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Army Regulation 530–1: Operations Security (OPSEC)

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Army Regulation 530–1: Operations Security (OPSEC) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Army Regulation 530–1 Operations and Signal Security Operations Security (OPSEC) Distribution Restriction Statement. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors. Requests from outside U.S. Government agencies for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQDA G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODI), 3200 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20310. Destruction Notice. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 19 April 2007 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SUMMARY of CHANGE AR 530–1 Operations Security (OPSEC) This administrative revision dated 19 April 2007- o Corrects an incorrect acronym (para 2-13). o Corrects typographical errors throughout the publication. This major revision dated 20 March 2007- o Designates "For Official Use Only" (FOUO) as the standard marking for all unclassified products that meet one or more of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and which if released to the public, could cause harm to Army operations or personnel (para 1-5). o Aligns the use of OPSEC terms and definitions with DOD and Joint usage (para 1- 5). o Updates the Total Army to include all Soldiers, Department of the Army (DA) Civilians, Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, and family members (para 2-1). o Emphasizes punitive measures for violations of specific directives from Commanders and leaders to protect critical and sensitive information (paras 2-1 and 2-2). o Specifically addresses recent technology concerns such as e-mail and web logs ("blogs") (para 2-1g). o Directs the encryption of e-mail messages containing sensitive information on unclassified networks when an encryption feature is available (para 2-1h). o Emphasizes the role of the Army OPSEC Support Element (OSE) (para 2-13). o Adds OPSEC requirements for the HQDA Staff (para 2-14). o Updates and clarifies OPSEC responsibilities for all Army personnel and specific organizations (chap 2). o Updates and clarifies responsibilities for the OPSEC Program Manager and OPSEC Officer (chap 3 and app H). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY o Describes the HQDA OPSEC Officer/Program Manager Certification Training Course for both OPSEC Officers and OPSEC Program Managers (para 4-2). o Authorizes qualified OPSEC Program Managers to conduct the HQDA OPSEC Officer Certification Training Course for their subordinate OPSEC Officers (para 4- 2). o Provides guidance for receiving Joint and Interagency OPSEC training (para 4- 3). o Emphasizes OPSEC in contracts and acquisition (chap 6). o Provides updated threat information throughout the publication (app E). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Headquarters *Army Regulation 530–1 Department of the Army Washington, DC 19 April 2007 Effective 20 April 2007 Operations and Signal Security Operations Security (OPSEC) the United States Army Reserve, and re- this regulation and establishment of com- l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s o f t h o s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . mand or local forms are prohibited with- Contractors must comply with contractu- out prior approval from HQDA G–3/5/7 ally imposed Operations Security require- ( D A M O – O D I ) , 3 2 0 0 A r m y P e n t a g o n , ments. This regulation applies during all Washington, DC 20310. phases of operations, including training, readiness, and mobilization. Suggested improvements. Users are Proponent and exception authority. invited to send comments and suggested The proponent of this regulation is the improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recom- Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7. The pro- m e n d e d C h a n g e s t o P u b l i c a t i o n s a n d ponent has the authority to approve ex- Blank Forms) directly to HQDA G–3/5/7, ceptions or waivers to this regulation that ATTN: DAMO–ODI, 3200 Army Penta- a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c o n t r o l l i n g l a w a n d gon, Washington, DC 20310. regulations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a Distribution. Distribution of this publi- d i v i s i o n c h i e f w i t h i n t h e p r o p o n e n t c a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e i n e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a H i s t o r y . T h i s p u b l i c a t i o n i s a n agency or its direct reporting unit or field only and is intended for command levels a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e v i s i o n . T h e p o r t i o n s operating agency, in the grade of colonel B, C, D and E for the Active Army, the affected by this administrative revision are or the civilian equivalent. Activities may A r m y N a t i o n a l G u a r d o f t h e U n i t e d listed in the summary of change. request a waiver to this regulation by pro- States/Army National Guard and United Summary. This regulation on operations v i d i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e s a f u l l States Army Reserve. Distribution is lim- security fully implements Chairman, Joint analysis of the expected benefits and must i t e d t o U . S . G o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s a n d Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3213.01B, Joint i n c l u d e f o r m a l r e v i e w b y t h e a c t i v i t y ’ s their contractors. Requests from outside P u b l i c a t i o n 3 – 1 3 . 3 , a n d D e p a r t m e n t o f senior legal officer. All waiver requests U.S. Government agencies for release of Defense Directive 5205.02. This regula- will be endorsed by the commander or this publication under the Freedom of In- tion states Army policy on Operations Se- s e n i o r l e a d e r o f t h e r e q u e s t i n g a c t i v i t y f o r m a t i o n A c t o r t h e F o r e i g n M i l i t a r y c u r i t y p r o g r a m d e v e l o p m e n t , r e v i s e s and forwarded through higher headquar- Sales Program must be made to HQDA terminology, provides details on the Oper- ters to the policy proponent. Refer to AR G–3/5/7 (DAMO–ODI), 3200 Army Pen- 25–30 for specific guidance. ations Security planning process, and out- tagon, Washington, DC 20310. l i n e s t h e O p e r a t i o n s S e c u r i t y r e v i e w , Army management control process. assessment, and survey. This regulation contains management con- Applicability. This regulation applies to trol provisions, but does not identify key military and civilian personnel of the Ac- m a n a g e m e n t c o n t r o l s t h a t m u s t b e tive Army, the Army National Guard of evaluated. the United States/Army National Guard, S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n . S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f Distribution Restriction Statement. This publication contains technical or operational information that is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors. Requests from outside U.S. Government agencies for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQDA G–3/ 5/7 (DAMO–ODI), 3200 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20310. Destruction Notice. Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. *This publication supersedes AR 530–1, dated 20 March 2007. AR 530–1 • 19 April 2007 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number) Chapter 1 Introduction, page 1 Purpose • 1–1, page 1 References • 1–2, page 1 Explanation of Abbreviations and Special Terms • 1–3, page 1 Responsibilities • 1–4, page 1 Definitions • 1–5, page 1 Requirement • 1–6, page 2 Application • 1–7, page 2 Proponent • 1–8, page 3 Chapter 2 Responsibilities, page 4 All Army personnel • 2–1, page 4 Commanders at all levels • 2–2, page 5 Commanders of units, activities, and installations at battalion and higher echelons • 2–3, page 5 Commanders of Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands and Direct Reporting Units • 2–4, page 6 Commander, U.S.
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