Supporting Material for Chapter 2, Value

Supporting Material for Chapter 2: Value-Theory and the Good Life

1. Pleasure, happiness and flourishing: summary

z Pleasure and enjoyment are generally agreed to be intrinsically desirable. z Thought-experiments such as Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine help show that hedonists are mistaken to claim that nothing but pleasure is intrinsically desirable. z Happiness, like enjoyment, is either a feeling or an attitude, although its older meaning is ‘a life of blessedness’. z As such, it is almost always desirable or a blessing. z But a life of happiness, like a life of pleasure, could lack or omit much that could make it more desirable. z The flourishing of a creature involves the development of its essential capacities. z Thus human flourishing involves the development of essential human capacities (whether distinctive or non-distinctive). z Health, autonomy, accomplishment and happiness will normally all be present in a flourishing life. z But there can be exceptions, and a flourishing life can be lacking with respect to health or autonomy or accomplishment or happiness. z Autonomy has a key place within human well-being, and need not be regarded as comprising an independent principle. z Autonomy usually plays a crucial part in a person’s flourishing, but it does not always trump other dimensions of well-being, and can sometimes rightly be over-ridden.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this section, you will be enabled to form a view about the nature of pleasure. z You will also be enabled to form a view about whether or not pleasure alone is intrinsically desirable, as hedonists claim. z You will be able to form a view about the nature of happiness. z You will further be enabled to decide whether happiness includes everything desirable, or whether a happy life can sometimes be supplemented and enhanced through the addition of other goods. http://philosophy.attfield.continuumbooks.com © Robin Attfield (2012) Ethics London: Continuum Books

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z You will also be able to form a view about flourishing and its relation to a creature’s capacities. z You will be in a position to form a reflective view about the relation between human flourishing and health, accomplishment and happiness. z In the light of the discussion here and of the examples presented in the section on Medical Ethics, you will be in a position to understand the possibility of conflict between autonomy and other aspects of well-being. z Granted the importance of autonomy in human flourishing, you will also be able to form a view on whether or not autonomy can ever rightly be overridden.

Further reading

Alison Hills, ‘Value, Reason and Hedonism’, Utilitas, 20.1, 2008, pp. 50–8.

An essay title and reading How cogent is EITHER psychological OR ethical hedonism? Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (any edition), Book 10, ch. 2. Broad, C. D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930, ch. 4 (‘Hume’), pp. 86–91; 99–104. Goodin, Robert E., ‘Utility and the Good’, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 241–8. Hills, Alison, ‘Value, Reason and Hedonism’, Utilitas, 20.1, 2008, pp. 50–8. Hume, David, Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, any edn, Appendix 2, ‘Of Self-Love’. 2. Moral standing, value and intrinsic value: summary

z Things have moral standing if (and only if) they should be taken into consideration when decisions are being made. z Stances that limit moral standing to rational creatures (Immanuel Kant) or to sen- tient creatures (Peter Singer) are held to be too narrow. z Kenneth Goodpaster’s view, that all living creatures have moral standing (which he calls ‘moral considerability’) is defended. z Things have value and are valuable if there is reason to value them. So they can have value even if no one ever values them. z Examples of how we can reason about what is valuable are supplied. z Intrinsic value is introduced and contrasted with instrumental value, inherent value and contributive value. z Those who recognize the existence of derivative value (whether instrumental, inherent or contributive) must accept the existence of non-derivative (or intrinsic) value.

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z In a review of theories of intrinsic value, particular theories of moral standing and of intrinsic value are found to fit together, such as sentientism and hedonism. z But this combination of theories appears to omit many bearers of moral standing and many sorts of intrinsic value. z Biocentrism, according to which all living creatures have moral standing, and perfectionism, according to which the development of a creature’s essential capacities has intrinsic value, fit well together and are defended here. z Value is shown to admit of degrees. Freedom of speech, for example, is arguably more valuable than doughnuts. z Grounds are given for regarding some things (and some living creatures) as more valuable than others, and against holding that all creatures are equally valuable. z This allows practical priorities to be formed for situations where decisions have to be made.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this section, you should decide whether or not you agree with Kenneth Goodpaster that all living creatures have moral standing (in the sense introduced here). z You will be able to form a view about ways in which it is possible to reason about value. z You will also be able to begin forming a view about which entities and activities are valuable. z You will be enabled to distinguish between intrinsic value and value of other kinds, such as instrumental, inherent and contributive value. z Granted that certain theories of moral standing and of intrinsic value fit together, you will be able to form a view about the acceptability of the combined stance of sentientism and hedonism. z You will also be able to form a view about whether biocentrism (about moral standing) and perfectionism (about intrinsic value) form a defensible combination of views. z You should also be able to form a view about whether all creatures have equal value or not. z You may further be enabled to grasp how priorities can be reached when different interests and values have to be compared.

Some essay titles and reading Which things have moral standing (or moral considerability)? Attfield, Robin, ‘The Good of Trees’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15 (1981), pp. 35–54. —, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (1983 and 1991), ch. 8. —, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics (1995), ch. 2.

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Callicott, J. Baird, ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair’, Environmental Ethics, 2 (1980). Feinberg, Joel, ‘The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations’, in William T. Blackstone (ed.), Philosophy & Environmental Crisis, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974. Frankena, William, ‘Ethics and the Environment’, in K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre (eds), Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century, Notre Dame and London: Notre Dame University Press, 1979. Goodpaster, Kenneth, ‘On Being Morally Considerable’, Journal of Philosophy, 75, 1978, pp. 308–25. Midgley, Mary, ‘Duties Concerning Islands’, in R. Elliot and A. Gare (eds), Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of Readings, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, and University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983.

What kinds of things have intrinsic value? Attfield, Robin, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, (1983) Athens, GA and London: University of Georgia Press, 1991, chs 7 and 8. —, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, chs 3–5. Downie, R. S., Eileen M. Loudfoot and Elizabeth Telfer, Education and Personal Relationships, London: Methuen, 1974, ch. 3. Glover, Jonathan, Causing Death and Saving Lives, 1977, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, ch. 3. Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1903) 1968; see ch. 6 (‘The Ideal’). Regan, Tom, ‘Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism and Animal Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, 1979–80, pp. 305–24. —, ‘The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic’, Environmental Ethics 3, 1981, pp. 16–31. Roupas, T. G., ‘The Value of Life’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7, 1977–8, pp. 154–83. VanDeVeer, Donald, ‘Interspecific Justice’, Inquiry 22, 1979, pp. 55–79. Warren, Mary, ‘Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?’, in R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry, Obligations to Future Generations, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, pp. 14–30; see also the articles of William Anglin and R. I. Sikora. Zimmerman, Michael J., ‘In Defense of the Concept of Intrinsic Value’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 29, 1999, pp. 389–410. 3. Worthwhile life, self-respect and meaningful work: summary

z A worthwhile life is distinguished from a worthy or virtuous life, and also from a life of which the quality is so low as not to be worth living. z The possibility of lives not being worth living raises issues about voluntary euthanasia and about infanticide. z Voluntary euthanasia is argued to be justifiable in rare but imaginable cases. z What makes life worth living is activities, states and experiences of intrinsic value. z A theory is presented, based on the account of human flourishing presented earlier in this chapter, of how to identify these.

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z This theory is defended against the charge that it ignores the diversity of concep- tions of worthwhile life that emerge from different societies. z The concept of self-respect is introduced, with the help of John Rawls’ account; a modified version of this account is accepted. z Self-respect is argued to have intrinsic value, and widely to confer such value on meaningful work. z Meaningful work is further argued to have intrinsic value because of its very nature. It has a place in worthwhile lives both because it conveys self-respect and because it embodies the development of an essential human capacity. z This raises issues about the desirability of full employment, both in developed and developing societies.

Learning objectives

z You will be enabled to distinguish between a worthwhile life, a worthy or virtuous life and a life not worth living. z Given that a life could in rare cases be not worth living, or even worth not living, you should be able to form a view, through studying this section, about the rel- evance of this to euthanasia and to infanticide. z You should be able to form a view about what kinds of thing make life worth living. z You will also be enabled to form a view about the place of the development of essential capacities in a worthwhile life. z You should be able to explain what is meant by self-respect. z You should be able to form a view about the place of self-respect in a life worth living. z You should be able to explain what is meant by ‘meaningful work’. z You should also be able to form a view about whether meaningful work has intrinsic value, and what reasons there are to believe this.

Some related essay titles and reading Is euthanasia ever morally acceptable? Glover, Jonathan, Causing Death and Saving Lives, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1977, pp. 182–202. Rachels, James, ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’, in Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), Killing and Letting Die, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 63–8. Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 175–217. Steinbock, Bonnie, ‘The Intentional Termination of Life’, in Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), Killing and Letting Die, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980, pp. 69–77.

Does meaningful work have intrinsic value? Attfield, Robin, ‘Work and the Human Essence’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 1, 1984, pp. 141–50.

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—, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 29–78. —, ‘Meaningful Work and Full Employment’, Reason in Practice, 1.1, 2001, pp. 41–8. Beal, J. M., ‘Essentialism and Closed Concepts’, Ratio, 16. 2, 1974, pp. 190–205. Cafaro, Philip, Thoreau’s Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Virtue, Athens, GA and London, 2004, chapter 3. White, John, Education and the End of Work: A New Philosophy of Work and Learning, London: Cassell, 1997, pp. 5–7, 23, 45–6, 94. 4. The good life, needs, virtue and morality: summary

z Needs are distinguished from wants, and contingent needs from needs that are constituents of well-being. z Examples of these different kinds of needs are offered. z Basic needs are further distinguished from less basic needs, as well as from wants. z The universality of certain human needs is defended against objections that rela- tivize needs to different social contexts. z Questions about reasons for being moral are considered, as also are the relations between morality and needs. z Morality does not always benefit the individual agent; for example, self-sacrifice may be both moral and harmful to the agent. z But in the absence of moral behaviour being displayed, many needs would not be satisfied, and everyone benefits from morality at some time or other. z Being virtuous contributes to living a worthwhile life in several ways, through rewards including self-respect. z Much depends on what kind of person an individual wants to be; if we want to be reliable, generous and honest, we need to make corresponding choices over a long period, and ignore self-interest as we do so. z Just as happiness is seldom to be attained by aiming to be happy, so aiming to be virtuous on a basis of self-interest is not likely to generate sincere forms of virtue such as kindness and generosity.

Learning objectives

z Through studying this section, you should be able to distinguish between basic needs, other needs and wants. z You will also be enabled to disregard claims that strongly felt wants are needs. z You should be able to form a view about the relation between behaving morally and the satisfaction of the needs of those benefited by such behaviour.

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z You should also form a view about the relation between morality, needs and other benefits to the moral agent. z You should be able to form a view about the relation between being virtuous, living a worthwhile life and self-respect. z You will also be able to recognize limits to the advantageousness of virtuous behaviour. z You will be able to recognize that becoming reliable, generous and honest involves making reliable, generous and honest choices over a long period of time. z You should further form a view about whether it is possible to attain such forms of virtue as kindness and generosity on a basis of self-interest.

Essay titles Is friendship a human need? Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (any edition), Books 8 and 9. Attfield, Robin, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Éditions Rodopi, 1995, pp. 66–78. Braybrooke, David, Meeting Needs, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 29–59. Joseph Butler, Sermons XI and XII, ‘Upon the Love of Our Neighbour’, in The Works of Joseph Butler, D.C.L., ed. W. E. Gladstone, Vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, pp. 156–92. LaFollette, Hugh, ‘Personal Relationships’, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 327–32. Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’, in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 242–76.

To what extent does moral virtue benefit its possessor? Baier, Kurt, ‘Why Should We Be Moral?’, in David P. Gauthier, Morality and Rational Self-Interest, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 151–65. Foot, Philippa, ‘Moral Beliefs’, in Philippa Foot (ed.), Theories of Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 83–100. Gauthier, David P., ‘Morality and Advantage’, in David P. Gauthier, Morality and Rational Self-Interest, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 166–80. Hursthouse, Rosalind, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 163–91. Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’, in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 242–76. Siegler, Frederick, ‘Reason, Happiness and Goodness’, in James J. Walsh and Henry L. Shapiro (eds), Aristotle’s Ethics: Issues and Interpretations, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1967, pp. 30–46.

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