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ATP 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis ATP 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis JANUARY 2020 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes ATP 2-33.4, dated 18 August 2014. Headquarters, Department of the Army This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). *ATP 2-33.4 Army Techniques Publication Headquarters No. 2-33.4 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 10 January 2020 Intelligence Analysis Contents Page PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... xi PART ONE FUNDAMENTALS Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ............................................. 1-1 Intelligence Analysis Overview ........................................................................... 1-1 Conducting Intelligence Analysis ........................................................................ 1-5 Intelligence Analysis and Collection Management ............................................. 1-8 The All-Source Intelligence Architecture and Analysis Across the Echelons ..... 1-9 Intelligence Analysis During Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations ........... 1-11 Intelligence Analysis During the Army’s Other Strategic Roles ........................ 1-13 Chapter 2 THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS ................................................... 2-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 2-1 The Phases of the Intelligence Analysis Process .............................................. 2-1 Chapter 3 ALL-SOURCE ANALYTICAL TASKS ............................................................... 3-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 3-1 Generate Intelligence Knowledge (ART 2.1.4) ................................................... 3-2 Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (ART 2.2.1) ......................... 3-3 Provide Warnings (ART 2.1.1.1) ........................................................................ 3-3 Perform Situation Development (ART 2.2.2) ...................................................... 3-4 Provide Intelligence Support to Targeting and Information Operations (ART 2.4) ............................................................................................................ 3-4 PART TWO TASK TECHNIQUES Chapter 4 ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES ................................................................................. 4-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1 Applying Structured Analytic Techniques ........................................................... 4-1 Chapter 5 BASIC AND DIAGNOSTIC STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES .......... 5-1 Section I – Basic Structured Analytic Techniques ....................................... 5-1 Sorting ................................................................................................................ 5-1 Chronologies ...................................................................................................... 5-4 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes ATP 2-33.4, dated 18 August 2014. i Contents Matrices ............................................................................................................... 5-6 Weighted Ranking ............................................................................................... 5-7 Link Analysis ....................................................................................................... 5-8 Event Tree ......................................................................................................... 5-12 Event Mapping .................................................................................................. 5-13 Section II – Diagnostic Structured Analytic Techniques ............................ 5-15 Key Assumptions Check ................................................................................... 5-15 Quality of Information Check ............................................................................. 5-16 Indicators/Signposts of Change ........................................................................ 5-18 Chapter 6 ADVANCED STRUCTURED ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES .................................. 6-1 Section I – Contrarian Structured Analytic Techniques ............................... 6-1 Analysis of Competing Hypotheses .................................................................... 6-1 Devil’s Advocacy ................................................................................................. 6-3 Team A/Team B .................................................................................................. 6-4 High-Impact/Low-Probability Analysis ................................................................. 6-5 “What If?” Analysis .............................................................................................. 6-6 Section II – Imaginative Structured Analytic Techniques ............................. 6-7 Brainstorming ...................................................................................................... 6-8 Functional Analysis Using Critical Factors Analysis ........................................... 6-9 Outside-In Thinking ........................................................................................... 6-10 Red Hat/Team Analysis .................................................................................... 6-11 PART THREE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS Chapter 7 ANALYTIC SUPPORT TO ARMY FORCES AND OPERATIONS .................... 7-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 7-1 Analysis Across the Echelons ............................................................................. 7-1 Support to Functional Elements .......................................................................... 7-3 Analysis Across the Army’s Strategic Roles ....................................................... 7-6 Chapter 8 ANALYSIS AND LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS ........... 8-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 8-1 Tactical to Operational Situation: An Enemy Attack ........................................... 8-1 Chapter 9 MANAGING LONG-TERM ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS ............................. 9-1 Overview ............................................................................................................. 9-1 The Basics of Analytic Design ............................................................................ 9-1 Collaboration During Analytic Design ................................................................. 9-6 Transitioning from the Analytic Design Process to Presenting the Results ........ 9-6 Crosswalking Analytic Design with Tactical Intelligence Analysis ...................... 9-7 Appendix A AUTOMATION SUPPORT TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ........................... A-1 Appendix B COGNITIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS ............. B-1 Appendix C ANALYTIC STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS VALIDATION .............................. C-1 Appendix D THREAT CONSIDERATIONS DURING LARGE-SCALE GROUND COMBAT OPERATIONS ................................................................................................... D-1 Appendix E INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION ....................................................................... E-1 Appendix F INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING ................................................... F-1 ii ATP 2-33.4 10 January 2020 Contents GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1 INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1 Figures Introductory figure. Intelligence analysis at a glance ............................................................... xii Figure 1-1. Achieving situational awareness and understanding ........................................... 1-1 Figure 1-2. Intelligence analysis within doctrinal constructs .................................................. 1-3 Figure 1-3. Information and intelligence reporting example ................................................... 1-4 Figure 1-4. Analytic standards ................................................................................................ 1-8 Figure 1-5. All-source analysis across the echelons ............................................................ 1-10 Figure 1-6. Key aspects of the operational framework ......................................................... 1-12 Figure 2-1. The intelligence analysis process ........................................................................ 2-2 Figure 3-1. The all-source analytical tasks ............................................................................. 3-1 Figure 4-1. Applying analytic techniques to understand the operational environment .......... 4-2 Figure 4-2. Structured analytic
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