitution. Every constitution can take down a government, everything will then fall on the constitution and the Prince. The Prince should have extraordinary powers for a few years, to be able to create a new order. This constitution can exist. After this time of extraordinary powers we will see how things are and then we can grant a new constitution.‖481

Clearly, Battenberg and Stoilov required very little urging to overthrow the Tarnovo Constitution and install a monarchical dictatorship. But the important point here is that the impetus for finally getting rid of the Tarnovo Constitution despite Russia‘s position on the matter came not from

Battenberg, but from Lieutenant-General Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth, the military agent of Russia itself.482

As we can see, Battenberg did not need much time to mull over Ehrnrooth‘s ultimatum.

To begin with, of course, Battenberg had his own long-standing antipathy to the Tarnovo

Constitution. But neither was Ehrnrooth‘s threat to resign toothless. Over the course of his tenure in Sofia, Ehrnrooth had established himself as Battenberg‘s closest ally in the Bulgarian government. In February, 1881, Battenberg had told the British representative Frank C. Lascelles that Ehrnrooth was ―most loyal‖ and that without Ehrnrooth, Battenberg ―would not have been able to oppose the will of the chamber.‖483 When one adds to this the shift in opinion in St.

Petersburg, then Battenberg‘s decision becomes increasingly clear.

212

Coup

The next step was to arrange the coup. Most of the actual work was conducted by a small circle of plotters consisting of Battenberg, Ehrnrooth, and some of the leading Conservatives, including Stoilov, Nachovich, Grekov, and Burm v.484

What is interesting is that during this period Ehrnrooth did not take steps to inform St.

Petersburg of just what was going on in Russia‘s Balkan client-state. In his own account published a few years later, Ehrnrooth stated that once the crisis had become inevitable, but before Battenberg had returned, the general had informed the Russian state by way of K. N.

Lishin, the temporary diplomatic agent in Bulgaria between Kumani and Khitrovó. In his own words, however ―it would seem that this didn‘t particularlu interest‖ St. Petersburg. Later on, once the coup had been decided upon, Ehrnrooth claimed to have been unable to communicate with Russia. He did not maintain constant communication with St. Petersburg about political matters, and as such he claimed to not have had the appropriate ciphers. Therefore, ―worrying, before anything else, about keeping my intentions secret until the time to act came, I did not find it convenient to inform [St. Petersburg of my intentions] through the means of the diplomatic agency in Sofia, and I had in this my reasons.‖485 Consequently, Alexander III, Girs, and Mil i tin had no idea that a coup was in the offing.

Just how truthful Ehrnrooth is in his explanation for his silence is questionable.

Ehrnrooth‘s successor, Lieutenant-General Leonid Nikolaevich Sobolev, a man with his own axes to grind, stated that he was ―unable to read without amazement‖ Ehrnrooth‘s statement above.486 Certainly the possibility should be considered that Ehrnrooth, being aware of Russia‘s position on the Tarnovo Constitution, preferred not to risk a negative reaction – essentially

213 deciding that it is better to ask for forgiveness rather than permission, and opting to present

Russia with a fait accompli. Yet the fact of the matter was that regardless of how one looks at it, something had failed in the Russian apparatus for the situation to come to pass. Either Ehrnrooth found himself unable to trust his communications with Russia, or he found it to his advantage to keep St. Petersburg uninformed about his actions. Either explanation casts the Russian Empire in a poor light.

So it was that St. Petersburg was thoroughly surprised when on April 27th/May 9th,

1881, Alexander von Battenberg announced the dismissal of the Karavelov government and the creation of a new ministry under Ehrnrooth, who would be Minister President, Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Interior all at once.xxv On May 11th/23rd, Battenberg

xxv The text of the proclamation is reproduced in Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 90-91.

Bulgarians,--It is two years since it has pleased God to confide the destinies of Bulgaria to me by the unanimous voice of its people. Obedient to the wishes and advice of our deliverer, my uncle, yet not without hesitation and mature deliberation, I resolved, in submission to the will of a Divine Providence, to devote my life to the work of leading Bulgaria towards the accomplishment of the task that history has prescribed to her. I, therefore, took the government of the country in hand, and worked towards this object as well as I could, with sincere devotion. In the course of two years I have caused every possible endeavor for the organization and orderly development of the principality to be made, but they have all disappointed my expectations, and to-day our fatherland is more than ever discredited abroad, and disorganized internally. This state of affairs has rudely shaken the nation‘s belief in justice, and has inspired it with fears for the future. Bulgarians! I have sworn an oath to the Constitution. I have kept this oath and will keep it to the end. This oath demands of me that I should hold the laws and the Constitution of the principality inviolate, but obliges me at the same time to keep the happiness and well-being of the land before my eyes in all my actions. On this account, therefore, I hold it a sacred duty to explain solemnly to my people that the present state of affairs in the principality makes it impossible for me to fulfill my duties. Basing my action on my constitutional rights, I have determined to convene the Grand National Assembly, the highest exponent of the people‘s will, as speedily as may be, in order to replace my crown and the destiny of Bulgaria in its hands. I have authorized my War Minister Ernroth to form a new Ministry for the purpose of maintaining peace and order and of securing for the population the time necessary for them to comprehend and consider, in all its bearings, the decision they are about to make, and also of assuring the complete freedom and impartiality of their choice. It will be of a provisional character, and remain in office only until the meeting of the Grand National Assembly.

214 proposed a series of constitutional changes, including being given full powers for seven years, a smaller and weaker National Assembly, a stark reduction in civil liberties, and the institution of a new, powerful Council of State. A Grand National Assembly was called, but through the use of force and intimidation, Battenberg and Ehrnrooth ensured that the vote was thoroughly lopsided.

Liberal meetings were broken up by club-wielding mobs, and the offices of Nezavisimost were attacked.487

The Russian government was caught completely off guard. In his diary for May 1st, 1881,

Mil i tin wrote that there was ―…a strange and utterly unexpected coup in Bulgaria. One could always expect from Battenberg some risky measure… but no one could have thought that such a decision would be forced upon him by our own Russian general, Ehrnrooth.‖488 Now however, it was time for the Russian state to take a stand, and while the co p d’ had taken place contrary to Russia‘s preferences, there was a great deal of sympathy for Battenberg‘s struggles with the liberals in the wake of Alexander II‘s assassination. Mil i tin noted as much when he went on to write in his diary that ―Although the coup in Bulgaria was conceived and carried out without the knowledge of the government and even contrary to our advice, at the same time one cannot deny that even our monarch, like many others around, in their souls will approve the decisiveness of the Bulgarian prince.‖489 Much as in the run-up to the Russo-Turkish War, official Russian policy was one thing, but unofficial Russian sympathy was quite another.

In the event of the Assembly approving the conditions, to be more accurately indicated later, which I consider indispensable for the government and the want of which is the fundamental evil of our present state, then, and only then, can I continue to wear the crown of Bulgaria and discharge my heavy responsibilities in the sight of God and posterity. Should it not do so, I am prepared to renounce the throne, with regret certainly, but with the consciousness that I have fulfilled my duty to the end. -Alexander

215

Ultimately it fell to the new Tsar to decide what to do about the coup. N. K. Girs offered to Alexander III a pair of reports, one from Lishin and one from Colonel A. A. Shepelev, now in

Vienna. Shepelev wrote a lengthy analysis on April 28th/May 10th, immediately after the coup was proclaimed. He argued that Battenberg‘s new order could only be maintained through the use of the army, and that as the army was staffed by Russian officers, this would put Russia on the side of Bulgarian despotism and against the Bulgarian people, which would have severe repercussions for Russia‘s prestige in Bulgaria and in the Balkans at large. Shepelev therefore recommended that Ehrnrooth be recalled post-haste, as a sign of Russian disapproval.490 Lishin, meanwhile, argued that Battenberg was entirely correct to give the people a choice between the

Prince and the Liberal Party, and further argued that the latter were basically a Western or

Russian-educated intelligentsia with nothing in common with the Bulgarian population as a whole, filled with ―great hopes and even greater pretensions.‖ Lishin, in essence, argued for the support of Battenberg.491

Having read both reports, Alexander III wrote upon Shepelev‘s that ―I never believed

Shepelev and always considered him a harmful man and with very suspicious tendencies,‖ while on Lishin‘s he wrote ―A very clear picture and I am convinced an absolutely correct one.‖

Alexander III‘s freshly-inflamed distaste for liberalism won out handily over his suspicion of

Germans such as Battenberg, and as a consequence, Russia approved of Battenberg‘s .

In all likelihood, this was the decision Girs had been aiming for when he had coupled the two reports together so.492 Girs, more so than Alexander III, was aware of the probable reactions of

Russia‘s neighbors. The negotiations for the Dreikaiserbund were still ongoing, and Girs had reason to worry that if Russia refused to back Battenberg, the Bulgarian situation would explode

216 anew, and that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron Heinrich Karl von Haymerle, who was fond of Battenberg, might refuse to continue the negotiations. Furthermore, there was a definite chance that the other Great Powers would step in to meddle in Balkan affairs. No, it was better for Russia if Battenberg‘s coup could be maintained as an internal affair.493 In the end,

Russia gave its full support to Ehrnrooth‘s and Battenberg‘s May Coup.

Conclusion – The Break with the Liberals

The problem was that as valid as Girs‘s foreign policy considerations were, Shepelev was also correct. Up until this point, notwithstanding the minor squabbles with Parensov and Kumani and Davydov, the Russian state had been relatively consistent in its larger goals. The Imperial

Court stood behind the Tarnovo Constitution, and maintained reasonably positive relations with the Liberal party, which one should remember was by far the majority party. Along with the geopolitical realities valued by Realists and Liberal IR scholars and the shared identity emphasized by Constructivists, this was enough to maintain broadly friendly diplomatic relations.

The coup in 1881 burned those bridges to the Liberal Party with devastating thoroughness. Outside observers saw Battenberg launch a coup to overturn the Tarnovo

Constitution and defy the Liberals with the loyal assistance of Lieutenant-General Ehrnrooth, and with the approval of the Russian state. Those attuned to the Sofia gossip networks, further, heard that it was Ehrnrooth that had initiated the coup in the first place by presenting Battenberg with an ultimatum. This was a stunning betrayal of the Liberals, and a far more significant act than any of Parensov‘s squabbles over titles or military officers, or Kumani‘s railroad-related

217 shenanigans. As T sankov wrote, soon the Bulgarians would have to tell the Russians ―the words with which the ancient sage addressed a bee, ‗I want neither your honey nor your sting‘.‖494 In other words, please leave us be.

Furthermore, it quite drastically narrowed the Russian state‘s field of action. Previously, the Russian Empire had essentially three courses of action available to it in Bulgaria. They could support the National Assembly and the Liberals, they could support Battenberg and the

Conservatives, or they could remain aloof. The Russian agents in Bulgaria never actually settled on a single option, but they remained open. Now however, the Russian Empire was inextricably bound to Battenberg and the Conservatives. The Liberals were no longer an option, and remaining aloof was going to be much more difficult now that Ehrnrooth had overthrown the government. For better or worse, the coup tied Russia‘s influence in Bulgaria to the fate of a personal, authoritarian regime headed up by the now-24-year-old Alexander von Battenberg.

Girs was likely correct that embracing the coup was Russia‘s best option, but it wasn‘t a particularly good option.

What makes it all the more peculiar is that the reason the Russian Empire was put into this ticklish situation was because Ehrnrooth presented his own government with a fait accompli.

It was Ehrnrooth who pushed Battenberg into the coup, despite Russia‘s really quite clear preference for maintaining the Tarnovo Constitution, and it was Ehrnrooth who opted not to inform the Tsar or his Ministers about the coming change in the Bulgarian government. While

Bulgaria‘s strife-ridden internal politics and the Tarnovo Constitution‘s own weakness may well have led to some manner of crisis sooner or later, it is Ehrnrooth who bears the primary responsibility for the Coup of 1881.

218

The Coup did not lead to the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations on its own, but it definitely weakened Russia‘s position. And this occurred because one of Russia‘s own agents in

Bulgaria decided to ignore his country‘s position and keep his government in the dark about it until it was too late.

426 Simeon Radev, Pantelej Zarev, and Statelova, oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij (Sofija: Bălgarski pisatel, 1990), 1:199-202, 803; also Ocherki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, Appendix, 21. 427 S. D Skazkin, Kone o-russko-ge m n kogo o i i ledo nie po i o ii ko-ge m n kikh i ko- i kikh o no heni i i o ochnym op o om -e gody I ole i i (Moskva: Nauka, 1974), 266 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 65. 428 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXI, 439. 429 Ibid., CXXXI, 439. 430 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 1 June 1880, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 61 to 62. 431 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 55. 432 Golos, No. 5, April 3, 1880 in Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXIV, 39. 433 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 22 February 1880, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 41. 434 Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, 81-82 and Hajek, Bulgariens Befreiung und Staatliche Entwicklung unter seinem ersten Fursten, 174-175, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism , 64. 435 Johann Casimir Gustavovich Ehrnrooth, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii‖ (Of the Recent History of Bulgaria), k i in , LII (1886), 478. 436 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 6 March 1880, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 47 to 48. 437 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 183. 438 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXI, 440. 439 Ibid., CXXXIV, 45. 440 Ibid., CXXXI, 440-441. 441 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 41. 442 Karel Durman, Lost Illusions: Russian Policies towards Bulgaria in 1877-1887, Upsala Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, no. 1 (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, distributed by Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1988), 74. 443 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 23-24; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 66-69; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 109. 444 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 68-69. 445 Zhomini to Girs, St. Petersburg, 4 November 1880, in Ibid., 69. 446 Zhomini to Girs, St. Petersburg, 4 November 1880, in Ibid., 69. 447 Ibid., 69-71. 448 Ibid., 71. 449 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 265-266. 450 Zhomini to Girs, NKG, Aug 25, Oct 3, 1880; Girs to Zhomini, NKG, Livadia, Oct. 25, Nov 11, 1880; in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 72. 451 Mil iutin and Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in , 3:276-277. 452 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 72. 453 Ibid., 72-73; Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 271. 454 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 24 November 1880, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 96 to 97. 455 Mil iutin and Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in , 3:42. 456 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 64. 457 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 47-50. 458 Ibid., 50-51. 459 Ibid., 51.

219

460 Ibid., 45, 51. 461 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 6 October 1880, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 84. 462 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 19 October 1880, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 86. 463 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 31 October 1880, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 90. 464 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 23 February 1881, TsDA Fond 600k, Opis 3, Delo 3, List 23. 465 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 71-72. 466 Ibid., 72. 467 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 270. 468 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 74; Tsar Alexander III‘s Panslavism has been mentioned earlier, in conjunction with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. 469 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 53. 470 Ruschuk Rabotnik [Worker], No. 14 (March 1/13, 1881), cited in D. Marinov, Stefan Stambolov i noveishata niistoriya (Letopisni spomeni i ocherki) [Stefan Stambolov and our recent history (Chronological memoirs and sketches)] (Sofia, 1909), 157, used in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 194; Cramption, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 53. 471 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 192. 472 Ibid., 193-194; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 74-75; Cramption, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 53. 473 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 372-374. 474 Telegram of Mil i tin to Parensov, December 1st, 1879, in Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXII, 619. 475 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 71-72. 476 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 25 November 1879, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 1, List 60. 477 Girs to Khitrovó, 8/20 April 1881, in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 192. 478 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 16 April 1881, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 3, List 43. 479 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 18 April, 1881, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 43 to 44. 480 Ibid. 481 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 19 April 1881, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 44. 482 This course of events is also supported by Adolf Koch (Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 87) and by Stephan Burián von Rajecz, the Austrian consul in Sofia at the time (Burián to Haymerle, H. H. S., XV. 18, No 10, Sofia, May 5, 1881 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria , 195). 483 Lascelles to Granville, FO, 78/3308, no 11, Sofia, Feb 10, 1881 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 76. 484 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 21 April 1881, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 3, List 48. 485 Ehrnrooth, ―K Noveishei Istorii Bolgarii,‖ 477. 486 Ibid., 480. 487 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 53-55. 488 Mil iutin and Zaĭonchkovskiĭ, Dne nik D Mil i in , 4:66. 489 Ibid. 490 Ibid., 4:72; Skazkin 243-244 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 79-80. 491 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 244 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 80- 81. 492 Ibid. 493 Girs to M. de Fenton, HHS, X 70, St. Petersburg, June 11, 1881; Kalnoky to Haymerle, HHS, X 70, no. 34B, St. Petersburg, June 4/16, 1881; Wyndham to Granville, FO, 65/1113, no. 347, St. Petersburg, June 29, 1881; Trauttenberg to Haymerle, HHS, X 70, 39A, vertraulich, St. Petersburg, July 1/13, 1881, all in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 83-84. 494 Ilcho Dimitrov, , Knostitutsiyata I Narodut. Iz istoriyata na politicheskite borbi v Bulgariya prez purvite godini sled osvobozhdenieto, 76 in Crampton, Bulgaria, 108.

220

Chapter 7: Simmering Resentment, 1881-1882

Following Battenberg and Ehrnrooth‘s coup, the situation in Bulgaria was changed from top to bottom once again. New elections for a Grand National Assembly to change the constitution were held in June. The Tsar‘s open support for the coup, the Russian officers at every polling booth ―to prevent fraud‖ and ―to aid illiterates‖ and the gangs of h k djii (armed thugs) ensured a positive response.495 Konstantin Irechek wrote that the voting must have gone well in the town of as ―only three people were badly beaten.‖496 A new Constitution was written in the town of Svishtov, which gave Battenberg enormous power for the next seven years, created a new authority, the State Council, to exercise executive power, curtailed civil liberties, and reduced both the size of the National Assembly and made them elected by indirect franchise. A number of prominent Liberals, including Karavelov and Slaveĭkov, made a hasty exit and fled to Eastern Rumelia. Others, such as T sankov, remained in Bulgaria.xxvi After spending his first years in constant struggle with the Liberals, now Battenberg had a chance to rule as he wished.

Observers were not optimistic. The Austrian consul, Stephan Burián von Rajecz, wryly noted in October of 1881 that ―the Assembly of Svishtov was able to create a dictatorship, but not a dictator.‖497 Lascelles, the British consul, echoed this sentiment, as the British Foreign

Secretary reported to Queen Victoria, saying that ―Mr. Lascelles‘ opinion, which of course cannot be communicated to the Prince, is that the latter, though of high character and with great charm, has not the experience or the capacity for taking the whole burden of Government upon xxvi All of the Liberals planned an eventual return to power in Bulgaria. T sankov believed it was possible to work inside the Principality, while the more radical exiles believed more forceful measures were necessary – as Slaveĭkov memorably put it, ―You cannot dig wells with needles.‖ Ilcho Dimitrov, Knyaz, Knostitutsiyata I Narodut. Iz istoriyata na politicheskite borbi v Bulgariya prez purvite godini sled osvobozhdenieto, 180 in Crampton, Bulgaria, 109.

221 himself. Mr. Lascelles thinks it would soon be a mass of intrigue.‖498 The Conservative

Bulgarian politician Todor Ikonomov, for his part, thought that Battenberg would have been a sterling monarch in a more stable and well-established state, but that he simply wasn‘t up to dealing with the situation in Bulgaria.499

Events would prove Burián‘s, Lascelles‘s, and Ikonomov‘s evaluation correct.

Battenberg‘s personal regime would be a failure, largely because of his inability to reconcile the

Conservatives and the Russian agents in Bulgaria. There was a new Russian Consul-General coming to Bulgaria, Mikha l Aleks ndrovich Khitrovó, and Ehrnrooth was recalled soon after the

Svishtov Assembly, replaced by Colonel Vladimir Vasilievich Krilov as Minister of War. A new man, Colonel Arnold Aleksandrovich von Remlingen, became the Minister of Interior.500

The New Russians – Khitrovó and Remlingen

During the period immediately after the Svishtov Assembly, Minister of War Krilov would prove to be a minor figure. Koch recalled him as a respectable older gentleman, tired but honorable, though in truth Krilov was only three years older than Ehrnrooth. He did little of note for Russo-Bulgarian relations.501 The same could not be said for Khitrovó and Remlingen.

Remlingen was another veteran of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and like Ehrnrooth was not actually a Russian himself, being rather a Baltic German from the Island of Osel (today called Saaremaa and a part of ).502 Unfortunately for Russia, he would continue the trend from Parensov‘s day of being a singularly undiplomatic individual. Adolf Koch, who otherwise held fond memories of Remlingen, admitted that he was ―uncouth and clumsily brusque… he certainly thought he was merely impartial, but he was unjust and impolitic.‖503 This evaluation

222 was echoed by Stoilov, who referred to Remlingen‘s actions in office as being ―highly tactless,‖ even before Remlingen got into squabbles with the Conservatives.504

Mikha l Aleks ndrovich Khitrovó was by far the dominant personality of the Russian agents in Sofia. He was an experienced diplomatic hand of the Asiatic Department of the Russian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having served tours in Montenegro and Serbia. He was also well connected by virtue of being a relative of Count Dm triĭ Andr evich Tolst ĭ, the Russian

Minister of Interior and one of the most powerful statesmen in Russia.505 He was a dedicated

Panslav and a member of the Slavic Benevolent Societies, someone whom Parensov called

―widely known and popular among the Balkan Slavs.‖506 In terms of reputation, he was considered a very intelligent individual, very charming, but unreliable and capricious – Stoilov wrote in his diary that Khitrovó was an inconstant man, prone to rapid changes of mood.507 He was also quite notably unscrupulousxxvii – when Khitrovó was later the Russian Ambassador to

Romania, he supposedly said the following to the French Ambassador, that ―I do not understand all the scruples of diplomacy of our time. It is unfortunate that today's diplomats do not have their hands free like in the fifteenth century, when dagger and poison were allowed.‖508 For

Khitrovó, politics was an art he practiced with a gusto.

Initially, Khitrovó‘s brief was to demonstrate Russian support for the coup – no sooner had he arrived in Bulgaria, than he was ordered to accompany Battenberg on a pan-Bulgarian tour. In theory, he was to act as Battenberg‘s advisor, but in truth he was to act as a visible sign of Russia‘s support for the Prince.509 Very soon, however, Khitrovó took a stand against

Battenberg and in favor of the now-vanquished Liberals and the Tarnovo Constitution. In 1882,

Khitrovó explained his reasoning as follows: xxvii His reputation was oddly appropriate for his name, given that Khitrovó in Russian means a cunning person.

223

The Prince is used to the certainty that he can force our Imperial Government to do everything that he likes, acting upon us through the use of a fait accompli…xxviii Until the moment comes when the Prince loses that belief, the cabinet… will not have a moment of peace: our politics will always have to be ready to run after the most unexpected outbursts, after the most unforeseeable events.510

Khitrovó saw it as his duty to disabuse Battenberg of the notion that he could expect unflinching

Russian support, come what may. In this, he was supported by Remlingen.

Russo-Bulgarian Controversies – Elections, Newspapers, Railroads, and other Troubles

The first minor crisis came about regarding the formation of a Council of State. The

Council, devised by Stoilov and the Conservative politician Dr. Georgi V"lkovich, would be one of the main organs for Battenberg to control the government. All bills submitted to the legislature would have to first be reviewed by the Council, among other functions. There would be twelve councilors, four selected by Battenberg directly, the other eight chosen from a list of twenty, the list being determined by a vote.511 It was here that Remlingen and Khitrovó chose to intervene, seeing this as a good place to get some Liberal counterweights to the Conservative domination of the government – Remlingen had earlier opened negotiations with T sankov in an effort to lure the Liberals back under the Russian wing. As Minister of Interior, Remlingen was directly responsible for overseeing Bulgarian elections, and with, as C. E. Black put it, ―considerable juggling of the returns‖ was able to introduce five Liberals into the final slate of possible

Councilors. The Conservatives were outraged, and a lengthy controversy over the verification of election results ensued, which tarnished the images of both the Russians and the

Conservatives.512

xxviii A reference to Battenberg‘s 1881 coup.

224

Remlingen‘s actions were effectively a declaration of war against the Conservatives, and they responded as one might expect. They began to criticize Remlingen in their various newspapers, both for the election controversy, and for a general lack of internal order in the country. As 1881 wore on with continued political chaos and with unpopular Conservative policies (particularly a failure to implement tax relief) popular unrest began to build in the country. By the end of the year troops had to be dispatched in order to arrest dissidents in

Gabrovo, a town in northern Bulgaria, and on Christmas Day a Sofia mob threw the pro-

Conservative Metropolitan Meletiĭ out of his own cathedral.513 Remlingen responded to the

Conservatives‘ press war first by a reply in the D"rzhaven V nik, the official journal of the

Bulgarian government. When that failed, Remlingen used his powers as the Minister of Interior to shut down the Conservatives‘ main newspaper, the B"lgarski Glas. It was this final action that was the straw that broke the camel‘s back, and Battenberg removed Remlingen from his post shortly thereafter, on December 31st 1881 / January 12th, 1882, replacing him with Nachovich.514

Khitrovó was also active during this time, specifically in the Railway Issue. Back during

Karavelov‘s administration, the Liberals had flatly refused to fund any railways at all, and so the matter was shelved. Now Khitrovó returned to it, backing the Russian (Danube) line and persuading Battenberg to move the railroad project under the purview of the Ministry of Interior

– that is, under Remlingen‘s eye. Once again, the Conservatives, backing the Khadzhienov consortium, took aim at Remlingen and Khitrovó with their newspapers. When Remlingen solicited an estimate from the Giuntsberg & Poliakov consortium, the Conservatives discovered this and angrily demanded that all of the consortiums submit proposals, with the railway going to the lowest bidder.515

225

Khitrovó opted then to go to St. Petersburg to seek out the government‘s opinion as to what to do – whereupon he discovered that the Russian state was not all that interested in the

Danube line (they were still seeking alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and compared to that Bulgarian railways were of limited concern). Girs advised him to act cautiously, yet as soon as Khitrovó returned to Sofia he once more threw himself into the railway issue.516

Khitrovó‘s new plan revolved around the occupation fund. According to the Treaty of

Berlin, Bulgaria owed Russia 28,000,000 francs for the expenses of the post-war occupation. To the Conservatives, paying this money was a matter of honor, although it would strain Bulgaria‘s never-healthy finances to their utmost. Battenberg made the suggestion to Khitrovó that perhaps the Russian state would allow the Bulgarians to use these funds to build a railway – Battenberg was even willing to award the contract to the Giunstberg consortium. Khitrovó responded enthusiastically, since it seemed to satisfy everyone. Bulgaria would pay her debt but at least get something for it, while Russia would have gained both a railway, and also would have made the kind of grand charitable gesture that would have garnered a great deal of public sympathy.

Unfortunately for Battenberg and Khitrovó, the Russian state (which was not particularly healthy financially itself, and was likely afraid of antagonizing Austria) rejected this plan, and Khitrovó was back to square one. He continued to press the Conservatives to build the Russian line, something which they flatly refused to do.517

With the railroad issue blocked off, and with Remlingen gone, Khitrovó now returned to his original task of humbling the Prince. In January of 1882, he told the British Consul in

Bulgaria, Frank C. Lascelles, that the key to controlling Battenberg was the army, which was the only institution in which the Prince was genuinely popular. He said that ―if this support were

226 withdrawn, His Highness would find himself in a helpless condition, and it would now become a question for the Russian government to consider whether they should render themselves unpopular in Bulgaria by supporting the prince in a line of action which was contrary to their

[Russia‘s interests.‖518 Remove Battenberg‘s support in the army, Khitrovó figured, and the entire edifice would come tumbling down.

And so, Khitrovó began to spread Panslav agitation throughout the ranks of the Russian officer corps. He began to refer to those officers who followed Battenberg as ‗Germans‘, while the ‗Loyal‘ officers were those who supported Khitrovó. One officer, a Colonel Aleksandr

Karlovich Timler, who had been Parensov‘s right-hand man a few years earlier, caused a scandal by refusing to toast Battenberg. When Battenberg insisted on expelling Timler from the country, the colonel replied that such an action would only be to Timler‘s credit in Russia.xxix By April,

1882, matters degenerated to the point that Krilov, who had taken Khitrovó‘s side, resigned – it fell to the Russian government to order him to his post, as well as forbidding other Russian officers from resigning as well.519

Nor is the foregoing an exhaustive list of all the ways in which Khitrovó clashed with

Battenberg and the Conservatives. There were even more conflicts. Battenberg and Khitrovó clashed over a revolt in Herzegovinia – Battenberg supporting the Austrians, Khitrovó the

Herzegovinians.520 There was a clash over the Bulgarian Exarchate.521 There were budgetary clashes over Remlingen‘s spending.522 There was no shortage of conflict.

xxix He was right, as it turned out – though Alexander III agreed to suspend Timler for a year, he was made assistant to the Chief of the Russian General Staff before the year was out. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 62.

227

Consequences and Recalls

Needless to say, Battenberg and the Conservatives were in an absolute uproar over

Khitrovó‘s actions. As Nachovich told Lascelles, ―there is nothing that His Highness would be likely to resent more strongly than any interference in military matters, and it is evident that unless he is able to place implicit reliance in his army, in any emergency that may arise, his position which is at best a difficult one becomes very precarious.‖523 And it was Khitrovó who was at the center of the rancor, most certainly. In his diary, Stoilov wrote that ―He is the center of the opposition, and if he does not go away, then the opposition may become dangerous.‖524 Even so staunch a Russophile as Bishop , educated in Kiev, a dedicated

Conservative and former Minister-President who had always been among Russia‘s most loyal allies in Bulgaria, now questioned the Russian policy towards Bulgaria.525 As far as Battenberg and the Conservatives were concerned, Khitrovó was the primary reason they were having all these political problems.

What is strange is that Khitrovó was doing all of this in stark opposition to official

Russian policy. On January 17th/29th, 1882, Girs sent a telegram to Khitrovó restating the

Russian government‘s original position – that Khitrovó was to stay out of Bulgarian politics other than to support the Prince and the Ministry.526 Battenberg received a similar telegram from the Tsar, and as Stoilov recalled in his diary the next day, ―this news prompted widespread joy… everyone is very happy.‖527 It seemed that the problem with Khitrovó was to be resolved – or it would have been, had Khitrovó paid the faintest attention to the telegram. Instead of obeying the instructions of Girs and the Tsar, Khitrovó doubled-down on his anti-Battenberg agitation, beginning his campaign against Battenberg among the Russian officers right around this point.528

228

Even more interesting is the fact that the Russian government was perfectly aware of

Khitrovó‘s disobedience. On January 31st/February 12th, Tsar Alexander III commented on a report from Khitrovó that the Consul-General‘s situation in Bulgaria was becoming hard to bear.

Khitrovó‘s intriguing was famous throughout the region, to the point that Count Gustav Kálnoky,

Austria‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs, mentioned Khitrovó‘s attempts to undermine Battenberg‘s

―authority and the normal development of the country‖ to the Russian Ambassador. This was reported in a telegram to Girs, and Tsar Alexander III made a marginal comment saying that

―Even the Austrians have noticed this!‖529 Austria‘s new representative in Bulgaria, Rüdiger

Freiherr von Biegeleben, commented sardonically in a dispatch home that he could not think of a better person to oppose Russian influence in Bulgaria than Khitrovó.530

Ultimately, Battenberg was forced to travel to St. Petersburg in order to petition the Tsar to get rid of Khitrovó, which Alexander III did without needing much prodding. Moreover, in a sign of his disapproval of Khitrovó‘s actions, the Tsar granted General Ivan Martinovich

Lesovoĭ, one of the Russian officers to have supported Battenberg, the order of St. Vladimir, third class.531 And yet, Khitrovó‘s career does not seem to have suffered for his flagrant disobedience – he would go on to be Ambassador to Romania, to , and to Japan before his death in 1896, all quite prominent positions in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Conclusion – A Deteriorating Situation

Russo-Bulgarian relations, which had begun so very well a few scant years earlier, became increasingly strained during Khitrovó and Remlingen‘s tenures in Sofia. Parensov,

Davydov, and Kumani had certainly given Battenberg and the Bulgarian politicians both Liberal

229 and Conservative something to complain about, but they were mostly personal disagreements, or relatively principled conflicts that arose in the course of their attempting to carry out their duties.

Ehrnrooth had steered Russia into a significant and largely irrevocable clash with the Liberals, but in so doing had also secured dictatorial rule for Battenberg and the Conservatives, so the

Liberal-Russian split need not have been fatal. Yet soon after they arrived, both Remlingen and

Khitrovó began to agitate against Battenberg and against the Conservatives whose allegiance they needed, and in favor of the Liberals who had so recently and so dramatically been betrayed by the Russian state.

This had consequences. By this point, there was not a single faction or politician in

Bulgaria who did not have serious cause for complaint with the Russians. Battenberg had his disagreements with Parensov and Khitrovó, the Liberals had Ehrnrooth‘s ultimatum and coup, and the Conservatives resented Khitrovó‘s efforts against them, as well as Kumani and

Khitrovó‘s railroad efforts. All of the Bulgarian elites had reason to feel disenchanted with

Russia.

This occurred even though it was staunchly contrary to the Russian government‘s clear and stated policy vis-à-vis Bulgaria. Remlingen and Khitrovó knew what St. Petersburg wished from them – in the case of Khitrovó, the entire Bulgarian political establishment knew what the

Tsar commanded him to do – and yet the Russian agents in Bulgaria refused to follow their instructions. And the Russian government refused to recall them until Battenberg visited St.

Petersburg to complain personally, or to take serious disciplinary action against Khitrovó, or against Ehrnrooth for that matter, despite what can only be interpreted as open insubordination.

230

Little surprise, then, that as the Russian government proved unwilling or unable to enforce a single line of action among its agents, the chaos in Russia‘s foreign policy continued.

This failure was all the more important due to the extreme rate of turnover among Russia‘s main agents in Bulgaria – there had been three sets in as many years, not counting minor actors such as Krilov. Russia‘s foreign policy in Bulgaria was proving not only counter-productive, but also internally confused, as policy switched with every change of personnel.

495 Crampton, Bulgaria, 108. 496 Konstantin Irechek (Constantin Jireček), Bulgarski Dnevnik, 30 Okt 1879-26, Okt, 1884g, 2 vols (Plovdiv: H. G. Danov, 1930-2), i. 441-2 in Ibid., 108. 497 Burian to Haymerle, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XV. 18, No. 24, Sofia, October 6, 1881 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 210 498 Earl Granville to Queen Victoria, Foreign Office, 28 June 1881, in Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series, 3:223-224. 499 Ikonomov, Suchineniyata na Todor Ikonomov, 4 vols., , 1897), IV, 172-176 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 211. 500 Crampton, 1878-1914, 59. 501 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 97. 502 Ibid. 503 Ibid. 504 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 16 September 1881, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 3, List 84 505 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de 109; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 112-113. 506 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXXI, 440 507 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 2 June 1881, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 3, List 75; Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de 109; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 94. 508 H. F. Geffcken, Frankreich, Russland, und der Dreibund [Berlin: Wilhelmini], 124. 509 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 86. 510 V. I Kosik, k i poli ik olg ii -1886 (Moskva: Akademi ia nauk SSSR, In-t slav ia novedeni ia i balkanistiki, 1991), 57-58 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 53. 511 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 210-213 512 Ibid., 213 513 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 95; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 60. 514 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 60. 515 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 96. 516 Ibid., 96-97; Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 273-277. 517 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 97-98; Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i 277-280. 518 Lascelles to Granville, FO, 78/3413, No. 8, Sofia, Jan 15, 1882 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 100. 519 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, HHS, XV 19, tel. no. 31, Sofia, April 26, 1882; Biegeleben to Kalnoky, HHS, XV 19, tel. no. 36, Sofia, May 2, 1882; Lascelles to Granville, FO, 78, no. 41, Sofia, May 1, 1882; all in Ibid., 100-101; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 104-106. 520 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 218. 521 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 7 January 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 4. 522 Stoilov to Nachovich, Sofia, 11 January 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 3 to 9.

231

523 Lascelles to Granville, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, 78/3414, no. 43, Sofia, 5 May 1882, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 101. 524Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 7 January 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 4. 525 Shcheglov, ―Russkoe Ministerstvo v Bolgarii,‖ Istoricheskii Viestnik, CSSVI (1911), 556 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 102. 526 Lascelles to Granville, FO, 78/3413, no. 8, Sofia, Jan 15, 1882 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 100. 527 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 18 January 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 5. 528 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 100. 529 P. P. Ubri (Oubril) to Girs, 21 April / 3 May 1882, in Ibid., 101. 530 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XV 19, no. 3B, reserve, Sofia, 15 January 1882, in Ibid., 102. 531 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i 280-281; Kennedy to Lascelles, FO, 78/3413, no. 47, Sofia, May 20, 1882, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 101.

232

Chapter 8: The Nadir, 1882-1883

The continuing unrest had shown that the Bulgarian population simply would not acquiesce in rule by the Prince and a Conservative faction alone. Therefore, Battenberg‘s government had to be propped up by one of the two factions in Bulgarian politics that still had wide-scale popular support, the Liberals or the Russians. Faced with that kind of choice,

Battenberg chose to ally with the Russians. However bad Khitrovó or Parensov had been,

Battenberg found working with Liberal cabinets even less enticing.532 At the same time, it was also clear that Battenberg was at the end of his tether. This was to be his last, great attempt at ruling the country with the aid of the Russians. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador Biegeleben reported back to the Foreign Minister Count K lnoky that ―with the choice of [new agents it was his desire to make a final concession to the principle of Russian supremacy, but that in case this new attempt failed as had all the others, he would consider himself under no further obligation to govern Bulgaria with the aid of the Russians, and would thenceforth base his policy entirely on

Bulgaria's own interests.‖533 If these new agents proved to be as impossible as Khitrovó, then

Battenberg was prepared for a final breach.

The New Russians – b ’b r

By the beginning of 1882, it was becoming somewhat difficult to actually find new people to take up positions as Russia‘s agents in Bulgaria. Initially, when Battenberg requested new people to replace Khitrovó and Krilov, he was told to find Ministers from the Bulgarian population. Battenberg parried back, pointing out that he needed Russian men independent of the

Bulgarian parties to support his rule. In fact, Battenberg‘s first choice was to bring Lieutenant-

233

General Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth back to Bulgaria, but this fell through. Instead, Girs recommended Battenberg speak to two of Russia‘s leading Panslavs, I. S. Aks kov and M. N.

Katk v – as Khitrovó was an extremely prominent Panslav, Girs likely saw it as a good idea to secure a measure of Panslav approval for any subsequent choices. They proved to be quite sympathetic to Battenberg‘s struggles with the ―Nihilists‖ in Bulgaria, and the result of these consultations was that two new men were sent to Sofia, with significant power. Lieutenant-

General Leonid Nikolaevich Sobolev was to be both Minister-President and Minister of Interior, while his colleague Major-General Aleksandr Vasil'evich Kaul'bars was to be Minister of War.534

Both men were thirty-eight years old when they took up their posts in Bulgaria, and both were career military officers who had graduated from the Nicholas General Staff Academy, the main organ for the training of higher-ranking officers in Russia. Sobolev had spent some time in

Central Asia, in modern day Turkestan and . He fought in the Russo-Turkish War of

1877-78, taking part in both the major battles at Plevna and at Shipka Pass, and afterwards, he had been a part of the Russian occupation, working on the organization of civil administration in

Bulgaria. Kaul‘bars had spent most of his career in and Central Asia, primarily as a geographer and explorer, for which he was repeatedly honored by the Imperial Geographic

Society. He likewise fought in the Russo-Turkish War, and afterwards was a member of the boundary commission that settled the question of the Serbian-Bulgarian-Albanian borders.535

Unfortunately for the course of Russo-Bulgarian relations, they were also by far the most stridently Panslavic agents yet sent to Bulgaria – much more hardline than Parensov, and without

Khitrovó‘s diplomatic touch. They were aggressively anti-German, and held the Bulgarians in some contempt – Adolf Koch recalls that:

234

All intercourse with [Kaul‘bars was quite out of the question, because every contradiction irritated him. Though born in the Baltic Provinces, he took upon himself the part of a German hater. He did not neglect to warn his fellow countrymen in the army to speak only Russian with their children… [Sobolev had conceived an irreconcilable hatred against his Ministerial colleagues, because the latter, as ―pupils of the West‖ (Soboleff, p.70), spoke Russian but indifferently, while he himself understood no other language, and thought he could conceal his ignorance by churlishness.536

Though one should take Koch with a grain of salt, Sobolev‘s own writings bear this view out – and by and large it was Sobolev who would take the lead in most of the generals‘ actions, as

Kaul‘bars concentrated on military matters. His own later writings called Battenberg ―inclined to the side of Austria and Germany,‖ and he mourned that ―Russia, having freed the Bulgarians from the heavy Turkish knout, delivered them into for a German Prince.‖ The 1881 Coup was ―the work of Austria and Germany. Austria acted almost in open, but Germany observed the strictest secrecy.‖537 The historian R. J. Crampton wrote of Sobolev as ―by sentiment an absolutist who disliked all parliaments, however weak, and who saw political parties as alien, western institutions ill-suited to a Slav people.‖538 Sobolev himself claimed that his goal was deliver power into the hands of the ―National [Liberal party, who understood the necessity of going together with Russia, and not leaving power in the hands of the party, which wished to turn Bulgaria, like Serbia, into a province of Austria.‖539 In short, Sobolev was not an individual likely to have peaceful reactions with a German monarch and Conservative politicians.

Overall, outside observers did not form a high opinion of the two Generals. The opinion of Koch, and one may gather by extension Battenberg, has already been made clear. The

Bulgarian Conservative evaluation was no higher. Stoilov wrote in his diary for July 10th, 1882, well before the conflict between the Conservatives and the Generals truly ignited, that:

235

My first impression of Sobolev was that he doesn‘t even know where he is and what he wants. He is longing for the position he left in Russia and doesn‘t have the needed enthusiasm and powers to create something for Bulgaria. He is not at all equal to the situation. He jumps from one thing to the next. Kaul‘bars seems cleverer to me. It seems that he leads Sobolev.540

One might compare this to Stoilov‘s first impression of Ehrnrooth, of whom Stoilov wrote that

―He gives a great impression; an educated and honest man.‖541 Clearly, Sobolev did not inspire confidence, nor did he improve on further acquaintance. By the following March, Stoilov had downgraded his opinion further, labeling Sobolev an incompetent micromanager unable to see the big picture.542

New Administration and Initial Plans

With the Generals procured from St. Petersburg, a new Bulgarian Cabinet was formed on

June 23rd / July 5th, 1882. Nachovich was Minister of Finance, Grekov was Minister of Justice, and somewhat later Stoilov would join as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religion. Initially,

Sobolev and Kaul‘bars seemed to work to support Battenberg‘s reign and to smooth relations with the Bulgarians – Stoilov recalls in his diary that the Generals made no decision without consulting with the Bulgarians first, offering an example of them delegating the decision of allowing a Liberal newspaper to a man by the name of Kopitkin.543 For his part, Battenberg set about to rework the constitution yet again, still unhappy with his inability to control all of the actions of his government, reporting to the acting British representative that the new constitution was to be a ―Constitution such as he himself understood a Constitution to be; that under it the

Sovereign is to be vested with full executive power."544 Battenberg desired to be the sole power in Bulgaria. If the Svishtov Assembly had not concentrated power in his hands the way he had

236 hoped, then Battenberg was going to keep altering the Bulgarian constitution until he was satisfied. However, even as the Conservatives debated the proposed constitutional reforms, and

Karavelov fired off lengthy rebuttals from his quasi-exile in Eastern Rumelia, Battenberg soon found that he had bigger problems.545

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – The Railroad Issue, Part III

The first breach between the Generals and the Bulgarians came about due to that hardy perennial of a conflict, the Railroad Issue. At this stage, the idea floated by Khitrovó and

Battenberg to have Russia finance the construction of the railroad had become popular among the Conservatives – though St. Petersburg had so far refused to offer any money for the matter, this could yet change. And if it changed, then there was a chance that the Khadzhienov

Consortium could receive the contract, and so the Conservatives could benefit personally as well as politically. Sobolev was also in favor of some similar idea, though both he and Kaul‘bars championed the Giuntsberg & Poliakov line, just as Kumani and Khitrovó had.546

Over the course of November and December, 1882, a series of telegrams shot between

Sofia and St. Petersburg over the railroad negotiations. Battenberg argued that Bulgaria was willing to build the Danube line, but that due to its financial position and treaty obligations, the

Principality could only do so with Russian aid. Time and again, the Tsar replied that Russia could not offer much in the way of material aid – if Bulgaria were to see fit to build the line out of its own resources, excellent, Russia would be grateful, but if not then so be it. Sobolev and

Kaul‘bars attempted to press Girs in a similar scheme, and apparently met with the same response.547

237

This was about as clear an indication of Russia‘s disinterest in pressing forth on the

Railroad Issue as one would like. Instead, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars forged onwards, coming together with a scheme in which Bulgaria would build the Danube line at a cost of some

42,000,000 francs, of which 15,000,000 would come from funds already in the treasury,

21,000,000 from yearly revenue, and 5,000,000 from a yearly surplus the Generals claimed

Bulgaria produced. According to Sobolev, this was not a great cost.548 The Conservatives and

Battenberg disagreed. On November 24th, 1882, Battenberg wrote a telegram to Alexander III, in which he described Sobolev‘s and Kaul‘bars‘s stance on the railroads and argued that it was

―contrary to the desires of the people.‖ He showed this telegram to Sobolev, who began to claim that he wasn‘t actually for Bulgaria building the railroad, but instead only proposed that the railroads be state property, an argument that did not impress the Prince.549 Two days later,

Battenberg told Stoilov that ―the Generals were greatly excited over the telegram,‖ saying that

Battenberg misunderstood them and that they did not want the Principality to build the railroad, but that the work be given to concessions. A written declaration to that effect was provided, and

Battenberg sent a new telegram to the Tsar telling Alexander III that all was settled with the

Generals.550

Even as that matter seemed to be settled, or at least at an impasse, a new situation arose also regarding the railroads. There was a proposal to establish a new Ministry of Public Works, which would deal with Bulgaria‘s railroads – this was uncontroversial. What was controversial was the question of who would run it, and Sobolev proposed Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Khilkov, a very prominent Russian railroad executive and a supporter of the Danube line. The

Conservatives, seeing the gambit for what it was, refused to approve Khilkov‘s appointment. So

238 instead Sobolev used his ministerial powers to appoint Khilkov the Assistant to the Minister of

Public Works. This was a very well-paying job, and more to the point, as there was no Minister of Public Works, left Khilkov as the de facto Minister, something which absolutely infuriated the

Conservatives, who considered it an illegal act.551 Battenberg, who supported the Conservatives in this, ultimately resolved the issue by appointing G. D. Nachovich to the Ministerial position.

The entire business left a sour taste in everyone‘s mouth. The Conservatives and

Battenberg were unhappy over Sobolev‘s high-handed efforts to force Bulgaria to pay for an excruciatingly expensive railroad. Sobolev, meanwhile, was just as irritated at the Conservatives and Battenberg for standing in the way of Russia‘s interests in the Balkans, accusing them of disloyalty, greed, and being too fond of Austria. He later claimed that Battenberg supported the

Austrian consortium for the railroad due to the advocacy of his father, Alexander of Hesse, whom Sobolev claimed was deep in talks with Viennese bankers.552

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – The Dragoons

Even as this latest episode of the railroad controversy was playing out, the Conservatives pushed back against Sobolev and Kaul‘bars by igniting a controversy over the ‗dragoon corps‘.

Back in 1881, when Battenberg and Ehrnrooth had carried out their coup, the Bulgarian gendarmerie was transformed into a ‗dragoon corps‘ of mounted police, for the suppression of unrest. These troops managed to become a lightning rod for popular discontent, with most of the animosity being directed at the Russian officers who led the dragoons. The Conservatives, seeing an issue on which they could score a victory over Sobolev and Kaul‘bars, pressed for the abolition of the Dragoon corps. Sobolev and Kaul‘bars, supported by Battenberg who wished to

239 build up the army, proposed the transfer of the dragoons to the army, without police power.

However the Conservative legislature refused to fund the dragoon corps and in the words of

Sobolev, ―Nachovich, Grekov, and Stoilov gloated, and lacked the self-control to hide their gloating.‖553 Battenberg, siding with the generals, said he would refuse to approve a budget without the funding.

Matters came to a head at a meeting of the cabinet of Ministers, February 23rd / March

7th, 1883, when Battenberg demanded that the Conservatives approve the funds. After hearing the order, Nachovich responded by submitting his resignation, followed a moment later by

Grekov, who reportedly said ―let them work without us.‖554 Sobolev, acting in his capacity as

Minister-President, refused to accept the resignations, and there followed a great deal of argument. As Sobolev himself recalled later, ―Sobolev and Kaul‘bars this time did not pity the

Conservative triumvirate and told them many bitter truths; Sobolev informed them, that he has the full opportunity to take away their power and to turn them into the very same thing, that they had turned their political opponents,‖ that is to say, exiles like the Liberals.555

Ultimately, Battenberg was able to persuade Nachovich and Grekov to stay their hand.

Everyone was aware that if the Conservative triumvirate resigned from their Ministries, then no other competent Bulgarians were going to join the Cabinet (Stoilov, Nachovich, and Grekov had complete control of the Conservatives, and the Liberals were all in exile or cast far from power).

That would leave the Principality in the position of being ruled entirely by a German Prince and two Russian generals, and this was a dangerous situation to be in vis-à-vis Bulgarian nationalism

– it was one thing to have Russian participation in the government and another to have absolute

Russian domination of the government. For the moment, then, Battenberg, the Conservatives,

240 and the Generals were able to co-exist, but relations between the Conservatives and the Generals were strained to the breaking point.556

Russo-Bulgarian Controversy – Metropolitan M

The modus vivendi did not last long. The very night of the above Cabinet meeting, a message arrived in Sofia from Constantinople, from the Ĭosif I, the head of the Bulgarian

Exarchate. Delivered by the Metropolitan Grigoriĭ of Ruse, the letter directed Stoilov, as the

Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religion, to remove the Metropolitan Meletiĭ of Sofia from his post and to exile him to the much smaller town of Vratsa. The Metropolitan Meletiĭ was a very prominent Bulgarian nationalist and a staunch Russophile, well-known for his patriotic actions during the Russo-Turkish War. At the time of the war he had been in Constantinople, but he escaped the city and joined the Russian army advancing on the Ottomans. The other high

Bulgarian churchmen, who were still in Constantinople and thus had to worry about what the

Turks thought, passed a decree on December 10th/22nd, 1877 that Meletiĭ be deprived of his post.

But the decree was not enforced, and when the Russians won the war, it was quietly forgotten about. Until 1883, when internal church politics resulted in the order sent to Stoilov. Grigoriĭ, a rival of Meletiĭ and something of a Turcophil, was to take over the church in Sofia.557

Strictly speaking, Stoilov was to carry out the Exarchate‘s instructions without question.

But Meletiĭ was a popular man, and close to the Russian authorities – removing him was by definition a politically charged act. Thus, on the following morning, February 24th / March 8th,

1883, Stoilov went to speak with Battenberg, with the Exarch‘s letter in hand. There, Stoilov proposed a softening of terms, that Meletiĭ be sent not to Vratsa but to the Rila Monastery, and

241 be given a pension. Battenberg agreed to this. Stoilov‘s next stop was to Major-General Leonid

Nikolaevich Sobolev, where Stoilov – so he wrote in a formal memorandum afterwards – gave

Sobolev the Exarch‘s letter and told him about everything that he had spoken of with the Grigoriĭ and Battenberg.558

Now comes the crux of the matter. According to Stoilov‘s memorandum ―His Excellency

General Sobolev agreed completely with my views and during the entire conversation said absolutely nothing that would have caused one to think, that could have given me cause to suspect, that he was not entirely of my opinion.‖559 In his own account written a few years later,

Sobolev told a different story, writing that ―Wanting to think over this matter calmly, Gen.

Sobolev proposed to Stoilov to wait and to inform the Metropolitan Meletiĭ beforehand, as was appropriate to the existing law, of the Exarch‘s decision.‖560 At this juncture, given that there were no other witnesses to the meeting, the truth of the matter is impossible to ascertain – though one might observe that both men were likely to be tired and stressed after the previous day‘s stormy Cabinet session, so an honest mistake or miscommunication is certainly possible.

Stoilov then conferred with the Metropolitan Grigoriĭ, and messages were dispatched to

Rila Monastery and to Meletiĭ. According to Stoilov, some dragoons were to accompany Meletiĭ, for his own protection, and Meletiĭ himself was given the Exarch‘s letter, whereupon the

Metropolitan declared that he would obey this decision of his own will and that if possible

Meletiĭ would like to leave quickly.561 As a result, on the night of the February 24th/25th / March

8th/9th, Meletiĭ quickly packed his belongings and left Sofia.562 Indeed, Stoilov claimed that this was exceedingly painful work for him, as he considered Meletiĭ to number among his friends –

242 but orders were orders, and Stoilov as Minister of Religion carried out the commands of the

Exarchate.563

According to Sobolev, however, Stoilov had ignored Sobolev‘s recommendation, and made ―the most outrageous uses of force upon the Metropolitan.‖564 Indeed, Sobolev claimed that the Conservatives seized this opportunity to embarrass the Russians once again, by evicting

Meletiĭ as if he were a simple footpad, the dragoon escorts actually jailers.565

On February 25th / March 9th, that is, the following morning, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars visited the telegraph office and attempted to have Meletiĭ brought back to Sofia. When this failed, Sobolev sent his personal secretary, A. N. Shchegl v, to intercept the Metropolitan – without a doubt exceeding his authority.566 Simultaneously, Stoilov, who received copies of all important telegrams by virtue of his office, saw Sobolev‘s telegram, and also two others – one from Khitrovó to the St. Petersburg telegraph office, and one from a man named Molchanov to the St. Petersburg newspaper the oe V m i (The New Times), both of which essentially repeated Sobolev‘s accusation that Stoilov had arrested Meletiĭ with excessive force, and that this was a Conservative power play.567 Once Meletiĭ was returned to Sofia by Shchegl v,

General Sobolev sent his secretary onwards to Constantinople, to attempt to have the Exarch‘s pronouncement changed. This effort was unsuccessful, and Meletiĭ was ultimately banished to the small town of , along the western border of Bulgaria.568

More importantly, on February 26th / March 10th, 1883, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars issued

Battenberg an ultimatum. They could no longer serve in the same cabinet as Stoilov. Battenberg would have to choose between the last major Conservative in the government, or the Russian generals. It was not really a choice. Battenberg had summoned the Generals at his own request

243 not nine months previously and he could hardly get rid of them now. So on February 28th/

March 12th, Stoilov resigned, as did Grekov and Nachovich.569

b ’b r

By March, 1883, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars were at once in the best and in the worst position yet. On the one hand, they were now in absolute control of the Bulgarian Cabinet – and after the

Svishtov Assembly, this meant they ran the country more or less as they wished. Sobolev‘s earlier concerns about the optics of Russian generals running Bulgaria entirely had vanished after the Meletiĭ incident. On the other hand, the Generals had now antagonized all of the Bulgarian politicians with impressive thoroughness.

Those least pleased with the Generals, of course, were the Conservatives, and they made their unhappiness known. On March 22nd, 1883, Stoilov, Grekov, and Nachovich delivered a lengthy memorandum to Battenberg, leveling a number of accusations against Sobolev. They accused the Generals of concentrating all power in their own hands in furtherance of some evil scheme, or at least towards the aim of turning Bulgaria into a de facto Russian province.xxx,570

They further accused Sobolev of electoral meddling in the vein of Remlingen, firing important officials and putting together new lists of people, all with the aim of returning the Liberals into power. 571 The Conservative triumvirate went on to say that ―the continued stay of the Generals

xxx Sobolev reproduced the memorandum in its entirety in his later account of his time, taking advantage of footnotes to contest virtually every claim of the Conservatives. In particular, in response to the above Sobolev wrote that:

This is a lie. No one thinks that Russia wants to turn Bulgaria into its own province. I‘ve explained more than once, that Russia wishes the full independence of Bulgaria, to which end it works towards the development of the armed forces of the Principality; Russia wishes, that the Principality itself finishes the unification of Bulgaria, without its direct aid, but with its agreement before-hand. This was understood by all, but Nachovich, Grekov, and Stoilov needed lies as arguments…

244 in Bulgaria threatens the existence of friendly relations between Russia and Bulgaria,‖572 which would be a great disaster, as ―beside the bonds of race and religion, which tie us to Russia,‖ only

Russia‘s help could allow Bulgaria to achieve its national interests.‖573 They even moved into ad hominem attacks, writing in the memorandum that Sobolev and Kaul‘bars treated with contempt everything that patriotic Bulgarians held dear, and even worse, that they claimed to act in such a fashion by order of the Tsar.574

Sobolev denied all of the Conservatives‘ accusations, but certainly others noticed that the divide between the Generals and everyone else was widening into a chasm. The Austrian diplomatic agent, Biegeleben, sent a report to Vienna in which he wrote that ―the two generals pay no attention to the limited susceptibilities of Bulgaria's national pride, nor are they adapting themselves to the form of government already established in the country. The regime which they seem to desire to set up in this country is a military dictatorship of two…‖575 Meanwhile, Adolf

Koch, Battenberg‘s chaplain, wrote that ―The behavior of the two Generals towards the

Bulgarians was both imperious and offensive. They might be heard saying on all occasions that the Bulgarians were all blockheads, who ought to be treated with the knout.‖576 The Bulgarian professor and diplomat Stefan Panaretov wrote to his friend Stoilov from Salzburg and told him:

You must make the Prince understand that he is the Prince of Bulgaria and not the governor of a Russian province… We must make the Russians understand that while we are bound to them by ties of religion, race, and everlasting gratitude for our Emancipation, we mean to govern our own affairs to the best of our ability… The sooner the Prince gets rid of them [Sobolev, Kaul‘bars, and their associates], the better for him and for the country. We only need a Russian general for a War Minister, and he who comes to fulfill that post ought plainly to understand that he comes as our servant, and not as our master.577

If Parensov and Khitrovó had before been able to make themselves objectionable to Battenberg and his supporters, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars raised that ability to an art form. It is interesting to

245 observe, however, how both the Conservative triumvirate and Panaretov mentioned the importance of a good relationship with Russia. The Bulgarians genuinely wished to have good relations with their liberator, for both emotional and geopolitical reasons. That Sobolev and

Kaul‘bars were causing damage to the relationship and muddying Russia‘s good name in

Bulgaria was a black mark against them.

In any case, it seems that Battenberg did not need much persuading. According to

Biegeleben, ―Apparently the prince desires to keep the two generals until he can demonstrate by the absurdity of their rule the impossibility of governing the country with Russian ministers.‖578

From the beginning of his reign, Battenberg was far less fond of Russia than his subjects, and his experiences with the previous Russian agents had only strengthened that. Moreover, Battenberg was also coming around to the idea that perhaps the 1881 coup had been over-hasty. The years since Battenberg‘s ascension to the Bulgarian throne had given him a rather rough-and-tumble political education, and his experiences with Khitrovó, Remlingen and Sobolev had shown him that there were worse ways to structure a government than under the Tarnovo Constitution. Thus, by the spring of 1883, according to C. E. Black, Battenberg was ―was ready to consider a form of government in which Conservatives and Liberals coexisted in a spirit of mutual toleration. As for the Turnovo Constitution, a number of changes must certainly be made, but they could wait until quieter times.‖579 Battenberg‘s next step was, therefore, to get rid of Kaul‘bars and Sobolev, which he intended to do by personal appeal to Tsar Alexander III, at the Russian Emperor‘s upcoming coronation ceremony.

246

The Coronation of Tsar Alexander III

Battenberg left Sofia on April 15th/27th, 1883, taking a roundabout route through the

Balkans and visiting with other leaders in the area such as King Milan of Serbia, with whom

Battenberg had so far managed to maintain fairly good relations. The coronation was scheduled for May 27th/June 8th, and there was reason to be optimistic about the journey‘s outcome.

Previously Battenberg had been able to successfully petition the Tsar and his father to remove first Parensov and then Khitrovó when they had become excessively troublesome, so there was reason to hope that Battenberg would be able to repeat his successes.580 Officials in St.

Petersburg were not ignorant of what was happening in Bulgaria. Neither was Sobolev held blameless in the constant controversies. On March 31st/April 12th, 1883, the conservative

Russian newspaper the nk -Pe e b g kie domo i wrote that it was due to Sobolev‘s

―arrogant attitude‖ and ―ill-advised and peremptory measures‖ that Russian influence in Bulgaria was on the wane.581 Likewise the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while not entirely happy with Battenberg or the Conservative Party in Bulgaria, was nevertheless displeased with the generals as well. A. E. Vlangali, an advisor of Girs, wrote that he was worried that Russian influence may be endangered due to the generals‘ actions.582 There was a sense in St. Petersburg that the administration of Kaul‘bars and Sobolev was a failure. In the end, though, all major decisions would be taken by Tsar Alexander III, and so his was the only opinion that mattered.

Unfortunately for the future of peaceful Russo-Bulgarian relations, the Tsar‘s opinion was to become exceedingly prejudicial against Prince Alexander von Battenberg. Objective reports of just what happened at the Imperial Coronation between Battenberg and Alexander III are sparse, but by any account the visit was a social disaster of legendary proportions. Sobolev

247 had also arrived in St. Petersburg, and was busily soliciting approval for his actions in Bulgaria and support for a new revision of the Tarnovo Constitution that would put final power in the hands of the Russian ministers, who would rule along with the Liberals. According to Sobolev, as recounted by his secretary, what Bulgaria needed was "an organic statute which will hold in check both the excessive popular government and the extremes of the prince's regime."583 The

Tsar turned a sympathetic ear to his fellow Panslav and approved the plan. A delegation of

Bulgarian Liberals had arrived in St. Petersburg as well, led by N. Suknarov, a man Kaul‘bars had appointed mayor of Sofia, to request Battenberg‘s replacement by Prince Waldemar of

Denmark. Despite Battenberg‘s best efforts, the Tsar granted the delegation an audience, before he had even met with Battenberg, though he did not grant their request. Furthermore, as

Battenberg‘s secretary reported to Stoilov on May 26th/June 7th, 1883, by this point Battenberg had assembled a fair few enemies in St. Petersburg – among them Khitrovó and Shepelev, both of whom were still well-connected and influential men, but also including the Minister of War

P tr Sem novich Vann vskiĭ and the head of the Russian General Staff Nikol ĭ Nikol evich

bruchev.584

Nor was Battenberg doing himself any favors. While Battenberg was generally considered a very pleasant and charming individual by those who knew him, tact was not one of the young Prince‘s strong points. In Constantinople he had spoken poorly of Russian policy, words which were rapidly relayed to St. Petersburg, and once at the coronation he turned down an Imperial decoration because it had not been the one he wanted.585 Having been repeatedly refused an audience with the Tsar, Battenberg apparently forced his way into Alexander III‘s private chambers, a grave breach of protocol and court etiquette which earned him ―the Tsar‘s

248 wrath‖, as Corti put it.586 He managed to secure a private interview, but then managed to compound his faux pas by not being at his rooms to receive the Tsar when Alexander III came to pay him a return visit. Kennan describes this as ―a social error, this time, of monstrous dimensions.‖587 The atmosphere in St. Petersburg had now taken a distinctly antagonistic turn, and according to Corti, Battenberg and his father were snubbed at various social occasions, to the point where Prince Alexander of Hesse, Battenberg‘s father, declared that ‗I‘ll be damned if anyone ever sees me in Russia again on any ceremonial occasion.‖588 Omens for future Russo-

Bulgarian amity were looking bleak.

The main result of Battenberg‘s coronation visit was that between Prince Alexander von

Battenberg and Tsar Alexander III was born a powerful hatred that would color Russo- Bulgarian relations for the rest of the period under study. The two men had never been close, but prior to this they had not been all that unpleasant to one another, and Alexander III had supported

Battenberg‘s coup in 1881. Now however, their mutual loathing was quite noticeable. The

Austrian Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Wolkenstein, reported that in 1885 the Tsar had said that

―The situation between me and the Prince of Bulgaria is this: that either I or he has lied. Since I have never in my whole life told a lie, he must be the one who has lied. No reconciliation is therefore possible between him and me.‖589 Battenberg was less eloquent but more forceful, writing to his father in later years that ―the cleft between the Tsar and myself cannot be bridged.

I hate the Tsar and shall never be able to forget what he has done to me‖590 and that ―you simply have no idea what a fearful hatred I have for the Tsar and for his government.‖591 The two monarchs would be at odds for so long as both reigned.

249

The news that Battenberg‘s mission had failed was greeted by the Conservatives with absolute horror. Writing from Bucharest, Grekov wrote to Stoilov in early July, noting that:

…The return of Sobolev to Bulgaria would be an enormous infelicity for Bulgaria; it would deliver the final blow to Russian influence in Bulgaria, as well as to the prestige of His Highness [Battenberg]. His appearance on the political scene could push the work to the extremes, and then who could predict to what miserable consequences such a position could lead? …The mood among the diplomatic agents is horrible; I have never heard anyone express themselves with greater vigor than against the current government… …I cannot believe that the Emperor, even if angry, [would do such a thing] because of the Prince, because Russia has interests in the Balkan peninsula, which it cannot sacrifice for a mere caprice…592

Yet despite Grekov‘s disbelief, this was what happened. In the grand scheme of things, the fact that Battenberg and Alexander III personally detested each other need not have been the cause for any major change in Russo-Bulgarian relations. Yet the way the Russian government was set up, the Tsar was the ultimate arbiter of foreign relations – the more so when the Tsar was a determined figure such as Alexander III. Battenberg‘s social faux pas would have severe consequences for Russo-Bulgarian relations. Up until now, Battenberg and the Bulgarians had been more or less successful in using appeals to the Tsar as a last resort whenever Russian agents in Bulgaria became too odious. Now that option was expended, and something else would have to be done.

The New Russian – Ionin

Compounding offense upon perceived offense, Battenberg had emerged from his interviews with the Tsar with the impression that General Ehrnrooth would in fact be returned to

Bulgaria. When Battenberg actually did return to Sofia, he found that contrary to his

250 expectations, Ehrnrooth was not to be dispatched to Sofia, something which the Prince regarded as just one more personal insult from Russia.xxxi,593 Instead the Russian diplomat Aleksandr

Sem novich Ionin was to be dispatched, arriving on August 10th/22nd of 1883.

Ionin was another old Balkan hand of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had previously served as Minister-President in Montenegro. Curiously, opinions differ sharply over his political and personal leanings. Battenberg considered him ―One of the most notorious

Russian diplomats,‖594 while the Prince‘s private secretary, Golovin, wrote that he was a

―zealous Panslav partisan.‖595 The British diplomatic agent in Montenegro wrote of his colleague that Ionin was ―one of the cleverest of the Slavophile band.‖596 On the other hand, Girs considered him ―prudent and well-balanced‖ 597 and the Austrian Ambassador Wolkenstein called him ―an intelligent and useful agent who, though a warm patriot, was not a Panslav agitator.‖598 Historians have generally given Ionin higher marks. The prominent Russian scholar

Skazkin noted that he was ―an intelligent man, an experienced diplomat, and politically talented—a very rare combination among Russia‘s agents in the Balkans,‖599 and both Charles

Jelavich and George Kennan gave him positive reviews overall.600

Yet for Ionin, his personal proclivities mattered less than for earlier Russian agents, as

Ionin was dispatched to Bulgaria with very precise, very specific goals in mind. First off, he was to maintain Russian prestige – this was paramount. Secondly, he was to support and maintain the

Generals. Girs, speaking to Wolkenstein, made it clear that for Sobolev and Kaul‘bars to be recalled at this stage would give the impression that Russia was knuckling under Battenberg, and

xxxi Girs later explained this decision to the German Ambassador as follows: Essentially, Ehrnrooth was considered too pro-Battenberg, and in his efforts to prop up the Prince‘s prestige, he would have inevitably clashed with Sobolev and Kaul‘bars. Schweinitz, Hans Lothar von. Denkwurdigkeiten des Botschafters General v. Schweinitz. Berlin, 1927, II, 238-239.

251 this was not to be allowed.601 The Tsar‘s motivations were more straightforward, as he wrote to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, ―it is necessary for us to support Sobolev and Kaul‘bars… and I blame the Prince entirely for this.‖602 Still, plans were made for an eventual recall of the

Generals. Third and finally, Battenberg‘s powers were to be reined in, and Bulgaria was to be put back under the Tarnovo Constitution, or at least a reasonable facsimile thereof.603 On August 3rd, while passing through Vienna, Ionin met Stoilov – there, the Russian chargé d'affaires assured

Stoilov that Ionin was going to Bulgaria ―to give the Prince a shove, to help him, and not to cause him troubles; everything will be done to support him; Russia was behind him, and so forth…,‖ as Stoilov recorded in his diary.604 This friendly promise of cooperation did not last long.

The Final Act

On August 12th/24th, Ionin had the first of several highly unpleasant meetings with

Battenberg, in which a number of insults were exchanged. Ionin delivered the following ultimatum: Battenberg was to convene the legislature in September exclusively for the passing of the budget and some international agreements, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars were to remain at their posts for at least another year, and a commission was to be established to study further necessary changes to the constitution. This, Ionin said, was the will of the Tsar, and that no compromises would be accepted. Battenberg‘s secretary reported to Stoilov that on August 20th/September 1st,

Ionin declared to the Battenberg that ―he had orders to compel the Prince to abdicate from his authoritarian rule, on account that this was given from Russia and Russia held that the

Constitution should be restored.‖605 According to Ionin, Russia had put up with enough anti-

252

Russian actions from Bulgaria, and Russia‘s honor was finally at stake. As Ionin explained to the

Austrian representative, Biegeleben, the controversies involving Sobolev and Kaul‘bars were

―the last drop which always made the vase overflow.‖606 The constitution would be rewritten, and Russia‘s influence in Bulgaria firmly re-established.

Battenberg resisted. Should the constitution be rewritten under Russian auspices, the

Prince‘s political powers would be gutted, and Battenberg would become a Russian puppet, a ruler in name only.607 Moreover, there was a question of simple ego, as the Russians appeared to be attempting to batter the Prince into submission. According to Koch, who met with Battenberg immediately after Ionin‘s first meeting, the Prince was ―still greatly excited at the shameless behavior of the Russian State Councilor.‖608 According to Battenberg, ―Jonin made insolent and impertinent answers to all my objections, and when I reprimanded him for this unseemly behavior he informed me, ‗As Herr Jonin, I ask your for the expressions I use; but as His

Majesty‘s Envoy I am forced to repeat them, for I have received orders from the Czar to use this language…‘ This, then, is my recompense for my obedience towards Russia for four years!... I have had enough of it now.‖609 Now, finally, open hostility between Prince and Tsar had been reached. At the end of the meetings, no decision had been arrived at, but events entered their final phase.

Ionin‘s next step was to secure the support of Bulgaria‘s politicians. The Conservatives were more or less written off, having established themselves as firmly antagonistic to Sobolev and Kaul‘bars. But the Liberals, the most popular political party in Bulgaria, could become potent allies. Ionin thus entered into negotiations with Dragan T sankov, the once imprisoned and

253 recently released leader of the Liberals in Bulgaria. Various efforts were also taken to influence the upcoming elections and insure that the Conservatives did not do well.610

These were not subtle acts. On August 15th, Nachovich wrote to Stoilov, presently in St.

Petersburg, that:

Ionin‘s position against His Highness is known in all of Sofia, and through her in all of Bulgaria; the conversation of Ionin with the Prince is told by Sobolev, Scheglov, and company to the Liberals with various exaggerations and commentaries and with the goal to show that the Emperor and the Russian government are ready to lift their hands from His Highness and support his opponents.611

The reason for this publicity, according to Nachovich, was that Ionin and the Generals were worried about the prospect of some kind of peace between the Conservatives and the Liberals.

Unfortunately, this effort backfired, as Nachovich reported that it made the Liberals even less likely to support the Russians, as they came to think they could gain more from a peace. 612

Nor were Battenberg and the Conservatives passive during all of Ionin‘s efforts. In a struggle with Battenberg and the Conservatives on one side, and the Russians and the Liberals on the other, there was no question that it was the latter that would be victorious. If one of the latter groups could be peeled off, however, the political calculus changed radically. Battenberg and the

Conservatives proceeded to petition both of their opponents, hoping that success with at least one would save the day.

It was to that end, specifically to try and mediate with the Russians, that Konstantin

Stoilov was sent to St. Petersburg in the later summer of 1883. He had been there before, and there was some hope that he would not suffer the personal antipathy of the Tsar. He was not successful. He wrote back to Sofia that ―I am more and more convinced that here they think very little about Bulgaria and that all initiative for any necessary acts must come from Sofia.‖613

254

Stoilov conferred with Ehrnrooth, who confirmed that there was little hope. As Stoilov reported back, ―Ehrnrooth thinks that honor and truth do not allow us to accept the conditions [of Ionin‘s ultimatum] and that the Russian government bears all responsibility for the break. In any case, he feels that this crisis must be solved by His Highness the Prince, and that he cannot expect any guidance from here.‖614 According to Ehrnrooth, ―Girs was very weak and simply does not know what to do,‖ 615 while according to General Mikhail Alekseevich Domontovich, Military

Governor of Tarnovo during the Russo-Turkish War and a ranking member of the Imperial

Military Academy, the Tsar still resented Battenberg for his poor behavior during the

Coronation. He also added that at this point, going to Bulgaria was seen as a very bad career move, which did nothing to help find qualified personnel to work there.616

In a last ditch effort, Stoilov went so far as to prepare a memorandum for the Tsar, in an effort to make the Russian Emperor see just how dangerous the situation was for all involved. He began by stressing that Sobolev was sent to Bulgaria in order to support the Prince, to lend the authority of the Russian uniform to Battenberg‘s orders. Sobolev did not do this. Instead of quieting Bulgaria‘s tempestuous politics, Sobolev exacerbated the chaos. Stoilov notes that

Sobolev has managed to antagonize everyone in Bulgaria, as can be seen by how the political parties have come together against him. Sobolev has lost Battenberg a great deal of prestige (for he is Battenberg‘s minister), and has damaged Russo-Bulgarian relations very sharply. Ionin‘s ultimatums are not helping the matter, as agreeing to them would be tantamount to political suicide for Battenberg. He points out that ―the acceptance of [the ultimatum] of Mr. Ionin would lead to a radical turnabout in the country and after the coming together of the parties would be such an astounding insult to the pride and national feeling of the Bulgars, that it is impossible to

255 imagine its consequences.‖ Stoilov even brought up the beloved memory of Alexander III‘s father, ―Our Great Liberator,‖ and pled to the Tsar that ―Your Highness, the Bulgarian people have placed all of their hopes upon you.‖617 Unfortunately for Stoilov, this fared no better than his other efforts.

This left Battenberg and the Conservatives to try and gain the assistance of the Liberals, while Ionin was doing the same. This left the Liberals under T sankov with role of kingmakers.

Whichever side gained the support of the Liberal party would be the one able to dominate the others, and T sankov intended to leverage this enviable position for the maximum advantage possible. Above all else, the Liberals wanted the return of the Tarnovo Constitution, since under it the Liberals would be assured of a commanding presence in the newly empowered legislature.

Ionin was willing to agree to this, even though it meant that Sobolev and Kaul‘bars would be removed, since the ministers under the Tarnovo Constitution would be chosen from the dominant party in the legislature. But there was a world of difference between having the Russian generals forced out, and having them depart due to a ‗parliamentary shift‘ approved of by Russia.618

T sankov, however, believed he could get a better deal from Battenberg and the

Conservatives. Not just the restoration of the Tarnovo Constitution, but also an end to Russian influence in Bulgaria. The Liberals had not forgotten how the Tsar had supported the 1881 coup, and the contradiction between the Liberals‘ principles and the autocratic government of

Alexander III was significant. The Russian agents had simply worn out their welcome. As the

British Ambassador to Vienna put it, ―Things in Bulgaria, I hope, look more promising; for the

Russians had tried to carry matters with so high a hand as to make the rival parties among the

Bulgarians forget their animosities for the moment and united them against the two Generals.‖619

256

T sankov went to Battenberg and presented his own ultimatum, demanding the return of the

Tarnovo Constitution. When Battenberg attempted to place conditions, T sankov reportedly replied ―Alles oder gar nichts‖ (All or nothing).620 Faced with a loss of personal power no matter what would happen, cooperation with the Liberals would at least allow Battenberg to save his reputation and gain popularity in Bulgaria, so he agreed.

T sankov and Battenberg sprung their surprise upon the Russians not long later.

Battenberg, seemingly obeying Russian commands, opened the National Assembly on

September 4th/16th, 1883, and stated that the only purpose of the assembly was to ratify the budget and the railroad conventions, which the legislature promptly did. Two days later, however, the Assembly declared that it was the ―unanimous desire of the assembly‖ that

Battenberg restore the Tarnovo Constitution.621 According to one account, T sankov gave a rousing endorsement to this motion, whereupon Sobolev and Kaul‘bars promptly left the

Assembly room, followed by ‗Shouts of triumph from the chamber‖622 The entire Assembly then adjourned to the palace to present its petition in person to Battenberg, even though it was nearly midnight now. The next day, on the 7th/19th of September, 1883, Alexander von Battenberg restored the Tarnovo Constitution. Stoilov, who returned to Sofia that very day, wrote in his diary that ―There is great joy. The Generals are expelled. The Constitution is restored.‖623

Though this had been what the Russians had wanted earlier, the way it had happened, by going around the back of Ionin and the generals, expressed a complete lack of confidence in

Sobolev and Kaul‘bars, who resigned on the same day after a few hurried telegrams between

Ionin, Girs, and Tsar Alexander III. As Charles Jelavich put it, ―thus the era of Sobolev and

257

Kaul‘bars came to an abrupt and unexpected end.‖624 Russian policy in Bulgaria had been dealt a stinging rebuke.

Consequences

On the one hand, Battenberg and the Liberals had scored a magnificent victory. Kaul‘bars and Sobolev had been forced to quite literally flee the country, and Ionin‘s prestige as a diplomat would never recover. But at the same time it was a victory won at the cost of souring Russia against Battenberg and the Bulgarian political parties still further. The reaction in Russia to the overthrow of Kaul‘bars and Sobolev was that of outright anger. As Kennan comments, ―the

Tsar‘s feelings must have been beyond expression.‖625 To have his hated cousin score such a public defeat of Russian policy would have been galling in the extreme to Alexander III. Nor were other Russians particularly more pleased. N. K. Girs, usually more restrained, certainly more willing to concede that the Generals had overstepped their bounds while in Bulgaria, nevertheless informed the Austrians that in his forty-five years of government service, he had never ―been involved in a matter that had disgusted him in the same degree.‖626 The Russian press promptly decided that Battenberg‘s actions had been the result of Austrian and German influence, and bemoaned the loss of Russian influence in the fledgling country. I. S. Aks kov‘s

’ labeled the entire business an Austrian intrigue in its October 1st/13th issue.627

Battenberg contributed to the problem with his customary lack of tact. Flush with victory, Battenberg felt that he was ―supported so widely by the Bulgarians that Russia will have to come down a peg,‖ as he reported in a telegram to his father on September 23rd / October 4th,

1883. Sometime later, Battenberg also wrote to his father on October 3rd/15th that ―The Tsar with

258 his limited mentality believes that I do not know the country; and the reason why he is now so furious is that he is feeling guilty.‖628 Out of these considerations, on the same day that Aks kov was calling the entire Bulgarian affair an Austrian intrigue, Battenberg sent a telegram to the

Tsar, in which he wrote that:

The present situation must not and cannot continue. Despite all that has happened, despite all the insults that your agents have inflicted upon us, I stretch out my hand to you, Sire. Bid your people to consider my views, to come to an agreement with me…for no matter what anyone may say, I love Russia with my whole heart; and no matter what anyone may say to contradict it, I have a feeling of deep friendship for Your Majesty‘s august person and for the whole of the Imperial family. 629

Even Egon Corti, usually quite sympathetic to Battenberg, said that ―these final assurances did not accord with the true facts, nor did they carry any conviction in St. Petersburg. Indeed, they did harm rather than good, for the Tsar regarded them simply as hypocrisy.‖630 Battenberg‘s reputation in St. Petersburg reached a new low point, and his telegram, laying the blame on

Russia‘s agents while magnanimously forgiving Russia did not improve matters. The Tsar‘s reply, coming a good month after Battenberg‘s telegram, was curt and cold. Alexander III had

―noted your assurances of loyalty. Your Highness will doubtless not question my good will.‖631

Warm and charitable forgiveness by all parties, this was not.

Ionin, meanwhile, took it upon himself to write a post-mortem for the recent disaster for

Russian politics. In October of 1883, after spending some time investigating and thinking, Ionin wrote a fifty-page memorandum on the problems of Russian policy in Bulgaria. He wrote that:

We ourselves could not determine our own goal, which we could have and need to follow in Bulgaria. In connection to this, we were entangled in the choosing of methods, as every agent of ours composed their own personal plan of action and destroyed the work of his predecessor… From the time of the Treaty of Berlin Russia never entirely justified those expectations which the Bulgarians put upon her. The ceaseless change of opinions, people, and systems, the transition

259

from the Tarnovo Constitution to a barely masked despotism, -- confused the minds and shook our popular credit… After the coup the Prince… had neither support in the country nor a foundation beneath his feet… Against him, protesting and indignant, stood all of Bulgaria, people of all parties, both the cautious and the utopian, the loyalists of Russia and her enemies… Together with this, and so as to even further compromise us, the Prince‘s clique made it seem as if they entirely placed themselves in the hands of Russia, and managed to have sent to Bulgaria ministers, who in such a fashion became the unwilling accomplices of the court camarilla… Among other things, in the heat of battle… the Generals were forced to set aside excessive care in their choosing of methods, particularly since on the sympathy of the country, in the current dictatorship, they could not particularly rely… Never would the Tarnovo Constitution have led us to the present and particularly for Russia unfortunate crisis, and most importantly under it we never would have been able to so powerfully compromise our influence and our prestige.632

Upon reading the report, Tsar Alexander III, who had approved of Battenberg‘s coup in 1881, commented simply that ―All of this is very detailed and clearly stated and just.‖633 Ionin‘s report was perhaps a bit charitable towards the specific Russian agents in Bulgaria, but it was a rather clear-eyed statement of just what had gone wrong. Ionin himself managed to come out the

Bulgarian crisis tolerably well, as in September the Tsar wrote that ―I am very satisfied with all the energetic actions of Ionin and I especially value his decisiveness, firmness, and his taking upon himself responsibility, and not asking for instructions from Petersburg every time, by which he once more demonstrated his ability and his resourcefulness.‖634 Ionin‘s career would survive.

Conclusion – The Open Crisis

By the fall of 1883, it was impossible to ignore the fact that Russo-Bulgarian relations were in a crisis. Up until now, almost all of the Russo-Bulgarian conflicts could be described as part of the normal give-and-take of Balkan politics. Not a good place for Russia to be in, but not a horrendous one either. The main exception, the 1881 Coup, was undeniably a blow to Russia‘s

260 position in Bulgaria, but at least Russia still found itself on the side of the Bulgarian monarch and one of the two political parties. Again, not a good turn of affairs, but a survivable one.

Now the battle lines were different. Battenberg and both Bulgarian political parties had arrayed themselves against the Russian Empire. And the expulsion of Sobolev and Kaul‘bars was not a petty political brawl. It was an open and public blow against Russia‘s position in Bulgaria, the sort of thing that could not be swept under the rug and quietly forgotten about.

This state of affairs had a number of causes. To begin with, Russia entered the administration of Sobolev and Kaul‘bars with an unfriendly Prince due to Parensov and Kumani, with limited freedom of action because of Ehrnrooth‘s coup, and with limited reservoirs of goodwill courtesy of Khitrovó and Remlingen. Yet the two Generals proceeded to wreck whatever remained of Russia‘s influence in Bulgaria with impressive alacrity. Their ―imperious and offensive‖635 actions were ―a European scandal.‖636 They were widely remarked upon to be disrespectful of both the Bulgarians and Prince Battenberg, and even the accounts which Sobolev himself writes of his tenure paint an unflattering picture. It is rarely an example of diplomatic nicety to inform one‘s fellow ministers that one can reduce them to political impotence at a wish, however blandly Sobolev describes it.637 Ignoring St. Petersburg‘s preference that they work together with Battenberg, Sobolev and Kaul‘bars took a steadfastly anti-German, anti-

Battenberg, pro-Liberal position that was guaranteed to cause conflict, and which the Russian state was unable or unwilling to do anything about.

Indeed, the Russian foreign policy apparatus found itself increasingly impotent during the growing crisis. Driven by his own personal loathing of Battenberg, the Tsar forced Russian policy into a confrontational and aggressive stance against Battenberg, so that by the end of the

261 period A. S. Ionin was putting forth plans for constitutional revisions that would reduce

Battenberg to a mere puppet-king.638 Some manner of climactic confrontation was inevitable, and previous Russo-Bulgarian conflicts meant that when the confrontation came, Russia lost. Yet even this did not seem to prompt a rethinking of Russian policy in Bulgaria – for all that Ionin‘s approach had failed, the Tsar declared himself satisfied with the way Ionin had carried out his orders.

To be entirely fair, there were other factors involved in this crisis of Russo-Bulgarian relations. Alexander von Battenberg was in no position to teach Remlingen or Sobolev about etiquette, in light of his disastrous visit to St. Petersburg. R. J. Crampton described the Prince as

―blotting almost every page of his copybook‖ with the Russians, which is an accurate description of Battenberg‘s actions.639 He was indiscreet in his opposition to Russian policies, he refused

Russian medals, he forced his way into the Tsar‘s private chambers and then snubbed the

Emperor of all Russias by not being around to receive him when Alexander III paid a visit. Little wonder that the Tsar grew to loathe his cousin. Then, not long afterwards the rest of Russia was brought about to Alexander III‘s point of view when Europe was greeted to the spectacle of two senior Russian generals being forced to flee Bulgaria in abject defeat. It was a stinging humiliation for a Great Power.

Russo-Bulgarian relations, which had begun so positively only four years previously, could now be well and truly said to be antagonistic. Yet there would be more conflict before the final break occurred.

532 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 63. 533 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches

262

Archiv, XV. 19, No. 25, Sofia, 1 July 1882, in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 228. 534 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 110; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 103; Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 221. 535 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 105 536 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 111. 537 Leonid Nikolaevich Sobolev, ―K Noveishei Istorii Bolgarii,‖ k i in , LI (1886), 704-705. 538 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 63. 539 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 729. 540 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 10 July 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 8. 541 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 6 March 1880, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 2, List 47 to 48. 542 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 3 March 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 49. 543 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 10 July 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 8. 544 Kennedy to Granville, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, 78/3414, No. 57, Sofia, 25 June 1882, in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 223. 545 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 228. 546 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 106-107. 547 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 285-286; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 107-108. 548 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 726. 549 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 24 November 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 28. 550 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 26 November, 1882, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 29. 551 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism , 109; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 117; Biegeleben to Kalnoky, HHS, XV 20, no. 3A-E, reserve, Sofia, Jan 9, 1883, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 109. 552 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 706, 726. 553 Ibid., 712. 554 Ibid., 715. 555 Ibid., 715-716. 556 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 109-110; Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 715. 557 Radev, oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij , 1 :368 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 111; Memorandum from Stoilov to Battenberg, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 140 to 141; Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 717. 558 Memorandum from Stoilov to Battenberg, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 141 to 142. 559 Ibid., List 142. 560 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 718. 561 Memorandum from Stoilov to Battenberg, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 142 to 143. 562 Radev, oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij , 1 :369-370; Biegeleben to Kalnoky, HHS, XV 20, no. 11A-D, Sofia, March 19, 1883; Lascelles to Granville, FO, 78/3528, no. 15, Sofia, March 17, 1883; all in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 111; Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 721-722; 563 Memorandum from Stoilov to Battenberg, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 144. 564 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 718. 565 Ibid., 721-722. 566 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 113; Memorandum from Stoilov to Battenberg, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 145 567 Memorandum from Stoilov to Battenberg, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 146. 568 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 113 569 Ibid., 111-114. 570 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 726-727. 571 Ibid., 733. 572 Ibid., 736. 573 Ibid., 737-738.

263

574 Ibid., 740-742. 575 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XV. 20, No. 4, Sofia, 26 January 1883, in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 230. 576 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 134. 577 Panaretov to Stoilov, Salzburg, 18 July 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 1, Delo 221, List 93 to 95. 578 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XV. 20, No. 4, Sofia, 26 January 1883, in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 230. 579 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 231. 580 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 119. 581 The article in full is reproduced in Thornton to Granville, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, 65/1155, no. 95, St. Petersburg, 16 April 1883, in Ibid., 120. 582 Vlangali to Girs, St. Petersburg, 24 November / 5 December 1882, in Ibid., 121. 583 A. N. Shcheglov, ―Russkoe Ministerstvo v Bolgarii: Vremia Aleksandra Battenbergskago‖ (A Russian Ministry in Bulgaria: The Time of Alexander of Battenberg), Istoricheskii Viestnik, CXXVI (Nov., 1911), 578-583 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 236 584 Telegram from Tepchilischov, Moscow, to Stoilov, Paris, 26 May / 7 June 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 213. 585 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 67. 586 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 288. 587 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 113. 588 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 288; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 113; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 122-123. 589 Wolkenstein to ―Mein sehr verehrter Gonner,‖ 2 October 1885, in Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 114. 590 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 301. 591 Ibid., 303. 592 Grekov, Bucharest, to Stoilov, Vienna, 6 July 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 233 to 238. 593 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 115. 594 Corti, Battenberg, 140-141. 595 A. F. Golovin, Fürst Alexander I. von Bulgarien (1879-1886) (Wien: C. Fromme, 1896), 240 in Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 427 596 Green to Pauncefoote, FO, 102/23, pvt. Letter, Scutari, Aug. 15, 1883 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism 124 597 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 124 598 Wolkenstein to Kalnoky, HHS, X 73, vertraulich, St. P., 20 July/1 August 1883, in Ibid., 124 599 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 297 600 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 124; Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de 116. 601 Wolkenstein to Kalnoky, HHS, X 73, no. 2, geheim, privatschreiben, St. P., Aug 2/14, 1883 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 125. 602 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 294. 603 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 124-125. 604 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 3 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 73 to 74. 605 Konstantinovich (Battenberg‘s secretary), Sofia, to Stoilov, Petersburg, 20 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 263. 606 Biegeleben to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XV 20, tel. no. 33, Sofia, 7 September 1883, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 130. 607 Konstantinovich (Battenberg‘s secretary), Sofia, to Stoilov, Petersburg, 19 August 1883; TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 261; Nachovich, Sofia, to Stoilov, St. Petersburg, 15 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 245 to 247; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 126; Skazkin, Kone o- ko-

264

ge m n kogo o i , 302-304 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 126-127; Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 240. 608 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 144. 609 Ibid., 148-149. 610 Nachovich, Sofia, to Stoilov, St. Petersburg, 15 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 245 to 247; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 127-129. 611 Nachovich, Sofia, to Stoilov, St. Petersburg, 15 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 245 to 247. 612 Ibid., 613 Ciphered Telegram from Stoilov, St. Petersburg to Konstantinovich, Sofia, 13 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 254. 614 Ciphered Telegram from Stoilov, Petersburg to Konstantinovich, Sofia, 15 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 383, List 257. 615 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 11 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 75. 616 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 24 August 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 78 to 79. 617 Memorandum of Konstantin Stoilov on the situation of politics in Bulgaria, August, 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 64. 618 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 132. 619 Sir Henry Elliot to Sir Henry Ponsonby, Vienna, 23 September 1883, in Buckle. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series, 3:444-445. 620 Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, 135-136. 621 Dnevnitsi na tretoto obiknoveno narodno silbranie. Vtora sessiya [Minutes of the third regular National Assembly. Second session] (3 vols.; Sofia, 1883-1884), I, 1-5 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 243. 622 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 154. 623 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 7 September, 1883, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 4, List 81. 624 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 134. 625 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 117. 626 Both Kennan and Jelavich refer to this comment, with Kennan offering the direct quote, though they differ as to who in fact it was said to. Kennan states that it was directed to Ambassador Wolkenstein, and cites Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, 147 in Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 117. Jelavich, however has this said to Welsersheimb, another Austrian agent, and cites a letter to that effect, Welsersheimb to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, X 73, vertraulich, St. Petersburg, Oct. 5th/17th, 1883 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 140-141. 627 Aks kov, l i n kii op o ’, 535 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 141. 628 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 290-291. 629 Ibid., 290. 630 Ibid., 290. 631 Ibid., 292. 632 Quoted in Kosik, Russkaya Politika v Bolgarii, 72-73. 633 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 330-333, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 137. 634 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 318, in Ibid., 137. 635 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 134. 636 Skazkin, Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i , 284 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 121. 637 Sobolev, ―K noveishei istorii bolgarii,‖ 716. 638 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 126. 639 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 67.

265

Chapter 9: The Unification of Bulgaria, 1883-1885

After the dramatic administration of Kaul‘bars and Sobolev, Russo-Bulgarian relations quieted down for the next two years. New Russian officials were, perforce, dispatched. Prince

Mikhail Aleksandrovich Kantakuzen replaced Kaul‘bars as Minister of War, and in 1884 Ionin was recalled and replaced by Aleksandr Ivanovich Ko iander. This is not to say that nothing happened during those two years, but there were no events which even came close to approaching the excitement of the summer and fall of 1883. Nevertheless, a few matters do deserve some brief attention.

The Two Year Lull – Internal Politics

The return of the Tarnovo Constitution also signaled other major changes in Bulgarian politics—the fall of the Conservatives and the splintering of the Liberals into multiple factions.

The Conservatives had made an agreement with T sankov that the Constitution, though restored, would also be somewhat altered. Changes were proposed, including a smaller legislature, fewer elections, and property and educational qualifications for voting. T sankov and the Conservatives then forced these changes through the legislature on December 5th/17th, 1883, utilizing some dubious political tactics. In accordance with their prior agreement with T sankov, the

Conservatives then resigned from the government and allowed him to form a new ministry.640

Dragan T sankov had underestimated, however, just how much outrage this would cause.

Petko Karavelov, leader of the center of the Liberal Party and freshly returned from his Rumelian exile, declared the legislation as a ―second coup‖ in his new newspaper, the Turnovska

Konstitutsiya (Tarnovo Constitution).641 The Liberal Central Office condemned T sankov and his

266 allies as traitors, and he was defeated in the next elections in the late spring of 1884 with only

28% of the popular vote. Karavelov took his place as the Minister-President of Bulgaria, and one of his first acts was to repeal the December 5th/17th legislation.642 This marked the end of the

Conservative Party as an electoral force. They had achieved their political ambitions in the

December 5th/17th law, only to have it rejected utterly by the population. Even with T sankov‘s changes to the election law, the Conservatives received only 48 seats in the Fourth National

Assembly, compared to 139 for the Liberals.643 At the same time, T sankov and Karavelov had between the two of them split the Liberal Party beyond hope of repair into the Tsankovists and

Karavelovists.644

Karavelov‘s most significant act, for the purposes of Russo-Bulgarian relations, was that he then proceeded to settle the Railroad Issue once and for all. Karavelov proposed a railroad bill that would give the government direct control over the railways, and the government would be the ones to build them. Introducing the legislation, Karavelov said that, ―Private profits play a secondary role [when railroads are run by the state], the government is satisfied that its interests are not being injured and it even reconciles itself to small annual losses, so long as the line serves the local development of the country and provides the population with the conveniences required in a civilized country.‖645 The bill was passed on January 31st/February 12th, 1885. The following

June, Ivan Grozev, a Bulgarian contractor, was commissioned to begin building the Vienna-

Constantinople line.646 The railroad issue which had for so long bedeviled Russo-Bulgarian relations could now become a thing of memory.

267

The Two Year Lull – Efforts towards a Russo-Bulgarian Rapprochement

The other major trend of this period was the movement towards a rapprochement in

Russo-Bulgarian relations. Once the immediate irritants of Sobolev and Kaul‘bars were removed, fundamental geopolitical reality began to reassert itself. Nothing had happened during the last few years to change the fact that Bulgaria still had irredentist hopes, still had a hostile

Turkey just to the south, and still needed a Great Power protector – nor had anything changed the

Russian calculation that Bulgaria was the best route towards geostrategic goals that were a century old. There was another factor as well. St. Petersburg still controlled the Bulgarian military through the Russians that occupied all of the officer ranks above the grade of captain. At this point there were approximately three hundred senior Russian officers in Bulgaria, and a further two thousand ‗young Russian commanders‘ in the Bulgarian army.647 There was a genuine worry that if another European war broke out, then Bulgaria would become collateral damage. These worries were particularly heightened following the Panjdeh Incident in March of

1885, when Russia and England seemed on the verge of war over Afghanistan. As Stoilov wrote to Nachovich immediately after the incident, ―if there will be a war between England and Russia, it will be a general war and Russia will formally or de facto annex Bulgaria; Kantakuzen will receive his instructions from Russia,‖ and between the Russian officers and the Russified

Bulgarian officers, a quick coup will be easily effected.648 Some manner of reconciliation thus became a political necessity, and the particular project of the Conservatives, who still had the ear of the Prince if not much influence in the assembly – Stoilov‘s letters to Nachovich mention the importance of reconciliation frequently.649

268

Distrust of the other factions in Bulgaria was also a factor in moving towards a rapprochement with Russia. While Battenberg, the Liberals, and the Conservatives had been able to cooperate to drive Kaul‘bars and Sobolev out of the country, there was precious little trust between the various factions in the Bulgarian government. The prospect of Russian assistance remained a tempting one, particularly given that Battenberg was not terribly popular in the country.xxxii Alexander von Battenberg made that point exquisitely clear in a conversation with

Prince Kantakuzen, telling him in August of 1885 that,

In Bulgaria there are only two powers: Russia and myself, and they must act together. If they do, all the local actors such as Karavelov, Tsankov, Stoilov, etc., are worth nothing. Without collaboration, however, between Russia and the ruling Prince, all their petty passions and vanities make their appearance, and they bring the country to anarchy. Neither Russia nor I is able to count on a single one of these so-called parties; they only lie to us and exploit our mutual distrust and our unhappy relations. I fully understand that this situation cannot continue; it is necessary that either you let me come to Petersburg or that I leave Bulgaria.650

Were Russia and Battenberg to work side-by-side, then they would be able to dominate the

Bulgarian nation.

There were concrete steps made in that direction from both sides, with varying degrees of success. The Tsar still had the right to appoint Bulgaria‘s Minister of War, and in February,

1884, the Russian Prince M. Kantakuzen was chosen as the Minister of War. Kantakuzen, a scion of an ancient Russian noble family and one of the high commanders of the Russo-Turkish

War of 1877-78, proved to be an extremely successful choice. The usually dreadfully

Russophobic Adolf Koch wrote of Kantakuzen that he was ―extremely prudent, cultivated man

xxxii Ko iander relates an amusing anecdote to this effect in one of his reports. He reported how the editor of the Bulgarian journal the Svirka (―Whistle‖) had accused Battenberg of embezzling funds to be used for the upkeep of the Palace. The editor was hauled into court, tried, and fined, and the entire sum of the fine was promptly collected in the courtroom, with the first to donate money to the cause being the prosecutor. Cited in Kosik, V. I., Russkaya Politika v Bolgarii, pg. 101 in Petr Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia‖ (Rossiĭska ia Akademi ia Nauk, Institut Slav ianovedeni ia, 2003), 64.

269 of tact and a very able minister… He was always polite and obliging in his relations with the prince, and never infringed in the slightest degree any rule of polite society; he had received instructions from St. Petersburg to be polite, but reserved, and he acted accordingly... His chief merit was that he placed himself on a footing of fellowship with the Bulgarian officers.‖651

Colonel Nikolaĭ Vasil'evich Kaul'bars, the older brother of the recent Minister of War and a close agent of the Tsar, was sent in to Bulgaria to try and calm the military situation, resulting in the

Russian government expressing a clear policy of non-intervention in local Bulgarian political affairs, a kind of tacit admission that mistakes had been made.652 Battenberg himself sent a number of emissaries to St. Petersburg to try and seek some sort of modus vivendi with the

Russian state – including the Metropolitan Kliment of Tarnovo, Colonel N. V. Kaul'bars, and the

Russian Ambassador to Vienna, Prince A. B. Lobanov-Rostovski, among others. 653 He persuaded Ko iander, the new Russian Consul in Sofia, to convey the following words to the

Emperor on January 18th, 1885: ―I hold the powerful hope that the coming year will present to me the opportunity and occasion to give a visible and tangible evidence of my unimpeachable devotion and undying loyalty to his Imperial Majesty and his August Consort.‖654 Ko iander noted in a later dispatch from February 4th that the Prince had taken to inviting Ko iander to the

Palace for breakfast and dinner, and just visiting the Russian Consulate to discuss Russo-

Bulgarian relations.655

Of course, this rapprochement ran into a few snags. Upon receiving Ko iander‘s report, the Tsar wrote upon it that ―Never will I believe that he is being honest; and this lying is turning into brazenness and shows once again what a pathetic character this Prince is,‖ and noted that he hoped that Ko iander wasn‘t going to give in to the Prince‘s courting.656 Furthermore, while

270

Prince Kantakuzen may have acted entirely correctly and above the fray, Ko iander made it perfectly clear that the Russian state was opposed to Battenberg in every way, and that

Ko iander‘s personal mission was to evict the Prince from Bulgaria. In a letter to Nachovich on

July 24th, 1885, Stoilov mentioned how the Metropolitan Kliment had visited Ko iander, and how the latter had said that ―his instructions are the same as before, and that ‗He needs to be gotten rid of‘.‖657 To that end, he funded an anti-Battenberg newspaper by T sankov,658 had a conversation with Stefan Stambolov about the best timing for Battenberg‘s removal,659 and had a meeting with T sankov and Karavelov where he heavily hinted that only an abdication by

Battenberg could secure Russian support for Bulgaria‘s national goal of unification with Eastern

Rumelia.660 To be fair, Battenberg didn‘t always help his case. He continued to treat the Tsar in a fashion that was altogether too casual for a petty Balkan princeling dealing with the Emperor of

Russia. In April of 1885, Battenberg mentioned to the German Kaiser Wilhelm I that he had always written to Alexander III as one cousin to another. The Kaiser was unimpressed. ―Cousin, cousin! An emperor is an emperor. My own son signs himself ‗Your most obedient servant‘ when he writes to me.‘‖661 So while there was certainly some desire for a rapprochement, it only went so far.

Still, geopolitical realities remained what they were, and Russia in particular was becoming increasingly focused on affairs in Central Asia – constant troubles in the Balkans were not in the Russian government‘s interests. 662 The result was that on August 20th / September 1st of 1885, Battenberg met with the Russian Foreign Minister, N. K. Girs, at the Austrian resort town of Franzensbad. Russia was far from forgiving of Battenberg‘s previous escapades, but nevertheless Girs said that Russia was willing to consider reconciliation with the Bulgarian

271

Prince. His abdication and replacement was not practical. In addition, the two men discussed the prospect of the unification of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia, something which had been increasingly in the air in the Balkans at this time. Battenberg knew that some preparations were being made, but nothing in the nearby future, and assured Girs of this.663 Girs, in turn, replied that, so long as the status quo in Bulgaria was maintained, some kind of rapprochement between

Sofia and St. Petersburg was possible.664 Girs would have to consult with Tsar Alexander III, but as the historian George Kennan wrote, it seemed that this was a meeting from which both Girs and Battenberg emerged ‗slightly encouraged‘. Battenberg would regain at least the limited support of his greatest backers, and Girs, ever cautious in the conduct of Russian foreign policy, would have calm and stability in the Balkans.665

Warnings Unheeded

Instead, barely two weeks after the meeting at Franzensbad, events would lead to the shattering of any hopes of an amelioration of Russo-Bulgarian relations. The Unification of

Bulgaria put Battenberg and the Balkans once more onto the center of the global stage, against the express wishes of the Russians. No one expected the Unification to occur when it did.666

Even the Bulgarians of the Principality, who had been hoping for unification since the Treaty of

Berlin, were focused more on bringing Macedonia back into the fold at the moment.667 Everyone in the Principality, and indeed in Europe at large, realized that the division of Bulgaria into the

Principality and into Eastern Rumelia was an artificial division that would not last, but no one expected it to break down quite so quickly.668 The people of Eastern Rumelia, however, had

272 other ideas, and as was becoming typical, the Russian foreign policy apparatus fell down on the job.

To begin with, there was little coordination between different branches of the Russian diplomatic corps. According to Evgeniĭ L'vov, a Russian correspondent for the St. Petersburg

oe V m i and one of the first people to arrive in Rumelia immediately after the Unification, the military and diplomatic agents in Sofia and Plovdiv (then called frequently) rarely communicated. For instance, the Plovdiv Consulate had no idea that the Sofia Consulate had had a falling out with Karavelov, while the Sofia Consulate claimed that they were kept in the dark about the preparations for the Rumelian coup and Unification movement (these preparations and warnings will be covered in more detail shortly). Indeed, the Sofia and Plovdiv consulates were thoroughly at odds on many a program. L‘vov wrote of how the diplomats in

Sofia recently were staunchly against Battenberg, against the Unification, and in favor of

Karavelov (this being prior to the falling out), at the very moment that the Plovdiv diplomats were for Battenberg, for Unification, and against Karavelov. This occurred because, so far as

L‘vov was aware – and he had interviewed most of the leading participants – neither the Sofia

Consulate nor the Plovdiv Consulate ―ever received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a political program or general instructions.‖669 The disagreements between the Sofia and Plovdiv agents was so bad that, as L‘vov wrote acidly,

Having no categorical instructions and utterly unknowing of Russia‘s plans, the Sofia consulate never acted together with the Plovdiv one, to the point that one might think these were not two diplomatic agents of one and the same state, but the representatives of two different countries, often (when passions, personal conflicts and competitions overflowed) utterly opposed to one another.670

273

Likewise, there was also a great deal of feuding between the Russian agents stationed in Plovdiv.

Recalling the struggles of Parensov and Davydov, and Ehrnrooth and Kumani, there was a sharp divide between the Russian Consul, Aleks ndr Grig r'evich Sor kin, and the Military Attaché

Lieutenant-Colonelxxxiii kko, over the question of who, precisely, should be in charge of the

Russian agents in Eastern Rumelia. This led to a split among the pro-Russian population of

Eastern Rumelia. As L‘vov writes, towards the end the situation between the two men was so extreme that kko was unwilling to allow Sor kin to read his dispatches prior to telegraphing them to St. Petersburg, and as a result had to send them by mail.671

Between this and the constant chaos in the Principality, the Russian attitude towards a putative unification of Bulgaria took on a decidedly schizophrenic cast. On the one hand,

Unification had previously been a policy that received Russian support, and throughout 1882 and

1883, Russian agents in Eastern Rumelia quietly encouraged unification movements. In 1884, as the Dreikaiserbund alliance was in its final stages of negotiation, the Russian state decided that no, a Unification just at this moment in time was not in Russia‘s interests.672 Nel dov, the

Russian Ambassador to Constantinople, sent a telegram to the acting consul in Plovdiv in March of 1885, subsequently published, which stated that the Russian government disapproved of all the Unionist agitation and meetings taking place.673 Except this information somehow never penetrated to Sor kin, who continued to support a unification. On several occasions Sor kin openly announced that Russia approved of the agitation for the unification of Bulgaria.674 Like

Khitrovó or Ionin, Sor kin was an experienced diplomat, having begun his career in 1867 and spent time as the Consul-General in Constantinople.675 Yet he was either unaware of his own government‘s clearly stated policy, or chose to ignore it for his own reasons. xxxiii To be precise, a Podpolk nik, lit. ―Under-Colonel.‖

274

The general state of confusion in the Russian foreign apparatus also meant that Russia was caught off-guard by the actual Unification. Sor kin sent a stream of information to St.

Petersburg about the movement in Eastern Rumelia, mentioning large pro-Unification meetings in Sliven, Panagyurishte, , , , Kotel, , , and

Koprivshtitsa.676 Yet Lieutenant-Colonel kko was writing to St. Petersburg in March of 1883 that, while the unification of the three parts of Bulgaria (The Principality, Eastern Rumelia, and

Macedonia) remained the ―ideal goal of every Bulgarian,‖ it was unlikely to take place in the absence of Russian support and so long as the Principality‘s internal situation was so confused.677

The result of all of this was that the Unification came as something of a shock to the

Russian government.

The Rumelian Coup

And yet, it should not have been. There was a great deal of desire among the people of

Eastern Rumelia for unification with the Principality. The south of Bulgaria was closer to the

Ottomans, was more ardently anti-Turkish, and had seen the bulk of the fighting and of the atrocities during the 1870s – Batak, site of the infamous massacre, was in Eastern Rumelia.xxxiv

And as had been mentioned much earlier, the administration put in place by the Great Powers was far too large and far too unwieldy for the small province.

The years since the Congress of Berlin had done little to resign the Rumelians to their fate. The province had its own legislature, but the Ottomans retained veto power, which they frequently used to the detriment of the Bulgarians. They vetoed laws about the press, and also xxxiv See Chapter 1.

275 blocked a plan for an educational system, due to the belief that the gymnasiums included in the latter might have military purposes. The Ottomans also vetoed a loan which the city of Plovdiv raised to try and help local agriculture recover from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and

Constantinople also vetoed the creation of a Rumelian national bank. The Ottomans also vetoed a railway from to , which would have allowed Rumelian merchants to avoid paying the expensive Oriental Railway Company and Ottoman customs levies. Relative to the

Principality, Eastern Rumelia was also much more heavily taxed, and was subject to an unfavorable exchange rate with the Turkish Pound, which resulted in yet higher taxes and also very high pay for administrators and officials.678

Furthermore, the province was in a state of considerable economic distress. Just like the

Principality, Eastern Rumelia suffered from dislocations and changed markets and trade patterns, yet they also suffered more war damage and more onerous interference from the Ottomans. The towns of , once the most prosperous, suffered. Sliven‘s export trade, primarily with Romania, fell 75% between 1872 and 1879, and it was hardly unique. Property prices in

Kotel rose by 50% in five years. 679

The desire for Unification, then, was there all along in Eastern Rumelia – it took new developments in 1884 and 1885 to make it seem achievable. One of these developments was the arrival of a new consul, Aleks ndr Grig r'evich Sor kin, who in the spring of 1884 announced that Unification was only a matter of time, and that Russia would unite Bulgaria just as it had liberated the country. Others took up more active agitation as well, with Zakhariĭ Sto ianov publishing his pi ki po b lg ki e ni i (Notes on the Bulgarian Uprisings) in 1884, which intimated that Rumelia, having rebelled once, could do so again. In early 1885, revolutionary

276 committees began to pop up in both Rumelia and the Principality, with Sto ianov establishing one in Plovdiv and calling it the Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee. Initially it was aimed at sparking a revolution in Macedonia as well as uniting Eastern Rumelia and the

Principality. When the Macedonian effort failed, Sto ianov reorganized it as the Committee for

Union and refocused on the latter goal. By the late summer of 1885, the Committee was developing concrete plans and taking action to prepare for them. The Unification would take the form of a quick, bloodless coup by Bulgarian-trained officers, which would then be presented to

Europe as a fait accompli. There would be public demonstrations and agitation to make it clear that this was a popular coup, but it was fundamentally a military coup, not a rebellion.680

When Battenberg returned to Bulgaria on August 28th/September 9th, he was met by two members of the Committee for Union – a Macedonian-born newspaperman named Dimit"r

Khristov Rizov, and a major in the Rumelian militia, Atanasov Mutkurov. They informed him that a revolution was to occur very soon and beseeched Battenberg to accept Eastern

Rumelia as a new part of the Bulgarian state. At first, Battenberg did not take these two men very seriously, according to his chaplain, Koch. After speaking with Karavelov, who had been involved in Rumelian politics during his exile from Bulgaria, and dispatching an aide to Plovdiv to find out the truth of the matter, it dawned on Battenberg that events were in fact quite serious.

He tried to persuade the revolutionary representatives to postpone their uprising. The very last thing Battenberg needed at this juncture was to have his assurances to Girs at Franzensbad rendered false.681

Unfortunately for everyone involved, events were now spiraling out of control of the original conspirators. On September 3rd/15th, enthusiasts in Panagyurishte raised the flag of

277 revolt ahead of time, followed shortly by Kotel. On the 4th/16th, the Rumelian government responded by arresting several leading revolutionaries, including Sto ianov. Matters come to a head two days later, when a detachment of the Rumelian militia under a Major Raĭcho Nikolov marched into Plovdiv.682

At this time, the Russian agents in Eastern Rumelia were Lieutenant-Colonel M. M.

Chichagov, kko‘s replacement, and Sor kin‘s assistant, Vice-Consul G. V. Igel'strom – Sor kin himself being on vacation. These two men were to represent Russian policy in Rumelia, yet at the critical moment they found themselves uncertain of how to act and lacking in instructions for what to do. On the night of the coup (September 5th-6th/17th-18th), according to L‘vov, Chichagov went to Igel'strom at the Russian Consulate for a final decision. Both men had been riding around the countryside, trying to tamp down on the Unification movement, and also calm the

Rumelian government which was duly suspicious that this was all a Russian plot to begin with.683 As L‘vov writes, ―Chichagov asked [Igel'strom a categorical question ‗Does Russia want a Unification or no?‘ Mr. Igel'strom, having neither news, nor instructions, did not know what to tell him and in large steps paced the room.‖ Chichagov explained that there were sufficient troops around Plovdiv that if he roused them, he was certain he could stop the uprising.

Yet as he put it, ―I am not a politician, but a soldier, my task is to carry out your instructions.

Will you give me the authority to take these measures [of rousing the troops]? If not, then there will be a coup.‖ Igel'strom at length answered that he did not have the right to spill Bulgarian blood, and so they would try to use persuasion.684

Yet Chichagov proved to be correct, and in the absence of Russian-backed military force, the Rumelian coup was successful. The following morning, the Rumelian Governor-General,

278

Gavril Krustevich was plucked from his home while eating breakfast by the revolutionaries. He was paraded around the town in an open carriage beside a sword-waving schoolmistress, and by lunchtime was being trundled off north to Sofia, where, as George

Kennan describes, ―he was held in a species of polite house-arrest until the excitement was over.‖685 In any case, it should be noted that Krustevich himself was a patriotic Bulgarian, and willingly resigned the leadership of the province.686 By the evening of September 6th/18th, 1885, the revolutionaries had proclaimed the Unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.

Bulgaria and Rumelia Joined

This put Prince Battenberg and Minister-President Karavelov in an extremely difficult position. Whatever the confusion that reigned among Russia‘s agents in Eastern Rumelia, in the

Principality of Bulgaria the Russian state had by this point made it unequivocally clear that it opposed any Bulgarian Unification at this time. The conversation between Battenberg and Girs at

Franzensbad alone was enough to make this clear.

Yet the question of what to do with a Rumelian coup and an already-proclaimed

Unification was a bit trickier to answer. The Russian agents in Sofia were scarcely surer of themselves than Chichagov or Igel'strom. 687 Ko iander conveyed, via T sankov, the following message to the Prince, ―Although I have not yet received any instructions from my Government,

I consider it vital to personally beg His Highness to be extremely careful in his decisions.‖

Ko iander was afraid, not unreasonably, that the ―crossing of so much as a single Bulgarian soldier into Rumelia‖ could give the Ottomans cause to invade, and spark the Great Eastern

Crisis anew. According to Stambolov, this was duly conveyed to the Prince.688 Both Ko iander

279 and Kantakuzen were also writing telegrams to St. Petersburg, asking their respective chiefs for a variety of instructions – should Russian officers be allowed to cross the border to Rumelia? What should be the official line of the Russian state towards the Unification? The fundamental issue was the same one as Chichagov had confronted a little earlier – as Ko iander wrote in one of his reports, ―To stop the Unification effort, which if successful will finally doom our situation in

Bulgaria, can be done only through force.‖689 But days would pass before instructions would begin to arrive from the Russian government, and in the meantime, the center of political gravity remained with the Bulgarians.690

Karavelov was in Tarnovo when news of the revolt broke, and his first reaction was to hedge and to equivocate. He declared that Bulgaria could not, at the moment, afford to pay for the Rumelian tribute in addition to its own various debts.691 Battenberg, meanwhile was at a loss for what to do. He had no wish to violate his recent promises to Girs. It fell to Stefan Stambolov, the leader of the most radical wing of the former Liberal party, to force Battenberg to some manner of decision. Stambolov, soon after the Bulgarians were informed of the situation, told

Battenberg that, ―Sire, the union is made—the revolt is an accomplished fact, past recall, and the time for hesitation is gone by. Two roads lie before Your Highness: the one to Philippopolis and as much farther as God may lead; the other to Sistoff, the Danube, and Darmstadt. I counsel you to take the crown the nation offers you.‖692 In other words, Battenberg was caught between the

Bulgarians and the Russians, and his next actions would of necessity anger someone. If

Battenberg accepted the revolution, he would bring the wrath of the Tsar down upon himself, especially in light of Franzensbad. If he rejected his subjects‘ long-sought goal, his own enraged people would force him out of his office and send him home to Darmstadt. When presented with

280 the choice in that sense, Battenberg sided with the Bulgarians. The Russians may have their vengeance later, but the Bulgarians would force his abdication now, and in any case, it was unlikely that the Russians would ever be fully reconciled to his presence, not after the last few years.

So, Battenberg sent off several telegrams, including one to his father saying that for better or for worse, he was leaving for Plovdiv.693 He also sent word to the Tsar asking for Russian approval of the unification, though interestingly, he did not try to communicate with Ko iander, either due to lack of time or possibly a desire not to get any contrary advice.694 Battenberg then made his way to Plovdiv to take control of the revolt. Joined en-route by Karavelov, Battenberg arrived in Plovdiv on the 8th/20th of September, where he was greeted by Chichagov and

Igel'strom. In fact, Chichagov went ahead to greet Battenberg, finding the Prince and Karavelov in the village of Bani. According to L‘vov, the meeting occurred as followed:

The Prince slept in an armchair; in a similar chair slept his first minister. Upon the arrival of our military agent, the Prince was awakened. Seeing Chichagov, the Prince rushed to greet him and cried out: ―God himself has sent you to me! What is the news out of Russia?‖ Chichagov answered, that he himself had been hoping to ask the Prince about what orders he had from His Imperial Majesty. The Prince noted that he had sent a telegram, but did not receive an answer before departing [for Rumelia], and therefore expected, that our military agent would convey to him the views of our government. In the words of Mr. Chichagov, it was only now, for the first time, that ‗suspicions appeared that this matter was being conducted without us [the Russians ‘695

Lacking instructions to the contrary, Chichagov and Igel'strom tentatively supported Battenberg, who promptly set about charming all involved – including the two Russians themselves, whom

Battenberg praised to the skies (noting that if men like them had been in Sofia, then there would

281 never have been any unpleasantness between Russia and the Principality).xxxv Battenberg visited both the Orthodox-Christian cathedral and the chief mosque of the city, invoking the protection of God and Allah on the union which was, George Kennan writes, ―all the more likely to require the support of the Divine Power inasmuch as it was most unlikely to receive that of any of the earthly ones.‖ Battenberg finished the day by issuing an appeal for calm to the city, and came out of the Unification with a dramatically increased standing among the Bulgarian people. He became, according to Kennan, ―something of a national hero‖ for his actions.696

The Russian Response and its Consequences

For the first few days after the Unification, confusion reigned in Russian foreign policy.

The Tsar was visiting relatives in , and so there was no official governmental reply to the events of the Bulgarian Unification. Indeed, the unofficial response was initially positive.

―The Treaty of Berlin is broken!‖ Aks kov crowed, while other Russian newspapers such as the

oe V m i and the Russkie Vedomosti extended their congratulations to the Bulgarians.697 In

Eastern Rumelia, the Coup was followed by a feast at the Russian Consulate in Plovdiv, where the Unification was toasted in champagne.698

The Tsar‘s return to the scene promptly dispelled any hopes of Russian agreement to the

Unification. Tsar Alexander III‘s fury at the Unification knew no bounds. Not only was this an action taken in direct contravention of the Tsar‘s wishes for stability in the Balkans, it took place after Battenberg had assured Girs at Franzensbad that nothing of the sort was happening.

Wolkenstein, the Austrian Ambassador to Russia, reported in October that the Tsar viewed xxxv Among other things, Battenberg noted that there was not a single intelligent Bulgarian who had not first been charmed by the representatives of Russia, who did not afterwards receive ―des coups de pied dans le derrier,‖ that is, a kick in the hindquarters. L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 100-101, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 214.

282

Battenberg as ―an untruthful ingrate with a predilection for swindle, who, moreover, has most impudently insulted the Tsar, his benefactor.‖699 Alexander III, quite simply, felt that he had been lied to.700

Other prominent actors within Russia also made their displeasure known. Girs, of course, was the person most immediately concerned with the dialogues at Franzensbad, and if Alexander

III felt betrayed, then Girs‘s reputation was at stake. The assumption (likely false, but widely believed) was that Battenberg had known of the Unification beforehand. In such an event, there were only two possible conclusions for people in Russia to make. Either, as George Kennan put it, Girs ―had sanctioned a development which had turned out to be a triumph for Battenberg and had made Russia the laughing-stock of Europe,‖ or that Girs, ―an old and experienced statesman, had been tricked by a snip of a German princeling who had successfully lulled him into a sense of false security while preparing the putsch behind his back.‖701 When Battenberg protested in a telegram that he had known nothing of the Unification beforehand, Girs‘s reply was decidedly icy. ―Since Your Highness states that the Rumelian events took him by surprise, I would not venture to doubt it, but I deplore the dangerous adventure into which Bulgaria has thrown herself in so ill-considered a manner.‖702 Before the Unification, Girs had been if not a partisan of

Battenberg then at least less antagonistic to him than the rest of Russian officialdom, but now even his supply of patience was exhausted.

On September 9th/21st, 1885, the Tsar made public his extreme disapproval of the

Unification. Without consulting Girs or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tsar Alexander III also made one of the more fateful moves in the course of Russo-Bulgarian relations now by ordering the recall of all Russian officers in Bulgaria, from the Minister of War Prince Kantakuzen right

283 on down to the very last lieutenant. In one fell stroke, Bulgaria lost all of its military leadership.703 Ko iander was the only remaining Russian agent of note in Bulgaria, and he was ordered to avoid conversations with Battenberg.704 What Alexander III expected was that the recall of Russian officers would bring Bulgaria promptly to its knees. Indeed, this was a common sentiment in both Russia and Bulgaria, as there was a long-held opinion that it was only the presence of Russian officers in the Bulgarian army that allowed the country to avoid utter anarchy.705 Ko iander wrote before the Unification that ―Our departure from here would lead invariably to anarchy, and in the end to a foreign occupation, Austrian, Rumanian, Turkish… or ours…‖706 A. E. Vlangali, the Acting Russian Foreign Minister at this time, suggested something similar if less extreme, writing to the Tsar on September 7th/19th that it would be useful to recall the officers so as to bring Bulgaria under control, but that some volunteers could remain.707 The

Tsar believed that it was only Russian authority and influence kept the Bulgarian government propped up, and so the Tsar decided that it was now time to remove all of those supports. In theory, this would bring the recalcitrant Battenberg to heel.

The measure backfired in all particulars. Battenberg handled the situation with his by- now-customary lack of tact, remarking that that if Russian officers were the sort to desert their post at the first sign of danger then Bulgaria was well rid of them; but the Prince was also quite pleased by the Tsar‘s actions. Now, all the officers in the Bulgarian army were Bulgarians who would be loyal to him, and not the Tsar. It was the final victory that Battenberg had been struggling for since Parensov‘s day.708 At the same time, for public consumption Battenberg suggested that the recall of Russian troops was only temporary, and was merely a game being played for the benefit of Europe.709 The local Bulgarian army was likewise quite pleased at the

284 removal of Russian officers, which suddenly opened up a vast swathe of command positions for ambitious young Bulgarians. Others in Bulgaria were less sanguine. The National Assembly sent a delegation to beg the Tsar to reconsider his stance. The delegation, consisting of a mixture of

Bulgarians and Rumelians and led by the Metropolitan Kliment and the prominent Rumelian banker met with the Tsar on September 21st/October 3rd in Copenhagen.

For their troubles they were informed that while the Tsar considered unification desirable, the manner in which it had come about was against all Russian wishes. ―I shall do my best to save you from the perils into which you have brought yourselves,‖ the Tsar told them.710 The Tsar would not accept a Union under the aegis of Alexander von Battenberg.

What Alexander III failed to realize was that his actions were the most public blow to

Russo-Bulgarian relations yet inflicted. Always before, the various Russo-Bulgarian disagreements had occurred in the realm of upper-level politics and high finance. While questions about the railroads or the state council were of vital importance to political figures such as Battenberg, T sankov, and all the rest, they touched upon the lives of the Bulgarian peasantry very little. But the withdrawal of the Russian officers was a different matter altogether.

The Russian officers had been a constant presence in Bulgaria, and now they had disappeared.

The withdrawal came as a particular treachery, since it was now that Bulgaria needed them most, given the increasingly aggressive posture of Bulgaria‘s Balkan neighbors and the prospect of an

Ottoman attempt to recover Eastern Rumelia by force. Sir William White, the British

Ambassador to Constantinople, commented that ―Having paid the Russian officers like Princes during six years, they [the Bulgarians are now abandoned by them in their hour of need.‖711

Chichagov responded to the withdrawal order with a lengthy telegram in which he observed that

285

―The rumor of the recall of the officers produced a very poor impression.‖712 L‘vov wrote of how a great many among the Bulgarian intelligentsia and military were exceedingly nasty to the departing Russian officers, some even accusing them of desertion and betrayal, first for preventing any Bulgarians to rise in the ranks, and now leaving the country. The common people were calmer about it, but only because they flatly refused to believe that the Unification could occur without Russian support, and so presumed that this was just a political maneuver of some sort.713 By withdrawing the officers, Tsar Alexander III managed to simultaneously remove his most powerful tool of influence from Bulgaria, cede control of the military to Battenberg, and turn the Bulgarian people against him when years of Russian miscues in the country had not managed to do so. The Russian stand was a disaster on any number of levels.

The British agent in Bulgaria, Sir Frank Lascelles, had been out of the capital when the

Unification situation occurred, and hurried back to Sofia with all due haste. Once back in

Bulgaria, Lascelles could not help but marvel at the rapid turnaround in Russo-Bulgarian affairs, and at the depth of the Russian miscalculation which led to it. He laid out these thoughts in a private letter to a friend back in England, a letter that is worth reproducing at length, given

Lascelles‘s experience and insight with Bulgarian politics. Sir Frank Lascelles wrote that:

Since my return here I have been very much struck by the complete change that has taken place. Prince Alexander has become universally popular, and the Russians universally detested. His Highness, by placing himself at the head of the movement, has gained the hearts of all the Bulgarians, who will certainly resist to the very utmost of their power any attempt either to destroy the union or to dethrone his Highness. As regards the country therefore, his Highness‘s position is a very strong one. Of course, for some time he will find himself in a most difficult position with regards to the Powers, who, however, do not seem to have come to any understanding as to the course they are to follow. The Russians here are open-mouthed against the Prince, and their violent abuse of his Highness is doing much to destroy the very little influence which they still enjoy here. Their anger is intelligible, because they have been entirely mistaken as

286

to what has taken place. How far they were aware of the movement before it took place is difficult to say, but it is evident that they believed that, as soon as it was known that the Emperor disapproved of the movement, the Bulgarians would have deserted the Prince and left his Highness in a lurch. They were amazed that this was not the case, and that on the contrary Prince Alexander‘s popularity if possible increased. They then thought that, by recalling the officers, the army would be incapacitated from marching, and here again they were deceived, and it is really admirable that the army, deprived as it was of its officers, marched into Eastern Roumelia without the slightest disorder or confusion...714

The prospect of national reunification was the one force that was powerful enough to overcome

Russian prestige. Russia‘s favored position in Bulgaria had been built by Russian support for

Bulgarian independence and national unity. By standing against the Unification, Alexander III destroyed that very foundation. Likewise, Battenberg had managed to associate himself with

Bulgarian Unification and with the Bulgarian nationalist feeling, and so every attempt by the

Russians to remove Prince Battenberg was counted by the populace as a further attempt to reject the unification, and only further turned the Bulgarian people against their one-time patron.

The Resolution of the Bulgarian Unification

By mid-September of 1885, then, the Principality of Bulgaria and the former Ottoman

Province of Eastern Rumelia were united, and Europe‘s various Foreign Ministries tried to decide just what to do about it. The other Great Powers generally supported the Bulgarian

Unification, being aware that it would create a counterbalance to Russia in the Balkans – which put the Russian Empire in the awkward position of being the only Power, along with Turkey, to actually oppose the Unification. For that matter, even the Ottomans were not all that enthusiastic about trying to bring Bulgaria back into the fold.715

287

For the weeks following the Bulgarian Unification matters lay stalemated in the halls of

Great Power diplomacy. The Russians insisted on the status quo ante, the British insisted on the preservation of Battenberg and a ‗‘, that is, the maintenance of separate institutions but for Battenberg to be the ruler of both Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.716 The

Austrians, though nominally in favor of the status quo, had reservations about the matter.717 The

Turks would take no action against their rebellious province in the face of British displeasure, and Lord Salisbury made it quite clear in a letter to Lord Lyons that ―I confess, I do not view with enthusiasm the prospect of a Turkish campaign of repression in Bulgaria under the sanction of a Conference.‖718 The British public would throw a fit about such repression.xxxvi

A Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople was called, but matters were soon taken out of the hands of Great Power diplomacy. The Serbian monarchy believed that if the Bulgarian

Unification went through, without Serbia receiving some manner of territorial compensation, then they risked being locked into a position of weakness relative to their now much-larger neighbor. In November of 1885, the Serbs declared war on Bulgaria. Given that the Serbians had the advantage of numbers, and that the Bulgarian army had just lost its entire officer corps, Lord

Salisbury informed Queen Victoria that it was the unanimous opinion of the foreign ambassadors that Bulgaria would be defeated.719 Instead, at the Battle of Slivnitz (November 5th-7th/17-19th,

1885) the Bulgarian army thoroughly routed the Serbs. By the 14th/26th of November, Battenberg entered Serbian territory.720 It took a hasty horseback journey through the battle-lines by the

Austrian emissary to Belgrade (and former consul in Sofia), Count Rudolf Khevenhüller, to

xxxvi ―The most novel solution was proposed by the Russian consul in Rumelia, Sor kin, who suggested that the union be considered as Bulgaria joining Rumelia. Thereby the Rumelian ruler and not Alexander would become the head of the new state.‖ Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 222.

288 prevent Battenberg‘s taking the capital and overthrowing King Milan. Only the threat of an

Austro-Hungarian military intervention forced Battenberg to back-down.721

Following the Bulgarian victory at Slivnitz, events wound down to a less exciting conclusion for the Unification crisis over the course of the following year. The Serbians and

Bulgarians signed the Treaty of Bucharest on February 19th / March 2nd, 1886, which restored the status quo ante bellum, at least with regards to Serb-Bulgarian relations. The Great Powers, realizing that the Bulgarian Unification could not be undone without an even greater disruption of the Balkans, took up the British proposal for a personal union. The Unification was undone on paper, but Battenberg was declared the Governor General of Rumelia for five years and the two provinces were united in his person, as he was ruler of both. The final agreement was signed at

Constantinople in April of 1886.722

Conclusion – Self-Inflicted Wounds

The Russian response to the Bulgarian Unification was yet another serious blow to

Russo-Bulgarian relations. The foundation of the two countries‘ mutual sympathy was in very large part the result of Russian efforts against the much-hated Turks and in favor of Bulgarian independence. Alexander II in Bulgaria was the Tsar-Liberator. Yet now, St. Petersburg was siding with Constantinople in order to return part of Bulgaria into Ottoman rule. Furthermore, the

Russian officers that had fought for Bulgarian independence and had trained the Bulgarian army now abandoned them to face a Serbian invasion. This was an immense betrayal, and one that did a great deal of harm to Russo-Bulgarian relations. Essentially, these actions caused a readjustment of the initial factors that according to international relations theory should have

289 ensured positive relations between the two countries. Consider the Realist formulation first. For

Bulgaria, one of the key reasons to maintain good relations with the Russian Empire was simple security – so that the Russians would protect them from the hated Turks. Yet now, Russia was actively harming Bulgarian security by recalling the officers and sabotaging the war effort right when it was most necessary. From the Constructivist perspective, one can instead point to a divergence in the importance of identity and self-interest. So long as Russia and Bulgarian nationalist interests marched hand in hand, relations were good. But now the Russians were standing openly against Bulgarian nationalism, the very keystone of the Principality‘s identity.

Whichever theory one uses, this was a disastrous turn of events for Russo-Bulgarian relations. It was also to a great extent avoidable.

To begin with, the possibility of a pro-Unification coup in Eastern Rumelia should not have caught Russian officials as off-guard as it did. One part or another of the Balkans had been erupting in anti-Turkish rebellion for the better part of a century by now, and the lands of southern Bulgaria had been the center of the April Uprising. Not to mention the Russian diplomatic agent in Eastern Rumelia, Sor kin, was both actively supporting such a Unification movement, and also reporting regularly to St. Petersburg about it. The Rumelian coup should not have been a surprise. Yet it was, and when it came about, none of the Russian agents in either

Rumelia or the Principality had firm instructions on what to do, nor would they receive any until several days had passed. This meant that control of the situation was effectively ceded to the

Rumelian conspirators and then to Battenberg. This in turn meant that Russia first allowed the coup to proceed as a result of Igel'strom‘s refusal to allow Chichagov to use troops to put it down, but then tried to stop the Unification only after it was much more advanced and with

290 methods with a lesser chance of success when the Tsar recalled all Russian officers. Either immediately quashing the Rumelian coup or fully embracing the Unification would have likely led to better results for Russia. Instead, Tsarist foreign policy ended up being wavering and consequently failed both at stopping the Unification under Battenberg (itself of arguable value as a foreign policy goal) and at maintaining Russian influence in Bulgaria.

The recall of the Russian officers was also a high-risk effort taken by the Tsar on his own initiative. It was not an entirely foolish act – reasonable Russian agents had long felt that this was a kind of last resort, a way of breaking through Bulgarian intransigence with a show of force. Yet it was also a tactic that risked backfiring, since it removed the Tsar‘s control over the Bulgarian military, and also opened up the Russian Empire to accusations of desertion and betrayal – particularly after Serbia chose to attack. Girs, who was not consulted about the matter, noted that with all of the Russian efforts to sabotage Battenberg, ―the situation of our government would become rather ticklish, if this Prince, offended by us, returns triumphant from the war.‖723

Unfortunately for Russia, Girs‘s prediction came true.

By the end of 1885, then, Bulgaria and Russia stood even further apart than before, with a number of important bonds broken. The bond of sympathy, forged during the Russo-Turkish

War and the Liberation of Bulgaria, was greatly tarnished by Russian action. And the bond of administration, in the form of Russian control over a key part of the Bulgarian state, had been first removed and then shown to be unnecessary.

640 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 76. 641 Georgi Borushkov, Istoriya na Bulgarskata Zhurnalistika 1844-1877, 1878-1885, (Sofia 1976), 500 in Ibid., 76. 642 Ibid., 76-79. 643 Kostadinova, Bulgaria, 1879-1946, 12. 644 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 79.

291

645 Dnevnitsi na chetvfirtoto obiknoveno narodno sufbranie. Pfirva sessiya [Minutes of the fourth regular National Assembly. First session] (4 vols.; Sofia, 1885-86), II, 62 in Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 262-263. 646 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 263. 647 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 74; Crampton, Bulgaria, 113. 648 Stoilov to Nachovich, Sofia, 22 March 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 45. 649 See for instance, Stoilov to Nachovich, Sofia, 9 May 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 71 to 77 and Stoilov to Nachovich, Sofia, 9 July 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 115 to 120. 650 A. Ko iander to A. E. Vlangali, Sofia, 4/16 August 1885, in P. Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii sbornik dokumentov (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe so ts ial‘no-ėkonomicheskoe izd-vo, 1981), 7-9. 651 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 195-196. 652 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 150; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 175-180. 653 Izvlechenie ot Spomenit e Biografiyata na General-Maiora Velchev – Velko Stamov Velchev, TsDA Fond 248K, Opis 1, Delo 2, List 76 to 77; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 122-123. 654 AVPRI, Fond Politarchiv, Delo 1280, 1885, List 3 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia.‖55. 655 AVPRI, Fond Politarchiv, Delo 1280, 1885, List 479 in Ibid., 56-57. 656 AVPRI, Fond Politarchiv, Delo 1280, 1885, List 3. in Ibid., 55; AVPRI, Fond Politarchiv, Delo 1280, 1885, List 479 in Ibid., 56-57. 657 Stoilov to Nachovich, Sofia, 24 July 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 125. 658 Stoilov to Nachovich, Sofia, 23 June 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 106 to 109. 659 Ko iander to Zinoviev, Jan 18/30, 1885, Document 1 in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii 660 Ko iander to Zinoviev, Avantiury, June 7/19, 1885, Document 2 in Ibid.; Vlangali to Girs, NKG, St. Petersburg, July 27th, 1885 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 158. 661 Corti, Downfall of Three Dynasties, 296. 662 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 83. 663 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 215. 664 Ibid., 160. 665 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 125-126. 666 Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 304-305. 667 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 81-84. 668 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 205. 669 Evgeniĭ L'vov, Rumeli ki pe e o o (Moskva, 1886), 74, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 201. 670 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 74-75 RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 201-202. 671 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 76-77, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 202. 672 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 213. 673 Wyndham to Granville, FO, 78/3749, no. 137, Constantinople, March 15, 1885 in Ibid., 215. 674 Radev, oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij , 479. 675 Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia.‖ 47. 676 AVPRI, GA –Y-A2, delo 923, list 131 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 48. 677 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, Delo 2128, list 72-74. 678 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 92-93. 679 Ibid., 93-94. 680 Ibid., 95-97. 681 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 214-215; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 128-129; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 232. 682 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 98-99. 683 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 80-81, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 204-205. 684 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 84-85, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 206. 685 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 129. 686 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 216.

292

687 Ibid., 216. 688 AVPRI, Fond 138, Sekrentii Arkhiv Ministra, Opis 467, delo 91/98, List 118-121 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia.‖105-106. 689 AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1885, delo 100, Lists 132, 140, 145, 155. 690 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 95-96, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 211-212. 691 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 98. 692 A. Hulme Beaman, M. Stambuloff, (London: Bliss, Sands and Foster, 1895), 59. 693 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 309. 694 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 217; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 234. 695 695 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 99-100, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 213-214. 696 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 131. 697 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 218. 698 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1885, Delo 2165, List 2. 699 Wolkenstein to ―Mein sehr verehrter Gonner,‖ 2 October 1885, in Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 114. 700 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 100. 701 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 132. 702 Biegeleben to the Foreign Office in Vienna, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, XV/91, Bulgarien. Sofia, 6 October 1885, in Ibid., 132. 703 W. N. Medlicott, "The Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias, 1885: Part I." The English Historical Review 54, no. 213 (1939), 70. 704 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 219; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 139. 705 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 219-220. 706 A. Ko iander to A. E. Vlangali, Sofia, 4/16 August 1885, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 9. 707 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1885, Delo 2159, List 3-4. 708 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 220. 709 AVPRI, Fond 138, Secret Archives of the Minister, Opis 467, Delo 91/91, List 113-114. 710 Biegeleben to the Foreign Office in Vienna, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, Sofia, 8 October, 1885 in Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 140. 711 White to Salisbury, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, 78/3753, no. 409, Therapia, 29 September 1885, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 220. 712 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Op 482, 1885, Delo 2165, List 22-23. 713 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 108, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 218. 714 Frank Lascelles to Major Bigges 3 October 1885, in Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series, 3:697- 698. 715 Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii 243-245. 716 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 226. 717 W. N. Medlicott, ―The Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias, 1885: Part II (Continued),‖ The English Historical Review 54, no. 214 (1939), 269. 718 Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons, 16 October 1885, in Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, 245. 719 Ibid., 251. 720 Medlicott, ―The Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias, 1885, Part II.‖ 281. 721 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 143-144. 722 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 102-103; Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii, 243-247. 723 A. A. Polovtsev, Dnevnik Gosudarsvennavo Sekretaraya, 351, in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 117.

293

Chapter 10: The Final Act, 1886

The Unification of Bulgaria had been a defeat ―for all of Russia,‖ in the words of

Ambassador Wolkenstein.724 Bulgaria had achieved a measure of national unity in spite of

Russian efforts, and Battenberg was the symbol of that unity. September of 1885 was in a very real sense Alexander von Battenberg‘s finest hour. However, Battenberg‘s position was to become increasingly perilous.

Troubles Abroad, Troubles at Home

To begin with, the Russians were now utterly opposed to Battenberg. Shortly after the

Unification, I. A. Zinoviev, the head of the department of Asiatic Affairs and thus the man in charge of Bulgarian affairs, wrote that the Bulgarian government, and Battenberg in particular, were ―exclusively‖ responsible for all of Russia‘s troubles in that country. Moreover, Zinoviev wrote to Girs that the Bulgarian government was an ―ulcer which had been grafted on her,‖ and which would have to be removed.725 While Russia‘s official policy would be to ignore

Battenberg, the unofficial policy would be to work for his removal, by any means necessary. For his part, Battenberg had no trouble adding fuel to the fire of Russian suspicions. He was sublimely confident that, as was reported to St. Petersburg:

If someone needs someone, then it is Russia that needs Bulgaria, and not the reverse, therefore She should seek to reconcile with Him, the Prince, before which She was so very guilty, and not He before Her; that the [Bulgarians] do not fear a Russian occupation, as Europe would never allow it, and that Bulgaria ought to stay near Turkey and follow such a political line, that would block for Russia any chance of advance on the Balkan peninsula.726

As one might imagine, these sorts of reports did nothing to reconcile the two sparring monarchs.

294

Indeed, the year following the Bulgarian Unification was consumed with a series of minor insults and tit-for-tat retaliations between Russia and Bulgaria. For instance, as the war with Serbia approached, Battenberg was heard to remark to one of his regiments that ―I am confident that you will fight with considerably more bravery under the command of your national officers, rather than beneath those officers who abandoned the standard before the foe.‖727 This was promptly conveyed to the Tsar, who on November 5th/17th, 1885, had

Battenberg‘s name struck from the Russian army list. The seriousness of this latest insult may be conveyed by the Russian account of Battenberg‘s reaction.

His Highness… complained bitterly and said that he did not deserve this humiliation, which he received from Russia. He wept bitterly, when he received the deeply stunning news of his exclusion without trial from the Russian army… He knew that his battalion, into which he had been inducted by the late Tsar, in whose ranks he had fought side-by-side with common soldiers and which was therefore for him more dear than anything in the world, -- was gathered in a field, and with a drumroll it was announced that he was excluded from the ranks, and the officers promptly tore off his monogram from their shoulder straps. This shame and humiliation he would never forget for his whole life.

Tsar Alexander III, upon reading this, was not impressed and wrote ―Pathetic liar. It‘s loathsome to read about this whining.‖728 Battenberg reportedly added, though this was not reported to the

Tsar, that ―I regret… that I do not have a regiment, whose chief was the Emperor Alexander III. I would do the same to him.‖729 Other petty insults occurred as well, though none so heartfelt.

Ko iander reported that Battenberg forbade the churches from mentioning the Tsar‘s name, though this rumor turned out to be false.730 What was true was that in mid-January of 1886,

Battenberg placed two former Russian naval officers, one Vladimir' Lu tskiĭ and a man named

Serebr iakov', in command of a pair of Bulgarian steam vessels. The catch was that these men were Russian nihilists who had been cashiered from the Imperial Fleet. Then, just to pour salt

295 into the wound, on February 11th Battenberg awarded Lu tskiĭ and his vessel a medal for bravery, though neither they nor the entire fleet had the least to do with the recent war with Serbia.731

Yet what made Russian antipathy so dangerous for the Prince was that at this very moment, Battenberg‘s standing in Bulgaria was falling sharply. In September of 1885,

Battenberg had been buoyed upward by a great surge of popularity due to his role in the

Unification. When it became clear that the Unification would not be the kind of true union desired by nationalists, Battenberg‘s status tumbled. The final act of Unification left Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia with largely separate administrations, united only in Battenberg‘s dual positions of Prince of Bulgaria and Governor-General of Rumelia, a status renewable every five years. The extent of popular unhappiness can be judged from the following letter, signed by such

Rumelian luminaries as the famed poet and literary figure :

A deep, profound mourning has struck every Bulgarian upon the announcement of the agreement, established between the and the government of the Principality of Bulgaria. The latter, foreseeing the reactions, which might arise from such an act, did not decide to make it public in all of its particulars; but if the newspapers are at least partially correct in their contents, then enough is known, to awaken indignation in the heart of the Bulgarian people… Such an agreement represents an encroachment upon the honor and interests, upon the present and the future of the Bulgarian people… The government of the Principality has turned Eastern Rumelia into a conquered province… In this difficult moment we, the representatives of the people, consider it our moral duty to protest against the agreement between the Porte and Prince Alexander Battenberg, composed against the will and desires of the Bulgarian people.732

Compounding Battenberg‘s problems, Russian agents in Bulgaria were making it exquisitely clear that only Battenberg‘s presence prevented a more complete Unification from occurring.733

The Unification was thus a half-done thing with an uncertain future, and ―the Bulgarians were horrified and dismayed,‖ writes Battenberg‘s biographer Corti, ―to find that their great sacrifice

296 of men and money had again resulted in no more than a provisional settlement.‖734 Prince

Battenberg himself realized this, writing to Queen Victoria that ―the protocol of the 5th April was my political death warrant. The people who had come victorious out of the war were cruelly disappointed by the issue of the peace of Bucharest and the Conference of Constantinople [which established the form of the Unification .‖735 The Unification turned from being Battenberg‘s great victory to a millstone about his neck.

There were other, more domestic problems as well. There was an economic crisis in

Bulgaria, brought about by the expenses of the war with Serbia, which did nothing for

Battenberg‘s popularity. The Bulgarian government had been forced to commandeer farm animals and grain, and this resulted in a shortage of seed and equipment for the following year.

Debts also had to be deferred, and taxes were raised. The Rumelians were also upset over the specific form that the Principality‘s administration of southern Bulgaria took, as the Rumelians were locked out of the high halls of government, and the Principality refused to pay for

Rumelian officials or militiamen. Karavelov also took steps to trim back the administrative system of Eastern Rumelia – an absolutely vital task, given how badly over-administered the province was, but one that aroused a great deal of resentment among the former administrators who were now out of work. The fact that this reduction in bureaucracy was not accompanied by an equivalent decrease in taxes also failed to enthuse the Rumelian peasantry – the assumption had been that high taxes went to pay for the government officials.736 All of this contributed to certain disillusionment with the Bulgarian state, and consequently led to factions and individuals arising to once more oppose Battenberg.

297

The most notable of these opponents was Dragan T sankov, the former leader of the

Liberal Party and former Minister President of Bulgaria. While he had been heavily involved in the expulsion of Kaul‘bars and Sobolev in 1883, his pact with the Conservatives had led to his fall from office, and since that time he had been in dire financial straits. T sankov thus turned to the Russians, offering his aid and influence in exchange for financial support. A. I. Ko iander conveyed this offer back to St. Petersburg, along with a recommendation that T sankov be awarded twelve thousand francs, a request which was approved.737 Not long afterwards,

T sankov, along with the former Foreign Minister Marko Dimitriev Balabanov and the prominent

Conservative politician and former Minister of Finance Todor Sto ianov Burm v, set up a pro-

Russian newspaper, the Svetlina (Light), using Russian funds.738 The three men also signed a written compact promising to support the Russian government, both now and when they eventually returned to power.739 The Russians now had their own personal Opposition party to

Battenberg and Karavelov, complete with their own newspaper. Should T sankov and his fellow

Conservatives prove recalcitrant, the Russians also had documentation suitable for blackmail.

More significant than the efforts of T sankov and his coterie, however, were the intrigues among certain sections of the army. While Battenberg remained broadly popular among the armed forces, not everyone in the army was pleased with the Prince. There were a number of reasons for this. First, there was always a strain of staunch Russophilia among the Bulgarian officer corps – after all, many had fought alongside the Russian officers and had been trained by them, and so there was simple sympathy. More problematically, after the war with Serbia the

Bulgarian army had handed out promotions and medals in an extremely capricious fashion, leading to a great deal of resentment.740 Even Konstantin Stoilov, who served as a captain during

298 the war, complained viciously about the distribution of medals and promotions in his diary, referring to it as ‗Charlatanism‘ and writing that so far as he could tell, the one result of the

Unification was a miserable war that provided for the Rumelian officers.741 V"lko Stamov

Velchev, one of those Rumelian officers, likewise recalled how officers who had never been in battle received medals for bravery, while others, who fought in important battles, were abandoned.742 As a result, there was a small group of military officers who felt themselves cheated, and they would have an influence on Bulgarian history out of all proportion to their numbers.

The Coup of August 9th

By the middle of 1886, Battenberg‘s situation was becoming dire. There had been two plots to try to assassinate him, the second of which included the participation of a Captain

Nabokov, formerly one of the Russian officers in Bulgaria, who had remained in the country.743

The third plot was more successful. The conspiracy was started by Captain Radko Dimitriev, who soon recruited Captain Anastas Bend rev, a hero of the Battle of Slivnitz, and the

Commander of the Military Academy, Major Pet"r Gruev. Even Karavelov and the new

Bulgarian Minister of War, Konstantin Nikiforov, were brought into the conspiracy – not as active participants, but the two men were made aware that a coup was in the offing.744

Ko iander‘s successor as the diplomatic agent in Sofia, P. M. Bogdanov was also heavily involved in the conspiracy,xxxvii but unlike previous Russian agents in Bulgaria, Bogdanov

xxxvii P. M. Bogdanov is one of the minor mysteries of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the period. Both George Kennan and Charles Jelavich call him as the successor to Ko iander, and he was clearly the main Russian actor on the ground in Bulgaria in the middle of 1886. And yet, he does not appear in the official records of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which flow seamlessly from Ko iander to N. V. Kaul‘bars. As Jelavich calls Bogdanov a former secretary

299 actually made certain that St. Petersburg was kept informed of events in the country. Over the summer of 1886, he kept Girs and Tsar Alexander III updated on the conspiracy‘s progress. On

July 27th/August 8th, 1886, Bogdanov sent the following telegram to Girs:

The conspirators, intent on the overthrow of the Prince, intend to carry out the coup using the 2nd Infantry Regiment, which will need to replace the 1st Infantry Regiment [the one stationed in Sofia]. The latter must be sent to Slivnitz under the rationale of fortifying the Serbian border. [The conspirators] will try and convince the Prince of the necessity of fortifying the border by means of falsified reports of Serbian preparations for war. The report laying out the importance of these measures will be delivered to the Prince on July 29th [August 10th]. If the report is approved, then the arrival of the 2nd Regiment can be expected on August 1st [August 13th]. The conspirators consider the moment to be advantageous, seeing as almost all of the forces loyal to the Prince will be away from Sofia.745

Battenberg would be tricked into sending away the loyal 1st Regiment from Sofia. The 2nd

Regiment, which had been thoroughly suborned, would then be the dominant power in the capital, and would be used to remove Battenberg from his throne. On July 29th / August 10th,

Bogdanov sent a second telegram to Girs, stating that:

Today the Prince agreed to send to the Serbian border the two platoons of the 1st Regiment, which will depart tomorrow morning. Remaining will be the less loyal platoons. The 2nd Regiment will arrive in Sofia on August 1st [August 13th … Upon the overthrow of the Prince, [the conspirators] plan to assemble from all the political parties a temporary government, which will turn to the Imperial Government with a petition which will acknowledge the extant reality and [request the Tsar] to immediately dispatch an Imperial Commissioner and officers to hold office. The temporary government will request as commissioner one of the more popular in Bulgaria generals – [N. P.] Ign t‘ev or [Prince A. M.] Donduk v[-Kors kov].746

at the Sofia Consulate, it seems probable that Bogdanov was simply the acting Consul-General while Ko iander was on vacation – it was fairly typical at the time for political and diplomatic figures to take the late summer off.

300

All was set in motion for the overthrow of Alexander von Battenberg. Suitable troops were brought into the capital, the loyalist regiments were rotated away to the border, and all was ready for the coup.

The Tsar, for his part, had significant doubts about the entire project. On the June

30th/July 12th, 1886, he wrote that ―this is not a serious conspiracy, but a trap designed for us.‖747

When informed on the following day that the Bulgarian Minister of War and half the army was supporting the plot, the Tsar commented sarcastically ―It would be interesting to know why.‖748

Ultimately, the Tsar was convinced that this was a genuine conspiracy, and instructed Girs and

Obruchev to be ready, that they do not get caught off guard.749 Still, there remained doubts.

Writing on the July 27th/August 8th telegram, Alexander III said that ―I fear that nothing helpful will come of this.‖750 However he did nothing to restrain the proposed coup.

The coup was carried out on the night of August 8th-9th/20th-21st. Battenberg was awakened by his valet, and confronted by Captain Dimitriev and Major Gruev, who presented him with abdication papers. Left with no choice by virtue of Captain Dimitriev‘s revolver,

Battenberg signed the abdication papers and was then rapidly moved first to a monastery outside of Sofia, then to the port of Silistria on the Danube, and then finally to Reni in Bessarabia

(modern-day ).751 Bogdanov sent a triumphant telegram back to St. Petersburg on the

9th/21st, saying that ―Today at 3:30 AM the army and the people overthrew the Prince, who signed the abdication papers. The Prince and his brother were taken to a monastery. There was no bloodshed.‖752 A temporary government was quickly assembled, consisting of Dragan

T sankov, Todor Sto ianov Burm v, Major Gruev, and led by the pro-Russian Metropolitan

Kliment (who was uninvolved in the conspiracy but agreed to head the government as a

301 respectable figure), with the backing of Bogdanov and the Tsar.753 Battenberg‘s chaplain, Adolf

Koch, describes reaching the Russian Consulate in the small hours of the morning:

I saw a body of about 200 peasants and gipsies [sic] proceed to the front of the Russian Consulate, and Bogdanoff, Sacharoff [the Russian military attaché], Zankoff, and Clement appear on the balcony above. Clement gesticulated as if he wished to speak, and began. By the time I got to the place he had finished; I saw him fall on his knees, and heard him call upon his peasants to do the same. Doffing their fur caps, they threw themselves, as if at the word of command, into the ankle-deep mud, and Bogdanoff opened his mouth and stammeringly declared that the Czar would with pleasure vouchsafe his protection again to Bulgaria, and loved it still, but only the true, old Bulgarian people, and he would certainly send the Bulgarians a new and better Prince.754

There was no question that the new government was supported by the Russian Empire. A few hours after his first telegram, Bogdanov sent a second one to St. Petersburg, saying that the new government was asking the Tsar to take Bulgaria under his wing, and beseeched him for military and monetary aid. There was once again the possibility of a threat from the Turks or the Serbs, and the treasury was empty. Bogdanov did note, however, that while the coup was at first met with celebration, people were beginning to have second thoughts, and that the immediate and forceful support of the Tsar would save the situation.755 The abdication of Battenberg was met with ―tremendous enthusiasm‖ in St. Petersburg. Tsar Alexander III took the lead in Russian foreign policy now. He rapidly approved of all of Bogdanov‘s requests. Russia would protect

Bulgaria from all external dangers, and Bogdanov was to advance the new government a sum of

800,000 francs from the occupation fund for expenses.756

Unfortunately, Alexander III, Bogdanov, and the conspirators had all made a severe miscalculation. All throughout this period, the Panslav idea was to assume that the Bulgarian people were naturally on the side of their erstwhile Liberators. The German Battenberg and the treacherous Bulgarian politicians alone were blamed for the breakdown in Russo-Bulgarian

302 relations. The belief was that once the Prince had been removed, then the Bulgarian people would embrace their Russian patrons, and close relations between Russia and Bulgaria could be re-established. Russia‘s own offenses, such as Ehrnrooth‘s coup or the public stance against

Unification, would be forgotten. This did not occur.

The role of Battenberg‘s chief supporter was now taken by Stefan Stambolov. An unlikely ally, Stambolov was one of the most prominent politicians in Bulgaria, a fixture of the left wing of Bulgaria‘s spectrum. He had over the course of his career opposed both the Russians and Battenberg in turn, particularly during the 1881 Coup and the subsequent dissolution of the

Tarnovo Constitution. Faced with a new coup, Stambolov opted to support the exiled Prince and to oppose the Russians. Partially this was because he saw no good coming of Bulgaria‘s becoming a Russian puppet state, and partially this was due to Stambolov‘s personal ambition.

The country was in chaos following Battenberg‘s abduction, and a strong leader could secure a considerable base of support for a future career.757

By the 10th/22nd of August, 1886, Stambolov established himself as the leader of the opposition to the coup. His first major ally was the brigade commander of the Plovdiv garrison,

Lieutenant Colonel Mutkurov, the same man who had delivered word to Battenberg of the

Rumelian uprising a year prior, now advanced in rank. Mutkurov sent a telegram to Sofia ordering the provisional government to step down within 24 hours or risk execution.758 Support for Stambolov and Battenberg grew by leaps and bounds. By August 12th/24th, garrisons in

Sliven, Varna (one of Bulgaria‘s most important ports), Stara Zagora, , ,

Svishtov, Kotel, , and Tarnovo had all declared in favor of Stambolov.759 Moreover, by way of G. D. Nachovich, the former Conservative minister and present Bulgarian ambassador to

303

Bucharest, Stambolov had the assurances of the other Great Powers that Russia would not be permitted to intervene militarily in Bulgaria should events fall out in an unfortunate fashion.760 In short, Stambolov had a significant military predominance, and the conspirators would have no outside champion to tip the scales in their favor.

The conspirators were discovering this at about the same time. Bogdanov now turned to

Petko Karavelov, the former Minister-President and still one of the most respected politicians in

Bulgaria, and asked him to form a coalition government. Primarily out of a concern about spreading unrest and chaos, leavened by a dose of the same personal ambition that had guided

Stambolov, Karavelov accepted and on August 12th/24th, he replaced the Metropolitan Kliment as the head of the provisional government. It was to no avail. Though Karavelov pled with

Stambolov to come to Sofia and join a coalition government on Russia‘s terms, on the basis of the two men‘s long-standing friendship, Stambolov refused. At the same time, the Tsar patently refused to offer any military support to the pro-Russian regime in Sofia.761 Alexander III had been dubious about the whole enterprise from the beginning, and now that his gloomy predictions were being vindicated, he had no interest in throwing more effort into a clearly failed enterprise. Indeed, on a telegram from Bogdanov, the Tsar wrote that ―All this is nonsense and all in Sofia do not know what they are doing and Bogdanov is included.‖762 Support from Russia would not be forthcoming.

With Stambolov unwilling to compromise and possessing the preponderance of both popular and military support, and with no support from Russia on the horizon, matters settled rather quickly. On August 15th/27th, 1886, Karavelov gave up in his attempts to form a coalition government. The next day, Stambolov announced a regency with himself at the head and

304

Mutkurov as the commander-in-chief of all armed forces. Alexander von Battenberg was invited back to the country to take the throne once more.

The eventual Russian post-mortem on the coup, which wended its way to Russian

Ministry of War on August 31st/September 12th, 1886, ultimately blamed the conspirator‘s defeat on their unwillingness to resort to ―harsh measures, and on the other hand, because they lacked the means to transmit their orders to the provinces.‖ The reason that the overwhelming majority of the military garrisons came out in opposition to the coup was given as ―all of the officers belonged to the party of Stambolov.‖763 The possibility that Russian did not enjoy sort of support necessary to pull off a coup was not considered. Regardless, the result was the same. The

Russian-backed coup had been defeated.

The Abdication of Alexander von Battenberg

Battenberg, in the meantime, was being shuttled around Eastern Europe. On August

12th/24th, he was informed of the counter-coup and of Stambolov and Mutkurov‘s request for his return to Bulgaria. Despite some reservations, Battenberg agreed to return to Bulgaria and entered the country on August 17th/29th, 1886, eleven days after he had been abducted. It was at this point that Battenberg made his final mistake. At Ruschuk (Ruse) on the northern Bulgarian border, Battenberg was greeted by the Russian vice-consul, Shatokhin. Battenberg also learned that the Tsar was dispatching Prince N. S. Dolgorukov, one of Battenberg‘s very few friends among the Russian elite, to Bulgaria to study the situation in Bulgaria. From these two signs,

Battenberg decided that the Tsar was willing to forgive all, and it was up to Battenberg to now

305 extend a final peace offering to his Imperial cousin. 764 Still in a state of nervous exhaustion from his ordeal, Battenberg dispatched a telegram to the Tsar, which read in part:

I thank your Majesty for the attitude taken by your representative in Ruschuk. His very presence at my reception showed me that the Imperial Government cannot sanction the revolutionary action taken against my person. I beg your Majesty to instruct General Dolgoruki to get in touch with me personally as quickly as possible; I should be happy to give your Majesty the final proof of the unchanging devotion which I feel for your Majesty‘s illustrious person. As Russia gave me my crown, I am prepared to give it back into the hands of its Sovereign.765

Unfortunately, Battenberg had made a severe miscalculation. The reality was that Vice-Consul

Shatokhin had had no instructions on what to do and was simply being polite, and Prince

Dolgorukov had been dispatched to Bulgaria back during the pro-Russian coup government. 766

Working under a misapprehension, Battenberg now acknowledged Russia‘s mastery of his fate.

Tsar Alexander III was not about to let such an opportunity pass. The Tsar had

Battenberg‘s letter published in all the Russian newspapers, and then personally penned a rather harsh response. In this he acted without his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was prepared to accept Battenberg‘s return – Baron Zhomini went so far as to draft several dozen possible replies to Battenberg‘s telegram, all of which the Tsar rejected.767 In his brusque missive, the Tsar stated that:

I have received your Highness' telegram. I cannot approve your return to Bulgaria in view of the disastrous consequences which it may entail upon the country, already so severely tried. It will not be advisable to dispatch Dolgoruki; I shall refrain from doing so during the unhappy condition to which Bulgaria is reduced as long as you remain there. Your Highness will understand what devolves upon you. I reserve judgment upon the course that I am bidden to take by the honoured memory of my Father, the interest of Russia, and the tranquility of the Orient.768

306

This rejection was also published, to the considerable surprise of the Bulgarian cabinet, which had not been informed of the original telegram.769 Stambolov mourned that ―This is the man for whom we have roused the whole of Bulgaria, have put our necks in the noose and brother has raised sword against brother and he takes such a momentous decision without even telling us beforehand; he throws his crown at the feet of a foreign ruler and keeps us in the dark about it.‖770 Battenberg‘s last olive branch was categorically rejected, and in the process Battenberg had managed to antagonize the very people who had returned him to power.

For Battenberg, this was the very last straw. He was half-ill with exhaustion and nervousness. He had just offended his best supporters. He had recently been betrayed by the very army that had so long been his pride and joy. He was tired of Bulgaria and tired of politics, and had returned to Bulgaria, as he told the British consul in Sofia, ―Only so as to not suffer the shame of having been chased out like a dog.‖771 The only way that Battenberg could have maintained his throne in the face of all this, he felt, was by decreeing summary executions and becoming a tyrant in truth. Instead, Battenberg chose to abdicate once again. He justified his decision to Queen Victoria in a telegram on August 25th/September 6th, the day before the abdication was made public, saying that ―My only choice… is to abdicate of my free will, guarding my honour, or, forced against my will, without any hope of success, amidst bloodshed to be murdered or driven away by Russian bayonets.‖772 Battenberg appointed a regency council of Stambolov, Mutkurov, and Karavelov to rule the country, held a final dinner with his loyal officers (where he promised to be the first volunteer to fight in the liberation of Macedonia, should it come to that) and on August 28th/September 9th, Prince Alexander von Battenberg left

307

Bulgaria once and for all.773 He would not return to the country until after his death in 1893, when he was brought to Sofia for burial.774

On the day that Battenberg made public his abdication, the Russian Foreign Minister, N.

K. Girs, spoke with the British Ambassador to Russia, Sir Robert Morier, about what Battenberg had come to represent.

That unfortunate young man—for I cannot but sincerely pity him and regard him even more as a victim of circumstances than of his own faults, though these have been many—has become in the eyes of the Russian people, the incarnation and embodiment of everything which most deeply stirs the national indignation. He represents, in the first place, the untold ingratitude of the Bulgarians for their deliverers, and reminds them of the losses in blood and treasure incurred in a war which yielded no other results but disappointments. In the second place, he reminds them of all the humiliations submitted to in the Constantinople conference [which secured the Unification] and since. Lastly, he represents the hopes and desires of Russia‘s enemies. Never, therefore, could there be peace between him and the Russian people.775

These words are as good an epitaph for Battenberg‘s reign in Bulgaria as any. But though

Battenberg was now gone, relations between the two countries would not have any smoother a course in the future. The damage done had been too deep.

’b r M

Now that the Russians had failed in their attempts to organize a coup, but succeeded in getting rid of Battenberg, their next step was to secure a more direct control over the Bulgarian state. The bonds of sympathy may have been quite thoroughly shattered by the events of the last few years, but the fact remained that Bulgaria was still geopolitically vital to Russia‘s Balkan goals.

308

To that end, on September 6th/18th, the Tsar announced that he would send General

Nikolaĭ Vasil'evich Kaul'bars, the Russian military attaché to Vienna and brother of the former

Bulgarian Minister of War, to Bulgaria as a personal envoy.776 It was at the time considered an auspicious choice. Kaul‘bars had been dispatched to solve problems in Bulgaria twice before, once after the fall of his brother and Sobolev to solve military questions, and once after the

Serbo-Bulgarian War. He had a reputation as a man both prudent and temperate, and according to Morier, his instructions from St. Petersburg were eminently reasonable, ―to study the situation and by his counsel assist the Bulgarians in putting an end to the present crisis in their affairs.‖777

Kaul‘bars arrived in Sofia on September 13th/25th, 1886, to settle Russo-Bulgarian relations once and for all.

Any hopes of a diplomatic end to the constant crises that had bedeviled Russo-Bulgarian relations were dashed when Kaul‘bars finally arrived in Bulgaria, however. Like Ionin before him, Kaul‘bars had precise instructions on how to behave with the Regency. He first informed them that they were a patently unconstitutional body and that Stambolov and the rest failed to meet the requirements for their office. Kaul‘bars then proceeded to present a list of demands to the Regency council. First, they were to abandon all the military precautions which they had undertaken and the present state of siege would have to be lifted. Secondly, all of the conspirators involved in the abduction of Battenberg were to be released forthwith. Thirdly, the elections for the Grand National Assembly to select the new Bulgarian Prince were to be delayed until conditions returned to normal. Any election taking place now – that is, any election which would take place before Russia could present its own candidate for the Bulgarian throne, though

309

Kaul‘bars did not say so in so many words – would be considered illegal and invalid by

Russia.778

Strictly speaking, none of these were very serious demands. But by this point, Russia was reaping the consequences of years of foreign policy mismanagement. The Russian consul in

Vidin passed along a missive from a local Bulgarian to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which illustrated Russia‘s problem quite clearly. The Bulgarian, a doctor by the name of Zhelezkov, wrote that ―In the eyes of the Bulgarians, [Kaul‘bars three demands were only the lead-up to other, more serious demands.‖ The belief was that Russia was only attempting to undermine the

Bulgarian government, and that Russia‘s true face would only be seen once it took power in

Bulgaria.779 In essence, Russia had squandered all of its goodwill and trust among the

Bulgarians, who now saw not their liberator, but an aggressive and grasping empire intent on taking over their country one way or another.780

Consequently, the regency council would only bend so far. On the first note, regarding the state of siege, they were willing to compromise. With regards to the second and third demands, Stambolov, Mutkurov, and Karavelov were immovable, relying on the constitution to defend them. Under the constitution, the prisoners were the domain of the judicial system and outside the regency council‘s power, while the elections were required to be held within a month.781 The elections were scheduled for September 28th/October 10th, 1886.

Having failed to secure acquiescence to his demands, Kaul‘bars then proceeded to go over the heads of the regents to appeal directly to the people of Bulgaria. He dispatched a telegram to St. Petersburg in which he asked the Tsar‘s permission ―if it proves necessary, to tour

Bulgaria and Rumelia. I am utterly certain that my unexpected appearance in the provinces and

310 my direct appeal to the people would calm minds and prevent any difficulties,‖ that is, convince the Bulgarian peasantry to support Kaul‘bars should the regency council prove recalcitrant. Upon the telegram the Tsar wrote, ―I agree utterly to this and it is even necessary.‖782 With permission thus secured, Kaul‘bars proceeded to embark on a tour of the provinces, repeating his demands to the people that the prisoners be freed and the elections postponed.

He was not well received. In Sofia, where Kaul‘bars began his journey, he was heckled down and unable to even finish his speech.783 Partially this was due to the extremely arrogant tone which Kaul‘bars took throughout his speech, on which Sir Frank Lascelles commented when reporting the incident back to London.

[Kaul‘bars‘s speech in Sofia may be taken as a proof of his personal courage and his disregard of diplomatic usage. It is, I presume, the first time that the representative of a foreign power has harangued a popular meeting in a sense hostile to the government to which he was accredited, and the question might arise whether such conduct would be covered by the diplomatic immunities to which foreign representatives are entitled.784

In other words, Kaul‘bars continued the tradition of his brother, as well as Khitrovó, Remlingen and Sobolev in adopting an antagonistic tone to the Bulgarian government and to the Bulgarian people. By this point, the Bulgarian crowds that met him were less than favorably inclined, and

Kaul‘bars made little headway there. All Kaul‘bars achieved was antagonizing those who heard him. Alexander von Battenberg, now quite free of Bulgaria, commented to Queen Victoria in a letter that ―The behavior of Gen. Kaul‘bars is a satisfaction to me, for it obliges the Bulgarians to rally round Stambouloff, who is a true patriot, and deprives Russia of her last remnant of credit in Europe.‖785 Kaul‘bars was not doing Russia‘s position in Bulgaria any good.

Despite his efforts, Kaul‘bars was unable to prevent the elections from taking place on

September 28th/October 10th, 1886. They were marked by violence on both sides. The Russians

311 encouraged bands of sympathetic peasants to disrupt the elections, only to have them beaten back by pro-government forces. Graphic exchanges of violence were reported back to the

Tsar.786 The election results returned an overwhelming victory for the Bulgarian government

(some 90% of the delegates were loyal to the regency council). Some of this can be attributed to the government‘s declaration of martial law, but the fact also remained that the Coup of August

9th had been extremely unpopular – when the officers and soldiers of the 2nd Regiment, which had carried out the coup, deserted back to their home regions, they were denied food and shelter by the peasantry there.787 The elections had been carried out, and the Grand National Assembly would now choose a new Prince for Bulgaria, without the input of the Russian Tsar.xxxviii

Kaul‘bars now proceeded to declare the elections illegal. He also now took up an argument that anti-Russian ‗‘ was abroad in Bulgaria, and that violence was being directed not just against pro-Russian Bulgarians, but against Russian citizens themselves. In response to this perceived threat, the Russian government dispatched two warships to Varna to protect Russian nationals in the city, the first of which arrived on October 13th/25th, and the second four days later on October 17th/29th.788 A Russian occupation was now a distinct

xxxviii Violence had consistently had a part in Bulgarian elections, dating back to Ehrnrooth and Battenberg‘s manipulation of voting procedures back during the Coup of 1881. For most of the period covered in this study, however, election results were of sufficiently overwhelming character that scholars such as Crampton tended to view them as at least semi-legitimate, representative of popular trends if not necessarily of precise voting behavior. The elections for the 3rd Grand National Assembly, however, marked the beginning of the period when Stefan Stambolov would dominate Bulgarian politics, and it also marked the time when Bulgaria would become infamous for violence and threats in its elections. According to Kostadinova, Bulgaria, 1879-1946, 16:

The Stambolov period gave rise to a very dangerous trend in Bulgarian politics. The violence and arbitrary arrests executed by the police and the interference of administrative staff representatives in the pre-election campaign led to a ―distortion‖ of the election returns. Often the electorate was forced to vote, which contradicted that part of the Election Law which guaranteed non-obligatory participation. The bloody skirmishes, arrests of candidates for deputies on election day, falsified counting of the ballot-papers had one goal—only ―approved‖ candidates, governmental partisans were to be elected, thus ensuring obedience and loyalty to the government—controlled Parliament.

312 possibility if events went awry. The Russian vice-consul in Varna informed the local officials of the city that if any more violence was directed against Russian nationals, then the city would be bombarded. Kaul‘bars took the opportunity created by the arrival of the warships to demand once again the release of the conspirators of the August plot, or else Russia would be forced ―to use extreme measures.‖789 To St. Petersburg, Kaul‘bars wrote a report outlining his ideas for a

‗half-occupation‘ involving the landing of a small number of Russian troops at Varna which would quickly take the loyalty of the local garrison. From there, small numbers of Russian troops supported by much larger Bulgarian regiments could then repeat the process throughout the country.790 Between the Russian warships and the General‘s own statements both to the

Bulgarian government and to St. Petersburg, a war seemed imminent. It was the fullest realization of the politics-by-intimidation approach that characterized the last few years of

Russian policy towards Bulgaria.

Certainly the Bulgarian government felt the possibility was real. Petko Karavelov now refused to travel to Tarnovo for the opening of the Grand National Assembly, effectively leaving the government. Stambolov, with some reluctance, acceded to the Russian demand for the release of the conspirators on October 17th/29th, 1886. Kaul‘bars had thus achieved two of his three original demands. The state of siege had been lifted, and the conspirators were released. All that was left was the third and most important demand, to cancel the elections and delay new ones until Russia was ready to intervene.

This would prove to be the farthest extent of Kaul‘bars‘ influence in Bulgaria. The issue was that while Kaul‘bars was certainly willing to consider and threaten occupation, St.

Petersburg was not. For this there were both practical and emotional considerations. As a

313 practical matter, if Russia made move to occupy Bulgaria by force, it would invite the interference of the other Great Powers, Britain and Austria in particular.791 The Foreign Minister

N. K. Girs made a note of informing the Tsar that any Russian military adventure in the Balkans could not be undertaken without ―[Russia‘s prior agreement with certain states.‖792 If the Great

Powers became involved in Bulgaria, it would mean the re-opening of the Eastern Question, and it is unlikely this would have gone any better for Russian interests than the Congress of Berlin.

There was also the matter that Tsar Alexander III, in addition to being aware of just how awkwardly an occupation would go with Europe, patently refused to invade a country which his own father had liberated from the Ottomans.793

Since it was with the Tsar that such decisions finally rested, when Kaul‘bars put in his proposal for a half-occupation, he was informed by Zinoviev, the director of department for

Asiatic Affairs that the Tsar ―considered [occupation an exceedingly serious step, to which we may turn only in the case of the most extreme necessity.‖ Even the dispatch of the warships to

Varna, Zinoviev writes, could have been a step too far had not there been prior negotiation with the other Powers.794 There would be no occupation of Bulgaria.

That was that. Kaul‘bars had come to the limit of what could be achieved by threats and intimidation in Bulgaria. Stambolov went on ahead with the Grand National Assembly.795

Kaul‘bars had achieved all that he could. Following a scuffle between the Russian consulate in

Plovdiv and the local police, Kaul‘bars demanded mass-dismissals and a public apology. When his demand was not accepted, General N. V. Kaul‘bars and his entire staff left the country on the

8th/20th of November, 1886. Kaul‘bars had effectively severed diplomatic relations.796

314

What makes this situation so curious is that N. V. Kaul‘bars was generally considered something of a partisan of Battenberg in Russian spheres.797 Yet he was acting under strict orders from Tsar Alexander III, and so adopted an aggressive, Panslav-tinged approach in dealing with the Bulgarian government. Bismarck commented on the strangeness, noting that Kaul‘bars was a perfect gentleman to everyone except the Bulgarian state. To them, he was ―like a ruffian… and this bearing was the result of direct instructions from the Emperor, who regarded the Regency as the legacy of the Prince of Bulgaria.‖798 In fact, Kaul‘bars was in almost constant contact with

Alexander III during his mission in Bulgaria, and acted as he was commanded.xxxix

The diplomats of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs were largely cut out of the conduct of Russian foreign policy. When the British Ambassador Morier spoke to Girs, the

Russian Foreign Minister did not even attempt to defend Kaul‘bars‘s approach towards the

Bulgarian government, and admitted that at least in the question of the prisoners, Kaul‘bars was exceeding his orders – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had only asked him to delay the trial of the conspirators until passions had cooled.799 A. I. Nel dov, from his post as Ambassador to

Constantinople, believed that Kaul‘bars‘s actions were only to the detriment of Russia, and urged

St. Petersburg to end ―the diplomatic period which will carry the name of Kaul‘bars.‖800

Virtually the only person happy with Kaul‘bars was the Emperor himself, who would greet him on his return to St. Petersburg with ―You are a soldier obeying the orders of your superior officer; you have acted to my full satisfaction.‖801

xxxix This constant communication was not without its issues, however. The Tsar personally deciphered Kaul‘bars‘s coded telegrams, but was not always able to do so, and there were a number of messages sent to Kaul‘bars to request that he use the proper codes. In fact, it was not Kaul‘bars‘s fault for the miscommunications – it later emerged that Stambolov had ordered Bulgarian telegraph agents to alter numbers in the Russian ciphered telegrams, causing extra chaos. AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1886, Delo 92 A, List 329, 483; AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, Delo 2171, List 76; AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, Delo 1288, List 197, all in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 260-261.

315

On August 14th/26th, 1887, Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg Gotha took the oath of allegiance as Prince of Bulgaria before the Grand National Assembly. He would rule the country for the next thirty-one years. Relations with Russia would not be re-established for almost a decade, when Tsar Nicholas II ascended to the throne.802

Conclusion – The End of Russo-Bulgarian Relations

By the end of 1886, Russo-Bulgarian relations were about as poor as those of any two countries can be without warfare. Russia had backed a military coup which abducted the ruling

Prince, had forced said Prince to abdicate, and then delivered ultimatums to the next government backed by threats of military occupation. Bulgaria, for its part, soundly rejected both the coup and the ultimatums, and the Tsar‘s personal agent was heckled in the streets and sabotaged by the regency. Russo-Bulgarian relations had now degenerated to such a degree that nothing constructive could come of them any longer.

Matters had reached such a stage by this point that it is questionable whether a more moderate, better-run foreign policy on Russia‘s part could have done much to salvage the situation. Yet no such policy appeared to make the attempt. With regards to the coup, one may argue whether or not backing a military coup in another country is particularly good foreign policy – certainly, the conspirators overestimated the degree of support that they had in Bulgaria, and the Russian state did little to conceal its support for the coup, which was unlikely to rebound to Tsar‘s credit. But it was an effort carried out by local Bulgarian army officers with the tacit support of the Bulgarian Minister President and the Minister of War, and it was not unreasonable to think it would succeed. The Russian government was kept well-informed by Bogdanov, and

316 remained at a safe distance from the actual conspiracy. The coup failed, but not through any particular fault of the Russian government.

Kaul‘bars‘s mission to Bulgaria, however, illustrated one last time the problems that had plagued Russian foreign policy in Bulgaria since the days of Parensov and Davydov. Rather than allow Girs and N. V. Kaul‘bars to leverage the latter‘s popularity in Bulgaria and try to salvage the situation somehow, Tsar Alexander III took personal control of Russian foreign policy. He sidelined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and commanded Kaul‘bars to act in an aggressive, offensive, Panslav-tinged fashion with the Bulgarian government. The result was that the

Bulgarian regents and populace, already skeptical and suspicious of Russian intentions after considerable prior experience, rejected this last Russian effort to dictate affairs.

724 Wolkenstein to Kalnoky, Austro-Hungarian Diplomatic Archives, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, X 75, geheim, privatbrief, St. Petersburg, 14/26 October 1885, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 237. 725 Zinoviev to Girs, 14 September 1885, in Ibid., 237. 726 AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1886, Delo 92, Volume 1, List 317 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 143. 727 Cited in Kosik, Russkaya Politika v Bolgarii, 121 in Ibid., 116-117 728 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1886, Delo 1285, List 105-106, in Ibid., 117-118 729 I u. S Kar ts ov, em l i e n li hnem o ok i e - o pomin n i poli iche k i i lichny i (S.-Peterburg: konomicheska ia tip., 1906), 266 in Ibid., 118 730 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1885, Delo 2194, List 23 in Ibid., 125 731 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 53-54, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 195-196. 732 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1886-1887, Delo 1289, List 9-10 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 127-129. 733 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 240-241. 734 Corti, The Downfall of Three Dynasties, 319. 735 Alexander von Battenberg to Queen Victoria, Jugenheim, 15 September 1886, in Victoria and George Earle Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria. Third Series. (London: J. Murray, 1930), 3:208. 736 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 243; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 107-108. 737 A. Ko iander to I. A. Zinoviev, St. Petersburg, 17/29 December, 1885, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m v Bolgarii, 10-11; N. K. Girs to P. M. Bogdanov, St. Petersburg, 26 December 1885 / 7 January 1886, in Ibid., 12. 738 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 24 December 1885 / 5 January 1886, in Ibid., 11-12; P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 5/17 April 1886 in Ibid., 12. 739 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 5/17 April 1886 in Ibid., 13-14. 740 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 189; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 247; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 110. 741 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 22 November 1885, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 5, List 164.

317

742 Izvlechenie ot Spomenit e Biografiyata na General-Maiora Velchev – Velko Stamov Velchev, TsDA Fond 248K, Opis 1, Delo 2, List 78. 743 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 244; Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 146; Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, 294-295 744 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 110; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 248. 745 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 27 July / 8 August 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m Bolgarii, 19. 746 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 29 July / 10 August 1886, in Ibid., 20. 747 AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1886, Delo 92, Volume II, 398 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖149 748 AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1886, Delo 92, Volume II, 418 in Ibid. 749 AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1886, Delo 92, Volume II, 480 in Ibid. 750 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 27 July / 8 August 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m Bolgarii, 19. 751 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 251; Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 267-272. 752 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 9/21 August 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 20-21. 753 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 251. 754 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 258. 755 P. M. Bogdanov to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 9/21 August 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 20-21. 756 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 252-253. 757 Ibid., 253-254. 758 Ibid., 255. 759 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 112. 760 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 256. 761 Ibid., 255-256. 762 S. M. Goriainov, ―Razryv Rossii s Bolgariei v 1886 Godu,‖ (Russia‘s break with Bulgaria in 1886), Istoricheskii Viestnik, CXLVII (Jan., 1917), pg. 188-189, in Ibid., 256. 763 Saharov to Obruchev, Sofia, 31 August / 12 September 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m Bolgarii, 21-22. 764 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 191; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 258. 765 Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, 334. 766 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 113; Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii 250. 767 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 259. 768 Koch, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 278; Goryanov S. M., Razryv Rossii s Bolgarii v 1886 Godu / Istoricheskii Vestnik, 1917, No 1, Pg. 189-90 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 239/ 769 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 259. 770 Radev, oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij , 2:227 in Ibid., 259-260. 771 AVPRI, Fond 133, Chancellory, Opis 470, 1886, Delo 92 A, List 33 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖239 772 The Prince of Bulgaria to Queen Victoria, Balmoral Castle, 6 September 1886, in Buckle. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Third Series, 1:200. 773 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1886, Delo 1288, List 135 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 242. 774 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 261; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 193. 775 Morier to Iddesleigh, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, XCI:1, no. 295, St. Petersburg, 7 September 1886, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 262. 776 Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 199. 777 Morrier to Iddesleigh, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, XCI:1, no. 357, St. Petersburg, 18 September 1886, in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 263.

318

778 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 263; Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 115. 779 AVPRI, Fond 151, Politarchiv, Opis 482, 1886-1887, Delo 2179, List 229-231 in Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 267-268. 780 Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 268. 781 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 264. 782 N. V. Kaul‘bars to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 8/20 September 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m Bolgarii, 24-25. 783 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 267. 784 Lascelles to Iddesleigh, Great Britain, Public Record Office, Political Dispatches, XCI:1, no. 41, 4 October 1886, in Ibid., 267. 785 Prince Battenberg to Queen Victoria, Jugenheim, 9 October 1886, Buckle. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Third Series, 1.216/ 786 A. V. Neklidov to N. V. Kaul‘bars, Sofia, 30 September / 12 October 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 27-28. 787 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 116. 788 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 269. 789 Radev, oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij , 2 :441 in Ibid., 269. 790 N. V. Kaul‘bars to N. K. Girs, Sofia, 18/30 October 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 30. 791 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 270; Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 201. 792 N. K. Girs to Alexander III, St. Petersburg, 25 October / 7 November 1886, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 30-31. 793 Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 297. 794 I. A. Zinoviev to Shatokhin, St. Petersburg, no date, in Pavlovich, n i y kogo i m olg ii, 31-32. 795 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 272. 796 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 119. 797 Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 251. 798 Malet to Iddesleigh, FO, 364/3, No. 455, Most conf., Berlin, Nov 12, 1886 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 273 799 Morier, FO, 65/1265, cypher tel. no. 154, St. Petersburg, October 1st, 1886 in Ibid., 265. 800 Nelidov to Girs, NKG, Personal and Very Secret, Pera, Nov 9/21, 1886 in Ibid., 274. 801 Morier to Iddesleigh, FO, 65/1263, no. 433, conf., St. Petersburg, December 6th, 1886 in Ibid., 273. 802 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 123.

319

Conclusion

Having just spent the better part of three hundred pages examining the steady disintegration of Russo-Bulgarian relations, it is worth stepping back and considering the initial question once more. Why did diplomatic relations between the Russian Empire and the

Principality of Bulgaria degenerate so swiftly and so completely? Relations began very well, with the liberation of Bulgaria by the Russian Empire and with the Treaty of San Stefano fulfilling the wildest dreams of Bulgarian nationalists. There were no good geopolitical reasons for the break – quite the contrary, there were good geopolitical reasons for maintaining good relations. And there was a high level of continuity between the leadership figures on both sides.

On the Bulgarian political scene, the same forces that had led Bulgaria in the beginning of the period – Battenberg, Karavelov, Stambulov – were the ones that held the reins of leadership in

1886. Among the Russians, N. K. Girs was a mainstay of the foreign office for the duration of this study. The one major exception is that in 1881 the Russian Tsar was assassinated and replaced by his son, with undeniable consequences for Russo-Bulgarian relations. Yet there were signs of the relationship‘s fracturing before Alexander III‘s ascension, and the major break did not come until 1883, two years after his father‘s death. Other explanations are necessary.

The explanation that appears time and again, both in contemporary accounts and in those of later scholars, is that the missteps of Russia‘s agents in Bulgaria were a key factor. These men antagonized the Bulgarians with their peremptory and overbearing manner and with their unclear and ever-shifting political allegiances. George Kennan speaks of ―a horde of Russian military and political officials, advisers and administrators, many of them heavy-handed, tactless, and brutal men, who came to Bulgaria with the expectation that the Prince would be a puppet in their

320 hands.‖803 Cyril Edwin Black mentions that a ―profound source of disorder was created by the dichotomous policy of the Russian empire,‖ sometimes in favor of the Liberals, sometimes in favor of the Prince.804 Charles Jelavich out and out says that ―one of the most glaring weaknesses of the Russian handling of the Bulgarian problem was the failure to formulate and enforce a single line of action.‖805 The analyses by Russian authors reach the same conclusion. Petr

Ku tsarov noted that one of the key elements that led to the breakup of Russo-Bulgarian relations was Russia‘s ―Swing-Set Politics,‖ that is to say, the rapid and constant change in views on how to deal with Bulgaria.806 A. V. Ign t‘ev mentions, alongside economic factors, that Russia‘s constant meddling in internal Bulgarian affairs, the mistakes of Russian diplomats, and the breaks between diplomatic and military agents, all contributed to the breakup of Russo-Bulgarian relations.807 Even authors of the time recognized that there was something badly wrong in the handling of Russo-Bulgarian relations on the Russian side. General P. D. Parensov lamented that

Russia created its own enemies in Bulgaria and in the Balkans, largely through its poor selection of people to carry out its policies.808 The Foreign Minister N. K. Girs complained to the British

Ambassador, Sir Robert Morier in 1885, that ―the internal administration of Bulgaria was from the beginning thoroughly badly composed. The employees sent from Russia… were worse than ill-chosen, many of them representing the scum of their respective profession.‖809 Harsh words from the man who had sent many of them there.

Yet the question that hardly any of these individuals have asked is why? Why were

Russia‘s people in Bulgaria so poorly chosen, why was the policy so chaotic, why was the behavior of Russia‘s agents so hostile towards the Bulgarians? Only one person has asked that

321 question, the nearly forgotten journalist Evgeniĭ L'vov. As he wrote in the conclusion of his short book on the Rumelian Uprising:

It seems to me that a Russian reader, having read the recent chapters of my work, must unwillingly ask the question: was not the success of the [Rumelian uprising] to some extent because of the Russian agents in Bulgaria and Rumelia, both military and diplomatic? …But on the other hand, with all that happened, can we indict the local agents and only them for their sad role, so useful to the plotters and Battenberg? I believe no, as it‘s doubtful they would have behaved in such a fashion had they been informed in matters and had known what they should have done and how they should have behaved in any situation; and they could have known this only having received serious, wide-ranging instructions, clearly indicating what we need and what they should have demanded of the Bulgarians – instructions which they could have then bravely applied to any individual situation… This means that the problem here is not in the people, but in the system; the people being not at all stupid, but simply in the wrong place, and even then not always. …Mr. Ko iander and Prince Kantakuzen, judging by their personal qualities, in another system would have undoubtedly risen to the heights of their careers—and all of the other individuals indicated by me, as people, are and deserve to be widely respected… Mr. Igel'strom, by his education, great decency and delicacy, is an exemplary individual and would have been not simply a useful, but even an indispensable diplomat if he had been placed in a consulate not here, but in a government with which Russia ought to have, according to the dictates of higher politics, have maintained a friendship come what may. But from our agents in Bulgaria was required and ought to be required something quite different. The poem about the baker and boots is applicable here as well.810

The poem in question is an old Russian poem by I a. L. Krylov from the early 19th century, which begins with the following lines: ―Oh woe, when the cobbler starts baking cakes / And the baker making shoes / Then matters won‘t go well.‖ In other words, Evgeniĭ L'vov quite astutely notes that one cannot simply say that so many of Russia‘s agents in the Bulgarian matter just happened to be fools and incompetents. Many of them were skilled and experienced diplomats and military officers, who had achieved distinction in their careers elsewhere. To explain why they failed so badly in Bulgaria requires one to consider systemic factors – that the Russian Foreign Policy

322 apparatus was simply not very good at this point in the nineteenth century, and so was unable to effectively control and direct its own people.

Now is a good time to consider the course of Russo-Bulgarian relations once more. They began, it must be recalled, very, very well. Bulgaria had been under Ottoman occupation for centuries, with vague efforts towards independence that culminated in the April Uprising of

1876. The uprising failed and provoked a brutally violent Turkish backlash, which in turn moved the Russian Empire to step into the conflict – thus launching the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.

So for sentimental reasons, the Bulgarians had considerable cause to be grateful to their liberators, all the more so when the Russian-dictated Treaty of San Stefano would have made

Bulgaria a regional power in its own right. That the Congress of Berlin revoked the Treaty of San

Stefano and split Bulgaria into three parts does not negate the influence it had on the Bulgarian imagination. There were also geopolitical reasons for Russia and Bulgaria to be close to one another. Russia had antagonized all of its other Balkan allies (but for tiny Montenegro) with the

Treaty of San Stefano, and so it was vital to maintain good relations with Bulgaria if the Russian

Empire was ever to achieve its age-old goal of securing the Dardanelles. Bulgaria, meanwhile, required the support of a Great Power to secure its irredentist goals and to ward off any Ottoman vengeance, and Russia was a far more convivial patron than Austria-Hungary. Finally, the terms of Bulgaria‘s liberation were such that Russia had an enormous influence on Bulgaria‘s administration – most notably, in the fact that the Minister of War and all the senior military staff were Russian army officers.

According to most contemporary theories of International Relations, this state of affairs should have continued. Under the Realist paradigm, which dominated American thinking during

323 the Cold War, states make their decisions on the basis of self-interest and security. In that framework, both Russia and Bulgaria had excellent reasons to maintain close relations, as both could benefit from having a military ally against their regional enemies, the most significant of which was Ottoman Turkey. Applying a Liberal or International Law perspective to post-Berlin

Russo-Bulgarian relations is more difficult, with Liberalism‘s emphasis on respecting norms and cooperation between states little represented at the Congress of Berlin. Yet the fact remains that both the Russian Empire and the Principality of Bulgaria were far better off in 1879 than they had been in 1877, if not quite as much better off as they had been after the Treaty of San Stefano.

Continued cooperation with each other, and working to change the opinions of the other Great

Powers, should have been the order of the day. Finally, Constructivism, with its emphasis on the social construction of identity and interests, issues a more ambiguous but still generally positive forecast for Russo-Bulgarian relations. Eastern Europe in the late 19th century was a place where ethnic and religious ties were extremely important, and Russia and Bulgaria were both Orthodox

Slavic states, with their greatest rivals being the Catholic German Habsburg Emperor and the

Muslim Turkish Ottoman Sultan. They perceived each other as natural friends and allies, and while their different systems of government – absolute autocracy and liberal constitutional monarchy – portended trouble, their shared religious and ethnic identity would in all likelihood have overcome those differences.

Under normal circumstances, this would have been more than enough to secure a long- lasting alliance. But the circumstances were not entirely normal due to the sorry state of the

Russian foreign policy apparatus during the 19th century. The entrance exams into the diplomatic profession were laughable, the bureaucracy was ineffective at distributing workload, dictates

324 from the Emperor regularly overturned Ministry policy, the Ministry of War regularly influenced foreign policy in its own way, and in general connections mattered for far more than skill. There were some excellent diplomats in the Russian foreign service, but there were also some execrable ones – the system was such that there was no quality control. All of the internal conflicts that bedeviled the Ministry meant that it had a difficult time either deciding on a single policy or forcing its agents to accept it. In the absence of such guidance, one had various diplomatic, and for that matter military, agents acting not out of a considered policy from St.

Petersburg, but out of their beliefs of what would be best for Russia. These beliefs were generally influenced by Panslavism, which painted a markedly skewed portrait of the world – most notably, Panslavs regularly expected more obedience and gratitude from the Balkan peoples than was reasonable, and so behaved in a way injurious to Balkan national pride. The

Bulgarians were perfectly willing to be allies and even clients of the Russian Empire, but there was a limit to the number of diktats they would accept.

These flaws manifested themselves from a very early point, producing stress between the

Bulgarians and their Russian patrons. Alexander von Battenberg was undeniably a factor in the downfall of Russo-Bulgarian relations in his own right. Battenberg was an excellent candidate for Prince of Bulgaria on paper, and an abysmal one in practice – being young, proud, and authoritarian. He was unable to reconcile himself to the role of a constitutional monarch or to working with the Liberal Party, and so internal political conflict in Bulgaria was inevitable. But the Russian agents in Bulgaria were unable to avoid entering into conflict with either Battenberg or the Bulgarian elites themselves. General P. D. Parensov fought with Battenberg from the very first moment over the question of titles, and the two men continued to struggle over every aspect

325 of the Bulgarian army, from its officer cadre to the way soldiers saluted. Davydov made his contempt for the Bulgarian Liberals – the dominant political party – exquisitely clear in his references to Karavelov as an ―unwashed, uncombed, country bumpkin.‖ 811 Complicating matters further was that Davydov, Parensov, and Shepelev found themselves on opposite sides of the Battenberg-Liberal battlefield, and no one ever took the effort to force them to reconcile. In fact, one of the most vivid examples of the chaos of Russia‘s foreign policy apparatus is when

Parensov, in St. Petersburg, visits first the Minister of War D. A. Mil i tin and then the Foreign

Minister N. K. Girs to ask them for guidance regarding the Titles Controversy, and is told two absolutely contradictory things.812 No one in St. Petersburg was the ultimate authority on matters

Bulgarian, no one established a single line of policy regarding what to do in Bulgaria (not regarding the titles, nor about whether to support Battenberg or the Liberals), and so Parensov,

Davydov, and Shepelev were left to their own devices. Thus one has Parensov, out of solid

Panslav logic, supporting the Liberals and the Tarnovo Constitution, at the same time that

Davydov steps out in battle against the very same. And this policy incoherence means, first, that problems continue to fester since Russia‘s political might never comes down firmly on one side or the other, and second, that rather than having one firm ally and one firm enemy among the

Bulgarian elites, neither Battenberg nor the Liberals are all that happy with Russia. Actually the ideal situation for Russo-Bulgarian relations would have been for the Russian Empire to remain above the fray of Bulgarian internal politics, remaining a friend to all.

Yet for all that, Parensov and Davydov‘s struggles, like Kumani‘s later conflicts, while illustrative, had little long-term effects on Russo-Bulgarian relations. For that one must look to

Parensov‘s successor, Johann Casimir Ehrnrooth, whose most important policy act was to force

326

Battenberg to replace the Tarnovo Constitution – even though the one clear Russian policy that had emerged from the recent chaos was support for the Tarnovo Constitution. The monarchical coup of 1881 was presented to Russia as a fait accompli by its own agent (who declined to inform his superiors ahead of time), and drastically narrowed Russia‘s freedom of action in

Bulgaria. They were now allies of Battenberg, a man with little inherent fondness for Russia, and blood enemies of the Liberal Party, the majority party of the country. The 1881 Coup undeniably weakened Russia‘s position in Bulgaria, and it occurred because the Russian state was again unable to force its own agent to follow its most clearly stated policy. And Ehrnrooth was never punished for putting his own government in such a ticklish situation.

Even so, Ehrnrooth‘s actions need not have been fatal. Russia had been forced into a narrow band of political action, but if close relations could be maintained with Battenberg and the Conservatives then Russia‘s dominance in Bulgaria could be assured. Except that after

Ehrnrooth was removed, he was replaced by Khitrovó and Remlingen. Khitrovó in particular was a dedicated, one might say fanatical Panslav, and simply refused to work with the German

Battenberg, and in this he was supported by Remlingen. Thus, they set about antagonizing

Battenberg and the Conservatives and trying to court the support of the Liberals who had so recently been betrayed by Ehrnrooth‘s coup. And they did this despite the orders of the Russian state – once again, here is an area where the policy is somewhat clear, with Russia intending to support Battenberg, and yet Russia‘s agents in Bulgaria refused to follow instructions from St.

Petersburg. And St. Petersburg then compounded the problem by refusing to recall Khitrovó until Battenberg went to Russia to personally complain. And once again, Khitrovó, like

Ehrnrooth, was not disciplined for his insubordination.

327

By 1882, then, every faction in Bulgaria – the Prince, the Conservatives, the Liberals – could recount their own tales of struggles with Russia‘s inchoate foreign policy and its ever- changing agents. But it was the next set of agents, Generals Sobolev and Kaul‘bars, who drove matters into the ground. In theory, their task was to reconcile Russia with Battenberg and the

Conservatives, who after Ehrnrooth‘s coup were the leading political forces in Bulgaria. But

Sobolev, the dominant figure of the two generals, was another ardent Panslav who considered

Battenberg a treacherous German and the Bulgarian politicians inexperienced and untrustworthy.

Acting with an absolute lack of political tact and statesmanship, Sobolev managed to quarrel with the Conservatives and drive them from the Bulgarian Cabinet. So offensive were Sobolev and Kaul‘bars, that they managed to ―make the rival parties among the Bulgarians forget their animosities for the moment and [unite] against the two Generals,‖ in the words of the British

Ambassador Sir Henry Elliot.813 Nor was the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ignorant of how damaging the Generals were, but it was unable to force them to follow a more conciliatory approach, or to replace them. The generals‘ tenure ended with Battenberg uniting with the

Liberals, previously his dire foes, to restore the Tarnovo Constitution and essentially evict

Sobolev and Kaul‘bars from the country. By 1883, then, Bulgaria and Russia were openly at odds.

Still, it is possible that matters could have still been rescued at this stage. The same geopolitical factors that had made Russo-Bulgarian amity a good idea were still in place, the

Bulgarian army was still heavily staffed by Russian officers, and there was still quite a bit of fond sentiment in Bulgaria towards their liberator, even if individual Russians had made themselves odious. Not to mention the stress of internal Bulgarian politics meant that different

328 factions still hoped for an alliance with Russia. Writing three years and several more blows to

Russo-Bulgarian relations later, Konstantin Stoilov put the Bulgarian situation thusly:

What‘s our policy towards Russia? This question is almost solved by what has been said up to now. Our party has been for Russia since its beginning and until today, for her lawful influence, for our close connection with her. If it has been against particular Russians, that was due to a desire to protect Russian prestige. People such as the generals, Khitrovó, Khilkov, have harmed Russia more than all other reasons put together. We raised the flag ‗Bulgaria for the Bulgarians‘ because it is the only guarantee for durable and close relations between Russia and Bulgaria… We want Russia to retain its role as our guardian. We want it to have that which belongs to her, which the real Slavic interests require. For such solidarity between Russia and Bulgaria to exist, their relations must be determined, for everyone to know their boundaries, to know their rights and duties and so to remove, once and for all, the reasons for misunderstandings.814

Even after Sobolev, Kaul‘bars, Khitrovó, Remlingen, Ehrnrooth, Parensov, Davydov, and all the rest, there was still a desire in Bulgaria for a rapprochement with Russia. For two years, relations between the two countries were quiet. Then in 1885, further failures of the Russian foreign policy apparatus, compounded by the rash actions of Tsar Alexander III, a man of noted Panslav sympathies, would scuttle all hopes of reconciliation.

For various reasons stemming from Russian mistrust of Battenberg and a general desire for quiet in the region, the Russian Empire had decided that the reunification of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was not in its interests for the moment. This was a reasonable position, but one that was never communicated to the local Russian agents in Eastern Rumelia, with the local consul Sor kin doing everything possible to encourage the Unification movement.

When an uprising in favor of Unification did in fact come, it caught the Russian authorities entirely off-guard – despite the fact that Sor kin had been reporting its progress to St.

Petersburg. The local Russian agents, lacking instructions to the contrary, supported the uprising.

329

Then Tsar Alexander III compounded the problem by refusing to accept as a fait accompli a

Unification under his much-loathed foe, Alexander von Battenberg. So he ordered the withdrawal of all Russian officers from Bulgaria, ceding enormous power to Battenberg, antagonizing the Bulgarian elites, and doing untold damage to Russia‘s prestige in the country.

After all, at the heart of the Russo-Bulgarian relationship lay the fact that the current Tsar‘s father had rescued the Bulgarians from the Turks. And now, when Eastern Rumelia once more sought to break free of the Ottoman Empire, when the danger from the Sultan was at its greatest height, the Russian officers who had served in the Bulgarian army for years packed up and left.

The sight of the Russian Tsar standing with the Sultan against the Bulgarians was an awkward one. It became even more awkward when Battenberg then proceeded to fight off a Serbian invasion, making Russian aid seem rather unnecessary. Now the very factors which had seemed to suggest positive Russo-Bulgarian relations were turned on their head – close relations with

Russia had proven detrimental to Bulgaria‘s security (the key factor according to Defensive

Realists), and to Bulgarian nationalist aspirations (the key factor according to Constructivists).

The dynamic had been utterly and irrecovably changed.

The following year of 1886 simply saw matters progress to a now-inevitable conclusion.

Russia and Bulgaria were now firm enemies. The Russian Empire backed a coup against

Battenberg, which proceeded to fall apart. Another Russian agent, General Nikolaĭ Vasil'evich

Kaul'bars, brother to the former Minister of War, was personally dispatched by Alexander III to reassert control over Bulgaria – he had some initial success, but like so many previous Russians contrived to make himself despised by the Bulgarian elites and was ultimately forced to leave the country with his mission incomplete. There were a few discussions of a Russian invasion of

330

Bulgaria, but this was rejected as politically problematic and morally untenable – the other Great

Powers would not pass up an opportunity to intervene, and Tsar Alexander III, however furious he was, was not about to invade a country his father had liberated. So instead, Russo-Bulgarian relations were cut off, not to resume until after the deaths of both Battenberg and Alexander III.

Ultimately, three things emerge clearly from an examination of Russo-Bulgarian relations in the years immediately following the Russo-Turkish War. First and foremost, the behavior of

Russian agents was the principal cause of the rupture. Time and time again, individual Russian agents would make themselves positively loathed by some faction or other of the Bulgarian people, and on occasion by the entire populace. Parensov, Davydov, Khitrovó, Remlingen,

Kumani, Kaul‘bars, Sobolev, the list is quite extensive. Very few of the conflicts these men embroiled themselves in were really politically serious, and yet they collectively managed to do immense harm to Russo-Bulgarian relations. Battenberg himself put it best when he observed that there was not a single Bulgarian of importance who had not received from Russia ―des coups de pied dans le derrier,‖ that is, a kick in the hindquarters.815

Secondly, one notes the inability of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to set and enforce policy. Very often, there was no one clearly in charge of Bulgarian policy, as Parensov discovered when he tried to get orders about what to do during the Titles Controversy. Other times, Russian agents acted in a manner directly contrary to what policy there was. The most dramatic example of this would be when Ehrnrooth would utterly overturn Russo-Bulgarian relations by forcing Battenberg into the 1881 Coup, but there are other examples – the way

Khitrovó and Sobolev both took it upon themselves to oppose the Prince, in contravention of orders from St. Petersburg, for instance. And the Russian government was very slow in recalling

331 these people, even when aware of the damage they were doing to Russian interests, and never made any effort to reprimand or punish agents who had exceeded their authority – Ehrnrooth being the most dramatic case once more. Finally, one notes the importance of Panslav ideals, in particular a sort of paternalistic expectation of Bulgarian obedience and a constant suspicion of all things German, in causing trouble. Both Khitrovó and Sobolev refused to work with

Battenberg primarily because the young Prince was of German heritage. Not coincidentally, these were the two Russian agents who caused the most harm to Russo-Bulgarian relations.

Were these the only factors leading to the breakup of Russo-Bulgarian relations? Of course they were not. Prince Alexander von Battenberg in particular bears a significant share of the blame, being quite as antagonistic to the Russian agents as those agents were to everyone else

– one can read Parensov‘s memoirs and get a distinct sense of frustration from the Russian general at having to work with a stripling prince with delusions of grandeur. Bulgaria‘s complex, multifaceted, and contentious political scene was also fertile ground for all manner of conflict, and even without the actions of the Russians Bulgaria would have had a tempestuous early existence. Nor can a simple dose of bad luck be excluded from the story, as demonstrated by the

Rumelian Uprising beginning so soon after Battenberg promised the Russian Minister of Foreign

Affairs that all would be quiet. But these factors, while having their own definite weight, would not have been enough to outweigh the many reasons for relations to continue in a positive vein.

At the end of the day, it was the behavior of Russian agents, uncontrolled by the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and egged on by Panslav ideology, that destroyed Russo-Bulgarian relations.

This destruction was not without consequences. Most obviously, it would have enormous repercussions for the later course of Bulgarian history. It was this conflict that saw Battenberg

332 removed, and would lead to the ascent of both Prince Ferdinand and Stefan Stambolov, who would exert enormous influence on the course of Bulgarian history. It also saw Russia lose its last major Balkan ally. The Treaty of San Stefano had alienated all of the others with its generosity towards Bulgaria, and now Russia had no allies in the Balkans at all but for tiny

Montenegro. This isolation, in a part of the world so long considered vital for Russian interests, would lead the Russian Empire to court Serbia with considerable ardor, and to cling to that alliance even when it became dangerous to Russia‘s own interests some thirty years later.

Notably, during both World Wars, Russia and Bulgaria would find themselves on opposite sides.

803 Kennan, The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de 105. 804 Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, 271. 805 Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 279. 806 Ku tsarov, ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia,‖ 330. 807 Khevrolina and Ignatʹev, I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii 258. 808 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CXXVI, 337-338; CXXXI, 439-442 809 Morier to Salisbury, FO, 65/1219, no. 384C, secret and confidential, Nov 11, 1885 in Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 235. 810 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 100-101, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 218-220. 811 Parensov, ―V Bolgarii,‖ CI, 594-595. 812 Ibid., CXXV, 521-522. 813 Sir Henry Elliot to Sir Henry Ponsonby, Vienna, 23 September 1883, in Buckle. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series, 3:444-445 814 Stoilov‘s Diary Entry for 20 February 1886, TsDA Fond 600K, Opis 3, Delo 6, List 26 to 27. 815 L'vov, meli ki pe e o o , 100-101, RGVIA Fond 430, Opis 1, Delo 173, List 214.

333

Glossary of Names

Alexander II: Emperor of Russia, 1855-1881, called the Tsar-Liberator in Bulgaria for his role in freeing the Bulgarians from the Ottoman Empire, father of Alexander III, uncle-by-marriage of Alexander von Battenberg.

Alexander III: Emperor of Russia, 1881-1894, cousin of Alexander von Battenberg. Possessed of Panslav sympathies. von Battenberg, Alexander: Prince of Bulgaria, 1879-1886, cousin of Emperor Alexander III, son of Prince Alexander of Hesse and by the Rhine. Served in both the Prussian military and as a lieutenant in the Russian Army during the Russo-Turkish War. Considered charming and intelligent, but extremely young at the time of his arrival in Bulgaria.

Bogdanov, P. M.: The main Russian diplomatic agent during the summer of 1886, presumably Acting Consul-General in Ko iander‘s place. Deeply involved in the preparations for the August Coup of 1886.

r , Todor: A Conservative politician and first Minister-President of Bulgaria. Later occupied the posts of Minister of Finance on two occasions.

Chichagov, M. M.: Lieutenant-Colonel in the Russian Army, military attaché to Eastern Rumelia at the time of the Unification of 1885.

The Conservative Party: One of the two original political parties of Bulgaria, they represented the elites and were in favor of a strong executive. Primarily led by the ‗Triumvirate‘ of Stoilov, Grekov, and Nachovich, they were invariably the minority party. The party dissolved around 1884, though many of its leaders reappeared in the People‘s Party founded by Stoilov in 1894, which in turn lasted on through till 1920.

Davydov, Aleksandr Petrovich: First Russian Consul-General in Bulgaria, from 1878 to 1880. Famously hated being in Bulgaria, and feuded with the Liberal Party in general and Karavelov in particular.

- r r M : Russian General, scion of an ancient Princely family, and head of the Russian occupation forces after the Russo-Turkish War. Donduk v- Kors kov was responsible for setting up the initial Bulgarian state, and helped the Constituent National Assembly draft the Tarnovo Constitution.

Ehrnrooth, Johann Casimir.: Swedish-speaking Finn, Lieutenant-General in the Russian Army, Minister of War in Bulgaria 1880-1881, Minister-President and Minister of Interior, May- July 1881. Not a Panslav, but possessed of authoritarian preferences, and the driving force behind the Coup of 1881. Later became Minister-Secretary of State for Finnish Affairs.

334

Ė : Lieutenant-Colonel in the Russian Army, military attaché to Eastern Rumelia for much of the early 1880s. Replaced by M. M. Chichagov.

r r : Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1882 to 1894, though the ill- health of his predecessor, Prince Gorchak v, meant that Girs was effectively the Foreign Minister from about 1878 onwards. Generally considered a competent but not brilliant diplomat.

Grekov, Dimit"r: One of the ‗Triumvirate‘ that led the Conservative Party. Minister of Justice in 1879 and 1882-1883, Minister of Interior 1879, Speaker of the Legislature 1883-1884, later Minister-President in 1899.

Igel'strom, G. V.: Russian Vice-Consul to Eastern Rumelia, assistant to Sor kin, and the senior Russian diplomatic official during the Rumelian Uprising and the Unification of Bulgaria in 1885.

r ё : Russian Consul-General in Bulgaria from 1883 to 1884, an old Balkan hand (formerly Minister-) sent to clear up the crisis caused by the clash between Battenberg, the Conservatives, and Generals Sobolev and Kaul‘bars.

Kantakuzen, Mikhail Aleksandrovich: Russian General and scion of an ancient Princely family, served as Minister of War in Bulgaria from 1884 to 1885. In general, one of the few Russian agents to have left a largely positive impression on the Bulgarians. Recalled, along with the rest of the Russian military staff, after the Unification of Bulgaria.

Karavelov, Petko: Leader of the center wing of the Liberal Party, which was also the largest. Brother of Lyuben Karavelov, a prominent Bulgarian revolutionary. Minister-President on four occasions (1880-1881, 1884-1886, 1886, 1901-1902) and Finance Minister on three (1880-1881, 1884-1886, 1901-1902). Probably the single most powerful Bulgarian politician of the 1880s.

’b r , Aleksandr Vasil'evich: Russian Major-General, served as Minister of War in Bulgaria from 1882 to 1883, alongside L. N. Sobolev. Was widely disliked, but overall a less active individual than Sobolev. Younger brother of N. V. Kaul‘bars.

’b r V : Russian General and military attaché to Vienna, and close aide of Emperor Alexander III, was sent to Bulgaria as an emissary on a few occasions to patch up disagreements. His last trip was in 1886, when he was sent after the August Coup to try and bend the Bulgarian Regency to the Russian will. He failed, and diplomatic relations were severed.

r M r : Russian Consul-General from 1881 to 1883, an experienced and well-connected diplomat (a relative of the Russian Minister of Interior, Count Dm triĭ Andr evich Tolst ĭ). An ardent Panslav and a member of the Slavic Benevolent Societies, he came out firmly against Battenberg from the very beginning on the basis of the latter being German. Rather notoriously unscrupulous in his political behavior.

335

Kliment of Tarnovo (T"rnovski): Born Vasil Nikolov Drumev but better known as the Metropolitan Kliment of Tarnovo. In addition to being a prominent clergyman, he was a politician and ardent Russophile, and was the second Minister-President of Bulgaria. Was also the chosen Minister-President of the August Coup of 1886, though it seems likely that he himself had nothing to do with the coup. Also considered one of the fathers of Bulgarian fiction, having written the first original short story in Bulgarian, A Woeful Family, in 1860.

Koch, Adolf: Personal chaplain of Alexander von Battenberg, wrote an account of his time in Bulgaria. A virulent Russophobe.

r r ich: Russian Consul-General in Bulgaria from 1884 to 1886. Overall a minor figure in Russo-Bulgarian relations, he closely followed his government‘s policy of being cold and unfriendly towards Alexander von Battenberg.

Kumani, M : Russian Consul-General in Bulgaria from 1880 to 1881. Disliked the Liberals and the Tarnovo Constitution, but followed a relatively restrained policy.

M , r : Russian Minister of War from 1861 to 1881, and one of the most influential political figures in Russia during the reign of Alexander II. Responsible for major military reforms, and considered something of a liberal in the context of Russian politics. The direct superior of P. D. Parensov, but after Alexander II‘s assassination Mil i tin was forced to retire from politics. In 1898 promoted to Field Marshal, the last man to hold that rank in the Russian Empire.

The Liberal Party: One of the two original political parties of Bulgaria, they represented the lower and middle classes, though the core of their support was in the rural intelligentsia (schoolteachers and the like). They were the majority party, frequently outpolling their Conservative rivals by margins of 4-to-1. Their main leader was Petko Karavelov, though Stefan Stambolov and Dragan T sankov led important wings. In the mid-1880s the Liberal Party fractured into several splinter parties, including Stambolov‘s People‘s Liberal Party and Tsankov‘s Progressive Liberal Party. The splinter led by Petko Karavelov was renamed the Democratic Party in 1896, and has remained a force in Bulgarian politics to the present day.

Nachovich, Grigor: One of the ‗Triumvirate‘ that led the Conservative Party. At various points Minister of Finance, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Justice, as well as Ambassador to Romania.

Parensov, ё r r : Major-General in the Russian Army and a veteran of the Russo- Turkish War, Minister of War in Bulgaria 1879-1880. An ardent Panslav, he clashed repeatedly with Battenberg over military matters. His memoirs are among the most detailed sources on the first year and a half of Bulgaria‘s independent existence.

336 von Remlingen, Arnold Aleksandrovich: A Baltic German and a Colonel in the Russian army, served as Minister of Interior from 1881 to 1882. Clashed with the Conservatives over election matters.

Shepelev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich: A colonel in the Russian Army and personal aide-de- camp to Tsar Alexander II. Considered an extremely diplomatic and politically savvy individual, he was sent to Bulgaria in 1879 to serve as an adviser for the young Alexander von Battenberg. He soon fell out with the Prince, and was recalled in 1880.

R : Grand old man of the Liberal Party and to this day one of Bulgaria‘s most renowned poets and writers. Highly influential in the writing of the Tarnovo Constitution, but largely retired from political life afterwards.

Sobolev, Leonid Nikolaevich: Russian Lieutenant-General, served as Minister-President and Minister of the Interior from 1882 to 1883. An extremely sharp Panslav, Sobolev came into numerous conflicts with his Conservative fellow Cabinet-members, which ultimately led to the return of the Tarnovo Constitution and his quickly leaving the country in 1883.

r r r r : Russian Consul to Eastern Rumelia at the time of the Unification of Bulgaria. Was not actually present at the Unification due to a vacation, but was a conspicuous supporter of unification movements previously.

Stambolov, Stefan: Leader of the leftist wing of the Liberal Party, generally considered something of an enfant terrible during the 1880s. Took the lead in defeating the August Coup of 1886, and became Minister-President of Bulgaria from 1887 till 1894.

Stoilov, Konstantin: Dominant member of the ‗Triumvirate‘ that led the Conservative Party, Political Secretary of Battenberg 1880-1883, later Minister-President in 1887 and 1894-1899, as well as Minister of Interior, Minister of Finance, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Justice on various occasions. A very close supporter of Battenberg, his diary is one of the best sources on the period, as are his letters to Nachovich.

, Dragan: Leader of the most moderate wing of the Liberal Party, Minister-President and Foreign Minister in 1880, Minister-President 1883-1884. Generally the most pro-Russian of the Liberals, considered a poor public speaker but a master of backroom politics.

337

Bibliography

Abrikosov, Dmitriĭ Ivanovich. Revelations of a Russian Diplomat: The Memoirs of Dmitrii I. Abrikossow. Edited by George Alexander Lensen. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.

Aksákov, Ivan Sergeyvich. Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii. 3rd ed. 3 vols. Moscow: Universtitetskaia tipografiia, 1875.

———. Sochineniia, 1860-1886. Moskva: Tip. M.G. Volchaninova, 1886.

Aks kov, Konstantin Sergeevich. Polnoe n e ochinen Moskva: V Tip. P. Bakhmeteva, 1861.

Anderson, M. S. The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450-1919. London; New York: Longman, 1993.

Baumgart, Winfried. The Crimean War: 1853-1856. London; New York: Arnold ; Oxford University Press, 1999.

Beaman, Ardern George Hulme. M. Stambuloff. With ... Portraits. London, 1895.

Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture. New York: Knopf, 1966.

Bismarck, Otto. Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman; Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck,. New York: Harper & Bros., 1899.

Black, Cyril Edwin. The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria,. Princeton; London: Princeton University Press; H. Milford, Oxford university press, 1943.

———. ―The Start of the Cold War in Bulgaria: A Personal View.‖ The Review of Politics 41, no. 2 (April 1979): 163–202.

Bolsover, G. H. ―Izvol‘sky and Reform of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.‖ The Slavonic and East European Review 63, no. 1 (1985): 21–40.

Brennan, William Howard. ―The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Alliance with Germany, 1878- 1884.‖ Brennan, 1973.

Burchill, Scott, and Andrew Linklater. Theories of International Relations. New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1996.

Burchill, Scott. Theories of International Relations. Basingstoke, Hampshire [U.K.]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

338

Cecil, Gwendolen. Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury,. London: Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1921.

Corti, Egon Caesar. Alexander von Battenberg. London: Cassell, 1954.

———. The Downfall of Three Dynasties. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.

Crampton, R. J. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

———. Bulgaria. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

———. Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History. Boulder, Colo.; New York: East European Monographs ; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1983.

Danilevskiĭ, N. I a. o i i i E op pi el’n i ’ i I I k . New York: Johnson Reprint, 1966.

Durman, Karel. Lost Illusions: Russian Policies towards Bulgaria in 1877-1887. [Uppsala, Sweden]; Stockholm, Sweden: [Uppsala University ; Distributor, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1988.

———. The Time of the Thunderer: Mikhail Katkov, Russian Nationalist Extremism and the Failure of the Bismarckian System, 1871-1887. Boulder; New York: East European Monographs ; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1988.

Ehrnrooth, Johann Casimir Gustavovich. ―K Noveishei Istorii Bolgarii.‖ k i in , LII (1886): 475–83.

Golovin, A. F. Fürst Alexander I. von Bulgarien (1879-1886). Wien: C. Fromme, 1896.

Grimsted, Patricia Kennedy. The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Hamilton, Keith. Bertie of Thame: Edwardian Ambassador. Woodbridge, Suffolk [England]; Rochester, NY: Royal Historical Society ; Boydell Press, 1990.

Hamilton, Keith, and Richard Langhorne. The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration. London; New York: Routledge, 1995.

Herzen, Alexander. My Past and Thoughts: The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen. Translated by Constance Garnett, 1973.

339

Hughes, Michael. Diplomacy before the Russian Revolution: Britain, Russia, and the Old Diplomacy, 1894-1917. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Macmillan ; St. Martin‘s Press, 2000.

Institut voennoĭ istorii, V. I Achkasov, and Ivan Ivanovich Rostunov. ko- e k i o n - 1878. Moskva: Voenizdat, 1977.

Jelavich, Barbara. i ’ lk n En nglemen -1914. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Jelavich, Charles. Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism; Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Kalmykov, Andreĭ Dmitrievich. Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Kar ts ov, I U . S. em l i e n li hnem o ok i e - o pomin n i poli iche k i i lichny i . S.- Peterburg: konomicheska ia tip., 1906.

Kennan, George F. The Decline of i m ck’ E ope n O de F nco-Russian Relations, 1875- 1890. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Khevrolina, V. M, A. V Ignatʹev, and Institut rossiĭskoĭ istorii (Rossiĭska ia akademi ia nauk). I o i i ne hne poli iki o ii Moskva: Institut rossiĭskoĭ istorii (Rossiĭska ia akademi ia nauk), 1997.

Koch, Adolf. Prince Alexander of Battenberg; reminiscences of his reign in Bulgaria, from authentic sources,. London: Whitaker & Co., 1887.

Kohn, Hans. Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

Kosik, V. I. k i poli ik olg ii -1886. Moskva: Akademi ia nauk SSSR, In-t slav ia novedeni ia i balkanistiki, 1991.

Kostadinova, Tatiana. Bulgaria, 1879-1946: The Challenge of Choice. Boulder; New York: East European Monographs ; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1995.

Ku tsarov, Petr. ―Vossoedinenie Bolgarii v 1885 Godu i Rossiĭska ia Imperi ia.‖ Rossiĭska ia Akademi ia Nauk, Institut Slav ianovedeni ia, 2003.

Langer, William L. European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890. New York: Knopf, 1950.

340

Lieven, D. C. B. ―The Russian Establishment in the Reign of Nicholas II: The Appointed Members of the State Council.‖ University of London, 1978.

Lincoln, W. Bruce. In W ’ D k h dow The i n befo e he G e W . New York: Dial Press, 1983.

———. The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia. DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990.

Lukashevich, Stephen. Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886; a Study in Russian Thought and Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

L‘vov, Evgeniĭ. meli ki Pe e o o ’. Moskva, 1886.

MacGahan, J. A. ―The Turkish Atrocities in Bulgaria: Horrible Scenes at Batak.‖ The Daily News, August 22, 1876.

MacKenzie, David. The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Maxwell, Margaret. ―An Examination of the Role of N. K. Girs as Russian Foreign Minister under Alexander III.‖ European Studies Review, no. i (1971).

Medlicott, W. N. Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe,. New York: Greenwood Press, 1969.

———. ―The Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias, 1885: Part I.‖ The English Historical Review 54, no. 213 (1939): 67–82.

———. ―The Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias, 1885: Part II (Continued).‖ The English Historical Review 54, no. 214 (1939): 263–84.

Meininger, Thomas A. Ignatiev and the Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872; a Study in Personal Diplomacy. Madison: [Prepared by] State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Dept. of History, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

Menning, Bruce. Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

Mil iutin, Dmitriĭ Alekseevich. Dne nik D Mil i in . Edited by Petr Andreevich Zaĭonchkovskiĭ. 4 vols. Moscow: Gosudarstvenna ia biblioteka SSSR imeni V.I. Lenina, Otdel rukopiseĭ, 1947.

Mosse, W. E. Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia. New York: Macmillan, 1958.

341

Narochni ts kiĭ, A. L. o i i i n ion l no-o obodi el n i bo b n lk n kh -1878: [Sbornik dokumentov]. Moskva: Nauka, 1978.

Ocherki Istorii Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del. St. Petersburg: Tovarishchestvo R. Golike i A. Vil‘borg, 1902.

Parensov, P. D. ―V Bolgarii: vospominaniye ofitsera general‘nago shtaba‖ k i in , CI (1900), 107-127, 359-381, 593-602; CXXV (1906), 62-74, 272-287, 509-527; CXXVI (1906), 62-78, 324-340; CXXXI (1907), 435-455; CXXXII (1908), 257-270; CXXXIV (1908), 17-47, 257-282.

Pares, Richard, L. B. Namier, and A. J. P Taylor. Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier. London; New York: Macmillan; St. Martin‘s Press, 1956.

Pavlovich, P. n i y kogo i m olg ii bo nik dok mentov. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe so ts ial‘no-ėkonomicheskoe izd-vo, 1981.

Perry, Duncan M. Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870-1895. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.

―Portretna ia Galere ia Russkikh De iateleĭ: Tom 1: 100 Portretov: S Biografi iami. - V Tipografii A. M iunstera, 1865.,‖ 1865.

―Portrety Lits, Otlichivshikhsia Zaslugami I Komandovavshikh Dieistvuiushchimi Chastiami v Voinie 1853-1856 Godov.‖ New York Public Library, n.d. http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/collections/portrety-lits-otlichivshikhsia-zaslugami-i- komandovavshikh-dieistvuiushchimi#/?tab=about.

Radev, Simeon, Pantelej Zarev, and Elena Statelova. oi eli e n ă emenn ălg ij . Sofija: Bălgarski pisatel, 1990.

Ragsdale, Hugh, and V. N Ponomarev. Imperial Russian Foreign Policy. [Washington, D.C.]; Cambridge; New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Rosen, Roman Romanovich. Forty Years of Diplomacy,. London; New York: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd.; A.A. Knopf, 1922.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Russian Empire, 1801-1917. Oxford: Clarendon P., 1967.

Shaw, Stanford J. ―The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914.‖ International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 3 (1978): 325–38.

342

Simpson, James Young. The Saburov Memoirs or Bismark and Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929.

Skazkin, S. D. Kone o- ko-ge m n kogo o i i ledo nie po i o ii ko-ge m n kikh i ko- i kikh o no heni i i o ochnym op o om -e gody I ole i i . Moskva: Nauka, 1974.

Sobolev, Leonid Nikolaevich. ―K Noveishei Istorii Bolgarii.‖ k i in , LI (1886): 703–52.

Sorokin, Pitirim Aleksandrovich. Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press, 1951.

Sumner, B. H. Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880. Hamden [Conn.: Archon Books, 1962.

Taylor, A. J. P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.

Tolst ĭ, Lev, and Constance Garnett. Anna Karenina. Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs & Company, 1919.

Venturi, Franco. Roots of Revolution; a History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. New York: Knopf, 1960.

Victoria, and George Earle Buckle. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Second Series. A Selection from He M je y’ Co e pondence nd Jo n l be ween he Ye nd London: J. Murray, 1926.

———. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Third Series. London: J. Murray, 1930.

Vinogradov, Viktor Ivanovich. Russko-Turetskaia Voina 1877-1878 Gg. I Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii. Moscow: Mysl‘, 1978.

Vitte, S. I u. The Memoirs of Count Witte. Translated by Sidney Harcave. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990.

Vyshinskiĭ, A.I a., and S.A. Lozovskiĭ, eds. Diplom iche ki lo ’. Gosudarstvennoe izdatel‘stvo politicheskoĭ literatury, 1948.

Zhomini, Alekṣandr Genrikhovich, Nikolaĭ Karlovich Girs, and Charles Jelavich. Russia in the East, 1876-1880; the Russo-Turkish War and the Kuldja crisis as seen through the letters of A.G. Jomini to N.K. Giers. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959.