MCWP 2-22 Signals Intelligence ______C-3

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MCWP 2-22 (formerly MCWP 2-15.2)

Signals Intelligence

U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

PCN 14300006300

MCCDC (C 42) 13 Jul 2004

E R R A T U M

MCWP 2-22

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

1. Change the publication short title to read “MCWP 2-22” (vice MCWP 2-15.2).

PCN 143 000063 80 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

22 February 1999

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-22, Signals Intelligence, serves as a basic reference for understanding concepts, operations, and procedures for the conduct of signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations in support of the Marine air-ground task force. This publication complements and expands on Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, Intelligence, and MCWP 2-1, Intelli- gence Operations, which provide doctrine and higher order tactics, techniques, and procedures for intelligence operations.

The primary target audience of this publication is intelligence personnel responsible for planning and executing SIGINT operations. Personnel who provide support to SIGINT or who use the results from these operations should also read this publication.

MCWP 2-22 describes aspects of SIGINT operations, including doctrinal fundamentals, equipment, command and control, communications and information systems support, planning, execution, security, and training. Detailed information on SIGINT operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures is classified and beyond the scope of this publication.

MCWP 2-22 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-23, (C) Signals Intelli- gence/Electronic Warfare Operations (U), dated 21 September 1990.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. E. RHODES Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000063 00 To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes that will improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite 318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail to smb@doctrine div@mccdc. Recommendations should include the following information: • Location of change Publication number and title Current page number Paragraph number (if applicable) Line number Figure or table number (if applicable) • Nature of change Add, delete Proposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewritten • Justification and/or source of change

Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following universal reference locator: http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both men and women are included. Signals Intelligence

Table of Contents

Page Chapter 1. Fundamentals

1001 What is Signals Intelligence? 1-1 1002 Concept of Employment 1-1 1003 SIGINT and Electronic Warfare 1-2 1004 Threats 1-3 1005 All-Source Intelligence and Operations Command Support 1-3 1006 Capabilities 1-4 1007 Limitations 1-5 1008 Organization 1-5 1009 Command and Control 1-6 1010 Operations 1-6 1011 Commanders’ Responsibilities 1-8

Chapter 2. SIGINT Responsibilities in the Supporting Establishment

2001 Marine Corps SIGINT Organization 2-1 2002 SIGINT Organizations in Other Military Services 2-2 2003 National SIGINT Organizations 2-3

Chapter 3. SIGINT Responsibilities in the MAGTF

3001 Commanders, Marine Corps Forces 3-1 3002 MAGTF Staff Sections 3-1 3003 MAGTF Intelligence Section Elements 3-2 3004 Marine Divisions and Aircraft Wings 3-5 3005 Radio Battalions 3-5 3006 VMAQs 3-5

Chapter 4. Radio Battalion

4001 Tasks 4-1 4002 Organization 4-1 4003 Task Organization for MAGTF Operations SIGINT Support Unit 4-3 4004 Command and Control 4-5 4005 Notional Concepts of Employment and Task Organizations 4-5

iii ______MCWP 2-22

Chapter 5. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons

5001 Mission and Tasks 5-1 5002 Organization and Concept of Employment 5-1 5003 EA-6B Prowler 5-2 5004 Tactical EA-6B Mission Planning System 5-4 5005 TERPES 5-4

Chapter 6. Communications and Information Systems

6001 Basic MAGTF SIGINT CIS Requirements 6-1 6002 Notional MAGTF SIGINT Operational Architectures 6-2 6003 Planning Consideration 6-7 6004 SIGINT Communications 6-7

Chapter 7. Planning and Operations

Section I SIGINT Functional Planning 7-1

7101 SIGINT Concept of Operations 7-1 7102 Enemy Characteristics 7-1 7103 Topography 7-2 7104 Planning Responsibilities 7-3 7105 Coordination of SIGINT Operations 7-3

Section II SIGINT Operational Planning 7-5

7201 Planning and Direction 7-5 7202 Collection 7-6 7203 Processing and Exploitation 7-7 7204 Production 7-8 7205 Dissemination 7-8 7206 Utilization 7-10

Section III SIGINT Plans and Orders 7-11

Section IV Execution 7-12

Chapter 8. Security of Sensitive Compartmented Information

8001 Special Security Officer 8-2 8002 Personnel Security Program 8-2 8003 Physical Security 8-3 8004 Information Systems Security 8-5

iv Signals Intelligence ______

Chapter 9. Training

9001 Military Occupational Specialty Training 9-1 9002 Functional Training 9-2 9003 Exercises 9-2 9004 Operational Training Objectives 9-3

Appendices

A Radio Battalion SIGINT Support Unit Checklist A-1 B Marine Corps SIGINT Equipment B-1 C SIGINT and SCI Security Management Operations Flowchart C-1 D SIGINT Appendix Format D-1 E TSCIF Checklist E-1 FGlossary F-1 G References and Related Publications G-1

List of Figures

1-1 The Intelligence Cycle 1-7 4-1 Radio Battalion Organization 4-2 4-2 SIGINT Support Unit Elements 4-3 4-3 Notional SSU Fly-In Echelon Configuration 4-6 5-1 EA-6B Prowler 5-2 5-2 VMAQ Organization 5-2 5-3 VMAQ and TERPES Operations 5-3 6-1 Notional MEF SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-3 6-2 Notional MEF Lead Echelon SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-4 6-3 MEU(SOC) CE Afloat SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-5 6-4 MEU(SOC) CE Ashore SIGINT Operational Architecture 6-6 6-5 MEF CE CIC Communications and Information Systems Architecture 6-9 6-6 RadBn SSU Operations Control and Analysis Center Communications and Information Systems 6-10 6-7 VMAQ Operations Center and TERPES Communications and Information Systems 6-11 7-1 MAGTF and Supporting SIGINT Operations 7-13 B-1 AN/ULQ-19(V2) B-1 B-2 AN/MLQ-36 B-2 B-3 AN/MLQ-36A B-3 B-4 AN/PRD-12 B-4 B-5 AN/MSC-63A B-5 B-6 AN/MSC-63A (interior view) B-5 B-7 Technical Control and Analysis Center Concept of Employment B-6 B-8 Team Portable Collection System Upgrade B-8 v ______MCWP 2-22

B-9 Team Portable Collection System COMINT Collection Subsystem B-8 B-10 Team Portable Collection System Analysis Subsystem B-9 B-11 Trojan Spirit II B-10 B-12 RREP SS-1 B-11 B-13 RREP SS-2 B-11 B-14 Rifle-Mounted HIDRAH B-12 B-15 EA-6B Prowler B-14 B-16 AN/TSQ-90D/E(V), TERPES Portable Unit B-14

List of Tables

2-1 Marine Support Battalion Companies 2-2 4-1 Notional MEU(SOC) SSU T/O 4-7 4-2 Notional Fly-In Echelon T/O 4-7 7-1 Emitter Technical Data 7-2

vi Chapter 1

Fundamentals

All military forces use the electromagnetic spec- from foreign communications by anyone othe trum to command and control operating forces than the intended recipient. acquire targets, guide weapons, and direct supporting arms. These military forces also use the b. Electronics Intelligence electromagnetic spectrum to collect, process, and report intelligence and to support other adminis- Electronics intelligence (ELINT) is the technical trative and logistics operations. Most facets o and intelligence information derived from foreign military operations involve the use of some de- noncommunication electromagnetic radiation em- vice or system that radiates or receives electro- anating from anywhere other than nuclear detona- magnetic energy via air waves, metallic cable, or tions or radioactive sources. fiber optics. Radios, radars, sensors, smart muni- tions, telephone systems, and computer networks c. Foreign Instrumentation Signals use electromagnetic radiation. Both complex and Intelligence unsophisticated military organizations depend on Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FIS- these systems and their inherent use of the elec- INT) is the technical and intelligence information tromagnetic spectrum. Signals intelligence opera- derived from the intercept of foreign instrumenta- tions are the principal way to exploit an tion signals by anyone other than the intended re- adversary’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. cipients. (FISINT is primarily strategic in nature and will not be addressed further in this manual.)

1001. What Is Signals Intelligence? 1002. Concept of Employment

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is “a category o SIGINT can be employed in tactical situation intelligence comprising either individually or in when the enemy uses electromagnetic spectru combination all communications intelligence, communications and/or systems. Optimal em- electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumenta- ployment is against enemy forces that depend on tion signals intelligence, however transmitted” tactical communications and noncommunications (Joint Pub 1-02). Simply, SIGINT is intelligence for command and control of their operations. SIG- gained by exploiting an adversary’s use of the INT operations are more difficult against enemy electromagnetic spectrum with the aim of gaining forces that have established more permanent em- undetected firsthand intelligence on the adver- placements using land lines or other cabled com- sary’s intentions, dispositions, capabilities, and munications systems. limitations. SIGINT is one of several intelligence disciplines. a. Communications Intelligence The other key intelligence disciplines are imagery intelligence (IMINT), human resources intelli- Communications intelligence (COMINT) is the gence (HUMINT), and measurement and signa- technical and intelligence information derived ture intelligence (MASINT). 1-2 ______MCWP 2-22

1003. SIGINT and Electronic quire further processing, correlation, or analysi Warfare may be passed directly to subordinate commanders or to the operations section or supporting arms element of supported commands, in accordance Electronic warfare (EW) is “any military action with United States Signals Intelligence Directive involving the use of electromagnetic and directed (USSID) 316, Non-Codeword Reporting Pro- energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or gram, and USSID 240, ELINT Processing, Analy- to attack the enemy” (Joint Pub 1-02). EW denies sis, Reporting, and Forwarding Procedures. the enemy use of the electromagnetic spectru for command and control and protects it for friendly command and control. There are three di- b. Electronic Attack visions of EW. Electronic attack (EA) is action taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electro- a. Electronic Warfare Support magnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare support (ES) includes actions tasked by or under the direct control of an opera- The objectives of SIGINT may conflict with those tional commander to search for, intercept, identi- of EA. For example, EA may be conducted to in- fy, and locate sources of intentional and terfere with the adversary’s use of an emitter a unintentional radiated enemy electromagnetic sig- the same time as SIGINT operations are designed nals for the purpose of immediate threat recogni- to exploit the adversary’s use of the same emitter. tion. ES provides information required for Furthermore, EA operations against one target immediate tactical decisions and operations such may disrupt or otherwise interfere with friendly as the identification of imminent hostile actions, SIGINT collection against the same or differen threat avoidance, targeting, or electronic attack. targets.

Both SIGINT and ES involve searching for, inter- SIGINT operations, EA operations, and the cepting, identifying, and locating electronic emit- MAGTF’s overall use of the electromagnetic ters. The primary differences between the two are spectrum for command and control (C2) opera- the information’s intended use, the degree of ana- tions must be carefully coordinated within the lytical effort expended, the detail of information MAGTF and with pertinent external organiza- provided, and the timeliness required. tions. Depending on operational requirements, SIGINT and EA operations coordination and de- SIGINT is used to gain information concerning confliction may occur within the radio battalion the enemy, usually in response to a priority intelli- operations control and analysis center (OCAC) gence requirement (PIR), an intelligence require- within the electronic warfare coordination center ment (IR), or other means. As described in (EWCC), or within the MAGTF command ele- chapter 6, SIGINT support is usually provided to ment (CE) current operations center (COC). the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) as a whole, but may also be provided directly to subordinate elements. c. Electronic Protection Electronic protection (EP) involves the action SIGINT information is normally provided to the taken to ensure effective, friendly use of the elec- MAGTF all-source fusion center (AFC) for inclu- tromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of sion into all-source intelligence products and for EW. Within the MAGTF, SIGINT elements may further dissemination throughout the MAGTF and be tasked to employ similar techniques agains to external organizations. See Marine Corps friendly force electronic emitters in order to iden- Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 2-1, Intelli- tify and help eliminate signals security vulnerabil- gence Operations. SIGINT-derived information ities that could be exploited by an enemy’s of immediate tactical importance that does not re- SIGINT operations. Signals Intelligence ______1-3

1004. Threats 1005. All-Source Intelligence and Operations Command a. Enemy Capabilities Support The more a combat unit relies on the electromagnetic spectrum, the more vulnerable it is to the en- Generally, SIGINT is more useful to the com- emy’s signals intelligence and electronic warfare mander and the decisionmaking process when actions. The enemy can— has been correlated and fused with information from other intelligence sources and disseminated in easily usable, tailored, all-source intelligence Detect a unit’s devices which radiate elec- products. Tactical SIGINT operations within the tromagnetic energy to reveal its identity and MAGTF, along with other services, theater, and location. national SIGINT support, make SIGINT a valuable source of information within the overall in- Monitor a unit’s communications to reveal telligence effort. SIGINT supports the following its intentions, combat capabilities, logistics six functions of intelligence. and personnel status, and other critical operational and tactical information. a. Commander’s Estimate Inject false information into communica- SIGINT helps formulate and modify the com- tions and information systems (CIS) to con- mander’s estimate of the situation by providing fuse and mislead a unit. information needed to analyze the enemy’s C2 Interrupt a unit’s use of the electromagnetic operations, identify the current parameters of op- spectrum, thereby degrading its ability to re- erating emitters, give insight into enemy inten- ceive and process intelligence, plan operations, and assess the enemy’s intelligence, EW tions, and execute C2 functions. and other military capabilities. b. Countermeasures b. Development of the Situation SIGINT’s ability to track enemy emitters and as- To counter threats listed and to enhance effective- sociated units and to obtain indicators of inten- ness, Marines must be able to— tions can confirm or refute potential enemy courses of action. SIGINT also helps commanders to better understand the enemy and the bat- Protect, to the maximum extent possible, the free use of the electromagnetic spectrum tlespace, thereby reducing uncertainty by acquir- and ensure the reliable performance of ou ing information regarding enemy structure, CIS. dispositions, locations, movements, and operational activities and patterns. Exploit the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum for intelligence and targeting c. Indications and Warning and intrude into the enemy’s CIS and net- SIGINT is often the principal provider of indica- works. tions and warning (I&W) because adversaries of- Attack the enemy’s CIS to adversely affect ten reveal their intentions, locations, and their decisionmaking process and opera- movements in their communications and other tions. electronic emissions. 1-4 ______MCWP 2-22 d. Force Protection with the capability to collect a wide range of intel- SIGINT supports force protection by revealing ligence information. Locating SIGINT element critical intelligence about enemy intelligence, with the ground combat element (GCE) forces sabotage, subversion, and terrorism and by as- provides the MAGTF commander with intelli- sessing the vulnerability of friendly C2 and CI gence support for decisionmaking as well as I&W operations. and force protection intelligence reporting to the local unit. e. Targeting (2) Air-Platform SIGINT Elements. Airborn SIGINT supports targeting by providing key op- SIGINT elements can provide direct support to erational and locational intelligence on enemy C2 both air and ground operations and significantly operations and facilities, weapons systems, force enhance collection operations by exploiting ene- compositions, and dispositions. Information pro- my targets masked or otherwise unattainable by vided through SIGINT can identify high value ground-based elements. These SIGINT elements and high payoff targets and help develop options also support friendly air operations by identifying, for attacking these targets. SIGINT also supports locating, and determining the status of enemy sur- all-source intelligence gain and loss assessments veillance, targeting, and weapons systems and by of potential enemy targets. providing intelligence support to friendly EA operations targeting these enemy systems. f. Combat Assessment SIGINT can aid in all-source intelligence support (3) Ship-Based SIGINT Elements. SIGINT of battle damage assessments by exploiting ene- elements may operate from ship-based SIGIN my reports of sustained battle damages and by de- operations facilities in support of amphibious op- tecting changes in enemy operations subsequen erations. Marine and Navy elements operating to friendly attacks. from ship-based SIGINT facilities may support amphibious operations as a part of the assault force, airborne SIGINT operations, or ship-based 1006. Capabilities SIGINT operations. Within an amphibious task force (ATF), the principal SIGINT facilities are found with ship’s signals exploitation spaces a. Remote Intelligence (SSESs) located within the intelligence centers of SIGINT operations provide extended-range intel- many ships. ligence without the need for physical presence within or near the surveillance area. The standoff range for SIGINT operations is directly depend- b. Target Detection and Identification ent on the characteristics of the terrain in which SIGINT can detect enemy activity in designated SIGINT collection is being conducted and the areas and provide a general indication of its type type, operating characteristics, and methods of and volume. Analysis of SIGINT information can employment of the enemy’s electromagnetic sys- provide the identity and location of specific ene- tems. Some enemy electromagnetic systems may my units, indications of enemy plans and future require that SIGINT operations be close to the operations, and the type, function, and location of transmission origin, path, or medium. Conversely, specific enemy units and systems. other electromagnetic systems may be exploitable from positions farther away from the transmission origin, path, or medium. c. Near-Real-Time Reporting SIGINT operations can immediately report enemy (1) Ground SIGINT Elements. Locating actions or events critical to the operations of ground SIGINT operational elements with friend- friendly units. Time-sensitive SIGINT reporting ly combat forces provides the friendly commander to combat units may be via standard MAGTF Signals Intelligence ______1-5 intelligence communications channels or any b. Terrain Masking available direct communications means. Heavily wooded and urban areas reduce the sus- ceptibility of enemy transmissions to SIGINT col- d. Continuous Operations lection. In these areas, generally, SIGINT elements must be closer to the enemy’s transmis- SIGINT operations are conducted on a 24-hou sion origin or medium. Mountainous or very hilly basis. The size and composition of SIGINT forces terrain also inhibits SIGINT operations (particu- along with the supported commander(s)’s concept larly ground-based operations) by effectively of operations will influence the scope, services blocking enemy signals from detection. and capabilities of SIGINT operations. c. Complex Signals e. Stealth Enemy signals that are complex or encrypted re- SIGINT operations are a passive intelligence duce the intelligence information available from technique and can usually be conducted withou the transmission. Complex signals (i.e., frequency the enemy’s knowledge or detection. EW opera- hoppers) require special equipment for intercep tions include both active and passive techniques and signals analysis. Encrypted signals require and, depending on implementation, may or may deciphering to reveal intelligence information. not be recognized by the enemy. Deciphering simple encryption methods may be possible, but an enemy’s use of complex encryp- f. Flexibility tion methods is currently beyond the scope of tactical SIGINT elements. Marine SIGINT operations may be employed in a variety of means to support the MAGTF concept d. SIGINT versus Electronic Attack of operations and supporting intelligence operations. SIGINT elements may be deployed with ad- SIGINT operations may be affected when enemy vance forces or forward ground units; they may signals are being jammed. Prior to initiating EA be aboard air platforms or ship-based. Additional- jamming operations, consideration must be given ly, Marine SIGINT elements routinely operate to the intelligence value of the enemy’s signal and with joint and other service elements. These ele- the effects of its loss. ments are effective at leveraging their capabilities in support of MAGTF requirements. 1008. Organization

1007. Limitations Within the Marine Corps, the units responsible for the conduct of tactical SIGINT are the two radio a. Enemy System battalions and the four Marine tactical electronic warfare squadrons. The primary value of SIGINT operations is against enemy systems using electromagnetic spectrum system transmissions. SIGINT opera- a. Radio Battalion tions are ineffective against systems that do no The radio battalion (RadBn) provides tactical use radio frequency (RF) transmissions (e.g., fiber SIGINT, electronic warfare, communications se- optics, land-line telephone systems, or other ca- curity monitoring and analysis, and special com- bled systems). If the enemy conducts operations munications operations in support of the MAGTF. under enemy emission control (EMCON) condi- A variety of employment concepts may be used tions (e.g., radio silence), SIGINT operations will depending upon the situation. Refer to chapter 4 not be effective. for a detailed description of RadBns. 1-6 ______MCWP 2-22 b. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare communications and information systems officer Squadron (G-6/S-6) to achieve optimum employment of The Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron RadBn. (VMAQ) conducts tactical electronic reconnaissance and ELINT operations in support of the (2) Support Relationships The RadBn most MAGTF. typically operates in general support of the MAGTF. However, RadBn or its elements may The VMAQ provides— be employed in direct support of any of the MAGTF’s major support elements, i.e., GCE and ACE. In such cases, the scope of the supported ELINT collection operations to maintain the commander’s control over assigned RadBn ele- electronic order of battle, including identifi- ments usually is specified to ensure effective sup- cation of selected emitters and location o port of operations while allowing the MAGTF nonfriendly emitters. commander to maintain effective control of Threat warnings for friendly aircraft, ships, broader intelligence and SIGINT operations. and ground units. Intelligence support to prevent, delay, or in- b. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare terrupt detection and tracking by enemy ear- Squadron ly warning, acquisition, and fire or missile control radars of aviation combat elemen VMAQ or its detachments are subordinate to the (ACE) operations and Marine EA-6B tacti ACE and under the OPCON of the ACE com- cal jamming aircraft in support of strike air- mander. craft. (1) Staff Cognizance. The ACE commander Refer to chapter 5 for a detailed description of the will usually exercise C2 over VMAQ via the ACE VMAQ. operations officer or tactical air command center (TACC). The ACE intelligence officer will exercise staff cognizance over VMAQ ELINT activi- 1009. Command and Control ties beyond that required to support EA missions. a. Radio Battalion (2) Support Relationships. VMAQ elements principally operate in direct support of ACE oper- The RadBn (or RadBn detachment) is generally a ations or other designated commanders (e.g., the subordinate command of, or attached to, the joint force air component commander). However, MAGTF CE. The MAGTF commander has oper- ELINT acquired during VMAQ operations is ca- ational control (OPCON) of the RadBn (or RadBn pable of being used in general support of MAGTF detachment). elements and supporting intelligence operations.

(1) Staff Cognizance. The MAGTF commander exercises C2 over the RadBn or its detachments via the MAGTF intelligence officer. Such a rela- 1010. Operations tionship allows for the centralized direction and effective integration of SIGINT operations within RadBn and VMAQ conduct both COMINT and the MAGTF’s broader all-source intelligence con- ELINT operations to varying degrees. RadBns cept of operations. RadBn’s EW operations fa conduct predominantly COMINT operations; they under the staff cognizance of the MAGTF opera- also ensure rapid dissemination of fused ELIN tions officer, requiring close coordination and in- and COMINT from organic or external sources to tegration among the intelligence staff officer (G- the G-2/S-2 and subordinate commanders. The 2/S-2), operations staff officer (G-3/S-3), and VMAQ’s main focus is ELINT and ES. Signals Intelligence ______1-7

ducers, disseminators, and other SIGINT elements and agencies.

b. Collection During collection, organic, attached, and supporting SIGINT elements detect, collect, and record COMINT and ELINT data. The collected COM- INT and ELINT data is then delivered to the appropriate SIGINT processing or production element. The OCAC is the processing and production element for RadBn, while the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evalu- ation System (TERPES) is VMAQ’s processing and production element. In some instances, such as immediate threat information, PIRs and supporting reporting criteria may direct the SIGINT Figure 1-1. The Intelligence Cycle. collector to disseminate SIGINT reports directly to the local commander (e.g., an infantry maneu- To complete intelligence tasks, RadBn an ver element) for immediate support to operations. VMAQ incorporate the six intelligence cycle phases into their SIGINT methodology (see figure c. Processing and Exploitation 1-1). Products of the SIGINT cycle are disseminated to commanders and others through the SIGINT processing consists of converting and MAGTF intelligence officer. RadBn and VMAQ formatting raw signals data to a form that is us- also provide SIGINT products to other Service able in follow-on SIGINT and all-source intelli- and agencies as directed. gence analysis. The processing and exploitation phase is usually not a discrete function, but rather one that is accomplished during collection. Once a. Planning and Direction the collected information has been processed, SIGINT direction is a continuous process that en- analysis must determine its significance. Other in- compasses the tactical and technical employment telligence information may also be fused together of SIGINT assets. It begins on receipt of a warn- with the processed SIGINT to give a comprehen- ing order, initiating directive, or establishment of sive picture and to show how the information can a planning objective and continues until termina- be used by the commander to gain an advantage. tion of the mission. SIGINT unit commanders closely coordinate their operations with the MAGTF intelligence officer and pertinent exter- d. Production nal intelligence and SIGINT elements. The production stage involves converting the SIGINT analysis into appropriately tailored SIG- Planning and direction involves— INT reports and all-source intelligence product that can be easily understood by the commander and other users. Specifically formatted standard- Determining PIR and IR and SIGINT requirements to support them. ized messages, graphics, and other intelligence products are required to familiarize these user Preparing supporting SIGINT collection, with layout and content and to ensure rapid usage production, and dissemination plans. and automated processing of finished reports. Issuing orders and requests to SIGINT units. Within the MAGTF, the RadBn OCAC and the Checking continuously on the productivity VMAQ TERPES produce SIGINT reports and and effectiveness of SIGINT collectors, pro- products, and the MAGTF AFC incorporates 1-8 ______MCWP 2-22

SIGINT products and information into all-source Commanders are also responsible for planning intelligence products. integrating, and using SIGINT support, if available, from other United States or allied nationa e. Dissemination and military SIGINT organizations. The commander’s primary responsibilities fall into the fol- Dissemination is the process through which SIG- INT products are delivered to MAGTF users: the lowing areas. MAGTF commander, subordinate commanders and their staffs, and others as appropriate (e.g. a. Tasking and Directing joint force commander, joint components, and various theater and national organizations and in- The commander possessing SOTA is responsible telligence agencies). SIGINT products are dis- for the effective tasking and operation of assigned seminated via dedicated SIGINT or general SIGINT assets. Generally, once a commander de- purpose CIS channels according to available CIS termines the intelligence requirements, the G-2 resources, the classification of the product, and S-2, with the advice and assistance of the intelli- the intelligence dissemination plan. These prod- gence operations officer and SIGINT officer ucts include time-sensitive voice reports, text re- (SIO), decides which requirements can be satis- ports, data base updates, and web-based resources fied via organic SIGINT operations. SIGINT unit (e.g., via the MAGTF sensitive compartmented commanders or officers in charge (OICs) will also information local area network). coordinate operations with other key staff officers within the intelligence section (i.e., the collections f. Utilization manager, the AFC OIC, the surveillance and reconnaissance center OIC, and the dissemination SIGINT must be exploited to have value. Com- manager). The G-2/S-2 passes these IRs as task- manders, G-2/S-2s, G-3/S-3s, and other principal ings to the commanding officer (CO) or OIC o staff officers must continuously evaluate SIGINT the organic or attached SIGINT unit (e.g., a products for timeliness, usefulness, and overa RadBn unit). These requirements will be in the quality and provide feedback to the intelligence form of either PIRs or IRs. PIRs and IRs are fur- officer and SIGINT elements. ther managed within the intelligence effor through the use of intelligence collection requirements (ICRs), intelligence production require- 1011. Commanders’ ments (IPRs), and intelligence dissemination Responsibilities requirements (IDRs) in order to achieve effective, mutually supporting all-source intelligence opera- MAGTF commanders are responsible for the tions (see MCWP 2-1, chapter 3, for detailed in- planning and direction, collection, processing formation on IR management). The SIGINT unit production, dissemination, utilization, and securi- commander is then responsible for commanding ty of all SIGINT information by units under their and controlling resources to accomplish the as- command. The Director, National Security Agen- signed mission. This process is discussed further cy (DIRNSA), delegates SIGINT operational in chapter 7. tasking authority (SOTA) to MAGTF commanders by name for the duration of an operation o b. Reporting other specified period of time. SOTA allows the designated commander to task and direct the op- The ultimate goal of tactical SIGINT operations is erations of organic or attached SIGINT units. Ad- the timely and usable production of SIGINT in- ditional information regarding SOTA may be formation which answers the MAGTF command- found in USSID 4, Concept of SIGINT Support to er’s PIRs and other MAGTF IRs. SIGINT reports Military Commanders. are discussed in detail in chapter 7. Signals Intelligence ______1-9 c. Protecting needed during tactical operations or whenever a TSCIF is established. The MAGTF commander is responsible for safeguarding SIGINT personnel, facilities, and infor- (2) mation used or produced by units within the Sensitive compartmented information (SCI generally must be handled, processed, or stored command. Loss of SIGINT units and capabilities only in a SCI facility (SCIF). This may be either a by destruction or capture and unintended disclo- mobile tactical SCIF (TSCIF) or a permanent fa- sures of SIGINT operations may result in severe cility. SCI security requirements are discussed in losses of MAGTF capabilities. The effectiveness greater detail in chapter 8. of SIGINT depends on the ability to maintain security and conceal SIGINT techniques and suc- (3) Persons who handle or use SIGINT informa- cess from the adversary. Accordingly, the tion must have proper security clearances and be commander must provide adequate protection to indoctrinated for access to SCI and any additional prevent the capture of SIGINT facilities and per- required accesses. Access to SCI will be governed sonnel. In addition, special intelligence courier by need-to-know requirements. Unit commanders must be adequately protected, and positive mea- are responsible for determining who requires SCI sures must be taken to conceal courier runs and access. At a minimum, all unit staff principals and routes. To meet this responsibility, the MAGT key functional planners should have SCI access. commander must satisfy the following four basi security requirements. (4) SCI-secure CIS means for handling and trans- mitting special intelligence and SIGINT-related (1) A special security officer (SSO) must be ap- information must be available. These include SCI pointed in all units authorized to receive and use voice circuits, SCI record communications, SC SCI. The SSO is under the staff cognizance of the local area networks (LANs), and Joint Worldwide unit intelligence officer and is responsible for the Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). operation of the SCIF and the security, control, and use of SCI within the SCIF. Marine expedi- d. Training tionary force (MEF) CEs, Marine divisions, The MAGTF commander is responsible for en- Marine aircraft wings, force service support suring that staff and operating forces are trained groups, and other designated organizations have to effectively use SIGINT and to protect them- SSOs. Other SSOs may also be appointed as selves against enemy SIGINT efforts.

(reverse blank) Chapter 2

SIGINT Responsibilities in the Supporting Establishment

RadBns and VMAQs are the principal SIGINT Reviews the internal organization, training units within the operating forces. These units are requirements, and readiness of all SIGIN addressed further in chapters 4 and 5. To effec- elements of the Marine Corps. The internal tively execute their missions, MAGTFs, RadBns, organization of Marine Corps SIGINT ele- and VMAQs draw on a wide range of external or- ments is constantly reviewed, with particu- ganizations to provide personnel and equipmen lar emphasis on occupational field (OccFld) resources, training opportunities, and unique SIG- military occupational specialty (MOS) skill INT support. To understand how MAGTF SIG- requirements, to ensure requisite skills and INT operations can be supported externally, it is training are available to meet MAGTF oper- necessary to understand the missions and func- ational needs. tions of external SIGINT organizations and how they provide operational support to the MAGTF. b. Marine Support Battalion The Marine support battalion (MarSptBn) is a special supporting activity that provides for 2001. Marine Corps SIGINT Marine Corps participation in national and De- Organization partment of the Navy (DON) cryptologic activities. (SIGINT operations within the Navy are generally referred to as cryptologic operations a. Headquarters Marine Corps This term may generally be used synonymously Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) is responsi- with the term SIGINT.) Marines in MarSptBn are ble for the internal organization, training, equip- assigned to national and theater organizations that ping, and readiness of the Marine Corps; for the support both deployed and in-garrison MAGTFs operation of its material support system; and for with routine and time-sensitive, mission-critica the total performance of the Marine Corps. The SIGINT support. Additionally, these Marines Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, learn national-level SIGINT collection, produc- Communications, Computers, and Intelligence tion, and dissemination systems and benefit from Department (C4I), has the following SIGINT re- SIGINT skills training available only at these sponsibilities: sites.

Formulates Marine Corps SIGINT plans and (1) Commanding Officer. The principal func- policies and participates in the formulation tions and tasks assigned to the CO, MarSptBn, in- of joint and combined plans, policies, and clude the following: related command relationships.

Determines present and future SIGINT ac- Coordinate the withdrawal of MarSptBn tive and reserve personnel requirements, Marines to augment MAGTFs in response both quantitative and qualitative. to global-sourcing requests.

Provides final authority on validation and Support Marine Corps SIGINT require- approval of all personnel augmentation from ments through interface at the National Se- non-Fleet Marine Force (FMF) resources to curity Operations Center (NSOC) and support MAGTF operations. regional security operations centers 2-2 ______MCWP 2-22

(RSOCs). (Refer to paragraph 2003 for a de- letter companies are under the military command tailed discussion of these organizations.) and administrative control of the CO, MarSptBn, while under the OPCON and technical direction Manage and administer the reserve SIGINT program to provide augmentation to active of the CO of the NSGA site each supports. duty SIGINT forces.

Provide for entry-level skills qualification (4) Company K. Company K, MarSptBn, pro- and skills progression training of Marine vides administration for Marine students and staff SIGINT personnel. assigned to the Naval Technological Training Center (NTTC), Pensacola, Florida, and provides liaison and instructors in conjunction with SIG- (2) Battalion Headquarters. The battalion INT training. headquarters, collocated with Commander, Naval Security Group (CNSG), Fort Meade, Maryland, provides command, administrative, and Marine Corps-unique logistics support for the battalion 2002. SIGINT Organizations in and Marine Corps personnel in various Naval Se- curity Group (NSG). It is under the military com- Other Military Services mand and management control of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and un- Services man, train, and equip organic SIGIN der the staff cognizance of the Assistant Chief of forces to support their operational commander Staff, C4I, HQMC. and to prepare to participate in joint, theater, national, and combined operations. Each Service (3) Letter Companies. MarSptBn’s letter com- has a service cryptologic element (SCE) head- panies support the naval mission of the Naval Se- quarters that provides SIGINT management, curity Group Activity (NSGA) to which they are guidance, and oversight. The National Security assigned as well as provide for the unique service Agency (NSA) maintains SIGINT operational support of assigned Marines (see table 2-1). The control of each SCE.

Table 2-1. Marine Support Battalion Companies.

Company Site/Host Location Headquarters Company NSG Ft. Meade, Maryland Company A NSGA Denver Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Colorad Company B NSG Ft. Meade, Maryland Company D NSGA Ft. Gordon Ft. Gordon, Georgia Company E NSGA Misawa Misawa Air Force Base (AFB), Japan Company F1 NSGA Rota Rota, Spain Company G NSGA Menwith Hill Royal Air Force Menwith Hill, England Company H NSGA San Antonio Kelly AFB, San Antonio, Texas Company I NSGA Kunia Kunia, Hawaii Company K NTTC Corry Station Pensacola, Florida Company L NSGA Guantanamo Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 1Company F is scheduled for deactivation 30 June 1999. Signals Intelligence ______2-3 a. Naval Security Group (1) National Security Operations Center. NSG is the DON’s SCE. It directly supports de- The NSOC supports JTF and MAGTF operations ployed MAGTFs by providing access to— by providing SIGINT reporting derived from national assets. The NSOC functions as the current operations and crisis management center of the SSES use with MAGTF SIGINT personnel NSA to ensure that time-sensitive SIGINT needs while embarked. of commanders are satisfied. The NSOC works Direct support to MAGTF operations with closely with the National Military Command NSG elements operating aboard Navy ships Center (NMCC) and other Department of Defense or aircraft. (DOD) I&W watch centers. Direct service support to MAGTF operations from ashore NSG facilities in the the- (2) Regional Security Operations Centers. ater of operations. NSA established three RSOCs to enhance SIG- Hardware, software, specialized equipment, INT support to combatant commanders at all ech- and training to the RadBns. elons. RSOCs are regionally focused and receive SIGINT technical support kits from region- inputs from multiple sources. The RSOCs are lo- ally focused cryptologic shore support activ- cated at Fort Gordon, Georgia; San Antonio, ities. Texas; and Kunia, Hawaii. b. United States Army Intelligence and The following organizations are established at Security Command each RSOC: United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the Army’s SCE. It pro- NSG established a cryptologic shore support vides support to deployed MAGTFs when— activity (CSSA) staffed with Marine and Navy personnel at each RSOC. CSSAs provide direct support to naval tactical opera- Marines are part of a joint force that includes Army SIGINT units. tions through interface with the RSOC. This interface allows greater tailoring of RSOC Marines are serving as part of a larger force operations supporting the intelligence re- that includes adjacent Army units. quirements of MAGTF operations. Principal Army theater fixed-site activity or mobile communications connectivity to CSSAs i SIGINT asset can provide support. provided by Navy communications systems within SSES. c. Air Intelligence Agency INSCOM established a technical control Air Force Intelligence Agency (AIA) is the Ai and analysis element (TCAE) at each of the Force’s SCE. Its elements support deployed RSOC locations. CSSA Marine personne MAGTFs by collecting and producing air intelli- interface with TCAE personnel to provide gence or by providing SIGINT support for air and ground-oriented intelligence information in air defense operations. support of the MAGTF. Communication connectivity with the TCAEs is provided generally via the Trojan Spirit II communications system organic to the RadBns or 2003. National SIGINT communications battalions. Organizations b. National Reconnaissance Office a. National Security Agency The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) pro- In order to provide timely, effective SIGINT sup- vides critical support to United States SIGINT port to military commanders, NSA established operations. NRO’s mission is to enable United several tailored support mechanisms. States global information superiority during peace 2-4 ______MCWP 2-22 and war. NRO is responsible for unique and inno- complishes its mission through ongoing research vative technology, large-scale systems engineer- and development, acquisition, and operation o ing, development and acquisition, and operation spaceborne and airborne intelligence data collec- of space reconnaissance systems and related intel- tion systems. NRO assets and capabilities may be ligence activities to support global information requested to support MAGTF operations unde superiority. NRO’s capabilities include support- procedures described in the Joint Tactical Exploi- ing I&W, monitoring arms control agreements tation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual. and supporting military operations. The NRO ac- Chapter 3

SIGINT Responsibilities in the MAGTF

The MAGTF commander is ultimately responsi- 3002. MAGTF Staff Sections ble for the conduct of MAGTF SIGINT operations. The MAGTF commander’s staff, major subordinate commands (MSCs), specialized units, a. G-2/S-2 and theater or national level organizations assist All MAGTF intelligence and counterintelligence the commander in execution of SIGINT responsi- activities, to include SIGINT, are under the staff bilities. This chapter focuses on the roles and re- cognizance of the unit G-2/S-2. Within the sponsibilities of Marine operating forces’ staffs, bounds of the commander’s SOTA, the G-2/S-2 is MSCs, and specialized units. responsible for planning, directing, managing, and supervising the tasking and operations of SIGINT units organic to and supporting the 3001. Commanders, Marine MAGTF. The G-2/S-2— Corps Forces Develops and satisfies outstanding PIRs and IRs by planning, directing, integrating, and Commanders, Marine Corps forces (COMMAR- supervising organic SIGINT operations and FORs), are responsible for using their organic other MAGTF all-source intelligence opera- SIGINT assets effectively and for ensuring re- tions. sponsive national and theater support to subordinate commands. COMMARFORs— Prepares MAGTF SIGINT plans and orders. Coordinates SIGINT collection (to include Review and validate SIGINT support re- SIGINT amplifications and SIGINT time quests from subordinate commands and en- sensitive requirements), production, and dis- sure they receive the tailored support they semination requirements that are beyond the require. capability of the MAGTF and submits them to higher headquarters for JTF, theater, o Review and comment on cryptologic sup- national SIGINT support. port plans (CSPs) prepared by NSA and theater combatant commanders for MAGTF Ensures routine and time-sensitive SIGINT operation plans (OPLANs). information is rapidly processed, analyzed, and incorporated in all-source intelligence Coordinate SIGINT issues and requirements with the theater and national agencies in products, and rapidly disseminates this in- support of Marine Corps forces (MAR- formation to MAGTF and external units. FOR). Evaluates JTF, theater, and national SIGINT Coordinate with theater and national SIG- support to the MAGTF and adjusts stated re- INT and all-source intelligence agencies and quirements if necessary. organizations to support MARFORs. Identifies, validates, and assists with resolu- Review, exercise, and if necessary, develop, tion of SIGINT personnel and equipment re- interoperable CIS architectures to support sources deficiencies (e.g., insufficient the SIGINT effort. linguists and special signal analysts expertise). Coordinate between MARFOR and their subordinate commands to improve SIGINT Incorporates SIGINT in training exercises to interoperability, standardization, prepared- improve MAGTF individual, collective, and ness, and performance. unit readiness. 3-2 ______MCWP 2-22

b. G-1/S-1 Assists the unit security manager and G-3/ The manpower or personnel staff officer (G-1/ S-3 in promoting personnel awareness o S-1) is responsible for all SIGINT personnel re- enemy SIGINT threat capabilities, signals quirements. Often it is necessary to augment or- security training, and unit signals security ganic SIGINT units with specially-trained preparedness. personnel from outside the command. The G-1 S-1 either internally sources or forwards personnel augmentation requests developed by the G-2/ 3003. MAGTF Intelligence S-2 to higher headquarters for action. Section Elements c. G-3/S-3 The G-3/S-3 is responsible for planning, coordi- The MAGTF intelligence section, resident in the nating, and supervising the tactical employmen MAGTF CE, is the focal point for MAGTF SIG- of units. The G-3/S-3 coordinates the movement INT planning and direction and is supported by and operations of SIGINT units with the G-2/S- the combat intelligence center (CIC). Depending 2 for integration in current and future operations on the size of the MAGTF, operational require- planning. Because SIGINT units also provide cer- ments or other factors, the CIC may consist of a tain EW capabilities, the G-3/S-3, normally via number of subordinate elements. the electronic warfare officer (EWO), coordinates SIGINT units’ tactical positioning to provide tac- a. Combat Intelligence Center tical EW and command and control warfare (C2W) support. Normally, as the principal staf The CIC is established within the MAGTF CE. SIGINT user, the G-3/S-3 has the primary respon- Performing the primary functions of the MAGTF sibility for planning maneuver operations and fire intelligence section, the CIC includes the follow- support, which requires close coordination ing subelements. throughout the planning process to ensure effective SIGINT support. (1) All-Source Fusion Center The AFC is the primary MAGTF analysis and production d. G-4/S-4 element. It processes and produces all-source in- The logistics staff officer (G-4/S-4) is responsible telligence products in response to MAGTF re- for the combat service support (CSS) of MAGTF quirements. SIGINT units. To ensure the required support i available, the G-4/S-4 develops CSS arrange- (2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cen- ments to meet the needs of the deployed SIGINT ter. The surveillance and reconnaissance cente units (particularly SIGINT units’ unique equip- (SARC) is the primary element for the supervi- ment logistics requirements). sion of MAGTF collection operations. It directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence collections e. G-6/S-6 operations conducted by organic, attached, and The G-6/S-6 is responsible for providing and pro- direct support collection assets. tecting internal and external MAGTF CIS connectivity and operations. The G-6/S-6— (3) Operations Control and Analysis Cen- ter. The OCAC is the main node for the com- Coordinates or provides communication mand and control of RadBn SIGINT operation paths, network accesses, and frequencies for and the overall coordination of MAGTF SIGINT SIGINT organizations attached to and/or operations. It processes, analyzes, produces, and supporting the command. disseminates SIGINT-derived information and di- Provides representation for CIS matters rects the ground-based EW activities of the within the EWCC, when it is established. RadBn. Signals Intelligence ______3-3 b. Intelligence Section and SIGINT S-3 to coordinate the movement, operation, Unit Commanders and Officers in and reporting of SIGINT units.

Charge Coordinates with MAGTF AFC OIC, RadBn CO or OIC, and VMAQ TERPES (1) Intelligence Operations Officer. The in- OIC to coordinate MAGTF AFC analyst ex- telligence operations officer is responsible to the changes with RadBn TERPES COMINT G-2/S-2 for the overall planning and execution of and ELINT analysts and to coordinate the MAGTF all-source intelligence operations. The integration of SIGINT with all-source intel- intelligence operations officer— ligence production.

Coordinates with the dissemination officer Plans and implements a concept of intelli- to plan for the timely reporting of SIGINT- gence operations based upon the mission derived intelligence to MAGTF and external threat, commander’s intent, and concept of elements and the rapid handling of perish- operations. able SIGINT information.

Develops, consolidates, validates, and prior- Coordinates with the G-6/S-6, Marine divi- itizes recommended PIRs and IRs to support sion (MARDIV) OICs, Marine aircraft wing MAGTF planning and operations. (MAW) special security communications Plans, develops, and directs MAGTF intelli- teams (SSCTs), and SIGINT unit OICs to gence collections, production, and dissemi- plan and coordinate special intelligence nation plans, to include the effective communications paths and operations. employment and integration of MAGTF multidiscipline intelligence and reconnais- Assists the intelligence operations officer sance operations. with preparing and presenting special intelligence briefings and reports as required. Coordinates and integrates MAGTF intelligence operations with other components, JTF, theater, and national intelligence oper- (3) Special Security Officer. The SSO is re- ations. sponsible to the commander for ensuring the command’s adherence to SCI regulations and policies, Evaluates and improves MAGTF intelligence operations. security clearance procedures, and SCI materia handling. Generally, the SSO is the unit’s senior intelligence officer. The SSO— (2) SIGINT Officer. The SIO is responsible to the MAGTF G-2/S-2 for the planning, direction, and execution of MAGTF SIGINT operations. Establishes and/or maintains a SCIF or The SIO— TSCIFs to support SIGINT and other compartmented operations.

Coordinates with other intelligence section Ensures that the command and all subordi- staff officers, the RadBn CO or OIC, and the nate organizations have sufficient SCI bil- ACE G-2/S-2 (for VMAQ TERPES opera- lets to meet all potential operational tions) to prepare SIGINT plans and order requirements, to include the administration for the MAGTF. and management of unit SCI billets and SCI Coordinates with the collection manage- security investigations. ment officer and RadBn and VMAQ TERP- Provides oversight, training, and supporting ES planners to coordinate, plan, supervise, procedures for the conduct of SCI sanitiza- and assist SIGINT collection requirement tion and dissemination within the MAGTF. and taskings for MAGTF operations. This includes the determination of Coordinates with the SARC OIC, RadBn applicable authority for sanitization and au- CO or OIC, VMAQ TERPES OIC, and G-3/ thorized recipients of the sanitized material. 3-4 ______MCWP 2-22

(4) Collections Management Officer. The based upon all-source analysis, interpreta- collections management officer (CMO) is respon- tion, and integration. sible for formulating detailed ICRs and tasking and coordinating internal and external collection (6) Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cen- operations to satisfy the requirements. The CMO ter Officer in Charge. The SARC OIC is re- receives PIRs and IRs from the intelligence oper- sponsible for coordinating and supervising the ations officer and develops an integrated collec- execution of the integrated organic, attached and tion plan using organic and supporting resources. direct support intelligence collection, and reconnaissance operations. The SARC OIC— In coordination with the SIO and SIGINT unit COs or OICs, the CMO— Maintains the status of the following ongoing intelligence collection operations, to in- Determines and coordinates ICRs that may clude deployed RadBn collection and be tasked to organic or supporting SIGINT direction finding teams: elements. Mission of all teams. Identifies ICRs and prepares requests for in- Locations and times of all restricted fire telligence that are beyond organic capabili- areas and reconnaissance areas of opera- ties and that must be submitted to higher tions.

headquarters and external agencies for satis- Time and method of radio reconnaissance faction. team (RRT) insertion and extraction.

Primary and alternate communications (5) MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center Of- plans. ficer in Charge. The MAGTF AFC OIC is Time of last contact. primarily responsibile for managing and super- Time of next contact. vising the MAGTF’s all-source intelligence pro- Coordinates and monitors the insertion and duction and processing effort. The MAGTF AFC extraction of SIGINT and other intelligence OIC— elements. Coordinates RadBn and VMAQ TERPES Determines and coordinates MAGTF IPRs, elements’ collection and reporting activities to include SIGINT element products as well under the overall intelligence operations as all-source intelligence products. plan. Ensures SIGINT elements understand Maintains all-source automated intelligence the collection plan and are able to carry out data bases, files, workbooks, country stud- their responsibilities under the plan. ies, planning imagery, mapping and topo- Ensures other MAGTF C2 nodes (e.g., the graphic resources, and other references. current operations center, the fire support Administers, operates, and maintains intelli- coordination center) are apprised of ongoing gence processing and production systems intelligence and reconnaissance operations. both general service (GENSER) and SCI, Receives routine and time-sensitive intelli- e.g., joint deployable intelligence support gence reports from deployed SIGINT col- system (JDISS) and intelligence analysis lection teams; cross-cues or exchanges system (IAS). intelligence reports with other intelligence Analyzes and fuses all-source intelligence collectors, as appropriate; and rapidly dis- into tailored products in response to stated seminates intelligence to MAGTF C2 nodes or anticipated PIRs and IRs, to include sani- and others in accordance with intelligence tized SCI products. reporting criteria and dissemination plans. Develops and maintains current and future intelligence situational, threat and environ- (7) Dissemination Officer. The dissemination mental assessments, and target intelligence officer is responsible for the effective conduct of Signals Intelligence ______3-5

intelligence dissemination within the MAGTF. Advises the G-2/S-2, SIO, intelligence oper- The dissemination officer— ations officer, MAGTF AFC OIC, CMO, and dissemination officer on SIGINT em- Determines and coordinates MAGTF IDRs, ployment and its integration with JTF, the- to include all-source IDRs as well as intelli- ater, and national SIGINT operations. gence discipline-unique requirements. Recommends dissemination priorities. Advises on and selects dissemination means. 3004. Marine Divisions and Develops intelligence dissemination plans Aircraft Wings and coordinates with the G-6/S-6 supporting CIS architectures for both voice and data networked communications. Coordinates SIGINT activities of the MARDIVs and MAWs and integrates these plans and architectures come under the staff cognizance of the respective with theater, joint force, and MAGTF CIS G-2s. This includes the integration of SIGINT op- and intelligence plans and architectures. erations and products in support of unit operations Monitors the flow and ensures timely deliv- and the operations of their organic SSCT. SSCTs ery of intelligence throughout the MAGTF. provide special intelligence (SI) communications support to their commanders and designated sub- (8) SIGINT Unit Commanding Officer or ordinate elements. Officer in Charge. The SIGINT unit CO or OIC is responsible for the effective conduct o SIGINT operations in support of the command- 3005. Radio Battalions er’s intent and the operational and intelligence concept of operations. The SIGINT unit CO or OIC— The 1st and 2d RadBns are the Marine Corps’ principal organic, tactical, SIGINT direct support Plans and employs SIGINT resources in re- elements. The primary mission of the RadBn and sponse to the commander’s intent, threat sit- its detachments is to provide tactical SIGINT sup- uation, MAGTF G-2/S-2’s guidance a port to MAGTFs. RadBns are discussed further in direction, and intelligence operations plan. chapter 4. Effects technical direction and control of MAGTF organic SIGINT collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination operations. Also helps coor- 3006. VMAQs dinate MAGTF SIGINT operations with JTF, theater, national, and other Service VMAQs of Marine aircraft group (MAG)-14 per- SIGINT agencies. form airborne electronic reconnaissance and, Coordinates movement and operations of through the use of TERPES, produce ELINT re- SIGINT units with MAGTF staff element ports and electronic order of battle (EOB) intelli- and subordinate units’ commanders. En- gence. Due to the unique capabilities of TERPES, sures that all element movements are coor- the ACE will often be tasked with producing and dinated with the COC, fire support maintaining the EOB to be used by all MAGT coordination center (FSCC), and SARC. elements. VMAQs are discussed in chapter 5.

(reverse blank) CHAPTER 4

Radio Battalion

The mission of radio battalions is to provide com- Coordinates technical SIGINT requirements munications security (COMSEC) monitoring, tac- and exchanges SIGINT technical informa- tical SIGINT, EW, and SI communication support tion and material with national, theater, to the MAGTF. joint, and other SIGINT units. Provides intermediate, third- and fourth- echelon maintenance of RadBn SIGINT and 4001. Tasks EW equipment.

The radio battalion— 4002. Organization

Conducts interception, radio direction finding (DF), recording, and analysis of commu- The 1st RadBn, Marine Corps Base (MCB), nications and noncommunications signals Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is subordinate to Com- and SIGINT processing, analysis, produc- mander, Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (COM- tion, and reporting. MARFORPAC), and supports both I and III MEFs. The 2d RadBn, Camp Lejeune, North Conducts EW against enemy or other hostile communications. Carolina, is subordinate to II MEF. Both battalions are organized and equipped along functional Assists in the protection of MAGTF com- lines to provide administrative control of subordi- munications from enemy exploitation by nate elements, to facilitate training, and to permit conducting COMSEC monitoring, analysis, rapid structuring and operational deployment o and reporting on friendly force communica- task-organized units or detachments. tions. Provides SI communications support and cryptographic guard (personnel and terminal The 1st RadBn is organized into a headquarter equipment) in support of MAGTF command and service (H&S) company and three line com- elements and RadBn operations. (Normally, panies (A, B, and C). The 2d RadBn is comprised communications connectivity for SI com- of an H&S company and two line companies (A munications is provided by the communica- and B). See figure 4-1 on page 4-2. RadBns’ line tions unit supporting the MAGTF CE.) companies are not tactical organizations, but in- stead they serve as training and administrative Provides task-organized detachments to units providing the basic unit structure around MAGTFs with designated SIGINT, EW, SI which task-organized SIGINT support units o communications, and other required capa- detachments are trained, equipped, and formed bilities. Even if the entire RadBn were to deploy, it would Exercises technical control and direction task-organize for the mission assigned. over MAGTF RadBn SIGINT and EW operations. a. Headquarters and Service Provides RRT with specialized insertion and extraction capabilities (e.g., combat rubber Company raiding craft, fast rope, rappel, helocast, stat- The H&S company provides personnel and facili- ic line parachute) to provide specified SIG- ties with which the RadBn commander com- INT and EA support during advance force, mands and controls battalion operations. It also preassault, or deep postassault operations. provides service support for other battalion 4-2 ______MCWP 2-22

Figure 4-1. Radio Battalion Organization. elements. Those tasks are accomplished by H&S (3) Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. The ra- staff sections (i.e., S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, and S-6) and dio reconnaissance platoon (RRP) provides the following specialized platoons. trained RRTs for operations during advance force, preassault, or other operations where the employ- (1) Operations Control and Analysis Pla- ment of conventional RadBn teams may be inap- toon. The operations control and analysis (OCA) propriate or unfeasible. platoon provides the Marines and equipment to perform RadBn operational planning and direc- (4) Electronic Maintenance Platoon. The tion and SIGINT production, analysis, and report- electronic maintenance platoon provides up to ing operations. Additionally, it is the nucleus for fourth-echelon maintenance support on RadBn the RadBn OCAC during tactical operations. unique equipment and second-echelon support on Marine Corps common communications and elec- (2) Communications Platoon. The communi- tronics equipment. cations platoon provides Marines and equipment to conduct special security communications oper- (5) Mobile Electronic Warfare Support ations in support of RadBn and, when deployed, System Platoon. Using a light armored vehicle MAGTF CE operations. Additionally, the platoon (LAV) variant platform, the mobile electronic is equipped to support RadBn’s internal commu- warfare support system (MEWSS) platoon pro- nications requirements. vides Marines and equipment capable of SIGINT Signals Intelligence ______4-3

Figure 4-2. SIGINT Support Unit Elements. collection, DF, reporting, and communication erational requirements determine the composition jamming operations. and equipment of each element. b. Operational Companies (1) Command Element. The RadBn CO w Each RadBn operational company has a table of designate an OIC and/or a staff noncommissioned organization (T/O) of 5 officers and 100 enlisted officer in charge (SNCOIC) for each SSU. The Marines organized into a company headquarters, command element is comprised of the personnel EA platoon, voice collection and DF platoon, and and facilities to command and control the SSU nonvoice or ELINT collection platoon. During For smaller SSUs, the command element may be tactical operations, the company will be task- integrated within the operations control and anal- organized or reinforced with battalion assets con- ysis element with an OIC or an operations officer, sistent with the threat, mission, commander’s noncommissioned officer in charge or an opera- intent, and intelligence concept of operations. tions chief, and sufficient resources for command and control of the SSU operations. When the ma- jority of the battalion deploys, the command element consists of the battalion commander, 4003. Task Organization for executive officer, sergeant major, and sufficien MAGTF Operations SIGINT personnel for command and administrative sup- Support Unit port.

An entire RadBn will support a MEF operation (2) Operations Control and Analysis Ele- To support smaller MAGTFs, the RadBn’s tacti- ment. The SSU’s command and control, analy- cal organization is the task-organized SIGINT sis, production, and dissemination functions are support unit (SSU). The SSU may be as large as executed within the OCAC. The OCAC performs an operational company (minus or reinforced) or the SIGINT processing, analysis, exploitation, as small as a four-Marine team. The RadBn orga- production, and reporting of signals intelligence nization enables the rapid structuring and opera- products and information. Additionally, it is the tional deployment of task-organized SSUs. principle element that coordinates with other intelligence nodes to plan, direct, and integrate SIGINT operations with other intelligence and re- a. SIGINT Support Unit Structure connaissance operations. Marines assigned to this A fully structured SSU containing all the capabili- element include the operations watch officers or ties found in the RadBn is comprised of six basic operations watch chiefs, COMINT and ELIN elements (see figure 4-2). The nature of the threat, analysts, translators or transcribers, and SIGINT specific mission tasking, and intelligence and op- report writers. 4-4 ______MCWP 2-22

(3) Collection and Direction Finding Ele- quirements of the supported commander. The ment. The collection and DF element is com- SSU’s specific size and composition will also be prised of SIGINT support teams (SSTs) and other influenced by threat and environmental factors collection elements consisting of Marines and known or expected to be encountered in the in- equipment for conducting SSU SIGINT collec- tended area of operations. The following factors tion and DF operations. Personnel assigned to this must be considered when task-organizing an SSU. element include SIGINT linguists (or voice intercept operators), manual-Morse, non-Morse, and (1) Enemy Signals Environment. The prime ELINT collection and DF operators, and supervi- factor in determining the size, composition, and sory personnel. Additionally, this element may capabilities of an SSU is the known or anticipated contain MEWSS- or RRT-capable SSTs if the enemy signals environment. Enemy factors to mission or situation warrants. consider are—

(4) Electronic Attack Element. The EA ele- Target power output and frequency range. ment is comprised of the Marines and equipment Digital or analog signals. to conduct EA operations. Personnel assigned to Modulation techniques. this element include EA supervisors or controllers Target signal operating instructions (i.e., so- and EA operators. phisticated or complex). Target emitters (i.e., number, type, and den- (5) Special Intelligence Communications sity). Element. The SI communications element in- stalls and operates the SI or special security com- (2) Physical Environment. Terrain, climate, munications terminals for the SSU and the vegetation, and the operations area size influence MAGTF CE. In addition, the SI communications the size and composition of the SSU. element will install and operate SCI-level LAN systems to support SSU operations. The systems installed will depend on the mission, intelligence (3) Operational Environment. Among factors and CIS operations concepts, connectivity re- that must be considered are— quirements, and terminal equipment availability. Personnel assigned to this element include com- The military and political situation. munications supervisory personnel, information The adversary’s— systems security and system administrators, and Size. communications operators. Composition. Disposition. (6) Service Support Element. The service C2 and CIS operations. support element provides limited supply, engi- Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and proce- neers, electronic maintenance, and medical sup- dures. port to the SSU. The SSU depends on the The friendly force’s— MAGTF combat service support element (CSSE) Composition. for most of its combat service support. Marine assigned to the service support element may in- Commander’s intent. clude medical, electronic maintenance, motor Operational and intelligence concepts. transport, engineer, supply, and administrative Task organization. personnel. Mobility. b. SIGINT Support Unit c. SIGINT Support Unit Operations Task-Organizational Considerations Watch Structure SSUs are task-organized from resources available The SSU must be capable of sustained, 24-hou throughout the RadBn and are tailored to the re- operations. SSU elements, excepting the service Signals Intelligence ______4-5

support element, are normally employed in two or Time, place, level, and duration of the SSU three watch sections. In large SSUs, each watch support effort. section may have an officer and/or a staff non- Priority of the SSU supporting effort. commissioned officer (SNCO) assigned as an op- Command relationships and degree of au- erations watch officer (OWO) or operations watch thority granted to the supported commander. chief (OWC). In smaller SSUs, this function may be performed by a noncommissioned officer The two most common support relationships fo (NCO). SSUs are general and direct support.

(1) General Support General support (GS) is 4004. Command and Control action given to the MAGTF as a whole rather than to a particular subordinate element. Given the na- a. Command Relationships ture of SIGINT operations, GS is the most com mon support relationship used for SSU (1) Operational Control. The MAGTF com- operations. mander with SOTA has OPCON of RadBn, which is exercised by the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and executed (2) Direct Support. Direct support (DS) is a by the RadBn OIC. mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly (2) Administrative Control. Administrative the supported force’s requests for assistance. control (ADCON) of RadBn SSUs is exercised by When required by the mission and situation, ele- the unit to which the SSU is attached (in most cas- ments of a SSU may be placed in DS of MAGTF es the MAGTF CE). subordinate elements (e.g., elements of the SSU in DS of the GCE). (3) SIGINT Technical Control. SIGINT technical control (TECHCON) of United States SIG- INT system assets, to include RadBn SSUs, is 4005. Notional Concepts of always retained by DIRNSA who delegates SO- Employment and Task TA to MAGTF commanders. This means that within the MAGTF, the MAGTF commander Organizations with SOTA generally retains, coordinates, and exercises SIGINT TECHCON regardless of any The mission, enemy or other potentially hostile other C2 relationships established for the opera- elements, and operational environment will al- tion (e.g., RadBn elements attached to or placed ways influence the composition and employment in direct support of MAGTF subordinate ele- of SIGINT assets, as will logistics concerns such ments). as footprint or airlift availability. To serve as a planning departure point, RadBns have developed b. Support Relationships notional SSU packages and concepts of employment which will be refined as mission and adver- The MAGTF commander may establish variou sary details become known. (Appendix A, Radio support relationships between the SSU and Battalion SIGINT Support Unit Checklist, is pro- MAGTF subordinate elements when one organi- vided as an SSU operations planning guide.) The zation should aid, protect, complement, or sustain levels of RadBn support can range from electron- another unit. The nature of the support relation- ic collocation with the supported unit to an entire ship will be specified by a directive (e.g., annex B RadBn (minus or reinforced) deploying with a of the operations order) which should detail— MEF as indicated by the following examples. It is important to note that no specific RadBn SSU Forces and other resources allocated to the may ever match exactly the following notional subordinate element of the SSU. descriptions due to task organization, personnel or 4-6 ______MCWP 2-22 equipment availability, and mission and threat b. Fly-In Echelon considerations. The fly-in echelon (FIE) is integrated and task organized to provide immediate SIGINT, EW, a. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special and SI communications in support of lead ele- Operations Capable) SIGINT Support ments of a MAGTF or to reinforce MEU(SOC Unit SSU capabilities. The FIE serves as the founda- The SSU concept of employment is dependent on tion for the buildup of SIGINT assets as required. the Marine expeditionary unit’s (MEU) mission, Figure 4-3 illustrates a notional FIE configura- threat, and planned concept of operations. The tion. The FIE generally consists of 2 officers and SSU is attached to the CE and almost always is 18 to 30 enlisted Marines. Table 4-2 provides a employed in general support of the MEU (special typical FIE T/O. The FIE is under the operational operations capable [SOC]). control of the MAGTF commander who exercises SOTA. Initial operations will be in general support of MAGTF requirements. As the situation Generally, MEU(SOC) SSUs consist of 1 officer matures and the mission and associated tasks be- as the OIC, possibly another officer as the assis- come clearer, the task organization and command tant OIC, and 20 or more enlisted Marines (to nor- relationships of the FIE or SSU elements may be mally include at least one RRT). Table 4-1 modified to provide direct support to designated provides a notional MEU(SOC) SSU T/O. major subordinate elements (MSEs).

Figure 4-3. Notional SSU Fly-In Echelon Configuration. Signals Intelligence ______4-7

Table 4-1. Notional MEU(SOC) SSU T/O. Table 4-2. Notional Fly-In Echelon T/O.

Billet Rank MOS Billet Rank MOS H&S Support Elemen H&S Support Elemen OIC Capt 0202/0206 OIC Capt 0202/0206 Assistant OIC Lt 0206 SNCOIC MSgt 2691 SNCOIC GySgt 2621/2629 Electronic maintenance Sgt 2841 Electronic maintenance Cpl 2841 technicia technicia SI Communications Element SI CIS chief Sgt 2651 Communications chief SSgt 2651 LAV mechanic LCpl- 2147 Trojan Spirit operator1 Sgt 2651 Sgt Trojan Spirit operator LCpl 2651 OCA Element Communications operator Cpl 2651 Processing and reporting SSgt 2621/2629 Communications operator LCpl 2651 chief ELINT analyst Sgt 2631 OCA Elemen Signals analyst Sgt 2621/2629 Operations officer Lt 0206 Collection/DF Team #1 (MEWSS capable) Senior analyst GySgt 267X/2629 Analyst SSgt 2621/2629 Team leader SSgt 2621/2629 Analyst Sgt 2621/2629 Linguist or voice intercept Sgt 267X operator Signals chief SSgt 2621/2629 Linguist or voice intercept Cpl 267X Signals analyst Sgt 2621 operator Signals analyst Cpl 2621 Manual morse or DF LCpl 2621 ELINT analyst Sgt 2631 operator ELINT analyst LCpl 2631 EA operator LCpl 2621 Collection/DF Element Collection/DF Team #2 (Helo capable) Team leader SSgt 2621/2629 Team leader Sgt 2621/2629 Linguist or voice intercept Sgt 267X Linguist or voice intercept Cpl 267X operator operator Linguist or voice intercept Cpl 267X Linguist or voice intercept LCpl 267X operator operator Collection or DF operator Cpl 2621 Collection or DF operator LCpl 2621 12nd RadBn does not have Trojan Spirit Collection/DF Team #3 (RRT capable Team leader SSgt 2621/2629 c. Marine Expeditionary Force Assistant team leader Sgt 267X Support Linguist or voice intercept Cpl 267X operator For detailed SIGINT support information regarding a specific MEF operation, refer to the CSP Linguist or voice intercept LCpl 267X operator and annex B of the OPLAN for that operation The following is a discussion of RadBn support of Collection or DF operator Cpl 2621 a notional MEF operation. Collection or DF operator LCpl 2621 4-8 ______MCWP 2-22

(1) Concept of Operations A MEF-level op- The CCE— eration is supported by the RadBn (minus or reinforced. It could be minus because prior committed Provides I&W support to the supported RadBn assets, such as MEU SSUs, were unavail- commanders. able. It could be reinforced because some level of Coordinates location, operations, and sup- personnel or equipment augmentation from the port of SSTs with supported units and other other RadBn, MarSptBn, and/or Marine Corps forward-deployed intelligence and recon- units might be required. naissance units. Serves as the C2, communications, and (2) Concept of Employment. The RadBn SIGINT-tasking channel between the task-organizes and employs its companies and OCAC and forward-deployed SST as re- teams to best support the MEF by— quired. Provides company liaison teams (CLTs) to Deploying collection or DF teams for im- adjacent and subordinate units as required. proved target signals access and operational Provides or arranges for SST administra- support to forward MAGTF units. tion, logistic, and physical security support. Collocating RadBn’s C2 node with the Provides SIGINT tasking and direction of MAGTF G-2/S-2’s CIC and operating with- SSTs when the OCAC is unable to provide in the integrated intelligence concept of op- tasking and direction. erations in GS of the MAGTF. Focusing on tasked PIRs and IRs and pro- d. Radio Reconnaissance Teams viding required support to all six intelli- RRTs are six-Marine teams trained in special in- gence functions. sert or extract means and basic amphibious recon- Disseminating time-sensitive SIGINT prod- naissance capabilities. This additional training ucts to subordinate MAGTF units when re- makes the RRT capable of advance force, preas- quired by the tactical situation. sault, deep postassault, and maritime special purpose force (MSPF) SIGINT missions as assigned. Providing OCAC liaison teams (OLTs) to the lead elements of the MEF, its MSEs and RRTs support the six intelligence functions. Ad- adjacent units as required; and providing ditionally, they may be tasked to conduct SIGINT signals search and data base development in order SIGINT support elements (SSEs) and SSTs to enhance understanding of threat operations pri- with mobile MAGTF units. or to the arrival of other SSU forces. In an ad- Providing security and CIS for all internal vance force role, RRTs may be employed to— RadBn requirements and for specified MAGTF CE support. Provide SIGINT-derived I&W intelligence Integrating operations with other MAGTF support to advance forces. intelligence units to support cueing of other Provide SIGINT collection and reporting in intelligence and reconnaissance collection areas not accessible to conventional SSTs. elements, all-source intelligence production, Provide SIGINT collection and reporting in and other mutual support. support of assault and landing forces. Provide collection of unique signals. Unique (3) Company Command Element. One of the signals are signals expected to have keys to effective MEF support is the placemen intelligence value that cannot be collected and use of the company command elements by other reasonable means (e.g., low-pow- (CCEs). The CCEs are normally collocated with ered UHF communications). the GCE or MAGTF-subordinate task force head- Conduct threat signals search and data base quarters depending on the mission and threat. development. Signals Intelligence ______4-9 e. Mobile Electronic Warfare Support C2 support and CIS connectivity for tactical SIG- System SIGINT Support Team INT planning, production, and reporting with the The principal advantage of a MEWSS SST is its MAGTF G-2/S-2 and RadBn OCAC. OLTs expe- high mobility, light armored protection, allowing dite, simplify, and coordinate the sharing of SIG- it to maintain operations and provide direct sup- INT I&W, technical data, taskings, and products. port of similarly equipped ground combat element Normally, the OLT monitors RadBn collection units. The employment of MEWSS vehicles re- teams and theater SIGINT reporting communica- quires close coordination with both the G-2/S-2 tions to provide the supported unit access to tacti- and G-3/S-3 as the MEWSS provides the only cal and operational-level SIGINT and I&W ground-based ELINT collection and the major intelligence. In most cases, an OLT will consists ground-based communications EA capabilities or- of at least one officer and three enlisted Marines ganic to the MAGTF. The COMINT capabilities with supporting CIS equipment. of the MEWSS are similar to that of any SST. h. Company Liaison Team f. Aviation SIGINT Support Team A CLT is task-organized with available assets to The aviation SSTs capabilities are similar to those best satisfy the requirements of the organization of other SSTs. Its principal advantage is the abili- or unit to which it is assigned (e.g., an infantry ty to operate aboard Marine aviation platforms battalion). This assignment is normally for a spe- (e.g., helicopters). Aviation SSTs can provide cific duration or operational phase. In most cases, SIGINT support to air and airborne units during a CLT will consist of one SNCO and one to three missions such as deep raids and tactical recovery additional enlisted Marines. Like the OLT, the of aircraft and personnel operations or when the CLT expedites SIGINT I&W to local decision- MAGTF commander needs immediate I&W ac- makers and assists with SST employment, task- cessible only by airborne SIGINT collection ele- ing, and support. ments. The use of airborne SIGINT operation provides supporting SSTs with the ability to col- i. Augmentation and Composition lect and exploit threat signals from extended rang- Due to the low density of many SIGINT skills and es. The basic aviation SST is task-organized equipment and the high tempo of operations, the consistent with the mission and supported force’s RadBns may lack sufficient personnel with the requirements. Generally, an aviation SST consists requisite skills or SIGINT equipment with the of RadBn Marines with a COMINT receiver, in- necessary capabilities for a particular operation telligence broadcast receiver, communications RadBns are reinforced with personnel and SIG- jammer, and UHF satellite communications radio. INT equipment by augmenting and compositing. g. Operations Control and Analysis For a small number of personnel requirements, in- Center Liaison Team dividual augmentation often works best. With An OLT supports the intelligence effort of concurrence from the supported organization, the MAGTF subordinate elements (e.g., ACE or RadBn will forward a request for SIGINT person- CSSE headquarters or rear area operations cen- nel augmentation to CMC (C4I or CIS) via the ter). OLTs collocate with the G-2/S-2 of the sup- COMMARFOR (G-1/G-2). Once the request is ported unit operating from within its TSCIF. The received at CMC, it will be validated and for- OLT is task-organized out of available SSU assets warded to CNSG and MarSptBn. MarSptBn will in tactical support of the organization to which it attempt to satisfy the request with active and/o is assigned. This assignment could be for a specif- reserve Marines from the battalion. Any portion ic operation, phase, or for the duration of a con- of the request that MarSptBn can not satisfy will flict. Primarily, OLTs provide additional SIGINT be returned to CMC (C4I/CIS) for sourcing from other Marine Corps units or other sources. 4-10 ______MCWP 2-22

For significant numbers of personnel and equip- the development of contingency plans (CON- ment in support of a large operation or major re- PLANs), OPLANs, and CSPs to ensure mutual gional contingency, elements may be composited understanding and validation of requirements and from one RadBn with the other RadBn. Coordina- information (e.g., time-phased force deployment tion between the RadBns should be continuous in data). Chapter 5

Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons

Marine aviation performs six functions: offensive updating and maintaining enemy EOB. This air support (OAS), antiair warfare (AAW), assault is accomplished through the intelligence and support, aerial reconnaissance, EW, and C2 of air- electronic warfare division, TERPES, and craft and missiles. VMAQs provide the MAGTF the tactical EA-6B mission planning system and other designated forces with EW support. The (TEAMS) sections to support premission VMAQ also has an inherent capability to perform planning and postmission processing of col- visual and electronic air reconnaissance. Electron- lected data and production of pertinent intel- ic reconnaissance is the detection, identification, ligence reports. Working in concert with the evaluation, and location of foreign electromagnet- intelligence section, TERPES and TEAMS ic radiation to provide EOB information. This sections provide required ELINT and EOB chapter will focus on the VMAQ electronic re- intelligence products to the ACE and connaissance and ELINT capabilities. MAGTF. Providing liaison personnel to ACE and MAGTF CE staffs to assist in VMAQ em- 5001. Mission and Tasks ployment planning. Inherent in this task i the requirement to provide an air EW liaison officer to the MAGTF EWCC. VMAQs provide EW (principally EA) and ELINT support to the MAGTF and other desig- Conducting EA operations for EP training nated forces. When deployed, the VMAQ is under of MAGTF units. the operational and administrative control of the Intercepting, recording, and jamming threat ACE commander. To support the MAGTF, the communications and noncommunication VMAQ conducts tactical jamming to prevent, de- emitters. lay, or interrupt detection and tracking by enemy early warning, acquisition, fire or missile control, counterbattery, and battlefield surveillance radars. 5002. Organization and Concept Tactical jamming also denies and/or degrades en- of Employment emy communications capabilities. There are four VMAQs (designated VMAQ-1 In addition, the VMAQ conducts electronic re- through VMAQ-4) assigned to MAG-14, 2d connaissance and ELINT operations to maintain MAW, Cherry Point, North Carolina. Each squad- EOB, to include both selected emitter parameters ron has five EA-6B Prowler aircraft and is orga- and location of nonfriendly emitters. VMAQs al- nized into administrative, intelligence and so provide threat warnings for friendly aircraft, electronic warfare, operations, logistics, safety ships, and ground units. and standardization, and maintenance divisions See figures 5-1 and 5-2 on page 5-2. Key VMAQ tasks include— EA-6B aircraft conduct EA, ELINT, and elec- Providing aerial EA and ES support to ACE tronic reconnaissance operations in support of and other designated operations. ACE and other MAGTF missions. The TERPES Processing, analyzing, and producing rou- section functions as a key element of the tine and time-sensitive ELINT reports fo MAGTF’s intelligence operations. TERPES is an 5-2 ______MCWP 2-22

Figure 5-1. EA-6B Prowler air-transportable, land-mobile intelligence proces- 5003. EA-6B Prowler sing and production system organic to VMAQ and is used to develop, maintain, and distribute tactical EOB and ELINT reports. TERPES func- The EA-6B Prowler is a subsonic, all-weather, tions as an automated tactical data system capable carrier-capable aircraft. The crew is composed of of producing current and future intelligence one pilot and three electronic countermeasure through information storage and retrieval, data re- officers. The Prowler’s primary missions include cording, data base management, and data compar- collecting and processing designated threat SO ison. TERPES has a stand-alone capability but is for jamming and subsequent processing, analysis, utilized by VMAQs to optimize signals analysi and intelligence reporting; and employing the and reporting to support MAGTF operations. Fig- AGM-88 high-speed antiradiation missile ure 5-3 provides an overview of VMAQ and (HARM) against designated targets. The AN/ TERPES operations. ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System effectively

Figure 5-2. VMAQ Organization. Signals Intelligence ______5-3

Figure 5-3. VMAQ and TERPES Operations. incorporates receivers and external pods for sig- disrupt threat communications in either of the fol- nals reception and transmission of jamming sig- lowing two modes of operation: nals (principally those associated with threat air defense radars and associated C2). EA which scans the electromagnetic environment to intercept and jam targeted sig- In addition to the AN/ALQ-99, the EA-6B also nals of interest (SOIs). employs the USQ-113 Communications Suite ES which scans the electromagnetic environ- which provides the ability to collect, record, and ment to intercept and digitally record SOIs. 5-4 ______MCWP 2-22

5004. Tactical EA-6B Mission posed of Marines, equipment, software, and sup- Planning System porting procedures integrated to—

TEAMS is designed to assist EA-6B aircrew with Identify and locate enemy radar emitters planning allocation and optimization of receivers, from data collected by EA-6B aircraft o jammers, HARM, and other integrated weapon those received from other intelligence systems into a comprehensive C2W package. Ba- sources. sic intelligence data is provided by various Process and disseminate EW data rapidly to MAGTF theater and other intelligence and analy- MAGTF intelligence centers. sis centers. Parametric data for friendly and ad- Provide mission planning and briefing sup- versary platforms, weapons systems, and emitters port to VMAQ EA and ES operations. is provided by the electronic warfare data base system (EWDS) on a quarterly basis and near-re- The standard TERPES configuration consists o al-time updates may be provided through tactical one 8- by 8- by 20-foot shelter and two skid- receive equipment (TRE) integrated by the TER- mounted environmental control units (ECUs). Po- PES section into the TEAMS workstation. World sitioned on and around the shelters are a TRE maps, terrain data, and digitized navigation charts antenna, an HF antenna, and two mast-mounted are provided by the National Imagery and Map- UHF antennas. These modules can be tailored to ping Agency (NIMA) on a quarterly basis. specific mission requirements. Electrical powe support for TERPES must be obtained from the TEAMS allows the operator to— Marine wing support squadron.

Maintain area of operations emitter listings. The TERPES is operated by one MOS 2602 SIG- Edit emitter parameters. INT/EW warrant officer and six MOS 2631 TER- PES operators/analysts. Maintenance support i Develop mission-specific geographic data and EOB. provided by one MOS 9966 TSQ-90 maintenance officer and four MOS 2821 TSQ-90 technicians. Perform postflight mission analysis to— Identify electronic emitters using various a. Operational Capabilities electronic parameter data bases and ELINT analytical techniques. The TERPES will—

Locate emitters by coordinates with a cer- tain circular error of probability for each Translate rapidly the machine-readable, air- site. borne-collected digital data into man- and

Correlate new information with existing machine-readable reports (i.e., paper, mag- data. netic tape, secure voice, plots, and over- Accomplish mission planning in support of lays). coordinated strikes and EA-6B optimiza- Receive and process EA-6B mission tapes. tion. Accept, correlate, and identify electronic emitters data from semiautomatic or automatic collection systems using various elec- 5005. TERPES tronic parameter data bases and ELINT analytical techniques. TERPES (AN/TSQ-90) is an air- and land-trans- Locate emitters by coordinates with a cer- portable, single-shelter ELINT processing and tain circular error of probability for each correlation system. The TERPES team is com- site. Signals Intelligence ______5-5

Provide EA-6B EWOs with tactical intelli- Naval intelligence data base (NID) contains gence briefings to support EA and ES mis- characteristics and performance data for sions. (The official title for EWO is weapons, sensors, and platforms. electronic countermeasures officer [EC- EWDS is similar to the NID and provides MO]. EWO is used to accurately reflect the EA-6B tailored data. scope of MOS 7588 activities and EW ter- ELINT parameters list (EPL) is NSA’s ob- minology changes.) served radar parametric data. Provide tactical jamming analysis. Electronic warfare integrated reprogram- Ensure tactical intelligence data base main- ming (EWIR) is produced by the United tenance for the VMAQ and the EOB for the States Air Force Foreign Technology Divi- MAGTF. sion. EWIR combines assessed technical radar parameters from the United States Air b. Mapping Package Force EW Science and Technology data The TERPES mapping and overlay package is base with the observed parameters of the based on NIMA products which have been inte- NSA data base. grated into a software program called the De- Joint spectrum center (JSC) is used to derive lorme mapping system. This system allows friendly EOB and radar parametric data. TERPES operators to display mapping data that is loaded to the TERPES system at scales ranging e. TERPES Fusion Processor from worldwide scale down to the 1:5,000 scale. The TERPES fusion processor (TFP) processe A wide range of tools such as zoom, projection intelligence data from tactical ELINT (TA- magnification, perspective, linear, and spatial CELINT) reports, tactical reports (TACREPs), analysis allow operators to manipulate mapping and IMINT reports. The TFP provides filtering, data to enhance understanding of the overlaid characteristic and performance identification, or- threat information. der of battle (OOB) identification, technical analysis, multisource correlation, and candidate c. Intelligence Analysis updates. The TFP presents the information in var- The TERPES Intelligence Analysis Application ious forms for analysis. One TFP integrated infor- (IAA) enables the operator to analyze ELINT data mation source is the TRE and Related combined with additional modernized integrated Applications (TRAP) broadcast. This broadcast is data base (MIDB) intelligence data to— accessed using the TRE and provides near-real- time (NRT), national-level reports to the TERP- ES. The TRAP broadcast also assists the TFP in Respond to requests for intelligence (RFIs). maintaining an ELINT parameter data base to Prepare intelligence data base updates. track airborne, shipboard, and land-based targets Analyze threat and tactical situations. as a tool to develop EOBs and as an instrument to Estimate changes in the threat’s tactical situ- perform comparative studies on radar parameters. ation. f. TERPES ELINT Preprocessor d. Data Fusion The TERPES ELINT preprocessor (TEPP) proc- MIDB is the primary intelligence data base for esses all EA-6B SOI collected from recorder o IAA operator queries. In addition to EA-6B air- reproducer set tape or disk files. Specifically, the craft mission tapes, other inputs required to maxi- application allows for the NRT analysis of techni- mize the support provided to tactical intelligence cal ELINT data. Position reports and specific unit operations include the following: identification and location information are used to 5-6 ______MCWP 2-22 update the TERPES data base and to prepare TA- Other report forms include the following: CELINT reports. TERPES also provides tactical jamming system (TJS) analysis for the EA-6B air- TACREP provides information on immedi- crew and maintenance personnel. ate threat activity. ELINT summary report provides a summary TJS analysis consists of recovering recorded data of ELINT activity over established periods for verifying jammer calibration, on- and off-jam- (normally 24 hours). Refer to USSID 200 mer times, and frequency and azimuth coverage. Technical SIGINT Reporting, for format and TERPES will use mission data in the generation content. of EW mission summary reports. ELINT technical report provides for analyst exchange of information of parametric data. g. Intelligence Reporting Refer to USSID 341, Technical ELINT Re- porting, for format and content. The primary intelligence output from TERPES operations is mission reports. Mission reports are Over the horizon (OTH) “GOLD” report available in many forms and are provided prima- provides information derived from contac rily to MAGTF intelligence elements in response reports of ELINT parametrics. to established intelligence requirements. The most Order of battle report (OBREP) provides or- commonly used reporting form is the TACELINT der of battle information such as basic ency- (refer to USSID 340, Tactical ELINT Reporting, clopedia (BE) number, equipment, and for format and content). location. Chapter 6

Communications and Information Systems

The area of SIGINT operations currently under- systems resources pertinent to MAGTF SIGIN going substantial change is SIGINT CIS techno- operations. Also, see MCWP 6-22, Communica- logical advances and architectures development. tions and Information Systems, for a detailed re- SIGINT architectures are changing from the use view of MAGTF CIS and supporting tactics, of separate, secure, 24-hour manned communica- techniques, and procedures. tions centers with dedicated, bulk-encrypted links to the use of multilevel information system security initiative (MISSI) capabilities over unsecured 6001. Basic MAGTF SIGINT CIS commercial or DOD networks via the Defens Message System (DMS). Adding the proliferation Requirements of SIGINT collection, processing, and production systems and centers along with other intelligence a. Capability to Command and Control and operations systems and centers that must dis- Subordinate Units seminate and share SIGINT and communicate MAGTF SIGINT units must be capable of posi- digitally creates a very dynamic situation. tive C2 of subordinate units and integration of its operations with broader MAGTF and external in- The SIGINT effort depends heavily on a secure, telligence and operations C2. Traditionally, reliable, and fast CIS architecture to receive SIG- single-channel radio (SCR) and record message INT and all-source intelligence products and to traffic have been used to support C2 of SIGIN pass collected data and SIGINT products and units. In semistatic situations, secure electronic technical reports to the MAGTF and other users. mail or the telephone may be the method of Communications and information systems are al- choice, while in highly fluid or mobile scenarios, so required for the C2 of SIGINT units and their cellular telephones, satellite communications integration with multidiscipline intelligence oper- (SATCOM), VHF, or HF radio may be used. ations. Every mission and situation is unique, requiring some modifications to the CIS architecture supporting MAGTF SIGINT opera- b. Ability to Receive and Transmit tions. Detailed planning and close coordination Collected Data and Information from among the SIGINT units’ CO or OICs, the Collection and DF Elements MAGTF G-2/S-2 and G-6/S-6, and pertinent op- The SIGINT architecture must provide connectiv- erational and intelligence organizations is critical ity among organic and supporting SIGINT collec- to establishing reliable and effective SIGINT ar- tion or DF teams, SIGINT analysis and chitecture. production centers, and supported MAGTF operations and intelligence centers. Requirements in- See appendix B, Marine Corps SIGINT Equip- clude the capability to receive and transmit ment, of this publication for additional informa- collection files and reports digitally via fiber, tion on select communications and information wire, or radio (voice and data) in formats that are 6-2 ______MCWP 2-22 readily usable by the SIGINT and all-source intel- tions and intentions. This I&W intelligence is dis- ligence analysts. seminated by a variety of means to include voice, record messages, tactical reports, electronic mail, c. Ability to Provide Intelligence to the and intelligence broadcasts. Having the capability Supported Commander to receive the information, recognizing the I&W intelligence as such, and possessing a method to The required SIGINT architecture must support disseminate this I&W intelligence to the affected the commander’s intent, concepts of operation units and decisionmakers are key to satisfying this and intelligence, command relationships, and requirement. standing PIRs and IRs. The SIGINT CIS architecture must be capable of integrating SSU SCI- secure channels and C2 operations with the f. Ability to Receive SIGINT primary GENSER channels used by supported Broadcasts commanders throughout the MAGTF. For several years MAGTFs have possessed intelligence broadcast receivers capable of accessing d. Ability to Share SIGINT Products select SIGINT broadcasts. The broadcast receiv- and Technical Reports ers currently being fielded and under development will allow MAGTFs to receive multiple The SIGINT architecture must provide the means channels of JTF, fleet, theater, and national to share products and reports with MAGTF all- intelligence broadcast data. This data includes all- source intelligence centers and with SIGINT and source intelligence and SIGINT on enemy opera- all-source JTF, other components, theater, and tions as well as friendly positional and other national intelligence centers. The traditional information. Effective planning, design, and inte- means for providing this capability are the SCI gration of SCI and GENSER CIS and proper in- secure defense special security communication formation management filtering, correlating, and system (DSSCS) for record communications and tailoring prior to dissemination or display provide operator’s communications (OPSCOM) circuit timely SIGINT reporting to supported command- for SIGINT analyst-to-analyst exchanges and ers while preventing information overload. coordination. These means are rapidly being replaced by— 6002. Notional MAGTF SIGINT JWICS which provides interoperability of intelligence systems, access to intelligence Operational Architectures data bases, and direct analyst-to-analyst exchange. a. MEF National Security Agency Network (NSA- Figure 6-1 depicts a notional SIGINT operational NET) which provides access to national- architecture for a fully deployed MEF. It shows a level SIGINT reports and data bases and full complement of organic and supporting JTF electronic mail connectivity for SIGINT other service components, theater, and nationa analyst-to-analyst exchanges and intelli- SIGINT capabilities. gence requests. Key architectural concepts include the following: e. Ability to Receive and Disseminate SIGINT Indications and Warnings SIGINT operations planning and manage- A significant strength of SIGINT is its ability t ment are centralized within the MAGTF provide time-sensitive I&W of the adversary’s ac- G-2/S-2. Signals Intelligence ______6-3

Figure 6-1. Notional MEF SIGINT Operational Architecture.

RadBn OCAC is collocated with the G-2/ VMAQ TERPES is collocated with ACE S-2 CIC and operates in general support of headquarters and principally supports ACE the MAGTF, with collection or DF teams operations. collocated with forward-deployed MAGTF MAGTF CIC, RadBn OCAC, and TERPES units. maintain connectivity with appropriate 6-4 ______MCWP 2-22

external intelligence and SIGINT organiza- SIGINT operations planning and manage- tions. ment remain centralized within the MAGTF G-2/S-2, which is not yet within the area of b. MEF Lead Echelon operations. Figure 6-2 shows a notional operational architec- RadBn fly-in echelon is collocated with lead ture in support of the MEF lead echelon during its elements of the MAGTF G-2, with organi initial deployment and employment phases. SIG- teams operating in GS of deployed ele- INT operations focus on the MEF as it deploys in- ments. RadBn OCAC is collocated with the to the area of operations and builds its combat G-2/S-2 CIC. power. VMAQ TERPES is collocated with ACE headquarters and principally supports ACE Key architectural concepts include the following: operations.

Figure 6-2. Notional MEF Lead Echelon SIGINT Operational Architecture. Signals Intelligence ______6-5

MAGTF CIC, RadBn OCAC, and TERPES Key architectural concepts include the following: maintain connectivity with appropriate external intelligence and SIGINT organiza- SIGINT operations planning and manage- tions. ment are centralized in the MEU(SOC) S-2. RadBn SSU OCAC operates out of the c. MEU(SOC) CE Afloat SSES collocated with the S-2 CIC within Figure 6-3 shows a notional operational architec- the amphibious task force intelligence cen- ture in support of a MEU(SOC) afloat. During ter (ATFIC). RadBn operates in general such operations, MEU and ATF SIGINT capabili- support of the MAGTF. Depending on the ties and organizations generally collocate within mission, RadBn collection and DF elements the same afloat facilities (e.g., SSESs) integrate may operate in either general support of the and share some systems operations. A critical MAGTF or direct support of elements oper- component of this architecture is satisfactor ating ashore. voice and data ship-to-shore SCI communications MAGTF CIC and RadBn OCAC maintain between the MEU(SOC) command element and connectivity with appropriate external intel- ashore SIGINT elements. ligence and SIGINT organizations.

Figure 6-3. MEU(SOC) CE Afloat SIGINT Operational Architecture. 6-6 ______MCWP 2-22 d. MEU(SOC) CE Ashore The MAGTF RadBn SSU OCAC is collo- Figure 6-4 depicts a notional operational architec- cated ashore with the S-2 CIC. Other SSU ture in support of a shore-based MEU(SOC) CE. elements provide continued support from The MEU(SOC) requires ship-to-shore SCI com- the amphibious task force intelligence cen- munications connectivity to continue exploiting ter SSES. external SIGINT capabilities and resources while RadBn SSU normally will operate in GS of minimizing the CIS and logistic footprints ashore. the MAGTF. MAGTF CIC and RadBn OCAC principal Key architectural concepts include the following: connectivity with appropriate external intelligence and SIGINT organizations is via the SIGINT operations planning and C2 remain amphibious task force intelligence center centralized within the MEU(SOC) S-2. SSES.

Figure 6-4. MEU(SOC) CE Ashore SIGINT Operational Architecture. Signals Intelligence ______6-7

6003. Planning Consideration Provide time-sensitive I&W and non- codeword (NCW) SIGINT reporting. The following are key CIS requirements and plan- Coordinate with maneuver forces. ning considerations in support of MAGTF SIG- Support targeting. INT operations. Support force protection. Coordinate SIGINT CIS and dissemination Add the MAGTF CE, RadBn SSU, VMAQ operations and procedures with allied and TERPES, and other MAGTF elements to coalition forces. appropriate addressee indicator groups Coordinate SCI and SIGINT CIS activation (AIGs) to receive pertinent JTF, theater, and and restoration priorities and procedures. national intelligence and SIGINT products. Determine unique COMSEC material sys- Obtain and activate SCI plain language ad- tem (CMS) requirements for SIGINT and dresses for MAGTF CE, RadBn SSU, and SCI communications. other MAGTF elements as appropriate. Determine communications requirements Determine and coordinate radio nets, sup- between TSCIFs and mobile SCIFs and supporting frequencies, and procedures for— porting security forces. MAGTF external SIGINT operations.

MAGTF internal SIGINT operations. Intelligence broadcasts. 6004. SIGINT Communications Retransmission sites. Routine and time-sensitive operations. The SIGINT CIS architecture for any given oper- Obtain authority and establish procedures ation is dynamic. Specific theater, JTF, or for the sanitization of SIGINT products, re- MAGTF reference documents include— ports, and other information. Determine and coordinate wire communica- CSPs developed for various OPLANs. tions, to include telephones. Combatant commanders intelligence, CIS, Determine and coordinate SCI and GEN- and SIGINT tactics, techniques, and proce- SER LANs and WANs and unique intelli- dures (TTPs). gence networks information systems re- Annexes B (intelligence), C (operations), quirements (e.g., hardware, software, and K (communications) of an OPORD. internet protocol addresses). Appendix 2 (SIGINT) to annex B of an Determine and coordinate SCI-courier re- OPORD. quirements and operations. Integrate RadBn SSU and VMAQ CIS oper- The MAGTF mission, threat signals environment, ations with those of other MAGTF and per- friendly concepts of operations and intelligence, tinent JTF and other components and supporting task organization and command intelligence and reconnaissance units (e.g., relationships influence which communications mutual support, cueing). nets are established. Integrate RadBn SSU, SSE, and SST, and VMAQ TERPES communications with col- The following information addresses importan located GCE, ACE, CSSE, and other aspects of systems and technical architectures in MAGTF elements to— support of MAGTF SIGINT operations. 6-8 ______MCWP 2-22

a. MAGTF Command Element SIGINT RadBn OCAC.

Communications Nets Adjacent service cryptologic elements. Figure 6-5 shows aspects of a notional CIS archi- JTF or ATF SIGINT agencies. tecture for the MEF CIC. The following key SIG- INT communications nets terminate within the Theater and national SIGINT agencies. MAGTF CE CIC or RadBn SSU. (4) Tactical Receive Equipment and Relat- (1) MAGTF DSSCS or Special Intelligence ed Applications Program Data Dissemina- Communications Net External (HF). The tion System. The TRE and related applications DSSCS provides the MAGTF commander with a program data dissemination system (TDDS) secure data communications channel for the ex- broadcast provides I&W and global surveillance change of SCI information and the receipt of record communications. The path is provided by information in time for sensor cueing. Data is for- the supported commander, and the terminal warded from sensor to communications gateways equipment and personnel are provided by the or relays for dissemination to worldwide military RadBn SSU. Key net participants include— users via geosynchronous UHF satellite links. TDDS data sources include national and tactical The MAGTF CE via the RadBn SSU’s spe- sensor systems. Participants include the MAGTF cial security communications element. CE CIC or SSU OCAC and other JTF, theater, and national intelligence centers and agencies. Commander, joint task force (CJTF). Commander, amphibious task force (CATF). Other theater and national organizations. (5) Tactical Information Broadcast Ser- vice. The tactical information broadcast service (2) MAGTF Critical Communications Net (TIBS) provides near-real-time intelligence from (UHF-SATCOM/VHF). The critical communica- an open network of interactive participants using tions (CRITICOMM) net provides the MAGTF multiple sensors and sources. The TIBS broadcast commander communications with adjacent uses UHF SATCOM assets for network operation service cryptologic and other SIGINT and JTF el- and for the relay of out-of-theater specific infor- ements and theater cryptologic support groups mation into the tactical users’ areas of operation. The path is provided by the supported command- TIBS participants include a wide variety of er, and the terminal equipment and personnel are national and Service airborne, surface, and sub- provided by the RadBn SSCT. Key net partici- surface intelligence platforms. The broadcast will pants include— terminate in the MAGTF CE CIC or SSU OCAC.

MAGTF CE via the RadBn or SSU special (6) Tactical Intelligence Net. Tactical intelli- security communications element. gence (TACINTEL) net is an automated, high JTF. speed data link for transmission and reception of Adjacent headquarters. SCI (data and voice) among SIGINT collection and production units during amphibious opera- Theater and national intelligence or SIGINT agencies. tions. Key participants include naval expeditionary force (NEF) and ATF SIGINT centers (within the SSES) and the RadBn and SSU OCAC. (3) Theater Cryptologic Support Net (HF/ UHF-SATCOM). Theater cryptologic support net provides for rapid exchange of cryptologic infor- (7) MAGTF-Internal Special Intelligence mation with the SIGINT elements of other organi- Communications Net (VHF/UHF/SHF). Spe- zations. The path is provided by the supported cial intelligence communications (SPINTCOMM) commander, and the terminal equipment is pro- net provides the MAGTF commander with secure vided by the RadBn/SSU. Key participants in- SCI communications with subordinate division or clude— wing commanders through their organic SSCT. Signals Intelligence ______6-9

The path is provided by the supported command- disseminates intelligence information over a spe- er, and the terminal equipment and personnel are cial-purpose satellite system. Key participants in- provided by the RadBn SSU or SSCT. clude the MAGTF CE CIC, RadBn SSU OCAC, amphibious task force intelligence center SSES (8) TROJAN SPIRIT II Net. The Trojan Spirit and various external intelligence agencies and or- II net (C and Ku band SATCOM) receives and ganizations.

Figure 6-5. MEF CE CIC Communications and Information Systems Architecture. 6-10 ______MCWP 2-22 b. Radio Battalion SIGINT Support RadBn SSU collection operations. Key partici- Unit Internal Communications Nets pants include the OCAC and deployed collection Figure 6-6 shows key aspects of the CIS architec- and DF teams. ture for the internal operations of the RadBn SSU. The following key communications nets termi- (3) Electronic Attack Control Net (VHF). nate within the RadBn SSU OCAC. The EA control net provides direction and control of RadBn EA teams and assets. The path, equip- (1) Command and Control Net (HF/VHF). ment, and personnel are provided by the RadBn The RadBn SSU C2 net provides the battalion SSU. Key participants include the OCAC and de- commander or detachment OIC with C2 of subor- ployed MEWSS and EA teams. dinate elements. The path, equipment, and personnel are provided by the RadBn. Key net (4) Direction Finding Flash Net (VHF). The participants include the RadBn SSU OCAC and DF flash net provides the DF control station with deployed collection and DF, EA, and RRT teams. a means of broadcasting DF flashes to DF teams. The path, equipment, and personnel are provided (2) Collection and Reporting Net (UHF- by the RadBn. Key participants include the SATCOM/HF/VHF). The collection and report- OCAC’s DF control and deployed collection and ing net provides C2 and SIGINT reporting net for DF teams.

Figure 6-6. RadBn SSU Operations Control and Analysis Center Communications and Information Systems. Signals Intelligence ______6-11

(5) Direction Finding Report Net (VHF). The (8) Tasking and Reporting Net (VHF) The DF report net provides reporting from DF outsta- tasking and reporting net provides a means for the tions to the OCAC DF control. Path, equipment, RadBn to task deployed collection teams and to and personnel are provided by the RadBn SSU. report SIGINT information.

(6) Direction Finding Data Net (VHF). The (9) Radio Reconnaissance Command Net DF data net exchanges DF information between (UHF-Tactical Satellite/HF) The radio recon- the deployed collection and DF team and the naissance command net provides the means to OCAC DF control. The path, equipment, and per- command and control deployed RRTs and their sonnel are provided by the RadBn. reporting of SIGINT collection and DF reports to the RadBn SSU OCAC. (7) Mission Equipment Control Data Link Net (UHF). The mission equipment control dat c. Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare link (MECDL) net provides the means to control, coordinate, and monitor the mission equipment of Squadron Communications Nets MEWSS teams. This net is used for internal Figure 6-7 shows key aspects of the CIS architec- MEWSS operations and for interface and coordi- ture for VMAQ TERPES operations. The follow- nation with the Army intelligence and EW com- ing key SIGINT communications nets terminate mon sensor systems. within VMAQ operations or TERPES elements.

Figure 6-7. VMAQ Operations Center and TERPES Communications and Information Systems. 6-12 ______MCWP 2-22

(1) Aviation Combat Element Command (4) Tactical Digital Information Link B Net (HF). The ACE command net provides a (Multichannel Radio). TADIL-B, multichannel means for the ACE commander to exercise com- radio (MUX), (also known as Link-11B) is a full- mand and coordinate subordinate units’ adminis- duplex, point-to-point, encrypted system that si- trative and logistic functions. Composition multaneously exchanges tactical data between includes ACE headquarters, MAG detachments two units capable of TADIL-B at a rate of 600 Marine air control group or detachment, and inde- 1200, and 2400 bps. TADIL-B messages provide pendent squadrons or battalions. navigational data, surface and subsurface tracks, and operational orders. It may use VHF, UHF, SHF, and ground mobile force-SATCOM MUX (2) Aviation Combat Element Intelligence systems. Additionally, TADIL-B can also be ex- Net (VHF/HF/UHF). The ACE intelligence ne changed over wire. TADIL-B is used by the Unit- provides a means for rapid collection and dissem- ed States Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. ination of intelligence between the ACE head- MAGTF C2 nodes with TADIL-B capability are quarters and subordinate units. Composition the TACC, TAOC, and Marine air traffic control includes the ACE headquarters, the TACC, detachment (MATCD). Participants on a TADIL- MAGs or squadrons headquarters, the tactical air B network, such as TERPES, are called reporting operations center (TAOC), direct air support cen- units (RUs). Some RUs are capable of simulta- ter (DASC), TERPES, and others as appropriate. neously linking with several other RUs. Those units that can redistribute the information re (3) Tactical Digital Information Link A (HF/ ceived from one RU to another RU are called for- UHF). Tactical digital information link A warding reporting units (e.g., TACC and TAOC). (TADIL-A), also called Link-11, is used to exchange tactical data in real time among ships, air- (5) Tactical Digital Information Link C craft, and shore sites. TADIL-A messages provide (UHF). TADIL-C, also called Link-4A, is used navigational data, surface and subsurface tracks, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and operational orders. TADIL-A is an encrypted (NATO) and the United States Armed Forces. half-duplex system. It can be used on either H TADIL-C is an unencrypted, computer-to- single- or dual-sideband or UHF frequencies. computer digital information link that operates in the UHF frequency range at 5000 bps. The TADIL-C link is between a controlling unit and a There are two data rates: controlled tactical aircraft. TADIL-C is a valuable means for providing radar track correlated sym- Fast, at 2250 bits per second (bps) which is bology both up to the aircraft and, in the case of the most used data rate. two-way transmissions, back down to the controlling agency. The MAGTF TAOC uses the Slow, at 1364 bps. TADIL-C for one-way and two-way links to control F-14, F/A-18, EA-6B, and S-3 aircraft. TADIL-A is available within the United State Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Army. The (6) Voice Product Net (UHF). The voice prod- MAGTF’s C2 nodes that can use TADIL-A are uct net (VPN) provides a communications means the TAOC and the TACC. The exchange of digi- for forwarding nondigital intelligence information tal information by TADIL-A is accomplished by to other intelligence and operations elements. Key net-configured participating units (PUs) under the MAGTF participants include the TACC, TAOC, control of a net control station (NCS). A net can EA-6B, and TERPES, as well as other MAGT be composed of as few as two PUs (e.g., TERP- external platforms (e.g., Rivet Joint, Compass ES, via the TACC, and the TAOC). Call, EP-3). Chapter 7

Planning and Operations

The purpose of SIGINT operations is to develop and operations by exploiting the enemy’s use of intelligence on the enemy’s capabilities, intent, communication, radars, and electronic systems.

Section I. SIGINT Functional Planning

Detailed planning must precede actual SIGINT l What is the MAGTF concept of fire sup- operations to take advantage of the wealth of in- port? How will MAGTF target development formation available on the adversary’s signals and target intelligence be conducted? emanations and operations. l What are the SIGINT and intelligence concepts of operations of other JTF components, the JTF, and theater resources? What 7101. SIGINT Concept of are the task organization and command or Operations support relationships for all other MAGTF intelligence and reconnaissance units?

SIGINT operations must support the command- l How can shipboard SIGINT assets and other er’s intent, concept of operations, and the support- JTF, theater, and national SIGINT assets be ing concept of intelligence operations. integrated and employed to support MAGTF operations? Questions that must be answered to develop the SIGINT concept of operations include the following: 7102. Enemy Characteristics

l What is the MAGTF area of operations Intelligence operations focus on the enemy. Prior (AO) and area of interest (AI)? to commencing SIGINT operations, MAGTF in- l What is the MAGTF concept of operations, telligence personnel must learn as much as they task organization, and main and supporting can about the following enemy C2 CIS practices. efforts? Does the friendly concept of operations allow for fixed-site SIGINT collection and DF operations, mobile collection and a. Size and Composition of Enemy DF operations, or both? Forces

l What are the standing PIRs and IRs? Which l What threat forces are within the MAGTF have been tasked to SIGINT units? What AO and AI? specific information is the commander most interested in (e.g., enemy air operations, en- l What are the enemy’s centers of gravity and emy ground operations, friendly force pro- critical vulnerabilities?

tection, target battle damage assessment l Is this a large enemy force organized along [BDA], or enemy future intentions)? conventional military lines or a small, loose- l What is the MAGTF force protection con- ly knit guerrilla or unconventional military cept of operations? force? 7-2 ______MCWP 2-22 b. Enemy Command and Control and Table 7-1. Emitter Technical Data. Supporting Communications and Information Systems Aspect Technical and Operational l What and where are the enemy’s critical C2 Characteristics nodes and what are their vulnerabilities? Communications Operations l What types and categories of communica- and Emitters tions nets and networks are used by the ene- Frequency range HF, VHF, UHF, etc. my? and use l What echelons of command do the commu- Call sign use Rota, random, etc. nications nets and networks serve? Transmitter Hearability, SIGINT collection, l What are the associated communications power and DF location requirements and noncommunications electronic emitters? Emission type Single, multichannel, spread spectrum, frequency hopping, l What are the tactics, techniques, and proce- burst, etc. dures used for enemy CIS operations? How do they relate to various threat functional Signal type Analog or digital activities? Modulation AM, FM, PCM, etc. l How is information transferred among the Cryptologic Public, private key, none enemy’s units and command echelons? system l Does the enemy employ communications System type Voice, data, teletype, facsimile, emitters at all levels of command or does it video, combinations of some or rely on communications means less exploit- all able by SIGINT (e.g., fiber, wire, and mes- Language use Dialect, written, or voice senger)? Miscellaneous Communication procedures, emissions control practices, c. Emitter Technical Data use of deception, security systems, etc. Effective SIGINT operations require extensive technical information on the enemy’s CIS re- Noncommunications Operations sources and operations. See table 7-1 for key and Emitters threat emitter technical data requirements. Location Fixed, mobile Platform Air, ship, vehicle, fixed- 7103. Topography installation Associated C2 Command post, type of weapon Terrain, physical obstructions, and vegetation in node or weapon system the area of operations have a major effect on the system employment of SIGINT resources and their abili- Frequency range Band of operation ty to exploit enemy signals. Proper placement of Modulation Pulse duration, pulse repetition SIGINT collection and DF assets is essential for characteristics frequency, etc. effective reception of adversary emanations. Sev- Transmitter Effective radiated power, effec- eral factors affect reception quality. power tive range Purpose of Jamming, surveillance, target- a. Target Frequencies function ing, C2, fire control, etc. Many of the frequency ranges and power levels in use by the world’s military and paramilitary forc- the frequency used, the greater the LOS influence es require line-of-sight (LOS) or near-LOS paths and the more critical the accurate placement of from transmitter to receiver. Generally, the higher SIGINT collection and DF equipment. Lower Signals Intelligence ______7-3

frequencies (particularly those below 30 MHz) l Acting as liaison with SIGINT agencies and generally do not require LOS paths. Consequent- units external to the MAGTF. ly, the placement of SIGINT collection and DF l Coordinating with the G-4/S-4 to ensure ad- sites to exploit these frequencies may be located equate logistics support of SIGINT elements at greater distances from the target transmitters. (e.g., transportation and maintenance of SIGINT units’ unique equipment). b. Power Output The power output of a transmitter is an important factor in receiving the signal. To intercept some 7105. Coordination of SIGINT low-powered signals, SIGINT collection and DF Operations assets must be located closer to the adversary’s transmitter, often requiring SIGINT collection a. Internal Coordination and DF teams to either collocate with or closely follow forward MAGTF combat units. Internal MAGTF SIGINT requirements must be coordinated with maneuver, fires, electronic warfare, force protection, and CIS requirements. This c. Antennas coordination may occur within the EWCC under If the targeted adversary’s system uses highly di- G-3/S-3 staff cognizance, within the CIC, or with- rectional antennas, as do many multichannel sys- in the OCAC, depending upon the task organiza- tems, the SIGINT collection and DF site must be tion and C2 and support relationships in effect. placed within the adversary’s antenna radiating Additionally, collection and DF team movements pattern. and locations must be coordinated with the MAGTF’s tactical movements to ensure continuous support without interference. 7104. Planning Responsibilities These efforts are accomplished through planning and close coordination among the following Primary staff responsibility for SIGINT opera- MAGTF staff officers: tions planning lies with the G-2/S-2. The G-2/S-2 responsibilities are— l MAGTF G-2/S-2, the intelligence operations officer, and the intelligence battalion l Preparing integrated, multidiscipline intelli- commander. gence and reconnaissance operations, to in- l SIO, MAGTF AFC OIC, collections officer, clude supporting SIGINT plans, orders, SARC OIC, and the dissemination manager. annexes, and appendices. l MAGTF G-3/S-3 future and current opera- l Coordinating with the G-3/S-3 to ensure— tions officers, C2W officer, and EWO.

n Planned SIGINT effort will support the l MAGTF G-6/S-6. concept of operations and scheme of ma- l GCE, ACE, and CSSE staff officers. neuver. l RadBn SSU and VMAQ TERPES COs and n SIGINT and EW operations are effective- OICs. ly prioritized and integrated. n Adequate site placement and security for b. External Coordination SIGINT collection elements is provided.

l Coordinating with the G-6/S-6 officer for (1) Higher Headquarters and External Or- CIS support to the SIGINT elements, in- ganizations. The MAGTF G-2/S-2 and all SIG- cluding circuits and networks access, fre- INT planners must coordinate SIGINT quency assignment, equipment, and call operations, activities, and requirements with signs. DIRNSA. Accordingly, a continuous exchange of 7-4 ______MCWP 2-22 data and information is required. This requires site outside the MAGTF tactical operations area JWICS access and special security communica- could be conducting SIGINT collection and DF tions circuits for the exchange of SIGINT techni- against targets within the MAGTF area of respon- cal data and intelligence information. sibility. With proper planning and coordination, external SIGINT assets of the combatant com- (2) Adjacent and Area SIGINT Activities. mander, JTF, and other components can provide MAGTF SIGINT activities must be coordinated SIGINT support to the MAGTF (e.g., product re- with other SIGINT activities within the joint porting, exchanges of technical information), al- operations area and theater to reduce duplication lowing organic MAGTF SIGINT resources to and to ensure maximum use of available assets focus on critical targets. and mutual support. For example, an NSG-fixed Signals Intelligence ______7-5

Section II. SIGINT Operational Planning

This section provides a general description of the l Identifying intelligence requirements tasked SIGINT planning cycle and activities to enable an to SIGINT elements. understanding and appreciation for the SIGINT effort as a whole. No attempt is made to provide l Preparing a SIGINT operations plan, to in- technical details for SIGINT processing. The clude integral SIGINT collection, produc- SIGINT cycle is in concert with the following six tion, and dissemination plans. phases of the intelligence cycle (see MCWP 2-1 l Planning and establishing the SIGINT sup- for additional information on the intelligence cy- port system (e.g., CIS, logistics). cle and intelligence planning). l Issuing orders and tasking to SIGINT units.

l Supervising and coordinating the SIGINT 7201. Planning and Direction operations.

The planning and direction phase of the intelli- The selection of a particular source of information gence cycle consists of those activities which or intelligence discipline to fulfill a given intelli- identify and prioritize pertinent IRs and provide gence requirement is an important decision. SIG- the means for satisfying them. Intelligence planning and direction is a continuous function and a INT is a valuable source of information, and an command responsibility. The commander directs effective, dynamic SIGINT operations plan must the intelligence effort; the intelligence officer be developed to maximize the effectiveness of the manages this effort based upon the commander’s SIGINT effort. With the multitude of threat sig- intent, designation of PIRs, and specific guidance nals being transmitted, the collection plan must be provided during the planning process. The intelli- carefully constructed to collect and exploit enemy gence planning and direction functions are— signals that are most likely to provide the necessary intelligence data. Additionally, the SIGINT production and dissemination plans must effec- l Requirements development. tively support unique SIGINT and all-source in- l Requirements management. telligence operations requirements and

l Collections management. operations.

l Production management. a. Mission Planning l Dissemination management.

l Intelligence support structure. Based on the commander’s PIRs and IRs, the G-2/ S-2 determines those ICRs which are applicable l Supervision of the intelligence effort. to and have the potential to be satisfied by the organic SIGINT collection effort. The G-2/S-2 in- SIGINT planning is performed in concert with corporates these ICRs into the overall intelligence overall intelligence planning. It consists of those collection plan and issues mission tasking and activities that identify pertinent IRs which have guidance to the RadBn OIC, ACE G-2/S-2, and been tasked to SIGINT units and then provides other attached or supporting SIGINT units. Addi- the means for satisfying those IRs. SIGINT plan- tionally, SIGINT taskings from the joint force ning and direction is a continuous function that commander (JFC) and supplemental taskings requires close interaction between the G-2/S-2 from DIRNSA will need to be assessed by the G- and SIGINT unit planners. 2/S-2 and incorporated if possible into MAGTF SIGINT operations (refer to USSID 4 for addi- SIGINT planning and direction objectives in- tional information regarding DIRNSA supple- clude— mental tasking). 7-6 ______MCWP 2-22 b. Mission Management gence value (i.e., external SIGINT processing and production centers such as the RSOCs or NSA). SIGINT mission management is the unit commander’s supervision of collection, processing, production, and dissemination efforts. Proper Initially, a concentrated intercept search, signals mission management requires centralized control analysis, and target development program is car- of SIGINT assets at the MAGTF command ele- ried out to catalog the electromagnetic environment level. The OCAC (for RadBn SSUs) and the ment and identify the desired threat SOIs. In TERPES section (for VMAQ) provide this cen- many cases, prior knowledge of some technical tralized control for the their respective SIGINT characteristics, such as in RSOC or CSSA data efforts. Collection and DF elements are usually bases, will enhance and streamline the MAGTF’s positioned throughout the MAGTF’s operations COMINT search effort. When SOIs are acquired area based on the MAGTF’s focus of effort, that are readily exploitable, SIGINT collection scheme of maneuver, hearability of enemy sig- operators prepare a gist of the transmission. Re- nals, and security of SIGINT units. Air SIGINT cording of the entire intercepted signal using tape operations in support of both ACE and MAGTF recorders may also occur. requirements will be planned and incorporated in the supporting air tasking order (ATO). SIGINT Multichannel transmissions are first divided by unit commanders and planners must ensure that SIGINT operators into their component parts or coverage is complete, that assets are gainfully em- separate channels and then processed channel by ployed or redirected, and that SIGINT reporting channel. The acquired data (e.g., logs, gists, data (and supporting CIS support) is effective. Collec- files, page-prints, tapes) are rapidly assessed tion tasks must be analyzed to determine if they against standing PIRs for items of immediate tac- can be met or if new collection or analysis efforts tical intelligence value and reported in accordance are required. The collection, direction finding, with reporting and dissemination criteria to— and analysis and production efforts must be supervised, integrated with all-source intelligence operations, and evaluated to ensure mission effec- l Designated commanders. tiveness. l OCAC or TERPES production elements for detailed analysis and reporting.

l MAGTF AFC for all-source analysis and 7202. Collection production.

During collection, organic, attached, and support- b. Direction Finding ing SIGINT elements collect and deliver informa- Radio DF uses electronic equipment to obtain the tion to the appropriate processing or production locations of adversary emitters by determining the element (e.g., OCAC or TERPES). In some direction of arrival or the time difference of arriv- instances (e.g., immediate threat) the information al of the radio waves. In ideal conditions, direc- will be delivered directly to the local commander tion finders are arrayed in a network along a for immediate action. predetermined baseline consisting of at least three collection and DF stations, one of which acts as a. COMINT Collection net control. The DF sites must be placed carefully COMINT collection is performed using equip- so that all stations can hear the target SOI and mu- ment that intercepts adversary communications tually support the mission. signals. Simple signals (e.g., unencrypted single- channel voice) can be received by ordinary re- Close coordination between collection and DF ceivers. More complicated signals or those that sites and the OCAC is required for a responsive are encrypted require more sophisticated equip- DF effort. RadBn SSU DF results are then report- ment to fully exploit the signals for their intelli- ed, either manually or via automated means, to Signals Intelligence ______7-7 the OCAC for follow-on intelligence exploitation b. Cryptanalysis and reporting. Cryptanalysis is the study of encrypted signals, data, and texts to determine their plain language c. ELINT Collection and Direction equivalents. The capability to read the adversary’s Finding encrypted communications is obviously valuable. Although few in numbers, the RadBn MEWSS The RadBns’ limited cryptanalysis capability de- product improvement program (PIP) (AN/MLQ- pends on the sophistication of the target’s encryp- 36A) provides for the automated search, acquisition system and the availability of specialized tion, identification, and a single DF line of equipment and software resources from NSA. bearing of radars and other noncommunications emitters. Mission management, reporting, and c. Linguistic Analysis dissemination are handled similarly to COMINT Linguistic analysis is the transcription and trans- DF operations. lation of foreign language intercepts into English. This analysis starts at the collection site upon in- Additionally, in support of its strike escort mis- terception. Messages of considerable length re- sion, VMAQ elements collect ELINT information quire more time and are usually transcribed and that can be used by MAGTF intelligence translated in the OCAC. Marines are trained in a producers such as the MAGTF AFC and OCAC. wide variety of languages for this task, but aug- Technical capabilities within the EA-6B’s ELINT mentation by external sources (e.g., native and/or collection system allow for DF operations to occur contract linguists) may be required in order to sat- from a single aircraft. Acquired signals are record- isfy all requirements. ed and then provided to the TERPES section for postmission analysis, production, and reporting. d. Signal Analysis Signal analysis consists of working with all types of signals (e.g., COMINT, ELINT, pro forma) to 7203. Processing and identify, isolate, reduce to pure form, and exploit Exploitation acquired SOIs. The signal analyst must be well trained and possess the proper electronic and soft- The following processing and exploitation func- ware support tools to be effective. tions are used to convert collected raw information into a form suitable for SIGINT production. e. ELINT Analysis The location of early warning, surveillance, and a. Traffic Analysis fire control radars can provide a general trace of Traffic analysis is the study of all characteristics the adversary’s forward battle positions and loca- of communications except encrypted texts. Call tions of key C2 and fire control nodes and weap- signs, frequencies, times of transmission, crypto- ons systems. Medium-range and counterweapons graphic indicators, precedence, and message radar identification provides order of battle infor- lengths are examples of these characteristics. mation since these systems are organic to specific These characteristics are called externals and are adversary units. compiled and sorted primarily for the purpose of reconstructing the adversary’s communication Identification and location of air defense radars structure and organization. This information provide information on the disposition of the ad- yields valuable electronic order of battle data and versary’s air defense systems and their threat to other information. With on-line communication strike, close air support, and assault support air- encryption systems becoming widely used by po- craft. Following the reporting of any I&W infor- tential adversaries, traffic analysis becomes an in- mation to tactical decisionmakers, technical data creasingly difficult function. and detailed ELINT information is forwarded to 7-8 ______MCWP 2-22 the OCAC or to the TERPES section for further b. Integration analysis, production, and reporting. The information derived from traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, linguistic analysis, signal analysis, ELINT analysis, and radio DF must be fully inte- 7204. Production grated into a fused SIGINT product to develop a complete SIGINT picture. Concurrently, integration of SIGINT processing and production with Production is the conversion of raw information ongoing MAGTF G-2/S-2 all-source intelligence into SIGINT product reports through the evalua- processing and production is essential to achieve tion, integration, and interpretation of the infor- a complete, effective, and current intelligence es- mation derived during the processing and timate while using the strengths and results from exploitation effort. The results of the analysis are the other intelligence disciplines to improve SIG- correlated by SIGINT analysts and reporters to INT operations. form the basis for SIGINT reports. These reports are provided directly to tactical commanders c. Interpretation when appropriate, to the G-2/S-2 for the further analysis and production of all-source intelligence, The information derived from SIGINT collection and to the staff sections for future operations is interpreted to form logical conclusions and esti- planning. mates of enemy capabilities, intentions, and future actions. This step completes the translation of the raw SIGINT information into usable intelli- SIGINT production planning and management are gence. closely coordinated with all-source intelligence production planning and management to— 7205. Dissemination l Determine the scope, content, and format for each product. Dissemination is the provision of SIGINT infor- l Develop a plan and schedule for the devel- mation in a timely manner and in a usable form to opment of products. commanders, other decisionmakers, or all-source intelligence analysts. Because of security require- l Assign priorities among the various SIGINT ments, dissemination of COMINT information is product requirements. made primarily to SIGINT and all-source intelli- l Allocate SIGINT processing, exploitation, gence production elements such as the MAGTF and production resources. AFC. Proper SIGINT C2 and supporting CIS architectures that provide accurate situational l Integrate production efforts with all-source awareness, along with effective IRs and tactical collection and dissemination activities. requirements management, enable proper dissemination. The production goal is the effective and efficient use of limited resources while focusing on estab- SIGINT dissemination planning and manage- lished SIGINT priorities. ment involves establishing dissemination priorities, stipulating dissemination and reporting a. Evaluation criteria, selecting dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of SIGINT reporting. The ultimate SIGINT analysts evaluate the raw SIGINT infor- dissemination goal is to deliver SIGINT products mation to determine its pertinence to intelligence to the appropriate user in the proper form and at requirements. Further evaluation is made to judge the right time, while concurrently preventing the the reliability and accuracy of the information and dissemination of irrelevant products and avoiding to isolate significant elements. information overload. Signals Intelligence ______7-9

Reporting consists of providing the SIGINT prod- high tempo operations. In NCW reports, the ucts in standardized, easily usable formats needed source of information is clearly SIGINT. Howev- to satisfy tasked requirements in a timely manner. er, unlike standard SIGINT product reports, the The nature of the SIGINT effort requires timely NCW report is passed directly to commanders reporting to effectively exploit its intelligence without SIGINT markings or SI security controls value. SIGINT reports generally fall into two cat- to allow immediate tactical use (e.g., I&W, sup- egories, product reports and technical reports. port to targeting, support to force protection). For Standardized formats are used in the preparation example, NCW reports may be passed directly and transmission of these reports for speed and from the SSU collector to other MAGTF units compatibility. As most of these formats are classi- (e.g., an infantry battalion) via GENSER commu- fied, readers should refer to USSID 300, SIGINT nications (usually voice message). Typically, the Reporting, for specific information and examples. format for these is the standard size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) re- a. Product Reports port. Specific procedures regarding NCW reporting during operations should be contained Product reports are prepared by all SIGINT pro- within the SIGINT appendix to annex B of the op- ducers for commanders, planners, and all-source erations order. intelligence analysts. A product report contains timely, accurate, thorough, relevant, and useful SIGINT information about the adversary in re- (3) Sanitized Report. Sanitized SIGINT response to the supported commander’s PIRs and ports contain SIGINT information that is reported IRs. Reports may be sent periodically or may be via GENSER communications means in a manner sent whenever highly perishable data is acquired that does not reveal SIGINT as the source of the in accordance with specified intelligence report- information. The level of sanitization authority al- ing criteria. Generally, SIGINT product reports lowed the MAGTF commander is established by will fall into one of three categories: DOD Directive TS-5105.21-M-2, Sensitive Com- partmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, (1) SIGINT Report. In SIGINT reports, the Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy. source of information is clearly SIGINT by the Within the MAGTF, actual sanitization of SIG- content and classification markings. Such reports INT reports is generally performed by designated generally contain the SIGINT assessment along intelligence personnel under the guidance and su- with pertinent SIGINT technical information. pervision of the MAGTF SSO or AFC OIC. The These reports are handled within SCI-controlled reports are disseminated via all-source products facilities and communications channels. Within a or other GENSER intelligence reports. MEF, the CE, GCE, and ACE may be included in distribution for SIGINT products. Within a MEU(SOC) or special-purpose Marine air-ground b. Technical Reports task force (SPMAGTF), the CE is generally the Technical reports consist of the SIGINT technical sole recipient of these reports. When pertinent, ei- elements required by SIGINT collectors, analysts, ther these reports will be fused within all-source and technical support and production agencies ex- intelligence products for further dissemination ternal to the MAGTF (e.g., call signs, frequencies, within the MAGTF or dissemination will occur operating schedules). SIGINT technical reporting via SCI courier or briefings. requires SCI-secure connectivity with pertinent organizations (e.g., NSA, theater RSOC, support- (2) Non-Codeword Report. NCW reporting ing CSSA) via JWICS, NSANET, or some alter- procedures may be used only when authorized by nate SCI communications means. Within the DIRNSA. The principal value of NCW reporting MAGTF, all SIGINT technical reporting is con- is to allow time-sensitive dissemination of critical ducted by either RadBn or VMAQ’s TERPES SIGINT information to a broader audience during section. 7-10 ______MCWP 2-22

7206. Utilization must provide feedback to the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and SIGINT unit leaders to improve future SIG- SIGINT, as all intelligence, has no inherent value. INT operations. Ultimately, SIGINT utilization Its value is realized only through its effective provides guidance for future intelligence and support of the commander’s intelligence require- SIGINT operations and management. ments or other operational requirements. Commanders, G-2/S-2s, and G-3/S-3s must con- See appendix C, SIGINT and SCI Security Man- tinuously evaluate SIGINT operations, products, agement Operations Flowchart, that summarizes and reports for timeliness, usefulness, and overall the principal SIGINT planning considerations, ac- quality and responsiveness to stated IRs. They tivities, and products discussed in this chapter. Signals Intelligence ______7-11

Section III. SIGINT Plans and Orders

Guidance for the conduct of SIGINT operations l Friendly forces to be utilized include— comes from many sources. The DIRNSA- n Personnel augmentation requirements. developed USSID series are the principal SIGINT operations directives that contain policy, direc- n SIGINT units of adjacent or other theater tion, guidance, instruction, and procedures on per- forces and the support expected. forming SIGINT functions in compliance with n Joint force maritime component com- national directives and security requirements. Ad- mander (JFMCC) and ATF DS SIGINT ditionally, since MAGTFs will normally be part elements and CSSA available to support of a JTF or NEF, reference to joint and naval or- the landing force during amphibious oper- ders, guidance, and SIGINT TTPs is necessary to ations. identify unique operating concepts and methodol- n RSOC, joint force land component com- ogies and support procedures and formats. mander (JFLCC), joint force air component commander (JFACC), and other The MAGTF G-2/S-2 prepares SIGINT plans and component commanders or task forces ca- orders. The intelligence operations officer coordi- pable of providing SIGINT support dur- nates the overall effort with the assistance of the ing JTF operations. SIO, other intelligence section staff officers, and l Planned arrangement, employment, and use the CO or OICs of organic and supporting SIG- of external SIGINT support, to include any INT units. SIGINT plans and orders focus on in- special collection, production, dissemina- ternal MAGTF SIGINT requirements, operations, tion and CIS arrangements. and TTP. l Establishment of coordinating instructions for SIGINT operations planning and con- The SIGINT appendix will appear as appendix 2 trol, to include technical support expected (signals intelligence) to annex B (intelligence) in from higher headquarters. all MAGTF operations plans and orders. (See appendix D, SIGINT Appendix Format, of this man- l MAGTF SIGINT element taskings. ual for a recommended format for the SIGINT l Communication and information SIGINT appendix.) It should include the following: support. 7-12 ______MCWP 2-22

Section IV. Execution

MAGTF SIGINT operations generally are cen- annexes B, C, and K of the operations order or in trally managed by the MAGTF G-2/S-2 and de- a subsequent fragmentary order. centrally executed to— Figure 7-1 notionally depicts the following seven key aspects of these interrelated SIGINT opera- l Integrate RadBn SSU and ACE VMAQ TERPES SIGINT effectively with other tions. MAGTF and external intelligence and reconnaissance operations. l Task organization and command or support relationships of MAGTF SIGINT units with l Provide the most effective MAGTF intelli- other MAGTF elements. RadBn SSU gence requirements support. OCAC is collocated with the MAGTF G-2/ S-2 and operates in general support of the The integration of RadBn SSU and VMAQ TER- MAGTF. VMAQ and TERPES are organic PES SIGINT collection, production, and dissemi- and OPCON to the ACE. nation plans and activities with those of other l External SIGINT units that typically support MAGTF and supporting intelligence organiza- a MAGTF. tions uses these limited resources and their mutual l Principal SIGINT systems employed within support more effectively (e.g., cueing). The and in support of the MAGTF. MAGTF mission, commander’s intent, threat op- l Relationship of other MAGTF intelligence erations and signals usage, concept of operations, and reconnaissance units with SIGINT and environmental considerations all influence units. the ultimate task organization, command relation- l Principal communications pathways, means, ship, concepts of employment, and tasks of SIG- and level of classification. INT units. For example, they determine a decision l Key intelligence information systems that to task-organize elements of the SSU in direct interoperate with SIGINT systems. support of the GCE or rear area operations com- l Principal SIGINT reports disseminated via manders. Such information is specified within the communications pathways shown. Signals Intelligence ______7-13 lkmklm

Figure 7-1. MAGTF and Supporting SIGINT Operations. (reverse blank) Chapter 8

Security of Sensitive Compartmented Information

SCI is classified information concerning or de- SCIF and TSCIF requirements. rived from intelligence sources, methods, or ana- Classification levels. lytical processes that is required to be handled within formal access control systems established Compartmentation. by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Decompartmentation. Only intelligence and information that clearly Sanitization. warrant extraordinary security measures will be Release to foreign governments. restricted to SCI control. Emergency use. When dealing with issues involving SCI security, Security policy and procedures for the pro- refer to the following publications for policy and tection of information controlled in SCI instructions: compartments.

Director, Central Intelligence Directive Safeguarding SCI is critical. Security of SCI is (DCID) 1/14, Personnel Security Standards important as it protects not only a piece of intelli- and Procedures Governing Eligibility fo gence but also its source. For these reasons, dis- Access to Sensitive Compartmented Infor- semination and access to SCI information and mation. materials are restricted. However, to be worth- DCID 1/16, Security Manual for Uniform while, SCI must be accessible to commanders for Protection of Intelligence Processed in AISs use in decisionmaking. SCI must be classified and Networks. only to the degree necessary in the interests of security. SCI security must be applied within the DCID 1/21, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Fa- context of the mission, with security needs con- cilities. stantly assessed and balanced against operational mission needs. Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DI- AM) 50-4, Department of Defense Intelli- gence Information Systems (DODIIS) SCI security is the responsibility of the command- Information Security (INFOSEC) Program. er, who exercises this responsibility through the unit G-2/S-2. The SSO serves as the primary staff Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.21-M-1, Sensitive Compartmented In- officer for day-to-day SCI security administration formation (SCI) Security Manual, Adminis- and management. The commander must ensure trative Security. SCI is accessed only by those persons with an appropriate clearance, access approval, identified Department of the Navy Supplement (NAV- need-to-know, and appropriate SCI indoctrina- SUP) to DODD 5105.21-M-1, SCI Adminis- tion. This is accomplished by carefully managing trative Security Manual. those units and persons with SCI access and the equipment and facilities used to process, dissemi- These documents provide policy and guidance nate, and store SCI. (Appendix C, SIGINT and on— SCI Security Management Operations Flowchart, summarizes the principal SCI security planning SCI personnel and information security considerations, activities, and products discussed clearance procedures. in this chapter.) 8-2 ______MCWP 2-22

8001. Special Security Officer nated individuals are apprised of new requirements and guidelines. The SSO serves as the command’s focal point for Ensures that appropriate accreditation docu- the receipt, control, and accountability of SCI ma- mentation is available for each SCIF, terials and the supervision of the SCI security TSCIF, and SCI system under the SSO’s functions of subordinate SCIFs. The SSO will be cognizance. a military commissioned officer, warrant officer, or civilian (GS-9 or above). The SSO— 8002. Personnel Security Supervises the operation of the special secu- Program rity office and administers the SCI security program. This includes oversight of other The protection of SCI is directly related to the ef- local SCIFs under the SSO’s cognizance. fectiveness of the personnel security program. Maintains required SCI directives, regula- DCID 1/14 establishes the personnel security tions, manuals, and guidelines to adequately standards for the United States intelligence com- discharge SSO duties and responsibilities. munity. A mutually supporting series of program Ensures all SCI is properly accounted for, elements (e.g., need-to-know, investigation, bind- controlled, marked, transmitted, transported, ing contractual obligations on those granted ac- packaged, and safeguarded. Ensures all SCI cess, security education and awareness, and is destroyed in authorized destruction facili- individual responsibility) provides reasonable as- ties and in accordance with current regula- surances against compromise of SCI by those au- tions. thorized access to it. Ensures SCI is disseminated only to persons authorized access with an established need- a. Access Approval Authority to-know. In accordance with DCID 1/14, the Director o Provides guidance and assistance for proc- Naval Intelligence is authorized to grant, deny, or essing SCI access and eligibility requests. revoke SCI access to Marines and Sailors. This Serves as the official channel for passing responsibility is carried out through the Depart- SCI access certifications. ment of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility Conducts or otherwise manages SCI person- (DONCAF). nel, information, physical, and technical security (i.e., TEMPEST, technical surveil b. Requirements for SCI Access lance countermeasures [TSCM]) actions and procedures according to current regulations. DONCAF may grant an individual SCI access when the following requirements have been met. Conducts SCI security briefings, indoctrina- tions, and debriefings; administers and maintains signed nondisclosure agree- (1) Need-to-Know is Determined. Even ments; and performs other related personnel when approved for a specific access, the holder is security actions. expected to acquire or disseminate only that SCI essential to effectively carry out an assignment Investigates SCI security infractions, makes recommendations, prepares required re- No person will have a need-to-know solely by vir- ports, and initiates and supervises any nec- tue of rank, title, or position. essary corrective actions. (2) Eligibility is Determined. Conducts a continuing training and aware- DCID 1/14 pro- ness program to ensure that all SCI-indoctri- vides eligibility standards for investigation and evaluation for an individual’s access to SCI. A Signals Intelligence ______8-3 single-scope background investigation (SSBI) quired and when existing SCIFs are not adequate conducted within the last 5 years serves as the ba- to support the unit’s mission. sis for determining access approval. a. Sensitive Compartmented (3) SCI Billet is Identified. DCI does not re- Information Facility quire the Navy to maintain an SCI billet structure. A SCIF is an accredited area, room, group of However, SSO Navy and CNSG have decided to rooms, buildings, or installation where SCI may retain the current SCI billet numbering system for be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically accountability within the DON. SCI billets are ad- processed. Access to SCIFs will be controlled to ministered by the local command SSO and report- preclude entry by unauthorized personnel. Non ed annually to SSO Navy or CNSG as SCI-indoctrinated personnel entering a SCIF must appropriate. be continuously escorted by an indoctrinated individual who is familiar with the security procedures of that SCIF. The physical security (4) Security Indoctrination is Completed protection for a SCIF is intended to prevent as SCI indoctrination is the instruction an individual well as detect visual, acoustical, technical, and receives prior to receiving access to an SCI sys- physical access by unauthorized persons. tems, programs, and materials. The instruction convey the unique nature, sensitivity, and special security safeguards and practices for SCI han- b. Emergency Action Plans dling, particularly the necessity to protect sensi- Each accredited SCIF will establish an emergency tive sources and methods. action plan. This plan will be approved by the appropriate G-2/S-2 or SSO. The essential concern of the plan must be safety of personnel over a (5) Nondisclosure Agreement is Signed. other factors. The plan will address— As a condition of access to SCI, individuals authorized SCI access must sign a DCI-authorized nondisclosure agreement (NDA). The NDA es- Physical protection of personnel working in tablishes explicit obligations on both the Govern- the SCIF. ment and the individual for the protection of SCI. Adequacy of fire fighting equipment and An NDA is binding for life and cannot be revoked life-support equipment (e.g., oxygen and or waived. Failure to sign an NDA is cause for de- masks). nial of SCI access. Entrance of emergency personnel (e.g. police, medical technicians, and firemen) into a SCIF. Evacuation plans for persons. 8003. Physical Security Emergency destruction and transfer procedures of classified material and equipmen All SCI must be processed, used, and stored within the event of— in an accredited SCIF. Accreditation is granted Fire. when the proposed facility meets the physical se- Loss of essential utilities. curity standards stipulated in DCID 1/21. The Sabotage. SSO, DIA, is the accrediting authority for all Riots. DOD SCIFs, while NSA is the accreditation authority for all service cryptologic element SCIFs. Civil disorders. Organizations are responsible for ensuring that Hostile or terrorist attack or capture. SCIFs are established only when operationally re- Natural disasters. 8-4 ______MCWP 2-22

c. Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Establish and maintain communications with Information Facility local security or emergency reaction forces, if possible. Recognizing the need for SCIFs to support tactical operations, the DCI requires the following Conduct an inspection of the vacated TSCIF minimum physical security standards for a area. The SSO or G-2/S-2 ensures SCI ma- TSCIF. If the situation and time permit, these terials are not inadvertently left behind minimum standards will be improved on by using when the TSCIF displaces. the security considerations and requirements for Coordinate planning with the unit’s head- permanent secure facilities. (Appendix E, TSCIF quarters commandant, who is responsible Checklist, is provided as a guide when activating for providing TSCIF guard personnel, com- or deactivating a TSCIF.) munication with command post guard forces, emergency personnel reaction forces, and internal reaction forces. Locate the TSCIF within the supported headquarter’s defensive perimeter, preferably within its main command echelon. d. Mobile Tactical Sensitive Use permanent-type facilities, if available. Compartmented Information Facility

Maintain 24-hour operation under field or Mobile TSCIF requirements are as follows: combat conditions.

Establish a physical barrier around the Maintain a 24-hour operation and staff the TSCIF. Where practical, the physical barrier TSCIF with sufficient personnel as deter- should be triple-strand concertina o mined by the on-site SSO or G-2/S-2 based general-purpose barbed-tape obstacle. The on the local threat conditions. TSCIF approval authority determines Incorporate external physical security meas- whether proposed security measures provide ures into the perimeter defense plans for the adequate protection based on local threat immediate area in which the mobile TSCIF conditions. is located. (A physical barrier is not required Guard the TSCIF perimeter by stationing as a prerequisite to establish a mobile walking or fixed guards to observe the con- TSCIF.) trolled area. Guards will be armed with Use Marines performing the day-to-day op- weapons and ammunition in accordance erations of the TSCIF to control external with Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5500.6F, physical security. Arming of Security and Law Enforcemen Establish and maintain communication (LE) Personnel and the Use of Force. with backup guard forces, if possible. Restrict access to the controlled area with a Incorporate incendiary methods in emergen- single gate or entrance that is guarded con- cy destruction plans to ensure total destruc- tinuously. tion of SCI material during emergency Maintain an access list. Only those people situations. whose names appear on the list will be al- Adhere to the following restrictions when lowed access to the TSCIF. using a rigid-sided shelter or portable van. Staff the TSCIF with sufficient personnel as Mount the shelter to a vehicle so that the determined by the on-site SSO or G-2/S-2 shelter can move on short notice. based on the local threat conditions. Affix a General Services Administration Keep emergency destruction and evacuation (GSA)-approved security container per- plans current. manently within the shelter. Protect the Store SCI material in lockable containers lock combination to the level of security when not in use. of the material stored therein. Signals Intelligence ______8-5

Control the entrance to the mobile TSCIF the TSCIF and identifies supporting security, ad- with SCI-indoctrinated Marines on duty ministrative, and point of contact information. within the shelter.

Limit entrance to the mobile TSCIF to (2) TSCIF Activation Report. A report sent to SCI-indoctrinated personnel. the approval authority upon commencement o

Store classified material within the locked TSCIF operations. GSA container and secure the shelter’ exterior entrance during redeployment. (3) TSCIF Deactivation Report. A report sent Adhere to the following restrictions when to the approval authority when the TSCIF has using a mobile TSCIF for a soft-sided vehi- ceased operations and has been certified to be free cle or man-portable system. of SCI material.

Protect SCI material in an opaque container (i.e., leather pouch, metal storage box, or other suitable container that pre- 8004. Information Systems vents unauthorized viewing). Security Keep this container in the physical possession of an SCI-indoctrinated person. All SCIF intelligence and information systems used for processing, storing, and conveying intel- Limit the quantity of SCI material permitted ligence and/or SIGINT information must be ac- within the mobile TSCIF to that which is ab- credited prior to operating. The DON approving solutely essential to sustain the mission. authority for SCIF intelligence systems is the Of- Employ stringent security arrangements to fice of Naval Intelligence (ONI-54) in accordance ensure that the quantity of SCI material is with DIAM 50-4. The cognizant DON approving not allowed to accumulate more than is ab- authority for SCIF resident cryptologic systems is solutely necessary. CNSG (N1). e. Tactical Sensitive Compartmented The SSO is responsible to the G-2/S-2 for overall Information Facility Accreditation management and administration of the unit’s SCI security program and for SCIF security. The The accreditation process consists of three steps, unit’s information system security manager each requiring a message to be sent to the cogni- (ISSM) and the information system security offic- zant approval authority (see NAVSUP to DODD er (ISSO) complement the SSO and are account- 5105.21-M-1). Approval authorities vary with re- able for the SCIF-resident information systems spect to information and formats required. When The ISSM or ISSO will help ensure new and requesting TSCIF authorization and accreditation, changed information systems meet all security re- use the current reference from the cognizant au- quirements. These individuals coordinate the ap- thority. The following reports and messages are proval of new or changed systems with the prepared by the unit SSO or G-2/S-2. appropriate DON approving authority. Normally, the ISSM and ISSO are the principal interface (1) Concept of Operations. A message that between the approving authority and the local outlines the who, what, when, where, and why for command.

(reverse blank) Chapter 9

Training

The policies, standards, and procedures for the (IADS), naval forces organization and capabili- conduct of SIGINT training as well as the assign- ties, and the application of EW. ment of responsibilities to ensure adequate and responsive training are spelled out in DODD Following the Joint Electronic Warfare School, 5210.70, DOD Cryptologic Training. Additional- 7588 lieutenants receive specialized training with ly, MCO 1510.50A, Individual Training Stan- the Fleet Replacement Squadron (VAQ-129), dards (ITS) System for the Signals Intelligence Whidbey Island, Washington. This 9-month Ground Electronic Warfare Occupational Field course provides instruction and training on the (OccFld), provides a detailed description (by rank EA-6B aircraft operations and systems and on and MOS) of tasks SIGINT Marines must be ca- threat IADS aircraft and shipping. Additionally pable of performing. all 7588 electronic warfare officers obtain Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standard- ization (NATOPS) program qualification in the 9001. Military Occupational EA-6B. Speciality Training (3) 2621 Manual Morse Intercept Operator. Manual Morse training begins with Morse code Training for the SIGINT Marine focuses on build- training at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona. Upon gradua- ing, maintaining, and enhancing the technical tion, the new manual Morse intercept operator re- skills required to be MOS proficient. ports to Corry Field, Pensacola, Florida, for the Communication Signals Collection and Process- a. Entry-Level Training ing (450) Course. The foundation for all SIGINT Marine training is (4) 2631 ELINT Intercept Operator or Ana- the entry-level training. Due to its highly techni- lyst. Basic ELINT training is provided by the cal nature, this OccFld possesses some of the Cryptologic Technician Course, Corry Field, longest MOS entry-level training pipelines. The Pensacola, Florida. Marines assigned to the following paragraphs briefly describe these pipe- VMAQ TERPES section also attend the TERPES lines. Operator Course, Navy and Marine Corps Intelli- gence Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia. (1) 0206 Basic SIGINT. Following The Basic School, all SIGINT-designated lieutenants are (5) 2651 Special Intelligence Communica- sent to the Cryptologic Division Officers Course tor. Training in SI communications, data commu- (CDOC), Corry Field, Pensacola, Florida. Fol- nications, networks, and system security is lowing CDOC, all 0206 lieutenants are ordered to provided in the Cryptologic Technician “O” one of the two RadBns to develop and enhance Course, Corry Field, Pensacola, Florida. their SIGINT skills. (6) 267X Cryptologic Linguist. The crypto- (2) 7588 Electronic Warfare Officer. The ini- logic linguist has the longest initial training track tial, formal EW training for air EW lieutenants is of any ground MOS. Training begins with basic the Joint Electronic Warfare School, Pensacola language training at the Defense Language Insti- Florida. The course focuses on basic radar theory, tute (DLI), Monterey, California, for a period of friendly and threat integrated air defense system 47 to 63 weeks, depending on the language and 9-2 ______MCWP 2-22 student’s ability. Following graduation from DLI, ties, limitations, and operational support method- the basic linguist will report to Goodfellow AFB, ologies within MAGTF and other units. During Texas, for cryptologic linguist specialist training. exercises, SIGINT Marines interact with the G-3/ S-3 and G-6/S-6 to refine coordination require- (7) 2629 SIGINT Analyst. Upon completion of ments and improve intelligence flow during actu- their initial tour, many 2621’s, and some 2631’s, al operations. and 267X’s will attend the Fleet Analysis and Re- porting Course, Goodfellow AFB, Texas, for ad- b. SIGINT Training of Non-SIGINT ditional training to qualify for MOS 2629, Marines SIGINT analyst. Non-SIGINT Marines are trained in the capabilities and limitations of Marine, Navy, JTF, theater, b. SIGINT Skill Progression Training and national SIGINT systems that support SIGINT Marines have a wealth of resident and MAGTF operations. Equal time should be spen nonresident training opportunities to refine, main- training these Marines on the capabilities and lim- tain, or enhance their skills. These programs are itations of the adversary’s SIGINT or EW sys- announced by HQMC and include— tems and on individual and force protection tactics and techniques. To improve mutual under- NSA Director’s Fellowship Program for standing and eliminate misconceptions, the field grade officers. unique security restrictions required when dealing with SIGINT information should also be ex- Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program for company grade officers. plained to and practiced by non-SIGINT Marines. Middle Enlisted Cryptologic Career Ad- vancement Program for SNCOs. Military Intern SIGINT Analyst Program 9003. Exercises for SNCOs and NCOs. Military ELINT Signals Analyst Program SIGINT operations in exercises are closely con- for SNCOs and NCOs. trolled. The same security precautions and con- Marine Corps Cryptologic Computer Ad- trols are required for both the real world and ministration Program for enlisted Marines. exercises. USSID 56, Exercise SIGINT, provides guidance on obtaining and using SIGINT during Various military linguist programs. exercises.

Exercise SIGINT provides commanders, staffs 9002. Functional Training and units with experience in SIGINT operations, information, rules, communications, and person- Functional SIGINT training focuses on ensuring nel. Exercise SIGINT operations may be conduct- Marines in all elements of the MAGTF are aware ed with or without an opposition force. Care of SIGINT contributions and the corresponding should be taken during exercises to present a real- SIGINT or EW threat from our adversaries. istic picture of what SIGINT systems can provide to avoid creating false expectations. a. SIGINT Marines Functional training educates SIGINT Marines on If an opposition force does not participate, exer- all-source intelligence operations within the cise SIGINT may be scripted or preplanned (e.g., MAGTF, naval forces, and JTFs. SIGINT staff exercise [STAFFEX] or a command post Marines participate in exercises to learn opera- exercise [CPX]). Use of scripted SIGINT in an tional intelligence requirements; the interaction exercise must be requested and approved by the between commanders and staffs and MAGTF appropriate agency well in advance of the exer- units and intelligence sections; and the capabili- cise. This will allow time to script the exercise Signals Intelligence ______9-3

SIGINT necessary to realistically support the sce- b. G-2/S-2 and Intelligence Personnel nario. Exercise planners and exercise SIGINT Intelligence personnel must be able to— scripters must coordinate to ensure the SIGIN information flow is realistic. All security requirements must be maintained throughout the exercise Understand the capabilities and limitations (e.g., TSCIF activation and SCI-handling proce- of SIGINT collection operations and the dures). planning, integration, coordination, and execution of SIGINT collection with multidiscipline intelligence and reconnaissance Exercise SIGINT operations may be conducted collection operations. against an opposition force (e.g., during a Understand the capabilities and limitations MAGTF field exercise). This provides more real- of SIGINT production operations and the istic training for the SIGINT element and SIGINT planning, integration, coordination, and exe- users. Depending on the level of the exercise, the cution of SIGINT production with all- use of simulators and national systems may be resource intelligence production operations. quested to add realism and enhance training These assets must be requested well in advance of Understand the capabilities and limitations the exercise and approved by the appropriate of SIGINT dissemination operations (e.g. agency described in the J-TENS manual. planning, integration, coordination, and execution of routine and time-sensitive SIGINT dissemination) and the requirements, establishment, and integration of unique SIGINT 9004. Operational Training and multiuse CIS architectures. Objectives c. G-3/S-3 and Maneuver and Fires The major objective for SIGINT operations train- Personnel ing is exercising SIGINT operations in a realistic Operations, maneuver, and fires personnel should tactical environment with all elements of the be able to— MAGTF.

Plan, coordinate, and conduct effective a. SIGINT Organizations MAGTF SIGINT, EW, and CIS operations. RadBns and VMAQs should— Plan, coordinate, and conduct insertion and extraction methods. Train unit leaders, planners, and supervisory Site and coordinate SIGINT collection and personnel to— DF teams with supporting SIGINT elements, Plan and direct, process and exploit, pro- G-2/S-2, and subordinate commanders. duce, disseminate, and use unique Coordinate SIGINT operations with SIGINT and integrated all-source intelli- MAGTF and subordinate units’ future and gence. current operations centers and fire support Plan and integrate SIGINT operations coordination centers. with multifunctional staff operations. Disseminate and use SIGINT and other SCI Conduct SIGINT operations. information. Train SIGINT operators in SIGINT— Operations. d. G-4/S-4 and Combat Service Systems. Support Personnel Equipment. Logistics and CSS personnel should understand TTP. SIGINT units’ unique CSS requirements (particu- Supporting operations (i.e., CIS, logistics, larly electronic maintenance and unique consum- and intelligence). ables such as batteries). 9-4 ______MCWP 2-22 e. G-6/S-6 and Communications and f. Headquarters Commandant Information Systems Personnel Headquarters commandant personnel must be CIS personnel must be able to plan, coordinate able to understand, plan, and provide for the SIG- and integrate SIGINT CIS requirements within INT units’ security requirements (particularly MAGTF and supporting CIS plans and opera- those associated with TSCIFs and mobile SIGINT tions. SCIFs). Appendix A

Radio Battalion SIGINT Support Unit Checklist

The following checklist is provided as a guide to production, and dissemination require- assist the radio battalion (RadBn) SIGINT sup- ments and current intelligence estimate. port unit (SSU) officer in charge (OIC) conduc operations. Depending on the mission, location G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer to and duration of an operation, some items may not determine time constraints for submission be applicable. of input to appendix 2 to annex B of the operations order. Planning Stage G-2/S-2 all-source fusion center OIC to determine plans and integration of intelli- Coordinate with the RadBn S-3 to— gence and SIGINT production activities. Determine exact mission and tasking of G-2/S-2 dissemination officer for a list of the detachment and the authority and com- SIGINT products recipients, appropriate report formats, and routine and time- mand relationship. sensitive communications and informa- Review all messages related to deploy- tion systems (CIS) plans. ment and composition of the detachment. G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer and Ensure S-3 tasks companies or sections to G-4/S-4 for supply and logistics require- provide required personnel to fill detachments to be provided by supported comment table of organization (T/O) line num- mand (e.g., electronic maintenance and bers. consumables such as batteries; meals, ready to eat; maps; and fuel). Request assignment of RadBn SIGINT address and producer designator digraph, if G-3/S-3 electronic warfare officer for elec- necessary. tronic attack (EA) requirements and capabilities and input to appendix 3 to annex C Verify formats and instructions for re- of the operations order. quired reports. G-2/S-2 operations officer and G-6/S-6 to Determine if area clearances and clearance address requirements for communications certifications are necessary and request support (e.g., secure and unclassified local special security officer (SSO) take appro- area network [LAN] access, equipment). priate action. G-3/S-3 to establish liaison teams with Review pertinent orders and instructions supported unit’s subordinate elements if of the supported unit. necessary. Identify and arrange for special training Command security manager, G-2/S-2, and and operational requirements. G-3/S-3 for force protection and communications security monitoring requirements and plans. Coordinate with the following supported command— Develop and publish a training schedule in co- G-2/S-2 intelligence operations officer to ordination with the RadBn S-3 and supported determine initial intelligence collection, unit’s intelligence officer. A-2 ______MCWP 2-22

Request courier cards from RadBn SSO for Determine telecommunications service re- appropriate detachment personnel. quest (TSR) requirement. Coordinate collection and analytical and pro- Determine frequency and call sign require- duction requirements with the operations con- ments and request communications- trol and analysis (OCA) element to— electronics operating instructions. Ensure the detachment analytical and pro- Request special intelligence (SI) routing duction team knows the technical aspects indicator and plain language address as- of the operations area. signments. Ensure the analytical and production team Determine communications security mate- has a current technical support package; rials system (CMS) requirements and re- request an update if required (i.e., hard- quest that the CMS custodian have copy, electronic copy). material available for issue. Ensure SIGINT position designators for Designate an SSO CMS custodian. equipment are current; prepare and issue required SIGINT resource status report Determine TEMPEST inspections and au- (RSR). tomated information systems accreditation requirements. Ensure the National Security Agency (NSA) or the pertinent regional security Determine cryptographic hardware and operations center or cryptologic shore sup- keying material requirements and procedures with all communication elements. port activity provides a current technical briefing on targets in the area of operations. Ensure all personnel are qualified with T/O weapons and arrange for battlesight zero (BZO) firing as necessary. Coordinate transportation requirements with RadBn S-3, S-4, and supported unit. Predeployment Stage Coordinate embarkation requirements with RadBn S-4 and supported unit to— Audit health records to— Review current embarkation orders. Determine inoculations required and ar- Complete embarkation forms (e.g., Tacti- range for required shots with the corps- cal Cargo Manifest Declaration, 1387-2, man. 1348-1). Determine if detachment members or Review current inbound and outbound ag- members of their families are undergoing ricultural restrictions on vehicles. extensive outpatient care, with an indefi- nite prognosis. Assemble complete embarkation kit with guidelines for use upon departure. Confirm and record blood types. Request table of equipment (T/E) items for Ensure all personnel requiring eyeglasses detachment. have two pair. Also ensure they have opti- cal inserts for gas masks. Coordinate communications and information Ensure detachment members meet class I requirements with RadBn S-6 and supported or II dental readiness. unit intelligence officer and CIS officer to— Arrange for block pickup of health and Determine circuit request requirement. dental records. Signals Intelligence ______A-3

Coordinate legal affairs to— Ensure baggage is appropriate and of sturdy construction. Inform personnel of advisability of wills and procedures for obtaining them. Ensure personnel know customs requirements of locations to be visited. Inform personnel of powers of attorney and procedures for obtaining them. Prepare government transportation request. Prepare military transportation authorization. Arrange for storage of privately owned vehicles and personal effects. Conduct the following: Family services deployment briefing for Arrange for mail handling. all SSU and family members. Coordinate pay matters to— Red Cross brief. Conduct personal financial record audit. Navy and Marine Corps Relief brief (to include preauthorized emergency loan appli- Prepare savings and other allotments. cations).

Coordinate administrative matters to— Religious services brief. Verify accuracy of record of emergency Family services brief. data. Key spouses brief. Ensure identification cards are current and have proper Geneva Convention category Assemble assigned T/E equipment required information. for deployment to— Ensure personnel have current identifica- Perform operational check of equipment. tion (ID) tags. Complete limited technical inspection (LTI) on all equipment. Audit and update officer qualification records and enlisted service record books. Perform acceptance inspections on all temp-loan equipment. Complete change of reporting senior fit- Check the date of last calibration, if ap- ness reports, fitness report roughs, and plicable. proficiency and conduct marks. Arrange for draw or transfer of CMS material. Coordinate clothing inspection and requirements to— Receive CMS custodial briefing from CMS custodian. Ensure personnel have appropriate service- able uniforms for all destinations. Receive security requirements and emergency destruction briefing from SSO. Ensure personnel have appropriate civilian Conduct training in accordance with estab- attire in accordance with local military lished detachment training schedule. customs of country(ies) to be visited. Coordinate with the RadBn SSO and classi- Ensure temporary issue requirements draw fied materials control officer to— includes the proper sizes and is coordinated through the RadBn S-4 and supported Designate a detachment classified material unit. secondary control point and custodian. A-4 ______MCWP 2-22

Ensure required single-scope background Determine topographic and map require- investigation periodic reviews are initiat- ments and request allowance from OCA or ed on those detachment personnel identi- the supported unit. fied as needing updates. Request preparation of appropriate crypto- Request sensitive compartmented informa- logic technical kits from NSA or the sup- tion (SCI) clearance certification on all de- porting cryptologic shore support activity. tachment personnel be forwarded to cognizant units and other organizations as Coordinate with RadBn S-4 supply to estab- necessary. lish fiscal account job order numbers and sign the consolidated memorandum receipt. Coordinate with the RadBn adjutant or S-1 to— Coordinate with RadBn S-4 electronic maintenance to— Draw record books. Establish equipment maintenance proce- Pick up orders. dures. Establish report criteria. Establish electronic maintenance support and prepare pre-expend bin support block. Arrange for administrative and legal briefs. Ensure that all equipment receives a predeployment LTI. Arrange for detachment Uniform Code of Military Justice and code of conduct brief- Ensure skeleton record jackets are pre- ings. pared for all equipment. Coordinate with RadBn SSO to— Coordinate with RadBn S-4 motor transport and engineer to— Confirm security requirements. Establish equipment maintenance proce- Pick up courier cards for specified person- dures. nel. Establish motor transport and engineer Receive area intelligence briefs to include support. customs, politics, religion, and standards Ensure skeleton record jackets are pre- of personal conduct. pared for all vehicles. Receive counterintelligence area threat briefs. Coordinate with RadBn S-4 ordnance officer to— Ensure all required personnel receive appropriate special access indoctrination(s). Determine weapon requirements and other ordnance needs. Transfer necessary technical material from SSO and OCA classified material control Obtain proper storage boxes for the trans- center accounts. port of weapons. Draw weapons. Coordinate with RadBn S-3 to— Conduct necessary inspections. Establish SIGINT operations report criteria. Conduct daily sight counts. Signals Intelligence ______A-5

Determine ammunition and pyrotechnic Coordinate with G-2/S-2 intelligence opera- training requirements during deployment. tions officer for inputs and presentation for intelligence estimate, concept of operations, and Coordinate with RadBn S-4 embarkation of- intelligence operations plans briefings. ficer to— Submit the following required reports and Receive embarkation package. messages: Determine dunnage requirements. Activation report and deactivation report to RadBn S-3 and supported unit G-2/S-2. Draw equipment and sign for gear assigned to Circuit activation report to RadBn S-6 and detachment. supported unit G-6/S-6. Receive medical brief from battalion medical Administrative reports to RadBn S-1. personnel. CMS destruction reports to SSO or CMS. Contact special services officer for recreation items. Circuit deactivation report to RadBn S-6 and supported unit G-6/S-6. Publish the final— Transportation request to RadBn and sup- Detachment T/O and T/E. ported unit G-4/S-4. Roster of personnel. Required analysis and technical reports to OCA and supported unit G-2/S-2. (RSR to Dependent point-of-contact roster. NSA upon activation and deactivation.) Equipment and uniforms required. Tactical SCI facility activation and deac- Detachment training schedule. tivation reports to Commander, Naval Se- curity Group, supported unit SSO, and Detachment operations order. others as appropriate.

Palletize or combat load supplies and equip- Prepare and distribute required reports to the ment. supported commander. Coordinate embarkation of personnel and Send deactivation message. equipment with S-4 of supported unit. Stage for embarkation. Postdeployment Turn in weapons and classified material im- Deployment mediately upon return. Coordinate with G-2/3 and S-2/3 for initial lo- Participate in supported unit operations de- cation of combat operations center, combat in- briefings as required. Debrief with RadBn telligence center, and collection direction commanding officer and S-3 on the first finding (DF) and EA teams. working day after return. Continue coordination of collection and DF Coordinate with RadBn adjutant, S-1, S-3, team and radio reconnaissance team locations and S-4 to— with G-2/S-2 collections officer and G-3/S-3. Return record books to S-1. Include updates for inserts, extract times, and methods. Return medical and dental records. A-6 ______MCWP 2-22

Terminate temporary additional duty Turn in equipment on equipment repair orders (TAD) orders. and note any equipment damage or problems. Prepare and submit performance evalua- Settle fiscal account. tion reports and proficiency and conduct marks as required for the TAD period. Submit an after action report within 20 days of return (or as directed) to the supported unit Notify mail clerk to stop forwarding mail. G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and RadBn S-3. Return technical material to the OCA pla- Disband detachment. toon. Prepare award recommendations on deserving Return CMS material to CMS custodian with- personnel. in 48 hours of return. Return courier cards to SSO. Recommend necessary changes to unit SOPs and coordinate with the RadBn and supported Prepare equipment for postdeployment LTI. unit staff. Ensure proper maintenance is conducted on equipment prior to returning to respective companies or sections. Appendix B

Marine Corps SIGINT Equipment

Radio battalions (RadBns) and Marine tactical quent production and dissemination of SIGINT electronic warfare squadrons (VMAQs) use products. The following sections describe the pri- unique specialized equipment for the search, de- mary SIGINT equipment in the inventory of the tection, identification, processing and exploitation RadBns and VMAQs. of enemy signals of interest (SOIs), and the subse-

Section I. Radio Battalion SIGINT Equipment

AN/ULQ-19(V)2 Electronic Attack Set

The AN/ULQ-19(V)2 electronic attack (EA) set (figure B-1) provides the capability to conduct spot or sweep jamming of single-channel, encrypted or unencrypted, voice or data signals operating in the standard military frequency range of 20-79.975 MHz from selected mobile platforms (e.g., high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs], mobile electronic warfare support system [MEWSS], helicopters). In addition, it can provide up to four channels of high-power VHF voice and/or data communications when not being used as a jamming system. When employed as a tactical, general-purpose, low-VHF jamming system, it has a 250-watt radio frequency linear amplifier that produces a nominal 200 watts of effective radiated power (ERP) using a standard omnidirectional whip antenna. To provide required jamming, the system must be employed and operated from a location with an unobstructed signal line of sight to the target enemy’s communications transceiver. Figure B-1. AN/ULQ-19(V)2. B-2 ______MCWP 2-22

AN/MLQ-36 Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System

The AN/MLQ-36 MEWSS provides a multifunctional capability that gives SIGINT electronic warfare (EW) operators limited armor protection (figure B-2). This equipment is ideally suited to provide SIGINT EW support for highly mobile mechanized and military operations in urban terrain where maneuver and/or armor protection is critical. MEWSS comprises a signals intercept system, a radio direction finding (DF) system, an EA system, a secure communications system, and an intercom system installed in a logistics variant of the light armored vehicle (LAV)-25. Electronic warfare support (ES) activities are accomplished through the use of two WJ-8618B(S1) acquisition receivers and the WJ-32850 MANTIS DF system. EA activities are conducted with the AN/ULQ- l9(V) electronic attack set.

Figure B-2. AN/MLQ-36. Signals Intelligence ______B-3

AN/MLQ-36A Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System Product Improvement Program

The mobile electronic warfare support system product improvement program (MEWSS-PIP) is an advanced SIGINT/EW system integrated into an LAV (figure B-3). The MEWSS-PIP provides a total replacement of the EW mission equipment now fielded in the AN/MLQ-36 MEWSS. It provides the ground commander with a mobile SIG- INT/EW system capable of operating in a variety of tactical situations. The primary mission of the MEWSS-PIP is to provide intercept, collection, automated DF, and EA against threat modern communications and noncommunications emitters across a broad frequency range. It is a multiservice, open-systems architecture developed by the Marine Corps and the Army that incorporates elements of the Army’s intelligence and electronic warfare common sensor (IEWCS) system. This system enhances interoperability through cooper- ative engagement, data sharing, and precision location. Initial operational capability is scheduled for fourth quarter, fiscal year 1999.

Figure B-3. AN/MLQ-36A. B-4 ______MCWP 2-22

AN/PRD-12 Direction Finder Set

The AN/PRD-12 is a tactical, man-transportable system that provides search, intercept, and DF on communications signals in the HF/VHF/UHF bands (figure B-4). Up to four PRD-12 stations can be networked, providing DF data to a mission control station via radio link with single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) equipment. Each station has the ability to function as the net control station. When stations are networked, they provide target emitter position data to mission control via voice link. A complete station can be relocated rapidly, optimizing its use in forward areas with combat units.

Figure B-4. AN/PRD-12. Signals Intelligence ______B-5

AN/MSC-63A Communications Central

The AN/MSC-63A is a shelterized communications switch that provides a secure semiautomated data communications switch and terminals for the processing of general service (GENSER) or defense special security communications system (DSSCS) sensitive compartmented information (SCI) record message traffic. See figure B-5. There is one AN/MSC-63A with each Marine division and Marine aircraft wing special security communications team, and three AN/MSC-63A’s with each RadBn. The system consists of three functional subsystems: shelter and auxiliary support subsystem, the communications subsystem, and the data processing subsystem. See figure B-6. The AN/MSC-63A is fully compatible with the Army’s AN/TYC-39. Figure B-5. AN/MSC-63A.

Figure B-6. AN/MSC-63A (interior view). B-6 ______MCWP 2-22

AN/TSQ-130(V)2/(V)5 primary system used by the RadBn SIGINT Technical Control and support unit. It is capable of performing semiautomated-SIGINT collection management, Analysis Center data base maintenance, analysis, technical and tactical reporting, and SIGINT technical control The AN/TSQ-130(V)2/(V)5 technical control and of forward deployed RadBn elements or teams. analysis center (TCAC) is an all-weather, tactical, The (V)2 is the baseline system, while the (V)5 transportable, SIGINT-processing, analysis and has upgraded communications capabilities. See reporting system installed in a large, self- figure B-7 for a notional TCAC concept of em- contained, modified S-280G shelter. TCAC is the ployment.

Figure B-7. Technical Control and Analysis Center Concept of Employment. Signals Intelligence ______B-7

AN/MYQ-8 TCAC-PIP operations, a RAWS will be connected to the shelter via local area network (LAN) or radio link. It The AN/MYQ-8 TCAC-PIP will replace the could operate in a stand-alone mode. TCAC. It will consist of three remoteable analysis workstations (RAWSs), one communications in- Communications Interface Module terface module (CIM), and one supervisor control CIM provides man-machine interface to commu- module (SCM). Each workstation will consist of nication subroutines that support the interface be- modularly designed component equipment fully tween the TCAC PIP and other RadBn systems integrated to perform their intended functions. (e.g., team portable collection system, mobile electronic warfare support system) or external in- Remoteable Analysis Workstation telligence agencies. RAWS provides the capability to perform necessary analysis and reporting functions at a central Supervisor Control Module location or a more forward deployed site, remoted SCM provides a man-machine interface to file from the TCAC shelter. During shelter opera- server and supervisor subroutines to support sys- tions, a RAWS will be electrically interconnected tem control and overall supervision of the TCAC to the other terminals in the shelter. During remote PIP workstations.

AN/USC-55 Commander’s gence centers at all echelons, in near-real-time, at Tactical Terminal GENSER or SCI levels. The receiver provides one full-duplex and two receive-only channels. Planned concept of employment for CTT is simi- The AN/USC-55 commander’s tactical terminal lar to that of the tactical receive equipment (TRE) (CTT) is a multiservice-developed, special appli- fielded widely within the MAGTF to allow access cation, UHF satellite communications receiver to intelligence broadcasts and intelligence collec- that can be dedicated to receive critical, time- tors and producers. Full operational capability for sensitive intelligence by commanders and intelli- CTT is expected during fiscal year 1999. B-8 ______MCWP 2-22

Team Portable Collection System Upgrade

The team portable collection system (TPCS) upgrade (figure B-8) is a semiautomated, man-transportable communications intelligence (COMINT) system. It provides intercept, collection, radio direction finding, analysis, reporting, and collection management support. The system provides significant SIGINT capabilities in a modular configuration that can be deployed by component as a stand-alone COMINT system or as part of the integrated RadBn SIGINT and MAGTF intelligence efforts. TPCS uses state-of-the-art equipment that consolidates information and expedites the deliv- ery of critical COMINT to MAGTF and external commanders and agencies. The upgrade will ex- tend the frequency range of the system and provide capabilities against modern signals.

Figure B-8. Team Portable Collection System Upgrade.

Figure B-9. Team Portable Collection System COMINT Collection Subsystem. Signals Intelligence ______B-9

TPCS upgrade is comprised of three subsystems: radio nets are used to link TPCS upgrade outsta- a COMINT collection subsystem (CCS), includ- tions with the RadBn TCAC to allow automated ing the AN/PRD-12 direction finding set (to be processing and dissemination of collected infor- replace by TOPMAKER) and collection receivers mation and ultimate dissemination to the MAGTF (see figure B-9 on the facing page); an analysis G-2/S-2 and other organizations. Full operational subsystem (AS) (figure B-10); and a communica- capability for TPCS upgrade is expected by the tions subsystem (CS). Modern single-channel second quarter of fiscal year 2001.

Figure B-10. Team Portable Collection System Analysis Subsystem. B-10 ______MCWP 2-22

Trojan Spirit II Routers provide access to the secret internet protocol router network, the Joint Worldwide Trojan Spirit II (TS II) is a mobile SHF satellite Intelligence Communications System, National communications (SATCOM) system that uses Security Agency platform, and the defense SAT- commercial or military satellites to receive, trans- COM system. These capabilities provide the nec- mit, and process secure, voice, data, video essary dedicated communications for coordinating teleconferencing (VTC), and facsimile communi- MAGTF SIGINT and other intelligence opera- cations. See figure B-11. TS II provides 14 chan- tions. The system consists of three HMMWVs nels of digital voice or data (SCI or GENSER) with with mounted standard integrated command post a maximum aggregate data rate of 1.544 mega- lightweight multipurpose shelters, tunnel-mounted bytes per second (Mbps). LAN communications power generation units, a towed 2.4 meter (C, Ku- are supported by SCI and GENSER ethernets. band), and a 6.1 meter (C, Ku, X-band) antenna.

Figure B-11. Trojan Spirit II. Signals Intelligence ______B-11

Radio Reconnaissance Equipment Program

The radio reconnaissance equipment program (RREP) SIGINT suite (SS)-1 is a semiautomated, integrated radio intercept and DF system composed of a ruggedized computer and six functional modules that plug together. See figure B-12. RREP SS-1 modules may operate independently or semi-independently through the use of the ruggedized, handheld computer system. It is designed to enable preplanned product improve- ments and future technology upgrades. The selected equipment will enable the radio reconnaissance teams (RRTs) to target the majori- ty of low-level, single-channel, unencrypted tactical signals of interest used by military, police, insurgents, and other potential hostile forces throughout the world. RREP SS-1 will be employed by RRTs during advance force, preassault and deep postassault conventional, and special operations, under any environmental, climatic, or weather conditions. The system is designed to Figure B-12. RREP SS-1. lighten the individual RRT Marine’s combat load as well as to enhance the RRT’s operational signal search and technical data base development collection operations.

The RREP SS-2 will provide a highly deployable, man-transportable, signals intercept and DF system employed by RRTs in support of the entire spectrum of MAGTF operations. See figure B-13. RREP SS-2 employs advanced receiver capabilities, cellular phone and other digital communications collection and DF technology, global positioning system map navigation software, a more modular design, and electronic attack capabilities. As with RREP SS-1, the SS-2 operates at the modular level and at the integrated system level. The system can be controlled manually or via subcompact personal computer.

Figure B-13. RREP SS-2. B-12 ______MCWP 2-22

The handheld integrated directional receiver and RRTs with a threat I&W capability during radio homing (HIDRAH) system is a man-transport- reconnaissance foot-mobile patrols and signal able, tactical, cordless, radio intercept and signal homing support for tactical recovery of aircraft line-of-bearing (LOB) DF system consisting of and personnel operations. The HIDRAH system several commercial off-the-shelf items of equip- has a unique design that may be employed inde- ment fully integrated in a single, ruggedized and pendently in a handheld manner or by mounting it weather-resistant housing. HIDRAH provides to an M16 rifle (figure B-14).

Figure B-14. Rifle-Mounted HIDRAH. Signals Intelligence ______B-13

Section II. Radio Battalion SIGINT Equipment Technical Characteristics

Designator Description Frequency Coverage Modulation AN/MLQ-36 MEWSS; COMINT collect/process/ 20-80 MHz (collection and DF AM, FM, ICW, SSB, FSK analysis; EA expandable to 500 MHz) AN/MLQ-36A MEWSS-PIP; COMINT/ELINT col- 0.5 MHz - 40 GHz conventional, low probability lect/process/geolocation; EA of intercept AN/PRD-12 direction finder set, man .5 - 500 MHz AM, FM, ICW, SSB, FSK packable AN/ULQ-19(V)2 electronic attack set; EA 20 - 79.975 MHz FM AR-2002 commercial VHF/UHF frequency 25 - 550 MHz, 800 - 1300 MHz AM, FM scanner; COMINT AR-2500 commercial HF/VHF/ UHF fre- 1 - 1500 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB quency scanner; COMINT AR-2515 commercial HF/VHF/ UHF fre- 5 - 1500 MHz AM, FM quency scanner; COMINT AR-3000 commercial HF/VHF/ UHF fre- 0.1 - 2036 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB quency scanner; COMINT EB-100 receiver, miniport VHF/UHF; DF 20 - 1000 MHz intercept and DF AM or FM HEXJAMS hand-emplaced, expendable jam- barrage jam 20 - 80 MHz NA mers HIDRAH COMINT collection, DF .1 - 1900 MHz intercept AM, FM, USB, LSB, CW 25 - 1000 MHz DF IC-R71A general coverage HF receiver; 0.1 - 30 MHz AM, FM, CW COMINT IC-R7000 general coverage VHF/UHF 25 - 1300 MHz AM, FM, SSB receiver; COMINT IC-R9000 general coverage HF/VHF/UHF 0.1 - 1999.80 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB receiver; COMINT ICF-PR080 commercial HF/VHF handheld fre- .15 - 108 MHz & 115.15 - 223 MHz AM, FM, SSB quency scanner; COMINT MPR-88 receiver, miniport VHF/UHF, rugge- 20 - 1000 MHz intercept AM or FM dized; COMINT R-2174(P)/URR radio receiver, general purpose, 0.5 - 29.999 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB HF; COMINT RREP SS-1 COMINT collection, DF 1 - 2000 MHz intercept AM, FM, USB, LSB, CW 25 - 1000 MHz DF RREP SS-2 COMINT collection, DF .1 - 1900 MHz intercept AM, FM, USB, LSB, CW 25 - 1000 MHz DF WJ-8616 radio receiver, general purpose, 0.5 - 29.999 MHz AM, FM, CW, SSB HF; COMINT WJ-8618 radio receiver, general purpose, 20 - 500 MHz AM, FM, CW, pulse VHF/UHF; COMINT WJ-8654 radio receiver, general purpose, .5 MHz - 1.0 GHz AM, FM, CW, pulse COMINT B-14 ______MCWP 2-22 Section III. VMAQ SIGINT and EW Equipment

EA-6B Prowler

The EA-6B Prowler (figure B-15) is a subsonic advanced warfare carrier capable aircraft, powered by twin turbojet engines. The crew is composed of one pilot and three electronic countermeasure officers. The AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming system effectively incorporates receivers and external pods for power and transmission of jamming signals. The Prowler receives and processes designated signals of interest (SOIs) for jamming selected SOIs for subsequent processing and analysis and employs the AGM- 88 high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM). Figure B-15. EA-6B Prowler.

AN/TSQ-90D/E(V) TERPES (ACE) air strike mission planning and intelligence requirements. It is a multisource, integrated, tacti- The AN/TSQ-90D/E(V) tactical electronic recon- cal ELINT data processing, correlation, and fu- naissance processing and evaluation system sion system installed in a S-280-size transportable (TERPES) receives, processes, evaluates, and dis- shelter. TERPES supports the ELINT and EA/ES plays electronic reconnaissance and EA mission mission and VMAQ and MAGTF ACE com- information received from the EA-6B aircraft and mander’s intelligence requirements. TERPES other theater and national electronic intelligence may be transported by aircraft, shock-mounted (ELINT) assets (figure B-16). TERPES also as- air-ride commercial or tactical ground vehicle, or sists the MAGTF aviation combat element’s attachable mobilizer for short distances.

Figure B-16. AN/TSQ-90D/E(V), TERPES Portable Unit. Appendix C

SIGINT and SCI Security Management Operations Flowchart

The flowchart on the following pages summarizes the principal SIGINT and SCI security planning considerations, activities, and products discussed in this publication. C-2 ______MCWP 2-22 Signals Intelligence ______C-3

(reverse blank) Appendix D

SIGINT Appendix Format

This appendix should explain how SIGINT elements supporting or under the operational control of the MAGTF will be used to support this plan. It should also provide guidance to subordinate commanders for the conduct of SIGINT operations and the support of SIGINT elements and personnel identified to fulfill the SIGINT requirements in this plan. ______

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.___ of ___ copies Issuing Unit PLACE OF ISSUE Date/time group Message reference number

APPENDIX 2 (Signals Intelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order ______( )

Ref: (a) Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) for intelligence and counterintelligence (b) Combatant commander, joint task force, or other higher authorities’ operation orders (OPORDs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures directives (c) (List other documents that provide guidance required for SIGINT and supporting operations planning functions.)

1. ( ) SITUATION

a. ( ) Enemy Situation. (Reference Appendix 8 [Intelligence Estimate] to Annex B. Describe the threat and potential threat, the basic situation and the SIGINT operations perspective. Identify the enemy’s command and contro tactical and electronic orders of battle; and estimates of the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, intentions, capabilities, and possible courses of action pertinent to SIGINT operations. When possible, identify finished intelligence products supporting these findings. Reference Annex B and current intelligence estimates for threat capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, order o battle, and assessed courses of action.)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION D-2 ______MCWP 2-22

CLASSIFICATION

b. ( ) Friendly Situation. (Reference Annex C [Operations] and other pertinent sources.)

c. ( ) SIGINT Support Available. (Reference Annex A [Task Organi- zation], Annex B, and other pertinent sources. Identify organic, attached, and supporting SIGINT elements available to support MAGTF intelligence operations. Specify elements attached to or in direct support of any subordinate unit.)

2. ( ) MISSION

(State concisely the SIGINT mission as it relates to the command’s planned operation.)

3. ( ) EXECUTION

a. ( ) Concept of Operations. (Summarize pertinent command relationships, task organization, main and supporting efforts, and the scope of MAGTF and supporting SIGINT and relevant all-source intelligence operations.)

b. ( ) Tasks for SIGINT and Subordinate Units and Task Force Com- manders and Officers in Charge (OICs).

(1) ( ) Radio battalion (RadBn) SIGINT support unit (SSU) commanding officer or OIC

(2) ( ) Aviation combat element commander (special attention to VMAQ tasks)

(3) ( ) Ground combat element (GCE) commander

(4) ( ) Rear area operations center (RAOC) commander

(5) ( ) (Others as appropriate)

(This section may include direction, requirements, authority, and other guidance regarding SIGINT elements placed in direct support of MAGTF subordinate element. Also it may include tactical sensitive compartmented [SCI] facilities, special security offices, physical security, and personnel supporting SIGINT and SCI operations, etc.)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION Signals Intelligence ______D-3

CLASSIFICATION

c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. (Restatement of MAGTF priority intelligence requirements; detailed procedures for intelligence requirements management; SIGINT support requests; direct liaison among subordinate commanders, MAGTF SIGINT units, staff officers, and pertinent external organizations and agencies; routine and time-sensitive reporting and formats; etc.)

4. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. ( ) Logistics. (Reference Annex D [Logistics]. Identify unique combat service support requirements, procedures, and guidance to support MAGTF SIGINT units and operations. Specify procedures for specialized technical logistics support necessary from external organizations [e.g., from Director, Na- tional Security Agency, or via service cryptologic element channels].)

b. ( ) Personnel. (Reference Annex E [Personnel]. Identify SIGINT- unique personnel requirements and concerns, including global sourcing support and contracted linguist requirements.)

c. ( ) Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. (Provide a consolidated listing and impact assessment of personnel and equipment shortfalls and other limiting factors that significantly affect unit SIGINT operations and support. Identify resource problems and specify key tasks that might not be accomplished adequately.)

5. ( ) COMMAND AND CONTROL

(Reference the MAGTF’s and SIGINT units’ SOPs and Appendix 10 [Intelli- gence Operations Plan]. Provide guidance as appropriate on the following, including internal unit and external organizations’ command and control [C2])

a. ( ) Command Relationships. (Reference Annex J [Command Rela- tionships]. Provide any instructions necessary regarding command relationships arrangements that will influence MAGTF SIGINT operations, with special attention to C2 relationship concerning SIGINT elements attached to or in direct support of MAGTF subordinate units.)

b. ( ) Information Management. (Reference Annex U [Information Management], Annex C [Operations], and Appendix 10 to Annex B. Provide any instructions necessary regarding information management [e.g., time-sensitive and routine SIGINT reporting criteria, SIGINT data bases, administration and access, reports] that will influence MAGTF SIGINT operations.)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION D-4 ______MCWP 2-22

CLASSIFICATION

c. ( ) Communications and Information Systems (CIS) . (Reference Appendix 10 to Annex B and Annex K [Communications and Information Sys- tems]. Provide any instructions necessary regarding CIS that will influence MAGTF SIGINT operations.)

d. ( ) SIGINT C2 Nodes and Facilities. (Reference the MAGTF's and SIGINT units’ SOPs and Appendix 10 to Annex B. Provide any guidance and instructions necessary regarding the establishment and operations of SIGIN C2 nodes and facilities [e.g., the operations control and analysis center, amphibious task force ship’s signals exploitation spaces] and their integration with other MAGTF C2 nodes [e.g., the MAGTF all-source fusion center, the surveillance and reconnaissance center, the reconnaissance operations center, the amphibious task force intelligence center, electronic warfare coordination center].)

/s/ ______

OFFICIAL

/s/ ______

TABS:

A - Communications Intelligence Operations Requirements B - Electronic Intelligence Operations Requirements C - (Others as appropriate: routine and time-sensitive reporting formats, SIGINT CIS plan, etc.)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION Signals Intelligence ______D-5

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.___ of ___ copies Issuing Unit PLACE OF ISSUE Date/time group Message reference number

TAB A (Communications Intelligence Operations Requirements) to APPENDIX 2 (Signals Intelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order ______( )

1. ( ) GENERAL

(The purpose of this tab is to identify operations requirements for communications intelligence [COMINT] support to the planned MAGTF operation.)

NOTE: SCI controls may require this tab to be published separately from the basic OPORD, Annex B and/or Appendix 2.

a. ( ) (Orient COMINT collection, processing and exploitation, production, and dissemination efforts to answer the questions listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.)

b. ( ) (These requirements should address both organic and external direct support SIGINT resources tasked to support the MAGTF.)

c. ( ) (Reference other pertinent portions of Annex B and current intelligence estimates.)

2. ( ) COMINT OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS AND MANAGE- MENT

a. ( ) Classification. (Designate the overall classification of the information included. Assign the lowest classification possible consistent with established security guidelines.)

b. ( ) Statement of Requirement. (Describe in detail COMINT information need, priority, specification of timeliness, location accuracy, and periodicity using the following format:

(1) ( ) Requirement. A detailed narrative statement of the requirement.

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION D-6 ______MCWP 2-22

CLASSIFICATION

(2) ( ) Priority. The priority of each requirement specification, using the following criteria for assigning priority:

(a) ( ) Priority 1. Intelligence vital to successful plan implementation (forms the basis for the most crucial operational decisions).

(b) ( ) Priority 2. Intelligence of critical importance to plan implementation, required for making operational decisions and planning future operations.

(c) ( ) Priority 3. Intelligence of major importance to plan implementation, including intelligence required for the security of significant numbers of United States (and allied) forces.

(d) ( ) Priority 4. Intelligence of considerable importance to plan implementation (makes important contribution to operational decisionmaking and planning).

(e) ( ) Priority 5. Intelligence of moderate importance to plan implementation (makes moderate contribution to operational decisionmaking and planning).

(f) ( ) Priority 6. Intelligence of some importance to plan implementation (contributes in a measurable way to operational decisionmaking and planning).

(g) ( ) Priority 7. Intelligence of interest to plan implementation.

(3) ( ) Time. (Identify the maximum delay acceptable for receipt of information by the intended user [e.g., within 10 minutes after recognition].)

(4) ( ) Location Accuracy. (Identify the minimum locational accuracy for which the information is needed [e.g., 95-percent confidence, within 1 kilometer of center mass, within 25 kilometers of emitter location].)

(5) ( ) Periodicity. (Identify the maximum amount of time that should pass before the target is covered again [i.e., once every 24 hours or once every 8 hours].)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION Signals Intelligence ______D-7

CLASSIFICATION

c. ( ) User Echelon(s). (Identify the primary echelon needing the information [e.g., GCE, RAOC]. List multiple users only if all data elements o subparagraph 2c above are the same for all listed echelons; otherwise, restate the requirement.)

d. ( ) Geographic Area. (Specify the geographic area for which the requirement specification applies, defined precisely [i.e., Country X, 0 to 50 km from western border; or Country Y, 50 to 75 km from southeastern border].)

e. ( ) Justification. (For each requirement specification, indicate the operational function(s) or purpose(s) [i.e., artillery targeting or air reconnaissance planning].)

3. ( ) UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPORD. (List, in the manner described above, the COMINT operational requirements that become relevant upon implementation of the plan. Use subsequent paragraphs to reflect additional support requirements for planned phases of combat operations.)

(Page number)

CLASSIFICATION (reverse blank) Appendix E

TSCIF Checklist

The following checklist is provided as a guide Determine location of destruction site (burn when activating and deactivating a tactical sensi- barrel, etc.). tive compartmented information facility (TSCIF). The security measures identified should be im- Conduct briefings (i.e., operations security, proved upon as the situation permits. Refer to Di- emergency destruction, emergency evacua- rector of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/ tion, shift schedule, reaction force, perimeter 21, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive defense, badge system). Compartmented Information Facilities, and De- Doublecheck physical security of site. partment of Defense Directive (DODD) 5105.21- M-1, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Accredit site; declare site secure. Security Manual, Administrative Security, for de- Inventory SCI documents and materials as tailed TSCIF operations policy and procedures. they are unpacked. TSCIF Activation Inform G-2/S-2 of commencement of TSCIF operations. Obtain site location from advance party per- Begin SCI operations and communications. sonnel. Send TSCIF activation message. Submit request to establish TSCIF to cognizant special security officer (SSO). TSCIF Deactivation

Assign vehicle and/or shelter locations to Receive the order to terminate operations. site personnel. Coordinate deactivation time with the G-2/ Move vehicles into site position. Ensure SCI S-2. containers remain locked and guarded unt site is accredited. Zeroize communications security (COM- SEC) equipment; ensure message queues are Configure site for operation needs and ease emptied. of future movement. Establish guards for SCI materials; inventory and pack SCI into locked containers. Erect shelters, antennas, and camouflage. Debrief all one-time access personnel. Establish internal communications (SSO to access control point and emergency reaction Ensure all magnetic media is degaussed a force). minimum of three times each and all tele type, printers, and/or typewriter ribbons are Review and implement guard procedures. destroyed or secured with SCI material. Emplace barrier material and restriction Sweep all SCI work areas for SCI and other signs. classified materials, including telephone di- rectories, newspapers, magazines, notepads, Establish a 24-hour, single-gate access point trash bags, etc. Check desk drawers, under- (shelter with lights). Provide guards with ac- neath desks and boxes, equipment contain- cess roster of authorized personnel. ers, bulletin boards, acetate overlays, etc. E-2 ______MCWP 2-22

Ensure all SCI is either packed in proper Ensure all personnel are briefed on move- containers for redeployment or destroyed us- ment time and location and SCI is properly ing established procedures. controlled. Account for all TSCIF badges and access Upon termination of operations, return to rosters. garrison SCIF, reinventory and account fo all SCI material, reset all combination locks, Make a final inspection of the TSCIF and de- clear all hand receipts, and clean equipment. clare it officially deactivated. Update standing operating procedure and files Send TSCIF deactivation message. with lessons learned during the operation. Appendix F

Glossary

Section I

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAW...... antiair warfare Cdr ...... commander ACE ...... aviation combat element CE ...... command element ADCON ...... administrative control CGS...... common ground station ADP ...... automatic data processing CHATS ...... counterintelligence/HUMINT AFB...... Air Force base analysis tool set AFC...... all-source fusion center CI ...... counterintelligence AI ...... area of interest CIC...... combat intelligence center AIA ...... Air Force Intelligence Agency CIM...... communications interface module AIG ...... addressee indicator group CINC...... commander in chief AM ...... amplitude modulation CIS ...... communications and information systems AMP...... amplifier CJTF...... commander, joint task force AO...... area of operations CLF ...... commander, landing force AS ...... analysis subsystem CLT...... company liaison team ATARS ...... advanced tactical airborne CMC...... Commandant of the Marine Corps reconnaissance system CMO ...... collections management officer ATF...... amphibious task force CMS ...... COMSEC materials system ATFIC...... amphibious task force CNSG...... Commander, Naval Security Group intelligence center CO...... commanding officer ATO ...... air tasking order COC ...... current operations center AWACS ...... airborne warning and COMINT...... communications intelligence control system comm ...... communications COMMARFOR ...... commander, Marine Corps BDA ...... battle damage assessment forces BE ...... basic encyclopedia COMMARFORLANT...... Commander, Bn Hq...... battalion headquarters Marine Corps Forces, bps...... bits per second Atlantic BZO ...... battlesight zero COMMARFORPAC...... Commander, Marine Corps Forces, C2...... command and control Pacific C2W...... command and control warfare COMSEC ...... communications security C4I ...... command, control, communications, CONPLAN...... contingency plan computers, and intelligence Cpl...... corporal Capt...... captain CPX...... command post exercise CATF ...... commander, amphibious task force CRITICOMM ...... critical communications CCE...... company command element CS...... communications subsystem CCIR ...... commander’s critical information CSG...... cryptologic support group requirements CSP ...... cryptologic support plan CCS...... COMINT collection subsystem CSS ...... combat service support CDOC ...... cryptologic division officers course CSSA ...... cryptologic shore support activity F-2 ______MCWP 2-22

CSSD ...... combat service support detachment EWMSNSUM...... EW mission summary report CSSE ...... combat service support element EWO ...... electronic warfare officer CTT...... commander’s tactical terminal CW ...... continuous wave FDM ...... frequency division multiplexing FIE ...... fly-in echelon DASC...... direct air support center FIIU...... force imagery interpretation unit DCI ...... Director of Central Intelligence FISINT ...... foreign instrumentation signals DCID...... Director of Central intelligence Intelligence Directive FM ...... frequency modulation DCS...... Defense Courier Service FMF ...... Fleet Marine Force DF ...... direction finding FMFM ...... Fleet Marine Force manual DIA ...... Defense Intelligence Agency FSCC...... fire support coordination center DIAM...... Defense Intelligence Agency manual FSK ...... frequency shift key DIRNSA...... Director, National Security FSSG...... force service support group Agency DLI ...... Defense Language Institute G-1 ...... manpower or personnel staff officer DMS...... Defense Message System G-2 ...... intelligence staff officer DOD ...... Department of Defense G-3 ...... operations staff officer DODD...... Department of Defense directive G-4 ...... logistics staff officer DON ...... Department of the Navy G-6 ...... communications and information DONCAF ...... Department of the Navy Central systems officer Adjudication Facility GCE ...... ground combat element DS ...... direct support GENSER ...... general service DSSCS ...... defense special security GHz...... gigahertz communications system GS ...... general support; general schedule GSA ...... General Services Administration EA ...... electronic attack GySgt ...... gunnery sergeant EA-6B ...... all weather electronic attack ...... aircraft (Prowler) H&S ...... headquarters and service ECAC...... Electromagnetic Compatibility HARM ...... high-speed antiradiation missile Analysis Center HF ...... high frequency ECMO...... electronic countermeasures officer HIDRAH...... handheld integrated directional ECU ...... environmental control unit receiver and homing e.g...... for example HMMWV...... high mobility, multipurpose EHF ...... extremely high frequency wheeled vehicle ELINT ...... electronics intelligence HQMC ...... Headquarters, Marine Corps EM ...... electromagnetic HUMINT ...... human resources intelligence EMCON ...... emission control EOB ...... electronic order of battle I&W ...... indications and warning EP ...... electronic protection IAA ...... Intelligence Analysis Application EPL ...... ELINT parameters list IADS ...... integrated air defense system ERP ...... effective radiated power IAS ...... intelligence analysis system ES ...... electronic warfare support ICR...... intelligence collection requirement EW ...... electronic warfare ICW...... interrupted continuous wave EWCC ...... electronic warfare coordination ID ...... identification center IDR...... intelligence dissemination requirement EWDS ...... electronic warfare data base i.e...... that is system IEWCS ...... intelligence and electronic EWIR ...... electronic warfare integrated warfare common sensor reprogramming IMINT ...... imagery intelligence Signals Intelligence ______F-3

INSCOM...... U.S. Army Intelligence and MASINT ...... measurement and signature Security Command intelligence intel ...... intelligence MATCD ..... Marine air traffic control detachment IPR ...... intelligence production requirement MAW ...... Marine aircraft wing IR ...... intelligence requirement Mbps ...... megabytes per second ISSM ...... information system security manager MCB...... Marine Corps base ISSO...... information system security officer MCO ...... Marine Corps Order ITS ...... individual training standards MCW ...... modulated continuous wave ITT ...... interrogator-translator team MCWP ...... Marine Corps warfighting publication MECDL ...... mission equipment control data link JC2WC...... Joint Command and Control MEF ...... Marine expeditionary force Warfare Center MEU ...... Marine expeditionary unit JCS...... Joint Chiefs of Staff MEU(SOC) ...... Marine expeditionary unit JDISS ...... joint deployable intelligence (special operations capable) support system MEWSS ...... mobile electronic warfare support JFACC ...... joint force air component commander system JFC ...... joint force commander MEWSS PIP ...... mobile electronic warfare JFLCC...... joint force land component support system product commander improvement program JFMCC...... joint force maritime component MHz ...... megahertz commander MIDB ...... modernized integrated data base JIC ...... joint intelligence center MISSI...... multilevel information system JISE...... joint intelligence support element security initiative JMCIS ...... joint maritime command MOS ...... military occupational specialty information system MSC ...... major subordinate command JSC ...... joint spectrum center MSE ...... major subordinate element JSIPS...... Joint Service Imagery Processing MSgt...... master sergeant System MSPF ...... maritime special purpose force J-TENS...... Joint Tactical Exploitation MUX ...... multichannel radio of National Systems JTF ...... joint task force NATO ...... North Atlantic Treaty Organization JWICS...... Joint Worldwide Intelligence NATOPS...... Naval Air Training and Operating Communications System Procedures Standardization NAVSUP ...... Navy supplement LAN ...... local area network NCA ...... National Command Authorities LAV ...... light armored vehicle NCO ...... noncommissioned officer LCpl ...... lance corporal NCOIC ...... noncommissioned officer in charge LE...... law enforcement NCS...... net control station LOB ...... line of bearing NCW ...... non-codeword LOS ...... line of sight NDA...... nondisclosure agreement LSB ...... lower sideband NEF...... naval expeditionary force Lt...... lieutenant NID ...... naval intelligence data base LTI ...... limited technical inspection NIMA...... National Imagery and Mapping Agency MAG ...... Marine aircraft group NIPRNET...... nonsecure internet protocol router MAGTF ...... Marine air-ground task force network MARDIV ...... Marine division NIST...... national intelligence support team MARFOR ...... Marine Corps forces NMCC...... National Military Command Center MarSptBn ...... Marine support battalion F-4 ______MCWP 2-22

NRO ...... National Reconnaissance Office S-6...... communications NRT ...... near-real-time and information systems staff officer NSA ...... National Security Agency SALUTE ...... size, activity, location, unit, NSANET...... National Security Agency Network time, and equipment NSG ...... Naval Security Group SARC ...... surveillance and reconnaissance NSGA...... Naval Security Group Activity center NSOC...... National Security Operations Center SATCOM ...... satellite communications NTF...... naval task force SCAMP...... sensor control and management NTTC ...... Naval Technological Training Center platoon SCE ...... service cryptologic element OAS ...... offensive air support SCI ...... sensitive compartmented information OBREP...... order of battle report SCIF ...... sensitive compartmented OCA ...... operations control and analysis information facility OCAC ...... operations control and analysis center SCM ...... supervisor control module OccFld ...... occupational field SCR...... single-channel radio OIC...... officer in charge Sgt ...... sergeant OLT...... OCAC liaison team SHF ...... super high frequency ONI ...... Office of Naval Intelligence SI...... special intelligence OOB ...... order of battle SIDS...... secondary imagery dissemination OPCON ...... operational control system OPLAN ...... operation plan SIGINT ...... signals intelligence OPNAV ...... Office of the Chief of SINCGARS ...... single-channel ground and Naval Operations airborne radio system OPORD...... operation order SIO ...... signals intelligence officer OTH ...... over the horizon SIPRNET ...... secret internet protocol router OWO...... operations watch officer network SNCO...... staff noncommissioned officer PCM ...... pulse code modulation SNCOIC ...... staff noncommissioned PIP ...... product improvement program officer in charge PIR ...... priority intelligence requirement SOC ...... special operations capable PU ...... participating unit SOI...... signal of interest SOP ...... standing operating procedure RadBn ...... radio battalion SOTA ...... SIGINT operational tasking authority RAOC ...... rear area operations center SPINTCOMM ...... special intelligence RAWS...... remoteable analysis workstation communications recon...... reconnaissance SPMAGTF ...... special-purpose Marine RF...... radio frequency air-ground task force RFI ...... request for intelligence SS...... SIGINT suite RREP ...... radio reconnaissance equipment SSB ...... single sideband program SSBI ...... single-scope background investigation RRP...... radio reconnaissance platoon SSCC ...... special security communications RRT ...... radio reconnaissance team center RSOC ...... regional security operations center SSCT ...... special security communications team RSR...... resource status report SSE...... SIGINT support element RU...... reporting unit SSES ...... ship’s signals exploitation space SSgt...... staff sergeant S-1...... manpower or personnel staff officer SSO ...... special security officer S-2...... intelligence staff officer SSOC ...... special security operations center S-3...... operations staff officer SST...... SIGINT support team S-4...... logistics staff officer SSU ...... SIGINT support unit Signals Intelligence ______F-5

STAFFEX ...... staff exercise T/O ...... table of organization STU III...... secure telephone unit-type III topo ...... topographic TPCS ...... team portable collection system TACC...... tactical air command center (USMC) TPFDD...... time-phased force and tactical air control center (USN) deployment data TACELINT...... tactical ELINT TPU...... TERPES portable unit TACINTEL...... tactical intelligence TRAP ...... TRE and Related Applications TACREP ...... tactical report TRE ...... tactical receive equipment TACSAT...... tactical satellite TRIB ...... tactical remote intelligence broadcast TAD ...... temporary additional duty TRIXS ...... Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence TADIL ...... tactical digital information links Exchange System TAMPS ...... Tactical Aircraft Mission TRSS...... tactical remote sensor system Planning System TS II ...... Trojan Spirit II TAOC ...... tactical air operations center TSCIF...... tactical sensitive compartmented TCAC ...... technical control and analysis center information facility TCAE...... technical control and analysis element TSCM .....technical surveillance countermeasures TCIM ...... tactical control interface module TSR ...... telecommunications service request TCO ...... tactical combat operations TTP ...... tactics, techniques, and procedures TDDS ...... tactical receive equipment and related applications program data UAV...... unmanned aerial vehicle dissemination system UHF ...... ultra high frequency TDN ...... tactical data network USAF ...... United States Air Force T/E ...... table of equipment USB ...... upper sideband TEAMS ...... tactical EA-6B mission USMC ...... United States Marine Corps planning system USSID ...... United States Signals Intelligence TECHCON...... technical control Directive TEG...... tactical exploitation group USSS ...... United States SIGINT System TENCAP ...... tactical exploitation of national capabilities program VHF ...... very high frequency TEPP ...... TERPES ELINT preprocessor VMAQ ...... Marine tactical electronic warfare TERPES ...... Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance squadron Processing and Evaluation System VPN ...... voice product net TFP...... TERPES fusion processor VTC ...... video teleconferencing TIBS...... tactical information broadcast system TJS ...... tactical jamming system WAN...... wide area network F-6 ______MCWP 2-22

Section II

Definitions

A the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the all-source intelligence Intelligence products same subject. (Joint Pub 1-02) and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most battle damage assessment—The timely and ac- frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery curate estimate of damage resulting from the intelligence, measurement and signature intelli- application of military force, either lethal or non- gence, signals intelligence, and open source data, lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle in the production of finished intelligence. (Join damage assessment can be applied to the employ- Pub 1-02) ment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) amphibious objective area—A geographical ar- throughout the range of military operations. Battle ea, delineated in the initiating directive, for pur- damage assessment is primarily an intelligence poses of command and control (C2) within which responsibility with required inputs and coordina- is located the objective(s) to be secured by the tion from the operators. Battle damage assessment amphibious task force (ATF). This area must be is composed of physical damage assessment, of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the functional damage assessment, and target system ATF’s mission and must provide sufficient area assessment. Also called BDA. (Joint Pub 1-02) In for conducting necessary sea, air, and land opera- Marine Corps usage, the timely and accurate esti- tions. Also called AOA. (Joint Pub 1-02) mate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. BDA estimates physical damage area of interest—That area of concern to the to a particular target, functional damage to that commander, including the area of influence, areas target, and the capability of the entire target sys- adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy terri- tem to continue its operations. (MCRP 5-12C) tory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by battlespace—All aspects of air, surface, subsur- enemy forces who could jeopardize the accom- face, land, space, and electromagnetic spectru plishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (Joint which encompass the area of influence and area Pub 1-02) of interest. (MCRP 5-12C) area of operations—An operational area defined battlespace dominance—The degree of control by the joint force commander for land and naval over the dimensions of the battlespace which en- forces. Areas of operation do not typically encom- hances friendly freedom of action and denies ene- pass the entire operational area of the joint force my freedom of action. It permits force commander, but should be large enough for com- sustainment and application of power projection ponent commanders to accomplish their missions to accomplish the full range of potential opera- and protect their forces. Also called AO. (Joint tional and tactical missions. It includes all actions Pub 1-02) conducted against enemy capabilities to influence future operations. (MCRP 5-12C) B C basic intelligence—Fundamental intelligence concerning the general situation, resources, capa- centralized control—In military operations, a bilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or mode of battlespace management in which one areas which may be used as reference material in echelon of command exercises total authority and Signals Intelligence ______F-7 direction of all aspects of one or more warfighting ligence, to deny information to, influence, de- functions. It is a method of control where detailed grade, or destroy adversary command and control orders are issued and total unity of action is the capabilities, while protecting friendly command overriding consideration. (MCRP 5-12C) and control capabilities against such actions. Also called C2W. (Joint Pub 2-0) collection—In Marine Corps usage, the gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the commander’s critical information require- identified requirements. (MCRP 5-12C) ments—Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified collection management—The process of con- by the commander as critical to maintaining situa- verting intelligence requirements into collection tional awareness, planning future activities, and requirements, establishing priorities, tasking o facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called coordinating with appropriate collection sources CCIR. Note: CCIRs are normally divided into or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as three primary subcategories: priority intelligence required. (Joint Pub 1-02) Its purpose is to con- requirements, friendly force information require- duct an effective effort to collect all necessary da- ments, and essential elements of friendly informa- ta while ensuring the efficient use of limited and tion. (MCRP 5-12C) valuable collection assets. (MCRP 2-1) commander’s intent—A commander’s clear, combat data—Data derived from reporting by concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one operational units. (MCRP 5-12C) or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement which combatant command—A unified or specified guides the exercise of initiative in the absence of command with a broad continuing mission under instructions. (MCRP 5-12C) a single commander established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense communications intelligence—Technical and in- and with the advice and assistance of Chairman of telligence information derived from foreign com- the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant command munications by other than the intended recipients. typically have geographic or functional responsi- Also called COMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) bilities. (Joint Pub 1-02) communications security—The protection re- command and control—The exercise of authori- sulting from all measures designed to deny unau- ty and direction by a properly designated com- thorized persons information of value which mander over assigned and attached forces in the might be derived from the possession and study of accomplishment of the mission. Command and telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized control functions are performed through an ar- persons in their interpretation of the results o rangement of personnel, equipment, communica- such possession and study. Also called COM- tions, facilities, and procedures employed by a SEC. (Joint Pub 1-02 extract) commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the ac- coordination—The action necessary to ensure complishment of the mission. Also called C2. adequately integrated relationships between sepa- (Joint Pub 1-02) The means by which a com- rate organizations located in the same area. Coor- mander recognizes what needs to be done and dination may include such matters as fire support, sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. emergency defense measures, area intelligence (MCRP 5-12C) and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary. (MCRP 5-12C) command and control warfare—The integrated use of operations security, military deception, critical information—Specific facts about psychological operations, electronic warfare, and friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vi- physical destruction, mutually supported by intel- tally needed by adversaries for them to plan and F-8 ______MCWP 2-22 act effectively so as to guarantee failure or direction finding—A procedure for obtaining unacceptable consequences for friendly mission bearings of radio frequency emitters by using a accomplishment. (Joint Pub 1-02) highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receive or ancillary equipment. (Joint critical intelligence—Intelligence which is cru- Pub 1-02) cial and requires the immediate attention of the commander. It is required to enable the com- dissemination—Conveyance of intelligence to mander to make decisions that will provide a users in a suitable form. (Joint Pub 1-02) timely and appropriate response to actions by the potential/ actual enemy. It includes but is not lim- E ited to the following: a. strong indications of the imminent outbreak of hostilities of any type electronic attack—That division of electronic (warning of attack); b. aggression of any nature warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, di- against a friendly country; c. indications or use of rected energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack nuclear-biological-chemical weapons (target); personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent and d. significant events within potential enemy of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy countries that may lead to modification of nuclear combat capability. Also called EA. (Joint Pub strike plans. (Joint Pub 1-02) 1-02) critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of electronic protection—That division of electron- gravity that if exploited will do the most signifi- ic warfare involving actions taken to protect per- cant damage to an adversary’s ability to resist. A sonnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects vulnerability cannot be critical unless it under- of friendly or enemy employment of electronic mines a key strength. Also called CV. (MCRP warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy 5-12C) friendly combat capability. Also called EP. (Joint Pub 1-02) D electronic reconnaissance—The detection, iden- decentralized control—In military operations, a tification, evaluation, and location of foreign elec- mode of battlespace management in which a com- tromagnetic radiations emanating from other than mand echelon may delegate some or all authority nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (Joint and direction for warfighting functions to subor- Pub 1-02) dinates. It requires careful and clear articulation of mission, intent, and main effort to unify efforts electronic warfare—Any military action involv- of subordinate leaders. (MCRP 5-12C) ing the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to descriptive intelligence Class of intelligence attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three ma- which describes existing and previously existing jor subdivisions within electronic warfare are conditions with the intent to promote situational electronic attack, electronic protection, and awareness. Descriptive intelligence has two com- electronic warfare support. (Joint Pub 1-02) ponents: basic intelligen , which is general background knowledge about established and rel- electronic warfare support—That division of atively constant conditions; and current intelli- electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or gence, which is concerned with describing the under direct control of, an operational commander existing situation. (MCRP 5-12C) to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated elec- detachment—1. A part of a unit separated from tromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare sup- temporary military or naval unit formed from oth- port provides information required for immediate er units or parts of units. (Joint Pub 1-02) decisions involving electronic warfare operations Signals Intelligence ______F-9 and other tactical actions such as threat avoid- I ance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to indications and warning—Those intelligenc produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both com- activities intended to detect and report time-sensi- munications intelligence (COMINT), and elec- tive intelligence information on foreign develop- tronic intelligence (ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02) ments that could involve a threat to the Unite States or allied military, political, or economic in- electronic intelligence—Technical and geoloca- terests or to US citizens abroad. It includes fore- tion intelligence derived from foreign noncommu- warning of enemy actions or intentions; the nications electromagnetic radiations emanating imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/ from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive non-nuclear attack on the United States, its over- sources. Also called ELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) seas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists’ essential elements of friendly information— attacks; and other similar events. Also called Key questions likely to be asked by adversary of- I&W. (Joint Pub 2-01) ficials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so intelligence—The product resulting from the col- they can obtain answers critical to their opera- lection, processing, integration, analysis, evalua- tional effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (Joint Pub tion, and interpretation of evaluated information 1-02) Specific facts about friendly intentions, ca- concerning foreign countries or areas. Informa- pabilities, and activities needed by adversaries to tion and knowledge about an adversary obtained plan and execute effective operations against our through observation, investigation, analysis, o forces. (MCRP 5-12C) understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also in Marine Corps usage, intelligence is knowledge about the estimative intelligence Class of intelligence enemy or the surrounding environment needed to which attempts to anticipate future possibilitie support decisionmaking. This knowledge is the and probabilities based on an analysis of descrip- result of the collection, processing, exploitation, tive intelligence in the context of planned friendly evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpreta- and assessed enemy operations. (MCRP 5-12C) tion of available information about the battlespace and threat. (MCRP 5-12C) F intelligence cycle—The process by which infor- friendly force information requirements—In- mation is converted into intelligence and made formation the commander needs about friendly available to users. (Joint Pub 2-01) forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstanc- intelligence data—Data derived from assets pri- es, information on unit location, composition marily dedicated to intelligence collection such as readiness, personnel status, and logistics statu imagery systems, electronic intercept equipment, could become a friendly force information requirement. Also called FFIR. (MCRP 5-12C) human intelligence sources, etc. (MCRP 5-12C) fusion—In intelligence usage, the process of ex- intelligence discipline—A well-defined area o amining all sources of intelligence and informa- intelligence collection, processing, exploitation tion to derive a complete assessment of activity. and reporting using a specific category of techni- (Joint Pub 1-02) cal or human resources. There are five major dis- G ciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelli- global sourcing—A process of force provision or gence, signals intelligence (communications intel- augmentation whereby resources may be drawn ligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign from any location/command worldwide. (MCRP instrumentation signals intelligence), and open 5-12C) source intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02) F-10 ______MCWP 2-22 intelligence operations—The variety of intelli- intelligence community. Also called JIC. (Joint gence tasks that are carried out by various intelli- Pub 1-02) gence organizations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02 extract) Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communica- tions System—The sensitive compartmented intelligence preparation of the battlespace—An information portion of the Defense Information analytical methodology employed to reduce un- System Network. It incorporates advanced net- certainties concerning the enemy, environment, working technologies that permit point-to-poin and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence or multipoint information exchange involving preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconfer- data base for each potential area in which a unit encing. Also called JWICS. (Joint Pub 1-02) may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the M enemy, environment, and terrain on operation and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence prep- main effort—The designated subordinate unit aration of the battlespace is a continuing process. whose mission at a given point in time is mos Also called IPB. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine critical to overall mission success. It is usually Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process weighted with the preponderance of combat pow- of analyzing the threat and environment in a spe- er and is directed against a center of gravity cific geographic area. (MCRP 5-12C) through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C) intelligence requirement—1. Any subject, gen- maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy eral or specific, upon which there is a need for the that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through collection of information or the production of in- a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected ac- telligence. (Joint Pub 1-02 2. In Marine Corps tions which create a turbulent and rapidly deterio- usage, questions about the enemy and the envi- rating situation with which the enemy cannot ronment, the answers to which a commander re- cope. (MCRP 5-12C) quires to make sound decisions. Also called IR. (MCRP 5-12C) Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-step methodology which helps organize the though J processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. joint deployable intelligence support system— It focuses on the threat and is based on the Marine A transportable workstation and communications Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capital- suite that electronically extends a joint intelli- izes on the principle of unity of command and gence center to a joint task force or other tactical supports the establishment and maintenance o user. Also called JDISS. (Joint Pub 1-02) tempo. The six steps consist of mission analysis, course of action development, course of action joint force—A general term applied to a force analysis, comparison/decision, orders develop- composed of significant elements, assigned or at- ment, and transition. Also called MCPP. Note: tached, of two or more Military Departments, op- Tenets of the MCPP include top down planning, erating under a single joint force commander. single battle concept, and integrated planning (Joint Pub 1-02) (MCRP 5-12C) N joint intelligence center—The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and named area of interest—A point or area along a producing the intelligence required to support the particular avenue of approach through which ene- joint force commander and staff, components, my activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack task forces and elements, and the national of activity within a named area of interest will Signals Intelligence ______F-11 help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course operations control and analysis center—Main of action. Also called NAI. (MCRP 5-12C) node for the command and control of radio battalion signals intelligence operations and the overall national intelligence support team—A national- coordination of MAGTF signals intelligence op- ly sourced team composed of intelligence and erations. Processes, analyzes, produces, and dis- communications experts from either Defense In- seminates signals intelligence-derived telligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, information and directs the ground-based elec- National Security Agency, or any combination of tronic warfare activities of the radio battalion. Al- these agencies. Also called NIST. (Joint Pub so called OCAC. (MCRP 5-12C) 2-01) order of battle—The identification, strength, O command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force operational architecture—A description (often Also called OOB. (Joint Pub 1-02) graphical) of the operational elements, assigned tasks, and information flows required to support P the warfighter. It defines the type of information, the frequency of exchange, and what tasks are priority intelligence requirements—1. Those supported by these information exchanges. Also intelligence requirements for which a commander called OA. (MCRP 5-12C) has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. Also called PIR. operational control—Transferable command au- (Joint Pub 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, an in- thority that may be exercised by commanders a telligence requirement associated with a decision any echelon at or below the level of combatan that will critically affect the overall success of the command. Operational control is inherent in com- command’s mission. (MCRP 5-12C) batant command (command authority). Opera- tional control may be delegated and is the production management—Encompasses deter- authority to perform those functions of command mining the scope, content, and format of each in- over subordinate forces involving organizing and telligence product, developing a plan and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, schedule for the development of each product, assigning priorities among the various production designating objectives, and giving authoritative requirements, allocating processing, exploitation, direction necessary to accomplish the mission. and production resources, and integrating produc- Operational control includes authoritative direction efforts with intelligence collection and dis- tion over all aspects of military operations and semination. (MCRP 5-12C) joint training necessary to accomplish mission assigned to the command. Operational control R should be exercised through the commanders o subordinate organizations. Normally this authori- reach back—The ability to exploit resources, ca- ty is exercised through subordinate joint force pabilities, expertise, etc., not physically located in commanders and Service and/or functional com- the theater or a joint operations area, when estab- ponent commanders. Operational control normal- lished. (MCRP 5-12C) ly provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the com- S mander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational sensitive compartmented information All in- control does not, in and of itself, include authori- formation and materials bearing special commu- tative direction for logistics or matters of adminis- nity controls indicating restricted handling within tration, discipline, internal organization, or un present and future community intelligence collec- training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02) tion programs and their end products for which F-12 ______MCWP 2-22 community systems of compartmentation have situational awareness—Knowledge and under- been or will be formally established. (These con- standing of the current situation which promotes trols are over and above the provisions of DOD timely, relevant and accurate assessment of 52001R, Information Security Program Regula- friendly, enemy, and other operations within the tion.) Also called SCI. (Joint Pub 1-02) battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that foster sensitive compartmented information facili- an ability to determine quickly the context and ty—An accredited area, room, group of rooms, or relevance of events that are unfolding. (MCRP installation where sensitive compartmented infor- 5-12C) mation may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically processed. SCIF procedural and split base—Two or more portions of the same physical measures prevent the free access of per- force conducting or supporting operations fro sons unless they have been formally indoctrinated separate physical locations. (MCRP 5-12C) for the particular SCI authorized for use or storage within the SCIF. Also called SCIF. See also surveillance and reconnaissance center—Pri- sensitive compartmented information. (Joint mary element responsible for the supervision o Pub 1-02) MAGTF intelligence collection operations. Di- rects, coordinates, and monitors intelligence col- sensor data—Data derived from sensors whose lection operations conducted by organic, attached, primary mission is surveillance or target acquisi- and direct support collection assets. Also called tion, such as air surveillance radars, counterbat- SARC. (MCRP 5-12C) tery radars, and remote ground sensors. (MCR 5-12C) sustained operations ashore—The employment of Marine Corps forces on land for an extended Service component command—A command duration. It can occur with or without sustainment consisting of the Service component commander from the sea. Also called SOA. (MCRP 5-12C) and all those Service forces such as individuals units, detachments, organizations, and installa- systems architecture—Defines the physical con- tions under the command, including the support nection, location, and identification of key nodes, forces that have been assigned to a combatant circuits, networks, warfighting platforms, etc command, or further assigned to a subordinate and specific system and component performance unified command or joint task force. (Joint Pub parameters. The systems architecture is construct- 1-02) ed to satisfy operational architecture requirements per standards defined in the technical architecture. The systems architecture shows how multiple sys- signals intelligence—A category of intelligence tems within a subject area link and interoperate comprising either individually or in combination and may describe the internal construction or all communications intelligence, electronic intel- operations of particular systems within the archi- ligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intel- tecture. Also called SA. (MCRP 5-12C) ligence, however transmitted. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02) T

SIGINT operational tasking authority—A mil- tactical intelligence—Intelligence that is re- itary commanders’s authority, delegated by quired for planning and conducting tactical opera- DIRNSA/CHCSS, to operationally direct and tions. (Joint Pub 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, levy SIGINT requirements on designated SIGINT tactical intelligence is concerned primarily with resources. This includes authority to deploy and the location, capabilities, and possible intentions redeploy all or part of the SIGINT resources for of enemy units on the battlefield and with the tac- which SOTA has been delegated. Also called tical aspects of terrain and weather within the bat- SOTA. (USSID 1, SIGINT Operating Policy) tlespace. (MCRP 5-12C) Signals Intelligence ______F-13 technical architecture—The technical architec- 1. command and control—The means by which ture identifies the services, interfaces, standards, a commander recognizes what needs to be done and their relationships. It provides the technica and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. guidelines for implementation of systems upon 2. maneuver—The movement of forces for the which engineering specifications are based, com- purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy. mon building blocks are built, and product line are developed. Also called TA. (MCRP 5-12C) 3. fires—Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or fa- technical control—The performance of special- cilities as well as affect the enemy’s will to fight. ized or professional service, or the exercise o 4. intelligence—Knowledge about the enemy or professional guidance or direction through the es- the surrounding environment needed to support tablishment of policies and procedures. decisionmaking. 5. logistics—All activities required to move and tempo—The relative speed and rhythm of mili- sustain military forces. tary operations over time. (MCRP 5-12C) 6. force protection—Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, W concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. warfighting functions—The six mutually sup- Also called WF. (MCRP 5-12C) porting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations are:

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References and Related Publications

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)

S-3115.7 Signals Intelligence 5105.21-M-1 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Administrative Security TS-5105.21-M-2 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) Policy TS- 5105.21-M-3 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Security Manual, TK Policy 5200.1 DOD Information Security Program 5210.70 DOD Cryptologic Training

Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs)

1/14 Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 1/16 Security Manual for Uniform Protection of Intelligence Processed in AISs and Networks 1/21 Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSIDs)

1 SIGINT Operating Policy 4 Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders 56 Exercise SIGINT 200 Technical SIGINT Reporting 240 ELINT Processing, Analysis, Reporting, and Forwarding Procedures 300 SIGINT Reporting 316 Non-Codeword Reporting Program 340 Tactical ELINT Reporting 341 Technical ELINT Reporting 510 Information for SIGINT Users

Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM)

50-4 Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems (DODIIS) Information Security (INFOSEC) Program G-2 ______MCWP 2-22

Department of the Navy Supplement (NAVSUP) to DODD

5105.21-M-1 SCI Administrative Security Manual

Joint Publications (Joint Pubs)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 2-01 Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations 2-02 National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare 3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations 6-0 Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting 2 Intelligence 3 Expeditionary Operations 4 Logistics 5 Planning 6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

2-1 Intelligence Operations 6-22 Communications and Information Systems

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP)

5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 5-12D Organization of Marine Corps Forces

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

1510.50A Individual Training Standard (ITS) System for the Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare Occupational Field (OccFld) 26 5500.6F Arming of Security and Law Enforcement (LE) Personnel and the Use of Force Signals Intelligence ______G-3

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

34-2 Collection Management and Synchronization Planning 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Related Publication

Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual

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