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Intel Management Model for Europe

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Intel Management Model for Europe INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT MODEL FOR EUROPE PHASE ONE Guidelines for standards and best practice within the analysis function Contents Foreword 5 Acknowledgements 6 1. Executive Summary 7 Recruitment 8 Trainee Analyst - The Benefits 9 Training Programme for Police Analysts 10 Intelligence Training for Law Enforcement Personnel 10 Career Structure for Analyst Personnel 11 2. Recruitment 12 Person Specification 12 Pre-Selection 15 The Interview 15 3. Trainee Analyst - The Benefits 17 The Police Service of Northern Ireland 17 Belgian Federal Police 19 4. Training Programme for Police Analysts 20 Approach 1: The Police Service of Northern Ireland 20 Approach 2: The Belgian Federal Police 21 Approach 3: National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) UK 22 5. Intelligence Training for Law Enforcement Personnel 23 Probationary Officers 23 Intelligence Officers 24 Analyst Managers 26 6. Career Structure for Analyst Personnel 28 7. Recommended References 30 3 List of Figures Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle 7 Figure 2: Person Specification for Intelligence Analyst 14 Figure 3: PSNI Analyst Development Programme 18 Figure 4: Organisational Structure for Analysts - Strathclyde Police 28 Figure 5: Organisational Structure for Analysts - PSNI 29 4 Foreword The first tentative steps towards the development of an Intelligence Management Model for Europe were taken during early 2001. It was then that consideration was given to a proposed agenda for the forthcoming European Heads of Training Conference to be held in Scotland in June that same year. Many such conferences, in all disciplines, provide useful guidance and information to those in attendance. Often however there is little or no resultant legacy in terms of actual and tangible continuous development. Intelligence Analysis is pivotal in the drive to detect, deter and disrupt criminals and also in the desire to improve community safety and quality of life. As many law enforcement agencies across the European Community were giving consideration to the implementation of intelligence led policing strategies, it was decided to address this area for further deliberation. Specifically, the Conference identified three outcomes it hoped to achieve, and in doing so, provide a lasting and worthwhile legacy for the Community. The three areas were as follows: • To identify knowledge and skills gaps for analysts among Member States and identify appropriate training requirements to address them. • To develop training criteria, within a structured framework, for use across the community. • To raise awareness among Member States of the potential for the cohesive management of intelligence to capitalise upon the ongoing co-operation in combating organised crime. This paper, produced following collaboration between representatives of Member States experienced in the fields of intelligence and analysis, specifically identifies the area of analysis for your consideration. It makes clear that this is merely the first stage in the process of developing an integrated intelligence management model for Europe. In these times of heightened alert and security I commend it to you as a significant document to help promote high standards and best practice within the analysis function throughout the Community. D Garbutt QPM LLD FCIPD Director Scottish Police College July 2003 5 Acknowledgements The need for research into this discipline was identified at a conference of the Association of European Police Colleges held in June 2001. Funding was sought for the project to investigate the development of a European Intelligence Management Model. This was subsequently secured through the European Union OISIN II Programme, with further monies received from the United Kingdom Home Office. Summaries of the diverse approaches made to the development of an analytical function are included in this paper. I am indebted to Didier Dochain, Training Co-ordinator in Operational Crime Analysis at the Belgian Federal Police; and Mark Evans, Director of the Analysis Centre, Police Service of Northern Ireland, for providing examples of best practice within the analysis function. I am also grateful to Richard Landman, Senior Advisor at the National Criminal Intelligence Department of the Dutch National Police Agency for his contribution. In particular, with regard to his experiences in developing both training strategies and infrastructure for Accession States such as Poland and the Slovak Republic. The support and assistance of their colleagues, staff and organisations is also greatly appreciated. I would also like to make specific mention of Louise McIlvean for her assistance and understanding throughout the duration of the project. The Author Tony Dixon holds the position of Training Manager at the Scottish Centre for Intelligence and Analysis Training (SCiAT), based at the Scottish Police College. He has been responsible for the development of intelligence and analysis training since 1999. Prior to working at the Scottish Police College, Tony worked for ten years as a Senior and Strategic Intelligence Analyst with the Scottish Criminal Intelligence Office, based in Glasgow, Scotland. 6 1. Executive Summary This paper describes the results of an examination of the role of the Intelligence Analyst in a law enforcement environment within the European Union. The examination was conducted by experienced intelligence and analysis personnel representing law enforcement organisations in Belgium, The Netherlands and Northern Ireland. The Scottish Police College co-ordinated the process through the Scottish Centre for Intelligence and Analysis Training (SCiAT). Representation and advice was also received from experienced practitioners working throughout the intelligence community. The paper is produced in response to a void identified at the Association of European Police Colleges Summer Conference held in June 2001. The Conference discussed the “Development of a European Working Model for the Management of Intelligence” and it became apparent that Member States vary significantly in terms of their approach to intelligence and analysis. Many are mistaken in the belief that “intelligence” and “analysis” are the same; possibly because analysis is commonly referred to as “intelligence analysis”. In truth, they are two separate disciplines. Analysis forms a significant element of the Intelligence Cycle detailed in Figure 1. The process consists of several constituents that allow for the law enforcement organisation to approach the way in which information is handled in an efficient manner. Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle Direction Dissemination Intelligence Analysis Collection Cycle Evaluation Collation 7 Executive Summary Skilled analysis is key to the success of this process. It is concerned in the development and testing of inferences, which detail the who, what, where, why, when and how, from collected information. This ensures a focused intelligence-led approach contributing directly to the success of law enforcement objectives. The intent of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, to produce guidelines for Member States and Accession States that currently, or are about to, embrace the concept of proactive Intelligence-Led Policing. Secondly, to promote best practice in the field of intelligence and analysis across the European Union, giving specific regard to the standardisation of analytical products and training. This paper should be considered as Phase One of the Intelligence Management Model for Europe and will allow those working within an intelligence environment to appreciate the diverse requirements of an integrated intelligence unit. It concentrates upon the Analysis function, however, the Working Group acknowledges that education of Member States in relation to the wider Intelligence function would be beneficial. It is advised that Phase Two of this project address the issues of standardisation within the Intelligence process, and areas for consideration should include the evaluation process, standard analytical products and dissemination protocols. In Phase One, the Working Group deliberated over several issues and their findings are outlined here. Recruitment Research clearly indicates that there are several different categories of analyst. At one end of the spectrum there is the Strategic Intelligence Analyst working for a national organisation, often involved in work which impacts internationally; at the other end of the spectrum there is the Crime Analyst working for a small police command area involved in work of a local nature. Several levels exist between, as well as those specialist analytical roles in such areas as Fraud, Road Policing and Major Investigations. Whatever role the prospective analyst is destined to undertake, the importance of selecting the right individual must not be overlooked. To assist in this matter the Working Group has identified some of the requisite attributes under general headings of Skills, Knowledge, Attainment and Attitude, for use when determining an appropriate person specification. The Working Group recommends that once the person specification is complete, the recruitment process commence with pre-selection testing to allow for a focused interview process. 8 Executive Summary The Working Group further recommends that the interview panel itself must include an analytical expert in addition to the regular panel members. This is essential if the candidates are to be tested fully in terms of their capability to undertake the roles and responsibilities of the position. Trainee Analyst - The Benefits
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