MISSILE DEFENSE Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace With

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

MISSILE DEFENSE Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace With United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees December 2019 MISSILE DEFENSE Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace with Emerging Threats GAO-20-177 December 2019 MISSILE DEFENSE Further Collaboration with the Intelligence Community Would Help MDA Keep Pace with Highlights of GAO-20-177, a report to Emerging Threats congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found MDA is developing missile defense The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is experiencing delays getting the threat capabilities to defend the United assessments needed to inform its acquisition decisions. Officials from the States, deployed forces, and regional defense intelligence community—intelligence organizations within the allies from missile attacks. However, Department of Defense (DOD)—told GAO this is because they are currently missile threats continue to emerge, as overextended due to an increased demand for threat assessments from a adversaries continue to improve and recent upsurge in threat missile activity, as well as uncertainties related to their expand their missile capabilities. transition to new threat processes and products. The delays are exacerbated The National Defense Authorization because MDA does not collectively prioritize the various types of threat Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a assessment requests submitted to the defense intelligence community or provision that GAO annually assess provide resources for unique requests, as other major defense acquisition and report on the extent to which MDA programs are generally required to do. Without timely threat assessments, has achieved its acquisition goals and MDA risks making acquisition decisions for weapon systems using irrelevant objectives, and include any other or outdated threat information, which could result in performance shortfalls. findings and recommendations. This report is a public version of a classified MDA has increased its outreach to the defense intelligence community over report GAO issued in May 2019, which the past few years, but opportunities remain for further engagement on key addresses (1) the challenges MDA and threat-related processes and decisions. Specifically, MDA provides the the defense intelligence community defense intelligence community with limited insight into how the agency uses face in meeting the agency's threat threat assessments to inform its acquisition decisions. MDA is not required to assessment needs and (2) the extent obtain the defense intelligence community's input, and instead has discretion to which MDA engages the defense on the extent to which it engages the defense intelligence community. intelligence community on missile However, the defense intelligence community is uniquely positioned to assist defense acquisitions. GAO reviewed MDA and its involvement is crucial for helping MDA keep pace with rapidly MDA's threat-related acquisition emerging threats. Moreover, this limited insight has, in part, prevented the processes and interviewed relevant defense intelligence community from validating the threat models MDA builds officials from the defense intelligence to test the performance of its weapon systems. Without validation, any flaws community, MDA, test community, and or bias in the threat models may go undetected, which can have significant warfighters. Information deemed implications on the performance of MDA's weapon systems. MDA and the classified by DOD has been omitted. defense intelligence community recently began discussing a more suitable What GAO Recommends level of involvement in the agency's acquisition processes and decisions. GAO is making three Actions Needed for MDA to Improve Collaboration with the Intelligence Community and Keep recommendations to improve how Pace with Emerging Threats MDA: prioritizes and resources its threat assessment needs; obtains input from the defense intelligence community on key threat-related processes and decisions for missile defense acquisitions; and validates its threat models. DOD concurred with all three recommendations, citing actions it is already taking. While DOD has taken some positive steps, GAO believes more action is warranted. View GAO-20-177. For more information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Note: the threat missile coverage depicted is notional and not representative of MDA’s actual threat coverage. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 3 Mounting Challenges Are Delaying the Availability of Threat Assessments, but Opportunities Exist to Help MDA Receive the Information It Needs 12 Opportunities Exist for MDA to Further Engage the Defense Intelligence Community on BMDS Acquisition to Address the Challenges of Keeping Pace with the Threat 24 Conclusions 37 Recommendations for Executive Action 38 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39 Appendix I Defense Intelligence Components Responsible for Assessing Foreign Ballistic Missiles 43 Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 44 Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46 Tables Table 1: Defense Intelligence Community’s Roles in Supporting the Missile Defense Agency 8 Table 2: Revision to Defense Intelligence Community’s Threat Assessment Processes and Products 15 Table 3: Completion Status of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Validated Online Lifecycle Threat (VOLT) Report 16 Table 4: Defense Intelligence Community Components Responsible for Assessing Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats 43 Figures Figure 1: Ballistic Missiles of North Korea and Iran 5 Figure 2: Overview of Ballistic Missile Ranges 6 Figure 3: Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture 10 Figure 4: Ballistic Missile Flight Testing, 2005-2016 13 Page i GAO-20-177 Missile Defense Figure 5: Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) Potential to Collectively Prioritize Threat Assessment Requests in the Intelligence Community’s Queue 21 Figure 6: Meetings between Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Defense Intelligence Community to Coordinate on Threat Modeling Efforts, January 2015 - December 2018 36 Abbreviations BMD ballistic missile defense BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation CRBM close-range ballistic missile DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DIBMAC Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee DOD Department of Defense DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile MDA Missile Defense Agency MRBM medium-range ballistic missile NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center OTA Operational Test Agency SRBM short-range ballistic missile VOLT Validated Online Lifecycle Threat U unclassified This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page ii GAO-20-177 Missile Defense Letter 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 December 11, 2019 Congressional Committees The threat of ballistic missiles to the United States, deployed forces, and regional allies continues to increase, as indicated by recent missile tests by foreign adversaries that have demonstrated both increased capabilities and the potential to reach the United States. Ultimately, the challenge for the United States is how to contend with these foreign adversaries’ threat capabilities, which are becoming more mobile, reliable, accurate, and capable of achieving longer ranges. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working to address this challenge by developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to detect, track, and defend against these threats to the homeland and abroad. MDA uses information on foreign adversaries’ missile capabilities, which is primarily derived from threat assessments prepared by the defense intelligence community (Defense Intelligence Agency and the military services’ intelligence production centers), to inform its BMDS acquisition decisions. Defense acquisition and intelligence leaders have recognized that greater consideration of threat capabilities in design and testing decisions throughout a weapon system’s lifecycle can reduce developmental costs and operational risk.1 With today’s rapidly evolving threat capabilities, it is not only fiscally prudent to ensure that weapon systems are informed by defense intelligence community threat assessments, it is also vital to our national security, as each decision shapes future defensive capabilities. Various National Defense Authorization Acts since 2002 have included provisions for us to prepare annual assessments of MDA’s progress toward meeting its acquisition goals. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended, included a provision for us to report annually on the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives, and include any other findings and recommendations on MDA’s acquisition programs and accountability, as appropriate.2 To date, we have issued 16 reports citing MDA’s progress and challenges in developing and delivering the BMDS, including our 1Paul Reinhart and Brian Vanyo, “Improving Threat Support for DoD Acquisition Programs,” Defense AT&L, Vol. XLVI, No. 3 (Ft. Belvoir, VA: May-June
Recommended publications
  • Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN Director, Missile Defense Agency Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces March 12, 2020
    Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN Director, Missile Defense Agency Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces March 12, 2020 Good morning, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today. The Missile Defense Agency budget request of $9.187 billion for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 will enable the continued execution of the MDA mission to design, develop and deploy a layered Missile Defense System to defend the United States, deployed forces, allies, and friends from missile attacks in all phases of flight. Working together with the Services, international partners, and industry, the highly skilled and dedicated MDA government and contractor workforce stands ready to develop and deliver ready, reliable, and effective defenses the Nation needs to counter the proliferating and increasingly sophisticated missile threat. Missile Threat – A Significant Inflection Point for Missile Defense Potential adversaries continue to increase the number and capabilities of existing missile systems while adding new types of missile capabilities to their arsenals, creating an inflection point in the missile defense program that will complicate U.S. missile defense operations. Ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles are becoming more capable of carrying conventional and mass destruction payloads farther, faster, and with greater accuracy. New ballistic missile systems feature multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and maneuverable reentry vehicles, along with decoys and jamming countermeasures. Russia and 1 China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles. Hypersonic missiles can be launched from ground ballistic missile launchers, released from aircraft, or launched from the sea. These missiles travel along unpredictable flight paths and at low altitudes, making them especially difficult to track and intercept.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 30, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33745 SUMMARY RL33745 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) September 30, 2021 Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Specialist in Naval Affairs Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. MDA’s FY2022 budget submission states that “by the end of FY 2022 there will be 48 total BMDS [BMD system] capable ships requiring maintenance support.” The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA’s budget. The Navy’s budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA’s proposed FY2021 budget requested a total of $1,647.9 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA’s budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program. Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following: whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA’s annual procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the execution of Aegis BMD program efforts; what role, if any, the Aegis BMD program should play in defending the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • DEPARTMENT of DEFENSE Office of the Secretary, the Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301–1155 Phone, 703–545–6700
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301–1155 Phone, 703–545–6700. Internet, www.defenselink.mil. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM LYNN III Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, ASHTON B. CARTER Technology, and Logistics Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business PAUL A. BRINKLEY Transformation) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense LOUIS W. ARNY III (Installations and Environment) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy MICHELE FLOURNOY Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense JAMES N. MILLER, JR. for Policy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International ALEXANDER R. VERSHBOW Security Affairs) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special MICHAEL VICKERS Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland (VACANCY) Defense and America’s Security) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Strategic JOSEPH BENKERT Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense (Asian and (VACANCY) Pacific Security Affairs) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Plans) JANINE DAVIDSON Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (VACANCY) (Technology Security Policy/Counter Proliferation) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy, KATHLEEN HICKS Plans and Forces) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy PETER VERGA Integration and Chief of Staff) Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense WILLIAM J. CARR, Acting for Personnel and Readiness Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) DAVID L. MCGINNIS, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve JENNIFER C. BUCK Affairs) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program JEANNE FITES Integration) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) SAMUEL D. KLEINMAN Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military WILLIAM J. CARR Personnel Policy) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Military ARTHUR J. MYERS, Acting Community and Family Policy) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Plans) GAIL H.
    [Show full text]
  • Report to the Under Secretary of Defense
    Wind Turbine Analysis for Cape Cod Air Force Station Early Warning Radar and Beale Air Force Base Upgraded Early Warning Radar Spring 2007 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) analyzed the potential impact of utility class wind farms on radars. • Utility class wind farms could have a significant impact on radars, including the missile defense early warning radars (EWRs), the PAVE PAWS radar at Cape Cod AFS, MA, and the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) at Beale AFB, CA. • To mitigate this impact, establish and enforce a wind farm offset zone within the effective “line-of-sight” of the radars, taking into account the direct, refracted, and diffracted signals from the radar. This effectively establishes a zone around the radar of approximately twenty-five kilometers, assuming relatively level terrain. • Within twenty-five kilometers, further study would be required to assess the impact accounting for location within the radar’s field of view and the relative height of the wind turbine. • After establishing this offset zone, eliminate any remaining impacts on the radar by using gain control and range gating techniques. 1 History Studies on the effects of windmill farms on military readiness were documented in a 2006 Report to Congressional Defense Committees. That report focused on the effects of wind farms on radars and the resulting potential impact on military readiness. The primary historical data and research efforts were focused on air defense radars, characterized as “Primary Surveillance Radars” (PSR) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) radars. Two fixed-site missile Early Warning Radars (EWR) were mentioned in the report but not examined in detail.
    [Show full text]
  • CBEST Threat Intelligence-Led Assessments
    Implementation guide CBEST Threat Intelligence-Led Assessments January 2021 CBEST Threat Intelligence-Led Assessments 1 Forward Operational disruption can impact financial stability, threaten the viability of individual firms and financial market infrastructures (FMIs), or cause harm to consumers and other market participants in the financial system. Firms and FMIs need to consider all of these risks when assessing the appropriate levels of resilience within their respective businesses. Dealing with cyber risk is an important element of operational resilience and the CBEST framework is intelligence-led penetration testing which aims to address this risk. CBEST is part of the Bank of England and Prudential Regulation Authority’s (PRA’s) supervisory toolkit to assess the cyber resilience of firms’ important business services. This prioritised and focused assessment allows us and firms to better understand weaknesses and vulnerabilities and take remedial actions, thereby improving the resilience of systemically important firms and by extension, the wider financial system. Continued use of CBEST has confirmed its use as a highly effective regulatory assessment tool, which can now also be conducted on a cross-jurisdictional basis, in collaboration with other international regulators and frameworks. This latest version of the CBEST Implementation Guide builds upon the previous framework and contains improvements learned from the extensive testing which has taken place. In particular, we have analysed and implemented changes with the aim of clarifying CBEST roles and responsibilities as well as regulatory expectations for different CBEST activities. While the underlying intelligence-led penetration testing approach remains the same, we have reviewed and updated the technical guidance for most activities, prepared new templates (eg Penetration Testing Report) and incorporated important references to cross-jurisdictional assessments.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Press Center Briefing with Ms. Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, Dr
    FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH MS. KATHLEEN HICKS, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND FORCES, DR. PEPPINO DEBIASO, THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, AND MS. JANINE DAVIDSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PLANS. THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. TOPIC: "DEFENSE DEPARTMENT QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (QDR) ROLLOUT BRIEFING" THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2010 AT 1:00 P.M. EST MS. HICKS: Thank you and good afternoon. I’m going to speak to you a little bit about the Quadrennial Defense Review and then I’ll turn it over to Dr. DeBiaso to speak a little bit about the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and then we’ll be open to your questions. As you may know, on Monday, the Secretary of Defense provided the reports of both of these important documents to Congress. They help to institutionalize the shift that the Secretary of Defense called for last year to rebalance our forces for the urgent demands of today and for the complex and lethal threats of the future. Both reports emphasize international cooperation to ensure the United States and our allies, partners, and friends are able to meet the demands of a broad spectrum of threats, concerns, and issues that impact every nation. The QDR report delivered to Congress conveys a defense strategy centered on two key themes. The first is the need to rebalance capabilities to prevail in today’s wars while building capability to address future threats. We owe our people in harm’s way nothing less than focusing on the operations in which we are engaged today.
    [Show full text]
  • The FBI's Counterterrorism Program
    U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001 April 14, 2004 Report to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001 TABLETABLE OF OFCONTENTS CONTENTS I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................11 II FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART................................................. 3 III TIMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT REFORMS AND INITIATIVES SINCE 9/11/01.......................................................... 4 IV INTRODUCTION......................................................................................66 V PRIORITIZATION....................................................................................77 The New Priorities.........................................................................................77 1 Protect the United States from Terrorist Attack..........................................77 2 Protect the United States Against Foreign Intelligence Operations and Espionage........................................................................................77 3 Protect the United States Against Cyber-based Attacks and High-Technology Crimes..................................................................88 4 Combat Public Corruption at all Levels.......................................................88 5 Protect Civil Rights......................................................................................88
    [Show full text]
  • Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Report the State of Cyber Intelligence Practices in the United States Copyright 2019 Carnegie Mellon University
    Cyber Intelligence Tradecraft Report The State of Cyber Intelligence Practices in the United States Copyright 2019 Carnegie Mellon University. All Rights Reserved. This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trade mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by Carnegie Mellon University or its Software Engineering Institute. NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN “AS-IS” BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution. Internal use:* Permission to reproduce this material and to prepare derivative works from this material for internal use is granted, provided the copyright and “No Warranty” statements are included with all reproductions and derivative works.
    [Show full text]
  • ATP 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis
    ATP 2-33.4 Intelligence Analysis JANUARY 2020 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes ATP 2-33.4, dated 18 August 2014. Headquarters, Department of the Army This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). *ATP 2-33.4 Army Techniques Publication Headquarters No. 2-33.4 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 10 January 2020 Intelligence Analysis Contents Page PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... xi PART ONE FUNDAMENTALS Chapter 1 UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ............................................. 1-1 Intelligence Analysis Overview ........................................................................... 1-1 Conducting Intelligence Analysis ........................................................................ 1-5 Intelligence Analysis and Collection Management ............................................. 1-8 The All-Source Intelligence Architecture and Analysis Across the Echelons ..... 1-9 Intelligence Analysis During Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations ........... 1-11 Intelligence Analysis During the Army’s Other Strategic Roles ........................ 1-13 Chapter 2 THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS ..................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Navy’S Hypersonic Weapons Program Known As Conventional Prompt Strike, and Upgrades to the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle
    FY2021 Defense Appropriations Act: Context and Selected Issues for Congress June 7, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46812 SUMMARY R46812 FY2021 Defense Appropriations Act: June 7, 2021 Context and Selected Issues for Congress Brendan W. McGarry The Department of Defense Appropriations Act is one of 12 annual appropriations measures Analyst in U.S. Defense typically reported by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the largest in Budget terms of discretionary funding. The act funds activities of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) except for military construction and family housing programs. The legislation also funds certain activities of the intelligence community. On February 10, 2020, President Donald J. Trump submitted a budget request for FY2021 that included $753.5 billion for national defense-related activities, including discretionary and mandatory programs. The request aligned with the statutory spending limit, or cap, for national defense-related activities in the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25), as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (BBA; P.L. 116-37). The request included $69 billion in defense funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO, which is effectively exempt from the cap. The portion of the request falling within the scope of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2021, totaled $690.17 billion. That figure included $688.99 billion for defense activities and $1.18 billion for intelligence activities. The request was $8.17 billion (1.2%) less than the FY2020 enacted amount, which included emergency funding provided for hurricane relief and the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) response.
    [Show full text]
  • Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers the Peak Representative Body for All Intelligence Professionals
    Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers The peak representative body for all intelligence professionals 24 June 2020 Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers Inc. Submission National Intelligence Enterprise: Oversight and Evaluation Arrangements Thank you for the opportunity to provide a submission to the Committee considering the Intelligence and Security Legislation Amendment (Implementing Independent Intelligence Review) Bill 2020. We have reviewed the Information about the bill, including the Explanatory Memorandum (EM) and provide the following submission. A few brief comments about the National Intelligence Enterprise The National Intelligence Enterprise (NIE) is critical to the ongoing protection of Australia and Australia’s interests, and arrangements put in place to coordinate and optimize Australia’s national intelligence effort should do just that. However, the 2017 Independent Review and references contained in the Intelligence and Security Legislation Amendment (Implementing Independent Intelligence Review) Bill 2020 EM refer only to agencies in the intelligence enterprise at the federal level, not those at the state and territory levels. Arguably, a national approach should incorporate the contributions of states and territories since we are referring to the protection of Australia and Australia’s interests. There is no longer any safe clear separation between federal and state/territory intelligence responsibilities in meeting
    [Show full text]
  • Ballistic Missile Defense Patty-Jane Geller
    Ballistic Missile Defense Patty-Jane Geller issile defense is a critical component of either has or is developing the know-how to Mthe national security architecture that advance to the ICBM-level of capability.2 Ac- enables U.S. military efforts and can protect cording to Dr. Robert Soofer, Deputy Assistant national critical infrastructure, from popula- Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile tion and industrial centers to politically and Defense Policy: historically important sites. It can strength- en U.S. diplomatic and deterrence efforts As adversary missile technology matures and provide both time and options to senior and proliferates, the threat to the U.S. decision-makers amid crises involving mis- homeland, allies, partners, and our forces siles flying on both ballistic and non-ballistic in the field becomes increasingly dynamic trajectories (e.g., cruise missiles and hyper- and difficult to predict. While traditional sonic weapons). fixed and mobile ballistic missile threats continue to grow, adversaries are also in- The Growing Missile Threat vesting in ground-, air-, and sea-launched Missiles remain a weapon of choice for cruise missiles with diverse ranges. China many U.S. adversaries because they possess and Russia are also developing and test- important attributes like extraordinarily high ing hypersonic missile technology, with speed (against which the U.S. has a limited abil- Russia recently deploying the world’s first ity to defend) and relative cost-effectiveness operational intercontinental-range hyper- compared to other types of conventional attack sonic glide vehicle (HGV). These missile weapons.1 The number of states that possess technologies are being incorporated into missiles will continue to increase, as will the adversary strategies meant to coerce sophistication of these weapons, as modern and intimidate the United States and its technologies become cheaper and more wide- allies by threatening critical targets in ly available.
    [Show full text]