Unlikely Connections: What Can Intelligence Research Learn by Being Critical?
The article argues that intelligence can learn a considerable amount from social science research inspired by constructivist and critical approaches. Rather than being polar opposites, intelligence analysis and critical theory can identify significant areas of dialogue. The article begins by analyzing the relationship between research and of intelligence. It discusses the differences between the two and shows that research is a different kind of process than intelligence production, with which it shares some characteristics, but from which it differs considerably. Further, the article argues that research can support intelligence organizations through capacity building, improving the skills of practitioners and offering support to strategic decision-making. Then, it presents three possible understandings of this relationship and argues in favor of the use of critical approaches for improving the performance of intelligence agencies in two ways: understanding the other and understanding oneself.
1. Introduction – comparing intelligence and research
The article explores the conceptual and practical interrelationships between intelligence and research. It argues that intelligence analysis can significantly learn from critical research and that the latter can provide resources for improving the former. In order to clear the path for a discussion of the relationship between critical research and intelligence, the paper first claims that research (in general) and intelligence need to be analytically separated, and that all research can offer significant support to intelligence.
The article first defines the concepts of research and intelligence and elaborates their main differences. While both processes involve the examination of sources, the testing of previous knowledge and the identification of patterns and culminate in the production of new knowledge, the article argues that they produce a different kind of knowledge. Further, it identifies two relevant differences between intelligence and research: the goal and the time-frame. Intelligence can be defined as a form of knowledge produced for the consumption of decision-makers of organizations situated in a competitive environment, while research aims to elaborate more complex products
(either reports or academic articles or books), which not only aim to describe a particular situation
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but to also to identify trends, explain phenomena and argue for conclusions. Further, while
intelligence is produced in the short-run and its usefulness disappears quickly, the production of
research takes considerable more time, and is useful over a longer period of time. The article first
discusses the concepts and their possible interrelations. Further, it presents some of the ways in which critical perspectives can contribute to the practice and understanding of intelligence and argues for the usefulness of this combination. This work builds upon and expands that of Gill and
Phytian1, who discuss the theoretical background and the possible uses of one type of research
(discussed below as “research-about-intelligence”), by adding other possible relations between the
two (“intelligence-as-research” and “research-in-support-of-intelligence”) as well as by elaborating on the advantages of using critical rather than positivist approaches when doing so.
The main aim of the article is to show that, while some might see intelligence as a form of research, a better use of the skills and capabilities of a research organization is "research in support of intelligence”. Critical approaches can prove very useful in this context, as they can contribute both to “understanding oneself” (improving organizational performance) and to “understanding the other” (improving strategic decision-making). As mentioned above, due to the very different time-frames and given the very different types of conclusions one can reach through the two knowledge-productions processes, the two should not be conflated. However, the article argues that knowledge produced through research can meaningfully support an intelligence organization either through improving the skills of its practitioners, through proposing more efficient forms of organization, or through producing actionable recommendations for practitioners or managers facing different situations.
The article argues that using the premises of critical social science, such as the pervasiveness of power and domination and the social effects of discourse, for “research in support
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of intelligence”, can improve organizational performance, both in regard to understanding how
enemies operate but also how one’s organization functions. As mentioned in the introduction to
this special issue, aspects related to the internal culture of an intelligence organization (concerning
both how people interact and how intelligence “is done”) are highly relevant for the final output
the organization produces. This article acknowledges this. However, unlike other authors in the
critical intelligence scholarship, who argue that intelligence itself should become more “critical”,
the article claims that the research carried out “in support” of intelligence should have this fate.
While a layperson might employ a definition of the concept of research2 an intelligence
analyst aiming to understand what research is, would focus on the inquisitive, yet systematic
approach to observable facts. This is undertaken with the goal of identifying and explaining regularities, analyzing possible exceptions to the former and communicating these results to both a narrow audience of specialists and to a wide one composed of the general public. The main focus of research is on the relationship of the previously established knowledge (the “theory”) to the current observation (“the empirics”) and on how these shape each other. In one scenario, a new observation could confirm the theory, while in another, it is the theory which would need modification.
Conversely, while a great number of definitions of intelligence also exist, the article relies
on two, offered by two intelligence theorists. These two definitions were chosen because they
represent the most recent developments in the literature on intelligence theory and an evolution
from the debates in the 1950s and 1960s on whether intelligence represents only secret or also public information.
Kristan Wheaton proposed the first definition of intelligence that the article discusses:
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Intelligence, then, is a process, focused externally and using information from all available
sources, that is designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for a decisionmaker3
Thus, in this view, intelligence represents a set of procedures which rely on the processing of information, but the goal is not (necessarily) to identify new patterns or test existing laws, but, however, to inform a decision-maker. While unstated, this implies that the decision-maker controls a relatively large organization (either private or governmental), tasked with collectively
performing a particular process and which separates decision-making from execution.
Furthermore, it can also be assumed that this organization is also engaged in competitive relations
or even conflict with other organizations.4
Alan Breakspear formulated the second definition of intelligence that the article relies on:
Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it.
The capability involves foresight and insight, and is intended to identify impending change, which
may be positive, representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat5
In Breakspear's definition, the actionable component of intelligence is much more obvious,
as he argues that the goal of intelligence is to identify change and to help decision-makers take
advantage of opportunities and to avoid threat. Once again, the process of intelligence, as described
by Breakspear, relies on the existence of a large organization, which faces a changing environment,
populated by threats and opportunities and which behaves with instrumental rationality (minimizes
loss and maximizes gain).
According to these two authors, the process of intelligence represents the selection and
collation of relevant information, with the aim of delivering a relatively short and insightful piece
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to a decision maker. This happens in a relatively large organization situated in a competitive
environment.
The two definitions are part of the “classical” approach to defining intelligence. Given the
limited access that researchers outside the intelligence world have had to intelligence organizations
and intelligence processes, intelligence has been defined, until very recently, by practitioners, for
practitioners. This has led some to even accepting the tautology that “intelligence is what
intelligence services do”6. While this approach simple approach can be and has been challenged in a number of works7, the most far-ranging criticism has been leveled in a recent article by Jaffel
et al8. The authors argue that employing an interpretative approach to the study of intelligence leads to the understanding that it represents a set of practices rather than the activity of one type of organization. Furthermore, according to Jaffel, intelligence practitioners have a conception of the state “having a self-dependent validity within the international—a natural right to retain its geopolitical position”9. Thus, the authors argue that “intelligence”, in the sense of a practice
extends far beyond “what intelligence services do” and involves other actors such as police
officers, representatives of scientific fields as well as legal professionals10.
At the conceptual level, one can see both similarities and differences between research and
intelligence. Both processes adopt a studious approach to information: they aim at the collection
of a large volume of information, at identifying connections and regularities and at testing what
was previously known on the basis of newly identified aspects. Given that both research and
intelligence (at least in their classical, positivist, understanding) work with hypotheses that they
aim to test, both have been described by using a “Popperian” model of falsification11. Further,
Vrist Rønn and Høffding argue that intelligence produces a form of knowledge, in the sense of
justified true beliefs12.
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However, two main differences can be discerned, even at the conceptual level. The first of these is the goal of the activity. While research only aims to discover either new laws or the practical application of those already extant (thus, being logically possible to pursue research in a particular field for the purely personal pleasure), intelligence exists only to the extent a consumer with definite characteristics is placed at the end of the cycle. While a research product is designed to be read by a large number of people, an intelligence product can only take a particular form, being designed to be read by a particular audience. A classical research product (an academic article or a research report) delivered as intelligence would be bad intelligence because it does not address the aim for which intelligence products are produced. Alternatively, an intelligence product delivered as research would likely be seen as only a description of facts, without any large- scale explanation of the wider framework. Intelligence products are designed to be read quickly by a decision maker short on time. They do not make their underlying assumptions clear, as there is an expectation that these are commonly shared between the reader and the briefer. Conversely, research products summarize previous literature and focus on how new facts square with previous work13.
The second difference between the two processes is that of the time frame. While not explicitly stated in either of the two definitions, one can assume that an activity which aims to create or to test general laws or to reach new understanding, can be generally planned over a longer time-frame, but yields results which are valid over an extended period of time. Alternatively, a knowledge producing activity that is directed towards a decision-maker becomes less useful for its intended purpose after being consumed and especially after the addressee undertakes a particular action based on the information delivered.
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2. The Troubled Relationship between Research and Intelligence
Given their relatively similar nature, some academic authors and practitioners have argued that they can be seen essentially as the same. Several sources mention the idea of "research intelligence", with the aim of distinguishing it from "brute" or "raw" or "actionable" intelligence14.
According to this view, the fact that an intelligence product may involve the collation of large volumes of information, allows it to be qualified as "research" intelligence. Alternatively, in other works, "research intelligence” is understood to mean "intelligence derived from academic sources"15.
While not using the name "research intelligence", Sherman Kent's work Strategic
Intelligence for American World Policy16 distinguishes between three types of intelligence:
descriptive, reportorial and speculative-evaluative. The latter, according to Kent, implies that the
intelligence analyst not only collates information, such as in the case of descriptive intelligence or
reports on contemporary events, such as in the case of reportorial intelligence, but also aims to
establish strategic intentions or capabilities of a country (or a strategic actor, in general). In other words, "what the United States must know in order to be foresighted-what it must know about the future stature of other separate sovereign states, the courses of action they are likely to initiate themselves, and the courses of action they are likely to take up in response to some outside stimulus"17. This requires understanding not only what a country (or any other composite actor)
can do, given its material possibilities, but also what it intends to do, given the specific way strategic intentions are formulated in a particular political system. Then, an intelligence analyst should identify, through an "analytical process", a country's vulnerabilities, as those facets that expose it to the weapons one possesses. Finally, based on previous experiences, the intelligence
7 organization should elaborate estimates on how that particular actor would behave in a particular situation18. While more than simple collation of facts, speculative-evaluative intelligence, as described by Kent, is still closer to a standard intelligence product than a research article, as it does not aim to make background assumptions explicit nor to test previously established theories.
The same trend, treating intelligence and research as one and the same, can be identified in the following definition, re-published in an article by Marrin19, from a CIA publication:
Research Intelligence is more in-depth than current intelligence and can be used to support specific operations or decisions, or address a new development in greater detail. Research intelligence can also provide a “structured compilation of geographic, demographic, social, military, and political data on foreign countries,” known as “basic intelligence”.
In this approach, research intelligence is contrasted to both current intelligence and estimative intelligence. While it does not aim to foresee, research intelligence (in this understanding) is based on a complex volume of basic information, which can be used for planning and decision-making. In Sherman Kent's classification, facts collected under this approach would be descriptive intelligence, but at a wider scale. Alternatively, in this particular understanding, research intelligence does not include the analytical/speculative element, but only a collation of facts, which still sets it apart from usual research products
Alternatively, Svendsen20 foresees the use of research-based work as a form of intelligence, a form of knowledge production that he calls RESINT. While similar to the idea of "research intelligence" discussed above, in the sense that the ultimate goal is to create information for decision-making, Svendsen aims to use research-based products in intelligence production. Thus, rather than the intelligence process in itself constituting a form of research, Svendsen argues that we should transform research products into intelligence products, through a process of
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simplification and adaptation to the need of the intelligence consumer. Thus, according to
Svendsen, RESINT "consists of variously interconnected, frequently (or mainly) open source (OS)
research-based contributions—for example, packaged by producers as reports which seek to answer specific questions asked by their sponsors (users/ customers/clients/consumers)." 21 These inputs should go through a process of synthesis, summarization and collation, and information from them should be used to answer different questions than the ones originally posed. Svendsen argues that RESINT can significantly contribute to foresight, as it can help identify and predict trends and counter developments preemptively22.
The second understanding of the relationship between research and intelligence is
„research about intelligence”. This implies that some facet of the intelligence process, such as policy decision-making, analytic cultures, cooperation or legal regulation, is the focus of the investigation of a researcher. The research product can be either a newspaper article, addressed to the general public, an academic article, designed for an academic journal, or a report addressed to decision-makers. While these works might be merely descriptive, some might use the conceptual frameworks of specific disciplines such as sociology, political science or law. While a large number of works of „research-about-intelligence” has been produced, the article will only briefly summarize three, given that a wide meta-analysis is not its main focus. Each work selected will refer to a different part of the intelligence process and each will involve research in a specific scientific discipline: one work will be in sociology, one in political science and one in law.
While “research-about-intelligence”, as discussed below contributes to expanding the knowledge of the particular disciplines, it can also help understand the inner workings of an intelligence organization. The three pieces discussed below all belong to a positivist tradition of
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research, which will be contrasted with works that employ critical theory as their theoretical
underpinning.
The first example of this work is the PhD dissertation of Bridget Nolan23, who conducted an ethnography of the National Counter-Terrorism Center. This represents a fusion center between different US counter-terrorism agencies, where analysts from different agencies, members of the
American Intelligence Community work together to elaborate joint intelligence products. Nolan's dissertation is divided into six chapters, which refer to different aspects of the intelligence producing process at the NCTC. The first two chapters are primordially focused on the individual: exploring the daily life of analysts and showing how intra-agency solidarities could hamper inter- agency cooperation when analysts from different agencies come together in a structure such as the
NCTC. The next chapter looks at the institutionalized process of intelligence creation and argues
that this shapes, to a great extent, the intelligence products that get created, while the last chapter
looks at humor as a coping strategy that NCTC analysts use to handle the shifting realities around
them. Another well-known work of anthropology of intelligence organizations is Rob Johnston's
investigation of analytic culture in the CIA.24
Davis Cross25 investigates the role of transgovernmental networks in intelligence analysis and focuses on the role of the European External Action Service's Intelligence Center (IntCen).
She argues that while formal inter-governmental intelligence cooperation, even among the states of the European Union is weak, the IntCen favors the creation of a common analytic culture among representatives of intelligence services from across the Union. Davis Cross26 follows Joseph Nye who defines transgovernmental networks as "the process by which sub-units of governments engage in direct and autonomous interaction separate from nation states" and which are mainly
"composed of professionals and held together by shared values" and argues that such a
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phenomenon is also developing in intelligence. Davis Cross (argues that the creation of a
transgovernmental network of intelligence professionals, through IntCen, opens the possibility of overcoming the lack of cooperation among nation states in intelligence matters.
Bitton27 undertakes an examination of the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court, and argues that the Court has assumed the role of intelligence overseer through a series of decisions.
Bitton argues that the Supreme Court evolved into this role due to a number of Israeli specificities.
These include, according to Bitton, the weak international legitimacy of the actions of Israel in the occupied territories and a parliamentary intelligence oversight commission biased towards the intelligence agencies. These contrast with the willingness of the Supreme Court to offer an equal chance to petitioners whose rights have been allegedly infringed by the Israeli state. According to the author, this has placed the Court as an impartial arbiter in the eyes of both the domestic and the international public.
The third possible form of relationship between research and intelligence could be defined as "research-in-support-of-intelligence". This means that the activity of research does not directly feed in the intelligence product, but somehow supports the intelligence organization. This could be either through a consistent report on the trends in the wider security environment, on the policy formulation process of particular actors, on the psychology of terrorism, on the best way to organize information flows in a complex organization or on the psychology of intelligence analysis. The overall goal of such research could be improving the capacity or resilience of either
the organization's personnel, or of the institution as a whole. For example, while a large number
of studies has been elaborated on the psychology of intelligence analysis, one example of such
work could be that of Whitesmith28, who conducts a meta-analysis of different works on two major
forms of cognitive biases in intelligence analysis: serial position effects and confirmation bias.
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For serial position effects, Whitesmith29 argues that there are several factors which influence it,
such as "memory, the volume of information required to be processed during belief acquisition,
and the type of information from which belief acquisition is derived". In the case of confirmation
bias, Whitesmith30 concludes that "tasks that involve diagnostically weighted initial information
and tasks that derive from mixed types of information are associated with an increased risk of
confirmation bias". While Whitesmith’s work could also be considered “research-about-
intelligence”, its conclusions are much more relevant to an intelligence organization itself that to
psychology as a discipline. This has led the placement of Whitesmith’s work in this category.
Another example of “research in support of intelligence” is the work conducted by the
Hybrid Center of Excellence (CoE) established in Helsinki by a number of states and which is
supported by both the European Union and NATO. The center conducts research that aims to
understand hybrid patterns of action, to identify nation-state and organizational vulnerabilities and
to propose policies to eliminate them. It looks at issues such as the use of energy (including nuclear
energy) as a form of hybrid tool of influence31, the level of energy dependency as a nation-state
vulnerability32, Chinese interests in the Arctic33 and the toolkit of hybrid actions34. While other research products might focus on particular parts of the intelligence process, the research conducted at the Helsinki Hybrid CoE is more useful for establishing trends and focusing intelligence action on particular vulnerabilities rather than improving the immediate day-to-day intelligence products. The Leiden Institute of Global Affairs conducts a similar activity, but is focused primordially on terrorism and the issues associated with it, such as foreign fighters or radicalization. In addition to its own peer-reviewed academic journal, Perspectives on Terrorism, the Institute also elaborates a series of reports on terrorism-related aspects such as policies
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regarding foreign fighters and the role of the family in the process of traveling to conflict zones
such as Syria.
EU-funded research projects also amount to research-in-support of intelligence. Some projects merely aim to increase the capabilities of intelligence organizations through, for example, improving the technology available or increasing the number of buildings and training facilities.
However, other projects aim at investigating the social challenges posed by security developments
or by technological evolution and at increasing the capabilities of practitioners to combat particular
threats through developing toolkits (a set of solutions developed for specific and trainings which
employ the latest discoveries in academic research) or trainings that turn academic knowledge into
practical applications. Two examples of project funding scheme that also include a capacity-
building component are the EU Horizon 2020 Secure Societies Work Programme 2018-2020 and
the Internal Security Fund calls for proposals on preventing radicalization. While the first includes
lines of funding aimed at overcoming the social challenges posed by the development of Artificial
Intelligence or by irregular migration, the second aims to improve multi-agency cooperation or the
capabilities of local actors to combat radicalization35.
One such project is called A radical model of Resilience for Young Minds (ARMOUR) and
is funded through the DG HOME's Internal Security Fund and implemented by a consortium which
includes the University of Malta, University of Groningen, Romania's "Mihai Viteazul" National
Intelligence Academy and several private partners. It aims to improve the capabilities of
intelligence and law enforcement organizations to combat radicalization, especially in the case of
young people, through the creation of a toolkit for first-line practitioners. The bases of the toolkit are tested through a series of "experimental laboratories" (exercise sessions involving
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professionals from multiple institutions involved in tackling radicalization). Further, after the
results of these sessions are collected, a toolkit of relevant solutions is designed36.
The Semantic Analysis against Foreign Fighters Recruitment Online Network
(SAFFRON), a project implemented by a consortium in which the "Mihai Viteazul" National
Intelligence Academy is also a part. The project aims at creating a system of early detection
recruitment attempts by terrorist networks in Europe. It included a semantic analysis component,
which aims at identifying the social media patterns of terrorist-supporting accounts and of the
narratives and myths these employ. The goal of the project was to increase the capability of
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify terrorist threats at an early stage and to
disrupt recruitment activities37.
The literature on research and intelligence abounds with debates on the topic, and, in many cases, different works use a similar word to mean different things. This section aimed to flesh out
the way research and intelligence can and do interact. Of course, the categories are not clear-cut and mutually exclusive. However, from the examples mentioned above, it can be argued that the main specificity of “research-in-support-of-intelligence” is that it is more similar to research in the sense that it takes longer and aims for more developed products, but closer to intelligence in the sense that it prioritizes topics relevant to intelligence organizations and their consumers.
While the categories are not clear-cut, the discussion above aimed at conceptually distinguishing between the three possible functions of research in relation to intelligence and to define what is meant by “research-in-support-of-intelligence”. Given the novelty of this category, previous literature can be interpreted in its light. For example, Gill and Phytian38 argue that
“research-about-intelligence” could be translated and employed “in support of” intelligence.
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3. The Need for "research-in-support of intelligence"
While, both "intelligence-as-research" and "research-about-intelligence" are useful and
relevant, they also suffer from several conceptual and practical shortcomings. From the conceptual
point of view, while intelligence production could be assimilated to research, due to the large
volumes of information that it needs to use, there are several quintessential elements which keep
the two analytically separable (time-frame and audience, as mentioned above). Secondly, "research
about intelligence" is interesting from an academic point of view, as intelligence organizations can
represent objects of study when approached from the points of view of different scientific
disciplines. However, original information about the operation of intelligence organizations is
difficult to retrieve, and it mostly comes from historical operations.
Conversely, "research-in-support of intelligence" can address both contemporary topics
and represent a genuine research process. This section will argue in favor of the need for "research-
in-support of intelligence" and for its institutional relevance.
The main goal of "research-in-support of intelligence" is that of improving organizational
performance. This can be achieved through several avenues. The first represents research that
analyzes the principal characteristics of the intelligence organization, such as information flows
and redundancies. While this also could be characterized as “research-about-intelligence” (the
lines between the categories are, as mentioned, porous), the fact that it aims to generate actionable
recommendations for institutional transformation places it closer to “research-in-support” of
intelligence. While generally classified, some research also aims at identifying the weak spots
within the intelligence organization and concludes with proposals to rectify them through some
form of re-organization - the best known examples of such research which resulted in the
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publication of open reports were the Church Committee Report and the 9/11 Commission Report
in the US. However, one of the biggest challenges of adapting research for the use of intelligence
organizations is the diffusion of academic knowledge within intelligence organizations. Coulthart
outlines some of these, such as the culture of secrecy and the closed nature of intelligence
organizations39 as well as how the relationship between academia, think tanks and intelligence agencies can overcome them.
The second avenue through which research can help intelligence organizations is individual capacity building. This might involve developing and teaching to current practitioners novel practices that could help them better perform their assigned task, testing and implementing new technologies or new insights from applied or social sciences or applying techniques to increase the resilience of personnel and material. This can help people be more resilient to the changing environment both inside and outside an intelligence organization, employ the latest discoveries in
science in order to process much greater volumes of information and identify dangerous patterns
of behavior such as radicalization or insider leaks much faster than before.
The third avenue through which research-in-support of intelligence is useful is to help
strategic decision-making. This is generally done through analyzing the policies of relevant actors
and through proposing actions that take advantage of certain political opportunities while avoiding
particular pitfalls. One such example involves understanding the relevant political conflicts of a
state considered a competitor and supporting a particular faction that proposes favorable policies
towards one's own state. A particularly interesting topic is the process of differential European
integration and its impact on intelligence organizations, especially given their very national
character. This is crucially relevant for strategic decision-makers within intelligence organizations
in the European Union.
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Another advantage of research conducted in support of intelligence is that it can be
meaningfully fed into an intelligence analysis process. This can lead to a decision-making process
that is both well anchored in factual claims and relies on the best uses of methods of predicting the
future. For example, one can analyze the strategic intentions of a state-actor, on the basis of policy
documents that have been officially published, and then, conduct a scenario analysis or an
alternative future analysis on the potential developments in case that state actor undertakes a
particular course of action40. Combining research methods for retrospective knowledge and
intelligence analysis methods for prospective foresight could be a highly useful avenue for
obtaining relevant and accurate predictions and strategic anticipation.
4. Intelligence and Critical Research
The term “critical approaches” is enough to encompass a very large set of epistemological
premises and methodological approaches which share a number of common premises. These
include an intersubjectively constructed reality, the impossibility of establishing general and
immutable laws of social behavior, and the contingency of “truth”. These are then coupled with
the idea of the pervasiveness of power and of power relations as well as the need to understand the
relevant narratives and discourses that sustain/transform these relations. Critical approaches
acknowledge the different social roles created by knowledge, discourse, and power, and how all
three forces work to create and dismantle radically different versions of social reality, which are
shared by different groups.41
In a collective manifesto written in 2006, the C.A.S.E collective42 summarizes the
development and institutionalization of critical security studies in Europe. They argue that the core
premise of critical studies is that “discourses (and practices) have political effects”43. While
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varying considerably between them, all schools of thought that consider themselves “critical”
focus on the effects of discourse on politics: the first generation Copenhagen school focuses on the construction of security threats through discourse44, while the second generation looks at the
role of the audience in accepting or rejecting securitizations 45. Others analyze great power politics
in the United Nations as well as the development of the European Union’s Common Security and
Defense Policy through the role identity-shaping discourses.46 Bigo shows how “habituses” of
security of professionals47 shape security policy, while Aras and Polat48 discuss de-securitization
either from above or from below in Turkey. Finally, Aradau looks at the emancipatory effects of
discourses of contestation.49
Critical intelligence studies, thus, appears as a variation of critical approaches in social
sciences in general. For the intelligence practitioner, it can mean understanding the discourses
present in one’s own organization, but also the semiotic context of those who are the target of
intelligence investigations, while for the scholar of intelligence, it implies approaching source
material with an eye to de-constructing the narratives present in the official documents or interviews analyzed.
While, the introduction to this issue argues that a form of agonism (positive conflict) through which both scholars of intelligence (those that undertake “research-about-intelligence”) and practitioners of intelligence (who, sometimes, practice “intelligence-as-research”) become more self-reflexive, this article encourages those who practice “research-in-support” of intelligence to do the same and argues for some relevant advantages of doing so.
In order to understand how critical “research-in-support-of-intelligence” could look like, one should first see how other types of intelligence research have adapted to critical approaches.
One work where critical approaches have been used for “research-about-intelligence” is that of
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Colin Atkinson50, who delves on the internal organization of the Scottish police. Atkinson argues that intelligence analysts, who are predominantly women or younger men, without the experience of training in the police academy and of street-level patrolling have been assigned roles at the
bottom of a “gendered hierarchy” which privileges the “hegemonic masculinity” of older, male,
“street-smart” police officers and disparages cerebral thinking and unkempt bodies. According to
Atkinson, intelligence analysts are thus “infantilized” and their conclusions treated as useless or, at best, obvious, while the expenses with their employment are permanently decried. Bean51 similarly analyzes the discourse of the US intelligence community about its “organizational culture” and argues that this shapes notions of accountability in the post-9/11 world of U.S. intelligence. Unlike Nolan’s work, who simply describes the effects of the process of socialization within one agency on inter-agency cooperation, Atkinson employs concepts that aim to expose the power relations within a particular agency. Thus, while in Nolan’s work power relations are normalized, in Atkinson’s, they are contested through de-construction.
The second way critical approaches have been used in intelligence research is to improve intelligence analysis and, therefore, intelligence products offered to consumers. This is illustrated by the work of Peter de Werd52 who proposes a new intelligence analysis method, analysis by
contrasting narratives, which relies on an interpretivist methodology and which aims to move away from the inherently rationalist and realist assumptions of actor behavior prevalent in intelligence analysis53. De Werd then applies his method and aims to analyze both the behavior of Al Qaeda in
the 1990s and the corresponding US policy towards it. De Werd’s efforts could also be described
as a way of “research-in-support of intelligence”. Further, Walsh54 pleads in favor of using
qualitative, interpretative methodologies such as ethnography and phenomenology for intelligence
analysis.
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While the previous section aimed to map the possible relations between research and
intelligence, the current looked at how intelligence studies, in general have adopted and adapted
to critical approaches. Thus, the previous sections aims to individualize “research-in-support-of-
intelligence”, the current looks at critical intelligence in general. Both build up to the next, where the advantages of using critical approaches for research-in-support-of-intelligence are discussed.
5. Why use Critical Approaches for “research-in-support-of-intelligence”?
The final section combines the insights of its predecessors and shows what research for
intelligence (“in support of”) can do when employing critical approaches. If the focus of the
argument above was “what can research do for intelligence?”, this section centers on “what can
critical approaches bring to it”? As discussed above, “research-in-support-of-intelligence” is taken
to mean that a research activity is undertaken with the aim to generate actionable recommendations
that directly help the intelligence organization, by improving, for example, its analysis
methodology or its organizational flows. The novelty of this article lies within the fact that it
expands the desideratum to adopt critical approaches to “research-in-support-of-intelligence”.
The first way in which critical approaches could be used for “research-in-support-of-
intelligence” is to analyze one’s opponents. This aims to better “understand the other”. Rather
than assume the same “rational agent” model of the actor, which many intelligence products seem
to take for granted, the use of critical approaches would allow one to be considerably more
attentive to the cultural and historical context which other groups operate it. This would take into
account their widely different cultural characteristics, which many times, make their behavior
deviant according to the standards of instrumental rationality which are predominantly assumed
by most ‘Western-centric’ analysts. Understanding the values and the goals of these organizations
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requires the analysis of their foundational narratives and their quintessential cultural traits, which
only interpretive methods can provide.
Jaffel et al provide one example of such misunderstanding55. They quote British
intelligence produced prior to the 2003 Iraq war. In one of these assessments, Saddam Hussein is
presented as “misreading” the international situation. Rather than attempt to explain how far the
Iraqi leader would be willing to go with concessions or how much he would risk a disastrous war,
this particular intelligence product gave an image of an inept, rather than culturally determined,
Saddam Hussein. Another example where intelligence could have offered better predictions had
it approached its subject differently is the murder of journalist Jamal Khasoggi. Given that a
number of incentives had been offered to Saudi Arabia for it “opening up” to the West, it would
seem relatively irrational to destroy what had been built through a high-profile murder. However,
a closer analysis of the cultural context and the foundational narratives of the Saudi leadership
might have led to a better prediction of the final outcome.
These outcomes could have been improved by undertaking a more significant research of the foundational narratives of Arab nationalism in the case of Saddam Hussein’s Irak or of the justification and practices of power in Saudi Arabia. This would have involved the use of cultural anthropologists and historians of the region, and would have led to better understanding of the actions that some of these leaders might have felt compelled to undertake.
The second way in which critical approaches can be used for “research-in-support-of intelligence” is by analyzing one’s own organization. This would contribute to a better
“understanding of oneself”. One of the blind spots of research of intelligence organizations has been that it took for granted the in the “intelligence cycle” model and reproduced it.56 A new
21
approach could utilize the insights offered by Jaffel, as well as those provided by other authors in the critical tradition such as Bigo and Balzacq.57
This would involve focusing on the narratives of appropriateness that pervade a particular
intelligence organization, in respect to the proper hierarchy, the proper behavior and the proper
qualities of intelligence analysts, as well as how they are recruited and trained. One question that
could, for example, be posed is whether analysis a relatively new function in the organization and whether the personnel is appropriately trained. Alternatively, if analysts are former operatives converted to analysis, this can bias reporting to a more factual rather than “analytic” style. Further, when undertaking such research, one should discuss how analysts are trained and how intelligence is to be produced inside the organization (how intelligence products are drafted, what context the particular reporting has to be offered, how and to who it has to be presented).
One should remember that intelligence organizations themselves are also places where
particular narratives and interpretations of the social world are created and institutionalized. In
Europe, particularly, the development of armed forces, in general58, and of intelligence services is
strongly connected with the development of the nation-state. This makes the foundational
narratives of intelligence services closely parallel those of the respective nation-state. The role of
critical approaches for “research-in-support-of-intelligence” is to show how this limits the type of
intelligence that each organization can produce and to propose ways to overcome these limits.
While most intelligence services are strongly bound to the history of their nation-states,
intelligence cooperation has had not only a multiplier effect on the result of intelligence operations
but also a socialization effect on its personnel. Davis Cross discusses how international solidarities
are formed among intelligence personnel in IntCen while Ben Jaffel presents his own research on
the socializing effects of intelligence liaison officers59. This should be also taken into account
22
when one aims to understand how a particular piece of intelligence was shaped in a particular way.
For example, interesting mixes of both national narratives and “imported” styles might be
discovered among the products of one intelligence organization.
Further, the norms governing gender(ed) roles in an intelligence organization could be
discussed when conducting critical organizations research. As discussed in Atkinson’s article,
these have considerable impact about what intelligence is considered valuable and which is to be
discounted. For example, the association of intelligence obtained from covert sources has been
considered more relevant than “all source” intelligence. The association of usefulness with the
“masculine” approach to the danger inherent in collecting secret intelligence blinds some to the
fact that a significant part of the information acquired through secret sources could also be
discerned through a careful analysis of public ones, without the dangers associated with it60. This
also goes along with the culture of masculinity present in many intelligence services, exemplified
by a focus on playing sports and good driving skills61.
While all this might be true also for “research-about-intelligence”, the main aim of
“research-in-support of intelligence” could derive actionable recommendations for institutional
reform. The use of critical approaches could illuminate why intelligence failures happen and offer
ways to alter power relations in such a way to encourage ideas to be discussed and presented
without fear of being “too far off” from the prevailing paradigms of one’s organization.
The use of critical approaches for “research-in-support-of-intelligence” has the potential of
becoming a highly crucial tool in both “understanding oneself” and “understanding the other”.
While different from intelligence per se and from “research-about-intelligence”, this particular
type of research can help intelligence organizations to better understand their strategic
environment, the groups that they are targeting, as well as their own inherent limits. The main
23
advantage of critical “research-in-support-of-intelligence” is that it would to convert these
understandings into actionable recommendations, rather than just focusing on how critical theory
illuminates the practice of intelligence.
6. Conclusion
This article has analyzed the relationship between research and intelligence and has argued
that there are three possible ways to understand it: intelligence-as-research, research-about-
intelligence and research-in-support of intelligence. It has also argued that the two processes are
analytically separable and, although they might involve a similar approach to facts, they have
sufficiently different characteristics to not be treated as one and the same.
More research-in-support of intelligence, especially which involves the use of critical
approaches, would considerably improve the efficiency of intelligence organizations. On the one
hand, analyzing and eliminating some of the power imbalances within intelligence organizations
could help practitioners, especially those who do not conform to the traditional models, feel more
motivated in their work. Further, this could reduce communications mishaps, as hypotheses that
are more daring could be discussed more frankly. Moreover, the ability of intelligence
organizations to “understand the other” would be improved if this task was given to specialized
personnel trained in the use of critical approaches and methodologies. This can improve strategic
awareness and avoid intelligence failures.
Notes
1 Gill and Phytian “Intelligence in an insecure world” 2 One such definition, taken from the Merriam-Webster dictionary could be: studious inquiry or examination especially : investigation or experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of accepted theories or laws in the light of new facts, or practical application of such new or revised theories or laws 3 Wheaton and Beerbower. “Towards a new definition of intelligence”.
24
4 Sims „ Decision Advantage” 5 Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence”. 6 Jackson and Siegel, “Intelligence and Statecraft”, 4; Scott and Jackson, “ The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice” 7 Gill, Marrin and Phytian, “Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates”; Vrist Rønn and Høffding, “The epistemic status of intelligence”, Gill, “Knowing the self, knowing the other”; Gill and Phytian, “Intelligence in an insecure world”; Marrin “ Evaluating Intelligence Theories”; Bean, “Intelligence Theories from the Margins”; Stout and Warner, “Intelligence is what intelligence does” 8 Ben Jaffel, Hoffman and Kearns, “ Towards Critical Approaches to Intelligence” 9 Ibid, 9 10 Ibid 11 Tang, “How do we know” 12 Vrist Rønn and Høffding, “The epistemic status of intelligence”, 13 Durbin “ Bridging the Gap” 14 Marrin, S."Homeland security and the analysis of foreign intelligence” 15 Svendsen, "Introducing RESINT”. 16 Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. 17 Ibid, 39. 18 Ibid, 57. 19 Marrin, S."Homeland security and the analysis of foreign intelligence”; Central Intelligence Agency, “A consumer's guide to intelligence”. 20 Svendsen, "Introducing RESINT”. 21 Ibid, 779. 22 Ibid, 783. 23 Nolan, Information sharing and collaboration. 24 Johnston, Analytic culture in the US intelligence community. 25 Davis Cross, "A European transgovernmental intelligence network”. 26 Ibid, 389. 27 Bitton, "In law we trust”. 28 Whitesmith, M. "Experimental Research in Reducing the Risk of Cognitive Bias”. 29 Ibid, 6. 30 Ibid, 10. 31 European Center for Excellence, Nuclear Energy 32 Verner, Assessing Energy Dependency . 33 Sørensen, The ice dragon. 34 Treverton, Addressing Hybrid Threats. 35 European Commission, Horizon 2020 - Work Programme 2018-2020, Secure societies- Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens; European Commission, Internal Security Fund. 36 Armourproject.eu. 37 www.saffron-project.eu. 38 Gill and Phytian “Intelligence in an insecure world” ; Gill “Knowing the self, knowing the other” 39 Coulthart, “From laboratory to the WMD commission” 40 Pherson, & Heuer Jr, Structured analytic techniques. 41 Peoples and Vaughan Williams, Critical Security Studies. 42 C.A.S.E. collective “Critical approaches to security in Europe” 43 Ibid, 454 44 Waever “Security, the Speech Act”; Buzan, Waever and de Wilder “Security: A new framework for analysis”. 45 Balzacq “Three faces of securitization”; Balzacq “The policy tools of securitization”. 46 Kurowska “Multipolarity as resistance” ; Kurowska and Breuer Explaining the EU’s common security and defence policy 47 Bigo “The (in) securitization practices of three universes”; Bigo “ Pierre Bourdieu and international relations” 48Aras and Polat “From Conflict to Cooperation:” 49 Aradau “Security as Universality” 50 Atkinson, „Patriarchy, Gender, Infantilization” . 51 Bean, „Organizational Culture” . 52 De Werd, P. G., Critical Intelligence. 25
53 Lillbacka, “Realism, Constructivism, and Intelligence Analysis”. 53 Walsh, “Improving strategic analytical practice” 53 Jaffel, Hoffman and Kearns, “ Towards Critical Approaches to Intelligence” 53 Walsh, “Improving strategic analytical practice” 53 Ben Jaffel, Hoffman and Kearns, “ Towards Critical Approaches to Intelligence” 53 Johston “ Analytic culture in the US intelligence community” . 53 Balzacq, “Policy tools of securitization”; Bigo “ The (in)securitization practices” 53 Simonsen “Building <
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