The House on Garibaldi Street by Isser Harel, 1912-2003 Published: 1975 J J J J J I I I I I Table of Contents Introduction by Shlomo J. Shpiro, 1997 Dramatis Personae & Chapter 1 … thru … Chapter 30 Index J J J J J I I I I I Introduction by Shlomo J. Shpiro THE PUBLIC trial in Israel of Adolf Eichmann, the man who directed the Third Reich’s ‘Final Solution’, was held in 1961 under an unprecedented publicity coverage. The trial, which took place in Jerusalem, attracted hundreds of reporters and media crews from all over the world. For the first time since the end of the Second World War the horrific crimes of the Nazi regime against the Jewish people were exposed in all their brutality by one of their leading perpetrators. Eichmann stood at the top of the Gestapo pyramid dedicated to the destruction of Europe’s Jewry, and was personally responsible not only for policy decisions but for the everyday running of this unparalleled genocide. His trial and subsequent execution brought to millions of homes around the world the untold story of the Holocaust from its chief administrator. (I-1) The Eichmann trial had a profound influence in particular on the young generation of Israeli citizens, born after the end of the Second World War. This generation, born into a country which had built itself as a national home for the Jewish people in order to prevent such persecution in the future, swore as it joined the army ‘never again’ to let Jewish people be led to their death unresisting. But this well-publicised trial was preceded by a top secret operation conducted by Israel’s foreign intelligence service—the Mossad. The Mossad carried out one of this century’s most audacious intelligence coups. Its undercover team, operating without official cover half-way across the globe from their base in Tel-Aviv, located Eichmann in Argentina, kidnapped and smuggled him to Israel to be handed over to the judicial authorities. The success of this complex intelligence operation depended not only on planning and professionalism but also on flexibility and improvisation in order to resolve numerous problems encountered during the mission. The Mossad team was led by Isser Harel, Israel’s ‘Memune’—the top intelligence official in charge of the Mossad and its counterpart the Shabak—the internal security service. Harel’s presence on the ground throughout the operation enabled crucial decisions to be taken immediately without referring to higher authority. Harel’s leadership was critical to the success of the mission and to Eichmann’s being brought to justice. The House on Garibaldi Street is Harel’s personal and authoritative account of the Eichmann capture. Like many intelligence memoirs, while exciting on the details of operations, it reveals little of the man or his career. Isser Harel commanded both of Israel’s civilian intelligence organisations for over 12 years. More than anyone else he was responsible for transforming Israel’s fledgling intelligence services from a loose grouping of pre-independence underground organisations in 1948 to a community of formidable, professional and capable services. He was the only man in Israel’s history to hold the top position in both the internal and external intelligence organisations, and after his retirement in 1963 these jobs were separated and assigned to different people. Harel’s dedication to Israel’s security, his organisational capabilities and his relations with Israel’s leading politicians enabled him to develop the Mossad and carry out seemingly impossible missions. The achievements of the Mossad under Harel contributed greatly to Israel’s security and its political and military successes. Isser Harel was born Isser Halperin in Vitebsk, a small town in White Russia, in 1912. (I-2) The youngest son of a rich industrialist, he showed his commitment to Jewish security early on by organising groups of young Jewish pupils to defend the community against anti-Semitic attacks. After the Revolution, the Halperin family, which lost all its property during the civil war, moved to Latvia. There the young Isser got involved with the new Zionist movement. He joined a Zionist student group and underwent agricultural training as part of his preparations to live in Palestine. In 1930 Harel moved to Palestine and joined a new kibbutz near Tel-Aviv. Working as an irrigation specialist, he met his future wife, Rivka. The couple got married and in 1935 left the kibbutz and settled in Herzliya. Isser joined the Hagana, a clandestine Jewish organisation founded to be the military arm of the Jewish community in Palestine. It was in the Hagana that his talents for intelligence work were spotted. Harel was employed in special duties involving undercover work and later assigned to work in the Shai—the Hagana’s intelligence branch. The Shai comprised a small group of dedicated but amateur operatives, working out of one flat in Tel-Aviv. (I-3) It was the nucleus of Israel’s future intelligence services. The Shai developed the first intelligence systems and doctrines for covert work in the Arab countries, and spied not only on Arab parties and militant groups but on the British mandate authorities as well. Harel introduced to the work of Shai the elements of standardisation, thoroughness and professionalism. He organised its registry, collected reports and initiated its system of intelligence analysis. As a capable organiser he managed to obtain funds, facilities and personnel to expand the Shai’s collection capabilities as threats to the security of the Jewish community in Palestine grew. The information collected by Shai was used by the Hagana to mount operations against British bases and Arab bands. Harel’s collection efforts were not limited to Arabs and British targets, but expanded to cover Jewish extremist organisations and later also the activities of the Soviets in Palestine. In his work at Shai Harel made contacts with leading politicians and, most important of all, with David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s elder statesman. (I-4) It was the beginning of a life-long relationship which would lead both men to the peak of their careers, but also to bitter conflicts and differences of opinion. Ben-Gurion took a liking to the energetic young man and assigned him to more and more duties. When the state of Israel gained independence in 1948 it was only natural that Harel was called to take his place as the head of the newly founded Shabak— the internal security service. Harel’s first decision as head of the Shabak was that the service would be bound to the democratic principles of Israel and would not, in any of its actions, whether in war or peace, be above the law. Against strong voices which called for a ‘secret police’ type of organisation, which would intimidate political opponents of the ruling MAPAI party, Harel decreed that the intelligence services would not be involved in internal political affairs, and would always be directly controlled by the elected parliamentary authorities. (I-5) The adherence to democratic principles, even at the price of possible operational successes, was to guide Harel throughout his command of the Shabak and the Mossad. Despite bitter political conflicts in Israel’s first years of independence not once were the intelligence services involved in political activities, outside counter-intelligence work aimed against Soviet subversion. (I-6) Harel managed to keep the services apolitical, and the principles he developed of democratic control and accountability to the elected prime minister still govern the conduct of the Israeli intelligence services today. In 1952 Harel was appointed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to head the newly founded Mossad—Israel’s foreign intelligence service. (I-7) Throughout the 1950s he worked tirelessly to expand the capabilities of the service, and to create a network of co-operation with other intelligence organisations world-wide. Harel understood that, as a small and relatively poor country, Israel’s security could only be assured by a constant and reliable supply of information not only from its own intelligence services but also by those of the great powers. One of Harel’s most important successes in this field, and one which was to prove decisive for the security of the state of Israel in numerous wars and conflicts, was the development of Mossad’s relations with the CIA. To help establish the link with the Americans, Harel initiated a programme under which new immigrants coming to Israel from countries under Soviet control would be questioned for information of possible intelligence value. Thousands of new immigrants provided large quantities of information on all aspects of Soviet capabilities, from military industries to economic plans, research and development projects, to political, social and geographic reports. The information thus gleaned was provided to the CIA without anything in exchange. ‘Some people wanted to get something back right away’, recalls Harel. They saw the relations as a trading exchange.’ But Harel insisted that the information be provided as Israel’s contribution to the West’s security. This information was later used by the CIA in covert operations in Eastern Europe, and by the US Strategic Air Command in planning nuclear targets. (I-8) Within the CIA a small section was created to handle the relations with the Mossad. It was headed by James Angleton, the CIA’s notorious counter- intelligence expert, who directed these relations until his retirement in the 1970s. (I-9) Parallel to the CIA Harel developed working co-operation with many of the free world’s intelligence organisations, including the French and the British. A good part of these relations were developed through personal contact between the heads of the respective services, and many of these became welcomed guests not only at Mossad headquarters in Tel-Aviv but also at the Harel home.