The Article Argues That Intelligence Can Learn a Considerable Amount from Social Science Research Inspired by Constructivist and Critical Approaches

Unlikely Connections: What Can Intelligence Research Learn by Being Critical? The article argues that intelligence can learn a considerable amount from social science research inspired by constructivist and critical approaches. Rather than being polar opposites, intelligence analysis and critical theory can identify significant areas of dialogue. The article begins by analyzing the relationship between research and of intelligence. It discusses the differences between the two and shows that research is a different kind of process than intelligence production, with which it shares some characteristics, but from which it differs considerably. Further, the article argues that research can support intelligence organizations through capacity building, improving the skills of practitioners and offering support to strategic decision-making. Then, it presents three possible understandings of this relationship and argues in favor of the use of critical approaches for improving the performance of intelligence agencies in two ways: understanding the other and understanding oneself. 1. Introduction – comparing intelligence and research The article explores the conceptual and practical interrelationships between intelligence and research. It argues that intelligence analysis can significantly learn from critical research and that the latter can provide resources for improving the former. In order to clear the path for a discussion of the relationship between critical research and intelligence, the paper first claims that research (in general) and intelligence need to be analytically separated, and that all research can offer significant support to intelligence. The article first defines the concepts of research and intelligence and elaborates their main differences. While both processes involve the examination of sources, the testing of previous knowledge and the identification of patterns and culminate in the production of new knowledge, the article argues that they produce a different kind of knowledge. Further, it identifies two relevant differences between intelligence and research: the goal and the time-frame. Intelligence can be defined as a form of knowledge produced for the consumption of decision-makers of organizations situated in a competitive environment, while research aims to elaborate more complex products (either reports or academic articles or books), which not only aim to describe a particular situation 1 but to also to identify trends, explain phenomena and argue for conclusions. Further, while intelligence is produced in the short-run and its usefulness disappears quickly, the production of research takes considerable more time, and is useful over a longer period of time. The article first discusses the concepts and their possible interrelations. Further, it presents some of the ways in which critical perspectives can contribute to the practice and understanding of intelligence and argues for the usefulness of this combination. This work builds upon and expands that of Gill and Phytian1, who discuss the theoretical background and the possible uses of one type of research (discussed below as “research-about-intelligence”), by adding other possible relations between the two (“intelligence-as-research” and “research-in-support-of-intelligence”) as well as by elaborating on the advantages of using critical rather than positivist approaches when doing so. The main aim of the article is to show that, while some might see intelligence as a form of research, a better use of the skills and capabilities of a research organization is "research in support of intelligence”. Critical approaches can prove very useful in this context, as they can contribute both to “understanding oneself” (improving organizational performance) and to “understanding the other” (improving strategic decision-making). As mentioned above, due to the very different time-frames and given the very different types of conclusions one can reach through the two knowledge-productions processes, the two should not be conflated. However, the article argues that knowledge produced through research can meaningfully support an intelligence organization either through improving the skills of its practitioners, through proposing more efficient forms of organization, or through producing actionable recommendations for practitioners or managers facing different situations. The article argues that using the premises of critical social science, such as the pervasiveness of power and domination and the social effects of discourse, for “research in support 2 of intelligence”, can improve organizational performance, both in regard to understanding how enemies operate but also how one’s organization functions. As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue, aspects related to the internal culture of an intelligence organization (concerning both how people interact and how intelligence “is done”) are highly relevant for the final output the organization produces. This article acknowledges this. However, unlike other authors in the critical intelligence scholarship, who argue that intelligence itself should become more “critical”, the article claims that the research carried out “in support” of intelligence should have this fate. While a layperson might employ a definition of the concept of research2 an intelligence analyst aiming to understand what research is, would focus on the inquisitive, yet systematic approach to observable facts. This is undertaken with the goal of identifying and explaining regularities, analyzing possible exceptions to the former and communicating these results to both a narrow audience of specialists and to a wide one composed of the general public. The main focus of research is on the relationship of the previously established knowledge (the “theory”) to the current observation (“the empirics”) and on how these shape each other. In one scenario, a new observation could confirm the theory, while in another, it is the theory which would need modification. Conversely, while a great number of definitions of intelligence also exist, the article relies on two, offered by two intelligence theorists. These two definitions were chosen because they represent the most recent developments in the literature on intelligence theory and an evolution from the debates in the 1950s and 1960s on whether intelligence represents only secret or also public information. Kristan Wheaton proposed the first definition of intelligence that the article discusses: 3 Intelligence, then, is a process, focused externally and using information from all available sources, that is designed to reduce the level of uncertainty for a decisionmaker3 Thus, in this view, intelligence represents a set of procedures which rely on the processing of information, but the goal is not (necessarily) to identify new patterns or test existing laws, but, however, to inform a decision-maker. While unstated, this implies that the decision-maker controls a relatively large organization (either private or governmental), tasked with collectively performing a particular process and which separates decision-making from execution. Furthermore, it can also be assumed that this organization is also engaged in competitive relations or even conflict with other organizations.4 Alan Breakspear formulated the second definition of intelligence that the article relies on: Intelligence is a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do something about it. The capability involves foresight and insight, and is intended to identify impending change, which may be positive, representing opportunity, or negative, representing threat5 In Breakspear's definition, the actionable component of intelligence is much more obvious, as he argues that the goal of intelligence is to identify change and to help decision-makers take advantage of opportunities and to avoid threat. Once again, the process of intelligence, as described by Breakspear, relies on the existence of a large organization, which faces a changing environment, populated by threats and opportunities and which behaves with instrumental rationality (minimizes loss and maximizes gain). According to these two authors, the process of intelligence represents the selection and collation of relevant information, with the aim of delivering a relatively short and insightful piece 4 to a decision maker. This happens in a relatively large organization situated in a competitive environment. The two definitions are part of the “classical” approach to defining intelligence. Given the limited access that researchers outside the intelligence world have had to intelligence organizations and intelligence processes, intelligence has been defined, until very recently, by practitioners, for practitioners. This has led some to even accepting the tautology that “intelligence is what intelligence services do”6. While this approach simple approach can be and has been challenged in a number of works7, the most far-ranging criticism has been leveled in a recent article by Jaffel et al8. The authors argue that employing an interpretative approach to the study of intelligence leads to the understanding that it represents a set of practices rather than the activity of one type of organization. Furthermore, according to Jaffel, intelligence practitioners have a conception of the state “having a self-dependent validity within the international—a natural right to retain its geopolitical position”9. Thus, the authors argue that “intelligence”, in the sense of a practice extends far

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