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Cora Diamond List of Publications I. Books Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939, ed. Cora Diamond, Cornell University Press and Harvester Press, 1976; paperback edition, University of Chicago Press, 1989. Translations into German, French, Italian, Korean and Japanese. Intention and Intentionality, Essays in Honour of G.E.M. Anscombe, ed. Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman, Harvester Press and Cornell University Press, 1979 The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Bradford Books, MIT Press, 1991; paperback, 1995. L’esprit réaliste, Wittgenstein, la philosophie et l’esprit, Presses Universitaires de France, 2004 L’immaginazione e la vita morale, Cora Diamond (Piergiorgio Donatelli, ed.), Carocci, 2006 Philosophy and Animal Life, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Ian Hacking and Cary Wolfe, Columbia University Press, 2009 Rileggere Wittgenstein, James Conant and Cora Diamond, (Piergiorgio Donatelli, ed.), Carocci, 2010 L’importance d’être humain et autres essais de philosophie morale, Cora Diamond, Quadrige/PUF, 2011 Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe—Aufsätze zur Moralphilosophie, Cora Diamond (Christoph Ammann and Andreas Hunziger, eds.), Suhrkamp, 2012 Contro i diritti degli animali? Ambientalisti, vegetariani ma non animalisti, Cora Diamond, Christine Korsgaard and John B. Callicott, Medusa Edizioni 2012 Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On To Ethics, Harvard University Press, 2019 II. Articles “Mr. Goodman on Relevant Conditions and the Counterfactual”, Philosophical Studies, 1959 “Secondary Sense”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1966-67. Reprinted in The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. John Canield, Garland Press 1986, and in The Realistic Spirit. “The Interchangeability of Machines”, in The Business of Reason, ed. J.J. MacIntosh and S. Coval, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969. “Riddles and Anselm’s Riddle”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. vol. 51, 1977; reprinted in The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. John Canield, Garland Press 1986, and in The Realistic Spirit “Eating Meat and Eating People”, Philosophy, 1978. Reprinted in The Realistic Spirit; reprinted in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum, Oxford University Press, 2005; French translation in L’importance d’être humain; German translation in Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe; Italian translation in Contro i diritti degli animali? Ambientalisti, vegetariani ma non animalisti. Swedish translation in MoralVilosoViska essäer, J. Backström and G. Torrkulla, eds., Thales, 2001 “Frege and Nonsense”, in Intention and Intentionality, 1979; reprinted in The Realistic Spirit “Reply to Mr. Coope” in Philosophical Books 20:1 1979. “What Nonsense Might Be”, Philosophy 1981, reprinted in The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. John Canield, Garland Press, 1986; reprinted in Critical Assessments of Ludwig Wittgenstein, ed. Stuart Shanker, Croom Helm, 1985; reprinted in The Realistic Spirit “Experimenting on Animals: a Problem in Ethics”, in Animals in Research, ed. David Sperlinger, John Wiley and Sons, 1981, reprinted in The Realistic Spirit. “Wright’s Wittgenstein”, Critical Notice of Crispin Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Philosophical Quarterly, 1981. Reprinted in The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. John Canield, Garland, 1986; also in Critical Assessments of Ludwig Wittgenstein, ed. Stuart Shanker, Croom Helm, 1985, and in The Realistic Spirit “Anything but Argument?”, Philosophical Investigations, 1982. Reprinted in The Realistic Spirit. German translation in Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe; Swedish translation in MoralVilosoViska essäer, J. Backström and G. Torrkulla, eds., Thales, 2001 “Hommage ou Dommage?” (a study of Festschrift volumes in philosophy), Philosophy 1983 “Having a Rough Story of What Moral Philosophy Is”, New Literary History, 1983-84. Reprinted in The Realistic Spirit; reprinted (with a new introduction) in The Literary Wittgenstein, John Gibson and Wolfgang Huemer, eds., Routledge, 2004. German Translation in Wittgenstein und die Literatur, ed. by J. Gibson and W. Huemer. Suhrkamp 2006. “Rights, Justice and the Retarded”, in Natural Abilities and Perceived Worth: Rights, Values and Retarded Persons, ed. Loretta M. Kopelman and John C. Moskop, Reidel, 1984. “What Does a Concept Script Do?”, in Special Issue on Frege, Philosophical Quarterly, 1984 (reprinted as Frege: Tradition and InVluence, ed., Crispin Wright, Blackwell, 1985). Reprinted in Logic and Foundations of Mathematics in Frege’s Philosophy, ed. Hans Sluga, Garland Press, 1993. Reprinted also in The Realistic Spirit “Realism and the Realistic Spirit”, in Critical Assessments of Ludwig Wittgenstein, ed. Stuart Shanker, Croom Helm, 1985. Reprinted in The Realistic Spirit “Losing Your Concepts”, Ethics, special issue on moral philosophy and literature, 1988. French translation in L’importance d’être humain. Italian translation in L’immaginazione e la vita morale. German translation in Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe “Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus”, Philosophy, 1988. Reprinted in The Realistic Spirit; also reprinted in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stuart Shanker and David Kilfoyle, eds., Routledge, 2002 “The Dog that Gave Himself the Moral Law”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIII (on Ethical Theory, Character and Virtue), 1988 “How Many Legs?”, in Value and Understanding, ed. R. Gaita, Routledge, 1989. Italian translation in L’immaginazione e la vita morale “Rules: Looking in the Right Place”, in Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars, Peter Winch and D.Z. Phillips, eds., Macmillan, 1989 “The Importance of Being Human”, in Human Beings, ed. David Cockburn, Cambridge University Press, 1991. Italian translation in L’immaginazione e la vita morale; French translation in L’importance d’être humain; German translation in Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe “Knowing Tornadoes and Other Things”, New Literary History, 1991 “Frege against Fuzz”, in The Realistic Spirit, 1991 “The Face of Necessity”, in The Realistic Spirit, 1991 “Missing the Adventure: Reply to Martha Nussbaum”, in The Realistic Spirit, 1991 “Philosophy and the Mind”, in The Realistic Spirit, 1991 “Wittgenstein and Metaphysics”, in The Realistic Spirit, 1991 “Ethics, Imagination, and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, in Bilder der Philosophie, R. Heinrich and H. Vetter, eds., Wiener Reihe, 1991. Reprinted in The New Wittgenstein, A. Crary and R. Read, eds., Routledge, 2000. French translation in L’importance d’être humain ; translation reprinted in C. Romano, ed., Wittgenstein, Cerf 2013. Slovenian Tralnslation in Anthropos 1-2 (253-254) 2019 “Sahibs and Jews”, in Jewish Identity, David Theo Goldberg and Michael Krausz, eds., Temple University Press, 1993 “Truth: Defenders, Debunkers, Despisers”, in Commitment in Relection: Essays in Literature and Moral Philosophy, ed. Leona Toker, 1993 “¿Qué tan viejos son estos huesos? Putnam, Wittgenstein y la veri^icación” (Spanish translation of “How Old Are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein and Veri^ication”), Diánoia 1992 (published in 1993) “Martha Nussbaum and the Need for Novels”, Philosophical Investigations, 1993. Reprinted in Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy, and Theory, J. Adamson et al., eds., Cambridge University Press, 1998. Reprinted in Textualität der Philosophie, Philosophie und Literatur, ed. L. Nagl and H. Silverman, Wiener Reihe, Vienna, 1994 “Sameness and Difference” in Social Research, Vol. 62, No. 3, In the Company of Animals (FALL 1995), pp. 685-689 “Wittgenstein, Mathematics and Ethics: Resisting the Attractions of Realism”, in Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, David Stern and Hans Sluga, eds., Cambridge University Press, 1996. (Reprinted in 2nd edition, 2017) “‘We are perpetually moralists’: Iris Murdoch, Fact and Value”, in Iris Murdoch and the Search for Human Goodness, Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker, eds., University of Chicago Press, 1996. German translation in Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe; Italian translation in L’immaginazione e la vita morale “La philosophie morale de Ludwig Wittgenstein”, in Dictionnaire d’éthique et de philosophie morale, Presses Universitaires de France, 1996 “Consequentialism in Modern Moral Philosophy and in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’”, in Human Lives: A Critique of Consequentialist Bioethics, D.S. Oderberg and J.A. Laing, eds., Macmillan (UK) and St. Martins Press, 1997 “Moral Differences and Distances: Some Questions”, in Commonality and Particularity in Ethics, L. Alanen et al., eds., Macmillan, 1997. French translation in Éthique, littérature, vie humaine, ed., Sandra Laugier, PUF, 2006, reprinted in L’importance d’être humain. Italian translation in FilosoVia e questioni pubbliche, 1998; reprinted in L’immaginazione e la vita morale; German translation in Menschen, Tiere und Begriffe “Realism and Resolution: Reply to Warren Goldfarb and Sabina Lovibond”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 1997. “Henry James, Moral Philosophers, Moralism” (incorporating parts of “Moral Differences and Distances”), Henry James Review, 1997. Reprinted in Mapping the Ethical Turn, Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack, eds., University Press of Virginia, 2001; also reprinted in Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, Garry L. Hagberg and Walter Jost, eds., Wiley-Blackwell, 2010 “How Old are These Bones? Putnam, Wittgenstein, and Veri^ication” (revised version of paper published in Spanish in 1993), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. vol. 73, 1999 “Does Bismarck
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