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Ballistic Missile Defense Patty-Jane Geller Ballistic Missile Defense Patty-Jane Geller issile defense is a critical component of either has or is developing the know-how to Mthe national security architecture that advance to the ICBM-level of capability.2 Ac- enables U.S. military efforts and can protect cording to Dr. Robert Soofer, Deputy Assistant national critical infrastructure, from popula- Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile tion and industrial centers to politically and Defense Policy: historically important sites. It can strength- en U.S. diplomatic and deterrence efforts As adversary missile technology matures and provide both time and options to senior and proliferates, the threat to the U.S. decision-makers amid crises involving mis- homeland, allies, partners, and our forces siles flying on both ballistic and non-ballistic in the field becomes increasingly dynamic trajectories (e.g., cruise missiles and hyper- and difficult to predict. While traditional sonic weapons). fixed and mobile ballistic missile threats continue to grow, adversaries are also in- The Growing Missile Threat vesting in ground-, air-, and sea-launched Missiles remain a weapon of choice for cruise missiles with diverse ranges. China many U.S. adversaries because they possess and Russia are also developing and test- important attributes like extraordinarily high ing hypersonic missile technology, with speed (against which the U.S. has a limited abil- Russia recently deploying the world’s first ity to defend) and relative cost-effectiveness operational intercontinental-range hyper- compared to other types of conventional attack sonic glide vehicle (HGV). These missile weapons.1 The number of states that possess technologies are being incorporated into missiles will continue to increase, as will the adversary strategies meant to coerce sophistication of these weapons, as modern and intimidate the United States and its technologies become cheaper and more wide- allies by threatening critical targets in ly available. our homelands.3 Despite U.S. diplomatic efforts, North Ko- rea continues its aggressive development of An additional concern is ballistic missile a nuclear ICBM program that will allow it to cooperation between state and non-state ac- strike the United States. It also has recently tors, which furthers the spread of sophisticated tested ground-based and sea-based ballistic technologies and compounds challenges to U.S. missiles. Iran continues to modernize and defense planning.4 proliferate its regional missile systems. Its re- cent successful rocket launch demonstrates The Strategic Role of Missile Defense that Iran has the ability to build and launch Because they are designed to defeat incom- sophisticated missiles, which implies that it ing missile attacks, missile defense systems can The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 503 save lives and protect civilian infrastructure missiles on launch pads or even conceding to from damage or destruction. More important, his demands or actions. With a missile defense missile defense plays a critical role in strategic system, however, decision-makers would have deterrence. The ability to deter an enemy from additional options and more time to consider attacking depends on convincing him that his their implications and arrive at the one that attack will fail, that the cost of carrying out a best serves U.S. security interests. In other successful attack is prohibitively high, or that words, missile defense systems could be pro- the consequences of an attack will be so painful foundly stabilizing. that they will outweigh the perceived benefit of attacking. The U.S. Missile Defense System A U.S. missile defense system strengthens The U.S. missile defense system has three deterrence by offering a degree of protection critical components: sensors, interceptors, and to the American people and the economic base a command and control infrastructure that on which their well-being depends, as well as provides data from sensors to interceptors. Of forward-deployed troops and allies, making it these, interceptors receive much of the public’s harder for an adversary to threaten them with attention because of their visible and kinetic ballistic missiles. By raising the threshold for nature. Different physical components of a bal- missile attack, missile defense limits the option listic missile defense system are designed with for a “cheap shot” against the United States. A the phase of flight in which an intercept occurs missile defense system also gives a decision- in mind, although some of them—for exam- maker a significant political advantage: By ple, the command and control infrastructure protecting key elements of U.S. well-being, it or radars—can support intercepts in various mitigates an adversary’s ability to intimidate phases of flight. Interceptors can shoot down the United States into conceding important an adversarial missile in the boost, ascent, mid- security, diplomatic, or economic interests. course, or terminal phase of its flight. Missile defense systems also enable U.S. Another way to consider ballistic missile and allied conventional operations. Adversar- defense systems is by the range of an incoming ies want to deny the United States the ability ballistic missile (short-range, medium-range, to conduct offensive operations during a re- intermediate-range, or intercontinental-range) gional conflict, which they can attempt to do that an interceptor is designed to shoot down, by targeting U.S. and allied forward deployed since the length of the interceptor’s flight time personnel or military assets. In addition, they determines how much time is available to con- might try to decouple the United States from duct an intercept and where the various com- defense of its allies by threatening to strike the ponents of a defense system must be placed to U.S. homeland or forces abroad if the United improve the probability of such an intercept. States intervenes in a regional conflict. Mis- With intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, sile defenses in place make it easier for the U.S. the United States has “about 30 minutes” to de- military to introduce reinforcements that can tect the missile, track it, provide the informa- move more freely through a region and can tion to the missile defense system, come up with therefore strengthen the credibility of U.S. ex- the most optimal firing solution, launch an in- tended deterrence. terceptor, and shoot down an incoming missile, Finally, a missile defense system gives ideally with enough time to fire another inter- decision-makers more time to choose the most ceptor if the first attempt fails.5 The time frame de-escalatory course of action. Without the is shorter when it comes to medium-range and ability to defend against an attack, U.S. author- short-range ballistic missiles. ities would be limited to an unappealing set of Missile defense can also be framed by origin responses that could range from preemptively of interceptor launch. At present, U.S. inter- attacking an adversary to attacking his ballistic ceptors are launched from the ground or from 504 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength MAP 10 U.S. Missile Defense Assets 9 18 2 3 RUSSIA CANADA 10 17 7 15 5 6 U.S. 8 12 4 11 14 CHINA 16 Atlantic 13 Ocean Pacific 1 Pacific AFRICA Ocean Ocean SOUTH Indian AMERICA Ocean AUSTRALIA GBI—Ground based interceptors IDT—In-Flight Interceptor TPY-2—Transportable Radar Surveillance GFC—Fire control center Communications System (IFICS) and Control Model 2 ANTARCTICA GMD—Ground-based midcourse defense Data Terminal UEWR—Upgraded early warning radar 11 Pearl Harbor, HI (base) 77 Ft. Drum, NY 14 CENTCOM-Middle East • Sea-based X-Band radar • IDT • TPY-2 radar 22 Clear, AK 88 Cape Cod, MA 15 Shariki, Japan • UEWR • UEWR • TPY-2 radar 33 Ft. Greely, AK 99 Thule, Greenland 16 Kyogamisaki, Japan • 40 GBIs • UEWR • TPY-2 radar • GMD • GFC 10 Fylingdales, UK 17 Shemya, AK • IDT • UEWR • Cobra Dane radar • IDT 4 Vandenberg AFB, CA 1111 Rota, Spain (base) • 4 GBIs • Sea-based Aegis BMD 18 Outer space • 2 IDTs SPY-1 radar • Defense support program satellites 55 Beale AFB, CA 12 Kurecik AFB, Turkey • Space-based infrared • UEWR • TPY-2 radar system satellites • Space tracking and 66 Scriever AFB, CO 13 Israel • TPY-2 radar surveillance • GFC system-demonstrator NOTE: Locations are approximate. SOURCES: • Fact Sheet, “Upgraded Early Warning Radars, AN/FPS-132,” U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, approved for public release July 28, 2016, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/uewr1.pdf (accessed August 19, 2020) • William Cole, “‘Golf Ball’ Radar Leaves Pearl Harbor After $24M Upgrade,” Military.com, October 9, 2019, https://www.military.com/ daily-news/2019/10/09/golf-ball-radar-leaves-pearl-harbor-after-24m-upgrade.html (accessed August 19, 2020). • Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, “Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD),” January 31, 2019, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/defense-systems/ground-based-midcourse-defense/ (accessed August 19, 2020). • Thomas Karako and Ian Williams, Missile Defense 2020: Next Steps for Defending the Homeland, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Missile Defense Project, April 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/missile-defense-2020 (accessed August 19, 2020). A heritage.org The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 505 FIGURE 6 U.S. Missile Defense: Interceptors MISSILE THREAT TYPE MIDCOURSE Intercontinental 5,500 km Intermediate- MIDCOURSE Range 3,000 km Medium- MIDCOURSE TERMINAL AND TERMINAL Range 1,000 km MIDCOURSE TERMINAL TERMINAL Short-Range AND TERMINAL Ground-based Aegis Standard Terminal High Patriot Interceptor Missile-3 Altitude Area Advanced Defense Capability-3 44 interceptors 40 Aegis BMD- 7 batteries 15 battalions equipped ships SOURCES: • U.S. Department of Defense, Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Ocer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, February 2020, pp. 4–5, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Weapons.pdf (accessed August 19, 2020).
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