Copyright by Charles Girard Thomas 2012 The Dissertation Committee for Charles Girard Thomas Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: The Tanzanian People’s Defense Force: an Exercise in Nation-Building Committee: Oloruntoyin O. Falola, Supervisor Antony G. Hopkins Ruramisai Charumbira Zoltan Barany Timothy Parsons The Tanzanian People’s Defense Force: an Exercise in Nation-Building by Charles Girard Thomas, B.A.; M.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin May 2012 Dedication To the women in my life: the mother that started me on this path and my wife who has given me the strength to stay on it. Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the help and support of far too many people to properly acknowledge. In the interest of brevity I would like to thank Dr. Toyin Falola, Dr. Ruramisai Charumbira, Dr. AG Hopkins, Dr. Zoltan Barany, and Dr. Timothy Parsons for taking part in the production of this work. In addition, I must thank the Warfield Center for African and African American Studies, without whose support the primary research for this work could not have been completed. Numerous scholars and groups in Tanzania also supported the creation of this work. Dr. Nestor Luanda offered his guidance, support, and personal archives in support of my labors and Dr. Bertram Mapunda aided me in my search for the Commission of Science and Technology. General Herman Lupogo, General Lilian Kingazi, and General Paul Mela all took the time to discuss the history of their military with me, offering critical insights. Jessica Achberger worked long hours helping proofread the manuscript so it made sense and was properly put together. Finally, I need to thank my wife, Leigh Anne Fagin, who helped me put this work into a logical order and helped me think through some of the more troubling concepts of this work. v The Tanzanian People’s Defense Force: an Exercise in Nation-Building Charles Girard Thomas, PhD. The University of Texas at Austin, 2012 Supervisor: Oloruntoyin O Falola Following the 1964 Army Mutinies in East Africa, Tanzania alone among the three nations affected recognized the fundamental opposition between the colonial military structure and the post-colonial African state. Acting upon this consideration, Tanzania proceeded to dismantle its current colonial holdover armed forces and instead build a new, nationally representative, non-aligned military that could be integrated effectively into the post-colonial state. This military became the Tanzanian Peoples’ Defense Force and its construction remains unique among the African states. This dissertation contends that the TPDF and its innovative construction served as not only a stable and effective military exercise, but also as a nation building exercise, and that the lessons gleaned from its history may be used to combat both the praetorian militaries and weak national identities that continue to afflict Africa. vi Table of Contents Chapter One Introduction ........................................................................................1 Chapter Two: The Nature of the Colonial Military, Part One ..............................36 Chapter Three: The Nature of the Colonial Military, Part Two………………….72 Chapter Four: Nyerere, TANU, and Post-Colonial Tanzania ..............................105 Chapter Five: Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa: The National Service ...............................148 Chapter Six: A Politicized Military .....................................................................173 Chapter Seven: The Non-Alignment of Doctrine ................................................189 Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Coda .................................................................218 Bibliography ........................................................................................................242 Curriculum Vitae .................................................................................................251 vii Chapter One: Introduction September 12, 1964 was a proud day for President Julius Nyerere and his party, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). The President watched as the core of Tanzania’s new defense force marched by. All 1000 of the new recruits, including 30 young women, were reminded to serve their nation to the best of their abilities. Standing beside Nyerere were his two vice presidents, his cabinet, and the junior ministers, driving home the importance of this day. The defense force, soon to be named the Tanzanian People’s Defense Force (TPDF), was being sworn in a mere nine months after the previous armed forces had mutinied. The Tanganyikan Rifles’ mutiny on January 20, 1964 had been a black mark on the newly independent nation and the necessity of calling on the British for aid in suppressing it had deeply embarrassed the stridently anti-colonial Nyerere. In response, Nyerere and the ruling party of Tanganyika (soon Tanzania) took radical steps to insure the continued stability of the fragile nation. The Tanganyika Rifles, previously the 6 and 26 Battalions of the King’s African Rifles, were disbanded and the rank and file sent home under parole. The government then called upon the TANU Youth League to step forward to fill the ranks of the security force and be the foundation for a new national military. The first recruits from this call were now parading in front of TANU in what was seen as a gamble for national security. However, the TPDF would more than prove its merit. Although it underwent significant evolution and experimentation, the final product of this radical departure from the previous military structures would pay dividends. Over the next fifteen years, the TPDF would provide a 1 stable military structure that would not only protect Tanzania, but play a key role in building the stability and harmony for which Tanzania has become known. A Radical Departure To fully understand the nature of the change made by Tanzania, it is best to examine the alternative paths taken by its neighbors. The January Mutiny not only affected Tanganyika; the former King’s African Rifles formations of Kenya and Uganda also violently protested and threw their nations into disarray. While all were put down, the responses of each state would have longstanding effects. As noted, Tanganyika managed to restrain the mutiny with the aid of the British and took the radical step of dismantling their previous military forces. However, Kenya and Uganda responded very differently than Nyerere’s Tanganyika. Kenya reached independence under Jomo Kenyatta and his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). While Kenyatta had led his country to independence from the British, he eschewed Nyerere’s more radical socialist ideology and strident non- alignment. The Kenya Rifles had indeed mutinied, but the Kenyan government saw no reason to dismantle their military. In fact, Britain still saw Kenya as its main ally in the region and as such they were more than willing to extend help and military assistance to Kenya that they were unwilling to send to the more radical Tanganyika or the erratic Uganda. In addition, Kenya, as the former center of British East Africa, had a far larger number of expatriate British officers and officials that were willing to provide continuity in leadership in the Kenyan Rifles. Kenyatta gladly made use of both of these advantages while dealing with the future of his military. With the large amount of military aid and 2 the expertise of the expatriate British, Kenya managed to reconstruct the professional British model that had persisted throughout the colonial era. Increased pay and prestige kept the soldiery happy while the now reinforced British Model of a professional and apolitical military kept them loyal, all subsidized by Kenya’s continuing strategic importance to Britain throughout their retreat from Empire. However, these programs kept the military isolated from society and under the very constraints the fostered the original praetorian behavior; it was only through British aid that the model remained sustainable. This was a price that Nyerere’s Tanzania refused to pay. Uganda under Milton Obote did not have Kenya’s strategic relationship with Britain nor Tanzania’s strong central government, leaving it with few options. It was further constrained by its geographic location: it shared borders with the Congo and the Sudan, two areas that were wracked with conflict at the time of the mutinies and rebuilding. This left Uganda an unpleasant choice for its continued security. It required a professional military but lacked the time and public stability to build a new one like Tanzania, but could also not afford to remold their previous forces like Kenya. To try and remedy this situation, Obote reached out for other sources of funding and aid. Israel answered the call and began to implement their own military program within Uganda, causing a considerable rift between the remaining British officers and the new Israeli experts. This rift was mirrored within the military as the divisions became politicized along geographic lines; the Northern officers readily accepted the Israeli training methods while the Southerners cleaved to the British. This continued after the British withdrawal in mid-1964 and only accelerated as Obote increasingly favored the Northerners and played into the martial stereotypes that