DOCSLIB.ORG

The London School of Economics and Political Science Israeli Foreign

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The London School of Economics and Political Science Israeli Foreign The London School of Economics and Political Science Israeli Foreign Policy Towards Iran 1948-1979: Beyond The Realist Account Efrat Shaoulian-Sopher A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London, October 2017 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work. This thesis was copy-edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Dr. Daniel Strieff and Sandra Beck. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. The final word count of this thesis, including titles, footnotes and in-text citations, is 99,122 words. 2 ABSTRACT Israeli foreign policy towards Iran in the period 1948-1979 has been generally explained through the Realist perspective, claiming that Israeli relations with Iran were established and developed due to converging strategic interests and common threats. This thesis argues that the existing literature does not fully appreciate the role that individuals, especially with their perceptions and misperceptions and human agency played in the formation and implementation of Israeli foreign policy. By not fully appreciating the role of human agency, the existing literature on Israeli relations with Iran has not fully explored the methods that made Israel’s foreign policy with Iran a success. For instance, the existing accounts do not examine how the actions of specific Israeli diplomats in Tehran such as Ambassador Meir Ezri prevented attempts from groups in Iran such as the Iranian Foreign Ministry and certain religious clerics to stop Israeli-Iranian relations. For three decades, the relationship between Israel and Iran, though discreet and often kept secret, flourished within the context of the Cold War and the rise of Pan Arabism. Many covert joint operations yielded widespread collaboration in the areas of trade, civilian technology, oil, agriculture, and extensive military intelligence collaboration on areas such as Yemen, Iraq and the Kurds. That changed with a shift in Israeli personnel in 1973, and ended completely after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. If Israeli-Iranian relations did solely stem from converging strategic interests, relations would have been more likely to survive the 1979 Revolution. Rather, the Israelis’ change in personnel in Tehran, their relationships with the Iranians, and their perceptions of world events greatly influenced the 1973 and 1979 shifts. This thesis concludes that any analysis of Israeli foreign policy formation and implementation towards Iran must include the multidimensional role of decision-makers, diplomats, and other foreign policy actors in order to complete the analysis presented by the existing Realist-leaning accounts. The thesis bases its argument on extensive International Relations-based examination of Israeli diplomatic history. Analysis of the role of prime ministers and diplomats such as David Ben Gurion, Tzvi Doriel and Meir Ezri; including their perceptions and misperceptions and human agency—forges a new understanding of Israeli foreign policy towards Iran from 1948 to 1979. Through the use of personal interviews, memoirs in Hebrew, English and Farsi, recently de-classified documents from the Israel State Archives, and unseen documents from private family collections, this thesis presents an argument that addresses the gaps in the existing literature. 3 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to dedicate this thesis to and in honour of my grandfather, Meir Ezri, in gratitude for his inspiration and direction and without whom none of this project would have been possible. Saba, I am grateful that you saw my thesis evolve, and that your light and guidance has enabled me to follow it through to completion. I would like to honour the late Professor Fred Halliday for his unrelenting confidence in my PhD and for being a truly generous supervisor, teacher and mentor, and for teaching me that life continues at the same time as a PhD. My thanks also to Professor Michael G. Fry for encouraging me to pursue my PhD at the London School of Economics and for teaching me that all academic endeavours must involve ‘fire in the belly’. My very sincere thanks to my supervisors Dr. Katerina Dalacoura and Dr. Amnon Aran for agreeing to take on my thesis and for your critical eyes. I am grateful for your on going concern, thoughts and suggestions. I would like to thank my interviewees who wished to remain anonymous, to The Lord Alliance of Manchester, Yossi Alpher, Nachik Navot and Hamid Sabi for bringing my sources to life and for your generosity. My thanks also to Helena Vilensky at the Israel State Archives for your attentive assistance and for making my visits to the Archives such a pleasure. I would like to thank my academic friends and colleagues Dr. Glen Segell, Dr. Elliot Hentov, Dr. Bea Lewkowicz, Dr. Magdalena C. Delgado, Dr. Neal Suleimanova, Dr. Alan Mendoza, Dr. Melanie Garson and Dr. Daniel Strieff for your invaluable support and feedback and for so generously guiding me through my PhD and for your very watchful eyes and sympathetic ears. For my very dear friends Viola Raikhel-Bolot, Romy Jacobsen, Ingrid Coltart and Sandra Beck. Your love, strength and support as well as sense of humour have made this the most enriching journey, and I am deeply grateful for your unrelenting support and friendship. To my formidable extended family who has supported me through thick and thin. For my inspirational Grandmother, Miriam Ezri, for making your dedication and sense of duty during your mission to Iran an adventure in diplomacy, love and grace. For my parents Avigail and Morris Shaoulian for your unending love and for teaching me persistence and the ultimate value of education. To my sister Yael Shaoulian for the intellectual debate and amusing distractions. My deepest thanks to Avikhail Ezri for your love and laughs and for helping me navigate the Israel State Archives with a smile, and to Yoram Ezri for your continued support, encouragement and for being a wonderful observer at my lectures. To my husband Daniel Sopher for your love and support in every way imaginable and above all to my darling sons Judah and Ariel for allowing me to continue working through all school times and vacations. I hope that I have set a good example for a consistent work ethic with passion and persistence. You both in turn have been my compass and source of greatest joy. In memory of Meir Ezri, Iran Shaoulian and Nejat Shaoulian 5 ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................. 5 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 12 1.1 Introduction and Rationale ........................................................................................... 12 1.2 Research Question, Argument and Contribution .................................................. 18 1.3 Survey of the Existing Literature and its Themes ................................................. 20 1.4 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 31 1.5 Israeli Foreign Policy Objectives and the International Context ..................... 33 1.5.1 Israeli Foreign Policy Assumptions and Objectives .......................................................... 33 1.6 The Israeli Decision-Making Structure ..................................................................... 41 1.7 Structure of the Thesis ................................................................................................... 46 CHAPTER 2: ................................................................................................................. 48 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN: KEY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS FOR REALISM AND THE FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS APPROACH ............................................... 48 2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 48 2.2 Definition of the National Interest ............................................................................. 51 2.3 Realism Distilled ............................................................................................................... 52 2.4 The Inadequacy of Neoclassical Realism and Constructivism .......................... 57 2.4.1 The Inadequacy of Neoclassical Realism .............................................................................. 57 2.4.2 The Inadequacy of Constructivism .......................................................................................... 60 2.5 The Individual in Realist Policy ................................................................................... 64 2.6 What The Realist Account Has Not Explained ........................................................ 69 2.7 Towards a New Analysis of Israeli-Iranian Relations .......................................... 73 2.7.1 Synthesising
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Israel: Alternative Regional Options in a Changing Middle East
    Report June 2013 Israel: alternative regional options in a changing Middle East By Yossi Alpher1 Executive summary Today Israel confronts broad regional security challenges reminiscent of those it faced in the early decades of its existence. Then it responded to the threat posed by the hostile Arab states that surrounded it by developing the “periphery doctrine”. It formed strategic ties with Iran, Turkey and other non-Arab, non- Muslim or geographically distant Arab states and minorities that shared its concerns. The original periphery doctrine ground to a halt between 1973 and 1983 and was in many ways replaced by the Arab-Israel peace process, both bilateral and multilateral. Eventually, the failure to register significant progress toward a solution of the Palestinian issue blunted this momentum. Currently Israel sees itself increasingly ringed by hostile Islamists in Egypt, Gaza, southern Lebanon and probably Syria, as well as non-Arab Turkey and Iran. Once again it confronts the spectre of regional isolation. But it is far better equipped than in the past to deal with a hostile ring of neighbours. Its policy options include not only a “new periphery” (Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Greece and Ethiopia, among others), but also the projection of both soft (particularly economic) and hard power, a search for accommodation with political Islam beginning with Hamas in Gaza, and a partial or comprehensive two-state solution agreement with the West Bank-based PLO. Introduction hostile Arab states motivated by Arab nationalism and led Today Israel confronts broad regional security challenges by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. These neighbouring that in some ways are reminiscent of those it faced in the countries were smarting from a string of military defeats at early decades of its existence.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel and Lebanon Sign Agreement at 2 Ceremonies
    Page 1 135 of 220 DOCUMENTS The New York Times May 18, 1983, Wednesday, Late City Final Edition ISRAEL AND LEBANON SIGN AGREEMENT AT 2 CEREMONIES BYLINE: By DAVID K. SHIPLER, Special to the New York Times SECTION: Section A; Page 16, Column 1; Foreign Desk LENGTH: 1687 words DATELINE: JERUSALEM, May 17 Israel and Lebanon signed a security agreement today that is intended to lead to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and continuing Israeli involvement in policing the country's southern region. The agreement came nearly a year after Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6, 1982, with the stated goals of helping to install a Government more acceptable to the Israelis, diminishing Syrian influence in Lebanon and ousting guerrillas of the Palestine Liberation Organization from their military bases and political headquarters. In the hope of consolidating these gains, Israel has made its troop withdrawal and the carrying out of the rest of the agreement contingent upon the withdrawal of P.L.O. and Syrian forces from the north and east of Lebanon. The return of all Israelis held as prisoners of war and an accounting of Israelis missing in action are also prerequisites for an Israeli pullout. The agreement will be technically completed upon the exchange of instruments of ratification, a formality said to involve another approval by Israel's Cabinet and Lebanon's Parliament. Officials expect this to take place within a week. But no aspect of the accord is to go into effect until the Israeli withdrawal. Successful but Fragile The agreement, which the United States endorsed as a witness, was a step less than a full peace treaty.
    [Show full text]
  • Men and Boys: Representations of Israeli Combat Soldiers in the Media
    Men and Boys Representations of Israeli Combat Soldiers in the Media Zipi Israeli and Elisheva Rosman-Stollman ABstrAct: In this article we examine the representation of combat sol- diers in Israel through their media image. Using two major national Israeli newspapers, we follow the presentation of the Israeli combat soldier over three decades. Our findings indicate that the combat soldier begins as a hegemonic masculine figure in the 1980s, shifts to a more vulnerable, frightened child in the 1990s, and attains a more complex framing in the 2000s. While this most recent representation returns to a hegemonic mas- culine one, it includes additional, ‘softer’ components. We find that the transformation in the image of the Israeli soldier reflects changes within Israeli society in general during the period covered and is also indicative of global changes in masculinity to a certain extent. We conclude by ana- lyzing two possible explanations: the perception of the threat and changes in the perception of masculine identity. Keywords: identity, IDF, Israeli society, masculinity, media image, mili- tary service, representation, soldier The twenty-first century has encouraged the discussion of representations, and the representation of soldiers is no exception. In the present article, we focus on a specific aspect and social context of such a representation: the combat soldier in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). In this study, we explore how the Israeli media framed and constructed the image of the combat sol- dier1 in the IDF over the course of the past three decades (1980s–2000s). In order to examine the changes in the representation of the Israeli soldier, we concentrate on events of a clear combat nature that involve the presence of a defined external enemy.
    [Show full text]
  • Der Große Schatten Von RONEN BERGMAN Wappen Des Mossad
    KRIEGE UND FRIEDEN Zum Repertoire des Mossad gehören Mordanschläge ebenso wie Cyber- Attacken und klassische Spionage. Pannen, Skandale und ein veränderter Naher Osten haben den Geheimdienst in die Krise gebracht. Der große Schatten von RONEN BERGMAN Wappen des Mossad n der Welt der Geheimdienste sad noch mit Geringschätzung. Aber nun es, den Verräter notfalls zu töten. Da - kann es nicht schaden, einen gelang den Israelis ein Scoop: Sie be - mals legte er ein eisernes Prinzip fest, speziellen Ruf zu haben. Der is - schafften den vollständigen Text von das bis heute gilt: Der Mossad bringt kei - raelische Mossad hat nicht nur Chruschtschows Geheimrede. Dienste ne Juden und keine Israelis um. Harel Ieinen solchen Ruf, er ist eine Le - auf der ganzen Welt hatten vergebens befahl seinen Leuten, den Mann in Paris gende, ein Mythos, den die einen vereh - versucht, an das spektakuläre Dokument zu entführen, ihn zu betäuben und nach ren und die anderen fürchten und has - zu kommen. Israel zu bringen, wo ihm der Prozess sen: Die Israelis hoffen, dass ihre Leute Mossad-Chef Isser Harel wusste, wie gemacht werden sollte. besser sind als alle Feinde und ihr Land sich aus dem Erfolg seiner Beschaffer Doch durch eine Reihe von Fehlern, beschützen. Die Kritiker und Gegner Is - Kapital für seinen Apparat schlagen ließ: auch des Anästhesisten, starb der Ent - raels trauen dem Mossad Intrigen und Er leitete die Rede an die Kollegen von führte auf dem Flug nach Tel Aviv. Seine Verbrechen jeder Art zu. So oder so wirft der CIA weiter. Tatsächlich entwickelte Leiche warfen die Geheimdienstler ins der Auslandsgeheimdienst eines kleinen sich daraus eine enge Zusammenarbeit Meer.
    [Show full text]
  • The Truth of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann (Pdf)
    6/28/2020 The Truth of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann » Mosaic THE TRUTH OF THE CAPTURE OF ADOLF EICHMANN https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/history-ideas/2020/06/the-truth-of-the-capture-of-adolf-eichmann/ Sixty years ago, the infamous Nazi official was abducted in Argentina and brought to Israel. What really happened, what did Hollywood make up, and why? June 1, 2020 | Martin Kramer About the author: Martin Kramer teaches Middle Eastern history and served as founding president at Shalem College in Jerusalem, and is the Koret distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Listen to this essay: Adolf Eichmann’s Argentinian ID, under the alias Ricardo Klement, found on him the night of his abduction. Yad Vashem. THE MOSAIC MONTHLY ESSAY • EPISODE 2 June: The Truth of the Capture of Adolf Eichmann 1x 00:00|60:58 Sixty years ago last month, on the evening of May 23, 1960, the Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion made a brief but dramatic announcement to a hastily-summoned session of the Knesset in Jerusalem: A short time ago, Israeli security services found one of the greatest of the Nazi war criminals, Adolf Eichmann, who was responsible, together with the Nazi leaders, for what they called “the final solution” of the Jewish question, that is, the extermination of six million of the Jews of Europe. Eichmann is already under arrest in Israel and will shortly be placed on trial in Israel under the terms of the law for the trial of Nazis and their collaborators. In the cabinet meeting immediately preceding this announcement, Ben-Gurion’s ministers had expressed their astonishment and curiosity.
    [Show full text]
  • 463972 1 En Bookbackmatter 125..131
    Index Symbols Algiers Accord, 43, 44 1801 Treaty, 5, 19 Algiers Agreement, 29 1809 Treaty, 5 Algiers Declaration, 43 1913 Protocol, 35, 37, 41 Alireza Pasha, 32 1914 Treaty, 4 Almata Declaration, 61 1937 Border Treaty, 41, 43 Amasieh, 28 1937 Treaty, 4, 42 Amasieh Treaty, 28, 29 1975 Treaty, 4, 44–46 Amasieh Treaty of 1555, 2 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 59 America, 2, 8, 10, 13, 14, 44, 50, 62–65, 1982 Sea Convention, 58 78–81, 86, 102, 105, 111 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of American, 2, 9, 11, 13, 41, 63, 64, 76–82, 85, the Sea, 51 103, 108, 122 Amir Khosrow Afshar, 43, 111 A Amity Treaty, 54 A Million Palm Island, 96 Andrei Kozyrev, 76 Abadan, 3, 4, 33–36, 39–42, 105 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 41 Abbas Aram, 42 Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 110 Abbas Mirza, 31 Anglo-Persian treaty, 102 Abd al-Karim Qasim, 4, 41, 42 Anglo-Russian Convention, 7 Abdolhossein Teymourtash, 109 Anglo-Russian treaty of 1734, 11 Abu Musa, 102, 103, 108, 110 Anzali, 52 Act of Independence, 13 Arab, 3, 4, 13, 28, 30, 32, 34–45, 97, 98, 102, Afghans, 7, 8, 17, 19, 20–22, 30, 31, 52, 100 103, 106, 107, 110, 111 Afghanistan, 5–8, 17–25, 31, 74, 106, 111, Aras River, 20 115, 121 Arav, 11, 89 Africa, 77, 82, 87, 99, 118, 119, 122 Araz, 11, 56, 89 Agha Mohammad Khan, 8, 52, 97, 101 Ardebil, 28 Ahmad Shah Baluch, 24 Armenia, 3, 28, 29 Ahwaz, 23 Asadollah Mirza, 107 Al-Andalus, 2 Asia, 3, 27, 31, 37, 69, 118, 119 Al-Hasa, 96 Asia Minor, 14, 28 Al-Khalifa, 96, 97, 102, 104, 107 Asian, 2, 3, 10, 30, 78 Alborz, 12, 89 Asian-Eurasian transport corridor, 83 Aleppo, 99, 101 Astarabad, 21, 52 © Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019 125 M.
    [Show full text]
  • Military Activism and Conservatism During the Intifadas Murat ÜLGÜL* Abstract Introduction
    Soldiers and The Use of Force: Military Activism and Conservatism During The Intifadas Murat ÜLGÜL* Abstract Introduction Are soldiers more prone and likely to use force Are soldiers more prone to use force and initiate conflicts than civilians? To bring a and initiate conflicts than civilians? new insight to this question, this article compares The traditional view in the civil- the main arguments of military activism and military relations literature stresses that military conservatism theories on Israeli policies during the First and Second Intifadas. Military professional soldiers are conservative activism argues that soldiers are prone to end in the use of force because soldiers political problems with the use of force mainly are the ones who mainly suffer in war. because of personal and organizational interests Instead, this view says, it is the civilians as well as the effects of a military-mindset. The proponents of military conservatism, on the who initiate wars and conflicts because, other hand, claim that soldiers are conservative without military knowledge, they on the use of force and it is the civilians most underestimate the costs of war while likely offering military measures. Through an overvaluing the benefits of military analysis of qualitative nature, the article finds 1 action. In recent decades, military that soldiers were more conservative in the use of force during the First Intifadas and Oslo conservatism has been challenged by Peace Process while they were more hawkish in a group of scholars who argue that the the Second Intifada. This difference is explained traditional view is based on a limited by enemy conceptions and by the politicization number of cases, mainly civil-military of Israeli officers.
    [Show full text]
  • Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Iran-Israel Regional Security Conflict: the Overlooked Offense-Defense Arms Race
    Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Iran-Israel Regional Security Conflict: The Overlooked Offense-Defense Arms Race September 2020 Glasgow Student Number: 2409675 Dublin City Student Number: 18114296 Charles Student Number: 50089755 Daniella Candurra Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of International Master in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies Word Count: 23,949 Supervisor: Professor Nik Hynek Date of Submission: 30-09-2020 Cruise Missile Proliferation in the Iran-Israel Regional Security Conflict: The Overlooked Offense-Defense Arms Race Abstract Cruise missiles have been proliferating since World War II, leading to their gradual sophistication throughout history which has expanded to include long range and precision strike capabilities. Alongside these capabilities, the cruise missile is able to carry weapons of mass destruction, making its proliferation an international security challenge. Yet, arms control regulations and nonproliferation regimes have allowed the weapon to multiply completely undisturbed as priority is placed on ballistic missile proliferation instead. The September 2019 cruise missile attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities changed the perception of cruise missiles as it highlighted the threat these weapons pose in the hands of states like Iran. Furthermore, the attacks showed the world that these weapons had been introduced to nonstate actors, furthering the danger of its use within conflict ridden regions like the Middle East. Iran’s investment in cruise missiles began prior to this attack and stems from its ongoing security conflict with Israel. Iran and Israel have fluctuated between amity and enmity ultimately resulting in a regional rivalry that has fueled the proliferation of cruise missiles throughout the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Israeli History
    1 Ron’s Web Site • North Shore Flashpoints • http://northshoreflashpoints.blogspot.com/ 2 • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wb6IiSUx pgw 3 British Mandate 1920 4 British Mandate Adjustment Transjordan Seperation-1923 5 Peel Commission Map 1937 6 British Mandate 1920 7 British Mandate Adjustment Transjordan Seperation-1923 8 9 10 • Israel after 1973 (Yom Kippur War) 11 Israel 1982 12 2005 Gaza 2005 West Bank 13 Questions & Issues • What is Zionism? • History of Zionism. • Zionism today • Different Types of Zionism • Pros & Cons of Zionism • Should Israel have been set up as a Jewish State or a Secular State • Would Israel have been created if no Holocaust? 14 Definition • Jewish Nationalism • Land of Israel • Jewish Identity • Opposes Assimilation • Majority in Jewish Nation Israel • Liberation from antisemetic discrimination and persecution that has occurred in diaspora 15 History • 16th Century, Joseph Nasi Portuguese Jews to Tiberias • 17th Century Sabbati Zebi – Declared himself Messiah – Gaza Settlement – Converted to Islam • 1860 Sir Moses Montefiore • 1882-First Aliyah, BILU Group – From Russia – Due to pogroms 16 Initial Reform Jewish Rejection • 1845- Germany-deleted all prayers for a return to Zion • 1869- Philadelphia • 1885- Pittsburgh "we consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community; and we therefore expect neither a return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning a Jewish state". 17 Theodore Herzl 18 Theodore Herzl 1860-1904 • Born in Pest, Hungary • Atheist, contempt for Judaism • Family moves to Vienna,1878 • Law student then Journalist • Paris correspondent for Neue Freie Presse 19 "The Traitor" Degradation of Alfred Dreyfus, 5th January 1895.
    [Show full text]
  • HHRG-115-GO06-Wstate-Goldphdd
    Written Testimony Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening today’s hearing. A discussion about the Golan Heights today may seem baffling. Increasingly, in recent years, many Israelis have expressed a huge sigh of relief that previous rounds of Israeli-Syrian negotiations did not go anywhere and the Golan remains under Israeli control. They imagine that had these earlier talks been concluded, then in 2011, with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the forces of Jabhat al-Nusra, Da'ish (ISIS), not to mention Assad’s own ruthless forces, would have been be sitting along the coastline of the Sea of Galilee, with their weapons aimed at the city of Tiberius across the lake. What has changed today is that with the imminent victory of the forces of President Bashar Assad in the sector of South Syria, new diplomatic initiatives by outside actors cannot be ruled out. Already in March 2016, the U.N.'s Special Envoy on Syria, Staffan de Mistura, proposed a paper on "Essential Principles of a Political Solution in Syria." The first point of his paper specifically called for "the restoration of the occupied Golan Heights" to Syria. This past February at the Valdai Conference in Moscow, Vitaly Naumkin, the leading Russian authority on Syria insisted that Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights could not be accepted. He raised doubts about its very legality.1 Past US Assurances US recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights would constitute the fulfillment of a series of previous diplomatic assurances given to Israel by past administrations regarding the international status of Israel's position on that strategic plateau.
    [Show full text]
  • Fathom Journal Issue 22
    Fathom Journal Issue 22 DEBORAH FINEBLUM AMOS YADLIN SHABTAI SHAVIT GARY KENT JOEL SINGER NADAV EYAL RAPHAEL ALMAGOR PAUL IDDON JOHN LYNDON LIAM HOARE ADAM LEBOR JAMES SORENE PHILIP MENDES ALAN JOHNSON JOHN STRAWSON YOCHANAN PLESNER ERAN EZTION 1 YADLIN| ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOUR STRATEGIC THREATS ON ISRAEL’S RADAR | A SPECIAL BRIEFING BY FORMER IDF INTELLIGENCE HEAD AMOS YADLIN AMOS YADLIN Speaking at a private forum in late 2018, Director of the Institute for National Security Studies, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin presents an overview of the different regional threats facing Israel as well as the ongoing challenge of the Russian presence in the Middle East. Below is an edited transcript of his remarks. Introduction Israel faces numerous strategic security challenges both on its borders and hundreds of miles away. Its main security challenges come from Hamas in Gaza, Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, Leb- anese Hezbollah, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In order to fully understand the scope of these threats, one must analyse them on a scale of immediacy and severity [see infographic 1]. Hamas is the most immediate threat Israel faces, but the least severe. The next most immediate threat is the Syrian civil war coupled with Iran’s entrenchment in the country. After that comes the medi- um-term threat posed by Hezbollah, a far more severe challenge. The most severe and long-term threat Israel faces is Iran’s nuclear ambitions. This essay will analyse the scope, severity, and im- mediacy of these threats. Infographic 1: Threats to Israel’s National Security 2 FATHOM 22 The threat from Hamas When analysing the situation in Gaza, one cannot disconnect it from Israel’s other three main se- curity challenges – the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah, and the Iranian nuclear threat.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making
    The London School of Economics and Political Science UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF STATE IDENTITY IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING The Rise and Demise of Saudi–Iranian Rapprochement (1997–2009) ADEL ALTORAIFI A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London, October 2012 1 To Mom and Dad—for everything. 2 DECLARATION I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. The final word count of this thesis, including titles, footnotes and in-text citations, is 105,889 words. 3 ABSTRACT The objective of the thesis is to study the concept of state identity and its role in foreign policy decision-making through a constructivist analysis, with particular focus on the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement of 1997. While there has been a recent growth in the study of ideational factors and their effects on foreign policy in the Gulf, state identity remains understudied within mainstream International Relations (IR), Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and even Middle Eastern studies literature, despite its importance and manifestation in the region’s foreign policy discourses. The aim is to challenge purely realist and power-based explanations that have dominated the discourse on Middle Eastern foreign policy—and in particular, the examination of Saudi–Iranian relations.
    [Show full text]